CHAPTER 1
OBJECTIVES, PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES: WHAT HAS **CHANGED**?

This chapter answers four questions. What has changed in aid-for-trade objectives, priorities, strategies and policies since the last round of monitoring? What drove these changes? How has demand evolved? And what is the outlook for aid for trade?

All stakeholders are connecting aid for trade to the broader development agenda - and aid-for-trade objectives and strategies are focusing more on economic growth, poverty reduction and regional integration. Partner priorities are more focused on competitiveness, economic infrastructure and export diversification.

There are positive trends in partner-country strategy mainstreaming, articulation and communication. Yet some donors face budget challenges and have difficulty in responding to perceived higher demand for aid for trade and regional assistance.

Changes in aid-for-trade objectives, priorities and strategies were generally driven by changes in broader trade and development plans and national factors. Aid for trade remains a priority for many partners and donors. Future revisions of plans will be caused by changing focus, evaluation results and evolving trade and development strategies. The importance of results, and of monitoring and evaluation, will only increase.

INTRODUCTION

Aid for trade is very much affected by global economic movements - from trade flows, to economic performance, to commodity prices - as well as by the budget situation and fiscal space in developed countries. It also involves a wide range of actors - developing countries, emerging economies and the OECD countries, supported by multilateral institutions and regional organisations. Aid for trade therefore provides a useful lens through which to view how the world has changed since 2008. When the last *Aid for Trade at a Glance* was published in 2009, it noted that the Aid-for-Trade Initiative's generally positive progress risked being undermined by negative global developments. The financial crisis and the economic recession that followed threatened to reverse the strong growth in aid-for-trade flows. Substantial declines in trade jeopardised the work done in advocating trade as a development tool, while the transmission of the shock risked undermining open markets. Although the world economy has started to heal by this latest *Aid for Trade at a Glance*, the crisis leaves a legacy which will continue to shape the aid-for-trade agenda in the years to come. This chapter examines how objectives, priorities, strategies and polices have evolved - for partner countries, donors and providers of South-South co-operation. The chapter finds that on the basis of their self-assessments, objectives have not changed much, priorities more so, and approaches most of all – with both donor and South-South approaches to trade-related co-operation having changed in about half of those countries that took part in this round of the monitoring exercise.

Figure 1.1 What has changed since 2008?



SOECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Partner countries increasingly prioritise competitiveness and export diversification as a way of strengthening their resilience to shocks and of decreasing risk (see figure 1.1). For donors, the results agenda - *i.e.* monitoring and evaluation - has become more important in the wake of the crisis. Overall these changes are driven mostly by shifts in national circumstances, such as changes of government, development policy priorities and trade policy shifts. As might be expected, objectives have changed the least. Almost half of partner respondents report changing their priorities. Half of the donors have changed their strategies, and 44% of South-South co-operation providers have changed their trade-related co-operation policies. The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: the second section examines the changes which have occurred in objectives, priorities, strategies and policies of partner countries, donors and providers of South-South co-operation. The next section looks at the main drivers of these changes. This is followed by a look at how demand for aid for trade and regional trade-related assistance has evolved. This is then followed by a section providing details on how aid-for-trade policies and strategies might change over the next two years, as well as on the outlook for aid for trade. The final section offers some conclusions which will be built upon in the subsequent analysis.

WHAT HAS CHANGED?

This section examines the responses to the OECD/WTO aid-for-trade questionnaire - which attempted to assess changes since 2008 and provide an update to the previous questionnaire.

The WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade recommended the following objectives for the initiative:

- Enable developing countries, particularly least-developed countries (LDCs), to use trade more effectively to promote growth, development and poverty reduction and to achieve their development objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs);
- Help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure in order to facilitate their access to markets and to export more;
- Help facilitate, implement and adjust to trade reform and liberalisation;
- Assist regional integration;
- Assist countries' smooth integration into the world trading system; and
- Assist in the implementation of trade agreements (WTO, 2006).

Many developing countries' trade potential may not be realised because they face binding constraints that prevent them from turning market opportunities into trade, and trade into growth. OECD (2011) shows that the four most common aid-for-trade objectives - increasing trade, diversifying exports, maximising linkages with the domestic economy, and increasing adjustment capacity - have the potential to boost growth and reduce poverty in developing countries.

Figure 1.2 Did aid-for-trade objectives change?



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire

Partner country objectives have not changed much…

It is to be expected that countries' objectives are relatively stable and not prone to change. Indeed, objectives in most partner countries did not change, with less than 30% of LDCs, fewer than 40% of OLICs and LMICs, and only about 15% of UMICs changing their objectives.

Figure 1.3 looks at the changes made by partner countries. Most involve strengthening core issues. For instance, Uganda's key objectives are competitiveness, poverty reduction, and regional integration (because of its involvement in the East Africa Community common market). Although Botswana highlighted the same three objectives in both surveys, they grew in importance between 2008 and 2011 due to "the turn of economic events in 2009/2010". The Maldives continues to focus on attracting FDI and engaging the private sector through public-private partnerships, but more emphasis is being placed on competitiveness and diversification. Haiti retains its previous objectives, but green growth and gender equality have been added. Tonga's objectives reflect the country's small size, remoteness, and vulnerability to external shocks. The Solomon Islands does not have any articulated strategies, objectives or priorities specific to aid for trade, making it difficult to assess the extent to which the country's aid-for-trade objectives and priorities have changed since 2008. However, it does have broader development plans and objectives which, as is the case for many partner countries, seems to be driving changes in aid-for-trade objectives. Generally the picture that emerges is of country-specific factors leading to changes in objectives.

Figure 1.3 Changes in partner country objectives



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

…but priorities did change…

Partner-country priorities changed more signicantly than their objectives since 2008 - with 40% of LDCs changing their priorities, 55% of OLICs and LMICs, and 45% of UMICs.

Figure 1.4 Changes in priorities by income group



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Partner countries identify similar aid-for-trade priorities to those identified in the last survey: competitiveness, economic infrastructure, export diversification, and trade policy analysis, negotiation and implementation. However, among those countries whose priorities changed, 30% made competitiveness their first priority. Competitiveness is the top priority across all regions and income groups (*i.e.* competitiveness is now the top priority for 5 LDCs, 3 OLICs, 3 LMICs and 3 UMICs) but particularly for West Africa, Central America and the Caribbean. For LDCs, economic infrastructure is their second priority, followed by export diversification. For OLICs, trade policy analysis, negotiation and implementation, and trade facilitation are their second and third priorities respectively. LMICs also emphasise the importance of trade policy as well as on value chains. UMICs prioritise export diversification and economic infrastructure.

…with increased focus on competitiveness and export diversification.

Overall 24 countries prioritise competitiveness, 19 export diversification, and 18 economic infrastructure. As noted in the section on the economic crisis, these changes may reflect efforts to use aid for trade to build resilience and diversify risk, as well as to strengthen an economy's attractiveness to investors. For example, Gambia prioritises export diversification in order to move away from traditional exports and to harness new opportunities in other sectors, such as cashews, poultry, and agro-processing.

Figure 1.5 New partner priorities



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

For some countries, specific needs have arisen, and these have altered their priorities. Although Mongolia's aid-for-trade priorities remain largely unchanged, policy analysis and negotiations have taken on a new importance given the country's accelerated programme of RTA negotiations. Indonesia's top aid-for-trade priority is now trade policy analysis, negotiations and implementation, reflecting the need to integrate new environmental laws passed in 2009. Also some countries appear to have changed priorities in the belief that these priorities will receive funding. Kenya, for example, prioritises infrastructure because "OECD countries want to give aid [to] infrastructure". Fiji's suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and the Commonwealth impacted its trade relations in the region, and forced it to explore new markets, particularly in Asia, through its Look North Policy initiative. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation is currently formulating Fiji's first ever Trade Policy Framework to guide Fiji's trade and economic policies and to help achieve national objectives, including its Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The Framework will identify Fiji's trade and economic interests, both for goods and services, in international markets, as well as the objectives and strategies it must pursue as part of its overall sustainable economic development programme.

In Nigeria, new development priorities have meant that government policies increasingly focus on growth quality (in terms of enhanced industrial productivity), value chains, employment intensity, wealth creation and poverty reduction. Trade Facilitation is seen as key to increasing trade and has moved to the government's Vision 20:2020 strategic planning process. Senegal notes that the global food crisis influenced its decision to prioritise local competiveness and food self-sufficiency. Ghana has changed its priorities since the discovery and exploitation of oil and natural gas, while Suriname aims to be less dependent on the mineral sector because of its vulnerablity to commodity-price shocks. Its main priority is to produce final products from domestic endowments.

These changes have been largely mainstreamed in national strategies.

In 2008, almost all partner countries (79 of 83) reported having national development strategies. More than half (43) *fully* mainstream trade, based on identified priorities and action plans. Another 32 *partly* mainstream trade (*i.e.*, trade is mentioned in their national strategies, but these trade strategies lack operational objectives and action plans). Among the countries that changed objectives or priorities over the last two years, almost 60% mainstreamed these changes in their development strategies. Only just over 40% updated their operational strategies, but over 60% included these changes in their discussions with donors.

Figure 1.6 Have changes in priorities been mainstreamed, included in strategies and discussed with donors?



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Several countries gave details of their efforts to mainstream the changes into their broader development strategies. Gambia reports that its previous Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) did not mainstream trade priorities adequately. However, this deficiency is being rectified in the broader discussion of its new development programme. In Sierra Leone, changes have been incorporated into the President's National Agenda for Change. In Pakistan, the Strategic Trade Policy Framework and the Working Paper of the 10th Five Year Plan have been amended. Ghana has incorporated its new priorities into its medium-term Shared Growth and Development Agenda. The Angolan government has adopted its revised trade priorities in its Poverty Reduction Strategy.

Some countries do not have specific aid-for-trade strategies so far, while others intend to mainstream changes when their development plans are revised. Swaziland plans to conduct an aid-for-trade needs assessment in the near future, which will feed into an aid-for-trade strategy, which will, in turn, be incorporated into the country's development strategy. Suriname notes that its aid-for-trade strategy is already being implemented, but that new priorities will be formally incorporated in its forthcoming multi-annual development plan. Trinidad and Tobago's overall national development strategy, as well as the necessary operational strategies, will be developed over the short- to medium-term. Botswana notes that most aid-for-trade changes (*e.g.* its push for economic diversification) are recent and, although adopted by the government, have not yet been included in the National Development Plan.

In some cases, operational strategies need to be updated to reflect changes. However, almost all of the countries that have not yet updated their strategies are planning a revision. Moreover, of the 20% that have not discussed changes with donors, all are planning to do so. These findings seem to point to some improvements in mainstreaming trade and in including changes in objectives and priorities in national development plans, operational strategies and discussions with donors.

Many donors changed their strategies…

Roughly half of the donors report changing their strategies. For example, the United Kingdom, France and the World Bank revised their strategies, while the EU, Japan and Germany did not.

Figure 1.7 Past and future changes to donor aid-for-trade strategies



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Multilateral and bilateral donors agree on the three most important issues in aid for trade - namely economic growth, poverty reduction and regional integration. Multilateral donors attach more importance to better monitoring and evaluating results, and less importance to adopting a more regional focus - which makes sense given that many regional institutions have a specific geographical focus already which is unlikely to change (*e.g.* the African Development Bank's focus on Africa).

Figure 1.8 Importance of changes for bilateral donors



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Figure 1.9 Importance of changes for multilateral donors



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

The Australian government remains convinced that economic growth is the most powerful long-term solution to poverty, and that trade is a key driver of economic growth. Its priorities for 2008-10 remain: (*i*) support for economic infrastructure (particularly transport related); (*ii*) increased agricultural productivity and rural market development; (*iii*) trade reform; (*iv*) fisheries management; and (*v*) removal of barriers to private sector growth. Australia is making a greater effort to promote regional integration in its aid-for-trade activities, especially in East Asia and the Pacific, its two main regions of focus for aid for trade. Finland's Aid for Trade Action Plan has not changed since its launch in 2008. However, several new issues have emerged that were not identified in the Action Plan, including the expansion of co-operation to Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the South Caucasus and the Western Balkans. In Sub-Saharan African LDCs, Korea's aid for trade is targeted toward building the foundation for production and strengthening trade capacity.

…partly driven by the need to show results.

In 2010 the United Kingdom enhanced its approach to aid for trade with a stronger focus on achieving results - both through programme planning and improved monitoring and evaluation techniques. The February 2011 Trade White Paper sets out how the United Kingdom has refined its approach to aid for trade, seeking over the next few years to prioritise progress on trade facilitation, capacity building (including a special focus on building capacity for negotiations), and country competitiveness (including through stronger engagement with the private sector). The United Kingdom has strengthened its support for regional integration, mainly in Africa, but also in the Caribbean and increasingly in Asia. Other cross-cutting efforts include initiatives that promote benefits for women traders and workers in export industries; that build know-how and support to ensure that aid for trade supports poverty reduction; and that support broader research to inform trade development and export policies, and to improve aid-for-trade techniques. Italy has not set out an aid-for-trade strategy, so it cannot measure any change since 2008. This may also be the case with Portugal and Hungary, neither of which answered the question.

The new global trade environment, and the World Bank Group's experience in delivering aid-for-trade assistance, led the Bank to focus its aid-for-trade priorities on increasing trade competitiveness and diversification; improving transport and logistics to facilitate trade; expanding market access and integration; and ensuring access to trade finance. The IADB increased its emphasis on regional integration objectives. Thematic priorities include trade facilitation, trade and logistics, standards, and trade policy. Greater emphasis is being placed on monitoring and evaluating results.

Little change in South-South co-operation policies but more actors.

The trade-related co-operation policies of countries engaging in South-South co-operation changed in 4 of the 10 respondents to the South-South questionnaire. Policies changed in Ecuador, Mexico, Oman and Indonesia. However, there were no reported changes for the major providers of South-South co-operation, including China, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and India. Of these, all but Colombia responded to the 2008 questionnaire on South-South co-operation. South-South co-operation policies appear to have changed because of shifting development priorities and new approaches, procedures and instruments. These new policies are more focused on results, the regional dimension and green growth.

Oman is providing more infrastructure facilities, such as ports and airports, and helping countries to streamline trade procedures by setting up information-technology portals. The focus on climate change and green growth represent the most important planned change to Brazil's strategy. A major part of its support will be in biofuels and agriculture, particularly in Africa. India is also planning to revise its activities to focus on results and, in particular, on the regional dimension of aid for trade. It also intends to "intensify aid-for-trade assistance".

WHAT WERE THE DRIVERS OF CHANGE?

Regarding the factors prompting changes in priorites, most reflected domestic considerations. Where there were changes in government, the impact was noticeable. Even more significant, across all stakeholders, were broader changes in development priorities and strategies (see Figure 1.10). Regarding partner countries, changes in development and trade policies were identified as the most important drivers of changes. Donors also altered their strategies based on partner countries' changing priorities. South-South partners that changed their policies did so mostly because of changes in their development priorities.

Figure 1.10 What were the drivers of change?



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Partner countries are responding to new development priorities and trade policies…

Just over a third of the partner countries that changed their priorities identify new development strategies as the most important driver of change. Burkina Faso has launched an Accelerated Growth and Development strategy which prioritises external trade promotion and private-sector development. Tonga is in the process of formulating a National Export Strategy, National Private Sector Development Strategies and Labour Export Strategies. Guatemala is updating its foreign trade policy and striving to make its export sector more competitive. Regional Trade Agreements and Economic Partnership

Figure 1.11 Drivers of change according to partner countries



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011) Number of responses are shown in white

Figure 1.12 Drivers of change according to donors



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Agreements have also led some countries to shift their priorities. Swaziland's priorities changed due to its recent focus on trade in services within COMESA and the EPAs. Kenya's aid-for-trade objectives changed in order to align them with objectives set out in the new Kenyan constitution.

The next most important factor was changes in national trade policies and the development of new trade strategies. Nepal recently launched a Trade Integration Strategy which aims to strengthen trade negotiating capacity (especially bilateral), technical capacity to deal with Non-tariff Barriers (NTB), export capacity, and the government's capacity to manage the technical assistance and aid for trade needed to implement the strategy. The development of Diagnostic Trade Integration studies (DTIS) and action matrices led Comoros to change its priorities. The third most important driver of changes in priorities - identified by 15% of respondents - was regional trade. Multilateral trade was much less important probably reflecting the lack of progress in the Doha Round. The economic crisis was the most important driver of change for 14% of partner-country respondents, less than the corresponding figure for donors. A change of government prompted priority changes in El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Tonga and Suriname.

...and donors are responding to these changes in partner priorities.

Regarding the drivers of change identified by donors, shifting partner-country priorities and changing development co-operation priorities are the most important factors, as noted above. The economic crisis also played a role. Change of national government only affected a few donor's priorities, but where this happened it was important. New research and approaches were also considered important factors, but only one donor felt these were the most important. Triangular co-operation still has limited influence on aid-for-trade strategies. The next section looks at the economic crisis and emerging issues in the aid-for-trade discussion, especially the environment and gender.

The economic crisis has affected different actors in contrasting ways…

The figure below shows the sharply contrasting ways in which the financial crisis was perceived by countries, whether donors or partners. For over 30% of partner countries it was one of the most important factors that led to priority changes; for 40% it was either less important or not important. Similarly, over 20% donors saw it as the most important factor behind strategy changes; over 25% felt it was less important. For South-South partners, it was important in only half of those that changed their policies. As the previous section has pointed out, changes in objectives and strategies tend to be mostly driven by national characteristics. Yet the crisis does seem to have sharpened partner countries' focus on competitiveness, export diversification and strengthening resilience to economic shocks. For many donors, the crisis seems to have further sharpened their focus on demonstrating results.

Figure 1.13 How important was the economic crisis?



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

…and while the crisis was not explicitly identified as a key causal factor…

While many partner countries' aid-for-trade objectives and priorities have not changed, the economic crisis served, as Grenada explains, to highlight the importance of existing objectives and to underline the urgency of addressing existing priorities. The crisis weakened consumer spending power, thus reducing revenues from exports and economic activities. Sierra Leone reports that post-crisis it has become harder to source funds for addressing priorities and objectives. According to Canada, in the wake of the crisis, and the growing importance of trade and investment to economic recovery, aid for trade is figuring even more prominently as means of supporting economic growth. Countries are investing more in building economic infrastructure, productive capacity, and export-led development – changes that will increase the demand for aid for trade. Germany also notes increasing demand for aid for trade in the wake of the crisis, especially for trade financing and for improving private-sector competitiveness and productivity. New Zealand notes that the crisis has exacerbated existing economic and fiscal challenges facing Pacific island countries, prompting renewed efforts to strengthen economies and reduce vulnerabilities. These seem to provide a strong rationale for the prioritisation of competitiveness and export diversification in partner-country plans. So while the crisis was not explicitly identified as a key causal factor, it does seem to have implicitly shaped the agenda.

…it does seem to have implicitly shaped the agenda.

Many donors predict that future budget cuts in development assistance are likely, but they indicate that aid for trade will remain a priority. For the United Kingdom, the economic crisis and wider contextual issues, such as meeting aid targets, have sharpened the focus on ensuring that aid for trade is as effective and efficient as possible - both through programme planning and improved monitoring and evaluation. Many other donors also place greater emphasis on monitoring and evaluating results. Because of the economic crisis and budgetary cuts, the Netherlands is reconsidering its spending plans. The outcome is not clear, but it notes that "aid for trade remains a priority, to the extent that it will not be hit hard by expenditure cuts". In spite of budget pressures, the Australian government remains committed to increasing ODA to 0.5% of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2015-16, and to supporting developing countries to achieve the MDGs. As with many donors, Australia believes that its aid-for-trade efforts will help to make this possible, particularly for MDG 1 (poverty eradication) and MDG 8 (rules based predictable non-discriminatory trading and financial system).

Environmental issues are increasingly influencing the aid-for-trade agenda…

During the Second Global Review of Aid for Trade, OECD Secretary-General Gurría argued that aid for trade should join up with the broader development agenda to contribute to a cleaner environment and more sustainable growth. *"Aid for trade can play a big role in supporting those development goals we all share… it can also help developing countries build capacities that in turn can contribute to a healthier environment and to fighting poverty."* However, it is likely that many partner countries will not prioritise green growth due to the immediate employment, growth and poverty reduction challenges they face. In line with the principle of ownership, partner countries must drive this agenda and set their own priorities. In addition there is a risk that the economic crisis may have stalled support for climate change adaptation and funding for green-growth initiatives. While funding for climate change adaptation and mitigation is likely to grow in the years to come, ODA and aid for trade can already play a role in building capacities and resilience.

Developing countries can shift to lower-carbon paths while promoting development and reducing poverty, but this depends on financial and technical assistance available domestically and especially from high-income countries (Stern, 2009). Aid for trade and green-growth financing share many of the same objectives and, if used in *"a complementary and reinforcing manner, they may help build the economic resilience and supply-side capacity LDCs need to adapt and mitigate climate change and link to the world economy on better terms"* (Ancharaz and Sultan, 2010). Indeed, there is scope for aid for trade and new sources of climate change finance to work together to help meet some of the expected costs of climate change (Keane *et al.*, 2009).

As Collier *et al.* (2008) note, green growth struggles with similar challenges to aid for trade – for example, how to engage the private sector and how to address regional challenges in a coordinated manner. They suggest that adaptation to climate change in Africa is primarily a private-sector response involving relocation of people, changes in the sectoral structure of production, and changes in crop patterns (Collier, Conway and Venebles, 2008). They also suggest that adaptation in Africa will be impeded by Africa's fragmentation into a large number of countries, by poor business environments and poor regional integration. Aid for trade aims to improve the business environment and make economies more resilient and responsive to future needs (OECD, 2010).

…with many donors mainstreaming environmental issues in their programming…

New Zealand is seeking to mainstream climate-change issues throughout its aid programme. It is working to ensure that infrastructure projects - including trade-related infrastructure - are "climate-proofed". This is particularly important as many of its Pacific partners, the key regional focus of its work, are highly vulnerable to the environmental impacts of climate change. In supporting sustainable economic development, New Zealand is increasingly focusing on specific sectors, such as agriculture, fisheries and tourism, that are key to its partners future growth prospects, as well as on infrastructure and energy. It is important to view aid for trade through a climate lens because there is a risk of maladaptation, where policies and decisions increase vulnerability to climate change or overlook opportunities for adaptation (OECD, 2009). Chinese Taipei is focusing on climate change and environmentally sustainable development, as well as on growth and poverty reduction. Among IADB's cross-sectoral priorities are environment/climate change and green growth. These issues will be mainstreamed into the IADB's Aid for Trade Strategy and Agenda. Singapore aims to provide more technical assistance programmes in climate change. Germany plans to elaborate on the relationship between aid for trade and green growth.

Green growth also holds potential for innovative financing and for developing public-private partnerships (PPP). Korea provides an example with its "Project for the Creation of a Green Village and Provision of Water Utilising Renewable Energy in Kazakhstan (2 years/USD 150 million)" – the aim of which is to provide clean water and a wind and solar power producing system for the region. A Korean energy company promotes and conducts the project, in partnership with the Korean International Co-operation Agency, and is sharing its technical knowledge to increase the project's impact. The Austrian Development Co-operation Agency (ADC) has recently signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with SADC and ECOWAS, which include co-operation on building trade-related infrastructure and renewable energy. In this context, ADC has joined the "Energy and Environment Partnership with Southern and Eastern Africa (EEP)". The EEP is open to both the public and private sector, and is implemented via calls for proposals. It promotes institutional support and knowledge management, renewable energy projects and business development assistance, and national or regional pilot projects. Finland is also expanding energy and environment partnerships, though not exclusively for aid for trade.

… partner countries are also interested in this issue.

Donors, more than partner countries, seem to be prioritising green growth. Yet some partner countries have expressed an interest in this agenda, and see aid for trade's potential to build capacities to develop alternative energy, strengthen agriculture and expand tourism. Trinidad and Tobago considers sustainable development to be an important issue, as does Paraguay. However, Maldives worries that there is a risk that climate change and green growth will become donor priorities not widely shared by partner countries. It notes that green growth cannot be a donor-driven agenda. Nevertheless, in the Maldives' experience, donors are willing to support areas such climate change and good governance, often more prominently than trade.

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) provides an example of green growth and trade promotion advancing in tandem through its support for the East African Organic Products Standard - adopted in 2007 by the East African Community as the single, official standard for organic agriculture production in the region. The standard is a key output of the joint UNEP and the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) "Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment and Development" (UNEP-UNCTAD CBTF) initiative. The standard was the result of a multi-stakeholder process involving intensive consultations and participation by governments, the private sector, NGOs and international institutions. Although evaluations have not been completed, the standard appears to have been critical to promoting organic agriculture production in the East African region, and has influenced the development of other regional standards.

Beyond economic considerations, organic agriculture brings with it numerous other benefits for sustainable development. Environmental benefits from increased organic agricultural cultivation include lower energy consumption (20-56% lower per unit produced), reduced greenhouse gas emissions (on average 64% lower per hectare), higher levels of biodiversity, and increased soil fertility, leading to the possibility of equivalent or higher yields compared to conventional farming. Increased soil fertility can also help combat desertification by preventing erosion and land degradation. Besides environmental benefits, organic agriculture can increase food security resulting from higher productivity and higher yields. Measured impacts are particularly noticeable in subsistence agricultural systems with yield increases of up to 180%. Increased agricultural employment also reduces rural-urban migration.

Gender equality is being considered in aid for trade…

One of the guiding principles of aid for trade, as set out in the Recommendations of the WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade was that it should be "rendered in a coherent manner taking full account, *inter alia,* of the gender perspective and of the overall goal of sustainable development" (WTO, 2006). The impact of trade expansion on the distribution of income and employment differs between women and men. Women are more vulnerable to chronic poverty because of gender differences in the distribution of income and lack of access to productive assets, such as land and credit. Furthermore, within households, men may limit women's employment or control the income they earn. Inequalities between women and men in accessing opportunities, or "resources, rights and voice", are thus closely linked to women's empowerment, as well as to children's well-being (Morrison *et al.,* 2007).

While it is clear that trade has very different impacts on women and men due to gender relations, in practice the trade impacts are felt by all individuals as fluctuations in prices (and hence the availability of goods) and changes in output (what is produced, how, and under what conditions). Employment opportunities for women have increased in non-traditional agriculture (*e.g.* cut flower production) and in clothing and textile industries, as well as in electronics-oriented Export Processing Zones and services sectors. Many of these jobs are concentrated in export-oriented industries where electronic components are assembled, textiles processed, or garments and shoes produced (Nair *et al.*, 2004). Paid employment can increase women's autonomy and their economic and social status. It can also shift power relations between women and men, including at household level, and improve women's well-being, negotiating power and overall status (OECD, 2011).

…and many donors have trade-related programmes with gender equality objectives.

Many donors have specific trade-related programmes which also have gender equality objectives. Several of the United Kingdom's initiatives support women-owned businesses and women workers. In support of the Strategy for Sustainable Economic Growth, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) allocated CAD40 million over five years to enhance developing countries' participation in the global economy. About one quarter of this investment will be devoted to making substantive improvements to the lives of women

traders, entrepreneurs, and small-scale farmers. UNDP has undertaken specific efforts in Africa to support capacities of women entrepreneurs including those engaged in cross-border trade. A number of case stories were also prepared, mostly by international agencies, to demonstrate their commitment to gender equality in their aid-for-trade programmes.

HOW HAS THE DEMAND FOR AID FOR TRADE EVOLVED?

There is increased demand for aid for trade…

Donors and South-South providers note an increase in demand for aid for trade and regional trade-related programmes. In fact, 60% of donors indicate that demand has increased or significantly increased. Of the seven donors that experienced significant increases, five were multilateral donors (IADB, ADB, UNECA, UNCTAD and ITC) and two were bilateral (Australia and Finland). Just over half of bilateral donors report increased demand, while over 85% of multilateral donors report increased demand, with over 30% reporting a significant increase. Most South-South partners point to increasing demand with Brazil and China indicating a significant increase in demand.

Figure 1.14 Had demand for aid for trade increased?



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Donors generally find increases in demand from regions and countries where they have partnerships. IADB points to increases from the Caribbean, as do others. The Islamic Development Bank reports increases from Central Asian Countries. UNECA points to Africa. Other dedicated agencies report increases in demand for policy areas in which they specialise, *e.g.* FAO experienced increasing demand for building productive capacity in agriculture, fisheries and forestry. Finland says that demand has increased from all of their long-term partner countries.

…and needs are more clearly articulated.

The United Kingdom finds that the overall demand for aid for trade appears to have increased, and that needs are more clearly articulated. Sweden has experienced an increase in demand from several countries and regions, particularly in Africa and in relation to the EU-Africa Partnership Agreement negotiations. The requests are for all categories of aid for trade but most notably for trade capacity building, trade facilitation and areas related to quality infrastructure, namely SPS/TBT and other standards. Germany and France also note increased demand for aid for trade, especially in the context of EPAs that are currently being negotiated between ACP states and the EU, though the intensity varies across ACP countries. Benin and Kenya increasingly request support in the area of agriculture. Aid-for-trade demand also increased in the context of the EIF process, in particular in supporting the process. For the Czech Republic an increase in demand from Mongolia, and for Chinese Taipei from El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.

A number of countries are also accessing assistance through multilateral programmes that the United Kingdom and others support. These include the EIF, the World Bank's Trade Facilitation Facility and the World Bank-run Multi Donor Trust Fund - which provides targeted policy and technical support in response to country and regional demands. The World Bank itself has noted increased demand mainly from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also from some middle-income countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and in East and South Asia, for lending, technical assistance and capacity building. The EU gives details of countries where demand has increased, significantly increased or stayed the same. Among those where demand has significantly increased are Benin, Cameroon, Colombia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Ukraine, West Bank-Gaza, Yemen and Zimbabwe. UNCTAD indicates that most LDCs have increased demand. UNIDO perceives that the demand for aid-for-trade projects has increased noticeably across all regions of the developing world, in particular from LDCs. Enterprise upgrading and productive-capacity development, as well as quality infrastructure development for SPS/TBT compliance, are the two main areas of growth for UNIDO.

Significantly, no donor reports a decline in demand. However, many bilateral DAC donors report little or no change in demand (Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain). There are a number of non-DAC donors that also signal no change: Hungary, Lithuania and Israel. Neither Japan nor Italy were able to answer the question and are unsure about demand. Singapore points to little or no change, but notes that *"the demand for aid-for-trade programmes has remained consistently high"*.

Demand for South-South co-operation is also rising...

Both China and Brazil point to increases in demand for trade-related co-operation. Brazil notes increasing demand for support to agriculture and biofuels. India reports increasing demand from African countries and LDCs for technical assistance and capacity building. Indonesia also reports increasing demand from LDCs to support capacity building in economic development. Colombia reports an increase in demand for trade-related South-South co-operation from Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Dominican Republic and countries in Mesoamerica. Mexico also reports increasing demand from this region. Ecuador indicates that there has been little or no change. India has selected four LDCs (Zambia, Lesotho, Malawi and Ethiopia) for focused training and other assistance. India also supports Cotton 4 (C-4) countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali). Further details are provided in Chapter 3.

…as well as for regional integration programmes…

Similar trends emerge in demand for regional integration programmes and regional trade-related assistance. Over half of bilateral donors report an increase in demand, with Australia and Belgium reporting a significant increase. Belgium notes demand is growing most at the regional level, where partner countries with little prior experience of regional agreements have requested support for negotiation and implementation capacity. Australia has seen an overall increase in demand for regional integration processes, particularly by countries in the ASEAN, Mekong and Pacific regions.

Canada is active in providing aid-for-trade programmes on a regional basis, seeing this as one of the most effective ways of delivering aid for trade. Demand has continued from the Caribbean and Africa in particular for both training in export readiness and management of trade regimes. In Africa, increased focus on regional economic integration has led to growing demand for aid supporting regional economic bodies. Denmark reports increased demand notably from the East African Community (EAC) but also increasingly from other regional bodies in Africa. Most Danish aid is programmatic and is either undertaken jointly with other donors or closely coordinated with them. Similarly, Germany notes increased demand for regional economic integration from the ECOWAS Commission to implement a customs union, as well as from SADC, EAC, CARICOM and ASEAN.

Japan emphasises approaches that promote regional dimension; and it notes a "remarkable increase in demand for Japan's aid for trade from African countries and Mekong region countries" in, for example, regional infrastructure development, promotion of trade and investment, development of customs clearance. Sweden reports increases from several regions, but especially from Africa for trade capacity building, trade facilitation and areas related to quality infrastructure. The United Kingdom has scaled up its support for African regional integration with the development of the United Kingdom's African Free Trade initiative "which encompasses political support, investment and technical assistance in support of African ambition in this area". In terms of aid for trade, this involves the development of a flexible programme to support West African regional integration efforts, as well as flagship TradeMark programmes in southern and eastern Africa focused on support at the country and regional economic community level. Significant investments are being made to reduce transit times of goods and people across three African trade corridors by investing in trade facilitation initiatives, such as one-stop-border posts. Finland cautions that the demand for regional co-operation has increased but not really for regional integration.

Figure 1.15 Had demand for regional integration increased?



OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

…especially for multilateral donors.

Among multilateral donors, six note significantly increased demand for regional programmes: the African Development Fund, ITC, UNECA, UNIDO, IADB and the World Bank. According to the World Bank, demand has increased from regional bodies in Africa and Middle East and North Africa for trade facilitation and infrastructure projects. The EU gives specific support to regional integration for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.[1] The level of demand has not changed since 2008. Out of 89 EU delegations, 62 report that they have supported partner countries in including strategic regional integration priorities (relevant to aid for trade) in their national development

plans or trade strategies. 57 out of 89 report that this is an improvement compared to 2008. This suggests increasing demand for this type of support. The same priority also emerged from surveyed partner countries, with many noting a stronger focus on regional integration.

Six South-South partners have increased demand for regional trade related-assistance. According to China, demand is increasing for cross-border road and railway construction in Africa, and for infrastructure construction, such as road, bridges and telecommunications networks, under the framework of Greater Mekong sub-regional cooperation. India has recently joined the Regional Technical Group on Aid for Trade for the Asia Pacific region. Brazil, Chile and Colombia report no change in demand for regional programmes.

WHAT IS THE OUTLOOK FOR AID FOR TRADE?

Looking ahead to 2013, more than half of the reporting donors (16) are planning to revise their aid-for-trade strategies. Many others note that they may adopt a new focus or priorities, but these are contingent on changes in trade and development plans or future evaluation findings. 14 donors do not plan to change their approaches, often because they have recently developed a specific strategy. For example, the United Kingdom's broad direction and priorities were established in 2010 and will likely remain in force for the next four years. Recent changes instituted by the IADB, including new priorities, will be implemented through 2015.

Many donors are changing the focus of their aid-for-trade strategies…

Figure 1.16 summarises where donors see their focus increasing. The rating for many responses, including Germany's, refers to the importance of the issues in absolute terms rather than to the significance of the change. Economic growth, poverty reduction and regional integration are the three most important issues. No donor is planning to phase out aid for trade. Monitoring and evaluation is most important for Germany, Australia as well as multilaterals, including the World Bank, WTO, African Development Fund and the IADB.

The United States has a new strategic approach to development based on three pillars: First, a policy focused on sustainable development outcomes that places a premium on broad based economic growth, democratic governance, innovations, and sustainable systems for meeting basic human needs. Second, a new operational model that positions the United States to be a more effective partner and to leverage its leadership.

Figure 1.16 Importance of the changes your government is planning

OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

And third, a modern architecture that elevates development and harnesses development capabilities spread across government in support of common objectives - including a deliberate effort to leverage the engagement of, and collaboration with, other donors, foundations, the private sector and NGOs - not just at the project level, but systemically.

Germany's internal procedures and steering instruments will be adapted with the aim of integrating aid for trade more systematically in planning, designing, implementing, evaluating and steering German sector strategies, programmes and projects. Based on past experience and also on thematic and regional strengths, German development co-operation will place special emphasis on the following aid-for-trade intervention areas: a significant share of total aid for trade will continuously be implemented in the Federal Ministry for Co-operation and Development (BMZ) priority areas of sustainable economic development (in particular, private sector development and financial services) and agriculture (including value chains and food security). Other increasingly relevant areas are quality infrastructure, trade facilitation and co-operation with the German private sector. In all areas of co-operation, capacity development will be a central focus.

The Netherlands' priorities over the next few years include food security and water management. The Swedish government's overall development priority of poverty reduction will be made clearer in the new Aid-for-Trade Strategy. Sweden's thematic focus is virtually unchanged since 2008, but it is now more detailed and has been widened to include social issues. UNDP will further emphasise the contribution of trade to poverty reduction and gender equality within the context of efforts to accelerate progress towards achieving the MDGs. Singapore in 2011-2013, plans to maintain and refine its aid-for-trade strategy in response to changes in the global economic environment and the needs of partner economies.

UNDP regional programmes, particularly in Africa and Eastern Europe/CIS, are increasingly focused on supporting aid-for-trade strategies. UNDP also expects to renew its engagement with the EIF - which became fully operational in July 2009 - especially in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. Germany will focus even more on regional economic integration. Not only will it increase support for regional integration commissions and secretariats, focusing on institution building and organisational management, but it will also focus more explicitly on the regional dimension of productive-sector development, which offers even greater potential for inclusive growth and poverty reduction.

…taking into account evaluation findings…

Many donors will amend their approaches and priorities based on evaluations being planned or currently being undertaken (see the final chapter for a discussion of current donor approaches to evaluation). The effectiveness and efficiency of Australia's aid programme is currently being reviewed. While it is expected that the review will make recommendations on how to improve the structure, policy and delivery of aid, it is unclear at this stage the extent to which aid for trade will be part of the review's analysis and recommendations. How precisely the United Kingdom will implement its priorities will not be known until approval processes are completed in March 2011. Adjustments will be made in the coming years based on ongoing monitoring and evaluation, research findings, the outcome of pilot initiatives and dialogue with key partners. Norway's current aid-for-trade strategy will be evaluated in 2011, which might lead to thematic changes. Finland's Aid for Trade Action Plan (as well as its entire Development Policy) will be renewed because of the election of a new government in April 2011. Although the specific details are not known, the new priorities will likely reflect the results of the upcoming aid-for-trade evaluation, experiences and political priorities. UNDP's evaluation policy is also being strengthened which will have an impact on programmes.[2]

…and may change further with forthcoming reviews of overall development policies.

Some major donors plan to review their development policies which will shape aid for trade in the years to come. The World Bank has a new trade strategy which will be adopted in 2011. The EU is currently reviewing its overarching development co-operation policy, as well as its policy relating to trade and development. A Communication on the private sector development and growth is scheduled for the end of 2012 - beginning of 2013. This may have implications for the EU's Aid for Trade Strategy. Switzerland is also preparing a new framework for development co-operation for 2013-2016. Aid-for-trade programmes will fall under this new framework, but major changes in the thematic and/or geographic focus are not expected. However, its final content will be known only after approval by parliament.

New aid-for-trade commitments are being made…

The G20 commitment on aid for trade has also bolstered support for the Initiative. The commitment - made as part of the Multi-Year Action Plan on Development in Seoul – was to (at least) maintain aid-for-trade levels that reflect the average of 2006 to 2008 beyond 2011. The G20 also resolved to strengthen the role of South-South trade co-operation and to reinforce the involvement of the private sector. In parallel with the implementation of these commitments, the G20 pledged to sustain aid flows to other sectors in 2011 and beyond. Japan launched the Development Initiative for Trade in 2009 which involves improving aid-for-trade implementation and meeting the G20 London Summit (April 2009) commitments on trade finance. The higher target demonstrates "Japan's stronger commitment to aid for trade". Germany also confirms its financial commitment to aid for trade. The United Kingdom has committed to spending at least GBP 672 million annually, as part of its G20 commitment on aid for trade, and expect to exceed this amount by at least GBP 100 million per year.

…but the outlook for Official Development Assistance is moderate.

There has been much discussion recently about the future of ODA – including the DAC's new focus on aid and beyond. Aid for trade has demonstrated the key catalytic role that aid can play in stimulating dialogue, in formulating plans and strategies and in using resources to address capacity and supply-side constraints, thereby enabling trade to be better used as a development tool. The aid-for-trade experience will help to inform discussions on Aid Effectiveness which will take place at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea in November 2011.

The short term outlook for ODA flows is relatively modest. The global recovery has been sluggish, and many donors have budget deficits. Emerging economies have become stronger and their share of global GDP has increased. Sharp differences have arisen over currency and trade, although tensions have not yet escalated. Some donors have sovereign debt issues and many larger economies, such as the US, Japan and the United Kingdom, have public debt and deficit problems that have become major political issues. Against this backdrop, maintaining aid-for-trade flows will be challenging. All stakeholders must continue to make the case for aid for trade, and more evidence must be generated as to its effectiveness.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter highlights several positive developments in aid for trade. New aid-for-trade objectives are connecting the Initiative to the broader development agenda, and aid for trade is playing a greater role in strengthening overall national competitiveness. It is also facilitating and aiding regional integration. Priorities such as competitiveness, economic infrastructure and export diversification have become more prominent. There is a clearer articulation of aid-for-trade priorities. Policy changes are being mainstreamed in development plans and operational strategies are being discussed with donors. Where stakeholders have made changes, the focus on economic growth, poverty reduction and regional integration was strengthened. Modifications in aid-for-trade strategies were driven by new overarching development plans, new diagnostic studies and political changes. The economic crisis has also influenced the type of changes being pursued, though its effect has been uneven. Green growth is beginning to influence policy, but this trend appears to be at a formative stage.

Demand for aid for trade has increased - it has become more important in both partner and donor strategies. Many donors, in spite of fiscal consolidation, have reconfirmed their commitment to aid for trade. South-South actors are scaling up their activities and providing qualitative information on their programmes. Donors have operational aid-for-trade strategies, and some will be updating them in the years to come based on evaluation results, reviews of their development plans, and changes in thematic focus. Furthermore, monitoring and evaluation is set to become more important for a number of reasons. Improving work in this area will be essential to sustaining the progress that all stakeholders are making.■

NOTES

1 The allocation for the period 2008 to 2013 is € 1.783 billion, of which around 70 % is for economic integration.

2 UNDP's Executive Board adopted a new evaluation policy in February 2011 following recommendations from an independent review commissioned by the Board. The new evaluation policy introduced revisions in five areas: i) national ownership; ii) notional evaluation capacity; iii) the independence of the Evaluation Office; iv) decentralized evaluation; and v) the use of evaluation. The new policy has developed guidance with respect to decentralized evaluations (*i.e.* those commissioned by programme units at all levels of the organisation) which encourage joint evaluations with government, UN or other partners. Revisions related to the use of evaluations are geared towards strengthening UNDP's capacity to internalize what is learned from evaluations; and in particular, using the evidence generated by evaluations to improve the quality of programmes and guide strategic decisions. Improvements in the use of evaluation are expected to have a positive impact on the quality of UNDP's trade-related programmes.

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CHAPTER 2
HOW HAVE AID-FOR-TRADE **FLOWS** EVOLVED?

In 2009, aid-for-trade commitments reached approximately USD 40 billion, a 60% increase from the 2002-05 baseline. Non-concessional lending to trade-related sectors doubled to reach USD 51 billion. Half of all aid for trade is provided in grant form, mainly to the poorest developing countries. Disbursements have been growing steadily at 11-12% for each year since 2006 - reaching USD 29 billion in 2009 - indicating that past commitments are being met.

The outlook for aid for trade is stable, but growth rates are likely to diminish. While the changes from 2008 to 2009 were marginal in terms of aggregate flows - increasing by 2% - the pattern of who provided aid for trade, who received it and which categories were supported varied considerably.

Aid for trade to sub-Saharan Africa increased by almost 40% to reach USD 13 billion and Africa now receives the largest share among the different regions. Commitments to the Americas increased by almost 60% to reach USD 3 billion. Aid for trade to other regions declined with Asia 18% down on 2008, Europe down 34% and Oceania down 28%. Driving this shift in distribution, Low Income Countries (LICs) saw an increase of 26% in 2009, while Middle Income Countries (MICs) declined by 29%. Global and regional programmes continued to grow, receiving USD 7 billion in commitments.

At the sectoral level, flows increased to agriculture, banking and finance, a likely response to both the food and financial crises. Increases in non-concessional flows were mostly targeted to banking and finance, energy and transport, with 91% of total flows going to MICs.

The numbers presented by the OECD allow the various stakeholders of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative to assess at the global level progress and patterns in resource mobilisation and distribution. However, partner countries sometimes have difficulty matching these global numbers with specific aid-for-trade flows at the country level. This is a generic problem and reinforces the need for stronger local monitoring and tracking systems.

INTRODUCTION

The WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade noted that a *"lack of empirical data has made it difficult to examine the relationship between policies related to trade and development performance. Better data and statistics are a precondition for better understanding the process of globalisation and its impact and for determining priorities for development co-operation"*. Five years later the aid-for-trade community has now assembled the data and statistics to provide a global picture on aid for trade. Clear benchmarks have been established for measuring flows and assessing additionality.[1] This data shows that aid for trade has increased substantially, although its distribution among developing countries remains uneven. Resource mobilisation has been central to the success of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative. However, the outlook is mixed, conditioned by recent trends in overall Official Development Assistance (ODA). Moreover the latest available numbers highlight the changing environment induced by the economic crisis. Chapter 1 outlined how objectives, priorities and strategies have changed since the last survey in 2008. This chapter looks at the donor response and some of the financing issues identified by partner countries (some others will be addressed in Chapter 3). It will examine how flows have evolved across different sectors, regions and income groups.

There remains a perception gap between the tracking of flows at the global level and the thousands of interactions between donors and partner countries at the country level. This chapter sets out to clarify these issues and provide details on how local monitoring systems could be improved. The chapter asks seven questions; 1) Have trends in global aid-for-trade flows changed? 2) Who receives aid for trade? 3) Who are the providers of aid for trade? 4) What does aid for trade finance? 5) What are the aggregate trends? 6) What is the outlook? 7) What do we know about local monitoring?

HAVE GLOBAL AID-FOR-TRADE TRENDS CHANGED?

Aid for Trade has increased significantly in real terms, but...

In 2009, aid-for-trade commitments reached USD 40 billion, up 60% compared to the 2002-05 baseline and by 31% since the 2007 figures presented in the last *Aid for Trade at a Glance* (Figure 2.1).[2] Since the launch of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative in 2006 a total USD 137 billion has been committed with 44% going to building productive capacities, 53% to economic infrastructure and the remainder to trade policy and regulations and trade-related adjustment. In 2009 a greater share went to building productive capacity, 45% of the total and slightly less to economic infrastructure (51%). Trade policy and regulations received approximately 3%.

…the growth rate is slowing…

The increase in aid-for-trade commitments in 2009 compared to 2008 was just 2%. However this was preceded in 2008 by a significant increase of 28% from USD 31 billion in 2007 to USD 39 billion. Despite moderate change in overall commitments in 2009, there is quite a lot of variation in the composition of aid for trade and in particular in the contributions of the major donors. The share of aid for trade in sector allocable ODA declined from 35.6% to 33% from 2008 to 2009. The average share since the 2002-05 baseline though has been 33% indicating a stable share of sector allocable ODA. This highlights that the increase in aid for trade since 2006 has been additional, *i.e.* not at the expense of aid to other sectors.

Figure 2.1 Aid for trade by category, Commitments



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database(CRS)
Note: Building Productive Capacity includes trade development activities which are identifiable in the CRS since 2007 flows.
Trade-related Adjustment data are available since 2007 flows and may be invisible on the chart due to their small amounts.

StatLink http:dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932446075

… while disbursements continue to grow…

Commitments are forward looking and show the amounts that donors will spend on certain development activities. Disbursements show actual financial payments and, thus, the realisation of donors' intentions and the implementation of their policies. As noted in the 2009 *Aid for Trade at a Glance*, commitments generally lead to disbursements, but with a time lag. Commitments are often multiyear with subsequent disbursements spread over several years with, on average, infrastructure investment projects taking the longest time to implement, lasting from five to eight years. Consequently, disbursement trends will always trail commitment trends.

As the Aid-for-Trade Initiative matures it is increasingly important also to review disbursements, which have been increasing annually at 11-12% since 2006 (Figure 2.2). In 2009 aid-for-trade disbursements reached USD 29 billion, up 40% since 2006.

Figure 2.2 Aid for trade by category, Disbursements



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database(CRS)

Note: Building Productive Capacity includes trade development activities which are identifiable in the CRS since 2007 flows.

Trade-related Adjustment data are available since 2007 flows and may be invisible on the chart due to their small amounts.

StatLink http:dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932446094

Other Official Flows doubled in 2009 to reach USD 50.5 billion…

Other Official Flows (OOF) are transactions by the official sector which do not meet the eligibility conditions for Official Development Assistance (ODA), mainly because they have a grant element of less than 25% (*i.e.* low concessional loans). As noted in the 2009 *Aid for Trade at a Glance Report*, these flows can play a crucial role in financing trade related activities, but they are not aid for trade in the narrow sense of the definition. In 2009 there were substantial increases in OOF in areas related to trade. Overall flows totalled USD 50.5 billion, up USD 26.7 billion (112%) from 2008. This significant increase reflects the responses to the economic crisis by major international financial institutions, which boosted their non concessional lending substantially (Figure 2.3). Furthermore, the capital base from which these operations are financed has been strengthened with capital replenishment exercises completed for the multilateral development banks.

….with almost half provided by the World Bank…

The World Bank is the largest provider of OOF and contributes 47% of total OOF (USD 23.6 billion) following a 115% increase in 2009. The African Development Bank (AfDB) increased its OOF six fold to reach USD 6.6 billion, 13% of the total. The IADB has also increased its available financing (See Box 2.2). The remainder was mainly provided by the ADB (8%), the EBRD (7.5%) and Korea (4%).

… mostly to Banking, Energy and Transport…

OOF to economic infrastructure more than doubled to USD 25.8 billion. Resources to the category building productive capacity also more than doubled to USD 23.5 billion and trade policy and regulations expanded by 186% to USD 1.2 billion. Increases are strongly concentrated in three sectors: USD 10 billion more goes to banking and financial services, USD 7.7 billion more to energy and USD 5 billion more to transport and storage. Of the increases in banking, the World Bank Group provided an additional USD 5 billion; the AfDB lent USD 2.4 billion more and the IADB almost USD 2 billion. In energy, the World Bank increased lending by USD 3.2 billion, the AfDB by USD 2.7 billion and the IADB by USD 2 billion, while in transport and storage, increased lending by the World Bank amounted to an additional USD 3.8 billion, the IADB provided USD 800 million in additional lending and the AfDB USD 346 million.

Figure 2.3 Trade-related Other Official Flows by category



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database(CRS)

Note: Building Productive Capacity includes trade development activities which are identifiable in the CRS since 2007 flows.

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…in Middle Income Countries…

As is to be expected, MICs received 91% of all trade related OOF. Asia was the destination for 38% of these flows and 28% went to the Americas, while 19% was provided for Africa, 14% for Europe and less than 1% for Oceania. In terms of individual recipient countries, India received 14% of total OOF followed by Mexico (9%), Kazakhstan, Indonesia, South Africa and China (all at 6%). South Africa is the largest

Figure 2.4 Aid for trade by income group and category



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database(CRS)
Note: Building Productive Capacity includes trade development activities which are identifiable in the CR since 2007 flows.
Trade-related Adjustment data are available since 2007 flows and may be invisible on the chart due to their small amounts.

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African recipient followed by Botswana (4%). The top ten OOF recipients attracted 62% of total flows and all are classified as MICs. LDCs received most of their trade-related financing in ODA grants and loans and receive only minor OOF amounting to a total of USD 5 billion during the period 2002 to 2009. This represents around 3% of total trade-related OOF. Madagascar was the largest LDC recipient accounting for almost 40% of total flows to the LDCs in 2009. Almost all of these loans were destined for exploitation of mineral resources and mining. Despite the vary substantial increases in OOF in response to the global financial crisis, LDCs only recieved USD 1 billion or less than 2% of total trade-related OOF.

WHO RECEIVES AID FOR TRADE?

Low Income Countries get the lion's share…

Low Income Countries (LICs) saw their share of aid for trade increase significantly from the 2002 – 2005 baseline, while the share of MICs declined. In 2009, LICs received almost half of total aid for trade up from 39.5% in 2008, with USD 12 billion for LDCs and USD 7.4 billion for OLICs (Figure 2.4). Between 2007 and 2009 the LDCs received USD 2.5 billion in additional commitments and OLICs received USD 2 billion more. Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) received USD 12 billion in aid for trade, a decline of USD 5 billion or 30% compared to 2008. This is mostly due to significantly declining flows to India and Iraq. Aid for trade to Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs) declined by USD 550 million to USD 1.9 billion and this income group now account for less than 5% of total aid-for-trade flows. As noted above, however, trade-related OOFs to MICs have grown significantly since 2008.

…with significant increases to the LDCs…

While global aid for trade flows only increased by 2% between 2008 and 2009, those to the LDCs continued to increase by 20%. Consequently, the LDCs' share in total aid for trade has risen from 26.5% during the baseline period to 30.4% in 2009. Moreover, almost two thirds of all new commitments were provided as full grants, while this was only the case for 55% of the commitments during the baseline period.

…particularly in Africa, which surpassed Asia...

Aid for trade to Africa has increased every year by 20% on average since the 2002-05 baseline and now stands at over USD 16 billion. This makes Africa the largest regional aid for trade recipient with 41% of total aid-for-trade flows. Between 2008 and 2009, aid for trade committed to sub-Saharan Africa increased by almost 40%, while flows to North Africa fell by 56% in the same period. Asia now ranks as the second largest regional recipient with USD 15.4 billion (38% of total flows). Most of the USD 3.4 billion decline in 2009 can be attributed to less support for South and Central Asia and the Middle East, and

Figure 2.5 Aid for trade by region and category



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)

StatLink http:dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932446151

Note: Building productive capacity included trade development activities which are identifiable in the CRS since 2007 flows. Trade-related adjustment data are available since 2007 flows and may be invisible on the chart due to their small amounts.

in particular to India (a decline from USD 3.4 billion to under USD 2 billion) and Iraq (with energy down by USD 1.4 billion) and transport down by USD 784 million for the region as a whole. However, it should be noted that in 2008 aid for trade flows to Asia increased by USD 5.4 billion. The 2009 aid for trade commitments for Asia of USD 15.4 billion are more in line with the average flows to Asia. Aid-for-trade flows to the Americas increased by almost 60% since 2008 and reached USD 3 billion in 2009, mainly due to an additional USD 655 million in support for economic infrastructure. Flows to Europe decreased over one third to just over USD 1.4 billion, and support for Oceania also declined by 28% to USD 276 million. In both cases the decline was attributable to significantly less support for building productive capacities.

...and support for multi-country programmes also increased.

In 2009, USD 7 billion was committed to multi-country programmes (*i.e.* global and regional); more than triple the amount allocated during the 2002-05 baseline period. Both global and regional programmes reached around USD 3.5 billion and their combined share in total aid for trade has doubled from roughly 9% in 2002-05 to 18% in 2009. On average, multi-country programmes focus their support on building productive capacities (65%), improving cross border economic infrastructure (24%), and providing technical assistance for trade policy and regulation (11%). In fact, almost half of all aid for trade for policy and regulations is provided through regional and global training programmes. This delivery mode strengthens regional co-operation and generates important economies of scale. Regional programmes in Africa increased more than fourfold to USD 2.6 billion in 2009 compared to the baseline period. This covers 22% of total aid-for-trade increases to Africa. In 2009, the European Commission put in place a facility to provide a rapid response to soaring food prices with amounts in the region of USD 900 million, while the United Kingdom significantly increased its commitments for trade facilitation and agriculture projects in sub-Saharan Africa.

The top 20 recipients received 50% of aid for trade...

Asia and Africa both have 10 countries each in the list of top 20 recipients which receive half of total aid for trade. Figure 2.6 provides the full list, as well as the pattern of commitments since the 2002-05 baseline. Asia has six of the top 10 recipients, including the top 3. Vietnam is the largest recipient in 2009 with USD 2.6 billion, up 27% from 2008 with increases to energy (up USD 560 million), and industry (up USD 230 million). India is the second largest recipient, but its flows decline substantially from 2008 mostly because of over USD 1 billion less to transport and storage. Afghanistan is the third largest recipient and saw its flows decrease slightly from 2008. Nigeria is the largest recipient in Africa with USD 1.3 billion in commitments. Flows to Nigeria

Figure 2.6 Top 20 recipients of aid for trade in 2009



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS).

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were up by 89% in 2009, driven by large increases to banking and financial services (up USD 500 million), mining and mineral resources (up USD 400 million) and energy (up USD 220 million). Uganda's aid for trade has varied considerably because of large investments in energy (2007) and transport and storage (2009). Kenya saw a large increase in 2009, returning it to 2007 levels following political unrest which affected 2008 commitments.

Increased support for economic infrastructure and in particular transport projects are the main reason for the relatively high position of a number of recipients - for instance, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Ghana. Almost all the aid for trade that Thailand received in 2008 and 2009 was committed to urban transport projects in Bangkok and funded by the Japanese government. Similarly, almost 70% of all aid for trade to the Philippines in 2009 was destined to improve transport infrastructure, while for Indonesia 74% of its USD 970 million aid for trade was committed to this sector (including over USD 500 million in loans from Japan). In Ghana, 62% of almost USD 700 million of total aid for trade is destined to improve the transport sector with the World Bank providing over USD 250 million. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) received USD 725 million with energy receiving 36% of total support. Georgia enters the top 20 recipients because of loans for transport provided by Japan and the ADB's special funds. Projects in transport and energy are usually quite significant. For those countries where economic infrastructure is a major part of total aid for trade, this gives the impression of volatility and lack of predictability. For instance, aid for trade to Morocco increased almost six-fold from 2007 to 2008 and then dropped by half in 2009.

Agriculture received 46% of all aid for trade to Mali and 41% of support for Burkina Faso. Aid to the categories most closely associated with the WTO Task Force definition trade has fallen to China since the 2002-05 baseline but still stands at USD 588 million. Iraq declined from USD 3 billion in 2008 to just over USD 400 million and is now outside of the top 20. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh saw their support decline by USD 185 million and USD 296 million respectively, with flows to Tanzania declining by USD 444 million.

Figure 2.7 Top 10 donors of aid for trade in 2009



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)

StatLink http:dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932446189

Note: Korea became a member of the DAC on 1st January 2010. Official reporting of the flows commenced as from 2009. Data for previous years may be partial.

WHO ARE THE PROVIDERS OF AID FOR TRADE?

The top 10 donors provide 82% of total aid for trade.

Aid-for-trade commitments were reported to the CRS database by 24 DAC donors, 3 Non-DAC donors and 20 multilateral institutions. In 2009, the top 10 reporters account for 82% of total aid-for-trade commitments (Figure 2.7). For total ODA, the top 10 donors provide 74% of the total volume indicating that aid for trade is relatively more concentrated among a smaller number of donors. The European Union (EU) plus its Member States is the largest donor with USD 14 billion per year, an increase of 70% in real terms since the 2002-05 baseline. EU Member States provide USD 9.7 billion a slight decrease of 2% compared to 2008 and the EU institutions provide an additional USD 4.2 billion, up 14%. Whereas the World Bank Group increases its aid for trade by almost 50% to USD 8 billion, other major donors such as Japan and the US reported significant declines of 37% and 31% respectively (down by USD 5.5 billion collectively). In fact, of the five largest bilateral donors four declined by an average of 28% (France down by 38%, Germany down by 9%).

Large increases from multilateral donors, while bilateral flows declined...

There is considerable volatility in donor commitments from 2008 to 2009. Multilateral flows increased by almost USD 6 billion to almost USD 17 billion and now represent 42% of aid-for-trade flows, up from 28% in 2008. Conversely, total commitments from bilateral donors declined by almost USD 6 billion, or 20%. However, bilateral donors combined still provide the majority of aid for trade at USD 22.7 billion, 57% of the total in commitments in 2009. The share of aid for trade in bilateral donor's total sector allocable ODA declined from 35% in 2008 to 28.6% in 2009. While for multilateral donors this share increased from 36.8% in 2008 to 42% in 2009. Thus, the crisis response of bilateral and multilateral donors seems to have differed. Whereas the International Financial Institutions increased their budget commitments, some bilateral donors seem to have shifted the allocation of their funds to the social sector.

…despite increases from many bilateral donors…

Bilateral donors that showed strong increases in 2009 include the United Kingdom (up 18% to USD 1.9 billion), Korea (up 67% to USD 935 million), Norway (up 29% to USD 775 million), Belgium (up 74% to USD 542 million) and Finland (up 87% to USD 356.5 million). Among the bilateral donors, Korea now has at 67% the highest share of aid for trade in total sector allocable ODA. There is also better coverage in 2009 with United Arab Emirates (USD 473.5 million), Turkey (USD 28.9 million) and the Czech Republic (USD 0.1 million) reporting for the first time to the CRS database. Contributions by bilateral donors to multilaterals also increased (Box 2.1).

Box 2.1 The OECD's calculation of imputed multilateral aid

In addition to their direct, bilateral support for aid for trade, DAC members also provide significant assistance through contributions to multilateral development agencies. The table below estimates this effort. It is calculated by applying the share of each multilateral agency's outflow that is aid for trade to the amount which each donor gave to that agency. For example, if 10% of the World Bank's concessional lending is aid for trade, and the United Kingdom gives the Bank USD 200 million, then the table includes USD 20 million against the UK in imputed multilateral aid for trade through the World Bank. The totals shown are only estimates, not least because only the major multilateral agencies report in detail on their aid for trade.

IMPUTED MULTILATERAL AID FOR TRADE

USD million (2009 constant)

	2002-05 avg.	2006	2007	2008	2009
Australia	42.7	70.4	84.6	61.3	105.8
Austria	88.5	119.4	143.3	144.8	238.8
Belgium	150.9	273.4	148.8	381.2	297.3
Canada	111.1	123.7	162.1	286.6	132.1
Denmark	106.2	95.3	135.3	142.3	136.5
Finland	70.9	63.9	78.1	68.1	59.1
France	863.2	1 506.9	595.6	1 720.2	975.6
Germany	936.2	926.7	1 256.4	1 358.2	2 497.6
Greece	43.0	58.9	60.4	101.8	83.3
Ireland	29.5	80.3	54.0	68.4	56.5
Italy	615.3	330.0	429.7	934.7	657.2
Japan	325.8	1 374.7	206.3	770.2	961.9
Korea	43.2	41.0	44.3	41.8	146.8
Luxembourg	13.2	16.2	17.3	16.1	21.8
Netherlands	15.4	283.6	486.9	245.9	171.4
New Zealand	4.5	4.0	4.2	5.1	5.6
Norway	85.0	70.0	60.2	73.5	180.3
Portugal	45.9	48.5	51.8	51.3	79.5
Spain	257.2	318.1	363.1	535.6	589.0
Sweden	95.8	185.7	188.5	253.6	285.6
Switzerland	97.6	224.6	31.5	47.6	402.3
United Kingdom	497.9	741.7	825.8	1 009.7	1 222.0
United States	579.0	419.4	551.9	499.1	764.3
Total	**5 132.5**	**7 376.2**	**6 030.9**	**8 817.3**	**10 070.0**

Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)

…which changed the regional distribution.

The World Bank increased its aid for trade to Africa by almost USD 2.5 billion in 2009 and AfDB by USD 1.7 billion. DAC donors committed USD 1.2 billion less to Africa than in the previous year. The EU institutions also provided almost USD 600 million less. The decline in Asia is mostly attributable to a USD 3 billion decrease in aid for trade to the region from Japan. However, the significant increase to Asia in 2008 was due partly to large "one-off " Japanese commitments to infrastructure. In fact, the 2009 aid-for-trade commitments are still USD 2 billion above 2007 commitments and more in line with longer-term trends. Of the USD 1 billion increase in aid for trade to the Americas, the EU and Germany provided a little under USD 500 million more. The IADB also provided more (USD 155 million) as did Japan and Spain. The decline in Europe is mostly due to decreases from Germany (USD 287 million less) and France (USD 387 million less). While in Oceania, increases in support by the EU (USD 59 million more) and the ADB Fund (USD 74 million more) were offset by a decline in support from Japan (USD 127 million less).

Most donors have increased their support since 2008.

In the OECD/WTO donor questionnaire, donors and providers of South-South co-operation were asked if their aid for trade had increased since 2008. Their responses confirm the CRS data's mixed results with 16 bilateral donors responding positively and 12 indicating no increase, including the US and Japan. Multilateral donors responded more positively with 11 indicating increasing support, such as the World Bank, the EU and regional development banks, while five did not increase their support for aid for trade (mostly small providers of aid for trade such as UNCTAD, IMF and FAO).

Figure 2.8 Have providers of aid for trade increased their resources since 2008?



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Most providers of South-South co-operation have also increased their support…

In their responses to the OECD/WTO donor questionnaire, China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia and Mexico all report an increase in trade-related co-operation. China has increased spending on infrastructure construction and training in Asia and Africa. Brazil has focused resources on agriculture in Africa. Argentina has a focus on Latin America in the areas of institutional strengthening and sustainable development. Mexico increased support in cargo logistics and sustainable transport as part of the Mesoamerica Project, featured in the previous Aid for Trade at a Glance Report. Indonesia has increased coverage in Africa and the Pacific. India has regularly conducted special courses on trade issues under its Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme for developing countries, in particular LDCs, including for countries which are at various stages of accession to the WTO. No South-South partners provide figures on their support for trade-related co-operation to the CRS or gave figures in their questionnaire replies.

Half of aid for trade is provided in grants…

In 2009, aid-for-trade commitments are provided half in grants (USD 20.2 billion) and half in concessional loans (USD 19.9 billion). Grants have grown 67% since the 2002-05 baseline, whereas loans have grown by 53%. Grants represent 92% of funding for trade policy and regulations, 62% for building productive capacity and just 38% of economic infrastructure in 2009. These proportions are consistent with previous years.

Figure 2.9 Aid for trade loans and grants



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)
Note: Equity investment is classified as loans.

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...with multilaterals providing mostly loans…

Donors differ significantly in the financial terms of their aid-for-trade support (Figure 2.10 and 2.11). For instance, the World Bank provides 84% of its USD 8 billion in aid for trade in concessional loans. In fact, the World Bank supplies 34% of all aid-for-trade loans but only 6% of total grants. While most bilateral donors provide their assistance mostly in grant form there are some exceptions. For instance in 2009, Japan provided 78% of its USD 6 billion aid-for-trade programme in the form of concessional loans. Collectively, Japan and the World Bank provide almost 60% of concessional loans in aid for trade. All US aid for trade is in grants and the vast majority of aid from EU institutions is also provided in grants. Combined they provide 43% of total grants to aid for trade.

Box 2.2 Reporting to the Creditor Reporting System

The **Inter-American Development Bank** (IADB) is committed to Aid-for-Trade Initiatives and is one of the largest sources of development financing in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2010, the IADB revised their methodology for reporting to the CRS. At the same time, some slight discrepancies were found in 2009 data, while serious under-reporting was noted with respect to 2008 flows. The IADB has since sent revisions for both years (see below).

According to the revised data, in 2009 the IADB committed USD 239.7 million towards aid for trade and another USD 6.1 billion in non-concessional flows. At almost 57%, economic infrastructure projects cover the bulk of aid-for-trade funding followed by building productive capacity (USD 93.4 million) and trade policy and regulations (USD 8.7 million). Bolivia and Nicaragua, were the IADB's largest recipients in 2009, and attracted 40% of the total.

OECD is working closely with IADB to update the CRS with regard to both 2008 and 2009 data. However, it should be noted that the tables in Annex 1 are based on present CRS data.

Commitments, USD million (current prices)

	2008		2009	
	Present CRS data	Revised IADB data	Present CRS data	Revised IADB data
Aid for trade				
Building Productive Capacity	33.0	104.0	66.0	93.4
Economic Infrastructure	49.7	61.5	162.6	137.6
Trade Policy and Regulations	2.0	8.5	8.7	8.7
TOTAL	84.6	174.0	237.3	239.7
Trade-related Other Official Flows				
Building Productive Capacity	1 146.9	3 778.4	3 354.7	2 641.5
Economic Infrastructure	574.2	2 773.1	3 444.2	3 473.5
Trade Policy and Regulations	13.4	31.6	249.5	21.2
TOTAL	1 734.5	6 583.2	7 048.4	6 136.2

The **Islamic Development Bank** (IsDB) is also working to improve global information sharing on aid for trade. It intends to start providing activity-level data on its operations to the OECD Creditor Reporting System, which will allow the production of statistics on aid for trade extended by IsDB on the same basis as for other donors and multilateral agencies. The reporting procedures and definitions were discussed in detail during a statistical mission by the OECD Secretariat to the IsDB headquarters in March 2011. The first data submission, covering the IsDB's ordinary capital resources (OCR) operations, is planned for 2011 on 2010 flows. Other entities of the IsDB group will be included in the reporting in a second stage.

When analysing **Australia's** 2009 aid-for-trade commitment flows users should exercise caution. Since supplying CRS data to the DAC, a number of conceptual and methodological issues have been identified which could not be corrected prior to the release of this publication. The data contained in the tables do not accurately reflect Australia's aid-for-trade commitments for 2009. The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) estimates that Australia's aid for trade will continue to increase, furthermore AusAID are undertaking a review of the conceptual and methodological processes to ensure Australian commitment data aligns with OECD reporting requirements. Revised data will be sent to the OECD and made available electronically. Australia remains committed to the Aid-for-Trade Initiative and understands the importance of the role of credible data to track global aid-for-trade efforts.

Figure 2.10 Donors' shares of aid for trade grants, Commitments, 2009 (2009 constant)



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)

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Figure 2.11 Donors' shares of aid for trade loans, Commitments, 2009 (2009 constant)



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)
Note: Equity investment is classified as loans.

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LDCs received aid for trade mostly in grant form.

Loans tend to go mostly to MICs because of their higher capital productivity and repayment ability, while LDCs receive aid for trade mostly in grants. Two thirds of aid for trade to LDCs is delivered in grants and one third in loans, used mostly to finance economic infrastructure projects. Within LDCs and between certain periods, there is great variation in the amounts of aid for trade provided in loans. For instance, Bangladesh between 2007 and 2009 received over 80% of its aid for trade in loans from Japan and the World Bank for projects in energy and transport. More than half of aid for trade to Ethiopia was provided as concessional loans from the World Bank and France for transport and energy, while in Afghanistan almost 100% of aid for trade is provided in grants, with the United States and the United Kingdom providing 73% of total assistance. Grants for LDCs increased by 9% in 2009, and loans to the LDCs increased by 44%, with more support from the AfDB, Japan and the World Bank. Indeed the World Bank provides 55% of loans to LDCs, Japan 13% and AfDB 12%.

Figure 2.12 Aid for trade grants and total aid for trade to LDCs



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)

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WHAT DOES AID FOR TRADE FINANCE?

Since the 2002-05 baseline, aid to economic infrastructure and building productive capacity has dominated aid-for-trade flows. Both sectors increased steadily from the 2002-05 until 2008 with economic infrastructure growing annually on average by 18% and building productive capacity by 14%.

The food and financial crisis shifted the distribution…

In 2009, aid for trade to Africa increased USD 2.7 billion – most of it concentrated in agriculture (up USD 0.9 billion), banking and finance (up USD 0.7 billion), mining and energy (up USD 1 billion). Increases in these sectors are likely a response to the food and financial crises, as well as energy- and commodity-price spikes. Figure 2.13 shows how flows to these sectors in Africa have evolved since the baseline and show large increases in 2008 and 2009 for all sectors.

Figure 2.13 Aid for trade to Africa: responses to food and financial crises



Source: Authors calculation based on OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)

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….and increased commitments to agriculture and banking...

In 2009, total aid to building productive capacities continued to increase, while support for economic infrastructure declined because of moderately less aid for transport and energy generation. The increases in building productive capacity were mostly in agriculture, banking and finance. Aid to agriculture has increased by 105% since the baseline and 28% since 2008. Aid to the banking and financial services sector has increased by 140% since the baseline and 19% since 2008. Combined these three sectors are attracting 71% of aid flows to building productive capacities.

Figure 2.14 Building Productive Capacity



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)
Note: Building productive capacity ncludes trade development activities which are identifiable through trade development policy marker in the CRS since 2007 flows.

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While considerable support goes to building productive capacities, not all of this is directly trade related. Using the trade development marker in the CRS, donors estimate that USD 1.9 billion has a principal trade objective and another USD 2.9 billion a significant trade objective. In 2009, trade-related projects represented more than a quarter of a total USD 18 billion in aid to the productive sectors. However, all aid to these sectors helped to create an environment supportive of private-sector development and enhaced productivity in various economic sectors, such as agriculture, banking and financial services, and tourism.

…with a focus on trade development objectives

Since 2007, the use of the trade development marker has increased, and for 2009 flows nearly all DAC donors reported. The amounts of support with a principle trade objective has increased 55% since reporting began in 2007, and for a significant objective, it has nearly doubled from USD 1.5 to USD 2.9 billion. Different sectors vary in the extent to which the trade development marker is reported *e.g.* donors considered that 70% of business services and 79% of tourism are directly related to developing trade capacities. Even for the larger sectors such as banking and agriculture significant shares are reported to have a trade component (29% in banking and 16% for agriculture).

Economic infrastructure support falls slightly…

The major components of economic infrastructure, transport and energy both decreased slightly in 2009 while communications increased slightly. Japan is the largest donor in the transport and storage sector among DAC members, providing more than half of the funding both in 2008 (USD 5 billion out of USD 9.5 billion) and 2009 (USD 3.9 billion out of USD 7.4 billion). Nearly all these Japanese funds went to Asia. The biggest projects were rail transit systems construction in Delhi, Bangkok and Jakarta, totalling USD 3.3 billion in two years. Additionally, Japan provided another USD 871 million to India for its Hyderabad outer ring road project in two instalments.

Figure 2.15 Economic Infrastructure



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)

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The World Bank, Korea and United Kingdom provided almost 60% of total aid for trade in communications in 2009. While the World Bank and the United Kingdom focussed on Africa, Korea divided its support between Africa and Asia. While bilateral donors scaled down their commitments in the energy sector, multilateral donors scaled up their support from USD 1.7 billion in 2008 to USD 3 billion in 2009.

…while aid for trade policy and regulations increased.

Trade policy and regulations remains relatively small in total flows and has fluctuated between 2006 and 2009, although for all years (with the exception of 2007) there have been moderate increases. Flows to this area are currently almost USD 1.4 billion annually. Most of this support goes to trade policy and administration management. Trade Facilitation has increased 187% since the baseline period and now stands at USD 266 million. EU institutions contributed USD 173 million in 2008 and USD 86 million in 2009 to trade facilitation. In 2008, the EU allocated USD 63 million to promote mutual trade by removing technical barriers to trade between Ukraine and the EU.

Figure 2.16 Trade Policy and Regulations



Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)

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WHAT ARE THE AGGREGATE TRENDS?

From annual to aggregate trends.

Monitoring the year-to-year fluctuations in commitments and examining their causes provides a useful spotlight on global aid-for-trade trends. However, as noted above, these annual changes are more pronounced in aid for trade because of the predominance of large commitments to major infrastructure projects. This gives the impression that aid volatility and predictability are problematic. Looking at aggregate aid-for-trade flows provides an overview against which the changes in the annual numbers become less salient. It also provides an opportunity to examine in a more holistic manner the main questions posed in this chapter. Moreover it enables the examination of total flows, distribution, concentration and the comparison of aid for trade with overall ODA.

Commitments totalled USD 238 billion between 2002 and 2009 and…

Since 2002, a total of USD 238 billion in aid for trade has been committed. Asia received USD 111 billion or 47% between 2002 and 2009, and Africa USD 81 billion or 34%. The top 8 recipients are located in Asia, with India, Iraq and Vietnam receiving considerably higher volumes than the rest of the recipients. More specifically, India has received USD 16 billion in commitments since 2002, Iraq USD 15 billion and Vietnam USD 14.8 billion. Africa has 10 countries in the top 20 headed by Ethiopia, Egypt, Tanzania, Morocco and Kenya. Turkey is the only country in the list from outside Asia or Africa, and it received a total of USD 3.5 billion in aid for trade since 2002.

…is relatively concentrated, but…

There were 157 countries that were eligible to receive ODA and thus aid for trade between 2002 and 2009. The pattern of the distribution of aid for trade is relatively concentrated, with ten countries receiving 45% of total country-specific aid-for-trade commitments between 2002 and 2009. The bottom 50 countries received less than 1.5% of total flows. However, some of these countries such as Saudi Arabia, Slovenia and Malta no longer have the status of aid recipient. Some recipients are small island states and while these have small flows in terms of volume, they are among the largest recipients of aid for trade per capita. For instance, St Helena, Niue and Cook Islands received USD 2 742, USD 1 840 and USD 659 per capita respectively in 2009, but they have a combined population of just 22,000. Oceania dominates a list of per capita recipients with 7 out of the top 10 being from this region.

Table 2.1 Top 20 recipients of aid for trade, by total commitments from 2002-09

USD million (2009 constant)

	Commitments					Total commitments 2002-09
	2002-05 avg.	2006	2007	2008	2009	
India	1 703.6	1 847.0	2 388.6	3 424.0	1 882.4	16 356.3
Iraq	2 101.2	2 208.1	1 191.4	3 029.7	400.2	15 234.1
Viet Nam	1 643.6	1 450.2	2 141.9	2 046.0	2 608.1	14 820.7
Afghanistan	759.2	1 267.2	1 478.2	1 692.0	1 509.5	8 983.8
Indonesia	1 208.6	1 022.6	905.9	895.9	970.0	8 629.0
Bangladesh	830.0	580.1	1 008.9	1 187.9	892.2	6 989.2
Pakistan	648.6	408.5	738.2	1 150.4	965.2	5 856.7
China	829.6	614.8	402.6	728.7	588.2	5 652.6
Ethiopia	533.5	729.2	912.8	740.7	883.6	5 400.3
Egypt	578.8	809.8	567.2	990.1	277.1	4 959.5
Tanzania	412.5	429.8	586.9	1 325.2	881.3	4 873.1
Morocco	328.6	515.5	305.3	1 799.9	848.4	4 783.5
Kenya	314.6	510.3	973.0	92.2	962.1	3 795.8
Sri Lanka	513.1	347.1	340.8	487.8	457.3	3 685.6
Congo, Dem. Rep.	512.9	161.0	479.7	267.4	724.6	3 684.3
Ghana	280.8	350.0	784.4	633.8	697.4	3 588.6
Turkey	485.0	281.2	224.0	785.9	283.8	3 514.8
Nigeria	229.6	189.4	286.3	705.4	1 333.4	3 432.9
Uganda	258.3	191.7	739.7	305.5	1 017.9	3 288.1
Mozambique	354.5	346.5	488.1	520.0	430.4	3 202.8
TOTAL						**130 731.6**

Source: OECD-DAC. Aid activities database (CRS)

Figure 2.17 Cumulative share of aid for trade and Official Development Assistance by total commitments 2002-09, %



Source: Authors calculation based on OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)
Note: Exclude multi-countries programmes and activities.

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Most developing countries receive little aid or no aid for trade. In fact, 100 developing countries account for a little over 10% of total aid-for-trade flows between 2002 and 2009. Conversely 25 countries account for almost 70% of total aid-for-trade commitments. However, examined in terms of population a different picture emerges. The top eight recipients of aid-for-trade flows representing 40% are all from Asia (India, Iraq, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and China) and account for 58% of the total population of recipient countries.

…is similar to overall ODA distribution.

Total ODA is slightly less concentrated with the top ten recipients accounting for just under 40% and the bottom 50 countries receiving less than 2%. However, since aid for trade is part and parcel of regular ODA this is not surprising. It may be slightly more concentrated because of the nature and size of large infrastructure projects which leads to large increases in commitments for particular countries in particular years.

WHAT IS THE OUTLOOK FOR AID-FOR-TRADE FLOWS?

The outlook for aid for trade is moderate…

Total bilateral ODA grew by 6.5% in 2010 and will continue to grow in 2011 and 2012 by approximately 2-3% based on an OECD survey of indicative forward spending plans. If aid for trade maintains its share in sector allocable aid then incremental growth can be expected over the medium-term. Furthermore, the recent G20 commitment on aid for trade might also bolster support. As noted before, Multi-Year Action Plan on Development at the Seoul G20 Summit included a commitment to at least maintain, beyond 2011, aid-for-trade levels that reflect the average of the last three years 2006 to 2008 (Box 2.2).

Almost two third of donors have indicative forward spending plans including major donors such as the United States, Japan, United Kingdom and the EU, while fewer than half of the multilateral donors have these spending plans, including the World Bank and many of the regional development banks, such as the IADB, AfDB and IsDB. Furthermore, nine bilateral and seven multilateral donors have specific estimates for aid for trade, though others can say something about future aid-for-trade spending even if they do not have exact estimates.

...some donors are continuing to scale up resources…

France estimates that it will spend EUR 850 million per year of which EUR 150 million per year for technical assistance from 2010. The United Kingdom has committed to spending at least GBP 672 million annually as part of its G-20 commitment on aid for trade; and it expects to exceed this amount by at least GBP 100 million per year. The EU has set aside a total of EUR 22.7 billion for the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries for the period 2008-2013. Between EUR 4 and 5 billion of this will be allocated to aid-for-trade; a total of EUR 1.78 billion is made available in support of ACP integration efforts at regional level; and a total of around EUR 1.16 billion concerns the aid-for-trade agenda at the multiregional level.

...some are pledging to maintain flows…

As noted before, in 2010 the G20 pledged to maintain support for aid for trade at current levels (Box 2.3). In addition, a number of other donors have made similar commitments. For instance, Switzerland's aid for trade is expected to remain at current levels in 2011 and 2012. Non-DAC donors are also maintaining support for aid for trade. Singapore noted that while aid for trade will remain a key component of its co-operation strategy, resources will be allocated based on local needs and Singapore's capacity to contribute.

...others are unable to indicate future spending.

The German budget system operates on an annual modus. Programming of trade-related assistance and broader aid for trade is carried out with a time horizon of no more than 1 to 2 years. The United States uses a mix of funding and planning vehicles for foreign assistance, as directed by the US Congress. Planning and spending are intended to be responsive to partner-country needs. During the annual budget process, agencies begin to allocate resources to specific sector programmes, such as aid for trade. Final allocations are not made until Congress acts on the President's Budget, and appropriations levels are known and enacted in law. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and its partner countries agree on budgets of up to five years in their "compact" (grant agreement), which lays out objectives, programme elements and targets for program success. MCC funds this multi-year programme in its entirety from the outset. For threshold programmes which are normally two years in length, the threshold agreement contains programme details and funding plans for the entire length of the programme. Again, MCC funds are set aside up front to ensure aid predictability. In both cases, MCC calculates overall programme funding of aid for trade as the agreements enter into force, which then triggers funding obligations. MCC's aid-for-trade activities are embedded within the various activities that make up an MCA programme and MCC partner countries provide rolling estimates of annual forward spending, but do not break out aid for trade on an annual basis.

Box 2.3 G20 aid-for-trade pledge

"Commitment to at least maintain, beyond 2011, aid-for-trade levels that reflect the average of the last three years (2006 to 2008) and (…) monitor these commitments and evaluate their impact on LICs' capacity to trade. We will consider the outcome of the Global Aid for Trade Review of July 2011."

During 2006-2008 the OECD/DAC members of the G20 Development Working Group (*i.e.* Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union) provided on average USD 7.3 billion in aid for trade to the LICs (see table). In 2009, the total volume increased to USD 8.7 billion and is projected to reach USD 9.2 billion in 2010.

Most donors increased aid for trade in 2009 relative to the 2006-08 average including the European Union, United States and Japan. The United Kingdom and South Korea had substantial increases while some others declined slightly. While the OECD posses approximate data on the overall volume of G20 South-South co-operation, this provides insufficient detail to establish an aid-for-trade baseline.

G20 Members	Self Assessments	G20 DWG OECD/DAC Aid for Trade to LICs *Commitments, USD million (2009 constant)*	
		2006-08 average	**2009**
Argentina	South-South	..	..
Australia	Donor	101.3	...
Brazil	South-South	..	..
Canada	Donor	216.6	288.3
China	South-South	..	..
France	Donor	535.0	411.9
Germany	Donor	364.6	352.0
India	South-South	..	..
Indonesia	South-South	..	..
Italy	Donor	99.6	72.1
Japan	Donor	1 815.8	2 353.1
Mexico	South-South /Partner	..	..
Russia*	--	..	..
Saudi Arabia	--	..	..
South Africa	--	..	..
South Korea	Donor	251.0	492.1
Turkey	--	..	0.1
United Kingdom	Donor	301.5	772.5
United States	Donor	2 195.8	2 416.4
EU Institutions	Donor	1 369.6	1 472.5
Spain	Donor	85.8	63.3
TOTAL		**7 336.5**	**8 694.3**

** not a WTO member*
.. no data available
. . .for an explanation of Australia's aid for trade data, see Box 2.2.

Source: OECD-DAC, Aid activities database (CRS)

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT LOCAL MONITORING?

From global review to local monitoring.

The latest OECD/WTO questionnaire solicited information about monitoring at the country level, and there has been much discussion in the WTO Committee on Trade and Development as well as in regional forums about measuring aid-for-trade commitments at the global level and the perceived discrepancies with locally-registered flows. This section examines this issue and the extent to which partner countries posses detailed information about concessional financing in general and aid-for-trade flows in particular.

Partner countries are keeping track, but…

Firstly partner countries were asked if they kept track of external concessional financing. The majority, 62 out of 84 countries, report that they do keep track, another 13 do not, and a further 9 are either unsure or did not answer the question. What is clear from the responses is that tracking is usually preformed in the Finance or Economic Planning ministries, while the trade ministry is peripheral to the process. Given that most of the questionnaires were filled out by trade ministry officials, some experienced difficulties in estimating aid-for-trade flows. Gambia, like many others, noted that *"records are kept at the Loans and Debt Office under the Ministry of Finance"*. Kenya explained that *"the External Resources Department in the Ministry of Finance co-ordinates the donor support and financing to our budget"*. In Sierra Leone, it is the Development Assistance Coordination Office in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, while in Swaziland it is the Ministries of Economic Planning and Development and the Ministry of Finance.

…mostly only of ODA going directly to their budgets.

The survey confirms the findings that the two major systems used by partner countries to better manage aid flows are the Aid Management Platform (AMP), developed by Development Gateway, and the Development Assistance Database (DAD), developed by Synergy International Systems. A number of countries have also developed "home-grown" systems (OECD, 2009). In the questionnaire, 19 countries reported using the AMP and 30 the DAD, while others used these along with national accounting systems. In fact, 43 countries rely on some form of national accounting.

Figure 2.18 Partner country aid tracking systems



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

The AMP uses the AiDA (Accessible information on Development Activities) standard and relies on data harvesting techniques. The recipient-country database is automatically linked to the OECD/CRS database and several other international donor databases, such as those from the World Bank and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, DAD relies on in-country reporting mechanisms by aid agencies. The advantage of the DAD approach is that data is based on what is actually happening in the field and so, in theory, should be more reliable. The DAD can also be linked more closely to recipient-country budget classifications. Because it is web-based, the DAD is accessible to the public at large. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that sectoral classifications may vary greatly among countries causing discrepancies between country-level date the aggregate level. Questions have arisen as to the reliability of the data in the system. Without credibility, development partners have become weary of supplying information to the DAD, reducing its effectiveness still further.

In Burundi, a National Committee for Co-ordination of Aid uses the AMP, while Cape Verde is in the process of instituting an AMP system scheduled for completion in late 2011. Gabon is also working on developing a particular system. In the Solomon Islands, the Ministry of Development Planning and Aid Co-ordination is currently developing an AMP to improve the co-ordination of aid in the country. Suriname will establish an aid co-ordination unit within the Ministry of Finance. Gambia keeps records at the Loans and Debt Office under the Ministry of Finance, which uses the Commonwealth Secretariat Debt Relief Management Strategy to capture all loans and grants in the country. However, the government is planning on implementing an AMP system on which training has already begun. Within the EIF, the government will also create an aid-for-trade database. However, in general there are no specific systems used for gathering information on aid for trade.

Several partner countries also have their own aid management systems, such as Ecuador's Information System for International Development. Zambia uses Excel- and Access-based systems (Ministry of Finance and National Planning in-house system). Uganda also uses *"spread-sheets developed in house."* In Fiji, the Aid Unit in the Ministry of Finance has a Excel spread-sheet database which has details of aid inflows. However, the Unit is currently in discussions with UNDP about adopting the DAD system. All external concessionary financing inflows are captured through the national accounting system or Financial Management Information System (FMIS).

Systems vary in their complexity. Azerbaijan keeps track of aid flows "*through simple filing in the organisation*", whereas Indonesia has multiple databases for managing its aid budget. *"With regard to aid-management platforms"*, it reports, *"Indonesia has two schemes: the Blue Book and the Borrowing Strategy; for the development assistance database, Indonesia has Debt Management and Financial Analysis System; the National Accounting System of Indonesia is Central Government Accounting System and Local Government Accounting System that recorded all aid and loan in State Budget scheme."*

Most partner countries confirm that aid for trade is increasing…

Where partner countries are tracking flows and are able to say something about how flows have changed in recent years, most point to an increases from all donor groups. 32 countries say aid for trade has increased or stayed the same since 2008, with 21 reporting increases. South-South and multilateral providers have also increased their aid for trade, with 60% of countries indicating an increasing in assistance from these sources. Less recognise is the support of NGOs, with only 16 partner countries saying anything about resources provided from this source. 11 countries indicate declining support from DAC donors, and 7 report declining support from multilaterals. It is telling, though, that almost half are unable to say anything about changes in aid-for-trade flows highlighting the lack of detailed information at the country level.

Figure 2.19 Changes in aid for trade according to partner countries



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011

… others are unable to say much about the details of aid-for-trade flows.

This was further confirmed when partners were asked about the composition of aid for trade by type of provider. While many partners were able to assess whether aid-for-trade was increasing or not, fewer were able to provide information on the magnitude and provision by type of donor. On average, over 40 countries were unable to answer this question about providers of assistance. Even for those countries that answered, there is a credibility gap in that not all responses fully account for their aid envelope and over 50% do not recognise the contributions of NGOs. These answers indicate considerable gaps in local accounting systems when it comes to aid for trade.

Figure 2.20 Distribution of aid for trade by donor



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011

Better local accounting systems are needed…

Most ODA is delivered to public-sector institutions. In the case of aid for trade, DAC donors use this channel for more than three quarters of their commitments, while only about 6% is delivered through NGOs. Public-private partnerships are an even more minor destination representing less than 1% of flows. While reporting on delivery channels is not complete, the available data suggests similar trends for multilaterals. For ODA delivered to the public sector, the finance ministry is just one delivery channels, together with sector ministries and other public and private organisations.

Thus, multiple agencies need to be involved in tracking ODA flows and these efforts need to be combined and tabulated. However, little is known about the extent to which the partners attempt to collect information about the totality of ODA as reported by donors to the CRS. In Madagascar, the Central Bank and the National Institute of Statistics carry out biannual surveys of NGOs. Ethiopia keeps track of concessional financing, but not of ODA, to local NGOs (a major destination of funds from the United States) or to private associations, such as chambers of commerce. In Grenada, aid-for-trade flows are monitored by the agencies and ministries associated with the various projects that are part of the Public Sector Investment Programme. However, Grenada reports that *"the data is not disaggregated and only actual disbursements are registered"*. Lao PDR's aid-for-trade database tracks overall project volumes, but does not provide annual disbursement data. This would again make it difficult to match CRS flows which are recorded annually.

…but reconciling global and country data is challenging...

Even if partner countries could track aid-for-trade flows more accurately there would still be a number of factors accounting for the discrepancy between flows recorded in the CRS and flows recorded in national accounts:

- CRS data provides the monetary value of in-kind aid, such as most forms of technical co-operation, whereas partner countries will only track services rendered. In addition, the cross-cutting nature of aid for trade means that certain projects may be accounted for under different codes in country systems, perhaps in line with allocations to ministries.
- CRS data is usually presented in constant terms and US dollars. In contrast, partner-country data will likely be presented in nominal terms and in a number of currencies.
- Accounting systems of partner countries may also be based on a specific financial year which might differ from the CRS reference year.
- Government systems will provide information on budgets, while CRS reports are based on annual disbursements.

In summary, there are many different approaches involving different systems, in different ministries, with different timeframes, and different accounting cycles. Coordinating all these various actors is difficult, which explains why many countries do not recognise the global flows.

…because the CRS and local tracking systems have different functions…

A recent study by the OECD and the Development Gateway concluded that the OECD Creditor Reporting System and local aid information management systems have *"distinct and important roles"*. Few local databases on aid provide accurate data. Furthermore, the different platforms can make it difficult to integrate local data into international data bases (Khadras, 2010). OECD (2009) compared data in the AMP and the CRS and concludes that while the data are comparable in aggregate terms, the systems differ in terms of purpose, coverage, sector classifications, and other factors. Country systems, such as the AMP, are central to managing aid flow on a day-to-day basis, while the CRS is the authoritative source for aggregate data that is most useful in international comparisons and historical analysis. This is important given that an essential function of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative is to monitor and access additionality, comparability, and the implementation of the Hong Kong aid-for-trade pledges. Although progress is being made, it is clear that without better local aid databases developing countries cannot hold donors truly accountable.

…while the definition of aid for trade remains an issue.

The Solomon Islands provides a partial explanation as to why so few can answer these questions: *"There is insufficient information available to answer these questions, particularly given the broadness of the definition of aid for trade and the fact that trade-related financing is not distinguished from other types of external financing"*. As Cameroon and others note, partner countries have difficulty identifying the border between aid for trade and ODA. Nepal also makes a similar point: *"since aid for trade covers assistance to increase export of goods and services, training to trade officials, support for national stakeholders, institutional support and so on, no clear demarcation has been made in practice between traditional ODA and aid for trade. This has hampered not only on accessing aid for trade but also on predictability in terms of volumes, conditions and procedures."* Ultimately major differences in the perception of aid-for-trade flows stem from differences concerning the definition of aid for trade. The provision of aid-for-trade assistance to countries pre-dates the launch of the initiative, and *"created some confusion as to what can be described as aid for trade"* (UNECA, 2010).

While the Task Force defines aid for trade as whatever a partner country considers trade-related, the CRS proxies described earlier in this chapter were chosen to track progress in aid-for-trade flows, specifically to measure additionality. The advantages of the CRS are its coverage and it's the depth of its historical data, allowing the WTO and OECD to track what was happening and what was not. Essentially these proxies capture all donor support for economic sectors, whether tradable or not. While inexact, the proxies enable the aid-for-trade community to assess the magnitude and distribution of flows that support trade. Statistical approximations are needed because getting exact measures of what is specifically trade-related could not be achieved efficiently or in a cost-effective manner.

Each country will have a different definition of aid for trade and this sometimes creates confusion. For example, while India is one of the largest beneficiaries of aid for trade, as noted earlier, India's own definition of aid for trade is narrower. It notes that *"except for a DFID (Department for International Development) funded UNCTAD India Project that wound up in 2010, no aid that comes to India is for trade. All the bilateral assistance that India gets is for either social sector or for infrastructure."* In addition, trade ministries in developing countries generally only consider trade-related activity in its narrowest sense. Economic infrastructure and building productive capacity, which represent the vast majority of the aid-for-trade flows, may only be partly trade-related. However, it would be impossible to determine the precise "trade" component so instead total numbers are used as proxies. If the proxies are increasing, as they have been, then generally we can say that donors are doing more in support of trade. In addition, these areas provide an essential enabling environment in which firms and individual producers can access finance, and market and distribute their goods. It provides public goods such as transport networks, energy and communications. It also helps build capacities in its broadest sense not just for traders or producers.

CONCLUSIONS

In the five years since the WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade presented its recommendations, the WTO and the OECD working with 27 donor agencies and 20 multilateral institutions have assembled the data and statistics to provide a basis for the global discussion on aid for trade. Clear benchmarks have been established for measuring aid-for-trade flows using the OECD Creditor Reporting System. This chapter outlined the latest available numbers.

In 2009, aid-for-trade commitments reached approximately USD 40 billion, a 60% increase from the 2002-05 baseline, from which progress is assessed, and 30% since the last *Aid for Trade at a Glance Report*. While the changes from 2008 to 2009 were marginal in terms of aggregate flows - increasing by 2% - the pattern of who provided aid for trade, who received it and the categories supported varied considerably. Disbursements which show actual financial payments and, thus, the realisation of donors' intentions and the implementation of their policies have been growing steadily at 11-12% for each year since 2006 - reaching USD 29 billion in 2009 - up 40% since 2006. These figures indicate that past commitments are being met.

Global monitoring has provided useful information for all stakeholders in aid for trade. However, increasingly a shift is taking place with more emphasis on local tracking and monitoring. Better local aid tracking systems are needed but reconciling data between the country and global level is challenging because the CRS and local aid tracking system have different functions and the definition of aid for trade remains an issue.■

NOTES

1 The source of the data on aid flows is extracted from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) – a database covering around 90% of all ODA which was recognised as the best available data source for tracking global aid-for-trade flows.

2 In order to monitor aid-for-trade flows and to assess progress in meeting pledges made at the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, the OECD has established a baseline of average aid for trade between 2002 and 2005

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CHAPTER 3
HOW IS AID FOR TRADE **DELIVERED**?

This chapter presents the findings of the 2011 aid-for-trade monitoring survey of donor and partner country adherence to these key aid effectiveness principles. More specifically, it assesses whether the delivery of aid for trade has improved since the previous survey in 2009. The commitment to the Paris principles by both partner countries and donors on aid for trade remains strong. Compared to the situation in 2009, the 2011 survey finds that country ownership over aid for trade has advanced the furthest among the five Paris principles. That is to say, many partner countries are mainstreaming trade into national development strategies. They are consulting broadly involving the private sector, civil society organisations and relevant government agencies to formulate trade strategies and priority project proposals. Donors continue to work towards harmonising their procedures and aligning their support around national priorities relating to trade. But progress appears to be uneven and partner countries note that more remains to be done, including addressing particular challenges in accessing aid for trade. Putting the aid effectiveness principles into practice necessitates continued attention and efforts. Donors and partner countries note that the challenges in delivering aid for trade effectively are not unique to this initiative, but are, in fact, part and parcel of the broader aid effectiveness agenda.

INTRODUCTION

Aid for trade is about enabling partner countries to use trade more effectively to promote growth and poverty reduction and to achieve their development objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). To achieve these objectives, aid for trade – as with any cross-sectoral development co-operation programme – involves complex relationships among partner country governments, bilateral donors, multilateral and regional agencies, the private sector and other non-governmental organisations. Each of these stakeholders has different priorities, operating arrangements, timeframes and financial and human resources. Therefore, making aid for trade work better requires comprehensive and rigorous implementation of the tenets of aid effectiveness enshrined in the Paris Declaration, which encapsulates decades of lessons learned and which sets out clear commitments aimed at improving results.

The importance of aid quality was underlined in the 2006 Recommendations of the WTO Task Force on Aid for Trade, which urged that the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness should guide the delivery of aid for trade. In practice, this means that partner countries need to integrate trade objectives into their development strategies and take the lead in their implementation (*Ownership*). To make ownership a reality, donors are expected to align their aid around these strategies and priorities and use local systems for the provision of their aid (*Alignment*). Furthermore, all aid-for-trade activities provided by donors should be delivered in a harmonised and transparent manner (*Harmonisation*). Finally, managing for results and being accountable for them should ensure effective delivery of aid for trade (*Managing for results/Mutual accountability*).

Aid for trade exemplifies the benefits of adhering to the principles of the Paris Declaration. Furthermore, it shows how coherence at the international level can – and should – work. From the outset, the Aid-for-Trade Initiative has contributed significantly towards implementing the Paris principles. For instance, although some initially suggested setting up a new dedicated aid-for-trade fund, the general view was that aid-for-trade objectives would be better advanced not by creating additional mechanisms but by making existing ones work better. Indeed, if aid for trade were implemented through earmarked funds rather than as part of broader development programmes, it would risk undermining the principles of ownership and alignment (Voionmaa and Brüntrup, 2009). This is particularly important considering that donors provide over a quarter of their ODA to aid for trade. Another achievement has been the adoption of a system to strengthen mutual accountability between the trade and development communities at two levels: first, at the country (and regional) level, to foster genuine ownership; and second, at the global level to ensure that the needs identified at country level – whether financial or performance-related – are addressed.

This chapter presents the key findings of the monitoring survey pertaining to the implementation of the Paris principles with respect to aid for trade. The analysis is based on questionnaire responses from 84 partner countries, 43 donors, 10 South-South partners and 9 regional economic communities. In addition, a number of relevant case stories have been referenced. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section examines whether the country-led approach is being reinforced and how the process of consultation and co-ordination is working. Developments in donors' performance with respect to the operationalisation of two key Paris principles (*i.e.* alignment and harmonisation) are presented in the subsequent section. The final section draws some conclusions.

HAS OWNERSHIP OVER AID FOR TRADE IMPROVED?

Strengthened ownership…

Ownership is widely regared as a precondition for development (OECD, 2008). When developing countries are not in the driver's seat to steer their own development path, or when donors fail to respect their leadership, then the results from development assistance will most likely be unsustainable. Thus, the aid effectiveness agenda acknowledges "the primacy of ownership" (Stern *et al.*, 2008). Within the framework of effective development partnerships, donors have committed themselves to "respect the right – and responsibility – of the partner country to exercise effective leadership over its development policies and strategies, and coordinate development actions" (OECD, 2005). A commitment to country ownership and country-driven approaches – complemented by more focused aid – is key to successful implementation of aid for trade.

Aid for trade can be considered as a joint venture between developed and developing countries. It can only succeed if partner countries ensure that trade is an integral part of their development plans (*i.e.* mainstreaming trade) with clearly articulated needs and priorities (see Chapter 1). This is a point which comes out very strongly in the case stories. The importance of ownership – at the political as well as the technical level – in ensuring that projects and programmes achieve their objectives was clearly expressed by many partner countries, donors and providers of South-South co-operation. The case stories suggest that the partner government's commitment, often at the highest level, is critical. Furthermore, co-ordination with domestic stakeholders, as well as with the donor community, will enhance country ownership and strengthen mutual accountability. For example, a case story on multi-donor assistance to Cambodia's rice-export sector attributes its success to strong country ownership and leadership in identifying binding constraints, and the creation of trilateral partnerships (donors, public and private sector) which ensured that the projects and programmes were aligned with Cambodia's priorities and could be self-sustaining post-donor support.

Shimomura and Ohno (2005) point to two elements that countries themselves must demonstrate if country ownership is to be taken seriously: the capacity to own development policies (policy autonomy) and the capacity to own the relationship with the donor community (donor management).[1] In order to exercise country leadership, countries must undertake co-ordination on three levels: "policy", "institutional" and "donor-partner government" level (UNDP 2008).

In 2009, almost all partner countries reported that they either fully or partly mainstreamed trade in their development strategies. Consequently, the 2011 survey no longer addressed this issue. Instead, it focussed on progress in encouraging national and international stakeholder dialogues. It shows that the principle of ownership appears to be taking hold better in the realm of aid for trade. The remainder of this section focuses on issues related to policy-level mainstreaming, institutional arrangements for aid co-ordination, and finally donor-partner dialogues.

…through better trade mainstreaming…

The relationship between trade and poverty reduction is not automatic. It needs to be managed and made compatible with the country development strategies and policies (OECD, 2011). Partner countries need to design their own trade strategies and make them central to their overall development efforts. This means integrating trade into national development or poverty reduction strategies and sectoral policies. Therefore, trade mainstreaming is inextricably linked with the concept of ownership. Such a process can help harness the benefits of trade, mitigate its possible negative impacts and improve the rate of development (UNDP, 2008). However, raising the profile of trade often proves difficult due to lack of institutional capacities and the division of competences between many ministries (Voionmaa and Brüntrup, 2009). While the trade ministry is responsible for negotiating and implementing trade policy, many aid-for-trade issues fall under the responsibility of other line ministries (*e.g.* finance, agriculture, transport). Moreover, the trade ministry is often absent from consultations with donors when national development priorities are discussed.

Despite such challenges, there is now a body of evidence from the global monitoring survey and other studies suggesting that trade is being increasingly mainstreamed into partner country development strategies. The 2009 survey showed that more than half of the partner countries indicated that they "fully" mainstreamed trade in their national development plans with well developed trade-related priorities and implementation plans. This assessment is broadly in line with the findings of a UNDP study assessing the role of trade policy in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). On the basis of the 72 PRSPs surveyed, Kosack (2008) found that trade was increasingly prominent in poverty reduction strategies, with 50 of them including a section devoted exclusively to trade. Furthermore, 52 PRSPs related their trade policies in some way to an analysis of their nation's poverty profile, and many showed substantial improvement in integrating trade and poverty issues. However, the study qualified these findings by stating that many PRSPs seemed to view poverty reduction at some distance removed from trade, rather than fully integrated with it (Kosack, 2008: 17). In a similar study of second-generation PRSPs in selected African countries, Driscoll *et al.* (2007) also concluded that there was still room for improvement, particularly with regard to trade-poverty linkages.[2]

In the LDCs, progress towards mainstreaming can be linked to the enhancement of the Integrated Framework (IF) (Box 3.1). Kosack (2008), for example, found that the countries that made the most progress with integrating trade into their PRSPs (*e.g.* Uganda and Rwanda) did so following their Diagnostic Trade Integration Study (DTIS). While most LDCs noted that it is still too early to tell (19 out of 32), eight respondents stated that the enhancement of the IF had made a significant impact on their ability to mainstream trade into their national development plans or poverty reduction strategies, with a further three reporting moderate impact.[3]

The role of Enhanced IF (EIF) is also documented in the case stories. For example, Lesotho noted that the EIF offers a way to overcome challenges related to mainstreaming trade. Another case story underlines how in both Uganda and Mali the EIF processes played an important role in efforts to integrate trade priorities in national development plans, as well as in sensitising donors on cross-sectoral links and the inefficiencies of isolated programmes.[4] There are, however, cases where such mainstreaming is still under way (OECD/WTO, 2011).[5] The WTO's Trade Policy Reviews of Democratic Republic of Congo and Malawi, as well as a joint review of Burkina Faso, Benin, and Mali also confirm the progress being made in mainstreaming trade.

…based on better national policy co-ordination…

Experience has shown that successful trade mainstreaming depends critically on consultation and co-ordination among different public and private stakeholders, as well as with donors and South-South development partners. This can be achieved by creating co-ordination mechanisms to promote broad-based consultations between these stakeholders to formulate trade strategies, action plans and project proposals (UNDP, 2008).

Aid-for-trade activities cut across many policy areas and sectors. Therefore, effectiveness in aid for trade will depend on many actors working together in a coherent way. As noted previously, the profile of trade can be raised through an institutional set-up that promotes stronger leadership for reform and more effective co-ordination by inter-ministerial teams. In the 2009 survey, the majority of partner countries (51 out of 82) reported that their trade department performed a coordinating role, but implementation was decentralised across ministries. Some had established inter-ministerial bodies, such as a national committee, to encourage a more inclusive, government-wide process.

Responses to the 2011 survey show that institutional mechanisms to coordinate trade-related support across government appear to be well established in many partner countries. Almost three quarters of the partner countries reported no change since 2008 in their institutional arrangements for the co-ordination and implementation of their aid-for-trade activities. In most countries, the trade ministry continues to perform the coordinating role while implementation is decentralised across ministries.[6]

Box 3.1 The Enhanced Integrated Framework and aid for trade

The Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade-related Technical Assistance for Least Developed Countries was originally launched in 1997 at the WTO and was seen as a means to build capacity in trade policy and other trade-related areas. The IF had two objectives: integrating trade into national development plans, such as poverty reduction strategies; and assisting in the coordinated delivery of support to address trade-related needs identified by LDCs. In the first stage of meeting these twin objectives, the IF called for a diagnostic trade integration study (DTIS) that specifies the main elements of the policy framework for trade integration, and an action matrix that maps out trade-related investment needs and identifies priority areas for the delivery of trade-related assistance.

Initial experience with the IF highlighted a number of problems: weak in-country capacity, lack of systematic follow-up at the country level, insufficient and uncertain financing, and variable donor responses to priorities identified in the DTIS. In May 2007, several enhancements were adopted to address these problems. The framework officially became "Enhanced" in October 2008 when an Executive Secretariat was established. The Enhanced IF (EIF) is intended to give LDCs greater ownership; to bring increased commitments from development partners; and to make improvements in the decision-making and management structure to ensure effective and timely delivery of increased financial resources.

Steps toward the enhancement of the IF came after the establishment of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative following the 2005 WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. The EIF is "an aid-for-trade partnership in action" for the LDCs. This multi-donor programme currently supports 47 LDCs worldwide, tackling their supply-side constraints to trade and helping them become more active players in the global trading system. The EIF works towards a wider goal of promoting economic growth and sustainable development and helping to lift more people out of poverty.

The Paris Declaration was also seen as very important to improving or "enhancing" the IF. The Task Force on an Enhanced Integrated Framework stated in its recommendations that "The enhanced IF should be guided by the aid effectiveness principles set out in the Paris Declaration, such as donor harmonisation, using country systems, promoting ownership and involving stakeholders such as the local private sector" (WT/IFSC/W/15).

The EIF process also aims to strengthen donors' support to a country's trade agenda. LDCs can use the EIF as a vehicle to assist in coordinating donors' support and to lever more aid-for-trade resources. Donors, in turn, can sign up to the EIF as a vehicle to deliver on their aid-for-trade commitments. The EIF programme is currently supported by 22 bilateral donors through contributions to the EIF Multi-Donor Trust Fund: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, and United Kingdom. To date, trust fund donors have contributed approximately USD 100 million, with total pledges of USD 182 million to be disbursed over a five year period.

The EIF has made significant progress in 2010 with regard to the institutional set-up of the programme, project delivery and outreach. Project implementation is now under way, with 19 multi-year National Implementation Arrangements projects and 7 pre-DTIS projects approved. To date, 42 DTIS and 3 DTIS updates have been validated, with another three such studies and several updates in the pipeline. The EIF is fully operational in 46 LDCs and in one other developing country that has recently graduated from LDC status. EIF graduating LDCs can also continue to access EIF funding for an additional three years after they graduate.

Several other countries (Gabon, Gambia, Madagascar, Mongolia, Sierra Leone and Yemen) have in place a central coordinating body. Evidently the task of co-ordination will be made much simpler (and involve lower transaction costs) when handled by a single entity.[7] Still, given its cross-sectoral nature, aid for-trade requires the involvement of various line ministries (*e.g.* finance, planning, transport, agriculture, businesses), and good co-ordination as well as communication between them. As such, the majority (11 out of 18) of the countries which carried out reforms delegated the coordinating role to several distinct entities. For instance, in countries such as Burundi, Mali, India, Nigeria, Tonga and Tuvalu, various line ministries, besides trade, are involved in coordinating trade-related support, often working through an inter-ministerial body (a national committee).

The EIF is one of the main vehicles for achieving better in-country co-ordination. In 28 of the 32 EIF countries[8] which have responded, the EIF focal point (often working out of the trade ministry) is responsible for in-country stakeholder consultation, and for overseeing and coordiating trade-related assistance. Few changes were reported in the entity or entities responsible for coordinating their aid for trade activities.[9] In a majority of the EIF countries, all relevant ministries are involved in the EIF process, although there is still room for improvement in promoting synergies with existing institutions and mechanisms. For example, in Zambia the EIF process was initially criticised as administratively cumbersome and slow because of difficulties in establising institutional mechanisms, on-off engagement by donors and limited buy-in by some stakeholders. Similar observations were also made in the case stories submitted by Malawi, Ethiopia and Niger.

Some 18 countries reported a change in their co-ordination mechanisms. In a number of cases where changes were made, the transfer of the co-ordination role was from a single ministry (typically the trade ministry) to a national co-ordination body (*i.e.* an inter-ministerial entity). Nine partner countries (Burundi, Fiji, Gambia, Mali, Madagascar, Nigeria, Suriname, Tonga and Uruguay) note that the changes have been made to improve co-ordination across government. For Gabon, Mongolia, Suriname and Tuvalu, institutional reforms resulted from a change of government. All but one (Tuvalu) opted for a single co-ordination entity. In Suriname, for example, the change of government provided an opportunity to rationalise the co-ordination procedures, establishing a dedicated unit within the Ministry of Finance for coordinating trade-related support. However, the responsibility for programme formulation and budget management is decentralised to individual line ministries.

Several case stories point to partner countries' weaknesses in co-ordination at the national level which affects the setting of priorities, implementation and the sense of ownership. For example, in the case of Zambia, one particular challenge was forging the necessary inter-ministerial lines of communications, which in turn held up official endorsement of the DTIS for nearly a year (OECD/WTO, 2011).[10] Institutional or political obstacles (*e.g.* inter-ministerial rivalries or vested interests) may also complicate inter-ministerial co-ordination. These weaknesses may explain why, in some cases, there seems to be a lack of synergy among the various players involved in implementing projects.

…and more inclusive partnerships…

The Accra Agenda for Action stresses that wide participation in development policy formulation and priority setting is paramount for country ownership. Indeed, many case stories highlight the importance of involving local stakeholders in the design and implementation phases of the activity, and the need to mobilise private sector. Stakeholder consultation is about "asking the constrained about constraints" (OECD, 2011), and has long been acknowledged as best practice in trade capacity building (OECD, 2001) and to make aid-for-trade effective (OECD, 2006). National stakeholders – both private and public sector, and non-governmental and civil society organisations – offer invaluable insights for identifying and prioritising the most critical constraints on trade expansion.

To achieve regular and effective dialogue, formal and informal consultation channels should be strengthened. A number of case stories highlight the challenges faced by governments in ensuring that consultation is broad-based, and includes representation from businesses outside the main cities and marginalised groups, such as informal traders and small-scale farmers. Some cases stories also point to the need to include women traders in such dialogues given their potentially powerful impact on progress towards meeting the MDGs.

Compared to the 2009 survey, the dialogue on aid for trade between government and national stakeholders has been significantly (39%) or moderately (36%) strengthened in three-quarters of partner countries surveyed. Whereas in 2009 stakeholder dialogues took place more frequently in middle-income partner countries this trend has now shifted to the LDCs (Figure 3.1). Some 17 LDCs report significant improvements, and an additional eight report moderate improvements. While less pronounced, stakeholder dialogues in lower middle-income countries (LMICs) and upper middle-income countries (UMICs)

Figure 3.1 More stakeholder dialogues are taking place in LDCs



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

have also seen some improvements. In terms of geography, Africa and Asia – where most of the poorest countries are found – show the strongest improvements. Latin America, where stakeholder dialogues were most common in 2009, has the lowest proportion of countries reporting 'significant' improvements.

Such dialogues take a variety of different forms: consultation meetings, forums or committees involving the private sector, trade associations and civil society roundtables.[11] Some 54 partner countries report that both the number and the frequency of such stakeholder consultations have increased. The remaining 15 countries saw no change in the frequency and level of dialogue, while a further three countries were not sure, although none observe any deterioration of their national dialogue processes.

The Gambia, for example, reports the following developments.

"There has been an increase in dialogue through some Aid for Trade capacity building programmes through EIF, West Africa Quality Programme, Hub and Spokes Project amongst others. These projects have actively engaged national stakeholders in trade-related issues. In addition, the EIF national steering committee meets quarterly and consists of key stakeholders on trade. Lastly, the newly established Aid for Trade Ministerial Committee was launched in December 2010 and will be meeting on a monthly basis."

A majority of donors (over 70%) also involves the private sector and civil society organisations to some extent in their policy dialogue with partner countries and regional communities. Most multilateral donors (60%) report that they 'always' involve the private sector in their dialogue; this rises to over 90% when also including 'sometimes'. Bilateral donors appear to involve the private sector less frequently but still significantly (Figure 3.2). As for the ten South-South partners, just five countries provided answers, with only Mexico stating that it sometimes involves the private sector in its trade-related assistance projects. In particular, Mexico highlighted its public-private partnerships in the areas of technical and scientific co-operation to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skills to the private sector in the South. India and Indonesia also appear to involve the private sector (*e.g.* industry and trade associations) to some extent in their trade-related assistance. The remaining four (*i.e.* Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador) report that they rarely or never involve the private sector in their trade-related assistance.

Figure 3.2 Donors involve the private sector in their dialogues with partner countries and regional economic communities



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)O

…and through trade-focused government-donor dialogue.

Binding constraints to building trade capacities are context specific. Consequently, aid for trade needs to be demand-driven. Put differently, donor support should be guided by priority needs of the specific partner countries (ownership and alignment). During the Second Global Review, the LDCs considered that effective implementation of aid for trade required better co-ordination between donors and recipients. Responses to the 2011 survey show that this has indeed happened. The following section presents the views of different aid-for-trade stakeholders.

Partner countries' views

More than three quarters of partner countries report that their policy dialogues with donors have been strengthened since 2008. This is broadly in line with donors' own assessment (see the next section). Most partner countries attribute these improvements to more regular and structured meetings with donors. In other cases (*e.g.* Fiji, Madagascar), dialogue also took place through informal channels. In several cases, partner countries have made specific efforts to strenghten their teams responsible for aid for trade (*e.g.* Guatemala, Serbia and Sierra Leone). It is likely that improved co-ordination within partner countries may have also contributed to strengthening the donor-partner country dialogue. For instance, all but one partner country (Yemen) that have changed their coordinating entities since 2008 (17 out of 18) note an improvement in their dialogue with donors. The Solomon Islands' response provides a somewhat nuanced picture:

"Since aid for trade covers a range of trade-related areas and there is no central co-ordination body, it is unclear whether dialogue may have been strengthened with donors in some areas of trade. Broadly, however, aid for trade does not yet feature as a main area of discussion in the regular national government-donor dialogues. This is likely to be partly due to the fact that aid for trade did not feature prominently in the 2008-2010 National Medium-Term Development Strategy document."

As was the case for the 2009 survey, the number of partner countries and regional communities with whom trade concerns are prominently discussed is much higher for multilateral donors than for bilateral donors.[12] About half of the donors report 'moderate' to 'significant' improvements compared to 2008. Multilateral donors have seen greater improvements (over 50% for partner countries and 60% for regional communities) than bilateral donors.

Greater co-ordination of efforts between partner governments and donors also appears to be taking place in the LDCs. Of the 32 LDCs that responded to the questionnaire 13 say that the aid-for-trade dialogue between government and donors has 'significantly' strengthened, while a further 10 say that the strengthening has been 'moderate.' Certainly, the EIF has provided the LDCs with the tools needed to improve ownership, and has also brought increased donor commitments (Chapter 2). In particular, The EIF's Donor Facilitators appear to be playing a central role in this regard (see Table 3.2). Uganda reports that its Donor Facilitator (the European Commission) helps to improve the dialogue between the government and the donor group. Nepal expects that, with the recent appointment of Germany as its Donor Facilitator for the EIF process, the dialogue between the government and donors will be strengthened. Furthermore, a quarter of other low-income countries (OLICs) and almost a third of LMICs also report significant improvements in their dialogue with donors.

Views from the providers of aid for trade

For many donors, trade-related issues remain an important part of their policy dialogue with partner countries (19 out of 42 estimate that trade is discussed in more than 50% of their partner country dialogues) and even more so with regional communities (23 out of 42) (Figure 3.3). The latter may be explained by the fact that, for most regional economic communities, trade is already mainstreamed in their regional and sectoral development strategies (as indicated by the seven respondent regional organisations[13] to the questionnaire). For example, partner countries and donors in the Asia and Pacific region have all coalesced around the importance of delivering effective aid for trade. In 2009, they formed an informal Regional Technical Group (co-chaired by Cambodia and Japan, with the Asian Development Bank serving as the Secretariat) to discuss aid-for-trade issues, share good practices, build partnerships, and help to formulate an integrated approach to operationalising aid for trade in the medium term.

Figure 3.3 Trade is featured prominently in most donor-partner country dialogues



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Significant or moderate improvements in the extent to which trade-related issues were discussed in policy dialogues with partners were also reported by half of the donors (Figure 3.4). Some indicate little or no change, but this may be because trade was already well mainstreamed in policy dialogues in 2008, as is the case for the European Union. In general, the majority of key ministries and agencies in partner countries are participants in a national consultative process to a varying degree.

Figure 3.4 Progress has been made in trade mainstreaming



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

A majority of South-South development partners (7 out of 10) also report significant progress in strengthening the dialogue with their partner countries. For example China, in addition to its regular bilateral dialogues, discusses development and co-operation with its partners through regional co-operation mechanisms (*e.g.* the ASEAN 10+1, Forum on China-Africa Co-operation, Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development Co-operation Forum, and China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Co-operation Forum). Chile prioritises regional integration by strengthening dialogue with countries from Central America, the Caribbean, and particularly with its neighbouring countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay. In addition, work has intensified with the countries with which trade agreements have been signed (*e.g.* Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Colombia). The governments of Colombia and Mexico held the 10th Summit of the Tuxtla Dialogue in June 2008, to review the process of the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP), launched in April 2007. It was agreed to transform the PPP into an integration and development project for the Mesoamerica sub-region, called the Mesoamerica Project. Colombia organises quarterly monitoring meetings.

The providers of South-South co-operation in the Latin America and the Caribbean region have been active in promoting regional dialogue relating to trade and interaction with partners. For example, in November 2010 they organised a seminar *"Cooperación Sur-Sur: hacia una agenda regional como espacio de oportunidades para la integración* (South-South Co-operation: Towards a regional agenda as an area of opportunity for integration)" in Quito, Ecuador. One of the resolutions adopted mandated Brazil, Chile and Ecuador to represent the Latin America and the Caribbean countries on issues related to multilateral and regional co-operation. Other challenges identified included reaching a common regional position on South-South co-operation as an instrument for regional integration, strengthening institutions, promoting a new system for co-operation, improving the efficiency of resource use, seeking consensus on modalities of co-operation and common methodologies for measurement, encouraging regional co-ordination among multilateral agencies, and raising awareness about South-South co-operation as a development tool.

The members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) also widely recognise that there are a multitude of development models and approaches for providing development assistance and that more purposive efforts by the DAC are needed to deepen the understanding of the principles underpinning South-South co-operation and associated good practice. In an effort to strengthen their engagement with the providers of South-South co-operation, the DAC unilaterally adopted at its Senior Level Meeting in April 2011 a statement "Welcoming New Partnerships in International Develoment Co-operation." This DAC statement signals its readiness and desire to engage in a meaningful dialogue and co-operation with the South-South partners.

Engagement of the private sector and other parts of civil society on aid for trade

The private sector is the engine of growth and trade. Aid for trade can help to strengthen public-private partnerships and ensure that civil society is more actively engaged in setting national trade priorities and in promoting a broad-based trade agenda. Donors engage with the private sector in a variety of ways, some involving the private sector systematically, and others involving it on a case-by-case basis (*e.g.* Sweden engages with the private sector where private sector development is identified as a priority by the partner countries). These different levels of engagement range from dedicated programme components,

to support for private sector advocacy (*e.g.* Australia's Enterprise Challenge Fund, Sweden's Business for Development initiative, and the UK's TradeMark programmes in Southern and Eastern Africa), to consultation during the programme planning and design phase, to monitoring and evaluation (*e.g.* Belgium, Canada, Denmark, EU). For some donors (*e.g.* Switzerland, UNIDO), the private sector is often represented in project steering committees and technical working groups, and is also directly involved in project implementation (*e.g.* UNECA-supported African Alliance on E-Commerce was a private-sector driven initiative which involved the creation and promotion of single windows in Africa).

Several donors emphasise public-private dialogue as a key instrument in, and an important element for, successful trade-related assistance programmes. Germany considers that a systematic involvement of the private sector in aid for trade ensures that business perspectives are effectively reflected in the formal government-to-government negotiations. Japan plans to expand its private sector dialogue to other countries in the Asia region. The UK Department for International Development, too, has established a new Private Sector Department to strengthen its engagement with the private sector in both identifying and helping to solve trade-related development challenges. Belgium channels a large part of its bilateral aid for trade (around 55%) through its development finance arm (the Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries, or BIO) to support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the agribusiness sector.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which works directly with private actors, sees policy dialogue with the private sector as particularly crucial in cases where specific trade policies have a detrimental impact on private sector projects. In other cases, donors consult and involve the private sector on a systematic basis through formalised arrangements or channels. For example, each time Finland holds a high-level policy dialogue with the Vietnamese government, a separate dialogue is also held in parallel with private sector representatives via the Vietnam Business Forum. The US, through its four USAID Trade Hubs in Sub-Sahara Africa, helps private sector actors take advantage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). These private sector clients are a key component of the bilateral and regional trade dialogues between the US government and the AGOA countries.

Figure 3.5 Donors involve civil society in their dialogues with partner countries and regional economic communities



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

New Zealand reports that the 2010 Pacific Island Forum of the region's leaders included a private sector dialogue for the first time. UNDP supports the active participation of the private sector in aid for trade through its role in the EIF process (*e.g.* trade diagnostic and needs assessments). Several donors also engage actively with the private sector as part of their efforts to support and promote public-private partnerships (*e.g.* UNECE, World Bank), in some cases in collaboration with business organisations from donor countries (*e.g.* Japan's Vietnam-Japan Joint Initiative, or Korea's renewable energy project in Kazakhstan). Australia supports the Pacific Island Private Sector Organisation (PIPSO) which is the central body for the private sector in the Pacific region and supports effective private sector representation in regional policy making processes and relevant business development activities.

A majority of donors – particularly multilateral donors – involve civil society organisations in their dialogue with partner countries and regional communities (Figure 3.5), although less frequently than the private sector. One explanation may be that civil society organisations working specifically on trade-related issues at country or regional level are in short supply. UNDP suggests that the limited capacity of civil society organisations may constrain their effective engagement with government counterparts and development partners.

Civil society may not always be part of donor-partner government policy dialogues on aid for trade. Some donors engage with civil society in partner countries as appropriate. Other donors, such as Germany and Portugal, have established mechanisms for regular dialogue on development issues with civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Non-state actors are involved through a variety of channels, including programme design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation (*e.g.* UK, EU). CSOs sometimes play the role of development partners in aid-for-trade operations (*i.e.* donors directly funding NGO programmes) and of implementing agents (on donors' behalf). They can also be the direct beneficiaries of aid for trade.

Under its new Country Partnership Framework, Spain's technical co-operation offices in partner countries engage with civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders in the co-ordination of Spain's ODA programmes. For Canada, dialogue with civil society is seen as particularly important in identifying the gender implications of aid-for-trade policies and programmes. SMEs, women's groups, firms, and banks in partner countries are consulted in the USAID's economic growth activities. Most regional and multilateral organisations are required to carry out public consultations, including with civil society, when developing their country assistance or sector strategies. For example, CSOs in partner countries were involved during the development phases of the World Bank's forthcoming Trade Strategy.

These results showing the increasing role that national stakeholders are playing in aid for trade are promising. However, while recognising that the private sector and other stakeholders are invaluable sources of information about what is happening on the ground, it is important to consider – and remain vigilant – about the potential risk of selection bias. OECD (2011) highlights some of these inherent biases. The first main source of consultation bias is the lack of comprehensive representation of all concerned stakeholders. In many partner countries, the formal sector is often very small and unorganised and does not have representatives who can speak on its behalf; at the same time, while informal sector is much larger, it can be very difficult to establish representative contact points.

The second main source of bias is the inherent subjectivity of those consulted. For example, while the objective of aid-for-trade interventions may be to expand trade and its benefits for the economy, some established firms may have a vested interest in maintaining anti-competitive practices that might limit the gains from trade liberalisation. For instance, a case story from the ECOWAS on the Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) highlights that companies which benefit from informal trade barriers (for example, continuing tariff restrictions or non-tariff measures, such as seasonal bans) and agencies that collect revenue (both formal and informal) may not favour ETLS implementation. Similarly, when the objective of the aid-for-trade intervention is the creation of new economic activity (*e.g.* through export diversification), rather than improving the performance of existing exporting sectors, the value of the information obtained from existing private sector organisations may be of limited value since they may not be independent or representative of the new target beneficiaries.

Finally, there is the on-going debate about the value of questioning the "incumbents" – those who have already adapted successfully to existing constraints. As noted by Dani Rodrik "asking successful firms what are the main problems they face – a very common strategy both in business consulting and in country analysis – is not only uninformative about the binding constraints of the economy, it may lead the analyst precisely in the wrong direction. After all, successful firms are successful (relative to other firms) because they have been able to surmount the binding constraints. So they are least likely to complain about the blockages that are holding the rest of the economy back."[14] Others, however, found that adjusting to a constraint does not mean that firms then do not recognise it; for example, generator-owning firms are not distinguishable from other firms when ranking electricity scarcity or high price as a constraint. Consequently, they maintain that stakeholder views can provide a useful first step in the business-government consultative process and help in prioritising more specific policy reforms (Gelb *et al.*, 2007).

Figure 3.6 Bilateral and multilateral donors are aligning better compared to 2008



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011) *Number of responses are shown in white*

Figure 3.7 Donor programmes are more aligned with country and regional stragegies



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)) *Number of responses are shown in white*

IS AID FOR TRADE BETTER ALIGNED TO POLICIES AND PROCESSES?

Alignment is an expression of donors' commitment to partner country-led development process. To foster true ownership donors need to align their support around partner-country priorities, policies and systems (*e.g.*, strategies, institutions and procedures). Alignment to partner-country policies and processes provides strong incentives to improve them, further strengthening national capacities, and enhancing the state's ability to govern (GMF-Eurodad, 2008). For this reason, the alignment principle of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action puts partner countries' priorities at the centre of development planning and implementation.[15]

Alignment is improving, but unevenly...

The 2011 survey shows that alignment continues to improve improve (Figures 3.6). Most donors align their support around partner-country priorities and regional strategies, although to a lesser extent around DTIS Action Matrices. The exception, as previously noted, is LDCs which are using the IF/EIF structures and the DTIS to mainstream trade into their national development plans and transform broad priorities into specific action programmes for individual LDCs. Therefore, as long as the DTIS has been sequenced and feeds into the national development planning process (such as the PRSP) too much should not be read into this finding (Figures 3.7).

Likewise, the majority of partner countries (60%) report that, compared to 2009, donors are aligning their support better with national trade priorities. Barbados highlights that the process of jointly developing country strategy documents with donors has led to significant improvement in donor alignment. Other factors highlighted that contribute towards enhanced donor alignment include: strengthened donor-partner country dialogue (*e.g.* Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Mexico, Niger, Pakistan and Tuvalue), shared adherence to the Paris Declaration principles (*e.g.* Ghana and Senegal), and the stability of national trade strategies over time (*e.g.* Uruguay). A number of case stories showcase how alignment with national strategies and priorities improves the chances of success. Tonga's case story, for example, identifies the lack of alignment of the STABEX programme around the government's priorities as one of the fundamental reasons for its limited success. In contrast, a port development project in Fiji, financed by the ADB, attributes its success to effective alignment of the project with the government's national development plan.

Table 3.1 How the implementation could be improved (ranked 1: most to 9: least important)

	CARICOM	CEN-SAD	ECOWAS	OECS	SADC	TTCA-NC	UEMOA
Greater say in design of interventions	2	4	4	1	1	1	1
Better predictability of funding	3	4	7	2	-	1	2
More regular joint donor implementation approaches	7	-	8	6	3	2	5
More frequent co-ordination with donors	6	6	6	3	4	2	5
More systematic use of M&E systems	8	1	5	9	3	1	4
Stronger focus on capacity development	1	5	1	4	-	1	3
Greater capacity within the Secretariat	4	3	2	5	0	1	5
More harmonised reporting requirements	9	-	9	8	-	1	6
Greater co-ordination between Member States	5	2	3	7	-	1	5

CARICOM : Caribbean Community ; CEN-SAD : Communauté des États Sahélo-Sahariens ; ECOWAS : Economic Community of West African States ; OECS : Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States ; SADC : Southern African Development Community ; TTCA-NC : Northern Corridor Transit Transport Coordinating Authority ; UEMOA : Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine

Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

For many donors, alignment varies across country and regional programmes. Most donors report that they ensure alignment by responding to the priorities outlined in PRSPs, in other national development plans, or in bilateral/multi-donor dialogues with partner-country governments. They also involve partner countries and regional communities in the planning phases of their country or regional assistance strategies. Regional donor agencies typically formulate their programme implementation plans based on the priorities set by the regional economic communities, which are themselves based on their regional strategies or action plans. For example, the African Trade Policy Centre, the main conduit for UNECA's aid for trade, annually organises a meeting with its client regional economic communities to consult on its work programme. UNECE applies a common strategic framework under the Special Programme for Economies in Central Asia (SPECA), which builds on the development objectives and priorities identified in national and regional aid-for-trade action plans of SPECA countries.

The main message from regional economic communities on how to improve the implementation of aid for trade is their wish to have a greater say in design of donor interventions and to see a stronger focus on capacity development (Table 3.1).

The EIF assisted LDCs in assessing their priority needs so as to allow donors to align their support accordingly. The process is starting to bear fruit. Eight LDCs (*i.e.* Benin, DR Congo, Guinea, Lao PDR, Mali, Senegal, Tuvalu and Uganda) report that alignment efforts are significantly better than in 2009, while a further nine (*i.e.* Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique and Niger) report a moderate improvement (Figure 3.8).[16] A case story from Lao PDR highlights how the EIF is also encouraging more innovative approaches. The Trade Development Facility – based loosely on a similar scheme in Cambodia – laid the basis for a sector-wide approach to trade and private-sector development. Initial assessment of the programme suggests it has "crowded in" additional assistnace and improved donor alignment with government priorities and implementation systems.

Figure 3.8 EIF mechanisms are being used to improve donor alignment



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Figure 3.9 Partner countries face specific challenges in accessing aid for trade



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Several donors highlight their efforts to align around the DTIS action matrix. Finland, for example, states that alignment has improved the most in Zambia, where Finland acts as the EIF Donor Facilitator. Germany is currently preparing its aid-for-trade strategy and intends to base its bilateral programmes around the prioritised needs identified in partner countries' DTIS. Still, a number of donors (*e.g.* Denmark, Finland, Germany) report that because EIF structures in many LDCs remain still weak it is difficult to align effectively.

Despite progress, a quarter of partner countries view donor alignment with national prorities as a challenge (*e.g.* Afghanistan, Botswana, Fiji, Haiti, Jordan, Malawi, Sri Lanka). A number of countries (Cameroon, Colombia, DR Congo, Sierra Leone, St Vincent) point explicitly or implicitly to the problem of donors having specific interests in certain sectors that do not necessarily coincide with government priorities. Maldives makes the same point, that donors are more willing to support areas such as climate change and good governance than trade. Some countries suggest that all donor resources be pooled in an aid-for-trade basket fund to ensure aid is delivered in accordance with national priorities. In other cases, a lack of well-defined national strategies (*e.g.* Madagascar and Cote d'Ivoire), a lack of dialogue with the donor community (*e.g.* Dominican Republic), or a lack of tools to assess alignment (*e.g.* Bangladesh) have been mentioned as possible factors contributing to slow progress in donor alignment. Interestingly, while 77% (65 out of 84) of partner countries say that the levels of their exchanges with donors have improved, only 60% of countries can point to improvements in donor alignment. In their case stories, some partner countries also point to the problem of conditionalities imposed by donors which they say complicates implementation.

...partner countries have challenges in accessing aid for trade...

Improving the predictability of aid flows is also an explicit target under alignment embeded in the Paris Decalaration. A lack of predictability typically involves managing both aid shortfalls and windfalls, and hampers aid management even in countries with stable macroeconomic policies (Celasun and Walliser, 2008). Aid-dependent countries are particularly vulnerable when committed funds are not disbursed on time, or when there is insufficient information about donors' intentions to disburse. Bulíř and Hamann (2008) suggest that a lack of aid predictability mostly results from unjustified bureaucratic and administrative delays by the donors. However, Celasun and Walliser (2008) also explain that donors may have aid effectiveness and technical reasons for not being fully predictable and that these need to be distinguished from what the authors call 'fickle' donor behaviour. In any case, progress toward this donor commitment is essential if partner countries are to successfully manage their public finances, so that they are able to develop, implement and account for their policies to their respective citizens and parliaments (OECD, 2009).

Over 60% of partner countries have specific challenges accessing aid for trade from DAC donors and multilateral agencies (Figure 3.9). Given that not all countries receive significant flows from non-DAC donors and South-South partners, there is generally less insight into whether there are also challenges in accessing these funds. Almost 50% are unable to answer with certainty. 35% have specific challenges from these providers as well. A minority of respondents, roughly 10-15% in each category, has no specific challenges accessing aid for trade.

Figure 3.10 Partner countries see conditionality as a major challenge

Number of responses are shown in white

Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

There is some variation by income groups. Lower income countries appear to have a slightly higher perception of difficulty: 66% of LDCs and 75% of OLICs report having specific challenges in accessing aid for trade from bilateral donors. Only Afghanistan said they did not have specific challenges. Middle income countries had fewer problems but still over half of LMICs and half of UMICs pointed to difficulty. The situations are slightly better when it comes to accessing funds from multilateral agencies, with 59% of LDCs and 58% of OLICs reporting difficulty.

...and conditionality is the most challenging aspect.

When asked to elaborate on the specific challenges, 40% of partner countries did not respond to the question (Figure 3.10). Still, of those countries which did answer, conditionality was identified as 'most important' by the highest number of partner countries. While appropriate forms of conditionality are key to achieving development goals and maintaining accountability to citizens in both partner and donor countries (OECD, 2009), they may potentially promote development at the expense of the poor majority in aid recipient countries (Fine, Lapavitsas, and Pincus, 2001). Fiji, for example, notes that some external funding was "conditional upon political status which in essence should not be the case if the objective of the aid for trade is targeted at socio-economic development." For Lebanon, a number of trade-related projects were held up because of "conditionalities related to the country's legislative framework (new laws and/or amendments to existing laws)…[which] can take time to meet due to a tense political situation that has faced Lebanon over the last six years."

The Paris Declaration commits donors to base conditions on recipient-country priorities "wherever possible" though it does allow exceptions with "sound justification" (paragraph 16). In general, however, as respect of ownership improves, conditionality should become less relevant and donors that insist on policy conditions may soon find themselves sidelined as developing countries look to alternative official and private sources of finance with fewer strings attached (Mold and Zimmermann, 2008). Rather, an emphasis should be placed on measures that will increase trust between donors and recipient countries which, in turn, will reduce aid volatility without reducing its effectiveness (Hudson and Mosley, 2008).

As for the other challenges, the lack of adequate trade-related funding, eligibility and understanding of procedures are also considered by many as particular constraints to ownership and alignment. Burundi, for one, notes that the volume of aid is insufficient to cover its aid-for-trade priorities. Jamaica reports that while its ability to attract grants for trade-related projects is limited, the country's "debt overhang restricts the quantum of loan financing that can be accessed." Costa Rica faced difficulty likely experienced by others in accessing concessional and non-concessional funding because procedures are not standardised, requiring the learning of different processes and requirements for each application to be successful.

However, many of the issues flagged in the qualitative responses are not specific to aid for trade but are related to general problems affecting development co-operation. Nigeria, for example, mentions that the delivery of aid for trade has "a long gestation period" with cumbersome and lengthy procedures for accessing funds and for procurement. Gabon highlights the difficulties in mobilising internal resources where co-financing is required. Paraguay points to institutional weaknesses as a reason for the difficulty in designing bankable projects, which is likely the case across income groups both in the feasibility stage (project design), and the implementation and monitoring.

HAS DONOR HARMONISATION IMPROVED?

Harmonisation refers to co-operation between donors to reduce the transaction costs of aid delivery. First and foremost, transferring more aid through country systems depends significantly on partner countries' ability and willingness to exercise the necessary leadership over coordinating donor programmes. If donor agencies were able to align their aid programmes completely around partner countries' policies and systems, 'harmonisation' *per se* would be less of an issue. However, shifting more of the focus of donor management to recipients does not absolve donors of responsibility. Especially in cases where country ownership is weak, and where it is not possible to use recipient country systems, donors can ease this burden by adopting common arrangements (*e.g.* for disbursement, procurement, and accounting), simplifying and adopting common procedures (*e.g.* reporting requirements), and sharing information. The OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness suggests that "given the difficulty of achieving full alignment, aid effectiveness can be enhanced when donors harmonise their actions and adopt – where possible – simple and transparent common procedures" (OECD, 2009: 72). In this context, the responsibility for implementing harmonisation goals rests primarily with donors.

The cross-cutting nature of aid for trade requires a high level of co-ordination between donors. However, separate co-ordination arrangements – often involving different line ministries – already exist in many partner countries for the various sectors covered under aid for trade. These structures often still have a sector-specific focus (*e.g.* private sector, transport, agriculture) and have not yet adapted to the comprehensive and cross-cutting requirements of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative (Voionmaa and Brüntrup, 2009). Despite these challenges, it is clear that some advances have been made by both donors and partner countries.

Figure 3.11 Donors are harmonising more compared to 2008



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011) *Number of responses are shown in white*

Donors are harmonising better, but more can be done

The 2011 survey suggests that harmonisation has improved between donors (Figure 3.11). A majority of donors report that they are harmonising better than they were in 2008.[17] Partner countries too largely agree with donors' own assessment, as 66% of them (56 out of 84) report a 'significant' (22) or 'moderate' (34) improvement in donor harmonisation. While progress appears to be modest for most bilateral donors (17 out of 27), six multilateral donors report significant improvements since 2008, with a further eight noting moderate progress. It appears that most partner countries perceive that donors are doing a better job at harmonising procedures than at aligning with their trade-related priorities.

Harmonisation among donors seems to be improving the most in LDCs, partly due to the success of the EIF's efforts in these countries. Donors are working with the EIF at the country level, for example, by building on the EIF's DTIS when programming their support or by acting as Donor Facilitators of the EIF process on the ground (Table 3.2). A recent empirical study of the impact of US support for trade capacity building found a stronger positive impact on exports in countries where USAID was working more fully with the EIF (Bearce, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán, 2010). Indeed, some 12 LDCs report that donors are harmonising their support significantly better than before 2008, and a further 12 say that harmonisation has moderately improved (Figure 3.12).

Figure 3.12 Donors are harmonising their support better in low-income countries



Number of responses are shown in white

Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Box 3.2 Complementarity and division of labour: an EU approach

The Paris Declaration noted that excessive fragmentation of aid at the global, country or sector level impairs aid effectiveness and overburdens recipients. Such concerns are leading some major bilateral donors to concentrate their aid on a reduced number of priority countries. Since the Accra High Level Forum in 2008, country-led division of labour (DoL) among donors has emerged as an important strategy to achieve harmonisation and to avoid aid fragmentation.

The European Union has been a leading proponent of the DoL agenda through the 2007 EU *Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour.* EU donors aim at concentrating on a maximum of three sectors per country, according to country comparative advantage. The presence of EU donors in a given sector is expected to be limited to three to five donors per country, with a lead donor in charge of co-ordination (Table 3.2), while efforts will be made to avoid imbalances in the form of "aid orphans" or "aid darlings" and the primary responsibility for in-country donor co-ordination lies with partner countries (Voionmaa and Brüntrup, 2009). Substantial progress has been made to enhance co-ordination among EU donors at country level through delegation agreements (*i.e.* a Member State, lead, acting authority on behalf of the EU, silent partner), transfer agreements (*i.e.* from a Member State to the European Commission), and co-financing arrangements. EU Member States have been monitoring progress on DoL in some 30 partner countries[1] through the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour and Complementarity (FTI-DoL) launched in December 2007. The FTI countries were selected on the basis of the following criteria: *i*) a local structure for co-ordination has been established; *ii*) the process of DoL has been started; *iii*) a regional balance; *iv*) countries are aid-dependent and have to work with a considerable number of donors; and *v*) EU donors have a significant share of ODA.

Of the 32 FTI partner countries (Table 3.2), 22 have responded to the questionnaire. Eight partner countries reported that donors were harmonising their support 'significantly' better than prior to 2008, whereas 10 reported moderate improvements. While it is not possible to make direct causal links between the EU's efforts on DoL and the improvements in donor harmonisation observed by those countries (for example, Lao PDR reported significant improvement in harmonisation even though in-country DoL among EU donors was not in place), one could plausibly assume that the former has positively contributed towards the achievement of the latter. As an example of delegated co-operation, Belgium approved in 2009 a voluntary contribution of EUR 2 million annually over the period of 2009-2013 to the Trademark East Africa (TMEA) Burundi Programme of the UK Department for International Development (DFID). In addition, in four of the countries (Bangladesh, Benin, Ethiopia and Senegal), the same EU donors act as both FTI-DoL and EIF donor facilitators, further smoothing the progress of in-country co-ordination of donors within the EIF.

Four countries (Mongolia, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone and Zambia) have indicated that donors' performance has rarely improved or not improved at all. While the EU has not identified a facilitator to coordinate the DoL-process in Mongolia, the facilitating and supporting donors are already in place for the other three countries (in the case of Sierra Leone, there are two facilitating donors, Denmark and Ireland, supported by the UK). Interestingly, in Zambia, two EU donors (Denmark and Finland) act as facilitators of FTI-DoL and EIF processes respectively. It is difficult to draw any conclusion without first knowing the intentions of the countries for choosing 'Rarely/No' response. It could very well be that donors in those countries were already better harmonising in 2008 and that they continued to do so. It could also be that the facilitating donors for these countries are not major aid-for-trade donors (except for the EU) and, thus, may not be as active in local DoL process addressing a larger donor community involved in aid-for-trade activities. Of course, the role played by the non-EU donors who are not bound by the EU-led DoL process may also be a factor.

1. The countries include: Albania, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, FYROM, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mongolia, Moldova, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zambia.

More than half of OLICs have seen improvements in donor harmonisation over the past two years. LMICs and UMICs follow a similar pattern, with the proportion of countries reporting either significant or moderate improvements in harmonisation at 63% and 65% respectively.

Partner countries report that donor harmonisation has improved across almost all aspects of aid-for-trade implementation (Figure 3.13), which sometimes, but not always, involved joint needs assessments (69%), co-financing (77%), sector-wide approaches (73%), joint implementation (65%), common monitoring (61%), and joint evaluation (57%).[18] Donors confirm these assessments and note that they favour using harmonised approaches, namely joint needs assessment, co-financing and joint implementation. They use common monitoring and joint evaluation less frequently.

Figure 3.13 More donors are using innovative tools to improve harmonisation



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Harmonisation efforts vary among country or regional programmes, often depending on the donors' programme objectives, as well as on the expertise and resources on the ground. Australia, for example, reports that the use of harmonisation tools – *e.g.* joint needs assessments, co-financing and joint implementation – is more frequent in its aid programmes in the Pacific region than in Africa, where Australia's presence is smaller. Country-level donor co-ordination is actively pursued in some partner countries (*e.g.* the Development Co-operation Forum in the Philippines, the Development Partners Group in Tanzania, etc.).

n Vietnam, a series of donor groupings has emerged over the years, including the Like-Minded Donors Group and the Six Banks Harmonisation Initiative[19] (Cox *et al.*, 2011). In Bangladesh, progress on harmonisation has been achieved due to the reorganisation of the local consultative group and the adoption of the Joint Co-operation Strategy (June 2010) by 15 bilateral and multilateral donors and the Government of Bangladesh (Choudhury *et al.*, 2010). In Kenya too the government and donors have formalised the Kenya Assistance Strategy and the Joint Statement of Intent to adhere to the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action.

Co-financing is often used as a way to harmonise multiple donor procedures. Good examples are the regional and sub-regional transport corridor projects (*e.g.* the North-South Corridor in Eastern and Southern Africa, the Mesoamerica Integration Corridor in Central America and the Greater Mekong Sub-region corridor projects in Southeast Asia) (see OECD/WTO, 2009). The UK's TradeMark East Africa Programme launched in February 2011 is jointly financed with three other donors (Belgium, Denmark and Sweden). Sweden has signed a joint financing agreement with the UNECA. Korea has approved 21 co-financing projects covering 15 partner countries, which amount to a total of USD 789 million. Australia, the EU, and New Zealand are using common funding arrangements to support the Oceania Customs Organisation. Singapore has forged international (triangular) partnerships with numerous donors in carrying out its Third Country Training Programme to deliver aid for trade.

A number of donors (*e.g.* Australia, Korea, the UK) also highlight the importance of channelling aid-for-trade contributions through multilateral programmes (*e.g.* ITC, EIF) or multi-donor trust funds (*e.g.* WTO Global Trust Fund) as an important part of their efforts towards donor harmonisation – in terms of needs assessments, programme implementation and monitoring and evaluation. However, unlike support to social sectors – where most often one line ministry (*e.g.* education or health) controls and spends the bulk of the pooled assistance – cross-sectoral aid for trade requires much more complicated institutional arrangements, involving many ministries as well as the private sector (Voionmaa and Brüntrup, 2009). This is one of the reasons why, in general terms, these types of instruments such as sector-wide approaches, basket funding of budget support have not been employed. However, some partner countries and donors are exploring this approach. For example, Cambodia has adopted a trade sector-wide approach (Trade SWAp) by building on the EIF structures. Several other countries, like Lao PDR and Nepal, are also working towards adopting the Trade SWAp concept.

Table 3.2 Donor facilitators for the EU Fast Track Initiative and EIF partner countries

EU-FTI-DoL	Lead Facilitator	Enhanced IF	Donor Facilitator
Albania	Italy	Afghanistan	Germany
Bangladesh	EC and Netherlands	Angola	tbd
Benin	Denmark	Bangladesh	EC
Bolivia	Denmark and Spain	Benin	Denmark
Burkina Faso	Germany	Bhutan	tbd
Burundi	Belgium	Burkina Faso	AfDB
Cambodia	Germany	Burundi	USAID
Cameroon	France	Cambodia	UNDP
Central African Republic	France	Cape Verde	tbd
Ethiopia	EC	Central African Republic	EC
FYROM	Slovenia	Chad	UNDP
Ghana	Germany	Comoros	France
Haiti	Spain	Congo, Dem. Rep.	EC
Kenya	Denmark	Djibouti	UNDP
Kyrgyz Republic	UK	Equatorial Guinea	tbd
Lao PDR	tbd	Eritrea	tbd
Madagascar	France	Ethiopia	EC
Malawi	tbd	Gambia, The	EC
Mali	France and Netherlands	Guinea	World Bank
Moldova	Sweden	Guinea-Bissau	Spain
Mongolia	tbd	Haiti	IADB
Mozambique	Netherlands	Kiribati	UNDP
Nicaragua	EC	Lao PDR	EC
Rwanda	EC	Lesotho	UK
Senegal	EC	Liberia	World Bank
Serbia	Sweden	Madagascar	World Bank
Sierra Leone	Denmark and Ireland	Malawi	EC
Tanzania	EC	Maldives	tbd
Uganda	tbd	Mali	USAID
Ukraine	Sweden	Mauritania	EC
Vietnam	EC	Mozambique	EC
Zambia	Denmark	Sudan (North & South)	EC
-		Nepal	Germany
		Niger	EC
		Rwanda	DFID
		Samoa	Samoa
		São Tomé & Príncipe	UNDP
		Senegal	EC
		Sierra Leone	UNDP
		Solomon Islands	EC
		Tanzania	Sweden
		Timore-Leste	World Bank
		Togo	UNDP
		Tuvalu	UNDP
		Uganda	EC
		Vanuatu	EC
		Yemen	EC
		Zambia	Finland

EU-FTI-DoL: EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour and Complementarity; EIF: Enhanced Integrated Framework
Source: European Commission (2011)
http://www.enhancedif.org/documents/EIF%20toolbox/EIF%20Donor%20Facilitators.pdf

For many EU donors, the joint EU Aid for Trade Strategy – alongside the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour – has provided the context for their aid-for-trade approach, priorities and delivery mechanisms (Box 3.2). Belgium participated in the elaboration of the EPA Programme for Development (PAPED) for West Africa, the EU's first regional aid-for-trade package within the framework of the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF). Germany is currently devising its own comprehensive aid-for-trade strategy to position the principles and objectives enshrined in the EU Aid for Trade Strategy into the German national context. France, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, too, highlight that their aid-for-trade strategies are aligned with the EU Strategy.

The UN Agencies, such as the UNDP and the UNECE, work through the activities of the UN Chief Executives Board (CEB) Inter-Agency Cluster on Trade and Productive Capacity, which is coordinated by UNCTAD, to ensure proper harmonisation of their trade-related technical assistance projects at the country level. Joint programmes, designed through the CEB Inter-Agency Cluster, have been implemented in four of the UN "Deliver as One" pilot countries (Cape Verde, Mozambique, Rwanda and Vietnam), and are being formulated in further three pilot countries (Albania, Tanzania and Uruguay).

In Ghana, different sectoral working groups have been established to bring together the government and donors on a quarterly basis and to help build on ownership and mutual accountability. Each sectoral working group is chaired by the government and the lead donor in the sector. The Trade Sector Working Group is the main platform for discussion on matters ranging from trade-sector strategic plans, financing needs and outcomes, performance monitoring, and implementing harmonisation agreements. The Laotian government also reports significant improvements in donor harmonisation through the Trade Development Facility, the Multi Donor Trust Fund and the EIF, with the help of the World Bank, Australia (AusAID) and Switzerland. However, Lao PDR reports that other donor-funded programmes have been less well harmonised. One donor appears to agree with this assessment. Reflecting on its experience in Lao PDR, Australia admits that even greater efforts could be made to better harmonise its aid-for-trade operations with other donors. Kenya, while noting moderate improvements in donor harmonisation, is concerned with donors' continued tendency to fund discrete activities and work through their own delivery frameworks. Uganda explains that some donors have specific interests which may diverge from those of other donors and therefore decide to pursue them independently.

WHAT ARE THE REMAINING CHALLENGES?

This chapter has shown that while consultative processes and aid implementation practices continue to improve, both donors and partner countries need to do more to ensure that aid for trade is effective and consistent. There is still room for improvement in harmonising donor procedures, aligning donors around partner countries' priorities, and strengthening consultation and co-ordination within partner countries themselves. Ecuador, for example, points to the lack of implementation of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness and the lack of co-ordination within providers of South-South co-operation. In Bangladesh, the main reasons for the Paris Declaration process not making much impact are the lack of awareness of the Paris principles among officials and the failure of both the government and donors to translate the principles into actual behavioural changes and operational practices (Choudhury *et al.*, 2010). However, while many of the issues highlighted in this chapter would be addressed through better implementation of the Paris principles, there is a question about how many of these points should be discussed by the aid-for-trade communities specifically or whether aid for trade should attempt to bring these concerns to broader fora addressing aid effectiveness, including the Fourth High Level Meeting on Aid Effectiveness to be held in Busan, South Korea, in November 2011. There is also the issue of measuring results. Recent changes in the global landscape of development assistance have led to a greater focus on transparency and accountability for the use of development resources. The Paris Declaration orients the aid relationship towards genuine partnerships which are focused on results for which recipient countries and donors are mutually accountable. Improved mutual accountability is widely seen as an effective way to establishing incentives to help strengthen country ownership and achieve better development results. As previously noted, donors and partners alike are often confronted with the basic problem of attribution, *i.e.* what part of the observed changes have resulted from aid-for-trade activities at the project level? However, as the concluding chapter will argue, measuring results and being accountable for them are essential in order to show progress towards the goals of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative. ■

NOTES

1 *Policy autonomy* is a much broader task than donor management, involving the execution of development policies themselves, of which the mobilization of aid is only a small part (Shimomura and Ohno, 2005).

2 Donors might have also contributed to the neglect of trade issues in first-generation PRSPs which typically gave priority to social sectors over productive sectors. Turner (2008) argues that while the influence of donors on the content of national development strategies has generally diminished, there is still evidence of partner countries' tendency to adapt their PRSPs to the preferences of donors. In effect, donors aligning with PRSPs may well be aligning with some of their own priorities.

3 While the EIF is invaluable, some LDCs are not yet making sufficient use of the mechanism as a means of attracting and managing aid for trade (OECD/WTO, 2011).

4 See Global Mechanism (2011), *Towards a Common Agenda on Trade and Agriculture: Lessons from the Uganda and Mali Experience.*

5 See OECD/WTO (2011), *Aid for Trade and LDCs: Starting to Show Results.*

6 In 2008/09, 62% of the respondents (51 out of 82) indicated their Trade Ministry as the main body for the co-ordination of trade activities (OECD/WTO, 2009).

7 This may not always be the case. Sierra Leone, for example, where trade-related support was previously coordinated through an inter-ministerial mechanism, transferred the co-ordination role to the line ministries partly due to the weak institutional capacity and other organisational shortcomings of the national-committee approach (OECD/WTO, 2009).

8 The EIF programme currently helps 47 countries (46 LDCs and a former LDC, Cape Verde).

9 The WTO's Trade Policy Reviews of the LDCs, for example, report that the experience of the LDCs, in most cases, has been positive with respect to the IF/EIF's establishment of Implementation Units to coordinate related work on aid for trade at the domestic level. However, in some cases, the Implementation Units are not yet fully operational. Even in cases where the Implementation Units are working, there is a need to ensure fuller co-ordination with other official bodies and fuller consultation with civil society.

10 The solution which emerged was to integrate the IF/EIF process with the country's Private Sector Development Programme (OECD/WTO, 2011).

11 In 2008/9, almost all countries were regularly engaged in dialogue with the private sector and other local stakeholders about the formulation and implementation of their trade strategies. However, the frequency of these dialogues varied widely among countries. Moreover, national dialogues appeared to occur more frequently in middle income and in Latin America countries (OECD/WTO, 2009).

12 First, many of the multilateral donors surveyed are specialised agencies whose core activities are (or are closely related to) aid for trade. Naturally for these donors, aid-for-trade concerns form the basis of their policy dialogue with many of the partner countries they support. Second, it is not surprising to find that trade concerns are less pronounced or even sidelined in donors' policy dialogues if the partner countries are post-conflict or fragile states. Similarly, some donors choose not to be active in aid for trade because they do not have a comparative advantage in this area – in accordance with the principles of complementarity and division of labour – and, thus, logically do not include trade concerns as part of their policy dialogue with the partner countries they support (OECD/WTO, 2009: 73).

13 These are: the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the Transit Transport Coordinating Authority of the Northern Corridor (TTCA-NC).

14 http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2008/09/a-manual-for-growth-diagnostics.html

15 The Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Accra, Ghana) closed with a commitment by donors to "use country systems as the first option" and agreed on a new target to channel at least 50% of government-to-government aid through country fiduciary systems (GMF-Eurodad, 2008).

16 In the 2009 surveys, both partner countries and donors highlighted the EIF as a successful example of efforts to align assistance with national systems (OECD/WTO, 2009).

17 The 2009 surveys showed that some 30% of partner countries reported that donors were regularly coordinating and aligning their actions in a more effective way, whereas 40% indicated only sometimes. Joint needs assessment and joint monitoring and evaluation were most commonly used approaches to promote co-ordination and alignment, followed by sectoral approaches (OECD/WTO, 2009).

18 In several cases, such co-ordination is still in the planning stages.

19 The Six Banks are the ADB, the Japan Bank for International Co-operation (now Japan International Co-operation Agency), the World Bank, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the Agence Française de Développement and the Korea Export-Import Bank (KEXIM).

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CHAPTER 4
WHAT ARE **EXPECTATIONS** AND **RESULTS**?

This chapter focuses on the results of aid for trade, based on the views of partner countries, donors and providers of South-South co-operation expressed in the self-assessment questionnaires. It analyses what each stakeholder expects from aid-for-trade interventions, what policies best support these results and what has been achieved so far. This analysis is complemented by references to the broader trade and economic literature.

While all stakeholders realise the importance of trade and development objectives, partner countries emphasise specific trade results, especially export growth and diversification. Broader development objectives such as economic growth and poverty reduction seem to be of secondary importance. In contrast, donors focus more on broad development objectives, and tend to see trade as a means to an end. Donors also tend to give more consideration to the positive role of imports – not just exports - than do partner countries. South-South partners tend to see aid-for-trade results more in terms of enhancing awareness and mainstreaming. This makes sense given their focus, for the most part, on technical assistance.

There is a consensus among partner countries about the importance of complementary policies - especially fiscal, regulatory, and governance policies - for the success of aid for trade. Discussing these macroeconomic and structural issues during the design phase of aid-for-trade projects and programmes can increase their impact on economic growth.

In terms of aid for trade's achievements, the survey highlights a gap between expectations and results. While partner countries expect aid for trade to boost trade, they report that its main achievements so far are limited to strengthening countries' understanding of trade's role in development, improving aid delivery, and increasing resources. This gap likely reflects a time lag between aid delivery and impacts, which can be long for some programmes and projects, such as those aimed at enhancing competitiveness. More broadly, there are well-documented methodological and practical difficulties in drawing a direct link between aid-for-trade interventions and economic and trade results - including the problem of accounting for the influence of complementary policies. This suggests that improvements in the economic and trade performance of many partner countries cannot be attributed directly or solely to specific aid-for-trade programmes and projects.

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this report is on showing results in aid for trade. To do this, it is first necessary to determine how successful aid-for-trade results are defined and to understand how policies influence these results. Only then can progress be assessed. This chapter, the first of two chapters focusing on the results of aid for trade, is based on the questionnaire responses of partner countries, donors and the providers of South-South co-operation. It enables comparison of their expected results from aid for trade, their perceptions about the role of complementary policies, and their views on the main achievements of aid for trade so far. This analysis of the questionnaire results is complemented by a review both of relevant empirical findings and of the broader trade and development literature. The following chapter analyses the main themes emerging from the case stories.

The chapter is organised as follows. The first part shows that while partner countries consider exports the most important goal of aid for trade, donors are more focused on growth and poverty alleviation. Possible reasons for their different definitions of successes are then discussed. The next section focuses on partner countries' perceptions of the importance of complementary policies, and describes their experience with the policy dialogues on these issues with donors and the private sector. Finally, the chapter reports on what partner countries see as the main achievements of aid for trade to date. While increased exports remain the goal, partner countries report that the main achievements so far are increased awareness and understanding of trade's role in development.

What do partners expect from aid for trade?

This section is based on responses and comments received from 84 partner countries, and analyses the results that partners seek from aid-for-trade projects and programmes.

Partner countries put an emphasis on increasing and diversifying exports…

Export diversification is what partner countries expect most from aid for trade. Some 60% of respondents consider export diversification "most important", while less than 50% consider increased exports "most important". This result is consistent with identifying competitiveness as the main objective of aid for trade (see Chapter 1). Profiling trade in national strategies, increasing aid-for-trade flows, and improving aid-for-trade delivery are also considered important. Mainstreaming trade in development strategies and improving countries' understanding of trade's role in development are viewed as slightly less important, while environmental sustainability and gender issues are seen as less important still. Less than 55% (45 countries) consider increased economic growth as "very important", and just 43 (51%) see poverty reduction as "very important" (Figure 4.1). In essence, partner countries tend to see exports as an end in themselves, rather than as a means to an end, such as economic growth and development.

This perception may be based on a pragmatic assessment that exports are crucial to addressing a number of immediate problems simultaneously. Partner countries report that exports increase foreign receipts that can be used, not only for needed investment, but also to promote employment and private-sector development, and to help to equalise the trade balance. For instance, Lebanon and Gambia mention a balance-of-payments equilibrium as an objective of aid for trade, and

Figure 4.1 Main goals partner countries want to achieve through aid for trade



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

they focus on export promotion to achieve it. Ecuador and Trinidad and Tobago use aid for trade to promote private-sector development and to increase investment. Finally, Cameroon and Zambia mention employment promotion and trade-related infrastructure as important objectives of aid for trade. The contribution of exports to economic growth has been well documented in the economic literature (Table 4.1).

…but pay less attention to imports…

Partner countries appear to pay more attention to exports than imports, as illustrated by more countries ranking "increased exports" higher than "increased trade". Their export focus probably reflects the political economy of trade negotiations which tend to emphasise "market access" over "import reform". This bias is also reflected in the Aid-for-Trade Initiative itself. While the Hong Kong declaration (WTO, 2005) stated that the objective of the Initiative was to *"expand trade,"* the Task Force

Table 4.1. Results of selected studies linking exports and economic growth*

Number of countries	Period	Impact on economic growth	Source
50	1953-63	Positive	Emery (1967)
41	1950-73	Positive	Michaely (1977)
41	1950-73	Positive	Heller and Porter (1978)
10	1956-73	Positive	Balassa (1978)
11	1960-73	Positive	Balassa (1982)
31	1964-73	Positive	Feder (1983)
4	1955-78	Positive	Nishimizu and Robinson (1984)
73	1960-78	Positive	Kavoussi (1984)
41	1960-81	Ambiguous: positive for 1960-70; positive but often insignificant in the more recent period	Kohli and Singh (1989)
17	1950-80	Positive	Nishimizu and Page (1990)
4	1976-88	Positive	Tybout (1992)
104	1960-88	Positive	Greenaway and Sapsford (1994)
74	Post 1985	Positive	Greenaway *et al.* (1997)
69	1975-93	Positive	Greenaway *et al.* (1999)
79	1970-98	Positive	Wang *et al.* (2004)

**Depending on the studies, growth in exports or growth in the share of exports in GDP were considered.*

Source: Greenaway et al. *(1999) and Hallaert (2006)*

on Aid for Trade focused on increasing exports: *"Aid for trade is about assisting developing countries to increase exports of goods and services, to integrate into the multilateral trading system, and to benefit from liberalised trade and increased market access"* (WTO, 2006). Beyond the political economy arguments, the role of imports is also often underestimated by countries, and robust empirical evidence supporting their importance has only recently appeared.

Overlooking the importance of imports is unfortunate, especially since the trade literature consistently emphasises the key role that imports play in achieving competitiveness - one of the main objectives of partner countries. These benefits are succinctly noted by Krugman (1993, p.24): *"Imports, not exports, are the purpose of trade. That is, what a country gains from trade is the ability to import things it wants. Exports are not an objective in and of themselves: the need to export is a burden that a country must bear because its import suppliers are crass enough to demand payment."*

…which are recognised as important in the literature.

The new growth theory also argues persuasively for focussing on the technology transfers embedded in imported goods. Wang *et al.* (2004) found that imports have a positive and significant impact on growth in both low- and middle-income countries.[1] Rodrik (2007) identified the process of importing, acquiring and adapting advanced foreign technologies as perhaps the most compelling mechanism linking trade with growth in developing countries. Highlighting the experience of newly-industrialised Asian economies since the 1960s, Lin and others (Lin, 2007; UNIDO, 2007) argued that industrial latecomers can take advantage of the newest technological developments by simply buying them at relatively lower cost and with less risk. Hallaert *et al.* (2011) found that even in landlocked, small and vulnerable economies, imports foster economic growth, albeit with impacts varying substantially across different country groupings.

Recent firm- and plant-level data provide even more robust evidence than cross-country regressions about the positive impact of imports on economic growth. This data highlights the various ways in which imports affect growth, including by (*i*) encouraging greater competition, leading to better resource allocation and improved management practices, (*ii*) lowering input and capital goods costs, and (*iii*) improving access to foreign technologies. Most of these gains from trade are dynamic - *i.e.* imports improve productivity which in turn increases economic growth and income.[2]

Through a multi-country analysis at the firm-level, Stone and Shepherd (2011) show that these findings are not country-specific or dependent on a specific liberalisation event, but have broad applicability. They also find that imports of intermediate inputs have a significant and positive impact on firm total factor productivity, while imports of capital goods have the same impact although more limited: *"Assuming constant returns, a firm that imports 100% of its inputs is around 30% more productive than a firm that uses domestic inputs only; and a firm that uses imported capital goods is around 20% more productive than one that uses domestically sourced capital goods only."* Importantly for aid for trade, they also find that the links between imported intermediate goods, productivity gains, and innovation are stronger in non-OECD countries than in OECD countries.

WHAT DO DONORS EXPECT FROM AID FOR TRADE?

This section is based on responses and comments received from 43 donors. It analyses donor's main goals in their aid-for-trade projects and programmes. 34 out of 43 donors (80%) report having defined goals in their aid-for-trade strategies, while nine, including the EBRD and the IMF, provide no clear answer.

Donors see trade as a means to an end…

Donors give the highest priority to long-term objectives such as poverty reduction and economic growth (Figure 4.2). Shorter-term objectives such as increased exports or trade are ranked second. Export diversification, a major objective for partner countries, is only the sixth highest priority for donors. Ranking behind these economic- and trade-related goals are objectives related to the aid delivery processes – enhanced awareness and increased mainstreaming. Lower long-term objectives include environment sustainability, larger aid-for-trade flows, and gender equality.[3]

Figure 4.2 Ultimate objectives are the main priorities of donors

Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

...giving a high priority to economic growth and poverty reduction.

This ranking of donors' priorities[4] shows that most consider aid for trade first and foremost as a means of fostering economic growth and reducing poverty. Given their mandates, this should come as no surprise.

Increased trade and exports are their second most important objectives, with 17 donors (almost 50%) rating them as "very important". Export diversification is lower, with only 12 donors (33%) considering it the "most important" objective – although only Norway considers export diversification an unimportant objective. Overall, donors give more priority to increasing partner countries' level of exports than to broadening or changing its composition. One explanation may be that the former is easier to achieve than the latter. An analysis of export-development programmes undertaken by Brenton and von Uexhull (2009) found that product-specific programmes were most effective where there was already significant export activity (with effectiveness measured by partner countries' export growth).

The authors conclude that the constraints to growing existing exports may be more easily identified and overcome through technical assistance than the constraints to developing new exports.

The responses also suggest that donors take a broader view than partner countries of trade's role in economic development – and in particular that they pay more attention to increasing trade in general (including imports) rather than just exports. For instance, four donors (Belgium, Japan, Ireland, and Spain) rank increased exports as "less important"; no donor ranks increased trade as "less important". Donors also see export diversification as a much lower priority. This can be problematic since partner countries generally see export diversification as an important objective of aid for trade (see also OECD, 2011a), as well as an area where alignment needs to improve.

In short, donors and partners seem to view the importance of aid for trade to trade, growth and development somewhat differently. While partner countries tend to focus more on the short-term trade outcomes from aid for trade, donors tend to concentrate more on its longer-term impacts on economic growth and poverty reduction. Donors seem to view trade, not as an end in itself, but as means of achieving broader ends such as economic growth and poverty reduction.

With the exception of export diversification, donors tend to rank objectives other than those related to over-arching economic objectives as far less important. Among the secondary goals, "enhanced awareness" and "increased mainstreaming" are most often mentioned, with 40% and 28% of donors respectively considering them "most important". This is in marked contrast to partner countries, 50% of which rate "mainstreaming" as the most important objective (Figure 4.1).[5]

The social and environmental dimensions of aid for trade do not appear to be an important priority for donors. Only seven donors (20%) rate environment sustainability as "most important", and just five (14%) see gender equality as "most important". This is in line with the views of partner countries, only a minority of which rate environmental sustainability and gender as the "most important" objectives (24% and 12% respectively).

Money matters for donors but effectiveness matters even more...

Finally, donors consider increasing aid-for-trade flows a lower priority. Indeed, only six donors (16%) see increasing flows as the "most important" objective - just slightly more than those which rate gender equality the highest priority. While the Aid-for-Trade Initiative has clearly succeeded in mobilising additional resources (see Chapter 2), it seems that donors view improving the effectiveness of aid flows – rather than increasing these flows - as more essential to economic growth and poverty reduction.

...better co-ordination between donors is needed.

There are significant differences in objectives among donors, suggesting that there is scope for better co-ordination among donor agencies. This is supported by a recent European Commission (2011) survey of EU and Member-States delegations[6] that suggests that since 2008 progress towards better European aid-for-trade coordination has been moderate (42 out of 89 respondents) or non-existent (30 out of 89). Regarding coordination between European and non-European donors, only 15 report significant progress, while 34 see no improvements or are not sure.

The scope for better donor coordination is also highlighted in the case stories (see Chapter 5). For instance, the success of the Azerbaijan Silk Road Rehabilitation Project depended critically on coordination among numerous development partners, and on assigning a single development partner to lead the coordination process. Regarding its trade facilitation strategy, Nigeria also noted that *"the key factor for success [was] the integrated partnership approach with the inclusion of most stakeholders and also including the organised private sector and the close interaction with the Development Partners which permitted closer alignment of their programme support"*.

South-South providers have differing perspectives in defining results.

As Figure 4.3 shows, the priorities of South-South providers differ considerably from the priorities of both partner countries and donors. For example, "mainstreaming" and "awareness" are the main objectives for South-South providers, but much less important for partner countries and donors. The gap is even larger for "increased exports" which is the main objective of partner countries, but a much lower priority for South-South

Figure 4.3 Priorities of South-South providers



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

providers. These differences can largely be explained by the South-South co-operation providers' focus on technical assistance and training activities.

The examples offered by South-South providers illustrating the success of trade-related co-operation are similar to ones offered by donors. Chile and Mexico report that projects aimed at strengthening and developing institutional capacities produced satisfactory results, while China suggests that its USD 30 million investment in the Laotian segment of the Kunming-Bangkok Expressway greatly promoted trade and economic development in the greater Mekong sub-region.

DO COMPLEMENTARY POLICIES MATTER IN ACHIEVING RESULTS?

Many of the aid-for-trade objectives identified by donors and partner countries require supportive or complementary policies. In order to maximise the positive impact of aid for trade on trade, growth and development, these policies and their proper sequencing need to be considered in the design phase of interventions and discussed in detail by partner countries and donors.

Harnessing the power of trade can be difficult for developing countries, and trade reforms alone are often insufficient to ensure growth. Partner countries are very aware of the importance of complementary policies to ensure that their trade reforms are sustainable and to maximise trade's positive economic impact.

Partner countries acknowledge the important role complementary policies play…

As illustrated in Figure 4.4, more than 83% of partner countries (70 out of 84) report that complementary policies are important to the success of aid for trade, and more than half (48) consider these policies "very important".[7] Only five countries (Dominica, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Solomon Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago) are not sure about their importance, and only one (Serbia) reports that complementary policies are unimportant. Results from the questionnaires show a large consensus across every region and income group about the crucial role that complementary policies play in the succes of aid for trade.

Figure 4.4 Importance of complementary policies in the success of aid for trade



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011) *Number of responses are shown in white*

When all significant answers are combined (*i.e.* "very important" plus "somewhat important"), almost 80% of all income groups and more than 73% of all regions agree that complementary policies are important to the success of aid for trade. The high level of positive answers reveals that countries are well aware of the crucial role that complementary policies play in ensuring that trade contributes to economic growth and poverty reduction.

Moreover, the feedback provided by partner countries suggests that in the design of aid-for-trade projects and programmes greater attention needs to be given to complementary policies.

...supportive macroeconomic policies are necessary to make trade reforms sustainable…

Drawing on the experience of past trade reforms, Hallaert (2010) argues that the success of aid for trade crucially depends on supportive macroeconomic policies that make reforms sustainable.[8] Such policies may be needed to prevent policy reversals. This section focuses on fiscal and balance-of-payments problems, as well as on exchange-rate misalignments, that can often make trade reforms unsustainable.

...trade-related adjustment can play an important fiscal role…

Trade reforms can be unsustainable because of fiscal difficulties. Such problems may arise, for example, when trade reform results in declining tariff revenues – problems that are especially acute when such revenues account for a relatively large share of government income (Ebrill *et al.* 1999).[9] Aid for trade can help to address these problems, for example, by providing technical assistance in the design of trade reforms, by helping to shift the tax system away from trade duties towards domestic taxes, and by providing financial support to mitigate adjustment costs. Redirecting the tax system away from trade duties is at the core of the recommendations and technical assistance provided by international organisations, such as the OECD and IMF. This strategy has merit – irrespective of its role in assisting trade reform - since tariffs are a relatively inefficient and distortive way of raising revenue.[10]

Moreover, offsetting the revenue losses from trade reform with domestic revenues helps countries to meet the challenges of globalisation while retaining the resources required to meet their development needs. Furthermore, revenues from domestic taxes tend to be less volatile than revenues from tariffs – which depend on trade flows - or from other external sources, such as aid, remittances, or FDI (Bulír and Hamann, 2007). They provide governments with more fiscal stability, and can help to pay for the recurring maintenance cost of projects financed by aid, including infrastructure projects (Gupta and Tareq, 2008).

In addition, assisting countries to shift towards domestic taxes helps to ensure consistency between various forms of aid, notably aid for trade and budget support. The development needs of partner countries are large and require a scaling up of spending. To finance this spending in a sustainable manner, it is important that donors live up to their commitments; but it is also important that countries generate resources internally. Beyond the sustainability question, there is the issue of coherence between the various forms of aid. Aid for trade and trade-related adjustment should ensure that revenue losses stemming from trade reform are offset by new revenue sources. Otherwise aid for trade risks undermining the capacity of recipient countries to finance their development needs - a capacity that budget aid and debt relief are trying to shore up.

However, past experience with tax rebalancing in developing countries calls for caution. In practice, rebalancing has been only partially successful in low- and middle-income countries. Examining the expericence of 125 counties between 1975 and 2000, Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) conclude that those which relied most on trade taxes were unable to recover from other revenue sources what they lost through lower tariffs and other charges. On average, low-income countries have *"recovered, at best, no more than about 30 cents of each lost dollar"* and for middle-income countries the recovery rate was in the range of 45 to 65 cents. As a result, the decline in the ratio of trade tax to GDP in low-income countries was accompanied by a decline in the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP. However, this disappointing average performance masks the fact that a few low-income countries were able to fully recover the revenue losses stemming from trade liberalisation.

…and can help address balance of payment problems.

Trade reform can be also unsustainable because of balance of payments problems, especially those resulting from an inappropriate or uncertain exchange rate policy.[11] If a currency is overvalued, trade liberalisation can trigger rising imports and declining exports - because of the damage to cost competitiveness – with the excess demand for foreign exchange resulting in balance-of-payments problems. In addition, domestic economic activity usually declines and unemployment rises because the contraction in import competing sectors is not offset by an expansion of the export sector. Governments then face the choice of either adjusting the exchange rate or reversing trade reform. Shatz and Tarr (2002), among many others, showed that this has been the experience of many countries, especially in the wake of the trade reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.

Aid for trade has a major role to play in preventing these problems, especially by supporting an early export response to trade reforms, and thus heading-off any balance of payments, employment, or fiscal problems that may arise. Such problems are exacerbated by the fact that trade reform tends to lead to an early import surge - adversely affecting the import competing sector - while the corresponding expansion of the export sector appears only after a time lag. For this reason, a rapid export response helps achieve another objective of aid for trade, namely smoothing the adjustment costs of trade reform. In addition, when people experience the immediate benefits of reform, they are more likely to support the reform process.

The importance of supportive macroeconomic policies is highlighted in an econometric study by Hallaert *et al.* (2011) which attempts to quantify the severity of various partner-country constraints to trade expansion. The authors show that both fiscal and exchange rate policies have a large and statistically significant impact on partner countries' trade performances. An increase of 1% of GDP in government spending is associated with a lower exports ratio of 1.8% of GDP. Moreover, a 10% appreciation of the real effective exchange rate is associated with a reduction of the openness ratio by almost 7% of GDP. The same study shows that the impact on trade performance of government spending and exchange-rate overvaluation differs for country groupings (*i.e.* landlocked economies, small and vulnerable economies, and commodity exporters). The study also shows that the impact of supportive macroeconomic policies is often larger than the impact of reducing binding export constraints through aid for trade.

Partners rank fiscal policies higher than monetary policies.

Consistent with the empirical evidence, 51 out of 84 of partner countries (61%) rank fiscal policies, along with the regulatory environment and improved governance, as the three most important complementary policies (Figure 4.5). Although respondents could not identify precisely in the questionnaire which aspect of fiscal policy they felt were most important, their comments suggest that tax revenues were the critical issue. Gabon and The Gambia highlight the importance of tax reforms conducive to the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Guatemala and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stress the need to increase domestic tax sources (such as VAT and income taxes) and to ensure their collection. These comments are supported by the economic literature which also underscores how tax policies can create an environment in which trade and investment flourish (OECD, 2009).

Figure 4.5 Importance of macroeconomic policies



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011) *Number of responses are shown in white*

Turning to monetary and exchange rate policies, partner countries view these policies as relatively less important to the success of aid for trade than fiscal policies. Of the 84 respondents, only 36 feel that monetary policies are "very important", while a further 22 say they are "somewhat important" (Figure 4.5). Comments related to monetary policy were provided by The Gambia, which argues that lowering interest rates can boost investment. Panama highlights the important role that monetary policies play in eliminating or diminishing the main obstacles to competitiveness.

Structural policies are important for trade expansion.

The importance of structural policies is underlined in a recent study by Dufrénot *et al.* (2010) who show that while there is little evidence of a statistically significant correlation between trade openness (measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP) and economic growth from 1980 to 1995, there was a strong and robust correlation between 1996 and 2000. The authors conclude that the main difference was that trade liberalisation was complemented by other supportive policies during the second period but not during the first. During the second period *"trade policies were complemented by reforms putting a stronger focus on other macroeconomic and social policies including productivity boosting reforms, spending on social programmes, improving the investment climate, and the strengthening of institutions"* (Dufrénot *et al.*, 2010, p. 742). Supporting this argument, Hallaert *et al.* (2011) show that structural policies are very important for trade expansion and economic growth, as they affect factors such as investment, labour productivity and participation that have a large impact on trade performance.

Complementary policies – such as labour market, education, and regulatory policies - are also crucial to reducing poverty and facilitating structural adjustment, key objectives of aid for trade (OECD, 2011). A recent OECD study (2005, p. 16) argues that *"the combined effect of complementary policies will be greater than the sum of the parts [. . .]. The key to successful structural adjustment lays*

Figure 4.6 Importance of structural policies



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

less in individual policies than in their interaction". It also points to the need to ensure the proper sequencing and coordination of complementary policies, because the gains from trade and the adjustment costs occur at different times.[12] Moreover, although there is empirical evidence that increased trade helps to reduce poverty on average, it also involves economic adjustment which in turn has distributional implications. Trade liberalisation impacts socio-economic groups differently – creating winners and losers – which requires complementary policies to distribute better the benefits and costs of greater market openness.[13]

The regulatory framework affects the impact of trade on growth...

Partner countries view the regulatory environment as the structural policy most important to the success of aid for trade, followed by governance and, to a much lesser extent, labour-market policies (Figure 4.6). The trade and growth literature provides ample evidence that regulatory reform increases the positive impact of trade on growth. For example, Chang *et al.* (2009) found that this impact is larger if accompanied by education, infrastructure, and financial, institutional and regulatory reforms. Bolaky and Freund (2008) also found that the impact of trade liberalisation is increased if it is accompanied by regulatory reform. They showed that in highly-regulated economies trade increases fail to affect growth positively. But once the effects of domestic regulation are controlled, they found an even greater impact of trade on growth than other studies.

Partner countries rank the regulatory environment as the most important complementary policy. Out of 84 respondents, 55 reports that it is "very important" and another 14 say that it is "somewhat important", revealing a broad consensus regarding its role in the success and effectiveness of aid for trade (Figure 4.6). This consensus may reflect the fact that the regulatory environment is a key concern of the private sector and that 64% of partner countries report discussing such issues with the private sector. In fact, the private sector, along with multilateral donors, was the most frequent interlocutors on complementary policies (Figure 4.7).

Regarding the relative importance that income groups attach to the regulatory environment, LDCs gave the lowest rating, with just 57% of respondents seeing it as "very important". This is surprising given the extent to which regulatory constraints affect the enabling environment in LDCs. Most of the comments provided by partner countries on complementary policies are related to the regulatory environment. More specifically, partner countries view trade policies and regulations aimed at improving the overall business climate – especially those related to customs, sectoral, and financial regulations - as pivotal to the success of aid for trade.

In terms of policies that affect the business environment, Uganda and Zimbabwe mention that trade facilitation programmes, such as the creation of one-stop border posts, have reduced cargo delays and transport costs. Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) and Lebanon, both in the process of acceding to the WTO, highlight the need to implement competition laws and to create competition enforcement authorities (such as a competition council).

Partner countries reported that they sometimes discuss the regulatory environment on a sectoral basis. For example, Chad, the Union of the Comores, and the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) focus on better regulations in their agricultural sectors. Belize is implementing SPS measures, as well as TBT regulations, to ensure that only safe and certified products are sold on the market. These measures also complement efforts to mobilise aid-for-trade funding to expand production and exports. Lebanon emphasises the need to implement food safety laws in order to increase food exports. Ecuador, the Republic of Congo, and the Union of the Comoros stress the importance of domestic regulations for industrial development in the fisheries and tourism sectors. Fiji and The Gambia highlight the role of financial sector regulations – especially those aimed at improving access to credit – in strengthening investment. Zambia reports that its floricultural and horticultural export sectors declined because of restricted access to credit.

...while good governance is a pre-requisite for both trade and growth.

Governance is another complementary policy that partner countries view as crucial to the success of aid for trade. According to Rodrik (2000), political institutions are critical for economic development because of the key role they play in reducing social conflict and brokering compromises. The evidence from cross-country analysis is also clear: governance is an important determinant of trade performance.[14]

Governance also matters for aid effectiveness. The problem of corruption was discussed at the 2005 High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris where commitments were made to improve transparency and "mutual accountability", underlining the growing recognition among donors that the quality of governance matters for development performance and aid effectiveness.[15] The Commision for Africa (2005, p. 25) was even more pointed, noting that *"the issue of good governance and capacity-building is what lies at the core of all of Africa's problems."*

Partner countries rank improved governance as the most important complementary structural policy, along with the regulatory environment (Figure 4.5), with 48 out of 84 describing governance as "very important", and 18 describing it as "somewhat important" (18 out of 84). UMICs have the lowest number of "very important" responses perhaps because these countries generally rank better in terms of governance quality, and can thus pay more attention to other complementary policies.

Nepal mentions that good governance is key to aid-for-trade effectiveness. Conversely, Burundi and Kenya identify governance as the root cause of unsuccessful aid-for-trade processes. According to Kenya, corruption can be one of the biggest obstacles to aid for trade. The Gambia points out that the adoption of best practices can attract more assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors.

Partner countries agree that strengthened governance is a prerequisite for improving trade performance and economic growth. Especially in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, partner countries need to implement governance reforms, while the donor community needs to maintain its funding pledges and ensure better management of aid delivery (Kaufmann, 2009).

Labour Market policies crucially affect labour productivity and competitiveness…

Hallaert *et al.* (2011) argue that policies aimed at improving labour productivity such as education, training and labour market reforms can also contribute significantly to trade expansion. They conclude that a 10% increase in labour productivity increases a country's export ratio by 3% of GDP.

However, labour market policies do not seem to be a priority for partner countries. Among the five complementary policies set out in the questionnaire, labour market policies received the lowest number of "very important" answers (26 out of 84, or 31%) (Figure 4.5). The importance of labour market policies was highlighted most by OLICs (13 out of 14, or 93%), followed by LDCs (25 out of 30, or 83%), LMICs (15 out of 19, or 79%), and UMICs (9 out of 20, or 45%). The significantly lower rate of positive answers among UMICs may reflect their relatively better labour markets.

Countries also provided relatively few comments on this issue. Exceptions include Fiji, The Gambia, and Cameroon which stress the importance of investing in human capital formation, especially training unskilled labour, and encouraging labour mobility, through, for example, the establishment of the National Employment Centres. The Gambia and Cameroon also stress the importance of policies to promote employment, particularly in the industrial sector.

...though there are also other policies that should be taken account of…

Partner countries see two additional complementary policies – investment and education - as critical to the success of aid for trade. For instance, the Union of the Comoros, Honduras, and Niger emphasise the need to improve the investment climate. Their observations are supported by research which shows that investment – by introducing new technologies, increasing productivity and linking countries to global value chains - is the main transmission channel between both trade and growth and aid and growth.[16]

In many partner countries, FDI is a major source of investment, so non-discriminatory investment policies are crucial for development. Malaysia reports that creating an FDI-friendly environment can contribute to achieving some of the main objectives of aid for trade (OECD, 2011) - namely export expansion and diversification, and economic growth (Dogan *et al.*, 2011).

...including education.

The ability to attract FDI is often dependent on the availability of a skilled labour force, a point made by Fiji when emphasising the importance of education policies. Krueger (2011) notes that *"as with the other prerequisites of an outer oriented trade strategy, appropriate attention to education and training is vital not only for success with an outer-oriented trade strategy, but also for domestic economic activity"*. In their cross-country analysis, Chang *et al.* (2009) found that trade's positive impact on economic growth is larger if it is accompanied by higher education levels.

Although aid for trade has no direct role in education, private sector capacity-building activities or training programmes can contribute to the development of human capital in partner countries. However, several countries express concern that some education projects and programmes do not always have a strong and clear link with trade, yet donors report these as aid for trade.

Despite the broad consensus about the importance of complementary policies, there remains some confusion about how they relate to aid for trade. For example, trade policy training and education clearly falls within the scope of aid for trade, although some partner countries consider them complementary policies. Other countries consider regional trade agreements (RTAs) complementary policies, when these are part of the aid-for-trade agenda.

Complementary policies are sometimes discussed with donors…

Complementary policies should be considered in the design and the sequencing of trade reforms which, if supported by foreign aid, require dialogue between partner countries and donors. According to partner countries, the intensity of the dialogue on complementary policies varies across donors, although the frequency is generally increasing. Regular dialogue on complementary policies is taking place with multilateral donors (56%), with the private sector (52%), and with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (45%). Partner countries discuss complementary policies less often with non-DAC donors (24%)[17] and with providers of South-South co-operation (33%) (Figure 4.7).

The survey shows that the dialogue on complementary policies takes place most often with multilateral donors and the private sector. This should come as no surprise. Complementary policies

Figure 4.7 Discussions on complementary policies



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Number of responses are shown in white

are likely to be included in the dialogue with multilateral donors because their programmes are large and multifacted. Likewise, private sector programmes and projects are directly affected by complementary policies, such as the regulatory environment. As mentioned above, the frenquency of the dialogue with the private sector may explain why partner countries percieve the regulatory environment as the most important complementary policy. This is also highlighted in the comments provided by partner countries such as the Gambia (see below).

…but the dialogue needs to be more inclusive…

The frequency with which complementary policies are included in dialogues differs between DAC and non-DAC donors. While 45% of partner countries report that complementary policies are part of their dialogue with DAC members, the rate is much lower with non-DAC members (24%). Out of 84 respondents, 16 report (25%) either no dialogue (or that they are not sure that there is any dialogue on complementary policies), and further 16 (25%) report only discussing complementary policies occasionally.

The reason for the limited discussion of complementary policies with non-DAC donors might be the high transaction costs involved. According to Davies (2008) *"building institutional and human capacities for providing development assistance is one of the key challenges for non-DAC donors. (…) In this context, implementing the Paris Declaration can involve significant transaction costs which may be perceived as too large relative to the scale of their development co-operation with a parner country"*.

Figure 4.8 Importance of complementary policies for South-South providers



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

...and involve South-South providers of assistance.

Providers of South-South co-operation do not seem to be best placed to lead the dialogue on complementary policies with partner countries. As part of the 2011 survey, 10 providers of South-South co-operation responded to a specially tailored South-South co-operation questionnaire. Although ranked higher than non-DAC donors, only 28 partner countries out of 84 (33%) report having regular dialogue on complementary policies with South-South co-operation providers. Yet, interestingly, Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia and Mexico (8 out of 10) view complementary poilcies as important to the success of aid for trade (See figure 4.8.) Only Brazil and Oman do not see these policies as important, and Brazil notes that South-South co-operation should promote partnerships and solidarity among developing countries and not be regarded as traditional ODA.

South-South co-operation providers share partner countries' view that the regulatory environment, fiscal policies and governance issues are the three most important complementary policies.[18] Despite this consensus, the lack of dialogue sometimes leads to the failure of aid-for-trade projects and programmes to incorporate these policies. For example, India reports that some LDCs have demanded larger product coverage in India's Duty Free Tariff Preferences (DFTP) Scheme, even though India's trade data shows that LDCs are not even exporting the products currently covered by the scheme. Despite this discrepancy between perception and reality, the DFTP Scheme is being reviewed, based on feedback received from LDCs and the results of studies to determine if coverage needs to expand, and Rules of Origin need to be modified. India's comment clearly underlines the need to promote more dialogue between partner countries and providers of South-South co-operation if aid for trade is to be successful and effective.

The main reason for the lack of dialogue with South-South providers may be that these donors differ from traditional donors. South-South providers tend to focus on human and institutional capacity development and on specific projects. Moreover, they often prefer not to interfere in the internal affairs of partner countries. However, dialogue on complementary policies does not necessarily mean interference in the internal affairs of another country, and promoting dialogue can better ensure the success of aid for trade.

The dialogue between partner countries and other stakeholders seems less frequent with 63% of countries reporting no dialogue (or no precise information on dialogues). While the "other" category is vague and no details are provided, comments suggest that dialogue on complementary policies is taking place internally. Indeed, several countries report that such discussions take place in the context of meetings organised at local level with different stakeholders, such as in the Povery Reduction Strategy (PRS) sector-group meetings (Burundi), in inter-ministrial committees (the Union of the Comores), in civil society roundtables (the Republic of Congo), in specialised trade promotion institutions (Guinea), and in regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as mentioned by Nigeria.

Complementary policies must be integrated into national aid-for-trade discussions.

Others report that while discussions on complementary policies with various donors take place, they are not integrated in a particular aid-for-trade framework, but rather occur during annual roundtables or conferences with donors. For example, although The Gambia *"does not have Aid for Trade Dialogue necessarily,… dialogue with DAC and Multilateral donors comes in a package where trade-related assistance and complementary policies are discussed simultaneously for example, during donor roundtables"*. Tonga also reports that complementary policies

are discussed during *"Annual Dialogue through Donor Missions and MOUs signed"*. Similarily, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stresses that complementary policies are not discussed in the particular context of aid for trade but rather during each financing agreement: *"Any funding negotiated with international donors is usually dependent on an analysis of the country's economic situation, including its fiscal and monetary policies, governance issues and the regulatory environment."*

On the other hand, Solomon Islands reports on the efforts of some donors to enter into dialogue on complementary policies within the context of aid for trade, even if these initiatives are rare: *"There is little specific aid-for-trade dialogue with donors. There may be some isolated discussions with donors with regard to certain trade-related projects. The private sector occasionally raises concerns with regard to fiscal policies and the regulatory environment during consultation on aid-for-trade initiatives. In aid dialogue more generally, most donors discuss complementary policies to some extent. The DAC donors tend to discuss complementary policies more than other donors"*.

The evidence suggests that the main problem is not that complementary policies are not being discussed with donors. The problem is more that these discussions take place during general and unspecific events, such as regular donor consultations, and not during the design stage of aid-for-trade projects. The risk is that the dialogue is not focussing on the specific challenge of tailoring complementary policies to trade reform and trade-related capacity building.

Responses to the questionnaires suggest that more dialogue on complementary policies is needed. This dialogue should focus specifically on partner countries' trade capacities and should take place before and during the design phase of capacity-building programmes.

WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR?

More awareness and better delivery, but few trade outcomes…

Aid for trade's main achievements so far relate to raising awareness about trade's role in development – as demonstrated by the increased mainstreaming of trade in development strategies - and to improving the delivery of aid for trade. Specifically, partner countries highlight: (*i*) the increased profile of trade in development strategies, (*ii*) an enhanced understanding of trade; (*iii*) more harmonised and aligned projects and programmes; and (*iv*) increased aid-for-trade resources (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9 Main results achieved in developing countries

Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

As explained in the last *Aid for Trade at a Glance* report (OECD/WTO, 2009), aid for trade has been successful in mobilising resources (see Chapter 2) and in increasing awareness about the role of trade in development. At the global level, partner countries report either fully (55%)[19] or partially (41%)[20] mainstreaming trade in their development strategies – a clear indication that countries are increasingly aware of the importance of trade. The fact that trade now features more prominently in policy dialogues and development strategies of LDCs in particular is also a testament to the success of the EIF.

...as trade and economic performance are long-term objectives.

However, partner countries report having achieved less in terms of improved economic and trade performance. Half report that they did not achieve the desired trade outcomes. When taking the answers "important" and "very important" together, the positive answers for "increased trade" and 'increased exports' are below 50%. Even fewer countries (35%) report having achieved export diversification. Moreover, when considering only "significant" achievements, rates fall to 15%, 14% and 10% of countries for these three objectives.

Reported achievements are lowest for environmental sustainability and gender equality. While they are considered as "important" objectives by roughly 70% of partner countries, only 30% report achieving results, and of these most report moderate achievements. While 20 countries rank environmental sustainability as a most important objective, only 6 see significant improvement in this area. Regarding gender equality, the gap is smaller - among the 10 countries that ranked it as an important objective, 7 see improvements. Against this background, it is noteworthy that gender is one of the most evaluated subjects in aid-for-trade impact evaluations (see conclusions).[21]

There is some variance between what is expected and what is achieved...

Clearly, there is a gap between expectations and achieved results. While partner countries are looking for clear trade and economic outcomes, aid for trade has delivered better trade mainstreaming in development strategies, a better understanding of trade's role in development, better aid delivery, and more financial resources. There is obviously room for improvement, first because the reported results are moderate, and second because the results do not match the priorities of partner countries.

In a different exercise, the European Commission (2011) also concludes that there has been moderate progress in the delivery of aid for trade. This conclusion was drawn from both a partner-country field questionnaire on aid for trade and from Member States' responses to the OECD/WTO questionnaire.[22] The Commission notes that *"reports from the EU field offices point to moderate improvement in the processes that underpin both the volumes and the effectiveness of aid for trade. (…) The replies of the Member States to this year's questionnaire on financing for development show that, although some improvements have been made, enhanced efforts are needed to maximise the impact of aid"*.

This is also supported by the findings of Chapter 3, which show that while consultative processes and aid-delivery practices continue to improve, both donors and partner countries need to make additional efforts to ensure that aid for trade is more effective. There is still room for improvement in the harmonisation of donor procedures, alignment of donors around partner-country priorities, and consultation and coordination among partner countries themselves.

…partly due to the timing of results for specific parts of the aid-for-trade agenda…

The gap between partner countries' objectives and the results achieved could also reflect a time-lag effect. The period between 2006 and 2011 is relatively short, and many aid-for-trade programmes and projects have not had sufficient time to produce the trade and economic impacts expected. In other words, the gap between expectations and outcomes may simply reflect the reality that results takes time.

Moroever, aid for trade has already contributed to increased awareness and better alignment - both preconditions for achieving positive long-term trade impacts. In fact, 60% of countries indicate that donors' alignment on national strategies has improved significantly or moderately since 2008.[23] For example, there is evidence that donors have responded to partner countries' recommendations to focus on capacity building.[24] A quarter of the case stories (64 out of 269) fall in the building capacity category, and mainly describe technical assistance programmes aimed at improving skills and capacities within governments (see Chapter 5 for details). Partner countries also report that (*i*) most of the positive results so far relate to better understanding trade, and that (*ii*) these results flow from public- and private-sector capacities building projects. Of partner countries' 39 positive comments, 33 relate to capacity building projects.

...with some immediate results being realised in building capacities.

- 13 countries (Angola, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Kenya, Madagascar, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Zimbabwe) report that national administrative capacities have been strengthened.
- 4 others (Afghanistan, Chile, El Salvador and Uganda) report that capacity building was aimed at facilitating trade negotiations, both regional and multilateral, and/or strengthening national trade-related institutions.
- 11 countries (Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Costa Rica, Madagascar, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Suriname, Uruguay, Ecuador and Mali) report benefitting from programmes aimed at improving private sector competitiveness and export capacity.
- 5 countries (Lao PDR, Nepal, Nigeria [alignment only], Sierra Leone and Botswana) reported significant improvements in trade mainstreaming, ownership, and alignement thanks to the implementation of different mechanisms.
- While not refering to capacity building, 2 countries report increased access to trade resources (Dominican Republic and Pakistan) and 4 others note improvements related to infrastructure development (Kenya, Paraguay, Suriname and Cameroon).

Several countries suggests that improvements in capacity building should result in better economic and trade performance in the future. Bangladesh notes that without relevant skills and policies at the national level improving trade performance is difficult, although it also argues that because of *"the narrow focus [of existing programmes] on policies, regulation and building skills, [they have] yet to achieve the intended results"*. After receiving agriculture upgrading programmes over several years, Senegal and Mali report that exports have increased measurably. Senegal claims that one project has increased horticultural exports from 17.8 tons in 2005 to 32 tons in 2009. Mali reports that upgrading and capacity-building projects have had a direct impact on mango exports which increased from 8.1 tons in 2008 to 10.4 tons in 2010. These examples suggest that well-designed capacity-building projects can help to improve trade performance. However, there is also a risk of linking trade performance too directly with specific capacity-building projects, as argued in Chapter 5 (Box 1), given that so many other variables also influence trade outcomes.

Donors share partner countries' generally positive assessment of capacity-building programmes. For instance, 12 of 13 bilateral donors (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Singapore and the United Kingdom) highlight these types of projects, especially those at the firm-level, as examples of successful aid-for-trade activities. Six of 12 multilateral donors (IsDB, UNECA, ITC, IADB, World Bank and EBRD) also single out capacity building projects as an effective means of promoting trade.

There is a measurement problem in assessing trade-related outcomes.

Although aid for trade may have achieved important economic and trade results, countries have had difficulty clearly identifying and measuring them. Croatia, Angola, Gambia, Solomon Islands and Uganda stressed the challenge of measuring the economic and trade impacts of aid for trade given (i) the lack of capacities and tools, and (ii) the difficulty of isolating those results that are directly attributable to specific aid-for-trade programmes or projects. These practical and methodological problems are well recognised by evaluators (see OECD, 2011b for the proceedings of the OECD Experts Workshop), and have already been raised by countries in the 2008 survey.[25]

Nonetheless many partner countries are committed to addressing this challenge. The Expert Group Meeting and Workshop on "Aid for Trade and Africa's Trading Capacity: Supply, Demand and Performance" organised by the ECA in 2010, called for a collaborative approach among donors and partner countries – and in particular more capacity-building support from donors to enable countries to measure the results of aid-for-trade projects.

Better delivery and more dialogue are needed.

Another possible explanation for the gap between expectations and the achieved results is that donors' activities are not sufficiently aligned with partner countries' priorities. Although this chapter, as well as the preceeding chapter, provide ample evidence that donors have made progress in aligning their aid-for-trade activities with countries' national strategies since 2008, there is scope for further improvements. Several partner countries report continued problems with donor alignment. Ethiopia, for example, mentions that the EIF has not yet been implemented. Haiti suggests that several aid-for-trade projects did not actually promote trade. Lao PDR expresss regret about the lack of alignment with its national strategies. Sierra Leone and Saint Lucia note that donors' actions are not sufficiently transparent,

and that trade financing is lacking. Despite the improvements in alignement since 2008, it seems that some donors have yet to implement fully the Paris Declaration principles. Lao PDR suggests that in some cases donors continue to at least partially design projects in accordance with their preferences and goals, not the countries' strategies and priorities: *"Overall, the EIF has provided a mechanism to increase national ownership and to more effectively coordinate donors efforts in trade, which by its nature has traditionally consisted of a number of disparate projects with limited national strategy and guidance. There is still, however, a reluctance by some donors to subscribe to the EIF approach, or to integrate activities with the National Integrated Framework Governance Structure (NIFGS)".*

CONCLUSION

Partner countries mainly want aid for trade to help them diversify and increase exports. They consider economic growth and poverty reduction to be of secondary importance, and pay less attention to trade awareness, aid processes, and the social and environmental dimensions of trade. Exports are the top priority for most partner countries, not so much to further long-term economic growth and poverty reduction, but to solve the immediate problems these countries face – such as a shortfall of foreign receipts which limits investment, employment, private-sector development, and efforts to equalise the trade balance.

What partner countries expect from aid for trade differs slightly from what donors expect. Donors expect aid for trade to foster economic growth and poverty reduction. They pay more attention to increasing the level of existing exports rather than to developing new exports, by helping countries to diversify production, modify their comparative advantages, and branch out into new and more value-added sectors. However, both donors and partners assign importance to trade promotion and overall development objectives.

The partner-country responses reveal a large consensus across every income group and region about the crucial role that complementary policies play in the success of aid for trade – and the need for a more supportive policy environment if overall trade and economic growth objective are to be met. Although partner countries acknowledge the role of supportive macroeconomic policies overall, they view monetary policy as relatively less important than fiscal policy. Structural policies are also considered critical to maximising trade's impact on economic growth. Partner countries identify the regulatory environment and governance issues – more than labour-market policies - as the structural policies that are most central to the success of aid for trade.

The gap between donors' and countries' expectations, as well as the need for more focus on complementary policies, underlines the importance of increased dialogue to enhance mutual understanding of aid-for-trade's objectives and to improve project design. Results also show that multilateral donors and the private sector are more likely to engage in a dialogue with partner countries about complementary policies – and that much more dialogue is needed with non-DAC donors and with providers of South-South co-operation.

More dialogue and better designed complementary policies will help to bridge the existing gap between expectations and the achieved results – as will the broader understanding that trade and economic results take time to achieve. ■

NOTES

1 Yanikkaya (2003) also found support for this hypothesis: the more a country (especially a developing one) trades with the United States (one of the most highly innovative countries), the faster it is likely to grow. Coe *et al.* (1997) showed that openness to imports of capital goods (to incorporate trading partners' stock of knowledge) enhances total factor productivity growth which is a key determinant of economic growth in the long run.

2 This evidence is surveyed in Hallaert *et al.* (2011) and covers Brazil (Muendler, 2004), Chile (Pavcnik, 2002), India (Topalova and Khandelwal (2010), Indonesia (Amity and Konings, 2007), Mexico (Tybout and Westbrook, 1995), and Korea and Chinese Taipei (Aw *et al.*, 2000).

3 The assessment of donors' priorities made so far is based on what donors indicate as "most important" objective. Combining this category with the category "important" makes it difficult to draw any significant conclusions since all objectives are seen as 'important' or 'most important' by 80% to 90% of the donors.

4 When taking into account only "most important" answers, the scores of economic growth and reducing poverty range from 58% to 67% which is far above the level of others aspects, even the most important of them: increased trade which is the third most desired objective records a 47% level of most important answers.

5 For partner countries, "increased profile of trade in development strategy" is assimilated as "mainstreaming".

6 European Union delegations and European Union Member States embassies in 89 partner countries across the developing world completed a questionnaire on how the aid-for-trade agenda is progressing at country and regional level.

7 The Bahamas, Republic of Congo, India, Kyrgyz Republic, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Saint Lucia and Republic of Yemen have not responded to the question. If only countries that have responded to the question are considered, over 92% consider complementary polices as important.

8 Many case studies, including Ebrill *et al.* (1989), Edwards (1993), Foroutan (1993), Rodrik (1989) and Thomas and Nash (1991), analyse specific policy reversals due to macroeconomic imbalances, be they fiscal or related to balance of payments problems.

9 Ebrill *et al.* (1999) as well as the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006) documented cases where trade liberalisation was reversed because of a lack of accompanying fiscal revenue reform.

10 Trade taxes have a narrow base and distort both consumption and production decisions. For details, see Whalley and ab Iowerth (2002) and Farhadian-Lorie and Katz (1988).

11 For more details on the importance of an adequate and predictable exchange rate and its link with balance of payments problem during trade reform, see Edwards (1993), Hallaert (2010), Krueger (1997; 1998; 2011), Panagariya (2004), Wacziarg and Welch (2003), and World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006).

12 The role of complementary policies is even clearer when one considers, following Banks and Tumlir (1986), that adjustment costs are not so much the result from the need to adjust but the results of market imperfections that appropriate complementary policies can address.

13 For more details in the role complementary policies in increasing the impact of trade on poverty reduction, see OECD (2011), and Winters *et al.* (2004).

14 Hallaert *et al.* (2011) and the literature on trade and economic growth Chang *et al.* (2009) as well as Bolaky and Freund (2008).

15 For details, see Kaufmann (2009).

16 For more details, see Gomanee *et al.* (2002).

17 Non-DAC providers of development assistance include non-DAC OECD members, major emerging and transition economies, Middle Eastern donors, non-OECD EU members, and other countries from Southeast Asia and Latin America. Source: *Working Party on Aid Effectiveness Special Session with Non-DAC Providers of Development Assistance* OECD, Paris 27 November 2007.

18 Brazil, Oman and Argentina have not responded to the question.

19 Compared to 51% in 2009.

20 There are however substantial differences across regions. For example, while all Asian countries have either fully (67%) or partially (33%) mainstreamed trade in their development strategy, in Africa 7% of countries have not mainstreamed trade at all.

21 See OECD (2011). A meta-evaluation on aid for trade commissioned by the OECD, conclude that: i) *"evaluations of aid-for-trade operations do not say much about trade. "Trade" and "exports" were not among the most frequently mentioned words, while "imports" was almost completely ignored"*. Moreover,: *"the evaluations usually did not clarify the policy linkages which matter most to policy makers;"* ii) *"in sharp contrast with the surprising silence on trade-related issues, the evaluations referred extensively to broad, development-related concepts, such as gender or poverty reduction, but without clearly defining these terms;"* iii) *"Indeed, evaluators were rarely able to identify causal links between operations and performance."*

22 Six Member States and the European Commission responded to the OECD/WTO aid-for-trade questionnaire which is intended to acquire information on the progress by individual donors with a particular focus on aid-for-trade strategies and programmes.

23 See Chapter 3 for more details. Comments provided by countries stress that this has been permitted through: new or more regular dialogue and consultations with donors; joint production (*i.e.* donors and government) of national trade strategies; common agreements between governments and donors to respect and enforce the Paris Declaration; and the stability of national trade strategies over time.

24 In 2008, this was the opinion of almost two-thirds of partner countries.

25 Indeed, in 2008 a number of partner countries faced important challenges in recognising aid-for-trade flows in their monitoring systems, often due to a lack of capacity to centrally track aid flows and to disaggregate the various trade-related components.

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CHAPTER 5
WHAT DO THE **CASE STORIES** TELL US?

The purpose of the case stories was to probe more deeply into the objectives, challenges, and processes of trade-related assistance so as to better understand the results of such assistance – particularly, what worked well in the provision of aid for trade, what were the key ingredients of success, and what governments and practitioners could learn from these experiences.

In total 269 case stories were received covering more than 150 countries and covering all major developing regions. Beneficiary governments, bilateral donors, and UN organisations were large contributors, with the multilateral development banks – perhaps because they oversee a smaller number of large projects – submitting somewhat fewer stories.

Collectively, the stories provided rich detail on the efforts by governments and the international community to promote trade. The sheer quantity of activities described in these stories suggests that aid for trade efforts are substantial, that they have taken root across a wide spectrum of countries, and that are becoming central to development strategies. The fact that nearly 40% of the stories were provided by developing countries underlines the salience of these programmes in the field - and the importance of making them work.

The diversity of stories also reveals activities that do not normally show up in global aid-for-trade flows. For example, projects undertaken by the private sector arms of multilateral and bilateral agencies are for the most part not covered, yet these activities figured prominently in the case stories. This suggests shifting the focus of the global monitoring from financial transfers to knowledge transfers. Recipient governments are clearly interested in gaining access to global information and knowledge on ways to harness trade to promote growth and raise incomes.

Another emerging trend evident in the case stories is the importance of South-South co-operation – and not just of middle-income countries helping low-income countries, but also of low-income countries helping each other. Moreover, the demand for South-South co-operation is clearly rising.

The apparent success of pro-active industry-specific government policies in the case stories is significant. This category reported the highest percentage of positive effects measured in terms of outputs and outcomes. The projects generally appeared to be both pragmatic and fruitful, and often translated into benefits for low-income participants, including women. Overall, the low percentage of projects reporting quantifiable outcomes suggest that aid-for-trade providers, as a group, may wish to devote additional attention to more systematic, quantifiable measures of success.

The great majority of the programmes and projects in the case stories reported at least some elements of success. While this might reflect the selection bias of the sample, several "success factors" were reported: ownership at the highest political level supported by the active engagement of all stakeholders; adequate and reliable funding; leveraging partnerships (including with providers of South–South co-operation); and combining public and private investment with technical assistance.

Furthermore, complementary policies - especially stable fiscal and monetary policies and flexible labour market policies - together with good governance can greatly enhance the chances of success. Conversely, delays and changes caused by exogenous factors such as natural disasters, political crisis and global recessions threaten successful outcomes.

The stories provide a wealth of information which this chapter can only begin to mine - and that offer considerable scope for further analysis. For this reason, the case-story exercise - and this initial summary of findings – should be viewed not as an end product, but rather as the start of a deeper process of learning.

INTRODUCTION

In July 2010, the Secretary-General of the OECD and the Director General of the WTO jointly put out a call for "case stories" on aid for trade. The purpose was to probe more deeply into the objectives, challenges, and processes of trade-related assistance so as to better understand the results – particularly, what was working in the provision of aid for trade, what were the key ingredients of success, and what governments and practitioners could learn from experience. In the months since the call went out, the WTO and OECD have received an outpouring of 269 case stories – a figure that greatly exceeded expectations.

Aid for trade takes many forms

The call for case stories provided only a general outline of the how they might be structured, so the results vary widely. Some stories, for example, recounted government efforts to foster private sector development [Kenya, 17; Ghana, 65].[1] Others described detailed policies to improve crop exports [Africa 37; Cameroon, 19; Caribbean 23]. Still others reported on efforts at the global level to conduct research or prepare policy guidebooks, for example on women in trade [Global, 52]. The diversity of responses underscores how aid for trade can take many forms.

The case stories were no less diverse in terms of the countries implementing or sponsoring aid for trade. The collection involves more than 150 countries – from the smallest states, such as Solomon Islands, and Comoros, to the largest, such as China - and includes all major developing regions. Some case stories contained detailed information – such as start and completion dates, donors' involvement, amounts invested, and associated results – while others had only a smattering of quantitative information.

Collectively, the stories provide rich detail on the efforts by governments and the international community to promote trade. This chapter presents an overview of these stories organised around six themes that emerge from the collection. It then points to some common lessons. Lastly, it ventures some conclusions about what works.

By way of preface, it should be noted that the case stories were not meant to be a scientific approach to evaluation. The sample is probably unrepresentative because it reflects selection bias; and conclusions have to be drawn with care because of omitted variables and *attribution problems*[2] (see Box 5.1). Nonetheless, these stories provide a valuable first step in the broader effort to assess the results of aid for trade. They deal with the "nitty gritty" of the real world and, as such, can convey important nuances and narratives not easily captured in more abstract methodologies. They can also capture the unique and critical variables that do not normally appear in analysts' cross-country regressions. One possible advantage of a collection of stories is that determinants of success or failure that, viewed in isolation, may appear to be project specific, are revealed to be part of a broader pattern when seen repeatedly in other stories – thus providing the basis for new hypotheses for researchers and practitioners to test.

Six themes

The 269 stories recount aid-for-trade efforts that tend to fall into one of six broad themes:

- Lowering trade costs through *trade facilitation* programmes;
- Investing in *infrastructure* to lower the cost of inputs and services (including in sub-regions);
- *Reforming policy* to improve incentives, support adjustment, enhance strategy, and adopt international standards;
- *Building capacities* within governments to better conduct trade policy, negotiate trade agreements, and implement trade-related rules and laws;
- Undertaking *industry-specific* pro-active policies to promote trade within a specific sector; and
- Leveraging the *private sector* through trade finance, export promotion, and skill-up-grading for SMEs and women traders.

Table 5.1 Most stories discuss programmes in sub-Saharan Africa

Region	Trade facilitation	Infrastruture	Improving policy	Building capacity	Industrial policy	Private sector	Total
North Africa	0	1	2	0	0	2	**5**
Sub-Saharan Africa	24	6	17	22	19	21	**109**
North America and Carribbean	10	1	9	11	12	10	**53**
South America	3	0	3	4	4	3	**17**
Europe	1	1	0	0	0	3	**5**
East Asia and Oceania	4	2	4	11	10	5	**36**
Middle East and Asia	4	2	5	5	2	2	**20**
Global	2	1	2	13	0	6	**24**
TOTAL	**48**	**14**	**42**	**66**	**47**	**52**	**269**

Table 5.2 ..and emanate from recipient countries

Region Author	Recipient government[a]	Donor government	United Nations[b]	Multilateral development banks	Private sector[c]	Total
North Africa	0	1	3	1	0	**5**
Sub-Saharan Africa	44	30	22	6	7	**109**
North America and Carribbean	30	12	5	4	2	**53**
South America	8	4	3	1	1	**17**
Europe	1	1	1	2	0	**5**
East Asia and Oceania	12	16	0	7	1	**36**
Middle East and Asia	9	2	6	5	0	**20**
Global	3	5	14	1	1	**24**
TOTAL	**107**	**71**	**54**	**25**	**12**	**269**

a Includes stories from regional economic communities and organisations
b Includes other international organisations
c Includes NGOs and un-affiliated authors

Source: OECD/WTO Case Story Database

While analysts could "cut the cake differently", these six themes have the advantage of tying into a larger body of literature on aid for trade, and can be readily interpreted through the lens of the categories set out by the WTO's Aid for Trade Taskforce.[3] These categories also correspond broadly to existing instruments in the donors' arsenals – grants, investment loans and credits, budget support loans, and in-kind services (*e.g.* technical assistance and studies), as well as equity investments through the private-sector arms of multilateral institutions. It should be noted that these six themes, though conceptually clear, have relatively subjective boundaries. This fact, together with the problem that many cases stories touch on more than one theme, means that the thematic organisation of case stories can be somewhat arbitrary. For example, a story might recount a developing country's efforts to develop a particular product with the goal of both diversifying exports (theme 5) and empowering women farmers (theme 6). In the following analysis, attention is drawn to several cross-cutting sub-themes.

These caveats notwithstanding, the case stories are spread roughly proportionately across the six themes (Table 5.1). The largest number of case stories appears in the building capacity and private sector categories, while trade facilitation, improving policy, and industrial policy have relatively smaller and similar allocations. The under-representation of infrastructure stories is striking, especially since infrastructure receives by far the largest share of aid for trade. This may reflect the fact that trade ministries, and their counterparts in the trade departments of donor agencies, generally provided the case stories, and infrastructure, though important for trade, rarely falls under their purview.

As expected, the region most represented in the case stories is Sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for about 40% of the total. The surprise was the relative over-representation of Latin America in the case stories, accounting for more than one-quarter of the total. This was unexpected since aid for trade is limited to concessional resources, and Latin America receives little concessional aid. In reality, the Latin American case stories reflect a larger conception of aid for trade – *i.e.* trade-related development assistance, in whatever form, to middle-and low-income countries alike - and not just the narrow definition employed by the aid-for-trade community.

The call for case stories revealed examples of aid for trade from several sources. The response from recipient countries was particularly encouraging, nearly 40% of the total (Table 5.2). Bilateral donors, providers of South-South co-operation, and UN organisations were also large contributors. The multilateral development banks – perhaps because they oversee a smaller number of total projects (even though they are among the largest providers of aid for trade) – appear to be under-represented. Private parties and NGOs also submitted few case stories.

Taken together, these stories provide a detailed picture of aid-for-trade activities throughout the developing world, and across virtually all important trade-related activities. The enormous breadth and volume of case stories show that governments and donors alike are making trade a central pillar of their development concerns. The stories provide a wealth of information which this chapter can only begin to mine, and that offer enormous scope for further analysis. For this reason, the OECD and WTO view the case-story exercise - and this initial summary of findings – not as an end product, but as the start of a deeper process of learning.

Generalisations should be taken with a grain of salt... including this one

Any conclusion from the collection of case stories must be tempered by an awareness of its limitations. First, the stories are written by the participants – governments, donors, or consultants working in the project – and this introduces two *selection biases*: respondents are less likely to report on failed projects because no one wants to advertise their mistakes; moreover, self-evaluations are likely to be somewhat more forgiving and less objective than outside evaluations of any given project. Indeed, nearly all stories reported some form of success, if with some noteworthy qualification (see, for example, Ethiopia, 190 Mauritius, 81, and Fiji, 196). Second, the intentional call for heterogeneity is a virtue, if the exercise is intended to elicit broad participation, but can also be a vice insofar as it renders comparisons unsystematic. Without guidance on content, individual authors may *omit variables* that later turn out to be critical in explaining outcomes when viewed in comparison with other stories. Third, the *level of abstraction* from a particular intended outcome differs widely, from global stories to project-specific stories. Both present difficulties in evaluating *attribution*.

Figure 5.1 Results chain



Source: USAID (2010)

Global stories – such as the writing of a policy guide or a research project – are often too distant from uses and outcomes to draw conclusions about effects on trade, poverty reduction, or other performance variables. At the other end of the spectrum, drawing conclusions from specific projects requires – in the words of Sida's (2009) evaluation -- walking back through a "results chain" of logic from project results to desired economic performance. For example, greater trade policy co-ordination is intended to produce better trade policies, implying greater export performance, economic growth, and poverty reduction. At any point in this chain, other – perhaps more powerful – intervening causal variables may enter to affect the next stage positively or negatively, complicating the *attribution* of outcomes to the project intervention (see Figure 5.1). For example, in Lesotho, a project to up-grade labour skills succeeded in training some 625 workers (491 of which were women) and even though the programme enjoyed a 75% placement rate, the collapse of the global economy in 2009 undercut exports and slashed incomes [Lesotho, 127]. The same happened in the Solo Raya region in Indonesia, where even with a successful value-chain promotion project underway, the rattan furniture industry saw export value drop 25% and employment fall by 15% between 2007 and 2009 [Indonesia, 185]. In general, the further away the project is from the performance result, the more tenuous is the attribution to performance outcomes. Finally, the case stories rarely speculate about what would have happened in the absence of the project – the *counterfactual*. Only through carefully constructed (and costly) impact evaluations – wherein project results are compared with control groups in randomly selected similar situations – can evaluations adequately take into account counterfactuals.[4]

LOWERING TRADE COSTS: TRADE FACILITATION

Reducing delays at the border and in transit can have a dramatic impact on reducing import and export costs, thereby improving competitiveness (Engman, 2005). In 2006, it took, an average 116 days to move an export container from the factory in Bangui (Central African Republic) to the nearest port and fulfil all the customs, administrative, and port requirements to load the cargo onto a ship. As Djankov, *et al.* (2010) point out, roughly the same process took 71 days from Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 87 days from N'djamena, Chad, 93 days from Almaty, Kazakhstan, and 105 days from Baghdad, Iraq. This is in stark contrast to the 5 days it took from ship a container from Copenhagen, 6 days from Berlin, 16 days from Port Louis, Mauritius, or 20 days from Shanghai, Kuala Lumpur or Santiago.

Hummels (2001) calculated that a one-day border delay drives up costs on average by about 0.8% around the world. Building on this work - and based on a study of 126 countries using a gravity model - Djankov, *et al.* (2010) found that each day in transit had the effect of reducing trade volumes on average by slightly more than 1%. They were able to capture the effects of administrative delays by using the proxy of the number of signatures required to export or import. These delays had the equivalent effect of adding 70 kilometres to the distance between the plant and the final market. The situation was more serious for exporters of perishable agricultural products because delays increased wastage. For these exporters, every additional day of delay reduced exports on average by 6%. Hoekman and Nicita (2010, 2011) estimate that efforts to move the logistics and trade facilitation performance of low-income countries (as measured by the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index and Doing Business 'cost of trading' indicator) closer to middle-income country levels would increase trade by 15%, double what would be achieved by converging on middle-income average import tariffs.

The majority of econometric empirical studies on the topic of trade facilitation conclude that improvements in trade facilitation measures are associated with increases in trade flows. This is because reforming customs to increase efficiency, reducing transactions at the border, eliminating bureaucratic interventions that create opportunities for corruption, and adopting procedures to speed goods across borders can lower trade costs for importers and exporters alike. Helble *et al.* (2009) undertake an analysis of these potential benefits, using gravity estimates from cross-country regressions, with a focus on aid for trade. In particular, they compare the effects of trade development assistance (productive capacity building), trade policy assistance, and infrastructure assistance on bilateral trade flows. They conclude that aid for trade targeted at trade policy and regulatory reform projects produces a high rate of return.

Portugal and Wilson (2008) apply a variant of this same methodology to an analysis of African trade performance, where trade costs are generally higher than in other regions. Using gravity-model estimates, the authors compute *ad valorem* equivalents of improvements in trade indicators. They conclude that the gains for African exporters from cutting trade costs to twice Mauritius' level would have a greater positive impact on trade flows than substantial tariff cuts. Similarly, reducing logistics costs in Ethiopia to twice Mauritius' costs would be roughly equivalent to a 7.6% cut in the tariffs faced by Ethiopian exporters in all their foreign markets.

The 48 case stories under the trade facilitation theme describe a wide variety of efforts to lower cross-border trading costs. These take several forms: (i) integrated trade facilitation programmes spanning strategy and investments, sometime with a regional focus; (ii) customs and logistics reform efforts; and (iii) corridor-focused programmes.

Integrated trade facilitation programmes

Some projects combined investments in infrastructure and accelerated customs procedures with regional integration programmes. The Mesoamerica Project, for example, sought to improve the ease with which goods moved within Central America. The project, begun in 2008 by the IADB, entailed investments in road infrastructure that by 2015 are projected to cut average freight travel times from 8 days to 2.25 days; in accelerated customs procedures forecast to reduce average border crossing time from 60 minutes to 8; in the creation of a regional electricity grid projected to generate costs savings of 20%; and in telecommunications service integration. The project has modest accomplishments to date, including the completion of survey work on the quality of roads, initial implementation planning for key measures, and the completion of 90% of the backbone fibre optic cable for the region. While the overall project is generally on schedule, continued high-level official involvement is necessary to ensure its timely completion [Latin America, 120].

Mexico offers an example of linking the "export side" of trade facilitation with a more efficient "import side", as well as with improvements in domestic business regulations. A central component of Mexico's "National Agenda for Competitiveness" is the goal of improving import efficiency by reducing and simplifying tariffs. Between 2008 and 2010, Mexico unilaterally reduced its average industrial tariffs from 10.4% to 5.3%. By 2013, it expects that 63% of its tariff lines will be duty free, reducing its average industrial tariff to just 4.3%. All of these changes allowed Mexico to move from 74 to 22 in the World Economic Forum's rankings for market openness. At the same time, the trade-distorting variance of tariffs will drop by a quarter in standard deviation, from 9.0% to 6.6% by 2013. On the export side, Mexico eliminated several export requirements and established an "electronic single window" to simplify access to required filings. In addition, an electronic application process has been adopted to accelerate business registrations. Mexico also conducted a "Base 0" regulatory review and eliminated 12,234 internal regulations and 1,358 bureaucratic steps for businesses. This combination of regulatory improvements is projected to save Mexican businesses and citizens USD 3.9 billion over a six year period [Mexico, 114].

Other countries also adopted integrated programmes to promote trade across borders. The Lao PDR did so under the auspices of the Trade Development Facility and the Enhanced Integrated Framework, with the help of the AusAID, the World Bank, Swiss Government and the EU. This initiative has resulted in coherent action plans in four subsectors to promote trade. It has also trained more than 1,000 officials and launched the Lao PDR Trade Research Digest [Lao PDR, 155]. With DFID support, CARICOM established the CARTFund programme to spur Caribbean integration and to implement EPA-inspired reforms. Established in 2009, CARTFund is still in its infancy, but regional demand appears to be outstripping supply [Caribbean, 25; Caribbean 153]. Similarly Nigeria's "Strategic Trade Facilitation Action Plan" has succeeded in creating a forum within which stakeholders can discuss deepening regional integration in ECOWAS and efforts to *"embrace accelerated trade liberalisation at our own pace"* [Nigeria, 7]. The Regional Strategy for UEMOA has also spearheaded a wide range of activities to promote trade, ranging from streamlined border crossings and customs

AID FOR TRADE FACILITATION: RESULTS AT A GLANCE	
Burundi	Tax-revenue increased 25% from 2009 to 2010 after the Burundi Revenue Office was implemented [Burundi, 211].
Cameroon	Custom reform increased revenue by 12%; number of declarations assessed by officials in a day increased by 130% [Cameroon, 164].
Colombia	The administrative procedure for certifying origin cut time to an average of 10 minutes, down from 2-3 days [Colombia, 226].
East Africa	Average transit times in the Northern Transport corridor decreased from 3 days to 3 hours; dwell time at the Port of Mombasa went from 19 to 13 days; transit time along the Mombasa- Nairobi-Kampala section dropped from 15 to 5 days [East Africa, 129].
Ethiopia	Custom reform increased import transactions by about 190% and export transactions by 200%; custom revenues increased 51% [Ethiopia, 166].
Ghana	The development of clusters in free trade zones led to a doubling of exports emanating from them from 2006 to 2008 [Ghana, 128].
Haiti	Custom clearing-time halved to 2 days for green declarations [Haiti, 246].
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan	60% drop in number of forms to be filled for foreign trade [Kyrgyzstan, 186].
Mexico	The time needed to register a new business went from 34 days to 2.5 hours, eliminating double certification costs of USD 213 million [Mexico, 114].
Mongolia	Data processing modernisation reduced imports clearing time from more than 3 hours to 23 minutes, and exports clearing time from over 2 hours to 13 minutes on average [Mongolia, 260].
Mozambique	Border clearing time for goods went from 30 days to about 2-5 days [Africa, 175].
South America	10,000 businesses were able to export for the first time thanks to slashing the number of forms required to export parcels under 30kg and worth less than USD 50,000 [South America, 16].
Vietnam- Lao PDR-Thailand	Transshipment requirements were eliminated for 500 trucks now licensed to cross the Southeast corridor [East Asia, 163].
Zambia-Zimbabwe	Border clearing time for commercial trucks went from 5 days to 1-2 days, and for passenger coaches from 2 hours to 1 hour [Zimbabwe, 107].

Source: Selected subsample of results taken from OECD/WTO case story database

procedures, to harmonised tax policies and investments in capacity building [West Africa, 266]. Suriname's "Improving Trade Facilitation Environment" project brings together efforts to expand the main port and cargo handling facilities, to improve customs procedures through risk management, and to identify future infrastructure investments and institutional improvements (including installation of ASYCUDA World). An important achievement of this work to date, aside from shrinking time to trade, has been Suriname's success in raising awareness about the importance of reducing trade costs [Suriname, 94].

Customs reform and logistics management programmes

More than a dozen case stories told of government efforts to improve customs and logistics. These included, for example, programmes in Africa [15], Central America [122], Ecuador [43], Ethiopia [166], Haiti [246], Macedonia [189], Mongolia [260], Montserrat [5], Mongolia [6], Suriname [94], Tunisia [130], and Uganda [239]. In Southern Africa, for example, SADC is sponsoring the reform of a region-wide tariff system and customs administration as it moves toward a full customs union. The project includes work on the legal and institutional framework, the common external tariff, a three year training strategy to build capacity, and the organisation of Business Partnership Forums. These efforts, sponsored by the EU, are still in their initial phases [Southern Africa, 15].

Cameroon launched major customs reforms in 2007 and 2010, with the support of the World Customs Organisation, the French Development Agency and the World Bank. The customs agency, responsible for collecting a large share of total government revenues, adopted a series of quantified indicators in 2008 as part of a broader reform programme ultimately aimed at introducing performance contracts. This provided for monthly reviews of some 30 indicators of 11 customs offices around the country - monitoring and assessing, among other things, imports, customs officers' performance (mostly in terms of processing delays), "officers at risk", and anti-corruption enforcement. To ensure follow-up, a second round of indicators, designed in co-operation with customs officials, was adopted in 2010. The results were dramatic: time between broker registration and officer assessment fell on average by 75% in two offices as compared with only 38% in a "control group" office. The number of declarations processed rose by 20 to 30%. Time savings averaged 10-14 hours. And revenues per container increased 11.7% between 2009 and 2010. These and other performance data form part of the evaluation of inspectors' annual performance, and contribute to good officers being promoted and others being transferred [Cameroon, 164]. In Burundi, tax-revenues also increased by a quarter between 2009 and 2010 after the implementation of the Burundi Revenue Office. [Burundi, 211].[5]

An export development project in Tunisia has also borne fruit. The USD 50 million project created a market access fund, a pre-shipment export finance guarantee facility, improved logistics management, and a customs procedures efficiency project. The market access fund offers co-financing for firms and professional associations to spur investment in market research, to finance the acquisition of equipment, to sponsor workshops, and to provide matching capital for selected projects. The customs and logistics components were estimated to reduce cargo delays by about two-thirds – from an average of 10.1 days in 2003-2004 to 3.3 days in 2010. The project also aims to improve technical standards and intellectual property rules to meet WTO requirements. Overall, the project had increased exports by more than USD 400 million by May 2010, more than one-third of which represented new exports to new markets. According to the case story, increased employment resulting from the project amounted to some 50,000 full time and 50,000 part-time jobs for the firms involved [Tunisia, 130].

Corridor programmes and efforts to speed border crossings

Programmes that treat trade facilitation, not simply as a border issue, but as an integrated policy challenge involving the whole of a transport corridor and multiple facets of trade are increasingly common. For example, the Greater Mekong Sub-region undertook to enhance trade by constructing bridges and roads in conjunction with its Cross Border Transport Agreement (CBTA). One objective was to promote foreign investment. Although politically complicated, the project eventually led to an agreement in 2006 among Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Thailand that each country would license 500 trucks to operate without restrictive cabotage provisions along the newly created East-West corridor. The savings, both in terms of lower transport costs and reduced trans-shipment times are expected to have a major impact on the region's development [Southeast Asia, 163].

Improving the North-South Corridor in Africa remains a high priority of governments and donors; three separate case stories describe the improvements to the Chirundu Border Post [Zimbabwe, 107; Zambia, 171; Southern Africa, 140]. According to one account, the journey along the corridor used to entail

"one-third driving and two thirds waiting" at the border [Southern Africa, 140]. But the creation of a one-stop border post has greatly expedited movement through a common control zone, improved work-flow efficiencies, and supplied the equipment needed to undertake pre-clearance of persons, vehicles and goods. The COMESA Secretariat has provided the institutional "home" and offices for the project, and the relevant ministries of trade and commerce has provided essential political and policy leadership – vital because the project required legal reforms, redesigning and revamping procedures on both sides of the border, new infrastructure, and new investments in information and communications technologies. Partner donors, including the Japanese government, DFID and the World Bank, provided resources for critical components. The benefits have been tangible: clearance times for buses and autos have been reduced by one half; and clearance times for commercial trucks have been reduced from five days on average to less than 24 hours, and with "fast lane" trucks cleared in under five hours. The positive spin-offs have been significant. Rapid, automated and standardised clearance procedures have reduced the illicit payments that multiple agencies previously charged for clearance procedures, while the reductions in border delays has reduced the sex trade as well as the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, such as HIV-AIDS.

The goal of the East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project is to stimulate trade within the East African Community. This USD 260 million World Bank-funded project, in co-ordination with companion projects financed by the EU, the AfDB, JICA, and DFID, is designed to improve traffic flow through the Northern Corridor, linking the Kenyan port of Mombasa, through Nairobi, to Kampala, Uganda, Kigali, Rwanda, the DRC, and South Sudan. Investments in more efficient border procedures have reduced delays from three days to three hours. Transit times from Mombasa to Kampala have dropped from 15 days to five days. Average waiting times in the Mombasa port have fallen from 19 to 13 days. This means that the average truck can make three trips per month along the corridor rather than the previous 1.5 trips, improving truck utilisation and reducing costs. Since this also means that export crops such as tea, are in transit for shorter periods, thus reducing financing costs. These savings translate into higher incomes for farmers through earnings on a greater volume of exports [East Africa, 129].

Despite the compelling logic of one-stop border posts, these projects are far more difficult to orchestrate and implement in practice than the name would suggest. As shown above, complex political, procedural, and institutional changes are often required to advance the project; changes that often threaten interest groups profiting from the status quo. Moreover, one-stop border posts usually require a level of inter-governmental co-ordination that can be politically challenging because it involves multiple levels of bureaucracy on both sides of the border. The difficulties involved in attempting to improve the Beitbridge Border Post separating South Africa and Zimbabwe – including lengthy delays in signing the MOUs - highlights the need for effective and high-level intergovernmental co-ordination [Southern Africa, 267]. The ways that normal co-ordination challenges can be magnified when working at the sub-regional level and across many countries was revealed in the start-up issues confronting the COMESA-EAC-SADC tripartite trade facilitation effort in East and Southern Africa [Africa, 145].

The ECOWAS Commission and the USAID West Africa Trade Hub submitted a joint case story on the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) – an effort to identify where problems are arising in the national implementation of regional protocols. Visa-free movement of persons has been a success, but less progress has been made in the free movement of goods and transport. Difficulties cited include incompatible national legislation, differing vehicle standards, varying inspection requirements and divergent axle load limits. The result is a complex web of conflicting national rules that makes compliance with the regional protocols impossible. This situation also creates opportunities for "irregular practices". The case story also suggests that companies which benefit from informal trade barriers (*e.g.*, continuing tariff restrictions or non-tariff barriers, such as seasonal bans), as well as the agencies that collect revenue (both formally and informally), may not favour ETLS implementation. Quarterly surveys of the private-sector conducted by the *Observatoire des Pratiques Anormales* highlight the negative impact that continuing restrictions and irregular practices have on trade in the West African region [West Africa, 42].

Finally, two case stories report on studies using cross-country data and econometrics to examine the link between aid for trade and trade costs. UNECA draws attention to a forthcoming study which shows that an increase in aid for trade is associated both with greater export diversification and lower transportation costs [Africa, 104]. Similarly, the Commonwealth Secretariat points to several studies that demonstrated the significant effects of aid for trade, including one study which argued that doubling aid-for-trade increases is associated with a 5% decrease in the cost of importing [Global, 34].

INVESTING IN INFRASTRUCTURE TO SPUR TRADE

One of the most pervasive binding constraints to export growth, productivity increases, and national income growth is the quality of infrastructure. Several studies have made the link between investments in infrastructure and increasing capacity to trade.[6] For example, Limao and Venables (2001) studied the relationship between roads and telecommunications and shipping costs, and then the relations between shipping costs and trade volumes. They found that an improvement in transport and communication infrastructure from the median score on surveys to the highest 25th percentile is associated with a decrease in transport costs by 12% - and this in turn is associated with an increase in trade volumes of 28%.[7] Moreover, they show that landlocked countries face higher transport cost since their ability to trade depends also on the infrastructure of the neighbouring transit countries. For example, in East Africa, goods bound for landlocked countries faced the time equivalent of at least three clearance processes of coastal countries. *"Poor infrastructure accounts for 40% of predicted transport costs for coastal countries and up to 60% for landlocked countries."* Furthermore, for landlocked countries, they calculated that improvements in their own infrastructure from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile would effectively overcome more than half the disadvantage of being landlocked.

Roads are obviously critical to trade. Buys, Deichmann, and Wheeler (2010), in a study for the AfDB, undertook an analysis of road networks in Africa. Estimating city-level gravity model averages of trade that could occur, given distance and incomes, and using actual cost and engineering data for road construction, they simulated the effect of creating a feasible continent network transport through up-grading. Their baseline estimates indicate that an investment of some USD 20 billion, together with USD 1 billion in annual maintenance, would generate about USD 250 billion in overland trade over 15 years. Similarly, Ben Shepherd and John Wilson (2008) used gravity model simulations for Europe and Central Asia to reach the conclusion that an "ambitious but feasible" road upgrade could increase trade by 50%.

Likewise efficient ports are essential to trade. Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2003) in their study of trade facilitation in APEC used a measure of port efficiency (an amalgamation of port efficiency, port facilities and air transport efficiency) in a gravity model and from those conducted some simulations; they found that bringing below-average countries on the index up to the APEC average would produce USD 117 billion in additional trade within APEC (2003:16).

Finally, telecommunications have been shown to be critical – and probably of increasing importance. Examining at the impact of the internet, an early article by Freund and Weibhold (2000) looked at the role of potential commerce over the internet, again using a gravity model, and concluded that a 10% increase in the relative number of web hosts in one country would have increased trade flows by 1% in 1998-99. The explosion in connections all over the world has undoubtedly altered these estimations. Park and Koo (2005) found telecommunications infrastructure to be a significant determinant of bilateral trade levels. Wheatly and Roe (2005) looked at international trade in agricultural and horticultural commodities between the United States and its partners, and undertook some analysis that differentiated the export and import effects of internet infrastructure and cost; they concluded that telecommunication effects depend critically on the perishability of products. Today, one could guess that the great majority of searches for internationally supplied inputs and consumer goods begin with the internet – so being online to advertise, to purchase, and to search is important to international trade.

Similar conclusions are found in studies that measure the effects of multiple types of infrastructure together to examine the collective impact on trade. For example, Nordas and Piermartini (2004) look the quality of ports, the density of airports with paved runways, and the density of internet users and of mobile phone subscribers. They showed that port infrastructure matters for all sectors, while timeliness and access to telecommunication matters most in the clothing and automotive sector.

Case stories highlight that trade needs infrastructure

The case stories add colour into the antiseptic black and white pictures of the econometric studies. For example, one case story looked in depth at the interaction of trade facilitation and transport infrastructure. It concluded that road infrastructure in East Africa was in *"surprisingly"* good condition or in the case of ports improving condition; but rail and internal water shipping were severely deficient. The authors argue for more regional projects on the grounds that purely national projects, while easier to implement, do not remedy co-ordination failures at the regional level [Africa, 229].

Some sub-regions are beginning to witness joint activities to improve trade-related infrastructure. In Mozambique, the government invested in energy with the technical assistance of the Norway and the World Bank. As a result, investments from SASOL, the Pande-field, after a long and turbulent history, finally came on stream in 2004, as did the Temane field in 2010.

The governments of South Africa and Mozambique availed themselves of technical assistance from Norway to draft a treaty that eventually made the project economically viable by creating the legal framework to build a pipeline from the fields into South Africa and to Maputo. The total investment has been USD 191 million and will permit extractable gas equivalent to 440 million barrels of oil [Mozambique, 59].

Another example is electric power. Hallaert *et al.* (2011) showed that electricity access appears to be a main constraint to trade expansion, particularly the lack of reliability. Improving the reliability of electricity by 10% increased trade openness by almost 2% on average. The impact was larger on exports (2.4%) than on imports (1.7%). Zanzibar, together with the Union Government and Norway, provided NOK 400 million financed the installation of submarine cables connecting the electricity grid on the island Pemba to Tanzania. The 78 kilometre cable will replace 3 diesel generators, and increase electricity reliability, thus providing more efficient electricity to inhabitants for the next 20-25 years. This has had downstream effects: the availability of electricity made it feasible for the private sector to invest in a new hotel, with concomitant benefits for tourist export earnings [Tanzania, 135]. Similarly, Chinese technical assistance to Lao PDR led to the creation of an Overall Plan for Comprehensive Development of the Northern Area. This provided a blueprint for investments in, among other things, infrastructure. Subsequent investments prompted the expansion of new trade links with China [Lao PDR, 155].

One example of how improving port services are essential to trade is in Fiji. The government, with support from the ADB, invested in the ports of Suva and Lautoka on the island of Viti Levu. Originally built in 1963, the port facilities were run down by the time the project commenced - failing to meet modern standards and with insufficient space for container cargo. The project figured prominently in both the government's Strategic Development Plan 2003-2005 and the subsequent ADB's programme. As a result, investments lead to an increase in turnaround times, and productivity improved from 5.2 to 8 containers per vessel-hour. Moves per hour of cranes nearly doubled from 11 to 20 [Fiji, 29].

Improving roads is a common theme in the case stories. The Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan collaborated to rehabilitate 226 kilometres of road between their respective capitals, Bishkek and Almaty. The project was coupled with technical assistance to improve customs facilities, including new equipment and training for customs officials. The ADB and the European Development Bank teamed up to finance the road work, implemented by the ministries of transport and communication in the two countries, and the EU's Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus-Asia Programme provided a parallel grant for customs reform. The programme had numerous benefits: best-practice were introduced into road planning and construction; and new livelihoods were opened up along the corridor, such as retail shops, taxis, car washing, roadside cafes, and hair salons. Border-crossings increased by 38% annually between 2000 and 2007, traffic volumes rose 25% (relative to 1998), and the Kyrgyz Republic's exports have risen 160% [Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, 10]. A similar story is told (without the quantitative detail) for the Rijeka-Zagreb motorway, a critical link between the Croatian capital and its primary port [Croatia, 228].

In the Mekong delta region, the governments of Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Thailand launched an effort in 1998 to connect their respective road networks in order to expand trade. With the support of the ADB, the project identified critical road links necessary to expand regional trade among the three countries. To support transport and facilitate trade, the authorities reached a Cross-Border Transport Agreement (CBTA) that covered nearly all aspects of goods and services flows – including customs inspections, transit traffic, and road and bridge design. As a result, average trade value rose by more than 50% - to USD 142 million in 2006-07 from 93.5 million in 1999-2000. Average travel times were cut by as much as half along the corridor. Time spent crossing selected borders also fell by 30 to 50%, and the average number of vehicle crossings per day increased. Finally, in June 2009, a CBTA agreement allowed issuance of licenses for some 500 trucks to operate along the corridor exempt from transhipment fees [Asia and Pacific, 9].

Some projects embedded improvements in road transport and other infrastructure with efforts to strengthen human technical capacities and productive capacities. One example is El Salvador's FOMILENIO project, an integrated rural development project that focuses on human development (through education and training), productive development (through technical assistance in entrepreneurial development and through investment in and loans to in six productive chains), connectivity (through the construction of the Northern Longitudinal Highway (*Carretera Longitudinal de Norte*) and investments in rural electricity. Financed by the US Millennium Challenge Corporation, the project has raised incomes, generated employment, and improved the rate of technological adoption [El Salvador, 233].

AID FOR INFRASTRUCTURE: RESULTS AT A GLANCE	
Greater Mekong Region	Average travel time between Savannakhet and Dansavanh reduced from 10–12 hours to 2.5- 3.0 hours and between Dong Ha and Lao Bao from 4 hours to 2 hours [East Asia, 9].
Fiji	The improvements at the King Wharf increased the load-bearing capacity, and containers moved per hour increased from 5.2 in 1998 to about 8 moves per hour [Fiji, 29].
Morocco	The programme led to an increase in road construction rate from 1000 km/year in 2002 to over 2000 km/year in 2009 [Morocco, 82].
El Salvador	634 km of new electricity cables that connected more than 7000 users for the first time; 950 solar panels were installed; an average of USD 41 was saved from electricity bills per family per year [El Salvador, 233].
Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan	226 km of road were rehabilitated; custom procedures were improved; road traffic increased 25% and exports from Kyrgyz Republic to Kazakhstan increased by 160% [Kyrgyz Republic, 10].
Tanzania	A 78km-long cable gave the island of Pemba a direct link to Tanzania's electricity grid that will provide its electricity demand for the following 20-25 years [Tanzania, 135].

The stories also contain cautionary tales. For example, efforts to privatise railways in Southern Africa between 1990 and 2005, often with donor support, have largely failed because of process and design flaws in granting long-term concessions. The process took much too long, funding provisions were inadequate, the agreements were generally weak and the choice of concessionaires was often poor, in that there was a lack of serious bidders with appropriate skills and resources [Africa, 144].

Adequately functioning railways are fundamental to participating effectively in regional and global trade. Governments are just beginning to look for new ways to revitalise this infrastructure, often through public and private partnerships. Establishing well-functioning arrangements, however, is not easy and results are not automatic.[8] The success of any revitalisation effort hinges on getting designs right for anticipated volumes and speeds, getting operating regulations right to encourage full utilisation based upon adequate maintenance, and getting incentives right through correct pricing, investment provisions, and clearly stated obligations [Africa, 144].

Cautionary tales also extend to the social dimensions of infrastructure projects. One story noted that improved road infrastructure in the Central American - Mexico corridor could lead to the increased spread of disease, most worrisomely HIV/AIDs, if appropriate policies were not adopted [Central America, 3].

In Africa, it has been shown that transport schemes which incorporate health measures at the programme level can slow the spread of disease significantly. Only recently have similar programmes been incorporated in Central American road projects and these are too new to be evaluated. Another case story underscored the importance of linking infrastructure investments to design safety in highway construction and driver and pedestrian education. The UN noted that *"road crashes claim the lives of more than 1.3 million people and at least 50 million people are injured on the roads every year"* [Global, 236]. Similar issues were raised by the Economic and Social Council for Western Asia [Asia, 238]. Pedestrian deaths are particularly tragic because they are easily avoidable. Another case story from Africa, which has particularly high road-casualty rates, argued for setting up more adequate information systems, a clear locus of government accountability, regional targets for reducing casualties, public education, and improved road design.[9]

IMPROVING POLICY TO PROMOTE TRADE

If the economic literature emphasises one area that is essential to trade promotion – increasing exports, importing more efficiently or creating incentives for efficient import substitution – it is the policy environment. This common theme runs through Winters' twin reviews of trade and poverty reduction and trade and growth,[10] the OECD's extensive work in aid for trade, and the World Bank's and other multilateral development institutions' research on aid effectiveness. The potentially important role that policy can play in assisting workers and firms to move from pre-liberalisation uncompetitive sectors into post-liberalisation competitive sectors is a main focus.[11] The Aid for Trade Task Force recognised this when it emphasised the need for adjustment assistance to accompany the DDA.

Stories in this area can be grouped in three general areas: (i) support for *adjustment to changes in trade policy*, (ii) support for changes in national *development strategy*, and (iii) support for the introduction of *improved standards*.

Support for adjustment to changes in trade policies

Despite the importance of adjustment assistance, only three case stories dealt directly with comprehensive policy reform aimed at assisting firms and workers to adjust to a new post-liberalisation environment. [Mauritius, 131, China, 89, and Costa Rica, 157].

The Mauritius [131] story involves archetypical "trade adjustment assistance" as defined in the Task Force report. By 2006, Mauritius was suffering a triple shock – the phase out of sugar quotas, the end of the Multi-Fibre Agreement, and rising oil prices – that had dramatically slowed its previous high growth. In response to a government request, the World Bank provided diagnostics work that helped to lay the analytical foundations for subsequent reforms.[12] In June, the government announced a major reform programme comprising 40 different policy initiatives. These included broad reductions in tariffs and the establishment of an "Empowerment Programme" to assist workers and firms during the adjustment period. In a co-finance arrangement with the French Development Agency, the World Bank provided several budget support loans totalling USD 175 million. FDI increased, exports rose, and growth rates rose from 1.5% in 2005 to over 5% in 2007-08 (before the "Great Recession" induced another slowdown in 2009). Despite the breadth of its reform programme and repeated requests for assistance, donors did not provide Mauritius with concessional lending because of its status as a middle-income country [Mauritius, 131].

To help China's agricultural sector adjust to trade liberalization associated with WTO accession, Canada's CIDA worked with the government to develop a programme to help small farmers adapt to import competition and new trade incentives. The five year programme, launched in 2003 and funded with CAD 40 million, helped to train more than 20,000 farmers, agricultural extension workers, and government officials in food safety and WTO marketing rules. The programme was effectively a pilot programme which eventually led to spin-off efforts that China is still implementing [China, 89].

Over the last several decades, Costa Rica has implemented an ambitious programme of trade opening which saw tariffs reduced from an average of 46.3% in 1982, to 16.8% in 1989, (after joining GATT in 1990 and CAFTA in 2009) to just 5.87% today. During this period, the government received external support from the IDB, the Central American Bank of Economic Integration, UN Economic Commission for Latin America, UNCTAD, the OAS, and the WTO. The assistance took different forms, including training for trade negotiators, the acquisition of specialised hardware and software, and programmes for small rural farmers, SMEs, and officials in charge of scaling up standards and certification (to help Costa Rica participate in global supply chains). Building on its growing trade negotiation experience, Costa Rica entered into free trade agreements with 42 countries – with the result that more than 75% of Costa Rica's exports enter foreign markets preferentially. This contributed to strong economic growth and the reduction of poverty by more than one-third (from 28.3% of the population in 1989 to 18.5% in 2009) [Costa Rica, 157].

Support for changing national development strategies

Experience has shown that trade reforms do not always deliver expected economic growth and poverty reduction benefits. Hallaert (2010) argues that the impact of trade reforms on both trade and economic growth will depend on compatible and complementary policies. First compatible policies, such as an appropriate macroeconomic environment, are needed to reduce the risk of policy reversal and to make a trade reform sustainable. Second, building infrastructure, supporting the financial and banking sector development, building public and private sector capacities or supporting some regulatory reforms are usually needed so that firms can take advantage of new price incentives.

Kenya, Ghana and Cape Verde launched comprehensive reform programmes as part of their national development strategies. In Kenya, the programme involved removing obstacles to private investment and growth. In 2005-2006 Kenya launched an inventory of all its business licenses, fees, and user charges – and concluded that the resulting number was simply too high (1,325) to be consistent with a growing private sector. The government eliminated 315 licenses, simplified 379 others, and retained just 294. Simultaneously, it created an e-Registry as a focal point for investors seeking information about obtaining licenses and operating a business. It also set up a Business Regulatory Reform Unit to oversee licences and to screen all new proposed regulations through a Regulatory Impact Assessment process. The case story claims that these efforts led to *"gains… in FDI flows, growth in local investments and business start-ups...growth in employment...and more efficient delivery of public services"* [Kenya, 17].

In the case of Ghana, its programme was more overarching, and entailed stabilizing the macroeconomic environment, strengthening the financial sectors, introducing new business registration procedures, developing infrastructure, and reforming the public sector, the legal system, and land and property rights. This programme became an organising vehicle for work with development partners, outlined in a signed memorandum of understanding, including DFID, DANIDA, IDA,GTZ, AfDB, IFC, EU, and the governments of France, Japan, Switzerland and the United States. The programme resulted in several procedural improvements that would appear to have lowered the costs of doing business and expanded trade [Ghana, 65].

For Cape Verde, its WTO accession process was a driving force for reform. The government committed to binding tariffs to an average of 19%. Because its tariffs were aimed primarily at raising revenue, the government embarked on a programme to reform revenue collection that went far beyond tariffs; – and, consequently, donor support in trade-related areas extended well beyond WTO technical assistance.. The programme included improvements in fisheries managements, infrastructure, telecommunications, airports and ports, as well energy and some business regulation. Although much remains to be done – particularly in business regulation -- the results so far include an increase in FDI and, most important, national income that have outpaced the rest of Africa in recent years [Cape Verde, 222].

Other countries reported on similar reforms with similar positive outcomes [Tanzania, 286; Uganda, 100)].[13] For example, Burundi [211] initiated major reforms to improve revenue collection from both tariffs and non-tariff domestic sources. .

Raising standards for products and labour

Meeting international standards can be a major obstacle for exporters, particularly in low-income countries, so the numerous case stories describing programmes to address this challenge are valuable. These include, among others, programmes in the Latin America [252] and [253], Bangladesh [208], the Caribbean [169] Central America [223] East Africa [61] and [92], Morocco [179], Pakistan [115], and Sri Lanka [91]. In the Gambia, for example, the EU (through its UNIDO-executed West Africa Quality Programme) supported a major effort to help firms raise quality to meet international standards. Even though implementation has lagged behind the original 2007 timetable – only two of six components are nearing completion – the programme established a National Standards Bureau in December 2010, to oversee national SPS and Codex standards for edible oil, labelling and advertising, and is nearing completion of metrology lab's refurbishment. The project has been extended for another year [Gambia, 45]. Meeting specialised standards might have been considered a "niche" market a decade ago, but today it is becoming more mainstream, offering exporters that achieve such standards significant growth and product differentiation potential. For example, certified-organic exports from Uganda have grown from USD 10 million in 2004-05 to USD 37 million in 2009-10 [East Africa, 102].

The work of the *Instituto Interamericano de Cooperacion para la Agricultura* (IICA) in Latin America is an example of the different ways that donor assistance can be used to promote international agricultural standards and exports. With support from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), the IICA developed an ambitious five-year project, supplemented by WTO training courses, to encourage capital-based discussions on standards prior to each SPS meeting in Geneva [Latin America, 251]. IICA also put together a valuable tool kit to aid SPS compliance and to improve agricultural health and food-safety services [Latin America, 253].

IMPROVING POLICY: RESULTS AT A GLANCE	
Sri Lanka	Accredited laboratories saw their customer base (exporters) increase by 72%, and thanks to their improved services (and other complementary assistance to the sector) fish exports from Sri Lanka increased from 7,742 MT in 2002 to 15,014 MT in 2008 [Sri Lanka, 115].
Asia and Pacific	Improved fumigation techniques in Indonesia allowed the mutual recognition and avoidance of re-treatment in Australia, which saved an estimated USD 4 million; about 12 tonnes of ozone-depleting methyl bromide were not used thanks to effective fumigation practices [Asia and Pacific, 151].
Honduras	After reforming business regulation, the time needed to open a new business went from 62 days in 2005 to 20 days in 2008 [Honduras, 247].
Ghana	Regulatory reforms included the creation of the Commercial Court to speed the timing of commercial dispute resolution and contract enforcement [Ghana, 65].
Mauritius	Trade policy reform paid off especially in terms of FDI which five-folded from 2002 to 2007 reaching 11 million rupees; growth rates increased until the onset of the Great Recession [Mauritius, 131].
Central America	SPS capacity-building activities and improvements in sanitary regulation in Central America have contributed to generating over USD 100m in exports to the US market since 2006 [Central America, 223].

Source: Selected subsample of results taken from OECD/WTO case story database

For the standard-setting process to improve both product quality and market access, it must involve private actors as well as developing-country officials. One lesson from ITC's Ethiopian Coffee Improvement Project was the importance of involving buyers in the project's design. Their direct knowledge of export markets proved invaluable in designing effective interventions [Ethiopia, 75]. Similarly, involving LDCs in standard setting requires continuous training throughout the process of designing and implementing appropriate standards.

Labour standards are also important. In Cambodia, the World Bank's IFC joined with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to launch a programme called "Better Factories Cambodia" (BFC). The programme's monitoring mechanism involves unannounced factory-inspection visits to ensure that working conditions – *i.e.*, emergency exits, lavatory facilities, and hours worked – met approved labour standards. Moreover, by sharing supervision efforts, multinational companies and local inspections were able to consolidate their inspections and audits, all of which had the imprimatur of the IFC and ILO. The programme was supplemented by training for supervisors and by an information management system to monitor working conditions. The programme is widely viewed as a success, improving not only working conditions but also productivity, as absenteeism and worker turnover rates have declined [Cambodia, 126]. Moreover, better labour standards attract reputation-conscious buyers who can now turn to the BFC for the monitoring results for a given factory. Using the BFC's factory-level data, Oka (2009) finds that having at least one reputation-conscious buyer encourages factories to improve compliance. Other studies have shown that during the recent downturn, factories participating in the BFC programme - and in similar certification programmes in other countries - suffered fewer order cancellations than non-participating factories.

One emerging area of concern for developing countries is the way that private standards are increasingly impacting trade flows. These standards are often set by large importing retailers or their associations, sometimes with the informal or formal backing of home governments. In 2008, UNIDO launched a forum to discuss these emerging standards involving private producers, governments and stakeholders. Sponsored by Norway, this dialogue eventually led to a guide, *Making Private Standards Work for You,* that shed light on a range of standards in three labour-intensive sectors - garments, footwear and furniture - which are of particular concern to developing countries [Global, 112].

BUILDING CAPACITY AND IMPROVING CO-ORDINATION TO ENHANCE TRADE

The largest number of case stories describe technical assistance to build government capacity and improve skills. Definitions of trade-related capacity building vary widely. The WTO's definition, for example, includes human capacity (training of professional negotiators), institutional capacity (customs and standards) and infrastructure capacity.[14] In a narrower approach, Prowse (2002) focused on the importance of a government's technical capacity to originate and implement a broad array of policies to enhance trade. She argued that government and donor efforts were too piecemeal to be effective, and advocated a more strategic and comprehensive approach; an argument that later would lead to the establishment of the EIF trust fund (see below). Whalley (1999), in a background paper for an OECD DAC experts meeting, adopted a similarly narrow definition of capacity building, which will be used in the following section.

Most case stories about technical assistance involved countries in sub-Saharan Africa, although there were also stories from Cambodia, the Caribbean, Cameroon and Comoros. While this category covered the most diverse activities, the stories tended to cluster around three types of technical assistance projects. One cluster involved efforts at the global, regional, and county level to *create knowledge and capacities* to help countries integrate trade more fully into the national development programmes. A second cluster involved government assistance to improve *trade policy formulation* or to help with trade negotiations. A third cluster concerned efforts to help governments understand and implement specific trade-related laws and regulations, including new intellectual property regimes.

Programmes focusing on knowledge and capacities

At the national level, the EIF represents one of the most ambitious programmes to build capacity to formulate and implement trade policy. Born in 2007 out of earlier efforts to strengthen trade management capacities in LDCs, the newly "enhanced" IF has its own secretariat and Trust Fund (intended to reach USD 240 million). These resources were to be put at the disposal of LDC governments to remedy any shortcomings in technical staff and to finance small "seed" projects of their choosing. The programme also continued to finance Diagnostic Trade Integration Studies (DTISs), a programme begun in 2001 to examine an LDC's infrastructure, institutional, and policy obstacles to trade. These studies also highlighted technical assistance needs, around which donor aid for trade support could be mobilised.

Some 31 case stories mention the EIF, and several specifically recount EIF-sponsored activities to improve the design of trade policy. One example is Lesotho [150] which describes the decade-long effort to help the country deal with the enormous trade problems it confronts, including being landlocked, being dependent on the garment industry, and having limited technical capacity. The EIF-assisted effort was essential to helping Lesotho unlock donor finance for aid for trade, as previously most donor support was directed towards the social sector at the expense of investments in potential sources of growth, many of them trade-related.

Zambia's case story [154] tells of the long – and at times bumpy – road to implementing a consistent trade strategy with the support of the EIF and its predecessor. The DTIS was validated by donors and government officials in July 2005, but because of insufficient stakeholder consultations, including within the government, the document was not approved until the following year. Staff turnovers and limited technical expertise in the donor community – combined with the key implementing agency's limited capacity to carry out the reforms and projects suggested in the DTIS - further complicated implementation. Despite these difficulties, the EIF *"achieved some notable results in Zambia"*. Raising awareness of the importance of trade to growth led to the inclusion of trade in Zambia's National Development Strategy and Poverty Reduction Strategy. It helped to introduce efficiencies in the economy and to mobilize additional donor resources. It also became the main mechanism through which Zambia accessed additional aid for trade resources, and built productive partnerships with donor and NGO groups. This was demonstrated by Zambia's productive partnership with CUTS and the Finnish government to identify new potential for economic diversification, to promote awareness of trade opportunities through workshops, and to identify supply-side constraints (such as infrastructure) that the government could redress with donor support [Zambia, 180].

At the regional level, one of the most ambitious regional capacity building projects involved a 2006 joint venture between the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute and Lund University in Sweden, financed by Sida, to provide sustained vocational education and university training for African policy makers, particularly those from LDCs. Some 300 government and private sector representatives have been trained annually since the programme was launched. In 2010 alone, 617 participants were enrolled [Africa, 95]. Another example of this kind of regional capacity building is an OAS-sponsored Masters degree programme for government officials at the University of West Indies [Latin America, 84]

At the global level, several case stories showcased efforts to mobilise information for the use of developing countries. For example, the ITC described its efforts to provide data on market access for developing-country exporters, including on tariff and nontariff barriers in major markets. Launched in 1999 at a cost of USD 22 million, the ITC's Trade Map and Market Access Maps now boast some 130,000 users. Originally a subscription service, the ITC began offering these tools at no cost in 2008 to allow the widest possible number of developing-countries users to better formulate negotiating positions and to seek new export opportunities [Global, 73]. Another example of a globally available tool – but one with a far narrower user base - is UNIDO's *Trade Capacity Building Resource Guide* which is a compilation of all current capacity building activities offered by the bilateral and multilateral donor community [Global, 113]. A third example of a global initiative is the Commonwealth Secretariat's effort to generate data and research on women in trade at the global, regional and national levels. This effort has produced, among other things, a *Gender and Trade Action Guide,* a website devoted to gender and trade issues, an EU-sponsored research project on Gender and Women's Rights, a women and trade advocacy campaign in several international fora [Global, 50], and a training programme (which supported SADC's Gender Programme in Southern Africa) [Southern Africa, 55].

Programmes to enhance negotiating and implementation capacities

Aid for trade has increased the capacity of officials to negotiate effectively, to understand the full policy and legal implications of agreements, and to implement them once agreed. For example, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) participated more effectively in WTO negotiations because of the support it has received from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) since 2000. The OECS set up a mechanism to improve coherence, culminating in full missions travelling to Geneva in 2005 with the support of the EU, among others (though sustainable funding remains a problem) [Caribbean, 259]. Likewise, several donors, including UNDP and WTO, have supported Madagascar's trade capacity strengthening programme since 2003 [Madagascar, 255]. Rather than training trade officials in one country at a time, another model involves bringing officials from several countries to a central location for training. For example, Singapore's Regional Trade Policy Course, organised jointly by the National University and the WTO, offers a three month course for senior officials from LDCs from the Asia-Pacific Region [Global, 262].

One requirement of WTO membership is a periodic Trade Policy Review of Member's policies. The WTO has recently piloted, in six countries, the inclusion of a review of aid for trade as part of the broader TPR process. One conclusion from this exercise is that it is particularly useful when governments and donors follow up on the analysis and recommendations provided by Geneva reviews – a step which Belize and the IADB have taken with great effect [Global, 205].

Funding support for the EPA negotiations was a common thread running through the case stories. The EU, through its "Hub and Spokes" programme, has endeavoured to strengthen the capacity of trade policy officials in the ACP countries to formulate negotiating positions in the WTO and in the Economic Partnership Agreements. The Caribbean project adopted a "bottom up" approach that included the formation of Public-Private Consultative Groups (involving entrepreneurs, NGOs, and government officials), the appointment of a regional trade policy advisor to the Caribbean Community secretariat and to the OECS secretariat, and the funding of trade policy analysts for Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St Vincent, and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. Collectively these efforts laid the foundation for Cariforum's negotiations with the EU on its EPA arrangements, for training staff in rules of origin, and later for setting up an implementation roadmap for EPA provisions. The programme also sponsored technical assistance to help bring several countries' export subsidy programmes into compliance with WTO rules [Caribbean, 22 and 258]. In Jamaica, the trade policy analyst provided by the Hub and Spokes Programme helped the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop policy and negotiating positions on specific issues, notably trade in services [Caribbean, 182]. The case story provided by the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) describes a similar experience in its region [Africa, 33]. Sudan's description of its efforts to improve its negotiating capacity with the EU is also representative of other countries' experiences [Sudan, 93].

The United States has also offered assistance to implement trade agreements. One example is Vietnam which, with the help of USAID resources after 2003, mobilised 52 different agencies to train officials and to draft new legislation and regulations for WTO accession in 2007 [Vietnam, 232]. Partly as a consequence of these efforts, Vietnam has grown at more than 7% annually over the last decade, and its exports have risen from USD 18 billion in 2001 to USD 72 billion today.

Since 2000, the ADB has also taken a more regional approach to improving countries' trade negotiating capacities. First, it has pulled together detailed information on various free trade agreements (FTAs) and created a transparent data base for country negotiators, including analyses of trends, summaries of key provisions, and the preparation of a comparative toolkit on FTAs. Second, it has promoted regional capacity building through training courses and the publication of trade manuals (sometimes in partnership with the UNESCAP). Third, it has undertaken an extensive research programme examining, among other things, the benefits of FTAs and the DDA, the economic effects of integration, and trade costs. Finally, working with the WTO, World Bank, and other multilateral partners, the ADB has conducted an advocacy campaign for best practices in multilateral trade policy formulation [Asia and Pacific, 11].

For more than two decades, the IADB has also mounted a sustained effort to strengthen trade negotiators' capacity throughout Latin America. This effort has evolved over time, from a focus in the mid-1990s on preparing for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA) negotiations, to the current focus on administering intra-regional free trade agreements, especially the implementation of market access commitments (including help with rules of origin) and improving trade facilitation (including the interoperability of single windows). The IADB's long-standing support for this type of activity has produced distinct benefits: greater negotiating skills, better intra-regional knowledge of existing productive capacity, and improved co-ordination of trade-interested actors within countries [Latin America, 213].

Through its TradeMark Southern Africa programme, DFID is supporting the efforts of three regional economic communities – COMESA, EAC, and SADC – to harmonise their trading arrangements, to promote the free movement of business people, and to facilitate the joint implementation of inter-regional infrastructure. This grew out of the Heads of State meeting in October 2008 which launched efforts to establish a Tripartite FTA (involving 26 countries) covering non-tariff barriers, rules of origin, customs co-operation, transit trade, trade remedies, SPS and IPR issues, among other things. TradeMark Southern Africa is providing technical support to the three secretariats, including the provision of short-term technical assistance, building analytical capacities for trade policy formulation, and improving negotiating skills. These efforts have contributed to the establishment of institutional structures to conduct the negotiations, to draft the Tripartite Agreement, with annexes, that will form the basis of negotiations, to draft a Roadmap outlining timetables for negotiations, and to support the preparation of negotiating modalities and rules [Africa, 49].

In addition to these direct efforts to strengthen negotiating and implementing capacities, there are programmes of knowledge creation and research that inform negotiators about the consequences of alternative policy formulations. The development banks, development institutes, universities and NGOs have produced a rich literature on the implications of the DDA, regional free trade arrangements, and bilateral trade and investment. These resources were generally not the subject of the case stories. Exceptions included the World Bank which described its analytical efforts in environmental goods and services, and the complexities, nuances, and potential of these discussions in the context of the DDA [Global, 167]. Another example was ODI's analytical contribution to the aid-for-trade discussion in West Africa, a contentious and important companion to the EPA discussions there [West Africa, 147]. Nevertheless, informative as these and other stories are, they represent a small tip of the massive research iceberg that has contributed to the understanding of collective trade action.

Ultimately these projects, like other forms of technical assistance, can rarely lay claim to direct export and import results. Nor can they be easily evaluated in term of their impact on the development-promoting quality of regional or multilateral trade agreements that emerge from the EPA or WTO negotiations– if only because these outcomes are the result of negotiations outside the power of any one actor to influence exclusively. Moreover, the evaluator does not know the counterfactual: would the EPA or intra-regional negotiations have had a different outcome in the absence of training and other knowledge dissemination? These qualifications notwithstanding, the case stories provide a rich recounting of efforts to empower negotiators and the general public with greater knowledge, and one finds little dissent in these stories about the value of these efforts.

Improving capacities to implement intellectual property rights

Several stories contained illuminating descriptions of improvements of specific capacities at the country level. These include aid for trade for technical assistance and capacity building designed to improve trade policy formulation, trade administration, implementation of SPS requirements, and better business regulations [Colombia, 227; Bangladesh 202; Botswana, 219; Vietnam, 195].

One recurrent theme was intellectual property rights. For example, the IDLO trained some 200 officials and private stakeholders in ways to use intellectual property rules to promote development in four African countries – Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zambia. This led to the adoption of a new Intellectual Property Policy [Africa, 69] and a set of recommendations for the Trademark Act of Zambia. It also fed into the intellectual property discussions that were part of the EPA negotiations [Africa, 69]. Similarly, in Cambodia, the Republic of Korea sponsored four types of training for 34 government officials during the course of 2005, as well as joint research on policy issues, for the most part associated with the adoption of regional agreements, SPS standards, and intellectual property rights. This training helped officials later to organise a larger effort in the form of sector-wide approach [Cambodia, 79]. In Vietnam, the Swiss government provided assistance to authorities' efforts to establish a TRIPs-compliant intellectual property regime in three phases as part of their accession to the WTO. This involved help with the legal framework, enhance the provision of administrative services, teaching of IPR at universities, help with geographic indications, and the protection of traditional cultural expressions. It contributed to the adoption of a new law on intellectual property in 2005, setting up of IPR courts in 2007, an IP institute, and transfer of knowledge on valuation issues. Training to 240 enforcement officials was associated with acceleration in IPR enforcement cases and raids to shut down violators. With the assistance of follow up courses on Geographic Indicators (GIs) provided by the Swiss and France, the effort also prompted Vietnam to register three geographic indications – Lang Son Start Anis, Doan Hung Grapefruit and Vinh Orange. Vietnam and Switzerland later teamed up to provide similar assistance to Lao PDR [Vietnam, 96].

The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), with financing from DFID, has provided technical assistance to five countries -- Sierra Leone, Uganda, Rwanda, Bangladesh, and Tanzania --to undertake needs assessments in the implementation of IPRs beginning in 2007. These efforts helped the countries take advantage of the WTO TRIP's Council invitation to submit needs assessments for possible donor finance, and by June 2010, all of the countries but Cambodia had submitted their assessments (and Cambodia is expected to do so in 2011). It is expected that the EIF will provide financing for follow-up technical assistance identified in the needs assessments [Global, 249].

In the Caribbean, a group of regional stakeholders is beginning a programme to leverage intellectual property rules. This public-private group – including the Caribbean Association of Industries and Commerce, Caribbean Export, the Office of Trade Negotiations of the Caricom Secretariat, the OAS and others – are setting up a training programme for entrepreneurs in three products (Grenadian nutmeg, West Indian Sea Island Cotton, and one to be named from Belize) with the idea of helping them move up the value chain by developing quality brands. Similar activities are planned for training at the university level in three countries [Caribbean, 170].

Rarely in this type of aid for trade is it possible to trace direct results to productive outcomes. Global programmes may well lead to new insights that motivate policy makers and private actors, which may lead to new policies, which may in turn produce greater trade, rising incomes, improved gender equality and a better environment. IPRs may eventually provide dividends in terms of earnings to music and transitional knowledge and greater foreign direct investment – such as those that Vietnam has experienced – although the link between stronger IPRs and increased FDI has only been convincingly made to technology-intensive investments in middle-income countries.[15] But a few cases stories argued that new IPRs were crucial to increased trade and FDI. In Jordan, for example, the signing of a free trade agreement with the United States provided impetus to put in place new intellectual property regulations in 2001. This was reported to have fostered the expansion of the fledgling generic drug industry. By 2010, sixteen pharmaceutical companies had sales of more than USD 500 million and were exporting 81% of their production to over 60 countries. The largest company, Al Hikma Pharmaceuticals, now has subsidiaries in the United States, Europe and throughout the Middle East, and has expanded its domestic R&D activities into a global network of laboratories [Jordan, 173]. Other similar stories, submitted by WIPO using its IP Advantage data base, are reported for beer exports from the Lao PDR [Lao PDR, 172] and Marula oil in Namibia [Namibia, 134].

UNDERTAKING PRO-ACTIVE INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC POLICIES

Industrial policy – *i.e.* government interventions targeted at promoting the growth of particular sectors – is one of the hot controversies in development economics. The purported purpose is to foment development in sectors in which countries have a latent comparative advantage, where there are positive spillovers in terms of technological advancement, employment, or other social purposes (*e.g.* poverty reduction or gender), and where policy can offset the costs of "discovery" of new products. As Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) argue, however, the argument for protection only carries weight when the country adopting the protection has a latent comparative advantage, such that the protection can later be removed.[16] Instruments typically used are tax breaks, credit and budget subsidies, reservation policies in government procurement, and trade protection. In trade policy, instruments have included trade-related investment measures, sectoral restrictions on foreign and/or private investment, and subsidies to technology policy.

Dani Rodrik, among others, has been a leading proponent of industrial policies to promote competitiveness. Much of his argument is predicated on offsetting the "discovery" costs essential to diversification, and on the desirability of certain product portfolios that lend themselves to inter-industry spillovers - an argument elaborated by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003). One justification for industrial policy generally is that it can help countries move into higher technology products that are more likely to lead to faster growth rates. Hausmann and Klinger (2006), extending work by Hausmann and Rodrik (2007), argued that certain types of products lend themselves to more rapid movement into other newer products or otherwise produced externalities, which were more amenable to rapid structural transformation and productivity growth.

Others, such as Pack and Saggi (2006), have taken a more critical stance, arguing that failures have been as common as successes, and that other variables, besides industrial policy, could as likely explain positive outcomes in regions such as East Asia.[17] Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009), in one of the most comprehensive review of the empirical literature, conclude that the evidence is inconclusive. In reaching this conclusion, they draw a distinction between "hard" and "soft" industrial policy. "Hard industrial policy" in their formulation includes tariffs and nontariff barriers, exports subsidies, and tax-breaks for foreign and domestic corporations. They find little evidence that these policies can be predicted to lead to more rapid growth or diversification. They contend that these policies are too easily entrenched and are more easily subject to manipulation by interest groups. On the other hand, their formulation of "soft industrial policy" -- namely "programmes and grants to, for example, help particular clusters by increasing the supply of skilled workers, encouraging technology adoption, and improving regulation and infrastructure" (2009:76) – is often effective. A key characteristic is that these policies tend to expose supported activities to import and export competition rather than to protect them from it.

Focusing on exports, Lederman and Maloney (2010) probe in detail whether "what you export matters" and whether that would justify more aggressive industrial policies. Their conclusion is that: "*First, what you export probably does matter. Externalities exist…and there is no reason to believe that they are associated with all goods equally… Second, the literature still offers us no confident policy guidance on what those goods might be. … Our bottom line is that "How you export matters more."* (2010:85) That is, the way a country deploys its resources to raise productivity is more important than the basket of goods they produce.

Evidence from the Case Stories: Soft Industrial Policies

Industry-specific policies surfaced frequently in the case stories. The instruments used only infrequently mention the broad instruments commonly debated in the literature – tariff and nontariff protection at the border, tax expenditures, subsidies and procurement, as well as measures proscribed by the WTO, such as performance requirements and export subsidies.[18] More common are measures for specific industries to provide direct technical assistance on production techniques, help with meeting standards, up grading quality, information about foreign markets, concerted government efforts to overcome specific transportation or other constraints in the value chain, and often coupled with some small subsidies. The measures in the case stories tend to conform to the "soft industrial policy" of Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) or industry-specific versions of what Newfarmer, *et al.* (2009) called "pro-active" government policies.[19] These policies are intended to remedy market failures (such as in information about export markets), to increase exposure to competition by actively promoting entry, and/or addressing bottlenecks in the supply chain to lower the costs of trading.

Expanding exports at the intensive margin: up-grading quality

Many of the projects were intended to up-grade quality – working at the "intensive margin" with traditional exports. Many of these exports exhibited substandard performance, but had considerable potential if supply-side obstacles could be overcome. Providing technical assistance to improve quality or to reduce specific costs in the value chain of delivery to foreign markets were common objectives that, once achieved, had high pay-offs. Among these figured projects in Cameroon to improve bananas and plantain [Cameroon, 19], in West Africa to improve cotton [Africa, 30], EU efforts in Rwanda to improve the quality of tea [Rwanda, 194], in West Africa to improve rice [Benin, 13], in Ethiopia to improve coffee [Ethiopia, 75], UNIDO's work with Bangladesh to up-grade quality in the readymade garment sector [Bangladesh, 216], in Guatemala to improve organic crops [53], in Honduras to improve oriental vegetables [Honduras, 68], in Grenada to improve fisheries [Grenada, 67], in Peru to improve milk quality [Peru, 198], in Mozambique to revive processed cashew exports [Mozambique, 184], in Tanzania to improve coffee [212], and in Tonga to control fruit flies [99], as well as in Indonesia to improve dairy livestock [70], and in East Africa, to improve trade in organic agricultural projects [East Africa, 102], to mention a few.

Several projects were financed by donors to help producers in meeting *quality standards* in their home and other export markets. Examples include EU assistance for fish production in Fiji [196], Honduras [178], and Mozambique [141], as well as assistance to palm oil producers in Ghana [215].

One example of South-South aid for trade is the Cotton-4 project initiated by the Brazilian government in 2008 in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali [Africa, 30]. Activities included refurbishing an experimental station in Mali and implementing an evaluation unit and technology showcase in Cotton 4 countries. The project also prepared a manual for best-practice farming techniques for Africa. Perhaps of more direct impact, the project introduced in Mali nine Brazilian cotton varieties. These efforts were complemented with technical assistance focussed on sustainable soil use and biological plague control. The project had dramatic results: yields increased threefold to 3,000 kg/ha. Overall the project forecast a 10% increase in the 2010 harvest. This project marked the expansion of Brazil's technical assistance to Africa to some 300 initiatives, with a budget of USD 60 million.

Sometimes donors' trade policies drove industries to change and improve. Such was the case for Caribbean rum producers who faced the prospect of losing their privileged access to the EU rum market with the phase out of quota preferences. Taking advantage of EU assistance, rum producers banded together, lobbied for a slower timetable for preference phase-outs, and invested in improving quality and product differentiation, with the result that exports actually expanded [Caribbean, 200]. The results of a similar effort by Fiji to adjust to EU reductions in prices and quotas are much less certain – in part because of the withdrawal of EU assistance in the face of "perceived noncompliance with the pre-requisites" of that assistance [Fiji, 243].

Diversification at the extensive margin: spurring new products

Soft industrial policies to promote diversification into non-traditional products – at the extensive margin – were also common in the stories. Grenada's effort to improve the quality of fishery products for exports offers an interesting example. To reduce its environmental vulnerability, Grenada tried to change its trade structure by diversifying into highly exportable sectors, including the fishery industry. This sector, however, faced nontrivial challenges, including strict international standards and norms for fishing, and local difficulties in storing and transporting fish. In 2003 Grenada was accepted into the EU's "Strengthening Fishery Products Health Condition Programme" which was launched in 2002 as a support mechanism to help third countries meet EU regulations in this sector. The project trained national inspectors in quality and gave advice to the fishing industry on improving its internal quality systems. It also provided a wide array of services in this area, inlcluding establishing a Produce Chemical Laboratory, funding EU study tours for inspectors and managers, supporting testing laboratories and technical institutes; providing technical assistance for writing quality assurance manuals and guidelines, assisting businesses to develop products, packaging, and increase value-added, and funding public infrastructure. Greneda's limited technical capacity was a constraint on the project, as were environmental setbacks (*i.e.* rising water temperature). Nevertheless, Grenada was included in the EU's List 1 of countries that can export fishery products into the EU as a result of the great strides it had made: the sector has a modern legislation, capacity was built at all levels of stakeholders (from auditors to individual fishermen and vendors) and equipped testing laboratories are readily available.

AID FOR PRO-ACTIVE INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC POLICIES: RESULTS AT A GLANCE	
Bangladesh	Families of the "phone ladies" of less than a dollar increased their income to USD 100 [Bangladesh, 64].
Benin	Exports of Nerica rice tripled from 2007 to 2009 [Benin, 13].
Burundi	The production of essential oils will provide employment for 40,000 families [Burundi, 18].
Cambodia	Almost 100% of rice production is now eligible for export to the EU [Cambodia, 139].
Caribbean	18 new brands of rum introduced into the EU market; 20% increase in direct female employment; 11 energy and conservation projects in 8 countries [Caribbean, 23]. 20 firms were assisted in modernisation and several reported reducing costs by 15-20% [Caribbean, 2].
Chad	The whole production chain of leather production was supported from 1,200 new knife/utensils distributed to butchers (200 butchers), to months of training for artisans working the leather (30 artisans) [Chad, 225].
Cote d'Ivoire	5,600 farmers were trained and they delivered 6,000 tonnes of certified cacao of higher yield and quality that led to increasing farmers' incomes [Cote d'Ivoire, 187].
Cotton 4 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali)	Farmers of organic cotton saw their gross margin increase by 30% and spend 90% less on input costs; farmers have also diversified and are producing sesame, shea nuts and hibiscus [West Africa, 37].
Fiji	6,000 ha of new cane were planted (represents 12% of total production) [Fiji, 243].
Ghana	Since 2009 (3 years into the programme of quality amelioration of palm oil) there has been no single alert or reported case of sub-quality palm oil export [Ghana, 215].
Honduras	A project to develop fishing capacities also led to the creation of 20 alternative products to traditional fisheries for Honduran farmers [Honduras, 178]. Newly introduced oriental vegetables produced USD 30 million of exports [Honduras, 68].

Source: Selected subsample of results taken from OECD/WTO case story data base

AID FOR PRO-ACTIVE INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC POLICIES: RESULTS AT A GLANCE	
Indonesia	Production costs for rattan furniture were cut by 15-20% and all companies that received assistance offered new and improved products [Indonesia, 185]. The eco exotic market expanded its exports by 9.8% [Indonesia, 71]. The streamlining of value chains, amelioration of quality produce, reduction of waste and costs gave cacao farmers a 20% increase in their income [Indonesia, 152].
Kingdom of Tonga	19% return on investment on the fruit-fly [prevention] project; the identification of the fruit fly saved the market [Tonga, 99].
Lao PDR	"Beerlao" accounts for 90% of the country's beer market [Lao PDR, 172].
Mali	Brazilian cotton variety yielded 3 times more produce than local variety [Africa, 30].
Mozambique	South African requirements of fisheries imports were met by Mozambique, thus allowing it to export to this country [Mozambique, 141]. The construction of a new pipeline for gas extraction, Mozambique will extract approximately 440 million barrels of oil from the Pande gas field [Mozambique, 59].
Namibia	By the year 2000, rural Marula oil producers were receiving over USD 60,000 annually, which they wouldn't have otherwise had [Namibia, 134]. Eudafano Women's Cooperative (EWC) is now the second largest Marula oil producer in South Africa and has engaged in multiple R&D and marketing partnerships with European firms [Namibia, 134].
Nicaragua	620 coffee and honey producers have significantly higher living standards and income [Nicaragua, 98].
Pakistan	Over 1000 farming households were linked directly to dairy companies, eliminating middlemen [Pakistan, 158].
Peru	Reducing drying time for maca from 3 months to 45 days, production costs and risks were reduced for the 184 families who also saw their incomes increase [Peru, 136].
Tanzania	Certified coffee farmers had net incomes 23% higher than conventional farmers as well as less pesticide related health injuries [Tanzania, 212].

Source: Selected subsample of results taken from OECD/WTO case story data base

The project was successful in increasing exports from this sector and improving the quality and variety of products [Grenada, 67]. However, other case stories underscore that this can be a hard area to get right. Only through the *"extraordinary commitment"* of staff and their creative solutions to problems ranging from lack of finance to poor testing facilities were Fiji authorities able to successfully implement new SPS standards for fish [Fiji, 196]. Mozambique successfully implemented standards for fisheries only to see rising fuel and other costs depress its exports [Mozambique, 141].

An example of non-agricultural technical assistance was the introduction of mobile telephones to Bangladesh [64]. By expanding into the mobile phone market, Grameen Bank equipped women with the capacity to connect disparate villages, to market better their products, and to become part of the formal financial system. This raised incomes of the "phone ladies" several fold, and transformed the lives both of the women and those benefitting from improved connectivity [Bangladesh, 64]. Simple technical assistance to mobile telephone regulators and operators in the Dominican Republic also helped that industry take off. As part of its FTA related support, USAID provided assistance to allow telephone numbers to be portable across carriers. Meanwhile new competition policies induced prices to fall and the market to widen [Dominican Republic, 231]

Another interesting example is rattan furniture production in Indonesia. With the support of Germany's GIZ, Indonesia undertook a study of the integrated value chain for rattan furniture exports, identified constraints (in productivity, human resources, knowledge of foreign markets, and capital), and worked with firms and workers in the industry to overcome them. The results (though subsequently adversely impacted by the 2008 downturn) include increased productivity, quality improvements, and a 16% increase in exports between 2009 and 2010 [Indonesia, 185].

Tangible results

This group of stories often included quantitative indicators of successful outcomes, such as increases in production, exports, and incomes, or even evidence of improvements in gender equality and environmental sustainability. For example, increases in exports were reported in Tonga [99], West Africa [13], Ethiopia [75], and Guatemala [53]. Women also benefited, according to some stories. A notable example is the Enterprise Uganda case story [Uganda, 116]; another is the rice technical assistance for the seven countries of West Africa, where some 80% of the producers were women.

These findings are consistent with more sophisticated econometric studies. Brenton and Von Uexkull (2009), for example, examine the effects of 88 export development programmes in 48 different countries. They found that, on average, export development programmes coincided with, or predated, stronger export performance. However, their conclusion are tempered by the lack of evidence of what would have happened in the absence of these interventions.

LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO PROMOTE EXPORTS: TRADE FINANCE, EXPORT PROMOTION AND SKILL UP-GRADING

Aid for trade can support government efforts to promote exports in ways other than activity-specific industrial policies. Case stories that captured government efforts to mobilise the private sector – and particular constituencies -- for exporting generally fell into three broad categories: efforts to provide *trade finance*; efforts to develop *new sources of exports* (including specific programmes aimed at SMEs); and efforts to promote *women in trade*. Taken together, these case stories represented a fifth of the total submitted, and entailed a wide range of projects.

Trade finance

Trade finance is the lubricant of trade. It became more important in the wake of the 2008 slowdown as financial markets seized up, risk premiums rose, and advanced-country banks recalled funds in order to recapitalise (see Chauffour and Farole, 2009; Haddad, 2009; and Chauffour and Malouche, 2011). At the urging of the WTO and others, the World Bank, the EBRD, the ADB, and the Islamic Development Bank expanded their support to banks providing credit to developing–country traders.

This effort was highlighted in the ADB's Trade Finance Programme case story. The ADB provided finance for USD 2.8 billion of trade in 2010. It attracted USD 1.5 billion in co-financing, and worked with over 200 banks in 14 countries of East and South Asia. It also supported some 500 SMEs. Almost half of the trade it supported was South-South trade [Asia and Pacific, 8]. The EBRD reported on a similar programme designed to provide counter-guarantees to private finance. By 2008, the programme was active in 18 countries - including 56 participating banks and 119 confirming banks – and covered business volumes of more than USD 900 million. The programme also provided technical assistance to participating banks to improve the accuracy of operations. Two thirds reported significant reductions in processing time, and half reported improvements in risk

management [Eastern Europe, 39]. The IADB also increased its trade finance activities through its Trade Finance Reactivation Programme. By the end of 2010, the TFRP had approved over USD 1.2 billion in credit lines, had issued guarantees of over USD 800 million, and had built a network of 72 issuing banks in 19 countries. Nearly three quarters of these banks count SMEs as their main business focus. As with the ADB, a large portion of the financed trade was South-South intra-regional trade (Latin America, 117]. In Central Asia, the Islamic Development Bank has also played a catalytic role in promoting the region's exporters, providing trade finance assistance and developing a Road Map for aid for trade within the region [Central Asia, 192]. The World Bank through its private sector arm, the IFC, doubled its Global Trade Finance Programme – a programme of trade finance counter-guarantees - to USD 3 billion and established a Global Trade Liquidity Programme that will provide USD 50 billion in trade liquidity support in public-private partnership.[20]

Access to credit generally, not just trade finance, is crucial for the private sector. Econometric results by Hallaert *et al.* (2011) show that limited access to credit is a significant barrier to trade. They report that a 10% increase in credit-to-GDP ratio boosts economic growth, through its trade impact, by 1.8%. This result is consistent with the finding of many developing countries; and according to the *Enterprise Surveys* (World Bank, 2010), access to credit is reported as a major business constraint.

Export promotion programmes

Efforts to promote exports were a common theme in many case stories. In the Caribbean, for example, the Caribbean Export Development Agency received assistance from the EU to provide support services to expand trade. The two-and-a-half year project, which ended in 2010 and involved EUR 6.8 million in funding, provided assistance to companies to up-grade product and service quality, increase productivity and reduce transport costs. Grants were made to 197 companies throughout the region [Caribbean, 207], with Trinidad and Tobago being among the successful users of this facility [Caribbean, 188]. Uganda also invested in export promotion, working with the ITC to undertake a firm survey that laid the basis for further financial assistance and policy revisions [Uganda, 77]. Tunisia's export promotion programme, Famex, was recently subjected to a series of rigorous impact evaluations [Tunisia, 130] which showed that the programme significantly raised export performance.[21] At the global level, the ITC continues to focus considerable energy on export promotion, including the development of a modular learning system for supply chain management. The programme is now offered in more than 120 licensed partner institutions in 61 countries. More than 25,000 people have taken part in the 18-module course [Global, 193].

Programmes aimed at SMEs

More than 20 case stories recount government efforts to develop and promote exports through a variety of different mechanisms. Some of these programmes involved training entrepreneurs, such as the EU-sponsored programme in Azerbaijan to help firms access the benefits of GSP [Azerbaijan, 12], or its"Coaching Exportador" programme in Chile [123]. Malawi provided training in business economics for SMEs [Malawi, 160], and Belgium has provided grants and training to small-scale producers and their associations in 18 developing countries, with a particular focus on sustainable trade [Global, 218]. Others stories highlighted efforts to promote the private sector more generally (*e.g.* Kenya's Private Sector Strategy [Kenya, 17] or Ghana's Private Sector Strategy [Ghana, 65]). Still others involved more ambitious programmes at the sub-regional level, such as the Caribbean Export Development Agency's efforts to provide an array of trade and investment services to firms in the region, supported financially and technically by the EU, DFID, GIZ, CIDA, ITC, the IDB, OAS, and World Bank, among others [Caribbean, 20]. The Inter-American Investment Corporation of the IDB has a similar programme, first focused on Guatemala but now expanded to all Central America and the Caribbean countries, aimed at helping SMEs to access export markets by researching new markets, gathering data on company operations, and providing technical assistance to select groups of applicants [Central America, 121].

Other stories focused on ways aid for trade could be used to help SMEs develop environmentally sustainable technologies. The Swiss government, in collaboration with UNIDO and UNEP, developed a programme in Colombia to help companies deploy environmentally sustainable technologies along with other SME-support programmes, such as marketing advice, meeting international norms and standards, and improving management [Colombia, 183]. Likewise the Netherlands' Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) provides matching grants designed to help SMEs export to the EU market based on sustainable technologies and fair labour practices [Global, 256]. UNCTAD and UNEP have helped establish organic production programmes in several countries of East Africa [East Africa, 102].

Programmes benefiting women entrepreneurs

Besides trade finance and export development, many stories recount public and private efforts to raise incomes of women through trade. These take different forms. One story that combines efforts to improve women's incomes with the protection of indigenous knowledge through the patent system emerged in Namibia. The Marula tree produces a plum-size, yellow fruit with seeds that are rich in oil that was used for centuries in skin moisturizing and cooking. In 1999, an NGO suggested producing Marula oil in higher quality so it could be sold to the pharmaceutical industry. It formed a women's cooperative, the Eudanfan Women's Cooperative (EWC), to set up an export activity. By 2008, the EWC had over 5000 women in 22 groups producing Marula oil from wild trees. These products are sold to The Body Shop, Marula Natural Products of South Africa, and Distell, among others. This laid the basis for a French company, Aldivia, to launch an R&D effort in partnership with PhytoTrade, a fair-trading sponsor of EWC, and Natural Products of South Africa to launch an R&D effort that led to the "Ubuntu" proprietary process to manufacture solvent-free cosmetics. In 2006, Aldivia and South African partners took out a patent on the process, and today, sales of the Marula-based products command a price four times other cosmetics. The EWC has branched out into other export product lines as well. In 2010, they began to market "ondjove" cooking oil and other food oils at the Windhoek Tourism Expo in June 2010. As a consequence, incomes of women producing the Marula were reported to have risen dramatically [Namibia, 134].

Several stories recounted government and donor efforts to use trade to raise female incomes. The Canadian government and the ITC sponsored a "Programme for Building African Capacity to Trade (PACT)" that is active in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania. This programme has a sub-programme focused exclusively on women, *Access! African Businesswomen in International Trade*. The programme was designed to provide several trade-related services in an integrated way: training in exports; training in information technology to gain market information; expert advice on market readiness; and market access missions. These efforts resulted in 600 small farmers in Ghana exporting 210 tons of fresh fruit and vegetables a week to Europe. Two South African cosmetic companies now export to Canada. The *Design Africa* brand, developed with the South African Textile Industries export Council, was also successfully introduced into the North America market. The *Access! Programme* involved 22 training modules for African businesswomen with 46 trainers in five languages, and certified more than 770 women in 11 countries [Africa, 46; Africa 119].

Similarly, Enterprise Uganda, set up with Norwegian help in 2001, was initially designed to provide integrated business support services to SMEs, but later came to focus almost exclusively on women entrepreneurs. The project provided training for some 3,832 women entrepreneurs in business management, many of whom lived in rural areas and were illiterate. Training was often coupled with health education focused on HIV/AIDs prevention. As a consequence, sales associated with women in the programme increased by more than 50% in two years, employment rose by 500 people, and investment increased, as did tax revenues. In general, women in cities improved their outcomes more than women in the countryside. Despite these successes, the activities of Enterprise Uganda are unlikely to be sustained without continued public sector support [Uganda, 116].

Involving women in the policy process can improve regulations for everyone. In Cambodia, the Ministry of Women's Affairs and the World Bank's IFC organised a forum to involve women's organisations in the policy making process, and to address concerns about taxation, corruption, lack of transparency in laws and regulations. The IFC's project manager used the *World Bank's Gender Dimension of Investment Climate* Reform, as a guide to help integrate gender-based concerns in the design of programmes. These ideas, according to the IFC project leader, led to increased women's participation, and to more effective lobbying for women's interests. One outcome is that it is now easier to obtain the certificates of origin (including lowering the cost of the certificate from more than USD 100 to about USD 1.25) required for exporting. The Executive Director of the Cambodian Craft Cooperative, with 2,000 members, found the forum helpful in expanding exports [Cambodia, 125].

Policy research that links trade and gender can also play a positive role. UNCTAD teamed up with DFID to undertake studies of the gender impacts of trade with a view to shaping policy in India. The analysis reported in the case story found, among other things, that *"export intensity has a positive and significant impact on women employment. But imports have not led to any displacement of women employment"* [India, 56]. The authors propose gender-sensitive trade policies that would favour sectors with female employment, enhanced opportunities for women's education, and further studies of the gender impact of trade in India.

LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: RESULTS AT A GLANCE	
Latin America	The Trade Finance Reactivation Programme has formed a network of 72 issuing banks in 19 countries, with trade transactions over USD 1 billion; 73% of banks focused on SMEs [Latin America, 117].
Samoa	Women in Business Development Incorporated (WIBDI) has helped over 350 farms become organically certified by the National Association for Sustainable Agriculture Australia (NASAA); a commercial contract with The Body Shop International was signed for the production of 10-30 tonnes of organic virgin coconut oil a year [Samoa, 257].
South Africa	Women-led development of a nano-technology water-sanitizing product is sold to the UN and NGO's worldwide [Africa, 46].
Cambodia	Women entrepreneurs saw their exports increase when certificates of origin were priced at USD 1.35 instead of the initial hundreds of dollars [Cambodia, 125].
Tunisia	Export diversification in products and markets led to an increase of USD 319m by the end of May 2010. [Tunisia, 130].
Colombia	In-plant technical assistance for environmental assessment resulted in 158 firms reducing water and energy use by 2-4 times, solid waste reductions were halved, CO2 reductions were also reduced even beyond the project's target [Colombia, 183].
Africa	The Ethical Fashion programme established 7,000 jobs for women in rural areas, 80% of participants said the production orders received through the programme allowed them to provide for their family, 88% said their new ability to make independent financial decisions thanks to the new income was the most important change in their lives. [Africa, 76].

Source: Selected subsample of results taken from OECD/WTO case story database

LESSONS TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS

The great majority of the programmes and projects in the case stories reported at least some elements of success. While this reflects to a certain extent the selection bias of the sample, several common "success factors" were reported which reinforced messages coming out of the larger evaluation literature.[22] These include:

Ownership is crucial… in the form of government commitment and high level leadership...

The most frequently reported success factor was national ownership of the aid-for-trade activity, mentioned in 120 of the 269 stories. This stands to reason because without active government involvement and sponsorship, projects can rarely succeed. One frequently reported manifestation of ownership was government commitment to the activity or projects. Sometimes the stories mention involvement of ministers or, less frequently, the President or Prime Minister [Mexico, 114; Kyrgystan, 186]. This was commonly seen as necessary prerequisite to pushing the project through recalcitrant bureaucracies or resistive private-sector lobbies. In Peru [137], high-level government involvement is also credited with providing the initial push to economic reforms, as well as continuous follow-up. Zimbabwe [107] reports that support *"and commitment at the highest political levels [was] essential for the Chirundu One Stop Border Post to become a reality"*. The opposite is also true: the lack of high-level and dedicated leadership in the initial days of the Beitbridge Border Post impeded steady progress in an otherwise valuable project [Southern Africa, 267].

…built upon active participation and involvement of stakeholders...

Two building blocks contribute to national ownership: first, increasing local stakeholder involvement in the preparation and implementation of the activity; and second, mobilizing the private-sector support to advocate on behalf of the project and to anchor it through changes in administrations and governments. Together, these twin elements were reported as success factors in 93 of the 269 case stories. Participation can occur at several levels. For example, the AfDB writes that in Africa [1] the most important lessons taken from efforts to connect the electricity grids of Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire,

and Burkina Faso was the need to ensure country ownership of, and government commitment to, the programme from its initial design. At another level, one of the factors that made the Cameroon Customs Reform project a success was the involvement of local customs inspectors in the design of performance contracts that would be used in their evaluation [Cameroon, 164]. The participation of trade associations in Honduras [247] was also crucial to the success of their trade programmes. And in Southern Africa, the Confederation of Agricultural Unions provided advice on agricultural standards to trade negotiators and SADC [Southern Africa, 204]. Similarly, reforms to promote more efficient institutional arrangements in Guyana, supported by the IADB, were predicated on effective stakeholder involvement: *"The stakeholders buy-in into the trade reforms is as critical to success as the political will of the public sector to sponsor or facilitate same"* [Guyana, 245].

Lack of local government involvement can lead not only to the misrepresentation of stakeholders' interests, but to a lack of government commitment and ownership that can undermine success [Gambia, 45] and endanger the continuation of the project once external funding and assistance ends [Solomon Islands, 90]. In Africa [15], one recommendation is that private–sector representatives, such as selected chambers of commerce and business associations, should be directly involved in the design and implementation phases of projects.

...leveraging partnership at the inter-ministerial level...

Trade policy is interdisciplinary by nature, and thus co-ordination and co-operation among the numerous actors is critical. Ministries of trade, economics, infrastructure, agriculture, industry, just to name a few, must work together for efficient policy. Saner (2010) identifies three roles that inter-ministerial co-ordination plays: to eliminate policy and project redundancy and duplication; to manage cross-cutting issues [*e.g.*, democracy and human rights, environment sustainability, gender equality and HIV/AIDS]; and to integrate numerous international trade agreements and trade policies in a coherent manner. UNCTAD lists inter-ministerial co-ordination as a crucial first step for implementing successful trade policy.

The case stories highlight partnerships as a key factor in a project's success -- or failure. For example, as Costa Rica sought to attract FDI, in order to link the country with global value chains, the lack of co-ordination among public institutions was cited as major factor holding its initiative back [Costa Rica, 156]. In the context of SPS regulation, the ministries of health, agricultural and environment all played a role. CAFHSA's objective was to assist CARICOM states to attain international standards to boost their exports of agricultural goods. However, the lack of initial agreement regarding CAFSHA's scope meant that co-ordination between the relevant ministries and stakeholders was absent, delaying the whole programme [Caribbean, 24]. In the context of developing North-South regional corridor, the EAC addressed the challenge of inter-ministerial co-ordination within and between its member governments by strengthening the role of the EAC Secretariat in long-term planning and co-ordination, but leaving implementation in the hands of member states [East Africa, 229]. Following WTO recommendations, the Malawi government set up an inter-ministerial Task Force on Trade Facilitation (TTF) that included three ministries, in addition to numerous public institutions and private sector actors. The TTF's main role was to coordinate all trade facilitation initiatives at the country and regional level. The TTF was considered the main factor behind the trade facilitation initiative's success [Malawi, 7].

…as well as donor partnerships

Another common theme was the need to integrate the combined expertise of donors to achieve a project's or programme's objective. Transport corridor projects, for example, typically have donors working together on several component parts, building toward a larger whole. For example, 503 km of the Silk Road were divided into 8 sections under the Silk Road Rehabilitation Project that entailed the involvement of numerous MDBs and IFIs.[23] Azerbaijan [74] recommends that multi-donor projects such as Silk Road work best when a single development partner acts as the leader of the co-ordination process. This is analogous to the EIF model which provides for one "donor facilitator" for all aid-for-trade projects. On the overall trade facilitation strategy in Nigeria, *"the key factor for success is the integrated partnership approach with the inclusion of most stakeholders and also including the organised private sector and the close interaction with the Development Partners which permitted closer alignment of their programme support"* [Nigeria, 7]. A shared committment and vision among all partners was also the key to the success in projects to promote organic agricultural goods in East Africa [102] and improve standards in Latin America (with the support of the US Department of Agriculture and the WTO) [Latin America, 251].

Table 5.3 The most recurring lesson is the need to enhance national ownership
Number of stories mentioning a particular lesson

Lesson / Author	Recipient Government[a]	Donor Government	UN[b]	MDBs	Private[c]	Total
1 National ownership	56	38	16	8	2	120
2 Increasing local participation (*i.e.* mobilizing support of private sector)	37	27	21	5	3	93
3 Value of integrated development programmes (*i.e.* infrastructure studies/ training/field)	23	15	8	4	2	52
4 Adequacy and reliability of external funding	27	8	7	2	3	47
5 Feedback loops between government and stakeholders	19	12	3	1	3	38
6 Flexibility in project design	12	13	6	1	4	36
7 Exogenous factors	8	4	2	2	3	19
8 Sustained interest of donors	5	7	3	3	1	19
8 Sustained interest of donors	5	7	3	3	1	19
9 Multilateral knowledge married with local knowledge	3	5	5	1	1	15
10 Intra-governmental and interministerial	9	2	2	0	1	14
Total Number of Case Stories by Author	**106**	**71**	**55**	**25**	**12**	**269**

Note: Columns don't add to the totals because a given story can mention more than one lesson

Source: WTO/OECD case story database

Adequacy and reliability of external funding

One recurring brake on project success was inconsistent funding mechanisms and/or inadequate continuity in funding. In one example, Malawi [161], it was noted that although the funding had been accepted for the project it was not disbursed in time, which disrupted the sequencing of activities. Some projects were not felt to be adequately funded, for example Cambodia [79], but it was unclear whether this reflected donor disenchantment for project-related reasons, or donors being swayed by development fads. In Tonga [99], the case story recommended that project funding address all outstanding needs, such as the travel expenses for a technician called to maintain mechanical equipment. Other stories also emphasised the importance of predictable and reliable donor financing [*e.g.* Ethiopia, 190]. Mauritius undertook a major set of policy reforms, but its concessional finance requests were unmet because of its middle-income country status [81]. It did, however, receive timely non-concessional support from the World Bank and the French Development Agency [Mauritius, 131]. Fiji lamented the fact that donor disbursements appeared to be driven more by end-of-fiscal-year timetables than project needs [Fiji, 244]. As might be expected, the case stories tended to assign blame for these problems – whether with the donors or with the developing-country government – depending on the institutional affiliation of the author.

Feedback loops linking government and stakeholders

Continuous feedback between governments and stakeholders is critical to national ownership and local participation. Potential problems can be identified at an early stage, increasing the speed with which they can be resolved [Caribbean, 2]. In Kenya [17], the success of business regulatory reform was mainly the result of close co-operation and co-ordination between the government officials and all the stakeholders in the reform process. In collaboration with UNCTAD, India developed strong stakeholder consultation mechanisms as part of its policy formulation technical assistance programme, and this contributed to its success. [India, 53]. Grenada's case story pointed out that feedback and co-operation can lead to strong ownership and thus more sustainable projects [67]. The effort of the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative was predicated on *"forging enterprising coalitions between government agencies, companies, trade unions and social organisations… to jointly transform the market, and make sustainable production and trade the norm"* [Global 256]..

Integrated projects that combine investments with technical assistance

Several case stories mentioned the need for complementary investments in both equipment and capacity building. For example, a Korean government sponsored capacity building programme in Cambodia [79] budgeted for office equipment and maintenance. Conversely, when new IT-based postal procedures were introduced in Brazil [16] as part of the *Exporta Facil* project, training sessions were organised for postal workers, government officials and customs agents so they could manage the new systems.

Delays and changes can occur due to exogenous factors such as natural disasters, political crises and global recessions

A number of case stories note that there are always unforeseen and idiosyncratic risks that projects must adapt to and deal with as efficiently as possible. For example, programmes in Grenada [67], Azerbaijan [74], and Montserrat [5] faced significant delays and cost overruns due to natural disasters in their respective regions, but managed to resume progress after the crises. In Fiji [79], Ecuador [44] and Honduras [101], political instabilities lead to temporary stoppages but there too projects were resumed. The recent financial crisis also interfered with projects in Ghana [128] and the Caribbean [24]. On the other hand, the ADB's Asia Pacific story [8] notes that its activities helped to mitigate the impact of the financial crisis.

CONCLUSIONS: WHAT IS WORKING?

Notwithstanding the limitations of the case story approach (see Introduction), a careful reading of the case stories gives rise to some tentative conclusions about what is working – and what might warrant further attention. Due to the inherent limitations of case stories as an evaluation tool, the following observations are intended to encourage further investigation rather than as the last word on the subject.

What is working well?

Volume

The sheer quantity of activity described in these stories suggests that aid for trade efforts are substantial, that they have taken root across a wide spectrum of countries, and that are becoming central to development strategies. The fact that nearly 40% of the stories are provided by developing countries underlines the salience of these programmes in the field - and the importance of making them work. Recipient governments are clearly interested in gaining access to global information and knowledge on ways to harness trade to promote growth and raise incomes.

Reach

The diversity of stories also reveals some activities that do not show up clearly in the OECD CRS's aid-for-trade data. For example, few of the stories from middle-income countries in Latin America and other relatively well-off regions involve ODA financing, and thus remain invisible to definitions of aid for trade. Moreover, projects undertaken by the private sector arms of multilateral and bilateral agencies – which also figure in the case stories - are for the most part not included in the OECD Aid for Trade CRS proxies. This is an important message for trade negotiators who often focuses more on the dollar amounts transferred than on the intrinsic value of capacity building, policy studies, technical assistance and knowledge transfers.

Results

Four case stories reported on econometric studies that attempt to establish links between aid for trade and trade and investment outcomes across large samples of countries. The Commonwealth Secretariat reports on studies that show a doubling of aid for trade for infrastructure, for example, would be associated with a 3.5% increase in merchandise exports, while a doubling of aid for trade facilitation would lower import costs by 5% [Global, 34]. Similarly, UNECA reports that its African econometric studies show that an increase of 10% in aid for trade is associated with a 0.4% increase in the index of economic diversification. Aid for trade also has a statistically significant impact in lowering container shipping costs [Africa, 104]. The ODI studied whether grants help to leverage additional resources.

SOUTH-SOUTH AID FOR TRADE AT A GLANCE	
Bolivia	Argentina began providing technical assistance to slaughterhouses and meat transport in highland Bolivia in 2007 [Bolivia, 197].
Cotton-4	Substantial technical assistance and development programme for the Cotton-4 countries to improve their varieties and yields of cotton [Brazil, 30].
China	Reported on its help to Lao PDR in the planning for the development of selected northern regions [Lao PDR, 109].
El Salvador	Japan and Chile teamed up to arrange for ProChile, an export agency of Chile, to provide technical assistance in various forms to the export programme in El Salvador over a three year period 2006-09 – including the provision of training on international fares, provision of firm-level assistance in exporting, diagnostics, and visiting overseas offices of ProChile in Costa Rica [El Salvador, 123].
Global	The Singapore Co-operation Programme has several technical assistance and training programmes in countries all over the world, particularly in Asia. Begun in 1992, the SCP has trained more than 70,000 government officials from 169 economies [Global, 263].
Honduras	Chinese Taipei provided technical assistance to oriental vegetable growers in Honduras, introducing high yield and pest resistant varieties, and providing assistance in export packaging [Honduras, 68].
Korea	Technical assistance programme for Cambodia to train trade officials [Cambodia, 79].
Lao PDR	With the support of the Swiss, Vietnam provided some technical assistance on IPR to the Lao PDR [Lao PDR, 96].
Nicaragua	Through its FO-AR programme, Argentina also provided capacity building resources to Nicaragua's National Technological Institute (INATEC) [Nicaragua, 199].

Source: Selected subsample of results taken from OECD/WTO case story database

It found that one unit of grant financing mobilised 5-6 units of loans and some 15 units of other finance [Global, 85]. Finally, the United States reported on the evaluation of its trade-related projects.[24] The review looked at 265 projects started between 2002 and 2006 involving more than 20 US agencies and totalling USD 1.5 billion in resources. It concluded that projects *"that combined modalities (technical assistance, training, equipment) and those that combined efforts to expand exporting with policy improvements were synergistic in ways that raised project success scores, but this was not true for projects that focused on exports from multiple sectors"* [Global, 201].

South-South co-operation

Another emerging theme in the case stories is *South-South co-operation*. This is part of a broader trend observed by Fengler and Karas (2011) that non-DAC donors and philanthropic organisations have grown to provide some 37% of development assistance in 2008, up from just 5% in 1992.[25] The case stories contain several examples of South-South aid for trade, and not just of middle-income countries helping low-income countries. Rwanda's revenue authority, for example, teamed up with several donors to help Burundi improve its tax collection [Burundi, 211]. Moreover, the demand for South-South assistance is rising. The lesson learned from a project in Jamaica, for example, was that *"there should be increased south-south involvement in technical assistance"* [Caribbean, 182].

Export promotion through soft industrial policy

Finally, the apparent success of "soft industrial policy" -- or industry-specific, pro-active government policies -- in the case stories is notable. This category of aid for trade reported the highest percentage of positive effects measured in terms of outputs and outcomes. The projects generally appeared to be both pragmatic and fruitful, and often translated into benefits for low-income participants, including women. This suggests that governments and donors might want to review their project portfolios to see if shifting scarce in-country resources into these types of projects - and away from more general projects with less specific benefits - might be beneficial.

What requires further study?

Possible Attention Gaps

There were several "gaps" between the focus of the case stories and the overall investment of aid for trade resources. For example, the relatively small number of infrastructure stories may indicate that trade officials are paying too little attention to this area. In 2009, infrastructure constituted some 47% of all aid- for-trade disbursements26 and, according to one study, was among the categories of aid for trade had the strongest direct impact on trade performance (Figure 5.2).27 But infrastructure was the focus of just over 5% of the stories submitted. As noted above, this low share may be because stories with a transport component were classified as "trade facilitation" or some other category. But it also may be because trade ministries have little direct influence over infrastructure activities – or because many governments see infrastructure and services as largely unrelated to trade.

Figure 5.2 Though countries differ, improvements in infrastructure often have the highest pay-offs in export growth...

Africa: Average increase in exports by improvements to half the level of the best performing countries



Source: Calculated from Portugal and Wilson, 2009

This sampling deficiency is not limited to responding governments. The largest providers of aid for trade to infrastructure are the multilateral development banks. However, their submissions also emphasised activities other than infrastructure. Although they provide 80% of the funds for infrastructure investment in low-income countries, infrastructure stories amounted to only 8% of their stories.

Likewise, there is an imbalance between the relatively small proportion of services-trade case stories and the importance of services in international trade. Only nine of 269 stories referred to services trade, yet cross-border business services represent the fastest growing segment of international trade.[28] Services also provide critical "complementary inputs" that determine firms' competitiveness internationally. Even in areas that are well represented in the case stories – such as trade facilitation – services policies affecting project objectives were often neglected, including, for example, trucking, brokers, and freight forwarder services.[29] Only St. Vincent and the Grenadines [264], Guadeloupe [188], Niger [83] and Cambodia [79] focused on services trade. It is worth asking whether this reflects a failure of both governments and donors to pay enough attention to the role of services in international trade.

The silence of the international community on the issue of *aid for trade for adjustment* is also noteworthy. Only three of the 269 stories linked development assistance to the implementation of trade reforms. Yet adjustment assistance was a major rationale for the Aid-for-Trade Initiative, and a key component of the WTO's 2006 Task Force Recommendations. One reason for this absence may be that budget support assistance – the main form that adjustment assistance takes – often involves a "package" of policy reforms, including trade, and thus the relevant policy makers were simply unaware of the call for trade-related case stories. The silence on adjustment assistance may also reflect shifting concerns of the trade community. The previous preoccupation with adjusting to lower tariffs and shrinking preferences has diminished in light of the DDA's slow progress, and countries are now more concerned with overcoming supply constraints to take advantage of market opportunities. The absence of adjustment assistance stories may also reflect the lack of knowledge among donors and development practitioners about how best to design trade-related adjustment programmes.

Table 5.4 Case stories with Quantitative Indicators of Results

Theme	Number of Case Studies	% of Case Studies with output	% of Case Studies with Outcome
Trade Facilitation	48	38%	19%
Infrastructure	14	64%	29%
Improving Policy	42	50%	14%
Building Capacity	66	45%	8%
Industrial Policy	47	43%	43%
Private Sector	52	44%	33%
TOTAL	**269**	**119**	**60**

Author	Number of Case Stories	% Case Stories with Output	% Case Stories with Outcome
Recipient Government[a]	107	46%	14%
Donor Government	71	49%	25%
United Nations[b]	54	35%	24%
Multilateral Development Banks	25	52%	44%
Private[c]	12	42%	33%
TOTAL	**269**	**121**	**61**

Notes:
a Includes stories from regional economic communities and organisations
b Includes other international organisations
c Includes NGOs and un-affiliated authors

Source: OECD/WTO Case Story Database

Lastly, it is worth noting that relatively few stories mentioned the vast research that international organisations and donors have undertaken - and continue to undertake - in areas related to trade, to say nothing of similar work by universities, NGOs, and the private sector. This work tends to fall within the province of the research groups in multilateral development banks, the OECD, selected UN agencies, and specific government agencies, and is thus two steps removed from the call for aid for trade case stories. Nevertheless, as a guide to policy options, the extensive research that has been undertaken on the DDA, regional trade agreements, and domestic trade and investment reform is a more important aid-for-trade "resources" that the few case stories reporting these activities would suggest.

Imbalances in emphasis?

The collection of case stories generally gives more weight to the exports side of trade than the import side. To measure their relative emphasis, clusters of words associated with exports and imports were created, and then counted in all of the case stories (see Annex 5.B) – a methodology recently used by the OECD to identify emphases in trade-related development projects.[30]

Stories generally emphasised export performance rather that import efficiency. References to exports dominate imports by a ratio of more than 4 to 1 (see table in Annex 5.B). To be sure, trade facilitation programmes dealing with border posts or infrastructure often reduce dead-weight costs on both sides of the trade balance. However, policy makers and donors need to pay as much attention to importing efficiently -- including reducing

"shoot-yourself in the foot" tariff and nontariff barriers – as they do to promoting exports. The good news is that the story collection holds many examples of effective customs reforms which increase competitiveness by importing more efficiently.

Performance outcomes, by this methodology, were more often focused on gender issues than poverty reduction. Counting words associated with poverty, incomes, employment, environment, gender and health indicated that the stories were most interested in gender, which was referred to twice as often as the next most frequently measured variable, the environment. This may reflect the special efforts of international organisations and donors to showcase their work on gender.[31]

Gaps in quantitative measures of success?

Another noteworthy feature of the stories is the relative absence of quantitative benchmark indicators of performance in either number of outputs or in outcomes measured against carefully formulated baselines. To be fair, the original call for stories did not solicit this kind of information, so it not surprising that reporting on these benchmarks was spotty. Moreover, many stories described projects that were in their infancy or in the process of being implemented (*e.g.*, Africa, 145; Africa 224; Dominica, 230; and Maldives, 240; to name a few). For these "early days" projects, it is unrealistic to expect reports of substantial results. That said, nearly all the stories could have included more information on specific and quantifiable measures of success. The fact that similar finding have been noted in other, more systematic evaluations reinforces this concern.[32]

Moreover, none of the studies, except Tunisia [130], report rigorous, state-of-the-art impact evaluation of trade interventions. Many of the interventions described in the case stories, from technical assistance, to export promotion, or to programmes targeted at women traders, can be evaluated rigorously, provided that impact evaluation is part of the programme's design from the outset,and that donors and beneficiaries are willing to commit the resources necessary to undertake the work.

The lack of quantitative benchmarks and evaluation techniques reflects the reality on the ground. As noted above, many aid-for-trade projects lack benchmarks and quantitative indicators of success. Particularly deficient were programmes at the global level that emphasised narrow technical assistance and training, and those aimed at improving policy (Table 5.4).

According to a rough count, nearly half of the stories contained quantitative indicators on outputs – *i.e.* a capacity building project might indicate the number of people trained, or a standards project might enumerate the products covered. Still, it is difficult to draw a causal link from these interventions to broader trade, income, poverty reduction, gender or environmental outcomes.[33] Far fewer case stories in the building capacity and improving policy thematic areas – roughly only 4% - claimed that their activities produced specific quantitative outcomes attributable to the activity.[34] Even so, the large literature on economic growth argues persuasively that the ever more productive use of factors drives future growth, so it stands to reason that the investments in human capital described in the stories might be among the most important contributors to future trade-led growth and poverty reduction,even though precise measurements, especially at the project-specific level and in the near-term, are impossible to generate. Stories from the multilateral development banks tended to have a higher share of quantitative information on outcomes that the other stories.

Tracing the link between investments in capacity building and results in terms of trade performance, poverty reduction and gender inequality is virtually impossible. The same is true for projects that purport to improve inter-ministerial or donor co-ordination. Even though capacity building may ultimately be important,[35] rarely is it possible for this type of aid for trade to trace productive outcomes to specific inputs. Similarly, global programmes may well lead to new insights that motivate policy makers and private actors, and these may lead to improved policies – which may in turn produce greater trade, rising incomes, improved gender equality and a better environment. IPRs may eventually provide dividends in terms of earnings to music and transitional knowledge and greater foreign direct investment – as Vietnam has reported [Vietnam, 96] – though the link between stronger IPRs and increased FDI has only been convincingly made to technology-intensive investments in middle-income countries.[36] These case stories, to their credit, generally refrain from making such sweeping claims. That said, developing a more quantitative and less impressionistic results framework – based on greater investments in gathering indicator data – is a necessary objective. ■

NOTES

1 Brackets refer to the country location of the activity and case story number as in the Index in Annex C; the annex also contains indices by story author and by story number. Activities that pertain to all developing countries, such as studies, are shown as "Global".

2 For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of impact evaluation, see Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2011) A *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of Ways to Fight Global Poverty* London: PublicAffairs.

3 In WTO (2006), the Aid for Trade Taskforce elaborated six areas, which map to the themes as follows: (1) trade policy and regulations, including training of trade officials, here captured under the theme "building capacity"; (2) trade development, including investment promotion, analysis and institutional support for trade in services, business support services and institutions, public-private sector networking, e-commerce, trade finance, trade promotion, market analysis and development – theme "leveraging the private sector"; (3) trade-related infrastructure; (4) building productive capacity, the themes "undertaking industrial policies" and "leveraging the private sector"; (5) trade-related adjustment including supporting developing countries to put in place accompanying measures that assist them to benefit from liberalized trade is part of the theme "Policies"; and (6) other trade-related needs is part of all categories.

4 See Strengthening Accountability in Aid for Trade (OECD 2011), for evaluating aid for trade, and Banerjee and Duflo, (2011), for a more comprehensive discussion of evaluating development projects and programmes.

5 With the support from the Belgian government, United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), German Technical Co-operation (GTZ), International Monetary Fund, Rwanda Revenue Authority and World Bank

6 Methodological problems abound in studying this relationship: Association by itself does not demonstrate causality, and the better studies employed lagged variables and other techniques to strengthen conclusions. Much of the empirical literature on the relationship of infrastructure to trade is based on the "gravity model". These apply cross-country regression equations to bilateral trade among all trading partners, and take into account the volume of trade controlling for the size of the respective economies and the distance between them. For example, two large countries will obviously have a greater bilateral trade, all the more so if they are close to each other. The gravity model provides a way of controlling for expected trade levels and then measures the impact of other variables on trade volumes. These often constitute the basis for simulations: "if a country in a bottom percentile were to improve to a top percentile then the level of associated trade would be greater by an amount given in the gravity model."

7 They take as an infrastructure indicator four components: the density of rail road per square km, the density of road and of paved road per square km and the number of telephone mainlines per capita. The indicator has been widely used by other researchers to proxy for the quality of infrastructure cost and thus, the cost of transport and communication (See Carrère, C., (2006). "Revisiting the effects of regional trade agreements on trade flows with proper specification of the gravity model", European Economic Review, Vol. 50/2: 223- 247.)

8 See Ronald Fischer 2011 "Public- Private Partnerships in Rwanda: Lessons from Chile" International Growth Centre, February (http://www.theigc.org/sites/default/files/presentation_slides/fischer_ppps.pdf)

9 The World Health Organization and the World Bank, working with other agencies, have mounted a major initiative on road safety. See *WHO and World Bank (2004) "World report on road traffic injury prevention"*

10 Winters, Alan L., (2004) "Trade Liberalization and Economic Performance". *The Economic Journa*l 114: F4-F21. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,; Winters, Alan L., McCulloch, Neil and McKay, Andrew, 2004. "Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The Evidence so Far". *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 42, No. 1.

11 See Porto, Guido and Bernard Hoekman (2010) (eds.) *Trade Adjustment Costs in Developing Countries: Impacts, Determinants, and Policy Responses* London: CEPR and World Bank

12 World Bank (2006a), *"Mauritius - From Preferences to Global Competitiveness: Report of the Aid for Trade Mission"* World Bank, April; World Bank (2006b) *"Mauritius - Country Economic Memorandum"*

13 In Uganda, Hallaert *et al.* (2010) showed the importance of identifying the most binding constraints by comparing the trade reforms of the 1990s with the reforms of the 2000s. They argue that in the 1990s, the reforms were mainly limited to MFN tariff reforms and did not result in trade expansion and economic growth because they did not address the most binding constraints. This contrasts with the broader reforms of the 2000s, which were successful in leading to a sharp increase in trade and a significant export diversification. The most binding constraints to trade mainly derived from transportation, not so much the transport costs but delays and unpredictability at border crossing.

14 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/build_tr_capa_e.htm

15 See Finger, M. and Schuler, P. (2004) *Poor People's Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in Developing Countries* World Bank: Oxford University Press.; Maskus , K (2005). "The Role of IPRs in encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer" in Carsten Fink and Keith Maskus (eds.) 2005, *Intellectual Property and Development Lessons from Recent Economic Research* World Bank: Oxford University Press; Javorcik , Beata (2005) "The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and Protection of IPRs: Evidence from Transition Economies" in Carsten Fink and Keith Maskus (eds.) 2005, *Intellectual Property and Development Lessons from Recent Economic Research* World Bank: Oxford University Press.

16 To be efficient and enhance incomes, the industry has to be able to survive without the protection (the Mill test) and the discounted present value of the gains compensate for the losses to consumers from the temporary protection (the Bastable test). Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) note that rarely in practice are these tests actually performed. The absence of these tests explains why "infant industries" benefitted from decades of protection until the 1990s.

17 See Rodrik, Dani 2004 "Industrial Policy for the 21st Century" CEPR Discussion Paper 4767 London. and Rodrik, Dani 2008 "Normalizing Industrial Policy" Commission on Growth and Development Working Paper 3. Washington. for the economic arguments; Robert Wade (2003) for the political economy arguments. Nolan and Pack (2003) and Pack and Saggi (2006) for critical reviews of the empirical underpinnings of Rodrik's interpretation of East Asia; Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) for a detailed review of the economics and empirical literature; and Lederman and Maloney (2010) for a more trade-focused review, and by implication Easterly and Reshef (2010) for Africa.

18 Rodrik, 2004 presents an annex of WTO-illegal industrial policies that he contends could in some situations be usefully employed.

19 See Richard Newfarmer, William Shaw and Peter Walkenhorst (eds.) 2009, *Breaking into New Markets: Emerging Lessons for Export Diversification* Washington: World Bank.

20 These programmes are not the subject of a case story, but are described in World Bank, (2009). *Unlocking Global Opportunities: the Aid for Trade Programme of the World Bank*, Washington: World Bank.

21 Using data collected in an ex post survey, Gourdon, Marchat, Sharma and Vishwanat (2011) find that the programme significantly raised the treated firms' export performance, in particular in the case of service firms. However, in the case of manufacturing firms, Cadot, Fernandes, Gourdon and Mattoo (2011) find evidence over-diversification of beneficiary firms and lack of persistence of the effects.

22 Many of these lessons can be found in OECD (2008a) "Trade-related Assistance: What do Recent Evaluations Tell Us?" Paris: OECD; OECD (2008b): "Effective Aid Management: Twelve Lessons from DAC Peer Review", Paris, OECD; USAID (2010), *From Aid to Trade: Delivering Results – A Cross-Country Evaluation of USAID Trade Capacity Building*.

23 Islamic Development Bank, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, OPEC Fund, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Saudi Fund for Economic Development

24 USAID (2010) From Aid to Trade: Delivering Results: A Cross Country Evaluation of USAID Trade Capacity Building" Washington: USAID November. The study also presents in an annex a commissioned study by David Bearce, Steven Finkel, and Anibal Perez-Linan "The Effects of US Trade Capacity Building Assistance on Trade-Related Outcomes, 1999-2008" September 2010; a USD 1 investment of total US government assistance to trade on average would increase exports USD 53. Other donors have undertaken similar evaluations; see, for example, OECD 2008; Sida, 2009; Brusset *et al.* (2006) for the Netherlands, Cox and Hemon (2009) for DFID, World Bank (2005).

25 See Fengler, Wolfgang and Kharas, Homi (2010) eds. Delivering Aid Differently – Lessons from the Field Washington, DC: Brookings

26 Source: OECD-DAC Aid Activities Database (CRS)

27 See Portugal-Perez, Alberto and Wilson, John, 2008. "Lowering Trade Costs for Development in Africa: A Summary Overview." Development Research Group, The World Bank.

28 See, *e.g.*, O. Cattaneo, M. Engman, S. Saez, and R. Stern (eds.), 2010. *International Trade in Services* Washington DC: World Bank.

29 For lengthier developments of this argument see Hoekman and Mattoo (2007) and Hoekman and Njinkeu (2010).

30 Claire Delpeuch, Marie-Agnes Jouanjean, Alexandre Le Vernoy, Patrick Messerlin, and Thomas Oliac (2011) "Aid for Trade: A Meta-evaluation" Paper presented to the OECD Experts Meeting on Aid for Trade March 29, 2011 draft

31 In part, this may reflect selection bias owing to the efforts of the ITC in gender. The ITC held a conference on women in trade in 2010 based on a score of participants' case stories it had solicited from around the world.

32 See OECD, 2008 "Trade-related Assistance: What do Recent Evaluations Tell Us?" Paris: OECD. They write: Donors and partner countries should focus on achieving results. They should adopt a collaborative, results-based management approach, where clear, realistic and measurable programme objectives are defined and translated into expected outcomes and required activities, with timetables for implementation (including information on the sequencing of outputs) and costing.

33 Several donor evaluations have pointed this out. See for example, Sida, 2009:12. OECD, 2008. Hallaert , Jean-Jacques, 2010. "Increasing the Impact of Trade Expansion on Growth: Lessons from Trade Reforms for the Design of Aid for Trade," OECD Trade Policy Working Papers 100, OECD Publishing

34 A story was considered reporting an outcome if it provided any numeric value one of 10 "performance" indicators: export increases, trade structure and regional integration; import efficiency; investment increases; poverty reduction; incomes increases; gender measures; employment; health and environment.

35 For the importance of international co-ordination, see, Raymond Saner, 2010 *Trade Policy Governance Through Interministerial Coordination: A Sourcebook for Trade Officials and Development Experts* Dordrecht: Republic of Letters

36 See M. Finger and P. Schuler (2004) *Poor People's Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in Developing Countries* World Bank: Oxford University Press; Keith E, Maskus "The Role of IPRs in encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer" and Beata Javorcik "The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and Protection of IPRs: Evidence from Transition Economies" in Carsten Fink and Keith Maskus (eds.) 2005, *Intellectual Property and Development Lessons from Recent Economic Research* World Bank: Oxford University Press.

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ANNEX 5.A
METHODOLOGY FOR CLASSIFYING CASE STUDIES

In response to the all for case stories, respondents sent in stories to the OECD and WTO. These were entered in a data base and given a number. Then the analysis team read the study and then identified the country, sub-region or region, in which the activity took place. General studies covering all aid for trade activities with no particular country or region were labelled global. The country and number in brackets in the text refers to the country of the project and its number in our data base. All submissions were then allocated each into one of six general themes:

1. Lowering trade costs through trade facilitation programmes
2. Investing in infrastructure to lower the cost of inputs
3. Reforming policy to revamp incentives, remedy co-ordination failures, or enhance strategy
4. Building capacities within governments to better conduct trade policy
5. Undertaking industry-specific pro-active policies to promote trade
6. Leveraging the private sector to development exports, promote SMEs, and women's activities

This in some cases required judgments because the content of some could have arguably been placed in more than one theme. Authorship was established according to the institutional affiliation of the author.

Stories were then tagged with indicators of having reported outputs and outcomes. A story was considered reporting an output if it mentioned quantitative indicators associated with the project, for example, number of people trained, number of ministries co-ordination or number of meetings held. Projects that reported work on changing a law were also denoted as having registered an output. A story was considered reporting an outcome if it provided any quantitative value associated with any one of 10 "performance" areas: export increases, trade structure and regional integration; import efficiency; investment increases; poverty reduction; incomes increases; gender measures; employment; health and environment.

Even though the cut-off deadline was officially January 31, 2011, in fact the team considered all case stories received before March 15, 2011.

Theme breakdown

1. Lowering trade costs through *trade facilitation* programmes
   a. Trade facilitation strategies
   b. Customs reform and border crossing
   c. Regional projects and corridors
   d. Global and regional programmes (*e.g.* studies & guides)
2. Investing in *infrastructure* to lower the cost of inputs and services (including in sub-regions)
   a. Roads
   b. Ports
   c. Power
   d. Other
   e. Global and regional programmes (*e.g.* studies & guides)

3. *Reforming policy* to revamp incentives, support adjustment, enhance strategy, and adopt international standards
   a. Adjustment programmes (tariff and NTBs reform)
   b. National development strategies
   c. Standards projects
4. *Building capacities* within governments to better conduct trade policy, negotiate trade agreements, and implement trade-related rules and laws
   a. EIF
   b. Creating knowledge capacities
   c. TA to ministerial co-ordination and mainstreaming
   d. Creating negotiating capacity
   e. Improving capacity to implement laws *e.g.*, Intellectual Property Rights
   f. Global and regional programmes (*e.g.* studies & guides)
5. Undertaking *pro-active industry-specific policies* to up-grade quality or promote trade diversification
   a. Projects dealing with specific activities in industry or agriculture
6. Leveraging the *private sector* through trade finance, export promotion, and skill-up-grading for SMEs and women traders
   a. Trade finance
   b. SMEs
   c. Women entrepreneurs

ANNEX 5.B
DISCERNING EMPHASIS: METHODOLOGY FOR CONCEPT COUNTS

The word searches were made by counting the number of mentions of keywords that are divided into clusters. The keyword mentions within a cluster are then added. Because there are case stories written in English, Spanish and French, we have included the words in all three languages. We further divide the cluster into two components: Trade Policy and Trade Performance Outcomes.

The words and their classification are the following:

TRADE VARIABLES		TRADE-RELATED OUTCOME					
Import	**Export**	**Poverty**	**Income**	**Employment**	**Gender**	**Environment**	**Health**
Import	Export	Poverty	Income	Employment	Women	Environment	Health
Imports	Exportacion	Pobreza	Salario	Jobs	Mujeres	Ambiente	Salud
Importaciones	Exportaciones	Pauvrete	Salaire	Empleo	Femmes	Environnement	Sante
Importations	Exportation		Ingreso	Empleos	Girls	Clean	Disease
Tariff	Exports		Ingresos	Emploi	Filles	Limpio	Enfermedad
Arancel	Diversification		Revenu	Emplois	Ninas	Pollution	Maladie
Arancelario	Diversificacion		Revenus	Sme	Gender	Contaminacion	
Aranceles				Pyme	Female	Organic	
Quota				Msme		Organico	
Tbt						Organicos	
Ntb						Organique	
						Organiques	

NUMBER OF MENTIONS IN THE OECD CASE STORY DATABASE (269 STORIES)									
	Trade Variables		Trade-related Outcome						
Author	Import	Export	Poverty	Income	Employment	Gender	Environment	Health	Total
Recipient Government[a]	136	629	138	66	76	245	108	96	1 494
Donor Government	109	459	81	141	112	241	174	42	1 359
UN[b]	107	567	122	69	166	644[d]	287	76	2 038
MDB	81	189	13	13	43	36	40	6	421
Private[c]	31	146	34	18	17	271	28	5	550
Total	**464**	**1 990**	**388**	**307**	**414**	**1 437**	**637**	**225**	**5 862**

Notes:
a Includes stories from regional economic communities and organisations
b Includes other international organizations
c Includes NGOs and un-affiliated authors
d Includes 15 case stories from the ITC that deal exclusively with gender and Aid for Trade

ANNEX 5.C
INDEX OF CASE STORIES BY CASE STORY REFERENCE NUMBER

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
1	AfDB	West Africa	NEPA-CEB Interconnection Project
2	ECDPM/CTA (Center for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation)	Caribbean	Trade and production adjustments in ACP countries - lessons from the EC supported Caribbean Rum Programme
3	Mexico	Central America	Mesoamerican integration and development project/International Network of Mesoamerican Highways
4	Malawi	Malawi	National Development and Trade Policy Forum Project
5	Montserrat	Montserrat	EC Funded Project on ASYCUDA
6	Mongolia	Mongolia	How to facilitate trade facilitation by implementing MNSW
7	Nigeria	Nigeria	Strategic Trade facilitation action plan for Nigeria
8	ADB	Asia and Pacific	ADB TFP
9	ADB	Asia and Pacific	ADB's GMS East West Corridor
10	ADB	Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan	Almaty-Bishkek Regional Rehabilitation Programme
11	ADB	Asia and Pacific	TA to Build Trade Policy Capacity
12	Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan	AFT case story
13	Benin	Benin	*Projet multinational de diffusion du riz nerica*
14	Benin	Benin	*Projet d'Appui au développement des filières halieutiques s ur le lac Ahème*
15	Botswana	Southern Africa	Customs modernization and Trade Facilitation towards the SADC Customs Union Project
16	Brazil	South America	Exporta Facil
17	Kenya	Kenya	Call for Aid for Trade Case
18	Burundi	Burundi	*Projet sur les huiles essentielles*
19	Cameroon	Cameroon	*Stratégies sectorielles sur la banane plantain et le manioc*
20	Caribbean Export Development Agency	Caribbean	Caribbean Export Development Agency
21	Central African Republic	Central African Republic	*Renforcement des capacités de production: cas sésame*
22	Commonwealth	Global	The EDF Funded Commonwealth Secretariat Trade Policy Formulation, Negotiation, and Implementation (Hub and Spokes) Project
23	Caribbean Rum Sector Programme	Caribbean	Caribbean Rum Sector Programme
24	CARICOM	Caribbean	The Establishment of CAHFSA and a regional SPS
25	CARICOM	Caribbean	The Caribbean AFT and Regional Integration Trust Fund: A mechanism for delivering AFT support to CARICOM and CARIFORUM states
26	Congo (Rep.)	Congo (Rep.)	*Projet de renforcement des capacités commerciales et entrepreneuriales*

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
27	Sékou BERETE	Guinea	*Présentation d'un Cas d 'Expérience*
28	Comoros	Comoros	*Programme de Renforcement des services du commerce et de l'investissement et soutien a un environnement incitatif pour le secteur privé*
29	ADB	Fiji	Fiji Ports Development project
30	Brazil	Africa	Brazilian Co-operation Agency of the Ministry of External Relations
31	ECDPM	Caribbean	Lessons from the Sugar Protocol Adjustment measures programme in the Caribbean
32	Universidad de Chile	Chile	Pymexporta
33	UEMOA	Africa	Projet de renforcement de capacités en matière de commerce "Hub and Spokes"
34	Commonwealth	Global	Assessing the effectiveness of AFT
35	Czech Republic	Moldova	Concrete Instruments Supporting SME Sector in Rep. of Moldova
36	Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	Congo (Dem. Rep. of)	*Présentation d'un Cas d 'Expérience*
37	SECO	West Africa	The Empowerment of Western and Central African Cotton Procedures: A sectoral approach on Cotton
38	EBRD	Eastern Europe	EBRD Business Advisory Services Programme
39	EBRD	Eastern Europe	EBRD Trade Facilitation Programme: Results from the survey of participating banks
40	ECOWAS	West Africa	*L'élaboration du programme de l'APE pour le Développement*
41	ECOWAS	West Africa	Exports Promotion & Enterprise Competitiveness for Trade (ExPECT) Initiative
42	ECOWAS	West Africa	Gap Analysis of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme
43	Ecuador	Ecuador	*Construcción de la Politica Nacional de Logística (PNL) como Instrumento para la Facilitación del comercio exterior*
44	Ecuador	Ecuador	Transporte Terrestre de carga en pasos de frontera (TTPF)
45	Gambia	Gambia	The Implementation of the West African quality programme in the Gambia
46	Lisa Fancott, for ITC	Africa	ACCESS! Export training for women entrepreneurs in Africa
47	UNECA	Africa	ATPC as AFT in Action on Gender Issues
48	Marylin Carr	Africa	AFT: Building capacities for linking women with export markets
49	TradeMark	Africa	Negotiating the COMESA-EAC-SADC- Tripartite FTA
50	Commonwealth Secretariat	Commonwealth	Capacity Building in gender and Trade
51	CGIAR	Global	CGIAR Gender and Diversity Programme Reaps Benefits for CGIAR globally
52	Plan International	Global	Empowering more women in trade paradigms
53	UN	India	Strategies and Preparedness for Trade and Globalization In India

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
54	CCGD Kenya	East Africa	Gender and Trade Mechanisms in East Africa: The Customs Union
55	SADC	Southern Africa	Gender mainstreaming: the experience of SADC and lessons learned
56	UNCTAD	India	Gender sensitization of trade policy
57	Rwanda	Rwanda	Gender Dimension in AFT
58	Benita Sharma	India	SEZ's and its Impact on Women Workers in the Garment Manufacturing Industry in Andhra Pradesh
59	Norway	Mozambique	A New Chapter in the Development of Mozambique's Oil and Gas sector
60	Business Advisory Services Enterprise Uganda	Uganda	Integrating Gender into the National Export strategies: A case for Uganda
61	UNEP	East Africa	East African Organic Products Standard
62	DMT Consultants	Uganda	Talking to the Target makes all the difference
63	UNIFEM	Africa	Women Informal Traders Transcending African Borders
64	Grameen Bank	Bangladesh	Women's Economic Empowerment… Bangladesh
65	Ghana	Ghana	Case study on Ghana's national medium term private sector development strategy
66	Germany	East Africa	Establishing a Regional Quality Infrastructure in the East African Community
67	Grenada	Grenada	Improving the Quality of Fishery Products for Exports
68	Chinese Taipei Technical Mission	Honduras	Oriental Vegetable Project in Honduras
69	IDLO	Africa	WTO Aid for Trade Case Story
70	Indonesia	Indonesia	Artificial Inseminatino of dairy cattle
71	Indonesia	Indonesia	Indonesia Enterprise and Agricultural Development Activity (SENADA)
72	Indonesia	Indonesia	ER-RI trade Support programme
73	ITC	Global	Market Analysis Tools and Capacity Building for LDCs
74	Islamic Development Bank	Azerbaijan	Silk Road Project Azerbaijan
75	ITC	Ethiopia	Ethiopia Coffee Quality Improvement Project
76	ITC	Africa	Ethic Fashion: not charity, just work
77	ITC	Uganda	AFT and export performance: a business perspective
78	JICA	Cambodia	The development study on the institutional strengthening of investment promotion
79	Korea	Cambodia	The Project for Capacity Building in the Trade in Goods and Services for Cambodia
80	Global Mechanism	Mali	*Vers un agenda commun de l'Agriculture et de l'Aide pour le commerce pour la Gestion Durable des Terres (GDT) : L'expérience du Mali*
81	Mauritius	Mauritius	(AFT in Mauritius)

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
82	WTO Chair	Morocco	*Aide au Commerce: quels enjeux pour le deuxième programme marocain des routes rurales?*
83	Niger	Niger	*Projet d'assistance technique destine a promouvoir le commerce de services*
84	OAS	Caribbean	Professional Masters in International Trade Policy
85	ODI	Global	AFT and Blended Finance
86	New Zealand	Pacific	Recognized Seasonal Worker Programme
87	Senegal	Senegal	Renforcement des capacités nationales a s'adapter aux marches
88	B & J Partners	Sierra Leon	Programme: Support to cash crop (cocoa and coffee) production
89	China	China	Small famers in Global Markets
90	Solomon Islands	Solomon Islands	Solomon Islands Cocoa Livelihood Rehabilitation Project
91	Sweden	Sri Lanka	Quality Infrastructure in Sri Lanka
92	Kenya	East Africa	Establishing a Centre of Phytosanitary Excellence (COPE)
93	UN	Sudan	The Sudan EPA Negotiations and Implementation Support (SENIS) Project
94	Suriname	Suriname	Improving the trade facilitation environment in Suriname
95	Sweden	Africa	Trade Policy Training Centre in Africa (Trapca)
96	SECO (Switzerland)	Viet Nam	Promoting the Use of IP in Viet Nam as a tool to Foster Trade
97	UNECA	Ethiopia	The African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) as an Aid for Trade (AfT) Case Story
98	ISF	Nicaragua	*Tierra Nueva*
99	Tonga	Tonga (Kingdom of)	Tonga: A tale of TA
100	Global Mechanism	Uganda	Towards a common Agenda on AFT and Agriculture for SLM: the experience of Uganda
101	UNCTAD	Honduras	Capacity Building in Developing Countries and LDCs to support their effective participation in the WTO negotiations process on trade facilitation -
102	UNCTAD	East Africa	International Partnership for Sustainable Development: Promoting production and trade of organic agricultural products in East Africa
103	UNCTAD	Uganda	The BioTrade Initiative Programme
104	UN	Africa	Econometric Evidence of the Effectiveness of Aid for Trade in Addressing Trade Binding Constraints in Africa
105	UNIDO	Morocco	The UNIDO Export Consortia Programme: The Case of Morocco
106	Germany	Zambia / COMESA	The EU's Joint Aid for Trade Strategy - Opportunities and Challenges for co-ordination. The case of Zambia and COMESA
107	Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	Chirundu One Stop Border Post: a regional trade facilitation programme
108	*Secretaria de Economia* (MX)	Central America	*El Proceso de Convergencia de los TLCs entre Mexico y Centroamerica para Establecer un Acuerdo Unico*
109	China	Lao PDR	Overall Plan for Comprehensive Development of Northern Area in Lao PDR
110	Gabon	Gabon	*L'appropriation de l'Aide pour le Commerce*

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
111	UNIDO	Global	Trade Capacity Building in UNIDO: Supporting AFT through organizational change
112	UNIDO	Global	How to make private standards work for developing country exporters - UNIDOS's Guide
113	UNIDO	Global	TCB in UNIDO: Supporting AFT through the publication of the TCB Resource Guide 2008 &2010
114	Mexico	Mexico	Agenda Nacional para la Competitividad
115	UNIDO	Sri Lanka / Pakistan	How Laboratory Business and Exports can grow Hand in Hand
116	NORAD	Uganda	Strengthening women entrepreneurs in Uganda
117	IADB	Latin America and Caribbean	Trade Finance Reactivation Programme
118	CIDA	Guatemala	Entrepreneurial development of cooperative federations
119	CIDA	Southern Africa	Programme for building African capacity for trade
120	IADB	Latin America and Caribbean	The Mesoamerica Project
121	IADB	Guatemala	FINPYME ExportPlus
122	IADB	Latin America and Caribbean	International Transit of Goods (TIM)
123	Chile	Chile	Coaching Exportador
124	Chile	Chile	*Fortalecimiento de la Gestión Comercial e Institucional de EXPORTA El Salvador*
125	World Bank	Cambodia	Women entrepreneurs in Cambodia
126	World Bank	Cambodia	Labor Standards in Cambodia
127	World Bank	Lesotho	WB Lesotho Improving skills
128	World Bank	Ghana	WB
129	World Bank	East Africa	East Africa Trade and Transportation Facilitation Project
130	World Bank	Tunisia	WB
131	World Bank	Mauritius	WB
132	Angola	Angola	Case Story
133	Chinese Taipei	Guatemala	Peten Papaya Export Project in the Republic of Guatemala
134	WIPO	Namibia	A Tree and traditional Knowledge: a Recipe for Development
135	Norway	Tanzania	The Tanga-Pemba submarine cable
136	Peru	Peru	*Alianza Público-Privada y Biodiversidad: La Cadena de la Maca en Perú*
137	Peru	Peru	*Impacto de la incorporación del comercio en la estrategia de desarrollo del Perú*
138	Peru	Peru	*Desarrollo de Asociaciones de Exportación de Artesanos Textiles del Cusco: equidad de género, emprendimiento e inclusión en el desarrollo comercial.*
139	Cambodia	Cambodia	Trade Diversification after the Global Financial Crisis: Cambodian Rice Export Policy Case Story

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
140	Trademark/DFID	Zimbabwe/Zambia	Improving Service Delivery and Reducing Clearing Times at Chirundu Border Post
141	TradeMark/DFID	Mozambique	Maintaining the Fisheries Sector's Access to the EU Market in Mozambique
142	TradeMark/DFID	Africa	Establishing a Regional Non-Tariff Barrier Reporting and Monitoring Mechanism
143	Jamaica	Jamaica	Jamaica's National Export Strategy
144	TradeMark/DFID	Southern Africa	Revamping the Regional Railway Systems in Eastern and Southern Africa
145	TradeMark/DFID	Africa	The COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite and Transport Facilitation Programme
146	PWC	Global	Creating an Engine for Growth and Development - Export Credit Agency
147	ODI	West Africa	AFT and trade related adjustment - economic partnership agreements
148	Trademark SA	South Africa	Establishing an Managing a Regional Aid for Trade Programme
149	Trade Mark SA (DFID)	South Africa	North-South Corridor Roads
150	Lesotho	Lesotho	Lesotho: Aid For Trade Needs
151	AUSAID	Asia and Pacific	Case Story: Australian Fumigation Accreditation Scheme
152	AUSAID	Indonesia	Case Story: The Cocoa Supply Chain in Indonesia
153	ICTSD	Caribbean	Caribbean Aid for Trade and Regional Integration Trust Fund (CARTFund)
154	Finland	Zambia	Aid for Trade Case Story on The Integrated Framework (IF)/Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) Process In Zambia
155	Lao PDR	Lao PDR	(Trade Development Facility)
156	Costa Rica	Costa Rica	FDI Attraction and Participation in Global Value Chains
157	Costa Rica	Costa Rica	Trade Opening as a Key Element of the Development Agenda
158	UNDP	Pakistan	Community Empowerment through Livestock Development and Credit Project (CELDAC)
159	ECDPM	Egypt	Traceability of agro-industrial products for the European market
160	Malawi	Malawi	Business Environment Strengthening TA
161	Malawi	Malawi	Integrated Framework Project
162	STDF	Global	Promoting Agri-Food Exports that Meet International Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Requirements: The Role of Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships
163	JICA	South East Asia	Truck Movement without transshipment along EW corridor
164	WB/WCO/France	Cameroon	Cameroon Customs reform: "gazing into the mirror".
165	ODI	Global	AFT and trade related adjustment in the context of climate change
166	WCO	Ethiopia	customs reform and trade facilitation
167	World Bank	Global	EGS Case Story
168	OAS	Latin America and Caribbean	Trade Capacity Building Programme for the Implementation and Administration of Trade Agreements

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
169	OAS	Caribbean	Strengthening the Official Sanitary System of Agricultural Goods for Export Markets in CARICOM
170	OAS	Caribbean	Caribbean Intellectual Property (IP) Value Capture Export Strategy
171	Zambia/Finland	Zambia	The Chirundu one stop border post
172	WIPO	Lao PDR	International Success of Laotian Beer
173	WIPO	Jordan	Evolving toward IP-fuelled Innovation
174	Norway	Tanzania	Support to the development of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania Investment Blueprint
175	US	Africa	USAID regional trade facilitation implemented by the African trade hubs
176	AUSAID	Pacific Islands	The Australia pacific technical college (aptc)
177	Belize	Belize	Completing Belize's Aid-for-Trade Strategy
178	Spain	Honduras	Development of fishing capacities in the Gulf of Fonseca; coalition of municipalities of the south of Honduras, -nasmar-.
179	Spain	Morocco	Support for technical industrial centers; sidi maarouf, morocco.
180	CUTS	Zambia	Zambia's Aid for Trade: A case of the EIF
181	Jamaica Business Development Corporation	Jamaica	Productive Integration of Micro-Enterprises in Jamaica: Increasing the Competitiveness of Micro – Enterprises in the Craft and Agro-processing Sub-sectors
182	Jamaica	Jamaica	Commonwealth Hubs and Spokes Project: Building the Capacity of ACP Countries in Trade Policy Formulation, Negotiations and Implementation
183	Switzerland	Colombia	Economic success through resource efficient and cleaner production (RECP)
184	Switzerland	Mozambique	Strengthening the Competitiveness of Export Oriented Agro Value Chains Cashew Nut Value Chain in Mozambique
185	Germany	Indonesia	Value Chain Promotion in the Rattan Furniture Sub-Sector in Indonesia
186	Germany	Kyrgyzstan	Three-Party South-South Co-operation: Using Senegalese Knowledge and Experience to Improve Trade Administration Systems in Central Asia
187	Germany	Cote d'Ivoire	Introducing Rainforest Alliance Certification to Cocoa Production in Côte d'Ivoire
188	Trinidad and Tobago	Guadeloupe	Case Story Aid for Trade Global Review 2011: Trinidad and Tobago Services Trade Mission to Guadeloupe and Martinique
189	WCO	Macedonia (FYR)	
190	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	(AFT in Ethiopia)
191	Spain	Global	Capacity building and human capital training course for the administrative units in charge of trade facilitation in countries targeted by enhanced integrated framework programmes
192	Islamic Development Bank	Central Asia	ITFC trade facilitation programme: lessons learned from the aid for-trade (aft) road map for the united nations special programme for the economies of central Asia (speca)
193	ITC	Global	modular learning system – supply chain management
194	EU	Rwanda	Support to the Agriculture Sector in Rwanda (2003-2010)

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
195	EU	Vietnam	Multilateral Trade Assistance Project III (EU-Vietnam MUTRAP III)
196	Fiji	Fiji	Case Story on Fiji's Competent Authority
197	Argentina	Bolivia	*Sistema de Control Sanitario en Centros de Faenamiento, Transporte Comercialización de Productos Cárnicos*
198	Argentina	Peru	*Asistencia técnica y capacitación a empresas del sector lechero de la Región Arequipa/Puno*
199	Argentina	Nicaragua	*Formación de Formadores en Artes y Útiles de Pesca Artesanales*
200	Antigua	Antigua	The Caribbean Rum Programme: The Case of Antigua Distillers Ltd.
201	US	Global	The Importance of Monitoring and Evaluation to Trade Capacity Building Programme Effectiveness
202	BFTI	Bangladesh	Successes and Failures of the TBSP
203	Spain	Latin America and Caribbean	Distance learning course and on-site workshop on negotiations of international investment agreements for Latin American and Caribbean countries.
204	SACAU	Southern Africa	A Case Study on SACAU's support to Southern African Delegates in International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) Attendance
205	WTO	Global	The WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Aid for Trade
206	Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	Presentation of the representative of the Ministry of Economic development and trade of the Republic of Kazakhstan on implementation of the Aid for Trade initiative: "Road map for the SPECA countries"
207	EU	Caribbean	Caribbean Trade and Private Sector Development Programme (CTPSD) – Phase II Caribbean Export Component
208	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Quality Support Export Diversification Programme
209	EU	Cameroon	*Appui à la filière café du Cameroun*
210	ITC	Africa	African cotton development initiative
211	DFID	Burundi	Changing Incentives – Revenue Growth in Burundi
212	Switzerland	Tanzania	The Impacts of Certification for Sustainable Production on Coffee Producers in Tanzania: An application of the Committee on Sustainability Assessment (COSA) Harmonized Methodology for Impact Analysis in the Coffee Sector
213	IADB	Latin America and Caribbean	*El desafío y la importancia de las reglas de origen en la agenda de política comercial*
214	Denmark	Uganda	African Organic
215	Denmark	Ghana	Food and Drugs Board
216	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Support to Bangladesh RMG Sector in post MFA
217	Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries	Vietnam	Expansion Project of a private company
218	Belgium	Global	Trade for Development Centre – Producer Support Programme
219	Botswana	Botswana	Trade and poverty programme

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
220	Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	*Projet de renforcement des capacités en formulation, négociation et mise en œuvre des politiques commerciales* " hub & spokes"
221	Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	*Fonds de soutien à coûts partages pour le développement de l'entreprise*
222	WTO	Cape Verde	Cape Verde Case Story
223	USAID	Central America	CAFTA-DR Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade Capacity Building Programme
224	CEN-SAD	Africa	*Expérience CENS-SAD en matière d'aide au commerce*
225	Chad	Thad	*Filiere cuir*
226	Colombia	Colombia	*Certificado Origen Digital*
227	Colombia	Colombia	*Proyecto Asistencia Tecnica Comercio*
228	Croatia	Croatia	Rijeka Zagreb Motorway
229	Vasudave Daggupaty	East Africa	Assessing Transport Trade Facilitation
230	Dominica	Dominica	Topic: Asycuda World Implementation
231	INDOTEL	Dominican Republic	(INDOTEL)
232	US	Vietnam	Supporting Vietnam's Legal and Governance Transformation
233	El Salvador	El Salvador	(FOMILENIO)
234	ESCWA	Asia	Strengthening capacities in the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia region to negotiate bilateral investment treaties
235	ESCWA	Asia	Networking of Expertise on Foreign Direct Investment for ESCWA Member Countries
236	UN	Global	Improving Global Road Safety Setting Regional and National Road Traffic Casualty Reduction Targets
237	ESCWA	Asia	Technical Committee on Liberalization of Foreign Trade, Economic Globalization and Financing for Development in the Countries of the ESCWA Region
238	ESCWA	Asia	EDGD Transport
239	WCO	Uganda	The use of the WCO Time Release Study to measure border performance in a landlocked developing country (Uganda)
240	Maldives	Maldives	(IF web-based information system)
241	ECSWA	Asia	EDGD trade and transport
242	ECSWA	Asia	EDGD ministerial conference
243	Fiji	Fiji	Sugar Industry
244	Fiji	Fiji	Trade Policy Framework
245	Guyana	Guyana	National Competitiveness Strategy (NCS): Trade Transactions Action Plan
246	Haiti	Haiti	*Projet d'automatisation du système douanier* (SYDONIA WORLD)
247	Honduras	Honduras	Supporting competitiveness reform in Honduras
248	Tanzania	Tanzania	The impact of business sector programme support (BSPS iii) on Tanzania business sector performance

No	Author	Country/Region	Title
249	ICTSD	Africa	Priority needs for technical and financial co-operation of LDCs: the ICTSD experience (2005-2011)
250	STDF	Global	Measuring the Performance of National Sanitary and Phytosanitary Systems
251	IICA	Latin America	Initiative for the Americas
252	IICA	Latin America	Sustainable institutional capacity building in the countries of the Americas to consolidate active participation in the sps committee and move forward with implementation of the wto/sps agreement
253	IICA	Latin America	Strengthening the national agricultural health and food safety services via the application of IICA's Performance, Vision and Strategy (PVS) tool
254	Madagascar	Madagascar	*Programme d'appui aux exportations*
255	Madagascar	Madagascar	*Programme de renforcement des capacités dans les négociations internationales (PRC)*
256	Netherlands	Global	Sustainable trade initiative
257	New Zealand	Samoa	Women in Business Development Incorporated
258	OECS	Caribbean	The Hub Spokes Project: Lessons in Best Practices for Donor Support for Trade Capacity Building
259	OECS	Caribbean	Institutional Capacity Building for Trade Policy – Lessons in Sustainability
260	ADB	Mongolia	Mongolia Customs Modernization Project
261	Singapore	Asia and Pacific	Regional Training Institute
262	Singapore	Asia and Pacific	Regional Trade Policy Course
263	Singapore	Global	Singapore Co-operation Programme
264	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	St. Vincent and the Grenadines' Tourism Development Project
265	ACTT-CN	Africa	*Appui Institutionnel à l'Autorité de Coordination du Transport de Transit du Corridor Nord (ACTT-CN) par la Banque Africaine de Développement (BAD)*
266	UEMOA	Africa	*Projet de stratégie régionale de mise en œuvre du programme d'aide pour le commerce de l'UEMOA*
267	Trademark/DFID	Africa	Improving Service Delivery and Reducing Clearing Times at Beitbridge Border Post
268	STDF	Global	Using Economic Analysis to Inform Sanitary and Phytosanitary Decision-Making
269	Nepal	Nepal	Aid-for-Trade and mainstreaming

CONCLUSIONS: WHERE NEXT IN MONITORING AND EVALUATION?

INTRODUCTION

The third aid-for-trade monitoring exercise has generated a vast amount of unique information from a wide range of sources about what works in aid for trade, what does not work and where improvements are needed. The bulk of this information has been generated through 269 case stories and 140 self-assessments submitted by partner countries, bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, providers of South-South cooperation and regional economic communities. Together with the aid-for-trade data extracted from the OECD/DAC CRS aid activities database and findings from evaluations and econometric studies, these assessments provide a mostly positive picture of the results of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative. In particular, the analysis shows that:

- Aid for trade remains a priority for many partner countries and donors who are connecting their trade-related strategies to the broader development agenda. In general, partner countries focus more on short-term objectives, such as export expansion and diversification, while donors expect aid for trade to foster economic growth and contribute to poverty reduction. Changes in objectives and priorities are mainly driven by national factors.
- Despite the impact of the economic crisis, aid-for-trade flows continued to grow in 2009 reaching approximately USD 40 billion; an increase of 60% in real terms since the 2002-2005 baseline period. Growth rates are likely to diminish, but the outlook remains stable. Increasingly, aid is tackling binding trade-related constraints in economic infrastructure and private-sector development in low-income countries, while the richer developing countries receive low concessional financing for programmes and projects in these areas.
- The delivery of aid for trade is guided by the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the trends are positive, with partner countries demonstrating a greater sense of ownership and donors harmonising their procedures and aligning their support. However, both note that more remains to be done.
- The case stories clearly demonstrate that aid for trade is becoming central to development strategies and that substantial initiatives are taking root across a wide spectrum of developing countries. Furthermore, these programmes and projects result in improved trade capacity which is bettering the lives of many men and women in developing countries.
- The essential conditions for successful aid-for-trade programmes are: ownership at the highest political level built upon the active engagement of all stakeholders; adequate and reliable funding; leveraging partnerships (including with providers of South–South cooperation); and combining public and private investment with technical assistance. Furthermore, complementary policies - especially stable fiscal and monetary policies - and flexible labour market policies, together with good governance, can greatly enhance the chances of success.

Despite the overall positive assessment of the results of aid for trade, partner countries and donors suggest that more remains to be done. For instance, the self-assessments and case stories show that putting aid effectiveness principles into practice requires continued attention and efforts (Chapter 3). This applies especially to the need to strengthen the dialogue between partner countries and donor agencies. The dialogue also needs to be expanded to include more regular discussions with the private sector and civil society organisations so as to generate broader support for the trade reform process. Discussions about the role of complementary policies to improve the success rate of these reforms and of aid-for-trade programmes are also called for (Chapter 4). However, most stakeholders note that the challenges in delivering aid for trade more effectively are not unique to this Initiative, but are, in fact, part and parcel of the broader aid effectiveness agenda. A conclusion which is supported by the emerging results from the forthcoming independent evaluation of the Paris Declaration.

Another area for further work concerns strengthening local capacities to monitor aid-for-trade flows (Chapter 2). Although progress is being made through various local aid management platforms, much remains to be done to expand the coverage both among countries and within countries. Furthermore, more clarity is needed about the purpose of monitoring global aid-for-trade flows to assess additionality and predictability and locally tracking concessional financing for implementing national development strategies (including aid for trade). Again, this is an area where the Initiative would benefit from general progress on transparency and accountability, which are both central to the aid effectiveness agenda.

The most pressing question in aid for trade is how to show results. This is particularly urgent in light of the significant additional resources that have been directed toward trade-related activities in recent years (see Chapter 2). More and more donors are putting in place general management frameworks to ensure that their efforts achieve the desired objectives and targets. However, implementing a genuine performance culture in aid for trade is difficult. For most DAC donors, attributing trade outcomes and impacts to aid-for-trade programmes and projects presents the biggest challenge, while providers of South-South cooperation highlight the complexity of setting quantifiable objectives and developing reliable performance indicators.

In a less favourable environment for continued growth of development assistance, taking steps to better measuring results at the outcome level is essential for showing that progress is being made towards the short- and long-term goals of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative. Consequently, the way forward in monitoring and evaluating aid for trade is a sustained focus on showing that aid-for-trade programmes and projects provide worthwhile contributions to sustainable economic growth and development. Better assessing the outcomes and impacts of aid for trade will help to justify continued support to the Initiative.

This chapter discusses the way forward in showing aid-for-trade results. It is structured as follows: The next section looks for evidence in past evaluations that are closely related to the aid-for-trade objectives. This is followed by a section discussing the challenges stakeholders identified in showing aid-for-trade related results. The final section suggests three mutually supportive approaches for the way forward in showing results:

- Country-based work to select a menu of performance indicators which partner countries and donors can use to measure progress towards country-owned trade capacity building targets.
- Laying the foundation for more robust evaluations of trade-related projects.
- Deepening the analysis of the case stories and disseminating good practices through a community of practitioners.

LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE

The Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action commit development partners to manage and implement aid in a way that focuses on development outcomes and impacts (rather than on process), and to use performance information to improve decision-making. While getting the process right is important, best practice in process does not guarantee tangible and meaningful results on the ground. Increasingly the development community is focussing on accountability for the use of development resources. Accountability is widely considered as an effective way to establish incentives that can help to strengthen country ownership and achieve results. This growing attention to development results has made "managing for results" a central focus for the entire aid-effectiveness agenda. Managing for development results (MfDR) provides a performance-based management framework for achieving developments goals. It puts the emphasis on reviewing progress towards results, modifying implementation if required, and learning from others.

Despite this momentum and apparently widespread acceptance, introducing a genuine performance culture that is based on results remains challenging, not only for partner-country governments, but also for donor agencies. Many case stories also highlight the difficulties faced by partner countries and donors alike in undertaking monitoring and evaluation. The 2008 Monitoring Survey of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration indicates that the number of countries establishing sound results-based monitoring frameworks has grown, but the pace of progress is still too slow.[1] In addition, there is a need to raise awareness even more about the importance of monitoring results.

Few quantitative results in the case stories…

The case stories were characterised by a relative absence of quantitative benchmark indicators of performance in either the number of outputs or in outcomes measured against baselines (see Chapter 5). This lack of quantitative benchmarks and indicators reflects the reality on the ground. Among those particularly deficient were programmes at the global level, projects that emphasised narrow technical assistance and training, and those aimed at improving policy. Nearly half of the case stories did contain some quantitative indicators on outputs. That is, a capacity building project might indicate the number of people that were trained, or a project on compliancy with product standard might enumerate the products covered. Still, drawing a causal link from these kinds of interventions to trade, economic growth, poverty reduction, gender or environment is problematic. Far fewer of the case stories in the building productive capacity and improving the trade policy environment claimed that the activity produced specific quantitative outcomes attributable to that activity.

The link between investments in capacity building, on the one hand, and results in trade performance, reductions in poverty and gender inequality, on the other, appears intrinsically complex. These difficulties are particularly acute when trying to link projects that purport to enhance inter-ministerial coordination or donor coordination to improved trade performance. Even though they may ultimately be important, it is rarely possible for this type of aid for trade to trace direct results to productive outcomes. Similarly, global programmes may well lead to new insights that motivate policy makers and private actors, and these may in turn lead to new policies, greater trade, rising incomes, improved gender equality and a better environment. The case stories generally refrain from making these kinds of sweeping claims. That said, developing a more quantitative and less impressionistic results framework – based on greater investments in gathering baseline data – is a necessary objective.

…or in past evaluations...

Evaluation provides tools to look beyond the implementation process (*i.e.* whether activities were implemented in a timely manner and outputs were obtained) to cover the extent to which activities and outputs contribute to reaching the desired outcomes and impacts (including relevance, attribution, cost-effectiveness, sustainability, and unintended results). It provides means for learning about why and how those results were achieved. It also serves to validate the findings of progress monitoring and self-assessment reports, enabling project/programme managers to make timely changes to improve performance if things are off track.

A recent meta-evaluation[2] of 162 trade-related evaluations provides an overview of and a perspective on the way DAC donors and international agencies have implemented aid-for-trade programmes and projects, and conducted evaluations in terms of both the methods applied and topics covered (OECD, 2011). The meta-evaluation demonstrates that evaluations of aid-for-trade programmes and projects have usually not had much to say about trade. Not only was the trade impact of programmes and projects clearly not the main focus of evaluations, but in a number of cases it was not even addressed. Moreover, the evaluations usually did not clarify the policy linkages which matter most to the aid-for-trade community. For example, potential positive or negative impacts of trade reforms or the stance of complementary policies on programmes and projects were not assessed or examined. Nor was there any evaluation of potential linkages with behind-the-border measures such as regulatory reforms or private sector policies.

In contrast to the near absence of trade-related issues, the reviewed evaluations referred extensively to broad, development-related concepts such as gender or poverty reduction, but without clearly defining these concepts. Moreover, evaluations have often lacked an adequate or a realistic timeframe for measuring results, rarely distinguishing between what is achievable in the short and longer terms. Consequently, their conclusions give little insight into whether aid for trade works or why. These findings, however, need to be put into perspective. The failure of evaluations to refer to specific trade results can be explained, at least in part, by the absence of trade-related objectives in the initial mandate of programmes and projects being evaluated.

Table 1 Aid-for-trade evaluations

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014*	2015*
AfDF	○	■	○	○		
Australia	○	■	■	○		
Austria		○		○		
Canada		○	○	○		
Chinese Taipei		■				
FAO				■		
Finland	○	■	○	○		
France			✱			
IADB				■		
IsDB	■	■	■	■		
ITC	○	○	○	○		
Japan	■	○	■	○		
Korea		○	✱			
Netherlands		○				
Norway		✱				
UNCTAD			■			
UNIDO	○	○	○	○		
UNECE	○	○	○	○		
Singapore	○	■	■	■		
United Kingdom			○	○		
South-South partners						
Brazil		○	○	○	○	○
Ecuador				○		
India				○		
Indonesia					○	
Mexico			○			

*Notes: */ Years only applicable to South-South partners;*
○/ Programmes and projects; ✱/ Overall strategy; ■/ Both

…but more evaluation are planned.

Many donors have evaluated their aid-for-trade programmes and projects, but only few their strategies, partly because not all of them have aid-for-trade strategies. Among the ten South-South development partners, only three (Brazil, Indonesia and Mexico) have evaluated their trade-related cooperation programmes. Indonesia reports that it is still in the process of improving its monitoring mechanism. Planned aid-for-trade evaluations over the coming years by donors and providers of South-South cooperation are presented in table 1.

Multilateral agencies appear to be more systematic with respect to evaluation, although some bilateral donors also evaluate annually their aid-for-trade interventions. Smaller aid-for-trade donors in volume terms, such as Norway and New Zealand, channel significant shares of their funds through multilateral agencies (Chapter 2). Thus, they rely more heavily on the monitoring frameworks of these agencies.

STAKEHOLDER'S ASSESSMENTS

According to the 2011 survey, progress has been made in the monitoring and evaluation of aid for trade both by donors and partner countries since 2008.[3] For almost two-thirds of the donors, these improvements have been moderate, although five (Finland, AfDB, UNECA, UNECE and IADB) report a significant improvement (Figure 1). Most of the reported improvements are associated with their own monitoring systems, while those of partner countries are not always used and joint arrangements are only used sometimes (Figure 2). Finland, for example, uses local monitoring processes in some partner countries (*e.g.* the private sector programme in Zambia), conducts joint monitoring for sector-wide programmes or other joint programmes, and employs its own system to monitor and evaluate its bilateral activities. Denmark too reports using partner countries' systems to the extent possible (though significant weaknesses are noted), joint monitoring for joint initiatives, and own monitoring for a number of distinct bilateral activities.

Figure 1 Moderate improvements in monitoring and evaluation compared to 2008



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011) *Number of responses are shown in white*

Figure 2 Most donors are conducting joint monitoring



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Evaluations are improving, but…

Over half of the partner countries report an improvement in monitoring and evaluation. Governments are scaling up their efforts to regularly monitor and review the implementation of aid-for-trade programmes and projects (*e.g.* Benin, Cameroon, Ghana, Lebanon, Tuvalu), or have established/strenghtened institutional mechanisms to improve monitoring (*e.g.* Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, St. Vincent and Grenadines). In some cases, countries have developed databases and published monitoring reports (*e.g.* Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Tonga, Uganda). Increased donor support through more intense dialogues and periodic assessments of aid for trade (*e.g.* Global Review) has also been highlighted by some partner countries (*e.g.* Grenada, DR Congo) as positive factors contributing towards improved monitoring and evaluation. Almost one-third of the partner countries (27 out of 84) do not report any notable improvement. They note, however, that this is at least partly due to a lack of institutional capacities at the national level (*e.g.* St. Kitts and Nevis) and a lack of standardised approaches across aid for trade (*e.g.* Solomon Islands).

Among the ten South-South development partners, Argentina, Brazil, China and Mexico report that their monitoring and evaluation of trade-related South-South co-operation has significantly improved since 2008, while Chile, India and Oman indicate only moderate improvements (Figure 3). Of these seven countries, Brazil, China and Mexico report that they 'always' conduct joint evaluations (Figure 4). Still China and Mexico also only use their own monitoring systems. Furthermore, while China will always involve partner-country stakeholders in its monitoring, Mexico only does this sometimes in follow-up meetings and periodic evaluations. In general, Argentina, India and Oman use their own monitoring systems, with involvement of partner-country stakeholders, and sometimes conduct joint monitoring. Chile appears to be the only country which neither involves partner countries nor conducts joint monitoring.

Figure 3 Monitoring of South-South trade-related co-operation has significantly improved since 2008

Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011) Number of responses are shown in white

Figure 4 Most South-South providers use own monitoring systems and involve partner country stakeholders



In 2009, monitoring and evaluation of aid-for-trade programmes and projects was more common in low-income countries than in middle-income. The 2011 survey shows a continuation of this trend. About 70% of LDCs (22 out of 31) say the monitoring of their aid-for-trade programmes and projects has improved either significantly (8) or moderately (14), as compared to half or less for the other income groups (Figure 5). For six LDCs, monitoring has not improved since 2008. The relatively high number of LDCs that monitor their trade-related programmes and projects likely reflect the enhancement of the Integrated Framework (see Chapter 3).

Figure 5 Share of aid-for-trade programmes with quantifiable objectives



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

… showing results remains difficult…

Bilateral and multilateral donors report that they increasingly putting in place the building blocks for results based management. For example, under the multi-donor Trade Development Facility initiative in Lao PDR, considerable effort has gone into developing the results framework, and all reporting will be based around this framework with the support of the National Implementation Unit. The IADB has implemented a new development effectiveness framework, taking a two-pronged approach: one from "bottom-up" which focuses on measuring the results of each development intervention; and the other from "top-down" which measures institutional-level results. In addition, the IADB is developing specific indicators for measuring the results of its Aid for Trade Strategic Thematic Fund. UNDP monitors for results through its enhanced resource-based management system (for the financial aspect) and the results-oriented assessment (for qualitative reporting). UNIDO is taking steps in that direction through designing a model for assessing the poverty impacts of its interventions to facilitate the evaluation of technical assistance in terms of its impacts on the poor and guide the design and implementation of interventions towards the poor. In the case of the European Union, all of its aid programmes, including aid for trade, are subject to a monitoring system called the Results-Oriented Monitoring. The system, which has been around since 2000, provides external, objective and impartial feedback on the performance of aid programmes and projects planned.

…new approaches are being piloted...

Germany is currently piloting a monitoring standard for private-sector development programmes and projects in three countries. This standard for results management is developed by the Donor Committee on Enterprise Development. It provides a common methodology – including three 'universal' impact indicators (covering income, jobs and scale) for measuring and attributing results in private-sector development in ways that are comparable. The IADB has established an aid-for-trade indicator to monitor its aid-for-trade flows more effectively, and is also developing specific indicators for measuring the results of its Aid for Trade Strategic Thematic Fund. New Zealand is placing a stronger focus on strengthening mutual accountability processes and results reporting between the New Zealand Aid Programme and its partners through, *inter alia*, formal processes for agreeing on appropriate benchmarks and targets.

…but attribution remains challenging.

A major challenge common to measuring many types of results is designing effective intervention logics or results chains that connect individual project objectives with more strategic, long-term development outcomes and impacts (OECD, 2011). This is often caused by attribution problems, significant time lapse (between the design of the intervention, its implementation and its impact), lack of credible data and difficulties in assessing often intangible capacities. In the case of aid for trade, this problem is compounded by the wide scope and multiple objectives of the Initiative (see Chapter 1), which complicates identifying clear indicators for measuring the outcome of aid-for-trade programmes and projects. In the 2009 survey, donors conceded that identifying and measuring trade-related outcomes was a real challenge (OECD/WTO, 2009). These findings are confirmed in the 2011 survey in which only 16 donors report to have quantifiable objectives in more than half of their aid-for-trade programmes and projects (Figure 5).

Most donors identify attributing aid-for-trade programmes and projects to trade outcomes and impact as the biggest challenge in evaluation (Figures 6 and 7). Attribution – linking aid-for-trade interventions with trade, economic and poverty related impacts – is also highlighted as a problem in many of the submitted case stories. This comes as no surprise since it is more difficult to assess the sector or economy-wide impacts of a specific project than to assess its performance in a specific context, given the complex array of extraneous variables influencing outcomes (OECD, 2011). South-South partners too report that establishing quantifiable objectives and producing reliable indicators are the main challenges, closely followed by data availability and a lack of partner country capacity to collect and report data (Figure 8). Case stories also support these findings. As noted, many of these stories do not contain quantitative performance indicators (in either number of output or in outcomes measured against baselines). The failure to refer to specific trade results can be explained at least in part by the absence of trade-related objectives in the initial mandate of the operations. Moreover, In addition to the attribution gap, the lack of built-in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in the project design – to develop indicators and establish measurable baseline data – is also recognised as a failing and underlines the importance of systematically collating data as a project progresses.

Figure 6 Challenges in evaluating aid for trade by bilateral donor



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Figure 7 Challenges in evaluating aid for trade by multilateral donor



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

Figure 8 Challenges in evaluating trade-related co-operation by South-South providers



Source: OECD/WTO questionnaire (2011)

THE WAY FORWARD IN SHOWING RESULTS

The results of the Aid-for-Trade Initiative can be measured in three areas: *i*) greater awareness (*i.e.* trade mainstreaming → increased demand); *ii*) increased aid-for-trade resources (*i.e.* donor response → increased aid flows); and *iii*) more effective aid-for-trade interventions (*i.e.* demonstrating outcomes and impacts in terms of trade capacity). The aid-for-trade monitoring exercise has measured progress mainly on the first two dimensions of the Initiative.

Monitoring the third aspect (*i.e.* reporting on results at the programme, country, regional and global level) is rather more complex. But, prrogress in showing results can be made further through *i*) continuing to strengthen management-for-results approaches in aid-for-trade programmes, *ii*) evaluating impacts of aid-for-trade programmes that are amenable to these and other quasi-impact methodologies, and *iii*) establishing a community of aid-for-trade practitioners to share knowledge.

Setting targets and performance indicators

Although attribution is clearly a problem, outcome indicators are still useful to point towards the direction of changes with which a programme or project can be associated. While the choice of indicators should be context specific, many performance indicators related to different areas of aid for trade are readily available today. These indicators can be used to design a light but effective monitoring system that is focussed on showing results.

A first step is to narrow down the indicators to those that can be related to aid-for-trade programmes and projects and say something meaningful about trade performance. The performance indicators should be used as a political tool to provide factual information about progress. The presentation of results should be based as much as possible on benchmarking to allow cross-country comparisons. The story emerging should be recognisable and conducive to a constructive dialogue focused on where further improvements are required.

Based on these criteria the OECD and the WTO designed the "aid for trade at a glance country fact sheet" (included in this publication). This tool is meant to enable rapid cross-country comparison, based on a limited number of indicators drawn from existing sources. The country fact sheet is an "evolving" tool. It has provided a starting point to help countries discuss how to make aid for trade more results-oriented. It does not provide all the answers to whether aid for trade works, nor does it claim to do so.

A plethora of indicators are being generated and used by partners and donors to assess progress towards specific aid-for-trade results. As more donors start to introduce results frameworks, agreeing on a menu of indicators to measure results would enable aggregating these results across programmes and projects and allow for cross-country comparison. Furthermore, such a menu would also further the Accra Agenda for Action, which called for efforts to arrive at internationally recognised performance indicators.

A menu of indicators would not limit development partners to only use those indicators for the performance assessment of their interventions. Such a limited approach is neither feasible, nor desirable given the differences in operational needs and strategic priorities. Micro-level indicators, for instance, will remain necessary to monitor specific programme and will vary between them. Consequently, these micro-level indicators cannot be aggregated across sectors or countries. In principle, however, all these separate trade-related programmes and projects aim to achieve the common objective of enhanced capacity to trade. The commonality of that objective could be enhanced and form the basis for reporting on results at the aggregate level.

There is considerable benefit in establishing a menu of a selective number of universal trade-related indicators across all aid-for-trade interventions. Such a menu would facilitate benchmarking progress in building trade capacity at the country level. The challenge is to select indicators broad enough to capture the wide range of aid-for-trade programmes and projects, while still specific enough to provide credible information on how aid for trade is contributing to improved trade capacity and performance.

As noted previously, several donors are moving towards the introduction of quantifiable targets and related performance indicators, including for their trade-related programmes and projects. Others are considering such an approach. This creates an opportunity for the aid-for-trade community to share experiences and work together with partner countries towards a more harmonised approach to manage and account for results. Moreover, it would avoid flooding partner countries with an unmanageable set of indicators all measuring different, but closely related results.

The idea would be to arrive at a menu of indicators that are reasonably representative of the essential characteristics of aid-for-trade categories as defined by the WTO Aid for Trade Task Force and shaped by data availability. These indicators, taken together, should provide a sense of progress at the sector and country level and contribute to the broader efforts of showing aid-for-trade results. The menu of indicators should be selected through an iterative process of country-based pilot studies led by partner countries and involving multilateral and bilateral donors and providers of South-South cooperation.

The third aid-for-trade monitoring exercise clearly shows that there is much to gain from working together to develop aligned approaches to measure aid-for-trade results. There is considerable benefit in agreeing among stakeholders on a menu of a limited set of indicators across aid-for-trade programmes and projects to assess and benchmark progress in building trade capacities. A more aligned approach to measure progress towards partner countries' aid-for-trade targets would also strengthen country ownership, the critical factor ensuring that aid-for-trade programmes and projects enhance trade capacity and promote economic growth and development.

Evaluating impacts

The growing demand for showing results in development has stimulated new thinking about how these can be demonstrated. Impact evaluations are one approach that is currently applied with considerable success to aid interventions in the social sector (health and education).[4] The approach focuses on "with and without" interventions and compares outcomes for participants in the programme with a control group. In the applying this evaluation method to aid-for-trade programmes identifying appropriate control groups can be difficult. Moreover, the application of impact evaluations to aid-for-trade programmes is hindered when targets are unclear and data scant. Without baseline data and a controlled experiment, it remains difficult to attribute success or failure exclusively to the programme, as opposed to the environment in which it operates (OECD, 2011).

The World Bank points towards this trend in evaluation, shifting away from conventional before-after comparisons (using for instance client surveys) towards rigorous impact evaluation techniques using either Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) or quasi-experimental methods. The use of econometric techniques combining data from surveys, customs and the national statistical institutes has made it possible to disentangle effects at the intensive (as opposed to extensive) margin[5] and long-run (as opposed to short-run).

For selected countries with promising success stories, it may be possible to examine country performance before and after the policy intervention and compare it with closely matched countries. This method was suggested by Benton and von Uexküll (2009)[6] in evaluating the impact of product-specific technical assistance for exports. This is the primary concern of Cadot *et al.* (2011)[7] who argue that some specific trade-related assistance especially industry specific pro-active policies can be evaluated more formally, provided that these evaluations are not limited to particular methodologies, such as RCTS, but also apply other quasi-experimental methods. The authors consider that the key barriers to undertaking such evaluations in trade-related assistance are less of a conceptual nature, but more related to the costs, the time frame and the burden it places on project managers. Consequently, they suggest that the impact evaluations should prioritise learning over monitoring. Showing what works in aid-for-trade processes, programmes and policies and sharing this knowledge among the wider aid-for-trade community was also the objective of the call for case stories.

A COMMUNITY OF AID-FOR-TRADE PRACTITIONERS

The sheer breadth and depth of the activity captures in the case stories and the fact that nearly 40% of the stories were submitted by developing countries underlines the salience of these programmes in the field - and the importance of making them work. Recipient governments are clearly interested in gaining access to global information and knowledge on ways to harness trade to promote growth and raise incomes. The aid-for-trade case stories were intended to be a beginning rather than an end. Many follow-up activities should be undertaken to create a better understanding of their results and of their wider applicability.

More rigorous analysis of the case studies using a common analytical framework could help clarify common determinants of success and weaknesses. For example, a sample of the case stories in three sub-areas – *e.g.* infrastructure, trade facilitation, and trade capacity building could be followed up with client surveys and interviews to better establish links to trade performance and poverty reduction, with greater attention to project attribution. This could be coupled with new cross-country analysis that would link the particular policy intervention types to country performance.

More generally, this third global monitoring exercise emphasises the need for an "one-stop-shop" knowledge platform on aid for trade. Currently, no such knowledge platform exists (website, portal or knowledge network). The joint OECD/WTO aid-for-trade website [www.aid4trade.org] provides access to all the primary information that has been collected through the three monitoring exercises. Consequently, the website contains a wealth of information on what works in aid for trade and what could work better.

The website will be developed further to offer a networking function supporting the information needs of the aid-for-trade policy makers and practitioners on how to make aid for trade more effective. Such an aid-for-trade knowledge sharing platform responds to the original recommendation of the WTO Aid for Trade Task Force, but also to the mandate of the G20 Development Framework for Shared Growth which encourages international organisations to strengthen such platforms. In addition, active knowledge sharing should also be further pursued through deepened and broadened in-country dialogue between stakeholders. These discussions should not only focus on 'bridging 'demand' and 'response', but increasingly on what approaches work best in showing that aid for trade has an impact on trade performance, economic growth and poverty reduction. ■

NOTES

1 The 'soundness' of a results-based monitoring framework is judged based on three criteria, which are: i) the quality of the information generated; ii) stakeholder access to the information; and iii) the extent to which the information is utilised within the country.

2 Meta-evaluations (evaluations of evaluations) are designed to aggregate findings from a series of evaluations.

3 . The questionnaires and case stories do not profile the full gamut of the important initiatives taken by other players. For example, the monitoring and evaluation system used by UNESCAP places results-based management at the centre of its evaluation work.

4 Banerjee, A. and Duflo, E. (2011), A Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of Ways to Fight Global Poverty, London: PublicAffairs.

5 Intensive margin denotes an increase in exports of existing products to existing markets, whereas extensive margin denotes an increase in the number of products exported or in the number of markets served.

6 Brenton, P. and E. von Uexkull, (2009), "Product specific technical assistance for exports – has it been effective?" *The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development: An International and Comparative Review*, 18(2), 235-254.

7 Cadot, O. *et al.,* (2011), "Impact Evaluation of Trade Assistance: Paving the Way"; in O. Cadot, A. Fernandes, J. Gourdon and A. Mattoo, eds., *Where to spend the next million: Impact evaluation of trade interventions;* London/ Washington: World Bank and CEPR, forthcoming.