
SEE ALSO:
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Mike Moore's speeches
Renato Ruggiero's speeches,
1995-99
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It has been said that most policy makers look for the future in a rear-view mirror.
Generals tend to fight the last war. Statesmen and diplomats, tasked with building
tomorrow, usually start with a blueprint of the ancien regime. This temptation to
look to past is even stronger in today's globalizing economy where all the landmarks seem
new and where the ground under our feet is constantly shifting. It's also far more
dangerous. We live in a world which is already launched on a path towards global free
trade -- it is a process which cannot be reversed or rolled back without unimaginable
costs to our future growth and our future progress. The challenge now is to come to grips
with a world of free trade and deeper integration, and to realize its immense benefits. It
is a choice between building a global architecture which is open, universal and
rules-based, or living in a system which is anarchic in the most literal sense of the
word. If one chapter of world economic history ended with the technological revolution of
the last decades and with the mammoth liberalizing efforts symbolized by the Uruguay
Round, another is about to begin. How it is written will depend on the decisions we make
in coming months and years.To argue that
globalization is an evolving reality is not to claim that we are nearing the point of free
trade in all sectors or in every region of the world. Clearly this is far from the case.
Trade liberalization is incomplete in many key areas -- substantial tariff peaks remain;
negotiations are still proceeding in critical sectors like telecommunications or financial
services; and even the Uruguay Round's final results in agriculture or textiles or
government procurement leave much to be desired. There's plenty on the liberalization
agenda to keep us occupied into the next century. It is also true that not all countries
are equally integrated into the multilateral system Globalization has gone considerably
further in Europe, in the Americas and in Asia than in Africa. This is to say nothing of
major economies like China or Russia which have yet to accede to the World Trade
Organization.
Yet, however imperfect our progress, the underlying trend is unmistakable.
Multilaterally, regionally, unilaterally -- all paths are leading to freer trade. MFN
tariffs in all countries, developed and developing alike, are on a sharp downward course,
while applied tariffs in many cases are lower still. Much more than one third of world
trade will be tariff free when the Uruguay Round is fully implemented. Most non-tariff
border restrictions have also been abandoned; those that haven't are scheduled to be
eliminated or converted to tariffs according to a strict timetable. Services trade has
already been brought into the ambit of the multilateral system and investment, logically,
cannot be far behind. Inside the border, many countries are undergoing equally radical
fiscal, monetary, and structural reforms in an effort to hone their economies to an
increasingly "open" and competitive international environment.
But the most fundamental transformation of all is occurring at the level of
awareness. Telecommunications is creating a global audience. Transport is creating a
global village. From Buenos Aires to Boston to Beijing, ordinary people are watching MTV,
they're wearing Levis jeans, and they're listen to Sony Walkmans as they commute to work.
Perhaps in the present world we can still imagine some government blocking Levis jeans or
MTV at the border. But if you stop goods and services the consequence would be massive
migration of people and of investment. What is going on is a citizen's revolution on a
global scale. And even those who do not like the direction globalization is taking us,
have no realistic plan to put the Genie back in the bottle. It is in this very personal
sense that we are all free traders now.
These changes are reflected in the growing volumes of world trade. Trade
flows have multiplied fifteen-fold in the last four decades -- reaching $6,000 billion
last year -- while production has increased six-fold. The worldwide movement of foreign
direct investment is even more striking. In the ten years to 1996, investment flows
worldwide easily quadrupled, from around $60 billion to almost $300 billion per annum. In
these statistics are revealed the new dialectic of globalization. The systematic reduction
of trade barriers worldwide, combined with dramatic decreases in transport and
communications costs, has paved the way for the emergence of a global system of
production, distribution and consumption -- one in which firms are increasingly free to
assemble inputs from around the world and to service an equally global marketplace. This
in turn has accelerated the movement of global investment, as firms learn that the best
way to achieve comparative advantage in production, in sourcing, in distribution, and in
technology is to establish a direct presence in foreign markets.
It is estimated that production by foreign affiliates of multinational
corporations (MNCs) now exceeds the value of world trade in goods and services, that
intra-firm trade among MNCs accounts for more than one-third of world trade, and that MNC
exports to non-affiliates account for another third. Where once trade was about the
exchange of goods among national firms operating from national markets, today trade is as
much about the movement of components, services, and technology within and among global
firms operating in global markets. Where once foreign investment was seen as a way of
substituting for trade -- a way of jumping over national barriers -- it is now seen by
many firms as a necessary precondition. We are reaching the point where trade and
investment are now part of a seamless web of international economic activity.
One by one, trade and investment barriers will continue to be swept away by
globalization, like leaves on an autumn day. But the force of these winds of changes is
already testing our ability to adapt. The immediate challenge is to integrate a rapidly
ascendent developing world. No one stands to benefit more from globalization than
developing countries. Production is now mobile, capital footloose, technology diffuse.
Developed and developing alike, we are all competing for the same investments, for the
same markets, for the same innovative edge. In this sense, globalization has erased the
old ground rules of economic growth, providing countries, once relegated to perpetual
"third world" status, with the tools to fast-forward their development.
Unprecedented growth rates of certain industrializing countries in Asia and Latin America
are evidence that a huge shift in economic power is underway. Developing countries now
account for a quarter of world trade compared to less 20 per cent five years ago. A third
of the world's 25 leading exporters and importers are now developing countries, including
Argentina. Twenty years ago, industrialized countries imported just 5 per cent of their
manufactured goods from developing countries; by 1990 this figure had risen to 15 per
cent, and by 1994, over 20 per cent.
Already some fear that the emergence of key developing countries will send
shock-waves through the system. They worry that rising exports from emerging markets will
place growing pressure on open economies in the developed world -- pressure which, in
sensitive sectors at least, could generate economic uncertainty and unrest. Others ask how
we will manage an increasing complex trading system which is growing wider just as it is
growing deeper. The short answer is that all these problems can be better managed inside
the existing global system than outside of it. As developing countries become more deeply
integrated into the global economy we have no choice but to involve them much more closely
and transparently in international rule-making and institution building -- to ensure the
stability as well as the evolution of the system. This of course underscores the critical
need to get China, Russia and all candidates still outside the multilateral system firmly
embedded in the WTO. No-one expects this to be easy. The accession of large transition
economies in particular raises fundamental questions of substance which cannot be answered
by compromising the integrity of the rules or the interests of existing members. Still we
cannot long maintain a coherent system of global rules which is perforated from the
outside. Without a massive economic player like China inside the tent we risk
being a World Trade Organization in name only.
Another major challenge is to channel constructively the growing
international competition for export markets, for investment and increasingly for
technology -- a competition which is being played out most visibly in an expanding web of
regional and supra-regional trade areas. The logic of regionalism is that certain groups
of countries can move further and faster towards liberalization than others. But one of
the main forces driving regionalism forward so rapidly is the race to grab a bigger slice
of the export and investment pie. Countries enter into free trade arrangements to increase
their access to markets and investment, which in turn encourages others to join the race
for fear of being left behind. Like falling dominos, free trade agreements beget more free
trade agreements. Already some one hundred bilateral or regional groupings had been
identified by the WTO last year, and each month we hear of new or expanded alliances.
So far this has generally been for the good. Regional arrangements have
provided stepping stones to global liberalization, they have served as important crucibles
for trade policy innovation, and they can be a source of creative tension in the system as
a whole, forcing the pace of other regional and multilateral initiatives. My concern is
not so much that regional arrangements will turn inward, but that their very momentum will
leave the multilateral system behind. If regional liberalization outstrips the WTO
process, there is a danger that we will lack a common framework of rules and disciplines.
If our economic interests are increasingly defined regionally and not globally, it will be
more and more difficult to find the critical mass of countries need to sustain the
multilateral system. The risk then is of a fragmented world -- one which fosters
inter-regional frictions and rivalries, but lacks the global architecture of rules and
procedures needed to manage them.
The long-term solution is not to try to restrict regional agreements,
beyond ensuring that they remain trade-enhancing and adhere to Article XXIV of the GATT --
this would be like trying to harness globalization. The solution is to ensure that
regional and multilateral liberalization are mutually reinforcing -- that all paths
eventually lead to the WTO. The solution, in other words, is to multilateralize
regionalism whenever possible. One answer may be found in the principle which some of the
newer regional groupings have enunciate -- the commitment to open regionalism.
What this means in theory is convergence -- that the elimination of barriers within a bloc
will be implemented at more or less the same rate as the lowering of barriers to
non-members. What it could mean in practice is truly revolutionary -- that in committing
themselves to openness, regional trade agreements could provide the catalyst
for global free trade.
This leads to the third challenge facing us in the years ahead -- ensuring
that the multilateral trade system is truly universal. We may be moving in the direction
of freer trade, but the progress is uneven. Residual barriers and discriminatory practises
distort trade and investment flows, which can in turn cause uncertainty and friction. This
situation is made worse when trade rules don't keep pace with deeper economic integration.
What most impacts on the shape and direction of economic activity today -- particularly
the rules of competition and the movement of global investment -- is not so much the
barriers at the border, but the domestic economic structures inside. Here there is growing
room for trade friction, not because of differences over rules, but because rules don't
exist.
We've successfully dealt with the issues of 1986 in the Uruguay Round. We
now need to tackle the issues of 1996 and beyond. But these new rules will not necessarily
come easily. For almost fifty years, multilateral negotiations were focused almost
exclusively on the removal of barriers at the border according to a score-card which was
fundamentally mercantalist -- the trading of one tariff concession for
another. But the new challenge will be less to regulate relations among national
economies, than to establish the rules and structures of a transnational economy. Its not
clear that we yet fully understand how to be rule makers as well as tariff negotiators.
Nor is it clear, when negotiating services or standards or investment, that we yet know
how to measure a trade concessions or market access -- or whether
these concepts still have the same meaning in a transnational economy. The fact is that in
emerging areas like financial services or telecommunications or investment there is a
growing coincidence of interest between producers and consumers, exporters and importers,
developed and developing. Trade has always been a win-win proposition, but it is all the
more so in a world economy where competitiveness and innovation increasingly hinge on
openness to the flow of technology, know-how and ideas.
It is against this background that we must also begin to grapple with the
really big challenges facing us as we head into the next century -- jobs, growth,
sustainable development, and so forth. These challenges increasingly demand global
solutions simply because of growing global interdependence. It is unfortunately true that
we are still a long way from correcting present imbalances in the world economy -- just as
we are far away from correcting imbalances even within the wealthiest countries. It is
also true that these imbalances at the global and national levels are absolutely
unacceptable.
But let me be clear about one thing: liberalization remains the single most
important engine for growth at the world level. This fact is reflected in studies like the
recent Human Development Report which observes that while 1.5 billion of the world's
people are poorer than in the past, over 3 billion are better off today than at any point
in history. The overall trend is towards a slow but significant improvement in human
development in almost all countries in recent decades. Free trade cannot be
responsible for the distribution of the wealth it generates. This is the main task of
government at the national and -- because of the increasingly global dimensions of the
problems -- at the international level. If countries seek greater protection from the
global economy in the name of seeking greater socio-economic equality, they will be
throwing out the baby with the bath water. But, by the same token, if we do not find
solutions to the problems of poverty in the least developed countries or unemployment
throughout the world, then I am certain we will put global growth and global progress at
grave risk.
The global community has every reason to feel proud as we approach the end
of the century. The walls between us are falling down -- economically, politically, and
ideologically -- after a bloody century of national conflict. The vast developing world is
being lifted up by trade and technology, erasing one of the most unsightly scars left by
the first industrial revolution. And we are embarked on a deep process of global
integration and ever-widening economic growth -- a process that carries with it our best
chance yet of achieving lasting world peace. This should be a time, on the eve of the
Fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the GATT, for us to celebrate our achievements and
to focus on the road ahead.
If some of us feel anxious today, it is perhaps because we still lack a
clear idea of where this new road is taking us. In one sense we are victims of our own
success. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round did not
just symbolize the end of a long struggle, but also the end of a common purpose. On the
brink of achieving that global community of nations which seemed so elusive a decade ago,
we suddenly lack a unifying goal. Everest has been climbed. Gone as well is the sense of
ideological purpose that propelled us forward. The cleavages of the last half century did
not just reflect a clash of economic or political interests, but the clash of ideas. In
economics, the struggle of free markets against inward-looking statism. In politics, a
struggle of liberal democracy against totalitarianism. But this two-headed dragon has now
been slain. Big ideas can give way to the slow working out of technical details. Grand
alliances can be eclipsed by petty squabbles and endless disputes.
But our current malaise goes deeper than the feeling of emptiness that
comes at the end of a long voyage. Through liberalization and technological advance, we
have utterly and irreversibly changed the economic landscape. We've made the great leap
into globalization. But it is a world for which we have as yet no clear answers and few
guideposts -- save for the old policies and institutions of the past. Perhaps the major
imbalance is that the really big economic, social and environmental problems we face at
the end of this century are truly global problems demanding a global vision and global
answers. But governments are national. And the tendency is often to listen only to local
concerns and pressures, and to reach for local solutions. Worse, in the absence of global
answers, there is a danger that the future will come to be viewed as somehow beyond our
control. Technology will be portrayed, not as a tool to help us progress, but as a machine
driving us aimlessly onwards. Globalization will be seen, not a process which is
fundamentally liberating, but one which is constraining and deterministic.
Fortunately some of the global answers are already at hand. The WTO was the
first major international institution to be created in the post-Cold War, post-Uruguay
Round era. This is significant because I believe the WTO offers a promise of the kind of
global architecture we need in the coming decades. It grew out of bottom-up pressure for
free trade and deeper integration; it was not handed down from on high -- centralized and
bureaucratic. The WTO's culture is firmly rooted in the tradition of consensus-building
and cooperation among sovereign countries. Most important, the WTO embodies rights and
obligations that are enforceable, not through the crude exercise of economic power, but
through the rule of law.
The success of our new organization will hinge largely on the work we do in
the time ahead. We have to consolidate what we have achieved in the Uruguay Round. We need
to agree on a workplan for the remainder of the century -- a workplan which had already
been envisaged at the end of the Uruguay Round in the so-called build in agenda. And we
need to begin to meet the really big economic and geopolitical challenges presented by a
globalized world. But more than just a plan, we need a guiding idea. That idea is the
realization of global free trade -- the demolition of the last walls of the old economic
order. The goal of barrier free trade was accelerated in the Uruguay Round by expanding
the so-called zero-for-zero negotiations. And it is being realized regionally in Mercosur,
NAFTA, APEC, the EU and the many other customs unions and free trade areas spreading
throughout the world. Now is the time to draw all of these disparate threads together.
Using the timetables we have already established in the various regional agreements, lets
move towards a world free of economic borders. The first WTO ministerial meeting in
Singapore will be the first major step towards answering these questions. What we can
demonstrate is that the WTO is focused clearly on the future, that we have a working plan,
and that the road from Singapore is a bright one.
Because in Singapore we cannot afford to fail. In the absence of success,
the temptation will be to look to the Good Old Days -- however ill-defined --
and to return to the old methods and models of the past. Are we talking about the days
before 1914 when world trade was shaped by a cat's cradle of overlapping and
discriminatory bilateral deals? Are we talking about the Good Old Days of Smoot-Hawley
with its prohibitive tariffs and reciprocal trade fixes? It was precisely because of these
Good Old Days -- and the economic chaos which followed -- that the post-war community of
nations chose the path of progressive trade liberalization under the umbrella of a
non-discriminatory multilateral system. But the biggest problem with this prescription is
that the Good Old Days no longer exist. Protectionism in today's world of deep
interdependence is not a recipe for easing the pain or shutting out globalization. It is a
recipe for greater pain and greater suffering -- a road, not to some mythical Good Old
Days, but to conflict and violence and war. If liberalization is a difficult enough
process to sustain, the cost of returning protection in this new globalized world would be
unbearable.
The role of choice in history is dealt with by Karl Marx in his famous
aphorism: Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they
please. Marx was partly correct. We cannot stop the future. But nor should we be
swept along before it. Globalization, as I have already said, is an evolving reality. Our
choice is between managing this reality and taking advantage of its immense potential, or
attempt to resist the inevitable. The issue is not how fast we move towards further
globalization, but whether we want this process to unfold under mutually agreed rules of
the game or in the wilderness of power politics -- power politics which will probably no
longer be defined along national lines -- whatever the dimensions of that power may be --
but along regional or even continental lines. None of us is big enough any longer to
maintain our economic security in such a wilderness. Deeper interdependence means that all
of us -- great powers and small -- have an interest in keeping the system firmly on track.
What is at stake as we contemplate the future of the multilateral system is
much more than trade or economics. It involves questions of political and economic
security. It is about how relations among countries and among peoples are to be
structured. It determines whether we foster international solidarity or descend into a
spiral of global friction and conflict. Fifty years ago, in the crucible of war and
economic ruin, statesmen set their sights on a free community of nations co-existing in a
borderless world. At the end of the century and the end of the millennium their vision is
becoming a reality. At the moment of victory, let's not lose the strength of our
convictions.
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