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WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes

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XI. Article 11    back to top

A. Text of Article 11

Article 11: Function of Panels

The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.

 
B. Interpretation and Application of Article 11

1. Panel “should” make an objective assessment

518.     In Canada — Aircraft, the Appellate Body discussed the meaning of the word “should” in Article 11 of the DSU and more generally:

“Although the word “should” is often used colloquially to imply an exhortation, or to state a preference, it is not always used in those ways. It can also be used “to express a duty [or] obligation”. The word “should” has, for instance, previously been interpreted by us as expressing a “duty” of panels in the context of Article 11 of the DSU.(847) Similarly, we are of the view that the word “should” in the third sentence of Article 13.1 is, in the context of the whole of Article 13, used in a normative, rather than a merely exhortative, sense.”(848)

2. “objective assessment of the matter before it”

(a) Duty to make independent assessment

(i) General

519.     In Argentina — Footwear (EC), the Appellate Body considered that a panel could not make an “objective assessment of the matter”, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, if it could only refer in its reasoning to the specific provisions cited by the parties in their claims”:

“We note that the very terms of Article 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards expressly incorporate the provisions of Article 3. Thus, we find it difficult to see how a panel could examine whether a Member had complied with Article 4.2(c) without also referring to the provisions of Article 3 of the Agreement on Safeguards. More particularly, given the express language of Article 4.2(c), we do not see how a panel could ignore the publication requirement set out in Article 3.1 when examining the publication requirement in Article 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. And, generally, we fail to see how the Panel could have interpreted the requirements of Article 4.2(c) without taking into account in some way the provisions of Article 3. What is more, we fail to see how any panel could be expected to make an ‘objective assessment of the matter’. as required by Article 11 of the DSU, if it could only refer in its reasoning to the specific provisions cited by the parties in their claims.”(849)

520.     In Australia — Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 — US), both parties argued that the task of the Panel was to choose between the position articulated by each party. The Panel disagreed and stated:

“That neither party has argued a particular interpretation before us, and indeed, that both have argued that we should not reach issues of interpretation that they have not raised, cannot, in our view, preclude us from considering such issues if we find this to be necessary to resolve the dispute that is before us. A panel’s interpretation of the text of a relevant WTO Agreement cannot be limited by the particular arguments of the parties to a dispute.”(850)

521.     In Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, Mexico advanced no counter-arguments in respect of the United States’ claim under Article III of the GATT 1994. The Panel indicated that it would examine the claims, arguments and evidence submitted by the parties for each legal requirement under the relevant provision of Article III “while, at the same time, being mindful of the relatively succinct analytical approach adopted by the panels in US — Shrimp and Turkey — Textiles in the absence of any counter-arguments by the respondent.”(851)

522.     In US — Shrimp (Ecuador), the Panel was faced with a rather unusual dispute in that the responding party, the United States, had not contested any of the complaining party’s claims. The parties had not, however, characterized their shared view of the substantive aspects of the dispute as a “mutually agreed solution”, and thus Article 12.7 did not apply. In spite of the lack of any rebuttal by the respondent, the Panel, referring to the Appellate Body’s findings in EC — Hormones and US — Gambling, concluded that it still had to satisfy itself that Ecuador, the complainant, had made a prima facie case:

“In our view, the issue of the burden of proof is of particular importance in this case. This is because Ecuador has made factual and legal claims before the Panel which the United States does not contest. Yet, the fact that the United States does not contest Ecuador’s claims is not a sufficient basis for us to summarily conclude that Ecuador’s claims are well-founded. Rather, we can only rule in favour of Ecuador if we are satisfied that Ecuador has made a prima facie case. We take note in this regard that the Appellate Body has cautioned panels against ruling on a claim before the party bearing the burden of proof has made a prima facie case. In EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body ruled that the Panel erred in law when it absolved the complaining parties from the necessity of establishing a prima facie case and shifted the burden of proof to the responding party.

 

 

Thus, not with standing the fact that the United States is not seeking to refute Ecuador’s claims, we must satisfy ourselves that Ecuador has established a prima facie case of violation, and notably that it has presented ‘evidence and argument … sufficient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, identify the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and explain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure with that provision.’”(852)

523.     In China — Publication and Audiovisual Products, the Panel recalled that according to Article 11 of the DSU, “the function of panels is to make an ‘objective assessment’ of the matter before them. Consequently, the parties’ common assessment in relation to a particular issue is, therefore, not in and of itself dispositive.”(853)

524.     The Panel in US — Poultry (China) followed a similar approach where the respondent did not contest a claim under Article XI of the GATT 1994:

“As indicated above, the United States has not contested China’s claim under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. The absence of refutation of a claim raises the question of what the role of the Panel should be in such a case. We note that in US — Shrimp (Ecuador) and US — Shrimp (Thailand), the panels found that although the respondent was not seeking to refute the claims, in order to make an objective assessment of the matter before them they had to satisfy themselves whether the complainant had established a prima facie case of violation.699 In particular, the panels considered whether the complainant had presented evidence and argument which “was sufficient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, identify the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and explain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure with that provision”.

 

Although the United States has not presented arguments seeking to refute China’s claims, the Panel, in order to make an objective assessment of the matter as directed by Article 11 of the DSU, will still examine whether China has established a prima facie case of violation of Article Xl:1 of the GATT 1994.”(854)

525.     In EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft, the Panel considered that it was for the complaining party to define the “subsidized product”, and saw nothing in the SCM Agreement that required it to make an independent determination of the subsidized product, as opposed to relying on the complaining Member’s identification of that product. The Appellate Body found that the Panel acted inconsistently by “deferring” to the complainant’s definition of the relevant product/ market at issue:

“[T]he Panel committed legal error by failing to adjudicate properly the United States’ subsidized product allegations and refusing to make its own independent assessment of whether all Airbus LCA compete in the same market or not. As noted above, the United States’ claims of serious prejudice were premised on its assertion that there is only one subsidized product at issue in this dispute, consisting of all models of Airbus LCA. The European Communities objected to the United States’ definition of the “subsidized product”, arguing that the Panel was required to make its own assessment of whether the “identified universe of allegedly subsidized products should be treated as a single subsidized product, or multiple subsidized products.” However, in its analysis, the Panel deferred to the United States’ subsidized product allegations rather than making its own independent assessment of whether all Airbus LCA should be treated as a single subsidized product. In so doing, the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter, including the “applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, as required under Article 11 of the DSU.”(855)

(ii) Independent assessment of the meaning of domestic law

526.     In response to India’s assertion that municipal law is a fact that must be established before an international tribunal by the party relying on it and that the Panel should have sought guidance from India on matters relating to the interpretation of Indian law, the Appellate Body in India — Patents (US) stated:

“In public international law, an international tribunal may treat municipal law in several ways. Municipal law may serve as evidence of facts and may provide evidence of state practice. However, municipal law may also constitute evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations. For example, in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of International Justice observed:

 

‘It might be asked whether a difficulty does not arise from the fact that the Court would have to deal with the Polish law of July 14th, 1920. This, however, does not appear to be the case. From the standpoint of International Law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States, in the same manner as do legal decisions and administrative measures. The Court is certainly not called upon to interpret the Polish law as such; but there is nothing to prevent the Courts giving judgment on the question whether or not, in applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity with its obligations towards Germany under the Geneva Convention (856) (emphasis added)’

 

… It is clear that an examination of the relevant aspects of Indian municipal law and, in particular, the relevant provisions of the Patents Act as they relate to the ‘administrative instructions’. is essential to determining whether India has complied with its obligations under Article 70.8 (a). There was simply no way for the Panel to make this determination without engaging in an examination of Indian law. But, as in the case cited above before the Permanent Court of International Justice, in this case, the Panel was not interpreting Indian law ‘as such’; rather, the Panel was examining Indian law solely for the purpose of determining whether India had met its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. To say that the Panel should have done otherwise would be to say that only India can assess whether Indian law is consistent with India’s obligations under the WTO Agreement. This, clearly, cannot be so.

 

Previous GATT/WTO panels also have conducted a detailed examination of the domestic law of a Member in assessing the conformity of that domestic law with the relevant GATT/WTO obligations. For example, in United States — Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the panel conducted a detailed examination of the relevant United States’ legislation and practice, including the remedies available under Section 337 as well as the differences between patent-based Section 337 proceedings and federal district court proceedings, in order to determine whether Section 337 was inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1947. This seems to us to be a comparable case.”(857)

527.     In connection with the examination of Section 301-310 of the US Trade Act of 1974, the Panel in US — Section 301 Trade Act stated that it would not “interpret US law ‘as such’. the way we would, say, interpret provisions of the covered agreements.” Rather, the Panel held that it was instead “called upon to establish the meaning of Sections 301-310 as factual elements”:

“Our mandate is to examine Sections 301-310 solely for the purpose of determining whether the US meets its WTO obligations. In doing so, we do not, as noted by the Appellate Body in India — Patents (US), interpret US law ‘as such’. the way we would, say, interpret provisions of the covered agreements. We are, instead, called upon to establish the meaning of Sections 301-310 as factual elements and to check whether these factual elements constitute conduct by the US contrary to its WTO obligations. The rules on burden of proof for the establishment of facts referred to above also apply in this respect. (858)

 

 

We note, finally, that terms used both in Sections 301-310 and in WTO provisions, do not necessarily have the same meaning. For example, the word ‘determination’ need not always have the same meaning in Sections 304 and 306 as it has in Article 23.2(a) of the DSU. Thus, conduct not meeting, say, the threshold of a ‘determination’ under Sections 304 and 306, is not by this fact alone precluded from meeting the threshold of a ‘determination’ under Article 23.2(a) of the DSU. By contrast, the fact that a certain act is characterized as a ‘determination’ under domestic legislation, does not necessarily mean that it must be construed as a determination under the covered agreements.”(859)

528.     In US — 1916 Act (EC), in connection with the examination of the 1916 Act, the European Communities argued that the Panel should not be influenced by the terms used by the United States courts whereas the United States argued that “the proper interpretation of the 1916 Act is a question of fact to be established, as it is an accepted principle of international law that municipal law is a fact to be proven before international tribunals.”(860) Referring to paragraph 66 of the Appellate Body Report in India — Patents (US), the Panel stated:

“[O]ur understanding of the term ‘examination’ as used by the Appellate Body is that panels need not accept at face value the characterisation that the respondent attaches to its law. A panel may analyse the operation of the domestic legislation and determine whether the description of the functioning of the law, as made by the respondent, is consistent with the legal structure of that Member. This way, it will be able to determine whether or not the law as applied is in conformity with the obligations of the Member concerned under the WTO Agreement.”(861),(862)

529.     The Panel in US — 1916 Act (EC) then noted that both complaining parties and the defending party relied on United States court cases in their claims. In connection with the consideration of the case law relating to the 1916 Act, the Panel stated:

 

“We recall that the International Court of Justice, in the Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) case, referred to the judgement of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Brazilian Loans case — to which the United States also refers in its submissions — and noted that:

 

‘Where the determination of a question of municipal law is essential to the Court’s decision in a case, the Court will have to weigh the jurisprudence of the municipal courts, and ‘If this is uncertain or divided, it will rest with the Court to select the interpretation which it considers most in conformity with the law’ (Brazilian Loans, PCIJ, Series A, Nos. 20/21, p. 124).’(863)

 

We are fully aware that our role is to clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements so as to determine the compatibility of a domestic law with those agreements. We are also aware that, in the Brazilian Loans case, the PCIJ was asked to apply domestic legislation to a given case. We are nevertheless of the view that there is nothing in the text of the DSU, nor in the practice of the Appellate Body, that prevents us from ‘weighting] the jurisprudence of municipal [US] courts’ if it is ‘uncertain or divided’. This would not require us to develop our own independent interpretation of US law, but simply to select among the relevant judgements the interpretation most in conformity with the US law, as necessary in order to resolve the matter before us.”(864),(865)

530.     The Panel in US — 1916 Act (EC) also examined the legislative history to determine the intent of Congress to assist their understanding of the actual scope and operation of the 1916 Act. In so doing, the Panel considered public declarations of various United States officials and stated:

“[W]e should determine whether they could actually generate legal obligations for the United States under international law. For instance, since they are subsequent to the notification by the United States of its ‘grandfathered’ legislation under the GATT 1947, it might be argued that they implicitly modified that notification by stating that the 1916 Act was ‘grandfathered’. We recall that the International Court of Justice has developed, inter alia in its judgement in the Nuclear tests case,(866) criteria on when a statement by a representative of a State could generate international obligations for that State. In the present case, we are reluctant to consider the statements made by senior US officials in testimonies or letters to the US Congress or to members thereof as generating international obligations for the United States. First, we recall that the constitution of the United States provides for a strict separation of the judicial and executive branches. With the exception of criminal prosecutions, the application of the 1916 Act falls within the exclusive responsibility of the federal courts. Under those circumstances, a statement by the executive branch of government in a domestic forum can only be of limited value. Second, with the possible exception of the statement of US Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter, they were not made at a sufficiently high level compared with the statements considered by the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Tests case, where essentially declarations by a head of State and of members of the French government were at issue. Moreover, the statements referred to in the present case were not directly addressed to the general public. Finally, they were not made on behalf of the United States, but — at best — on behalf of the executive branch of government. This aspect would not be essential if the statements had been made in an international forum, where the executive branch represents the State.(867) However, in the present case, the statements were addressed to the US legislative branch. Therefore, we cannot consider them as creating obligations for the United States under international law.”(868)

531.     In US — Shrimp (Article 21.5 — Malaysia), the Panel had examined the United States municipal law at issue taking into account the status of such law at the time of its review. Malaysia wanted the Panel to take into account a CTI ruling (Turtle Island ) which was still declaratory. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel and considered that it would have been an exercise in speculation on the part of the Panel to predict either when or how that case may be concluded, or to assume that injunctive relief ultimately would be granted and that the United States Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States eventually would compel the Department of State to modify the Revised Guidelines. The Appellate Body insisted that “the Panel was correct not to indulge in such speculation, which would have been contrary to the duty of the Panel, under Article 11 of the DSU, to make ‘an objective assessment of the matter … including an objective assessment of the facts of the case’”.(869)

532.     In US — Section 211 Appropriations Act, the Appellate Body stressed that “municipal law of WTO Members may serve not only as evidence of facts, but also as evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations”:

“Our rulings in these previous appeals are clear: the municipal law of WTO Members may serve not only as evidence of facts, but also as evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international obligations. Under the DSU, a panel may examine the municipal law of a WTO Member for the purpose of determining whether that Member has complied with its obligations under the WTO Agreement. Such an assessment is a legal characterization by a panel. And, therefore, a panel’s assessment of municipal law as to its consistency with WTO obligations is subject to appellate review under Article 17.6 of the DSU.

 

To address the legal issues raised in this appeal, we must, therefore, necessarily examine the Panel’s interpretation of the meaning of Section 211 under United States law. An assessment of the consistency of Section 211 with the Articles of the TRIPS Agreement and of the Paris Convention (1967) that have been invoked by the European Communities necessarily requires a review of the Panel’s examination of the meaning of Section 211. Likewise, that assessment necessarily requires a review also of the Panel’s examination of the meaning of both the CACR and the Lanham Act, to the extent that they are relevant for assessing the meaning of Section 211. This is an interpretation of the meaning of Section 211 solely for the purpose of determining whether the United States has fulfilled its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. The meaning given by the Panel to Section 211 is, thus, clearly within the scope of our review as set out in Article 17.6 of the DSU.”(870)

533.     In Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines), Thailand argued on appeal that the Panel failed to give “due deference” to Thailand’s interpretation of its own law. The Appellate Body responded:

“In our view, the panel in correctly recognized that, “objectively, a Member is normally well-placed to explain the meaning of its own law”, but that this does not relieve a party of its burden to adduce arguments and evidence necessary to sustain its proposed interpretation. (Panel Report, para. 7.28) Further, a panel’s duties under Article 11 of the DSU require it to conduct an objective assessment of all such arguments and evidence. In this dispute, the Panel observed, in the context of its Article III:4 analysis, that “Thailand should normally be in a position to explain the nature” of obligations under Thai law but that, to the extent that the parties disagree on the content of such obligations, the Panel was “required to objectively examine the question at issue based on the text of the concerned provision[s] as well as on the evidence before [the Panel]”. (Panel Report, para. 7.684(footnote omitted)) We see no error in the Panel’s approach.”(871)

(iii) Independent assessment of the meaning of other international conventions and treaties

534.     In EC — Bananas III, the European Communities asserted “that the Panel should not have conducted an objective examination of the requirements of the Lomé Convention, but instead should have deferred to the ‘common’ EC and ACP views on the appropriate interpretation of the Lomé Convention.” The Appellate Body expressly agreed with the following statement of the Panel:

“We note that since the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES incorporated a reference to the Lomé Convention into the Lomé waiver, the meaning of the Lomé Convention became a GATT/WTO issue, at least to that extent. Thus, we have no alternative but to examine the provisions of the Lomé Convention ourselves in so far as it is necessary to interpret the Lomé waiver.”(872)

(b) Other issues

(i) Panel’s duty to deal with matter before it

535.     In Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, Mexico argued that the Panel should have declined to exercise jurisdiction. In the context of addressing this issue, the Appellate Body referred to Article 11:

Article 11 of the DSU states that panels should make an objective assessment of the matter before them. The Appellate Body has previously held that the word “should” can be used not only “to imply an exhortation, or to state a preference”, but also “to express a duty [or] obligation”. The Appellate Body has repeatedly ruled that a panel would not fulfil its mandate if it were not to make an objective assessment of the matter. Under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel is, therefore, charged with the obligation to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements. Article 11 also requires that a panel “make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.” It is difficult to see how a panel would fulfil that obligation if it declined to exercise validly established jurisdiction and abstained from making any finding on the matter before it.”(873)

536.     In EC — Chicken Cuts, the Panel decided to seek certain information from the World Customs Organization. By way of general comment in its reply to the questions posed, the World Customs Organization suggested that the settlement procedures contained in the HS Convention should be followed by the parties before the Panel made its decision. In its report, the Panel referred to Article 11 and commented that “once seized of a matter, Article 11 prevents a panel from abdicating its responsibility to the DSB. In other words, in the context of the present case, we lack the authority to refer the dispute before us to the WCO or to any other body”. The Panel noted that “all the parties to this dispute, including the respondent, appear to consider that this case is appropriately adjudicated by us”, and that although it was “mindful of the respective jurisdiction and competence of the WCO and the WTO … we consider that we have been mandated by the DSB in this dispute to determine whether the European Communities has violated Article II of the GATT 1994 with respect to the products at issue.”(874)

(ii) Finding on a claim not made by the complainant

537.     In Chile — Price Band System, the Appellate Body considered that the Panel had exceeded its mandate and thus acted inconsistently with Article 11 because it had made a finding on a claim that was not made by Argentina:

“In this case, the Panel made a finding on a claim that was not made by Argentina. Having determined that the duties resulting from Chile’s price band system could not be assessed under the first sentence(875) of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, the Panel then proceeded to examine the measure under the second sentence of that provision. In so doing, the Panel assessed a provision that was not a part ‘of the matter before it’. As we have explained, the terms of reference were broad enough to have included a claim under the second sentence of Article II:1(b). However, Argentina did not articulate a claim under that sentence; nor did Argentina submit any arguments on the consistency of Chile’s price band system with the second sentence. Therefore, as with our finding in US — Certain EC Products, the second sentence of Article II:1(b) was not the subject of a claim before the Panel. Because it made a finding on a provision that was not before it, the Panel, therefore, did not make an objective assessment of the matter before it, as required by Article 11. Rather, the Panel made a finding on a matter that was not before it. In doing so, the Panel acted ultra petita and inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.”(876)

(iii) Consultation with experts

538.     In India — Quantitative Restrictions, India argued in its appeal that the Panel had acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU because it had delegated to the IMF its duty to make an objective assessment. The Appellate Body disagreed with India and stated:

“The Panel gave considerable weight to the views expressed by the IMF in its reply to these questions. However, nothing in the Panel Report supports India’s argument that the Panel delegated to the IMF its judicial function to make an objective assessment of the matter. A careful reading of the Panel Report makes clear that the Panel did not simply accept the views of the IMF. The Panel critically assessed these views and also considered other data and opinions in reaching its conclusions.(877)

3. “objective assessment of the facts of the case”

(a) Burden of proof

(i) General principles

The general rule: burden of proof rests on party asserting affirmative of claim, defence or fact

539.     In US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body held that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence:

“[W]e find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof.(878) Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.(879)

 

In the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement, precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case.”(880)

540.     The Panel in Turkey — Textiles, the Panel indicated that the Appellate Body “has confirmed the GATT practice” whereby:

“(a) it is for the complaining party to establish the violation it alleges;

 

(b)      it is for the party invoking an exception or an affirmative defense to prove that the conditions contained therein are met; and

 

(c)      it is for the party asserting a fact to prove it.”(881)

541.     In EC — Hormones, the Appellate Body discussed the allocation of the burden of proof in the context of the SPS Agreement, but referred to its statement in US — Wool Shirts and Blouses and stated that this rule “embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings”:

“The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States — Shirts and Blouses,(882) which the Panel invokes and which embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.”(883)

542.     In Japan — Apples, the Appellate Body emphasized the distinction between the two “distinct” principles relating to the burden of proof:

“It is important to distinguish, on the one hand, the principle that the complainant must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of a covered agreement(884) from, on the other hand, the principle that the party that asserts a fact is responsible for providing proof thereof.(885) In fact, the principles are distinct.”(886)

543.     The Panel in US — Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) stated that the “normal international legal standards” governing the discharge of the burden of proof unquestionably apply to the WTO dispute settlement procedures, as an important element of its functions concerning dispute resolution under the rule of law and due process.(887)

Presumption against the reversal of the burden of proof

544.     In Canada — Dairy (Article 21.5 — New Zealand and US II), the Appellate Body indicated that it would “not readily find” that the usual rules on burden of proof are inapplicable:

“[W]e have consistently held that, as a general matter, the burden of proof rests upon the complaining Member. That Member must make out a prima facie case by presenting sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in favour of its claim. If the complaining Member succeeds, the responding Member may then seek to rebut this presumption. Therefore, under the usual allocation of the burden of proof, a responding Member’s measure will be treated as WTO-consistent, until sufficient evidence is presented to prove the contrary. We will not readily find that the usual rules on burden of proof do not apply, as they reflect a “canon of evidence” accepted and applied in international proceedings.”(888)

Where evidence and arguments remain in equipoise

545.     In US — Section 301 Trade Act, the Panel clarified, in the light of the allocation of the burden of proof, which party would benefit in case of uncertainty (i.e. in case all evidence and arguments were to remain in “equipoise”):

“Since, in this case, both parties have submitted extensive facts and arguments in respect of the EC claims, our task will essentially be to balance all evidence on record and decide whether the EC, as party bearing the original burden of proof, has convinced us of the validity of its claims. In case of uncertainty, i.e. in case all the evidence and arguments remain in equipoise, we have to give the benefit of the doubt to the US as defending party.”(889)

Establishing a prima facie case

What is a prima facie case?

546.     In EC — Hormones, the Appellate Body specified what is meant by the term “prima facie case”:

“It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case.”(890)

547.     In US — Gambling, the Appellate Body indicated that “[a] panel errs when it rules on a claim for which the complaining party has failed to make a prima facie case”(891) and noted that:

“A prima facie case must be based on “evidence and legal argument” put forward by the complaining party in relation to each of the elements of the claim. A complaining party may not simply submit evidence and expect the panel to divine from it a claim of WTO-inconsistency. Nor may a complaining party simply allege facts without relating them to its legal arguments.

 

In the context of the sufficiency of panel requests under Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Appellate Body has found that a panel request:

 

… must plainly connect the challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) of the covered agreements claimed to have been infringed, so that the respondent party is aware of the basis for the alleged nullification or impairment of the complaining party’s benefits.

 

Given that such a requirement applies to panel requests at the outset of a panel proceeding, we are of the view that a prima facie case — made in the course of submissions to the panel — demands no less of the complaining party. The evidence and arguments underlying a prima facie case, therefore, must be sufficient to identify the challenged measure and its basic import, identify the relevant WTO provision and obligation contained therein, and explain the basis for the claimed inconsistency of the measure with that provision.”(892)

 

Source of evidence for a prima facie case

548.     In US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body stated that the nature and scope of evidence required to establish a prima facie case “will vary from measure to measure, provision to provision, and case to case.”(893)

549.     In Korea — Dairy, Korea argued in its appeal that the Panel should have looked solely at the evidence submitted by the European Communities as the complaining party to determine whether the European Communities had met its burden of proof of making a. prima facie case. The Appellate Body disagreed and stated:

“Korea appears to suggest that the Panel, in evaluating Korea’s actions leading up to the adoption of its safeguard measure, should have looked solely to the evidence submitted by the European Communities as complaining party. We do not agree with Korea in this respect. It is, of course, true that the European Communities has the onus of establishing its claim that Korea’s safeguard measure is inconsistent with the requirements of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. However, under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel is charged with the mandate to determine the facts of the case and to arrive at factual findings. In carrying out this mandate, a panel has the duty to examine and consider all the evidence before it, not just the evidence submitted by one or the other party, and to evaluate the relevance and probative force of each piece thereof. … The determination of the significance and weight properly pertaining to the evidence presented by one party is a function of a panel’s appreciation of the probative value of all the evidence submitted by both parties considered together.

 

We note that in examining the [Report of the Korean Authority], the Panel did not do anything out of the ordinary. The European Communities’ claim was that Korea had disregarded certain requirements of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards in its actions preceding and accompanying the adoption of its safeguard measure. The [Report of the Korean Authority] was issued by the Korean authorities which, inter alia, investigated and evaluated the assertions of serious injury to the domestic industry involved. Thus, that Report was clearly relevant to the task of the Panel to determine the facts, and the Panel was within its discretionary authority in deciding whether or not, or to what extent, it should rely upon the Report in ascertaining the facts relating to Korea’s injury determination.”(894)

550.     Likewise, in US — Shrimp (Thailand) I US — Customs Bond Directive, the Appellate Body found that the Panel had not erred by taking into account certain laws and regulations cited by the complainants in the course of finding that the challenged measure was justified under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994:

“Before the Panel, all of the parties — India, Thailand, and the United States — referred to laws and regulations with which they considered the EBR was designed to secure compliance. Whilst the United States cited Section 1673e(a)(1) of the Tariff Act, governing the assessment of anti-dumping duties, as well as, more generally, Section 113.13(c) of the United States Regulations, Thailand and India argued that the provisions cited by the United States do not exclusively govern the obligation to require payment of duties owed to the United States Treasury; rather, Thailand and India referred to additional provisions which they alleged constitute the laws and regulations governing the collection of anti-dumping duties.403 The Panel took all of these laws and regulations cited by the parties into account and, on this basis, decided that the relevant laws and regulations for considering the United States’ defence is Section 1673e(a)(1) of the Tariff Act in combination with Sections 1673e(b)(1) and 1673 of the Tariff Act and Sections 351.212(b)(1)and 351.211(c)(1) of the United States Regulations.”(895)

 

No need to state explicitly that a prima facie case has been made.

551.     In Thailand — H-Beams, the Appellate Body stated that “a panel is not required to make a separate and specific finding, in each and every instance, that a party has met its burden of proof in respect of a particular claim, or that a party has rebutted a prima facie case. Thus, the Panel did not err to the extent that it made no specific findings on whether Poland had met its burden of proof”(896)

552.     In Korea — Dairy, Korea argued in its appeal that a panel must evaluate and make a finding on whether the complaining Member has established a prima facie case of a violation before requiring the respondent to submit evidence of its own case or defence. The Appellate Body stated:

“We find no provision in the DSU or in the Agreement on Safeguards that requires a panel to make an explicit ruling on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case of violation before a panel may proceed to examine the respondent’s defence and evidence.”(897)

 

No need to state expressly which party carries burden of proof

553.     In India — Quantitative Restrictions, the Appellate Body stated that “we do not consider that a panel is required to state expressly which party bears the burden of proof in respect of every claim made”.(898)

Establishing a prima facie case as an unavoidable step

554.     In EC — Hormones, the Appellate Body ruled that the Panel erred in law when it absolved the complaining parties from the necessity of establishing a prima facie case and shifted the burden of proof to the responding party:

“In accordance with our ruling in United States — Shirts and Blouses, the Panel should have begun the analysis of each legal provision by examining whether the United States and Canada had presented evidence and legal arguments sufficient to demonstrate that the EC measures were inconsistent with the obligations assumed by the European Communities under each Article of the SPS Agreement addressed by the Panel … Only after such a prima facie determination had been made by the Panel may the onus be shifted to the European Communities to bring forward evidence and arguments to disprove the complaining party’s claim.(899)

 

Standard of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings

555.     In US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), the Appellate Body articulated a “more likely than not” standard in the context of analysing the issue before it:

“The Panel’s finding on the structure, design, and operation, in the light of the two plausible outcomes with similar probabilities that emerge from the quantitative evidence, provides a sufficient evidentiary basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the revised GSM 102 programme operates at a loss. Therefore, we consider that Brazil has succeeded in establishing that the revised GSM 102 programme is provided at premiums that are inadequate to cover its long-term operating costs and losses.”(900)

Panel making a case for a party

556.     In Japan — Agricultural Products II, the Appellate Body held that while a panel had a broad and “comprehensive authority” to engage in fact-finding under Article 13 of the DSU, it could not use this authority so as to effectively relieve the complaining party of making a prima facie case of inconsistency:

Article 13 of the DSU allows a panel to seek information from any relevant source and to consult individual experts or expert bodies to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter before it. In our Report in United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (‘United States — Shrimp’), we noted the ‘comprehensive nature’ of this authority, and stated that this authority is ‘indispensably necessary’ to enable a panel to discharge its duty imposed by Article 11 of the DSU to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements …’

 

Furthermore, we note that the present dispute is a dispute under the SPS Agreement. Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement explicitly instructs panels in disputes under this Agreement involving scientific and technical issues to ‘seek advice from experts’.

 

Article 13 of the DSU and Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement suggest that panels have a significant investigative authority. However, this authority cannot be used by a panel to rule in favour of a complaining party which has not established a prima facie case of inconsistency based on specific legal claims asserted by it. A panel is entitled to seek information and advice from experts and from any other relevant source it chooses, pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU and, in an SPS case, Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement, to help it to understand and evaluate the evidence submitted and the arguments made by the parties, but not to make the case for a complaining party.

 

In the present case, the Panel was correct to seek information and advice from experts to help it to understand and evaluate the evidence submitted and the arguments made by the United States and Japan with regard to the alleged violation of Article 5.6. The Panel erred, however, when it used that expert information and advice as the basis for a finding of inconsistency with Article 5.6, since the United States did not establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 5.6 based on claims relating to the ‘determination of sorption levels’. The United States did not even argue that the ‘determination of sorption levels’ is an alternative measure which meets the three elements under Article 5.6.”(901)

557.     In US — Shrimp (Thailand) I US — Customs Bond Directive, the Appellate Body recalled that, as established by the WTO jurisprudence, “a panel cannot make a prima facie case for a party who bears that burden”.(902) However, the Appellate Body concluded that:

“[T]he Panel was free to use the arguments made and provisions cited by all the parties — including Thailand and India — in order to assess objectively which laws and regulations were relevant to the United States’ defence. We do not believe that, in doing so, the Panel exceeded its jurisdiction.”(903)

Drawing adverse inferences

Panels routinely draw inferences from the facts and evidence

558.     In Turkey — Textiles, the Panel said the following in respect of “inferences”:

“For international disputes it seems normal that tribunals, in evaluating claims, are given considerable flexibility. Inference (or judicial presumption) is a useful means at the disposal of international tribunals for evaluating claims. In situations where direct evidence is not available, relying on inferences drawn from relevant facts of each case facilitates the duty of international tribunals in determining whether or not the burden of proof has been met. It would therefore appear to be the prerogative of an international tribunal, in each given case, to determine whether applicable and unrebutted inferences are sufficient for satisfying the burden of proof. In this respect, the International Court of Justice, in some cases, found it difficult to assert stringent rules of evidence.(904)

559.     In Canada — Aircraft, the Appellate Body confirmed panels may draw inferences from facts placed on the record, and routinely do so:

“The DSU does not purport to state in what detailed circumstances inferences, adverse or otherwise, may be drawn by panels from infinitely varying combinations of facts. Yet, in all cases, in carrying out their mandate and seeking to achieve the “objective assessment of the facts” required by Article 11 of the DSU, panels routinely draw inferences from the facts placed on the record. The inferences drawn may be inferences of fact: that is, from fact A and fact B, it is reasonable to infer the existence of fact C. Or the inferences derived may be inferences of law: for example, the ensemble of facts found to exist warrants the characterization of a “subsidy” or a “subsidy contingent … in fact … upon export performance”. The facts must, of course, rationally support the inferences made, but inferences may be drawn whether or not the facts already on the record deserve the qualification of a prima facie case. The drawing of inferences is, in other words, an inherent and unavoidable aspect of a panel’s basic task of finding and characterizing the facts making up a dispute.”(905)

560.     The Panel in US — Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) quoted this passage from the Appellate Body in Canada — Aircraft, in the context of inferring the effect of certain subsidies on the pricing of LCA:

“The Panel considers that in these circumstances, it is necessary and appropriate to deduce the effects of the FSC/ETI subsidies and the B&O tax subsidies on Airbus’ sales and prices over the 2004 — 2006 period, based on commonsense reasoning and the drawing of inferences from conclusions regarding the nature of these subsides as subsidies that increase the profitability of LCA sales in a way that enables Boeing to price its LCA at a level that would not otherwise be commercially justified, the duration of the FSC/ETI subsidies, as well as from what we understand of the nature of competition between Airbus and Boeing, particularly the price-sensitive nature of certain significant LCA sales campaigns and the pricing advantage afforded to incumbent suppliers through the phenomenon of buyer switching costs. We consider this approach to be consistent with our obligation under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the facts. In this regard, we note that the Appellate Body, in Canada —Aircraft, indicated that drawing inferences from facts on the record is a routine and inherent aspect of a panel’s discharging its obligation under Article 11 of the DSU: …

 

The other option potentially open to us is to decline to make a serious prejudice finding because of the difficulty of calculating with mathematical certitude the precise degree to which Boeing’s pricing of the 737NG and 777 families of aircraft was affected by the FSC/ETI subsidies and B&O tax subsidies. In our view, such an approach would be inconsistent with our obligations under Article 11 of the DSU, as well as contrary to considerations of basic commonsense and reason.”(906)

The concept of “adverse inferences”

561. In Canada — Aircraft, the Appellate Body addressed the issue whether panels have the authority to draw adverse inferences from a party’s refusal to provide information. In this dispute, Canada refused to provide Brazil, during consultations, with information on the financing activities of a particular agency, such information being subsequently also requested by the Panel. On appeal, Brazil submitted that the Panel erred by not drawing the inference that the information withheld by Canada was adverse to Canada and supportive of Brazil’s claim that the agency’s debt financing was a prohibited export subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body held that it is within the discretion of panels to draw adverse inferences and that in this particular case the Panel, in deciding not to draw adverse inferences, had not abused this discretion inconsistently with the provisions of the DSU:

“There is no logical reason why the Members of the WTO would, in conceiving and concluding the SCM Agreement, have granted panels the authority to draw inferences in cases involving actionable subsidies that may be illegal if they have certain trade effects, but not in cases that involve prohibited export subsidies for which the adverse effects are presumed. To the contrary, the appropriate inference is that the authority to draw adverse inferences from a Member’s refusal to provide information belongs a fortiori also to panels examining claims of prohibited export subsidies. Indeed, that authority seems to us an ordinary aspect of the task of all panels to determine the relevant facts of any dispute involving any covered agreement: a view supported by the general practice and usage of international tribunals.

 

Clearly, in our view, the Panel had the legal authority and the discretion to draw inferences from the facts before it-including the fact that Canada had refused to provide information sought by the Panel.

 

 

Yet, we do not believe that the record provides a sufficient basis for us to hold that the Panel erred in law, or abused its discretionary authority, in concluding that Brazil had not done enough to compel the Panel to make the inferences requested by Brazil. For this reason, we let the Panel’s finding of not proven remain, and we decline Brazil’s appeal on this issue.”(907)

562. In US — Wheat Gluten, the European Communities argued that the Panel had failed to draw the necessary adverse inferences from the United States’ refusal to submit requested information; the European Communities claimed that this was an error of law and that the Panel consequently had violated Article 11 of the DSU. The Appellate Body rejected this ground of the appeal. In its analysis, it stated that:

“We … characterized the drawing of inferences as a ‘discretionary’ task falling within a panel’s duties under Article 11 of the DSU. In Canada — Aircraft, which involved a similar factual situation, the panel did not draw any inferences ‘adverse’ to Canada’s position. On appeal, we held that there was no basis to find that the panel had improperly exercised its discretion since ‘the full ensemble of the facts on the record’ supported the panel’s conclusion.(908)

 

In its appeal, the European Communities places considerable emphasis on the failure of the Panel to draw ‘adverse’ inferences from the refusal of the United States to provide information requested by the Panel. As we emphasized in Canada — Aircraft, under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel must draw inferences on the basis of all of the facts of record relevant to the particular determination to be made.(909) Where a party refuses to provide information requested by a panel under Article 13.1 of the DSU, that refusal will be one of the relevant facts of record, and indeed an important fact, to be taken into account in determining the appropriate inference to be drawn. However, if a panel were to ignore or disregard other relevant facts, it would fail to make an ‘objective assessment’ under Article 11 of the DSU. In this case, as the Panel observed, there were other facts of record that the Panel was required to include in its ‘objective assessment’. Accordingly, we reject the European Communities’ arguments to the extent that they suggest that the Panel erred in not drawing ‘adverse’ inferences simply from the refusal of the United States to provide certain information requested from it by the Panel under Article 13.1 of the DSU.

 

In reviewing the inferences the Panel drew from the facts of record, our task on appeal is not to redo afresh the Panel’s assessment of those facts, and decide for ourselves what inferences we would draw from them. Rather, we must determine whether the Panel improperly exercised its discretion, under Article 11, by failing to draw certain inferences from the facts before it. In asking us to conduct such a review, an appellant must indicate clearly the manner in which a panel has improperly exercised its discretion. Taking into account the full ensemble of the facts, the appellant should, at least: identify the facts on the record from which the Panel should have drawn inferences; indicate the factual or legal inferences that the panel should have drawn from those facts; and, finally, explain why the failure of the panel to exercise its discretion by drawing these inferences amounts to an error of law under Article 11 of the DSU.

 

In this appeal, the European Communities makes, what we regard to be, broad and general statements that the Panel erred by not drawing ‘adverse’ inferences from the facts. Besides the fact that the United States refused to provide certain information requested by the Panel under Article 13.1 of the DSU, the European Communities does not identify, in any specific manner, which facts supported a particular inference. Nor does the European Communities identify what inferences the Panel should have drawn from those facts, other than that the inferences should have been favourable to the European Communities. Besides the simple refusal of the United States to provide information requested by the Panel, which we have already addressed, the European Communities does not offer any other specific reasons why the Panel’s failure to exercise its discretion by drawing the inferences identified by the European Communities amounts to an error of law under Article 11 of the DSU. Therefore, we decline this ground of appeal.”(910)

 

Drawing adverse inferences vs. operation of normal rules on burden of proof

563.     In US — Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), the European Communities requested the Panel to draw adverse inferences on a number of issues (relating to the amounts of the alleged subsidies) in the light of alleged non-cooperation by the United States in disclosing certain information regarding the amounts of some alleged subsidies. The Panel suggested that effectively the same result would be reached through the operation of the normal rules on burden of proof:

“For each of the challenged measures, the European Communities has presented the Panel with evidence and arguments in support of its estimate of the amount of the subsidy allegedly provided to Boeing. Where the United States disputes the European Communities’ estimate of the amount of an alleged subsidy, it has provided the Panel with its own evidence and/or arguments to support its own, generally lower, estimate. If the Panel were to consider the evidence and/or arguments advanced by the United States to be insufficient to rebut the evidence and arguments presented by the European Communities, then the Panel would accept the European Communities’ estimate. In such a situation, the Panel would accept the European Communities’ estimate not by virtue of United States “non-cooperation”, and not as a matter of drawing “adverse inferences”, but simply by virtue of the operation of the normal principles regarding the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Likewise, if the Panel were to consider the evidence and/or arguments advanced by the United States to be sufficient to rebut the evidence and arguments presented by the European Communities, then the Panel would accept the United States’ estimate not by virtue of United States “cooperation”, but simply by virtue of the operation of the normal principles regarding the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.”(911)

Impossible burden of proof

General

564.     In US — Line Pipe, the Appellate Body criticized the Panel for imposing an “impossible burden” of proof on Korea in respect of a particular issue in dispute:

“In our view, Korea has demonstrated that the USITC considered imports from all sources in its investigation. Korea has also shown that exports from Canada and Mexico were excluded from the safeguard measure at issue. And, in our view, this is enough to have made a prima facie case of the absence of parallelism in the line pipe measure. Contrary to what the Panel stated, we do not consider that it was necessary for Korea to address the information set out in the USITC Report, or in particular, in footnote 168 in order to establish a prima facie case of violation of parallelism. Moreover, to require Korea to rebut the information in the USITC Report, and in particular, in footnote 168, would impose an impossible burden on Korea because, as the exporting country, Korea would not have had any of the relevant data to conduct its own analysis of the imports.”(912)

565.     In US — Gambling, the Appellate Body confirmed that the general exceptions in the GATT 1994 and GATS cannot be interpreted as imposing an impossible burden of proof on the party invoking the exception:

“[T]he responding party must show that its measure is ‘necessary’ to achieve objectives relating to public morals or public order. In our view, however, it is not the responding party’s burden to show, in the first instance, that there are no reasonably available alternatives to achieve its objectives. In particular, a responding party need not identify the universe of less trade-restrictive alternative measures and then show that none of those measures achieves the desired objective. The WTO agreements do not contemplate such an impracticable and, indeed, often impossible burden.”(913)

 

Impossibility of proving a negative

566.     In Japan — Agricultural Products II, the United States appealed the Panel’s finding under Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, arguing that under the Panel’s interpretation of the burden of proof, complaining parties would have the impossible task of proving a negative, i.e. that there is no scientific evidence which supports a measure. The Appellate Body suggested that requiring a complaining party to prove a negative would be an “erroneous burden of proof, but disagreed that the Panel had done so in that case:

“[W]e disagree with the United States that the Panel imposed on the United States an impossible and, therefore, erroneous burden of proof by requiring it to prove a negative, namely, that there are no relevant studies and reports which support Japan’s varietal testing requirement. In our view, it would have been sufficient for the United States to raise a presumption that there are no relevant studies or reports. Raising a presumption that there are no relevant studies or reports is not an impossible burden. The United States could have requested Japan, pursuant to Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement, to provide “an explanation of the reasons” for its varietal testing requirement, in particular, as it applies to apricots, pears, plums and quince. Japan would, in that case, be obliged to provide such explanation. The failure of Japan to bring forward scientific studies or reports in support of its varietal testing requirement as it applies to apricots, pears, plums and quince, would have been a strong indication that there are no such studies or reports. The United States could also have asked the Panel’s experts specific questions as to the existence of relevant scientific studies or reports or it could have submitted to the Panel the opinion of experts consulted by it on this issue. The United States, however, did not submit any evidence relating to apricots, pears, plums and quince.”(914)

567.     In Guatemala — Cement II, the Panel noted the impossibility of proving a negative:

“In principle, Mexico bears the burden to prove that the Ministry failed to inform it of the inclusion of nongovernmental experts in the Ministry’s verification team. As a practical matter, this burden is impossible for Mexico to meet: one simply cannot prove that one was not informed of something. Although Mexico cannot establish definitively that it was not informed by the Ministry of the Ministry’s intention to include non-governmental experts in its verification team, there is sufficient evidence before us to suggest strongly that it was not so informed. Although an investigating authority should normally be able to demonstrate that it complied with a formal requirement to inform the authorities of another Member, Guatemala has failed to rebut the strong suggestion that it failed to do so. In fact, Guatemala has simply referred to the very letter which suggests strongly that Mexico was not notified by Guatemala. In these circumstances, we do not consider that the evidence and arguments of the parties “remain in equipoise”. Accordingly, we find that the Ministry violated paragraph 2 of Annex I of the AD Agreement by failing to inform the Government of Mexico of the inclusion of non-governmental experts in the Ministry’s verification team.”(915)

568.     In Canada — Pharmaceutical Patents, the Panel recognized that one of the conditions for justification under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement would involve proving a negative:

“The third condition of Article 30 is the requirement that the proposed exception must not “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties”. Although Canada, as the party asserting the exception provided for in Article 30, bears the burden of proving compliance with the conditions of that exception, the order of proof is complicated by the fact that the condition involves proving a negative. One cannot demonstrate that no legitimate interest of the patent owner has been prejudiced until one knows what claims of legitimate interest can be made. Likewise, the weight of legitimate third party interests cannot be fully appraised until the legitimacy and weight of the patent owner’s legitimate interests, if any, are defined. Accordingly, without disturbing the ultimate burden of proof, the Panel chose to analyse the issues presented by the third condition of Article 30 according to the logical sequence in which those issues became defined.”(916)

569.     In US — Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 — Canada), the Appellate Body found that the Panel was too deferential in its standard of review of an investigating authority’s analysis of injury under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Appellate Body criticized the Panel because, among other things, its “approach also imposes on complaining parties an unduly high burden of proving a negative; of proving that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could not have reached the particular conclusion”.(917)

Burden of proof and difficulty in collecting information

570.     In Argentina — Hides and Leather, the Panel stated that “[i]t may be the case that it will be difficult for one Member to prove that there is a cartel operating within the jurisdiction of another Member. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the need for sufficient proof of a party’s allegations simply because obtaining such proof is difficult.”(918)

571.     In EC — Sardines, the Appellate Body found that there is nothing in the WTO dispute settlement system to support the notion that the allocation of the burden of proof should be decided on the basis of a comparison between the respective difficulties that might possibly be encountered by the complainant and the respondent in collecting information to prove a case:

“The degree of difficulty in substantiating a claim or a defence may vary according to the facts of the case and the provision at issue. For example, on the one hand, it may be relatively straightforward for a complainant to show that a particular measure has a text that establishes an explicit and formal discrimination between like products and is, therefore, inconsistent with the national treatment obligation in Article III of the GATT 1994. On the other hand, it may be more difficult for a complainant to substantiate a claim of a violation of Article III of the GATT 1994 if the discrimination does not flow from the letter of the legal text of the measure, but rather is a result of the administrative practice of the domestic authorities of the respondent in applying that measure. But, in both of those situations, the complainant must prove its claim. There is nothing in the WTO dispute settlement system to support the notion that the allocation of the burden of proof should be decided on the basis of a comparison between the respective difficulties that may possibly be encountered by the complainant and the respondent in collecting information to prove a case.”(919)

572.     However, in US/Canada — Continued Suspension, the Appellate Body took into account, as one consideration, which party may be expected to be in a position to prove a particular issue:

“The allocation of the burden of proof in the context of claims arising under Article 22.8 is a function of the following considerations. First, what is the nature of the cause of action that is framed under Article 22.8. Second, the practical question as to which party may be expected to be in a position to prove a particular issue. Third, consideration must be given to the requirements of procedural fairness.”(920)

Necessary collaboration of the parties

573.     In Argentina — Textiles and Apparel, the Panel made the following statement regarding burden of proof and the requirement of collaboration of the parties in presenting facts and evidence to the panel:

“Another incidental rule to the burden of proof is the requirement for collaboration of the parties in the presentation of the facts and evidence to the panel and especially the role of the respondent in that process. It is often said that the idea of peaceful settlement of disputes before international tribunals is largely based on the premise of co-operation of the litigating parties. In this context the most important result of the rule of collaboration appears to be that the adversary is obligated to provide the tribunal with relevant documents which are in its sole possession. This obligation does not arise until the claimant has done its best to secure evidence and has actually produced some prima facie evidence in support of its case. It should be stressed, however, that “discovery’ of documents, in its common-law system sense, is not available in international procedures’.”

 

… Before an international tribunal, parties do have a duty to collaborate in doing their best to submit to the adjudicatory body all the evidence in their possession.”(921)

(ii) Application of the burden of proof in particular contexts

Burden of proof with respect to questions of WTO law

574.     In EC — Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body clarified that the burden of proof does not apply to questions of law or legal interpretation:

“Consistent with the principle of jura novit curia, it is not the responsibility of the European Communities to provide us with the legal interpretation to be given to a particular provision in the Enabling Clause; instead, the burden of the European Communities is to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate its assertion that the Drug Arrangements comply with the requirements of the Enabling Clause.”(922)

575.     In a footnote to this passage, the Appellate Body quoted the International Court of Justice’s interpretation of jura novit curia, namely:

“It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain and apply the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the burden of establishing or proving rules of international law cannot be imposed upon any of the parties, for the law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court.”(923)

576.     The Appellate Body’s reasoning in EC — Tariff Preferences was referred to by the Panel in EC — Export Subsidies on Sugar, which stated that:

“In the Panel’s view, what constitutes a Member’s “reduction commitment level” for the purpose of Article 10.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture or the “ reduction commitment within the meaning of Article 9 or the “commitment levels” within the meaning of Article 3.3 or the “commitment as specified in a Member’s schedule” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture is an issue of legal interpretation, for which there is no burden of proof as such.”(924)

577.     The Panel in US — Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 — Japan) referred to this prior jurisprudence and stated that “[w]e agree that there is no burden of proof for issues of legal interpretation of provisions of the covered agreements”.(925)

Burden of proof with respect to the meaning of domestic law

578.     In US — Carbon Steel, the Appellate Body explained that:

“The party asserting that another party’s municipal law, as such, is inconsistent with relevant treaty obligations bears the burden of introducing evidence as to the scope and meaning of such law to substantiate that assertion. Such evidence will typically be produced in the form of the text of the relevant legislation or legal instruments, which may be supported, as appropriate, by evidence of the consistent application of such laws, the pronouncements of domestic courts on the meaning of such laws, the opinions of legal experts and the writings of recognized scholars. The nature and extent of the evidence required to satisfy the burden of proof will vary from case to case.”(926)

Burden of proof in Article 21.3(c) arbitrations

579.     In EC — Bananas III (Article 21.3(c)), the Arbitrator implicitly found that it was up to the complaining parties to persuade him “that there are ‘particular circumstances’ in this case to justify a shorter period of time than stipulated by the guideline in Article 21.3(c) of the DSU [15 months].” In the case at issue, the Arbitrator found that he had not been so persuaded by the complaining parties:

“When the ‘reasonable period of time’ is determined through binding arbitration, as provided for under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, this provision states that a ‘guideline’ for the arbitrator should be that the ‘reasonable period of time’ should not exceed 15 months from the date of the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report. Article 21.3(c) of the DSU also provides, however, that the ‘reasonable period of time’ may be shorter or longer than 15 months, depending upon the ‘particular circumstances’.

 

The Complaining Parties have not persuaded me that there are ‘particular circumstances’ in this case to justify a shorter period of time than stipulated by the guideline in Article 21.3(c) of the DSU. At the same time, the complexity of the implementation process, demonstrated by the European Communities, would suggest adherence to the guideline, with a slight modification, so that the ‘reasonable period’ of time for implementation would expire by 1 January 1999. “(927)

580.     In EC — Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), the Arbitrator held that the burden of proof concerning the existence of particular circumstances falls on any party arguing for a period longer or shorter than 15 months:

“In my view, the party seeking to prove that there are ‘particular circumstances’ justifying a shorter or a longer time has the burden of proof under Article 21.3(c). In this arbitration, therefore, the onus is on the European Communities to demonstrate that there are particular circumstances which call for a reasonable period of time of 39 months, and it is likewise up to the United States and Canada to demonstrate that there are particular circumstances which lead to the conclusion that 10 months is reasonable.”(928)

581.     The Arbitrator in Colombia — Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)) placed the burden of proof “on the implementing Member to demonstrate that, if immediate compliance is impracticable, the period of time it proposes constitutes a ‘reasonable period of time’. However, this do not absolve the other Member from producing evidence in support of its contention that the period of time requested by the implementing Member is not ‘reasonable’. and a shorter period of time for implementation is warranted.”(929)

Burden of proof in Article 21.5 compliance panel proceedings

582.     In Chile — Price Band System (Article 21.5 — Argentina), the Appellate Body confirmed that the general rules on burden of proof are applicable in Article 21.5 proceedings:

“Neither Chile nor Argentina suggests that the general rules on burden of proof, which imply that a responding party’s measure will be treated as WTO-consistent unless proven otherwise, do not apply in proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU. We observe, in this regard, that Article 21.5 proceedings do not occur in isolation from the original proceedings, but that both proceedings form part of a continuum of events. The text of Article 21.5 expressly links the “measures taken to comply” with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB concerning the original measure. A panel’s examination of a measure taken to comply cannot, therefore, be undertaken in abstraction from the findings by the original panel and the Appellate Body adopted by the DSB. Such findings identify the WTO-inconsistency with respect to the original measure, and a panel’s examination of a measure taken to comply must be conducted with due cognizance of this background. Thus, the adopted findings from the original proceedings may well figure prominently in proceedings under Article 21.5, especially where the measure taken to comply is alleged to be inconsistent with WTO law in ways similar to the original measure. In our view, these considerations may influence the way in which the complaining party presents its case, and they may also be relevant to the manner in which an Article 21.5 panel determines whether that party has discharged its burden of proof and established a prima fade case.”(930)

Burden of proof in Article 22.6 arbitrations

General

583.     In EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6- EC) and in EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 — EC), the Arbitrators addressed the issue of the burden of proof and concluded that, as the European Communities was challenging the conformity of the United States’ proposal with the Article 22.4, it was for the European Communities to prove that the United States’ proposal was inconsistent with Article 22.4:

“WTO Members, as sovereign entities, can be presumed to act in conformity with their WTO obligations. A party claiming that a Member has acted inconsistently with WTO rules bears the burden of proving that inconsistency. The act at issue here is the US proposal to suspend concessions. The WTO rule in question is Article 22.4 prescribing that the level of suspension be equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment. The EC challenges the conformity of the US proposal with the said WTO rule. It is thus for the EC to prove that the US proposal is inconsistent with Article 22.4. Following well-established WTO jurisprudence, this means that it is for the EC to submit arguments and evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case or presumption that the level of suspension proposed by the US is not equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment caused by the EC hormone ban. Once the EC has done so, however, it is for the US to submit arguments and evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption. Should all arguments and evidence remain in equipoise, the EC, as the party bearing the original burden of proof, would lose.

 

The same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged; in this case, for example, where a party relies on a decrease of beef consumption in the EC or the use of edible beef offal as pet food. It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence.

 

The duty that rests on all parties to produce evidence and to collaborate in presenting evidence to the arbitrators — an issue to be distinguished from the question of who bears the burden of proof — is crucial in Article 22 arbitration proceedings. The EC is required to submit evidence showing that the proposal is not equivalent. However, at the same time and as soon as it can, the US is required to come forward with evidence explaining how it arrived at its proposal and showing why its proposal is equivalent to the trade impairment it has suffered. Some of the evidence — such as data on trade with third countries, export capabilities and affected exporters —may, indeed, be in the sole possession of the US, being the party that suffered the trade impairment.”(931)

584.     In US — 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 — US), the Arbitrators, after referring to the above quote from EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC) and in EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 — EC), confirmed their agreement that that quote was an accurate presentation of the burden of proof applicable in Article 22.6 proceedings. The Arbitrators clarified that “the fact that this case relates to the suspension of “obligations”, as opposed to the suspension of tariff concessions, in no way alters the applicable burden of proof.”(932)

Burden of proof in subsidy arbitrations under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement

585.     In Brazil — Aircraft (Article 22.6 — Brazil), the Arbitrators considered that the general principles of the burden of proof also apply to arbitrations under under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement:

“In application of the well-established WTO practice on the burden of proof in dispute resolution, it is for the Member claiming that another has acted inconsistently with the WTO rules to prove that inconsistency.(933) … . Brazil challenges the conformity of this proposal [from Canada] with Article 22 of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement. It is therefore up to Brazil to submit evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case or ‘presumption’ that the countermeasures that Canada proposes to take are not ‘appropriate’. Once Brazil has done so, it is for Canada to submit evidence sufficient to rebut that ‘presumption’. Should the evidence remain in equipoise on a particular claim, the Arbitrators would conclude that the claim has not been established. Should all evidence remain in equipoise, Brazil, as the party bearing the original burden of proof, would lose the case.”(934)

586.     In Canada — Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 — Canada), the Arbitrator summarized the burden of proof rules applicable in the case of arbitration proceedings under under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement as follows:

“We recall that the general principles applicable to burden of proof, as stated by the Appellate Body, require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement by another Member must assert and prove its claim.(935) We find these principles to be also of relevance to arbitration proceedings under under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement.(936) In this procedure, we thus agree that it is for Canada, which has challenged the consistency of Brazil’s proposed level of counter-measures under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, to bear the burden of proving that the proposed amount is not consistent with that provision. It is therefore up to Canada to submit evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case or ‘presumption’ that the countermeasures that Brazil proposes taking are not ‘appropriate’. Once Canada has done so, it is for Brazil to submit evidence sufficient to rebut that ‘presumption’. Should the evidence remain in equipoise on a particular claim, the Arbitrator would conclude that the claim has not been established.

 

We note, however, that it is generally for each party asserting a fact, whether complainant or respondent, to provide proof thereof.(937) In this respect, therefore, it is also for Brazil to provide evidence for the facts which it asserts.

 

Finally, both parties have claimed that, in respect of certain issues, the other party is in sole possession of the information necessary to establish the appropriateness of the proposed level of suspension of concessions or other obligations. In this regard, we recall that both parties generally have a duty to cooperate in these arbitral proceedings in order to assist us in fulfilling our mandate, through the provision of relevant information.(938) This is why, even though Canada bears the original burden of proof, we also requested Brazil to submit a ‘methodology paper’ describing how it arrived at the level of countermeasures it proposes.(939) Later, we asked it to come forward with evidence supporting various factual assertions made in its ‘methodology paper.”(940)

(b) Standard of review

(i) Standard of review applied by panels when reviewing factual findings of national authorities under particular agreements

Agreement on Safeguards

587.     See Article 14 of the Chapter on the Agreement on Safeguards.

Transitional safeguard measure under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing

588.     See Article 8.3 of the Chapter on the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.

SCM Agreement

589.     See Article 30 of the Chapter on the SCM Agreement.

Anti-Dumping Agreement

590.     See Article 17.6 of the Chapter on the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

591.     SPS Agreement

592.     See Articles 2.2, 5, 5.5, 5.7, and Annex A(4) of the Chapter on the SPS Agreement.

Customs Valuation Agreement

593.     See Section I of the Chapter on the Customs Valuation Agreement.

(ii) Standard of review applied by the Appellate Body when reviewing a WTO panel’s factual findings

General

594.     As regards the standard of review applied by the Appellate Body when reviewing a WTO panel’s factual findings, the Appellate Body summarized some of its prior pronouncements in EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft:

“The Appellate Body has repeatedly emphasized that Article 11 of the DSU requires a panel to “consider all the evidence presented to it, assess its credibility, determine its weight, and ensure that its factual findings have a proper basis in that evidence.”(941) Within these parameters, “it is generally within the discretion of the Panel to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in making findings”,(942) and panels “are not required to accord to factual evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as do the parties”.(943) In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that it will not “interfere lightly” with a panel’s fact-finding authority,(944) and has also emphasized that it “cannot base a finding of inconsistency under Article 11 simply on the conclusion that {it} might have reached a different factual finding from the one the panel reached”.(945) Instead, for a claim under Article 11 to succeed, the Appellate Body must be satisfied that the panel has exceeded its authority as the trier of facts.(946) As an initial trier of facts, a panel must provide “reasoned and adequate explanations and coherent reasoning”.(947) It has to base its findings on a sufficient evidentiary basis on the record,(948) may not apply a double standard of proof,(949) and a panel’s treatment of the evidence must not “lack even-handedness”.”(950),(951)

Distinction between an error in application of law versus a failure to make an objective assessment

595.     In EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate Body discussed the distinction between an error in application of law versus a failure to make an objective assessment:

“[A] failure to make a claim under Article 11 of the DSU on an issue that the Appellate Body determines to concern a factual assessment may have serious consequences for the appellant. An appellant may thus feel safer putting forward both a claim that the Panel erred in the application of a legal provision and a claim that the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the facts under Article 11 of the DSU. In most cases, however, an issue will either be one of application of the law to the facts or an issue of the objective assessment of facts, and not both.”(952)

Errors not rising to the level of a violation of Article 11

596.     In US — Steel Safeguards, the Appellate Body concluded that “not every error of law or incorrect legal interpretation attributed to a panel constitutes a failure on the part of the panel to make an objective assessment of the matter before it.”(953)

597.     In this regard, in EC and certain member States —Large Civil Aircraft the Appellate Body identified two elements to a claim of violation of Article 11:

“[N]ot every error in the appreciation of a particular piece of evidence will rise to the level of a failure by the Panel to comply with its duties under Article 11 of the DSU. In order for us to reverse the Panel’s finding in respect of the A380 on the basis of Article 11 of the DSU, we would have to be satisfied that the Panel’s errors, taken together or singly, undermine the objectivity of the Panel’s assessment of whether Airbus would have been able to launch the A380 in 2000 without LA/MSF. Thus, the question before us is whether the Panel did commit the errors alleged by the European Union and, if so, whether they demonstrate that the Panel’s conclusion that LA/MSF was a “necessary precondition” for the launch of the A380 in 2000, no longer had a sufficient evidentiary and objective basis.”(954)

Duty to examine all evidence

598.     In the first appeal presenting an Article 11 challenge to a Panel’s fact-finding,(955) EC — Hormones, the Appellate Body stressed that “[t]he duty to make an objective assessment of the facts is, among other things, an obligation to consider the evidence presented to a panel and to make factual findings on the basis of that evidence. The deliberate disregard of, or refusal to consider, the evidence submitted to a panel is incompatible with a panel’s duty to make an objective assessment of the facts.” The Appellate Body further considered that “ [t]he wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence put before a panel is similarly inconsistent with an objective assessment of the facts”.(956)

599.     In Korea — Dairy, Korea argued in its appeal that the Panel should have looked solely at the evidence submitted by the European Communities as the complaining party to determine whether the European Communities had met its burden of proof of making a prima facie case. The Appellate Body disagreed and stated that “under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel is charged with the mandate to determine the facts of the case and to arrive at factual findings. In carrying out this mandate, a panel has the duty to examine and consider all the evidence before it, not just the evidence submitted by one or the other party, and to evaluate the relevance and probative force of each piece thereof.”(957) With respect to the burden of proof issue in this context, see also paragraph 556 above.

600.     In Japan — DRAMs (Korea), the Appellate Body found that the Panel had not conducted an objective assessment of the matter before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, because it had failed to examine whether the Japanese authority (JIA)’s evidence in its totality supported the JIA’s finding of entrustment or direction.(958)

Panels’ discretion as trier and weigher of the facts

601.     In EC — Hormones, the Appellate Body stressed the role of the Panel as the trier of the facts and considered that the “[determination of the credibility and weight properly to be ascribed to (that is, the appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and parcel of the fact finding process and is, in principle, left to the discretion of a panel as the trier of facts.”(959) It further stated that “it is generally within the discretion of the Panel to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in making findings.”(960) It also said that “[t]he Panel cannot realistically refer to all statements made by the experts advising it and should be allowed a substantial margin of discretion as to which statements are useful to refer to explicitly.”(961)

602.     In Australia — Salmon, with respect to the evaluation of evidence, the Appellate Body considered that panels “are not required to accord to factual evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as do the parties”.(962)

603.     In Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body reiterated the role of panels as the trier of the facts with the corresponding discretion to examine and weigh the evidence. The Appellate Body however held that this discretion “is not, of course, unlimited” since it is always subject to the panel’s duty to render an objective assessment of the matter before it:(963)

“The Panel’s examination and weighing of the evidence submitted fall, in principle, within the scope of the Panel’s discretion as the trier of facts and, accordingly, outside the scope of appellate review. This is true, for instance, with respect to the Panel’s treatment of the Dodwell Study, the Sofres Report and the Nielsen Study. We cannot second-guess the Panel in appreciating either the evidentiary value of such studies or the consequences, if any, of alleged defects in those studies. Similarly, it is not for us to review the relative weight ascribed to evidence on such matters as marketing studies, methods of production, taste, colour, places of consumption, consumption with ‘meals’ or with ‘snacks’. and prices.

 

A panel’s discretion as trier of facts is not, of course, unlimited. That discretion is always subject to, and is circumscribed by, among other things, the panel’s duty to render an objective assessment of the matter before it. In European Communities — Hormones, we dealt with allegations that the panel had ‘disregarded’. ‘distorted’ and ‘misrepresented’ the evidence before it.”(964)

604.     The Panel in Australia — Automotive Leather II observed that any evidentiary rulings that the Panel makes must be consistent with its obligation under Article 11 to conduct “an objective assessment of the matter before it”. In the Panel’s view, “a decision to limit the facts and arguments that the United States may present during the course of this proceeding to those set forth in the request for consultations would make it difficult, if not impossible, for us to fulfil our obligation to conduct an ‘objective assessment’ of the matter before us.”(965)

605.     In US — Wheat Gluten, the Appellate Body again referred to the Panel as the trier of facts in respect of its discretion to consider the evidence in a given case and recalled its prior jurisprudence on the scope of the review that the Appellate Body can undertake of the Panel’s findings pursuant to Article 17.6 of the DSU:

“[W]e recall that, in previous appeals, we have emphasized that the role of the Appellate Body differs from the role of panels. Under Article 17.6 of the DSU, appeals are “limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel”, (emphasis added) By contrast, we have previously stated that, under Article 11 of the DSU, panels are:

 

… charged with the mandate to determine the facts of the case and to arrive at factual findings. In carrying out this mandate, a panel has the duty to examine and consider all the evidence before it, not just the evidence submitted by one or the other party, and to evaluate the relevance and probative force of each piece thereof. (966) (emphasis added)

 

We have also stated previously that, although the task of panels under Article 11 relates, in part, to its assessment of the facts, the question whether a panel has made an ‘objective assessment’ of the facts is a legal one, that may be the subject of an appeal.(967) (emphasis added) However, in view of the distinction between the respective roles of the Appellate Body and panels, we have taken care to emphasize that a panel’s appreciation of the evidence falls, in principle, ‘within the scope of the panel’s discretion as the trier of facts’(968) (emphasis added) … a panel’s appreciation of the evidence falls, in principle, ‘within the scope of the panel’s discretion as the trier of facts’(969) (emphasis added) In assessing the panel’s appreciation of the evidence, we cannot base a finding of inconsistency under Article 11 simply on the conclusion that we might have reached a different factual finding from the one the panel reached. Rather, we must be satisfied that the panel has exceeded the bounds of its discretion, as the trier of facts, in its appreciation of the evidence. As is clear from previous appeals, we will not interfere lightly with the panel’s exercise of its discretion.”(970),(971)

606.     In US — Carbon Steel, the Appellate Body summarized its previous jurisprudence on the extent of panels’ duty to examine the evidence:

“As we have observed previously, Article 11 requires panels to take account of the evidence put before them and forbids them to wilfully disregard or distort such evidence.(972) Nor may panels make affirmative findings that lack a basis in the evidence contained in the panel record.(973) Provided that panels’ actions remain within these parameters, however, we have said that ‘it is generally within the discretion of the Panel to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in making findings’.(974) and, on appeal, we ‘will not interfere lightly with a panel’s exercise of its discretion’.”(975),(976)

607.     In US — Carbon Steel, the Appellate Body further underlined that “although panels enjoy a discretion, pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU,(977) to seek information ‘from any relevant source’. Article 11 of the DSU imposes no obligation on panels to conduct their own fact-finding exercise, or to fill in gaps in the arguments made by parties.”(978)

608.     In EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), the Appellate Body ruled that it is not “an error, let alone an egregious error”, for a panel to decline to accord to the evidence the weight that one of the parties sought to have accorded to it.(979) In this regard, see paragraph 617 below. Specifically, India had argued that the Panel had not made an objective assessment of the facts of the case because the Panel had distorted the evidence by placing greater weight on the statements made by the European Communities than on those made by India. The Appellate Body stressed that “the weighing of the evidence is within the discretion of the Panel as the trier of facts, and there is no indication in this case that the Panel exceeded the bounds of this discretion.”(980)

609.     The Appellate Body in Japan — Apples considered that a panel was not obliged to give precedence to the importing Member’s approach to scientific evidence and risk over the views of the experts when analysing and assessing scientific evidence to determine whether a complainant established a prima facie case under Article 2.2.(981) As regards the examination of scientific evidence by panels in SPS disputes, see the Chapter on the SPS Agreement. In addition, the Appellate Body summarized its previous jurisprudence on the panels’ discretion as trier and weigher of the evidence:

“Since EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body has consistently emphasized that, within the bounds of their obligation under Article 11 to make an objective assessment of the facts of the case, panels enjoy a ‘margin of discretion’ as triers of fact.(982) Panels are thus ‘not required to accord to factual evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as do the parties’ (983) and may properly ‘determine that certain elements of evidence should be accorded more weight than other elements’. (984)

 

Consistent with this margin of discretion, the Appellate Body has recognized that ‘not every error in the appreciation of the evidence (although it may give rise to a question of law) may be characterized as a failure to make an objective assessment of the facts.’(985) When addressing claims under Article 11 of the DSU, the Appellate Body does not ‘second-guess the Panel in appreciating either the evidentiary value of … studies or the consequences, if any, of alleged defects in [the evidence]’.(986) Indeed:

 

‘[i]n assessing the panel’s appreciation of the evidence, we cannot base a finding of inconsistency under Article 11 simply on the conclusion that we might have reached a different factual finding from the one the panel reached. Rather, we must be satisfied that the panel has exceeded the bounds of its discretion, as the trier of facts, in its appreciation of the evidence.’(987)

 

Where parties challenging a panel’s fact-finding under Article 11 have failed to establish that a panel exceeded the bounds of its discretion as the trier of facts, the Appellate Body has not ‘interfere^]’ with the findings of the panel.”(988),(989)

610.     In Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, the Appellate Body, referring to its prior jurisprudence, ruled that the Panel’s decision not to rely on some of the facts submitted by one of the parties “would not, by itself, constitute legal error”:

“As we said earlier,(990) the Appellate Body has previously held that ‘it is generally within the discretion of the Panel to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in making findings’.(991) Accordingly, the Panel’s decision not to rely on some of the facts that the United States claims to have submitted would not, by itself, constitute legal error. To succeed in its claim that the Panel disregarded the evidence submitted to it, the United States would have to demonstrate that the Panel exceeded its discretion and that the Panel made, in effect, an ‘egregious error.”(992),(993)

611.     In US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, the Appellate Body rebutted the US claims against the Panel’s analysis and endorsed the Panel’s reliance on previous findings of the Appellate Body:

“Regarding the arguments presented by the United States relating to Article 11 of the DSU, we disagree with the United States that the Panel did not assess objectively whether the SPB is a measure. In our view, such an assessment is a legal characterization and not just a factual one, and the Panel correctly conducted its analysis. The Panel referred first to the SPB, which formed the factual information needed to conduct the exercise of legal characterization. The Panel had before it exactly the same instrument that had been examined by the Appellate Body in US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review; thus, it was appropriate for the Panel, in determining whether the SPB is a measure, to rely on the Appellate Body’s conclusion in that case. Indeed, following the Appellate Body’s conclusions in earlier disputes is not only appropriate, but is what would be expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same. Although the Panel may have expressed itself in a concise manner, we find no fault in its analysis that could justify ruling that the Panel failed to observe its obligations under Article 11 of the DSU.”(994)

612.     In US — Zeroing (Japan), the United States claimed that the Panel had failed to make an objective assessment of the matter before it — including an objective assessment of the facts of the case — as required by Article 11 of the DSU, when it had concluded that a single rule or norm existed by virtue of which the USDOC will apply zeroing in any anti-dumping proceeding, regardless of the comparison methodology used. According to the United States, the evidence relied on by the Panel did not support such proposition. The Appellate Body, after recalling its prior jurisprudence, upheld the Panel’s handling of the evidence:

“As we see it, the United States’ challenge under Article 11 of the DSU is directed at the Panel’s appreciation and weighing of the evidence. The Appellate Body has stated on several occasions that panels enjoy a certain margin of discretion in assessing the credibility and weight to be ascribed to a given piece of evidence.(995) At the same time, the Appellate Body has underscored that Article 11 of the DSU requires panels “to take account of the evidence put before them and forbids them to wilfully disregard or distort such evidence.”(996) Moreover, panels must not “make affirmative findings that lack a basis in the evidence contained in the panel record.”(997) Provided that a panel’s assessment of evidence remains within these parameters, the Appellate Body will not interfere with the findings of the panel.(998)

 

 

In sum, we agree with the Panel’s understanding of the Appellate Body’s previous jurisprudence and the manner in which the Panel framed the question before it. We also consider that the Panel had sufficient evidence before it to conclude that the “zeroing procedures” under different comparison methodologies, and in different stages of anti-dumping proceedings, do not correspond to separate rules or norms, but simply reflect different manifestations of a single rule or norm.(999) The Panel also examined ample evidence regarding the precise content of this rule or norm, its nature as a measure of general and prospective application, and its attribution to the United States. In our view, the Panel properly assessed this evidence. We therefore disagree with the United States that the Panel did not assess objectively the issue of whether a single rule or norm exists by virtue of which the USDOC applies zeroing “regardless of the basis upon which export price and normal value are compared and regardless of the type of proceeding in which margins are calculated.”(1000),(1001)

Egregious error calling into question the good faith of a panel

613.     In EC — Hormones, the European Communities argued in its appeal that the Panel had disregarded or distorted the evidence submitted by the European Communities as well as the testimony provided by the experts advising the Panel. The European Communities claimed that the Panel had failed to make an objective assessment of the facts as required by Article 11 of the DSU. The Appellate Body disagreed with the European Communities and set forth the standard, for a violation of Article 11, as “an egregious error that calls into question the good faith of a panel.” The Appellate Body concluded by holding that “[a] claim that a panel disregarded or distorted the evidence submitted to it is, in effect, a claim that the panel, to a greater or lesser degree, denied the party submitting the evidence fundamental fairness, or what in many jurisdictions is known as due process of law or natural justice”:

“Whether or not a panel has made an objective assessment of the facts before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, is also a legal question which, if properly raised on appeal, would fall within the scope of appellate review.

 

The question which then arises is this: when may a panel be regarded as having failed to discharge its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the facts before it? Clearly, not every error in the appreciation of the evidence (although it may give rise to a question of law) may be characterized as a failure to make an objective assessment of the facts. In the present appeal, the European Communities repeatedly claims that the Panel disregarded or distorted or misrepresented the evidence submitted by the European Communities and even the opinions expressed by the Panel’s own expert advisors. The duty to make an objective assessment of the facts is, among other things, an obligation to consider the evidence presented to a panel and to make factual findings on the basis of that evidence. The deliberate disregard of, or refusal to consider, the evidence submitted to a panel is incompatible with a panel’s duty to make an objective assessment of the facts. The wilful distortion or misrepresentation of the evidence put before a panel is similarly inconsistent with an objective assessment of the facts. ‘Disregard’ and ‘distortion’ and ‘misrepresentation’ of the evidence, in their ordinary signification in judicial and quasi-judicial processes, imply not simply an error of judgment in the appreciation of evidence but rather an egregious error that calls into question the good faith of a panel. A claim that a panel disregarded or distorted the evidence submitted to it is, in effect, a claim that the panel, to a greater or lesser degree, denied the party submitting the evidence fundamental fairness, or what in many jurisdictions is known as due process of law or natural justice.

 

 

[I]t is generally within the discretion of the Panel to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in making findings.

 

 

The Panel cannot realistically refer to all statements made by the experts advising it and should be allowed a substantial margin of discretion as to which statements are useful to refer to explicitly.”(1002)

614.     In Australia — Salmon, Australia argued in its appeal that the Panel had failed to make an objective assessment of the matter before it and had not applied the appropriate standard of review pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU. The Appellate Body noted Australia’s argument that the Panel “partially or wholly ignored relevant evidence placed before it, or misrepresented evidence in a way that went beyond a mere question of the weight attributed to it, but constituted an egregious error amounting to an error of law.” The Appellate Body stated:

“[l]n response to Australia’s contention that the Panel failed to accord ‘due deference’ to matters of fact it put forward, we note that Article 11 of the DSU calls upon panels to ‘make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements’. Therefore, the function of this Panel was to assess the facts in a manner consistent with its obligation to make such an ‘objective assessment of the matter before it’. We believe the Panel has done so in this case. Panels, however, are not required to accord to factual evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as do the parties.”(1003)

615.     In Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, Korea argued in its appeal that the Panel had breached its obligation under Article 11 of the DSU by applying a “double standard” in assessing the evidence before it. The Appellate Body again referred to the “egregious error” standard:

“We are bound to conclude that Korea has not succeeded in showing that the Panel has committed any egregious errors that can be characterized as a failure to make an objective assessment of the matter before it. Korea’s arguments, when read together with the Panel Report and the record of the Panel proceedings, do not disclose that the Panel has distorted, misrepresented or disregarded evidence, or has applied a ‘double standard’ of proof in this case. It is not an error, let alone an egregious error, for the Panel to fail to accord the weight to the evidence that one of the parties believes should be accorded to it.”(1004)

616.     In Japan — Agricultural Products II, the Appellate Body examined Japan’s claim that the Panel had not complied with Article 11 of the DSU when it made a finding under Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement concerning the varietal testing requirement as it applies to apples, cherries, nectarines and walnuts. More specifically, Japan claimed the Panel had not properly examined evidence, had treated expert views in an arbitrary manner and had not properly evaluated the evidence before it. The Appellate Body referred to its previous decision in EC — Hormones and reiterated that “[o]nly egregious errors constitute a failure to make an objective assessment of the facts as required by Article 11 of the DSU”:

“As we stated in our Report in European Communities — Hormones, not every failure by the Panel in the appreciation of the evidence before it can be characterized as failure to make an objective assessment of the facts as required by Article 11 of the DSU. Only egregious errors constitute a failure to make an objective assessment of the facts as required by Article 11 of the DSU.

In our view, Japan has not demonstrated that the Panel, in its examination of the consistency of the varietal testing requirement with Article 2.2, has made errors of the gravity required to find a violation of Article 11 of the DSU. We, therefore, conclude that the Panel did not abuse its discretion contrary to the requirements of Article 11 of the DSU.”(1005)

617.     In EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), India claimed in appeal that the Panel had failed to meet its obligation under Article 11 of the DSU to examine the facts of the case objectively. The Appellate Body ruled that it is not “an error, let alone an egregious error”, for a panel to decline to accord to the evidence the weight that one of the parties sought to have accorded to it.

“India has not persuaded us that the Panel in this case exceeded its discretion as the trier of facts. In our view, the Panel assessed and weighed the evidence submitted by both parties, and ultimately concluded that the European Communities had information on all relevant economic factors listed in Article 3.4. It is not “an error, let alone an egregious error”,(1006) for the Panel to have declined to accord to the evidence the weight that India sought to have accorded to it. We, therefore, reject India’s argument that, by failing to shift the burden of proof, the Panel did not properly discharge its duty to assess objectively the facts of the case as required by Article 11 of the DSU.”(1007)

Duty to accord due process

618.     In Chile — Price Band System, the Appellate Body concluded that the Panel had made a finding on a claim that had not been made by Argentina. Chile had claimed that, by making a finding on that claim, the Panel had deprived Chile of a fair right to response. The Appellate Body agreed with Chile and found that Panel had acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by denying Chile the due process of a fair right of response. In support of this finding, the Appellate Body considered that “in making “an objective assessment of the matter before it”, a panel is also duty bound to ensure that due process is respected”:

“Article 11 imposes duties on panels that extend beyond the requirement to assess evidence objectively and in good faith … This requirement is, of course, an indispensable aspect of a panel’s task. However, in making “an objective assessment of the matter before it”, a panel is also duty bound to ensure that due process is respected. Due process is an obligation inherent in the WTO dispute settlement system. A panel will fail in the duty to respect due process if it makes a finding on a matter that is not before it, because it will thereby fail to accord to a party a fair right of response. In this case, because the Panel did not give Chile a fair right of response on this issue, we find that the Panel failed to accord to Chile the due process rights to which it is entitled under the DSU.”(1008)

619.     In US/Canada — Continued Suspension, the Appellate Body found that the Panel infringed the due process right of one of the parties:

“[W]e consider that there was an objective basis to conclude that the institutional affiliation with JECFA of Drs. Boisseau and Boobis, and their participation in JECFA’s evaluations of the six hormones at issue, was likely to affect or give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality given that the evaluations conducted by JECFA lie at the heart of the controversy between the parties.”(1009)

620.     The Appellate Body thus concluded that “[t]he appointment and consultations with Drs. Boisseau and Boobis compromised the adjudicative independence and impartiality of the Panel” and that “the Panel infringed the European Communities’ due process rights as a result of the Panel having consulted with Drs. Boisseau and Boobis as scientific experts.”(1010) Consequently, according to the Appellate Body, the Panel could not “be said to have made ‘an objective assessment of the matter’ as required by Article 11 of the DSU”.(1011) The Appellate Body thus found that “the Panel failed to comply with its duties under Article 11 of the DSU, as a result of the appointment and consultations with Drs. Boisseau and Boobis in the circumstances of th[e] case.”(1012) With reference to the violation of the obligation under Article 11 of the DSU, the Appellate Body added as follows:

“We have found that the Panel did not apply the proper standard of review. This is a legal error and does not fall within the authority of the Panel as the trier of facts. Moreover, we have found instances in which the Panel exceeded its authority in the assessment of the testimony of the scientific experts. By merely reproducing testimony of some experts that would appear to be favourable to the European Communities’ position, without addressing its significance, the Panel effectively disregarded evidence that was potentially relevant for the European Communities’ case. This cannot be reconciled with the Panel’s duty to make an ‘objective assessment of the facts of the case’ pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU.”(1013)

621.     In Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines), the Appellate Body concluded that the Panel did not fail to ensure due process and, thus, to comply with its duty under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the matter, by accepting and relying on certain evidence without having afforded Thailand an opportunity to comment on that evidence.(1014)

(c) Selected issues relating to evidence

(i) Timing of submission of evidence

622.     In Argentina — Textile and Apparel, Argentina argued that the Panel had acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by allowing certain evidence offered by the United States two days before the second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties. The Appellate Body noted that “the Working Procedures in their present form do not constrain panels with hard and fast rules on deadlines for submitting evidence” and, accordingly, did not find a violation of Article 11:

Article 11 of the DSU does not establish time limits for the submission of evidence to a panel. Article 12.1 of the DSU directs a panel to follow the Working Procedures set out in Appendix 3 of the DSU, but at the same time authorizes a panel to do otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute. The Working Procedures in Appendix 3 also do not establish precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence by a party to the dispute.(1015) It is true that the Working Procedures “do not prohibit” submission of additional evidence after the first substantive meeting of a panel with the parties. It is also true, however, that the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 do contemplate two distinguishable stages in a proceeding before a panel. …

 

Under the Working Procedures in Appendix 3, the complaining party should set out its case in chief, including a full presentation of the facts on the basis of submission of supporting evidence, during the first stage. The second stage is generally designed to permit ‘rebuttals’ by each party of the arguments and evidence submitted by the other parties.

 

As noted above, however, the Working Procedures in their present form do not constrain panels with hard and fast rules on deadlines for submitting evidence. The Panel could have refused to admit the additional documentary evidence of the United States as unseasonably submitted. The Panel chose, instead, to admit that evidence, at the same time allowing Argentina two weeks to respond to it. Argentina drew attention to the difficulties it would face in tracing and verifying the manually processed customs documents and in responding to them, since identifying names, customs identification numbers and, in some cases, descriptions of the products had been blacked out. The Panel could well have granted Argentina more than two weeks to respond to the additional evidence. However, there is no indication in the panel record that Argentina explicitly requested from the Panel, at that time or at any later time, a longer period within which to respond to the additional documentary evidence of the United States. Argentina also did not submit any countering documents or comments in respect of any of the additional documents of the United States.

 

[W]hile another panel could well have exercised its discretion differently, we do not believe that the Panel here committed an abuse of discretion amounting to a failure to render an objective assessment of the matter as mandated by Article 11 of the DSU.”(1016)

623.     In Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, Korea requested the Panel to issue a preliminary ruling rejecting certain evidence submitted by the European Communities after the second substantive meeting. Korea alleged that its rights of defence had been violated by the late submission of such evidence:

“Korea complains that its rights of defense were violated by the late submission of a market study (the Trendscope survey) by the European Communities. Korea had submitted a study done by the AC Nielsen Company as part of its responses to questions arising from the first substantive meeting of the Panel. The European Communities responded to this with, among other things, the Trendscope survey presented at the Second Meeting of the Panel. The Panel gave Korea a week to respond to this and critique the results, methodology and questions used in the Trendscope survey. Korea argues that this time was insufficient, that it did not have copies in Korean of all the questions —asked, and that it did not have time to provide further questions or comments based upon the answers.

 

We do not consider that Korea’s rights under the DSU were violated. The European Communities submitted its rebuttal survey at the next available opportunity after receiving Korea’s Nielsen survey. Had Korea chosen to submit its survey at the first substantive meeting and the European Communities failed to respond at the next opportunity (in such a case, it would have been in the rebuttal submission), there obviously would have been more merit to the claim because then the European Communities, it could have been argued, delayed submitting their evidence. As it transpired, the European Communities submitted a new piece of evidence at the next available opportunity which Korea then was able to examine for a week in order to provide comments. The survey was not of a particularly complex type and, in our view, Korea had adequate time to respond given the nature of the evidence. The Trendscope survey is not critical evidence to the complainants’ case; it serves as a supplement to arguments already made. If we considered that it represented critical evidence, Korea’s request for further time for comment would have been given greater weight. While all parties to litigation might prefer open-ended potential for rebutting the other side’s submissions, we believe that for practical reasons submissions must be cut-off at some point and such a point was reached in this case. Thus, neither the timing nor the importance of the evidence in question support a finding that Korea’s rights have been violated in this instance.”(1017)

624.     In Canada — Aircraft, Canada requested the Panel to issue a preliminary ruling on the question of whether the complaining party may adduce new evidence or allegations after the end of the first substantive meeting. Canada argued that it would suffer prejudice under the accelerated procedure under Article 4 of the SCM Agreement as a result of the late submission of allegations or evidence. The Panel, in a finding not addressed by the Appellate Body, ruled that it was not bound to exclude the submission of new allegations after the first substantive meeting and that it could not see any legal basis for so doing:

“[A]n absolute rule excluding the submission of evidence by a complaining party after the first substantive meeting would be inappropriate, since there may be circumstances in which a complaining party is required to adduce new evidence in order to address rebuttal arguments made by the respondent. Furthermore, there may be instances, as in the present case,(1018) where a party is required to submit new evidence at the request of the panel. For these reasons, we rejected Canada’s request for a preliminary ruling that the Panel should not accept new evidence submitted by Brazil after the first substantive meeting.

 

[W]e are not bound to exclude the submission of new allegations after the first substantive meeting. We can see nothing in the DSU, or in the Appendix 3 Working Procedures, that would require the submission of new allegations to be treated any differently than the submission of new evidence. Indeed, one could envisage situations in which the respondent might present information to a panel during the first substantive meeting that could reasonably be used as a basis for a new allegation by the complaining party. Provided the new allegation falls within the panel’s terms of reference, and provided the respondent party’s due process rights of defence are respected, we can see no reason why any such new allegation should necessarily be rejected by the panel as a matter of course, simply because it is submitted after the first substantive meeting with the parties. We consider that this approach is consistent with the Appellate Body’s ruling in European Communities — Bananas that ‘[t]here is no requirement in the DSU or in GATT practice for arguments on all claims relating to the matter referred to the DSB to be set out in a complaining party’s first written submission to the panel. It is the panel’s terms of reference, governed by Article 7 of the DSU, which set out the claims of the complaining parties relating to the matter referred to the DSB.”(1019),(1020)

625.     In US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), Canada asked the Panel to accept as evidence a letter which it submitted after the first substantive meeting. In spite of the United States’ objections, the Panel issued a preliminary ruling accepting the evidence. The Panel noted that the letter at issue did not come into the possession of Canada until after the first substantive meeting. The Panel also noted that the information contained in the letter was in the public domain, and that the information was pertinent to the proceedings since it related to an issue which it had been asked to consider.(1021)

626.     In EC — Sardines, the Appellate Body explained that the interim review stage is not an appropriate time to introduce new evidence:

“The interim review stage is not an appropriate time to introduce new evidence. We recall that Article 15 of the DSU governs the interim review. Article 15 permits parties, during that stage of the proceedings, to submit comments on the draft report issued by the panel,(1022) and to make requests ‘for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report’.(1023) At that time, the panel process is all but completed; it is only — in the words of Article 15 — ‘precise aspects’ of the report that must be verified during the interim review. And this, in our view, cannot properly include an assessment of new and unanswered evidence. Therefore, we are of the view that the Panel acted properly in refusing to take into account the new evidence during the interim review, and did not thereby act inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU.”(1024)

627.     The Panel in Japan — Apples accepted evidence that became available only after the establishment of the Panel, as the other party had had an opportunity to comment:

“A related question is whether the Panel should consider evidence that became available only after the establishment of the Panel. Our approach in this regard should be pragmatic. Besides the situation contemplated in paragraph 11 of our Working Procedures, we decided not to reject evidence submitted by a party on which the other party had had an opportunity to comment, whether it took advantage of such an opportunity or not. This is without prejudice to the admissibility of such evidence on other grounds or the weight that we might eventually give to such evidence.

 

 

… We are of the view that our obligation, pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the matter before us, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case, imposes on us an obligation not to exclude a priori any evidence submitted in due time by any party. However, the fact that we accepted the evidence at issue as a matter of principle is, as stated in the latter above, without prejudice to the weight that we will ultimately give to these exhibits in our discussion of the substance of this case. We also note that, consistent with the practice of panels, we provided Japan with the opportunity to comment on the substance of these documents.”(1025)

628.     In US — Steel Safeguards, the Panel sent a letter to all parties that included a series of preliminary rulings on organizational matters. Among the issues, the Panel referred to the United States’ request to substitute the terms “rebuttal submissions” in paragraph 11 of the Panel’s Working Procedures regarding the timing of the submission of evidence, with the word “rebuttals”. For the United States the word “submission” is ordinarily taken to mean written submissions and thus the reference to “rebuttal submissions” would exclude the application of that paragraph to evidence in rebuttals made orally. The complainants disagreed and argued that the suggested amendment would allow, for example, new arguments and evidence to be adduced orally at the Panel’s second substantive meeting. The Panel, after referring to the Appellate Body Report in Argentina — Textile and Apparel (see paragraph 622 above), redrafted paragraph 11 “to ensure due process and to ensure that new evidence is not adduced at a late stage in the panel process, while simultaneously ensuring that all parties and the Panel are fully informed of all relevant evidence”.(1026) The new paragraph 11 read as follows:

“Parties shall submit all factual evidence to the Panel no later than during the first substantive meeting, except with respect to evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal submissions, or answers to questions or provided that good cause is shown. In all cases, the other party(ies) shall be accorded a period of time for comment, as appropriate.”

(ii) Temporal scope of the review

629.     In US — Cotton Yarn, the Appellate Body considered that a panel reviewing the due diligence exercised by a Member in making its determination under Article 6 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing has to put itself in the place of that Member at the time it makes its determination and thus “must not consider evidence which did not exist at that point in time.”

630.     The Appellate Body, in EC — Selected Customs Matters discussed the temporal limitations for measures to be considered as within the Panel’s term of reference, and emphasized that a panel is not precluded from assessing a piece of evidence for the mere reason that it pre-dates or post-dates its establishment:

“[l]t is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the measures at issue and, on the other hand, acts of administration that have been presented as evidence to substantiate the claim that the measures at issue are administered in a manner inconsistent with Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. The Panel failed to make the distinction between measures and pieces of evidence. While there are temporal limitations on the measures that may be within a panel’s terms of reference, such limitations do not apply in the same way to evidence. Evidence in support of a claim challenging measures that are within a panel’s terms of reference may pre-date or post-date the establishment of the panel. A panel is not precluded from assessing a piece of evidence for the mere reason that it pre-dates or post-dates its establishment.(1027) In this case, the United States was not precluded from presenting evidence relating to acts of administration before and after the date of Panel establishment. A panel enjoys a certain discretion to determine the relevance and probative value of a piece of evidence that pre-dates or post-dates its establishment.”(1028)

(iii) Factual findings made in previous disputes

631.     In US — Continued Zeroing, the Appellate Body made findings on the status of factual findings made in previous disputes on the assessment of facts in an ongoing dispute:

“Factual findings made in prior disputes do not determine facts in another dispute. Evidence adduced in one proceeding, and admissions made in respect of the same factual question about the operation of an aspect of municipal law, may be submitted as evidence in another proceeding. The finders of fact are of course obliged to make their own determination afresh and on the basis of all the evidence before them. But if the critical evidence is the same and the factual question about the operation of domestic law is the same, it is likely that the finder of facts would reach similar findings in the two proceedings. Nonetheless, the factual findings adopted by the DSB in prior cases regarding the existence of the zeroing methodology, as a rule or norm, are not binding in another dispute. In themselves, they do not establish that zeroing was used in all the successive proceedings in each of the 18 cases listed in the European Communities’ panel request.”(1029)

(iv) Admissibility of evidence versus weight accorded to evidence

632.     The Panel in EC — Bed Linen examined the European Communities, objection to the inclusion by India in its submission of reports of the consultations between the parties which took place before the establishment of the Panel. Although the Panel made no findings on the European Communities’ claims, it provided its thoughts about the difference between questions concerning the admissibility of evidence, and the weight to be accorded to the evidence in making its decisions:

“[l]t seems that the evidence concerning the consultations is at best unnecessary, and may be irrelevant. That said, however, merely because the evidence is unnecessary or irrelevant does not require us to exclude it.

 

 

… we consider that it is not necessary to limit the facts and arguments India may present, even if we might consider those facts or arguments to be irrelevant or not probative on the issues before us. In our view, there is a significant and substantive difference between questions concerning the admissibility of evidence, and the weight to be accorded evidence in making our decisions. That is, we may choose to allow parties to present evidence, but subsequently not consider that evidence, because it is not relevant or necessary to our determinations or is not probative on the issues before it. In our view, there is little to be gained by expending our time and effort in ruling on points of “admissibility” of evidence vel non.

 

In addition, we note that, under Article 13.2 of the DSU, Panels have a general right to seek information “from any relevant source”. In this context, we consider that, as a general rule, panels have wide latitude in admitting evidence in WTO dispute settlement. The DSU contains no rule that might restrict the forms of evidence that panels may consider. Moreover, international tribunals are generally free to admit and evaluate evidence of every kind, and to ascribe to it the weight that they see fit. As one legal scholar has noted:

 

‘The inherent flexibility of the international procedure, and its tendency to be free from technical rules of evidence applied in municipal law, provide the “evidence” with a wider scope in international proceedings … . Generally speaking, international tribunals have not committed themselves to the restrictive rules of evidence in municipal law. They have found it justified to receive every kind and form of evidence, and have attached to them the probative value they deserve under the circumstances of a given case’.(1030)

 

It has clearly been held in the WTO that information obtained in consultations may be presented in subsequent panel proceedings.”(1031),(1032)

(v) Circumstantial versus direct evidence

633.     In Canada — Aircraft, the Appellate Body observed that it is commonplace for adjudicators to rely on “inferences” in making factual findings:

“The DSU does not purport to state in what detailed circumstances inferences, adverse or otherwise, may be drawn by panels from infinitely varying combinations of facts. Yet, in all cases, in carrying out their mandate and seeking to achieve the “objective assessment of the facts” required by Article 11 of the DSU, panels routinely draw inferences from the facts placed on the record. The inferences drawn may be inferences of fact: that is, from fact A and fact B, it is reasonable to infer the existence of fact C. Or the inferences derived may be inferences of law: for example, the ensemble of facts found to exist warrants the characterization of a “subsidy” or a “subsidy contingent … in fact … upon export performance”. The facts must, of course, rationally support the inferences made, but inferences may be drawn whether or not the facts already on the record deserve the qualification of a prima facie case. The drawing of inferences is, in other words, an inherent and unavoidable aspect of a panel’s basic task of finding and characterizing the facts making up a dispute.”(1033)

634.     In US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, a case involving a review of the US investigating authority’s countervailing duty determination, the United States argued that the Panel erred in effectively requiring every piece of evidence “to be direct evidence of entrustment or direction and thereby precluded legitimate inferences drawn from circumstantial and secondary evidence”. The Appellate Body agreed:

“In our view, having accepted an investigating authority’s approach, a panel normally should examine the probative value of a piece of evidence in a similar manner to that followed by the investigating authority. Moreover, if, as here, an investigating authority relies on individual pieces of circumstantial evidence viewed together as support for a finding of entrustment or direction, a panel reviewing such a determination normally should consider that evidence in its totality, rather than individually, in order to assess its probative value with respect to the agency’s determination. Indeed, requiring that each piece of circumstantial evidence, on its own, establish entrustment or direction effectively precludes an agency from finding entrustment or direction on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Individual pieces of circumstantial evidence, by their very nature, are not likely to establish a proposition, unless and until viewed in conjunction with other pieces of evidence.

 

 

… what is absent from the Panel’s “global” assessment, in our view, is a consideration of the inferences that might reasonably have been drawn by the USDOC on the basis of the totality of the evidence. As we have already observed283, individual pieces of circumstantial evidence are unlikely to establish entrustment or direction; the significance of individual pieces of evidence may become clear only when viewed together with other evidence. In other words, a piece of evidence that may initially appear to be of little or no probative value, when viewed in isolation, could, when placed beside another piece of evidence of the same nature, form part of an overall picture that gives rise to a reasonable inference of entrustment or direction.”(1034)

635.     In US — Continued Zeroing, the Appellate Body faulted the Panel for rejecting a claim in the absence of direct evidence:

“The fact that there is no direct evidence establishing the use of simple zeroing does not absolve a panel from examining submitted evidence in its totality. We, however, come to this question not as the original reviewer of that evidence, but against the standard of whether the factual findings and uncontested facts on the Panel record adequately support completion. On that basis, we decide not to complete the analysis to reach a finding that the United States applied simple zeroing in these two periodic reviews. We emphasize that the nature and scope of the evidence that might be reasonably expected by an adjudicator in order to establish a fact or claim in a particular case will depend on a range of factors, including the type of evidence that is made available by a Member’s regulating authority. Because the design and operation of national regulatory systems will vary, we believe that, in a specific case, a panel may have a sufficient basis to reach an affirmative finding regarding a particular fact or claim on the basis of inferences that can be reasonably drawn from circumstantial rather than direct evidence.”(1035)

(vi) Public statements by company executives and government officials

636.     In EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft, the United States submitted various public statements by company executives and government officials as evidence that Airbus would not have been able to launch its aircraft without launch aid / member State financing (LA/MSF). The European Communities argued that such statements not be given weight. Citing the prior panel report in Australia — Automotive Leather II, the Panel stated that:

“In considering the above evidence, we recognize that the public statements of Airbus or participant company executives and public officials as to the need for LA/MSF in order to launch a given aircraft may involve a degree of self-interest. For example, comments attributed to Sir Austin Pearce appear to have been made in the midst of efforts by British Aerospace to lobby the government of the United Kingdom for additional support.(1036) In these circumstances, it may well have been in the interest of the company to suggest that its participation in the A320 project would come to a halt without further commitment from the UK government. Having committed public monies, it is also possible that public officials would be inclined to describe government participation in Airbus projects as essential. However, we note that the Decision letter of the European Commission seems to us to be in the nature of a quasi-judicial evaluation and finding, rather than mere statements by public officials, and therefore the same concerns do not arise in evaluating that decision. In any event, we consider it appropriate to take this evidence into account, making our own judgements as to its weight and probative value, together with other evidence in our evaluation of the United States claims.(5600)

 

5600 In Australia — Automotive Leather II, the panel reached a similar conclusion in respect of public statements of Australian government officials reported in the press, noting:

 

“A commentator on the International Court of Justice’s consideration of evidence and proof of facts has stated:

 

“It appears to be the case that press reports, when significant but not denied by the responsible state, or when reporting other events such as official statements by responsible officials and agencies of that state, are accepted; {footnote omitted} but when they are uncorroborated or do not otherwise contain material with an independent title of credibility and persuasiveness, the tendency of the Court is to discount them almost entirely”.

 

Highet, Evidence and Proof of Facts, in Damrosch, The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, 1987. Similarly, we take into account the circumstances in which the reported remarks were made, the source, and whether the information is corroborated elsewhere or contrary evidence is offered, in assessing the value of these Exhibits as evidence.”

  

Panel Report, Australia —Automotive Leather II, footnote 210.” (1037)

4. “make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings”

(a) Judicial economy

(i) Legal basis for the exercise of judicial economy

637.     The Panel in US — Wool Shirts and Blouses decided to exercise judicial economy with respect to some of India’s claims in that dispute, stating “India is entitled to have the dispute over the contested “measure” resolved y the Panel, and if we judge that the specific matter in dispute can be resolved by addressing only some of the arguments raised by the complaining party, we can do o. We, therefore, decide to address only the legal issues we think are needed in order to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making recommendations or in giving rulings in respect of this dispute.” The Appellate Body upheld the finding of the Panel and discussed the legal basis for judicial economy. The Appellate Body began by noting the function of panels, as defined under Article 11 of the DSU:

“The function of panels is expressly defined in Article 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:

 

‘The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements … (emphasis added).’

 

Nothing in this provision or in previous GATT practice requires a panel to examine all legal claims made by the complaining party. Previous GATT 1947 and WTO panels have frequently addressed only those issues that such panels considered necessary for the resolution of the matter between the parties, and have declined to decide other issues. Thus, if a panel found that a measure was inconsistent with a particular provision of the GATT 1947, it generally did not go on to examine whether the measure was also inconsistent with other GATT provisions that a complaining party may have argued were violated.(1038) In recent WTO practice, panels likewise have refrained from examining each and every claim made by the complaining party and have made findings only on those claims that such panels concluded were necessary to resolve the particular matter.(1039)

 

Although a few GATT 1947 and WTO panels did make broader rulings, by considering and deciding issues that were not absolutely necessary to dispose of the particular dispute, there is nothing anywhere in the DSU that requires panels to do”.(1040),(1041)

638.     In US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, the Appellate Body also referred to Article 3.7 of the DSU and emphasized that a requirement to address all legal claims raised by a party is inconsistent with the basic aim of dispute settlement, namely to settle disputes:

“Furthermore, such a requirement [to address all legal claims] is not consistent with the aim of the WTO dispute settlement system. Article 3.7 of the DSU explicitly states:

 

‘The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.’

 

Thus, the basic aim of dispute settlement in the WTO is to settle disputes. This basic aim is affirmed elsewhere in the DSU. Article 3.4, for example, stipulates:

 

‘Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the covered agreements.’”(1042)

639.     Finally, the Appellate Body in US — Wool Shirts and Blouses rejected the argument by India that, pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, panels were obliged to address all legal claims raised by the parties:

“As India emphasizes, Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the Members of the WTO ‘recognize’ that the dispute settlement system ‘serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ (emphasis added). Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to ‘make law’ by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute. A panel need only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.(1043)

 

We note, furthermore, that Article IX of the WTO Agreement provides that the Ministerial Conference and the General Council have the ‘exclusive authority’ to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements.(1044) This is explicitly recognized in Article 3.9 of the DSU, which provides:

 

‘The provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement.’

  

In the light of the above, we believe that the Panel’s finding in paragraph 7.20 of the Panel Report is consistent with the DSU as well as with practice under the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement.(1045)

640.     The Appellate Body confirmed its approach to judicial economy in India — Patents (US):

“[A] panel has the discretion to determine the claims it must address in order to resolve the dispute between the parties — provided that those claims are within that panel’s terms of reference.”(1046)

(ii) Meaning of “judicial economy”

641.     In Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, the Appellate Body explained that:

“The practice of judicial economy, which was first employed by a number of GATT panels, allows a panel to refrain from making multiple findings that the same measure is inconsistent with various provisions when a single, or a certain number of findings of inconsistency, would suffice to resolve the dispute. Although the doctrine of judicial economy allows a panel to refrain from addressing claims beyond those necessary to resolve the dispute, it does not compel a panel to exercise such restraint.”(1047)

642.     In Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body confirmed that the concept of judicial economy applies only where there is a finding of inconsistency:

“[W]e observe that it might have been appropriate for the Panel to address the European Communities’ separate claims that the MERCOSUR exemption was inconsistent with Article I:1 and Article XIII:1. We have previously indicated that the principle of judicial economy “allows a panel to refrain from making multiple findings that the same measure is inconsistent with various provisions when a single, or a certain number of findings of inconsistency, would suffice to resolve the dispute”, and it seems that the Panel assumed this to be the case in the present dispute. However, the Panel found that the MERCOSUR exemption resulted in the Import Ban being applied consistently with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. In view of this finding, we must acknowledge that we have difficulty seeing how the Panel could have been justified in not addressing the separate claims of inconsistency under Article 1:1 and Article XIII: 1 directed at the MERCOSUR exemption.”(1048)

643.     In EC — Fasteners (China), China alleged that the Panel failed to address one of its main arguments concerning a claim under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and that this constituted a false exercise of “judicial economy”. The Appellate Body disagreed, and explained the concept of “judicial economy” applies only in respect of claims:

“The above review of China’s arguments before the Panel indicates that China did not raise a separate claim under the last sentence of Article 2.4, but referred to that sentence in support of its claim that the Commission acted inconsistently with the obligation to conduct a fair comparison under Article 2.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. On appeal, China has also characterized its allegation under the last sentence of Article 2.4 as an “argument put forward by China”. Thus, we disagree with China’s view that the Panel’s failure to address this argument constitutes “a false exercise of judicial economy”, because the issue of judicial economy is only relevant to the manner in which a panel deals with a party’s claims. Moreover, as the Appellate Body has found, a panel has the discretion “to address only those arguments it deems necessary to resolve a particular claim” and “the fact that a particular argument relating to that claim is not specifically addressed in the ‘Findings’ section of a panel report will not, in and of itself, lead to the conclusion that that panel has failed to make the ‘objective assessment of the matter before it’ required by Article 11 of the DSU”.”(1049)

(iii) No obligation to exercise judicial economy

644.     In US — Lead and Bismuth II, the United States argued that the Panel was required to exercise judicial economy and not address issues which did not need to be addressed for resolving the dispute at hand. The Appellate Body rejected the argument and emphasized that the exercise of judicial economy was within the discretion of a Panel, but that a Panel was never required to exercise judicial economy:

“The United States seems to consider that our Report in United States — Shirts and Blouses sets forth a general principle that panels may not address any issues that need not be addressed in order to resolve the dispute between the parties. We do not agree with this characterization of our findings. In that appeal, India had argued that it was entitled to a finding by the Panel on each of the legal claims that it had made. We, however, found that the principle of judicial economy allows a panel to decline to rule on certain claims.

 

 

In order to resolve the claim of the European Communities, the Panel deemed it necessary to address the two principal arguments made in support of this claim. In doing so, the Panel acted within the context of resolving this particular dispute and, therefore, within the scope of its mandate under the DSU.” (1050)

645.     In Argentina — Footwear (EC), the Appellate Body expressed its “surprise” that the Panel had made a certain finding under the Agreement on Safeguards:

“We are somewhat surprised that the Panel, having determined that there were no ‘increased imports’. and having determined that there was no ‘serious injury’. for some reason went on to make an assessment of causation. It would be difficult, indeed, to demonstrate a ‘causal link’ between ‘increased imports’ that did not occur and ‘serious injury’ that did not exist. Nevertheless, we see no error in the Panel’s interpretation of the causation requirements, or in its interpretation of Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.”(1051)

646.     In EC — Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, the Panel opted to make findings in regard to a 2001 restructuring programme despite holding the view that the principle of judicial economy permitted it not to do so:

“We recall that, in the earlier section of our Report concerning the existence of a financial contribution, we concluded that the EC failed to establish that the private bodies which participated in the May 2001 restructuring through a bond purchase of KRW 1 trillion were directed to do so by the government. In the absence of a proper determination of the existence of a financial contribution, the principle of judicial economy suggests that it is not necessary for us to discuss the question of benefit conferred by the private creditor bank’s behaviour.

 

However, for purposes of implementation and in case of an appeal which would overturn our financial contribution determination, and thus assuming, arguendo, that the EC properly determined that all banks that took part in the May 2001 Restructuring Programme were directed by the government to do so, we will now examine whether the EC was justified on the basis of the record evidence to consider that a benefit was conferred by the purchase of the CBs by the creditor banks in May 2001.”(1052)

647.     Elsewhere in the Panel Report in EC — Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, however, the Panel elected to exercise judicial economy with respect to claims under Articles 10, 15.1, 19.4, 22.3 and 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994.(1053)

(iv) Relevance of order of analysis to judicial economy

648.     In India — Autos, the Panel observed that the order of analysis of claims can have an impact on the potential to exercise judicial economy (the Panel ultimately exercised judicial economy in respect of the claims under the TRIMs Agreement):

“The order selected for examination of the claims may also have an impact on the potential to apply judicial economy. It seems that an examination of the GATT provisions in this case would be likely to make it unnecessary to address the TRIMs claims, but not vice-versa. If a violation of the GATT claims was found, it would be justifiable to refrain from examining the TRIMs claims under the principle of judicial economy. Even if no violation was found under the GATT claims, that also seems an efficient starting point since it would be difficult to imagine that if no violation has been found of Articles III or XI, a violation could be found of Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, which refers to the same provisions. Conversely, if no violation of the TRIMs Agreement were found, this would not necessarily preclude the existence of a violation of GATT Articles III:4 or XI:1 because the scope of the GATT provisions is arguably broader if India’s argument was accepted that there is a need to prove that a measure is an investment measure and its assertion that this is not the case with the measures before this Panel.”(1054)

(v) Requirement for a panel to state it is exercising judicial economy

649.     In Canada — Autos, the Appellate Body admonished the Panel for not stating explicitly that it was exercising judicial economy, when it did not address a particular claim:

“In our view, it was not necessary for the Panel to make a determination on the European Communities’ alternative claim relating to the CVA requirements under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement in order ‘to secure a positive solution’ to this dispute. The Panel had already found that the CVA requirements violated both Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article XVII of the GATS. Having made these findings, the Panel, in our view, exercising the discretion implicit in the principle of judicial economy, could properly decide not to examine the alternative claim of the European Communities that the CVA requirements are inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.

 

We are bound to add that, for purposes of transparency and fairness to the parties, a panel should, however, in all cases, address expressly those claims which it declines to examine and rule upon for reasons of judicial economy. Silence does not suffice for these purposes.” (1055)

650.     However, the Appellate Body in US — Upland Cotton approved of the Panel’s application of judicial economy where the Panel only explained that it did not believe it “necessary to conduct any additional examination” without explicit reference to the principle:

“The Appellate Body has stated that panels may exercise judicial economy and refrain from addressing claims beyond those necessary to resolve the dispute.(1056) In this case, the Panel did not expressly state it was exercising judicial economy.(1057) We agree with the United States, however, that the Panel’s approach can be properly characterized as an exercise of judicial economy.(1058) Moreover, we believe that the Panel was within its discretion in refraining from making additional findings and it was not improper for the Panel to have exercised judicial economy given that its finding of actual circumvention resolved the matter.”(1059),(1060)

(vi) “False” judicial economy

651.     In Australia — Salmon, the Appellate Body held that the right to exercise judicial economy could not be exercised where only a partial resolution of a dispute would result:

“The principle of judicial economy has to be applied keeping in mind the aim of the dispute settlement system. This aim is to resolve the matter at issue and ‘to secure a positive solution to a dispute’. To provide only a partial resolution of the matter at issue would be false judicial economy. A panel has to address those claims on which a finding is necessary in order to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance by a Member with those recommendations and rulings ‘in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.’”(1061)

652.     In Japan — Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body found an error of law in the Panel’s exercise of judicial economy. As in Australia — Salmon, the Appellate Body found that the Panel had exercised “false” judicial economy and had provided only a partial resolution of the dispute before it:

“We note that there is an error of logic in the Panel’s finding in paragraph 8.63. The Panel stated that it had found earlier in its Report that the varietal testing requirement violates Article 2.2, and that there was, therefore, no need to examine whether the measure at issue was based on a risk assessment in accordance with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. We note, however, that the Panel’s finding of inconsistency with Article 2.2 only concerned the varietal testing requirement as it applies to apples, cherries, nectarines and walnuts. With regard to the varietal testing requirement as it applies to apricots, pears, plums and quince, the Panel found that there was insufficient evidence before it to conclude that this measure was inconsistent with Article 2.2. The Panel, therefore, made an error of logic when it stated, in general terms, that there was no need to examine whether the varietal testing requirement was consistent with Article 5.1 because this requirement had already been found to be inconsistent with Article 2.2. With regard to the varietal testing requirement as it applies to apricots, pears, plums and quince, there was clearly still a need to examine whether this measure was inconsistent with Article 5.1. By not making a finding under Article 5.1 with regard to the varietal testing requirement as it applies to apricots, pears, plums and quince, the Panel improperly applied the principle of judicial economy. We believe that a finding under Article 5.1 with respect to apricots, pears, plums and quince is necessary ‘in order to ensure effective resolution’ of the dispute.”(1062)

653.     In Argentina — Ceramic Tiles, the Panel declined to exercise judicial economy despite its finding under Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that “cast doubt on the entire final determination of dumping” by the investigating authorities. The Panel indicated that “[m]indful of the Appellate Body’s comments in [Australia — Salmon],(1063) we will continue with our analysis of the other claims made before us “because it could prove of utility depending on any appeal’(1064) and in order ‘to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings so as to allow for prompt compliance with those recommendations and rulings’.”(1065),(1066)

654.     In EC — Export Subsidies on Sugar, the Appellate Body addressed whether it is appropriate to exercise judicial economy with respect to a claim under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement where a panel finds that a complaining Member has established that the subsidy in question is prohibited within the meaning of Article 3. The European Communities argued that the Panel was permitted to exercise judicial economy since a panel is not obligated to make multiple findings that a measure is inconsistent with various provisions, when one finding would be sufficient to resolve the dispute.(1067) Noting that the SCM Agreement contains special rules and additional procedures on dispute settlement in respect of subsidies prohibited under Article 3 and that the subsidy in question was prohibited within the meaning of Article 3, the Appellate Body condemned the Panel’s exercise of false judicial economy, explaining:

“In this case, the Panel’s findings under Articles 3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture were not sufficient to “fully resolve” the dispute. This is because, in declining to rule on the Complaining Parties’ claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel precluded the possibility of a remedy being made available to the Complaining Parties, pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, in the event of the Panel finding in favour of the Complaining Parties with respect to their claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.(1068). Moreover, in declining to rule on the Complaining Parties’ claims under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel failed to discharge its obligation under Article 11 of the DSU by failing to make “such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements”, namely, a recommendation or ruling by the DSB pursuant to Article 4.7. This constitutes false judicial economy and legal error.”(1069)

655.     In US — Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, Mexico argued that the Panel exercised false judicial economy by declining to decide Mexico’s claims concerning the dumping margins, thus failing to make an objective assessment of the matter before it as required by Article 11 of the DSU. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s exercise of judicial economy with regard to the issue of whether the USDOC determination was consistent with Article 2, where the Panel had already found that determination to be inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Appellate Body supported its conclusions based on several factors, focusing its reasoning on Mexico’s failure to explain why an additional finding on Mexico’s claim under Article 2 was necessary to resolve the dispute:

“In Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, the Appellate Body found that the practice of judicial economy ‘allows a panel to refrain from making multiple findings that the same measure is inconsistent with various provisions when a single, or a certain number of findings of inconsistency, would suffice to resolve the dispute.’(1070) Mexico has not explained why an additional finding on Mexico’s claim under Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is necessary to resolve the dispute.(1071) And we find no such need.(1072)”

 

In any event, we note that Mexico’s arguments are premised on the assumption that the United States ‘used’ a dumping margin in the context of the sunset review at issue.(1073) Thus, Mexico submits, for instance, that the USDOC’s ‘reliance on a flawed margin for purposes of its likelihood of dumping determination, and its reporting of a flawed margin of dumping likely to prevail to the [USITC], tainted both the [USDOC’s] and the [USITC’s] likelihood determinations.’(1074) Although the USDOC ‘calculated’ dumping margins for OCTG, the Panel found that’ it is clear that USDOC did not rely on historical dumping margins … , but solely on import volumes’(1075) in making its determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping in the sunset review at issue. Hence, we do not see how a margin that the USDOC did not ‘rely upon’ could taint the USITC’s and the USDOC’s determinations in the context of the OCTG sunset review at issue.

 

Moreover, the Panel’s finding that the USDOC did not rely on historical dumping margins is a factual finding. No reason was given to us why we should ‘interfere’(1076) with this finding by the Panel. Nor has Mexico pointed to any evidence in the Panel record to suggest that the USITC relied on or otherwise factored in the margin of dumping likely to prevail that was reported to it by the USDOC. Also, the Panel Report contains no factual findings regarding this issue.”(1077)

(vii) Considerations not relevant to judicial economy

656.     In US — Tuna II (Mexico), Mexico brought claims under both the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994, and argued that the Panel should not exercise judicial economy in respect of any of its claims. The Panel considered that most of the reasons invoked by Mexico in support of its view that the Panel should not exercise judicial economy with respect to any of its claims were not persuasive:

“We note that, in response to a question by the Panel, Mexico has argued that it was necessary and essential to the effective resolution of this dispute that the Panel rule on all of the claims raised by Mexico under Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 of the TBT Agreement because of: “(i) the nature of the measures at issue; (ii) the fact that this is the first time that such measures have been subject to dispute settlement under the DSU; (iii) the differences in the wording and potential application of the provisions of the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement to the measures; and (iv) the importance of the effective discipline of such non-tariff measures to developing country Members such as Mexico. This final reason — the importance of these disciplines to developing country Members — is particularly important because developing country Members may be most likely to be exposed to the adverse effects of non-tariff measures such as those at issue in this dispute.”

 

We agree with Mexico that, should the Panel fail to make findings that are necessary to resolve the dispute this would constitute a false judicial economy and an error of law.(1078) However, we also note that if the panel finds that the matter in dispute is sufficiently resolved by the findings on the first claims examined, there is no need to examine additional claims. As explicitly stated by the Appellate Body, “[n]othing in [Article 11 of the DSU] or in previous GATT practice requires a panel to examine all legal claims made by the complaining party.(1079)

 

In this respect, we note that three of the reasons invoked by Mexico in support of its view that the Panel should not exercise judicial economy with respect to any of its claims (reasons (i), (ii) and (iv)) do not appear to directly relate to the question of whether the dispute would be fully resolved. These considerations therefore have little, if any, bearing on the question of whether we may exercise judicial economy.”(1080)

(b) Use of arguendo assumptions

657.     In Mexico — Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 — US), the Appellate Body made certain findings assuming, arguendo, that Article 6.2 applied in the context of Article 21.5 proceedings. The Appellate Body did not make a finding whether Article 6.2 actually applied in the context of Article 21.5 proceedings and, if so, to what extent.(1081)

658.     In US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, the Appellate Body stated that:

“[E]ven assuming arguendo that a “practice” may be challenged as a “measure” in WTO dispute settlement —an issue on which we express no view here-we find that the record does not allow us to complete the analysis of Argentina’s conditional appeal with respect to the “practice” of the USDOC regarding the likelihood determination in sunset reviews.”(1082)

659.     In US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 — Argentina), Argentina argued that the manner in which the Panel “summarily” dismissed Argentina’s request for a suggestion under Article 19.1 (for withdrawal of the anti-dumping duty order) was inconsistent with the Panel’s duties under Articles 11 and 12.7 of the DSU. In the course of addressing this claim, the Appellate Body relied on an arguendo assumption regarding the applicability of Articles 11 and 12.7 to a panel’s consideration of a request for a suggestion under Article 19.1:

“The Panel’s explanation is brief, but it is sufficient to convey that the Panel considered Argentina’s request and that, in the light of the discretionary nature of the authority to make a suggestion, the Panel declined to exercise that discretion. The discretionary nature of the authority to make a suggestion under Article 19.1 must be kept in mind when examining the sufficiency of a panel’s decision not to exercise such authority. However, it should not relieve a panel from engaging with the arguments put forward by a party in support of such a request. In the present case, Argentina offered several reasons in support of its request for a suggestion. Although it would have been advisable for the Panel to articulate more clearly the reasons why it declined to exercise its discretion to make a suggestion, this does not mean that Panel’s exercise of its discretion was improper, and, thus, even assuming arguendo that Articles 11 and 12.7 were applicable to a request for suggestion, we do not consider that, in the circumstances of this case, the Panel failed to fulfil its duties under those provisions.”(1083),(1084)

660.     In US — Shrimp (Thailand) I US — Customs Bond Directive, the Appellate Body considered it unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 can be invoked as a defence to justify a measure found to constitute “specific action against dumping” under Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and not to be in accordance with the Ad Note to Article VI:2 and 3 of the GATT 1994, as well as Article 18.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. The Appellate Body found that “[a]ssuming, arguendo, that such a defence is available to the United States”, (1085) the measure at issue was not “necessary” within the meaning of Article XX(d)” of the GATT 1994. Having made that finding, the Appellate Body stated that “we do not express a view on the question of whether a defence under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 was available to the United States”.(1086)

661.     In China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, the Appellate Body offered the following guidance on the use of arguendo assumptions by panels:

“We observe that reliance upon an assumption arguendo is a legal technique that an adjudicator may use in order to enhance simplicity and efficiency in decision-making. Although panels and the Appellate Body may choose to employ this technique in particular circumstances, it may not always provide a solid foundation upon which to rest legal conclusions. Use of the technique may detract from a clear enunciation of the relevant WTO law and create difficulties for implementation. Recourse to this technique may also be problematic for certain types of legal issues, for example, issues that go to the jurisdiction of a panel or preliminary questions on which the substance of a subsequent analysis depends. The purpose of WTO dispute settlement is to resolve disputes in a manner that preserves the rights and obligations of WTO Members and clarifies existing provisions of the covered agreements in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. In doing so, panels and the Appellate Body are not bound to favour the most expedient approach or that suggested by one or more of the parties to the dispute. Rather, panels and the Appellate Body must adopt an analytical methodology or structure appropriate for resolution of the matters before them, and which enables them to make an objective assessment of the relevant matters and make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.”(1087)

662.     In that case, the Appellate Body concluded that it was not appropriate to proceed on the basis of an arguendo assumption on the question of whether the defence in Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 could be invoked in respect of paragraph 5.1 of China’s Accession Protocol:

“In our view, assuming arguendo that China can invoke Article XX(a) could be at odds with the objective of promoting security and predictability through dispute settlement, and may not assist in the resolution of this dispute, in particular because such an approach risks creating uncertainty with respect to China’s implementation obligations.”(1088)

663.     In several cases, panels and the Appellate Body have considered arguments based on the principle of estoppel on an arguendo basis, and found that the conditions for estoppel were not met. Thus, in EC — Export Subsidies on Sugar, the Appellate Body observed that “even assuming arguendo that the principle of estoppel could apply in the WTO, its application would fall within these narrow parameters set out in the DSU”.(1089) Referring to the prior panel reports in Argentina —Poultry Anti-Dumping Duties and Guatemala — Cement II, the Panel in EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft observed that these panels “did not establish that the principle of estoppel applies in WTO dispute settlement proceedings; rather, the respective panels proceeded on the basis that, even if arguendo a principle of estoppel in the terms contended for did exist, it was not established on the specific facts of the case.”(1090)

664.     In US — Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint), the Panel found that, assuming arguendo that the allocation of patent rights under NASA/DOD R&D contracts and agreements with Boeing involves a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, the European Communities had failed to demonstrate that any such subsidy is specific within the meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. With respect to its use of this arguendo assumption, the Panel recalled the Appellate Body’s guidance in China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, and explained that:

“We have relied upon the arguendo assumption that the allocation of patent rights is a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement and proceeded directly to the issue of specificity under Article 2 of the SCM Agreement for the following reasons. First, the question of whether the allocation of patent rights under NASA/DOD R&D contracts and agreements with Boeing constitutes a financial contribution, whether in the form of a provision of goods within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement or otherwise, is a potentially difficult one; in contrast, the question of whether the alleged subsidy is specific is more straightforward. (On the question of whether the allocation of patent rights under NASA/DOD R&D contracts and agreements with Boeing involves a financial contribution in the form of a “provision” of “goods” or otherwise, see European Communities’ first written submission, paras. 841-842; United States’ first written submission, paras. 317-325 and 331; European Communities’ second written submission, paras. 536-548; United States’ response to question 127, and the European Communities’ related comments; Australia’s oral statement, paras. 28-34; Canada’s written submission, paras. 3-9.) In other words, we have relied upon this arguendo assumption to “enhance simplicity and efficiency” in our decisionmaking. Second, having found that the alleged subsidy is not specific under Article 2, our reliance upon this arguendo assumption creates no issues or difficulties from the point of view of the “implementation” of DSB recommendations and rulings. Third, the question of whether or not the allocation of patent rights constitutes a subsidy does not “go to the jurisdiction” of the Panel. Finally, the substance of our analysis under Article 2 does not depend on whether the measures at issue are properly characterized as subsidies within the meaning Article 1.”(109)

 

Footnotes:

847. (footnote original) European Communities — Hormones, supra, footnote 64, para. 133. back to text
848. Appellate Body Report, Canada — Aircraft, para. 187. See also Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 51. back to text
849. Appellate Body Report, Argentina — Footwear (EC), para. 74. As regards the Panel’s mandate limitations concerning the assessment of only specific claims, see paras. 413–414 of this Chapter. back to text
850. Panel Report, Australia — Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 — US), para. 6.19. back to text
851. Panel Report, Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 8.20. back to text
852. Panel Report, US — Shrimp (Ecuador), paras. 7.9 and 7.11. See also Panel Report, US — Shrimp (Thailand), para. 7.21. back to text
853. Panel Report, China — Publication and Audiovisual Products, para. 6.46. back to text
854. Panel Report, US — Poultry (China), paras. 7.445—7.446. back to text
855. Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1128. back to text
856. (footnote original) [1926], PCIJ Rep., Series A, No. 7, p. 19. back to text
857. Appellate Body Report, India — Patents (US), paras. 65—67. back to text
858. (footnote original) In this respect, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), referring to an earlier judgment by the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) noted the following: “Where the determination of a question of municipal law is essential to the Court’s decision in a case, the Court will have to weigh the jurisprudence of the municipal courts, and ‘If this is uncertain or divided, it will rest with the Court to select the interpretation which it considers most in conformity with the law’ (Brazilian Loans, PCIJ, Series A, Nos. 20/21, p. 124)” (Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 47, para. 62). back to text
859. Panel Report, US — Section 301 Trade Act, paras. 7.18 and 7.20. See also Panel Report, US — Steel Plate, para. 90. back to text
860. Panel Report, US — 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.46. back to text
861. (footnote original) This is evidenced by the examples used by the Appellate Body (Ibid., para. 67):
          “Previous GATT/WTO panels also have conducted a detailed examination of the domestic law of a Member in assessing the conformity of that domestic law with the relevant GATT/WTO obligations. For example, in United States — Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 [footnote omitted], the panel conducted a detailed examination of the relevant United States’ legislation and practice, including the remedies available under Section 337 as well as the difference between patent—based Section 337 proceedings and federal district court proceedings, in order to determine whether Section 337 was inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1947.” back to text
862. Panel Report, US — 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.51. back to text
863. (footnote original) ICJ, Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15, at p. 47, para. 62. back to text
864. (footnote original) We do not consider that this would be engaging into interpreting US law, with the risks highlighted by the United States in its submissions. Our approach is in line with the reasoning of the PCIJ in the Brazilian Loans case, which, even though it had to apply domestic law, was prudent in its approach of the domestic case—law:
          “It follows that the Court must pay the utmost regard to the decisions of the municipal courts of a country, for it is with the aid of their jurisprudence that it will be enabled to decide what are the rules which, in actual fact, are applied in the country the law of which is recognized as applicable in a given case” (PCIJ, Series A, Nos. 20/21, p. 124) back to text
865. Panel Report, US — 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.53. back to text
866. (footnote original) ICJ, Nuclear Tests case, judgements of 20 December 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 253 (Australia v. France), p. 457 (New Zealand v. France). See, e.g., Patrick Daillier & Alain Pellet, Droit International Public, 5th edition (1994), p. 354—358. back to text
867. (footnote original) See also Article 7 of the Vienna Convention. back to text
868. Panel Report, US — 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.63. back to text
869. Appellate Body Report, US — Shrimp (Article 21.5 — Malaysia), para. 95. back to text
870. Appellate Body Report, US — Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 105—106. back to text
871. Appellate Body Report, Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines), footnote 253. back to text
872. Appellate Body Report, EC — Bananas III, para. 167. back to text
873. Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 51. back to text
874. Panel Report, EC — Chicken Cuts, paras. 7.56—759. back to text
875. (footnote original) Panel Report, para. 7.104. back to text
876. Appellate Body Report, Chile — Price Band System, para. 173. back to text
877. Appellate Body Report, India — Quantitative Restrictions, para. 149. back to text
878. (footnote original) M. Kazazi, Burden of Proof and Related Issues: A Study on Evidence Before International Tribunals (Kluwer Law International, 1996), p. 117. back to text
879. (footnote original) See M. N. Howard, P. Crane and D. A. Hochberg, Phipson on Evidence, 14th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 1990), p. 52: “The burden of proof rests upon the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue.” See also L. Rutherford and S. Bone (eds.), Osborne’s Concise Law Dictionary, 8th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 1993), p. 266; Earl Jowitt and C. Walsh, Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, 2nd ed. by J. Burke (Sweet & Maxwell, 1977), Vol. 1, p. 263; L. B. Curzon, A Directory of Law, 2nd ed. (Macdonald and Evans, 1983), p. 47; Art. 9, Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile; J. Carbonnier, Droit Civil, Introduction, 20th ed. (Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), p. 320; J. Chevalier and L. Bach, Droit Civil, 12th ed. (Sirey, 1995), Vol. 1, p. 101; R. Guillien and J. Vincent, Termes juridiques, 10th ed. (Dalloz, 1995), p. 384; O. Samyn, P. Simonetta and C. Sogno, Dictionnaire des Termes Juridiques (Editions de Vecchi, 1986), p. 250; J. Gonzalez Perez, Manual de Derecho Procesal Administrativo, 2nd ed. (Editorial Civitas, 1992), p. 311; C. M. Bianca, S. Patti and G. Patti, Lessico di Diritto Civile (Giuffre Editore, 1991), p. 550; F. Galgano, Diritto Privato, 8th ed. (Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, 1994), p. 873; and A. Trabucchi, Istituzioni di Diritto Civile (Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, 1991), p. 210. back to text
880. Appellate Body Report, US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14. back to text
881. Panel Report, Turkey — Textiles, para. 9.57. See also Panel Report, Argentina — Textiles and Apparel, paras. 6.34—6.40. back to text
882. (footnote original) Adopted 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R, p. 14. back to text
883. Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 98. back to text
884. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report on EC — Hormones, para. 98. back to text
885. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report on US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:1, 323, at 335. back to text
886. Appellate Body Report, Japan — Apples, para. 157. back to text**
887. Panel Report, US — Large Civil Aircraft (T complaint), para. 7.13. back to text
888. Appellate Body Report, Canada — Dairy (Article 21.5 — New Zealand and US II), para. 66. back to text
889. Panel Report, US — Section 301 Trade Act, para. 7.14. See also Panel Reports, US — 1916 Act (EC), paras. 6.38 and 6.58; US — 1916 Act (Japan), paras. 6.25 and 6.57; Guatemala — Cement II, paras. 1.38 and 8.196; Argentina — Hides and Leather, para. 11.2; US — Shrimp (Article 21.5 — Malaysia), para. 5.19; US — Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 8.18; EC — Sardines, para. 7.49; and US — Textiles Rules of Origin, para. 6.17. back to text
890. Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 104. This was confirmed by the Appellate Body in its Reports Japan — Agricultural Products II, paras. 98 and 136 and Japan — Apples, para. 159. back to text
891. Appellate Body Report, US — Gambling, para. 139. back to text
892. Appellate Body Report, US — Gambling, paras. 140—141. See also Appellate Body Report, US — Zeroing (EC), para. 217. back to text
893. Appellate Body Report, US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14. back to text
894. Appellate Body Report, Korea — Dairy, paras. 137—138. back to text
895.  Appellate Body Report, US — Shrimp (Thailand) I US — Customs Bond Directive, para. 301. back to text
896. Appellate Body Report, Thailand — H—Beams, para. 134. See also Appellate Body Report, Canada — Aircraft, para. 185. back to text
897. Appellate Body Report, Korea — Dairy, para. 145. back to text
898. Appellate Body Report, India — Quantitative Restrictions, para. 137. back to text
899. Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 109; See also, the Appellate Body in its Reports Japan — Agricultural Products II, paras. 122 and 130. back to text
900. Appellate Body Report, US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), para. 321. back to text
901. the Appellate Body in its Reports Japan — Agricultural Products II, paras. 127—130. back to text
902. Appellate Body on US — Shrimp (Thailand) I US — Customs Bond Directive, para. 300. back to text
903. Appellate Body on US — Shrimp (Thailand) I US — Customs Bond Directive, para. 302. back to text
904. Panel Report, Turkey — Textiles, para. 6.39. back to text
905. Appellate Body Report, Canada — Aircraft, para. 198. back to text
906. Panel Report, US — Large Civil Aircraft (2n complaint), paras. 7.1820—7.1821. back to text
907. Appellate Body Report, Canada — Aircraft, paras. 202—203 and 205. With respect to the drawing of adverse inferences under the SCM Agreement, see also Annex V in the Chapter on the SCM Agreement. back to text
908. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report on Canada — Aircraft, paras. 204 and 205. back to text
909. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report on Canada — Aircraft, paras. 204 and 205. back to text
910. Appellate Body Report, US — Wheat Gluten, paras. 173—176. back to text
911. Panel Report, US — Large Civil Aircraft (2n complaint), para. 7.38. back to text
912. Appellate Body Report, US — Line Pipe, para. 187. back to text
913. Appellate Body Report, US — Gambling, para. 309. back to text
914. Appellate Body Report, Japan — Agricultural Products II, para. 137. back to text
915. Panel Report, Guatemala — Cement II, para. 8.196. back to text
916. Panel Report, Canada — Pharmaceutical Patents, para. 7.60. back to text
917. Appellate Body Report, US — Softwood Lumber VI (Article 21.5 —Canada), para. 130. back to text
918. Panel Report, Argentina — Hides and Leather, para. 11.51. back to text
919. Appellate Body Report, EC — Sardines, para. 281. back to text
920. Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada — Continued Suspension, para. 361. back to text
921. Panel Report, Argentina — Textiles and Apparel, paras. 6.40 and 6.58. back to text
922. Appellate Body Report, EC — Tariff Preferences, para. 105. back to text
923. Appellate Body Report, EC — Tariff Preferences, footnote 220. back to text
924. Panel Reports, EC — Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 7.121 and footnote 437. back to text
925. Panel Report, US — Zeroing (Japan) (Article 21.5 — Japan), para. 7.8. back to text
926. Appellate Body Report, US — Carbon Steel, para. 157. back to text
927. Award of the Arbitrator, EC — Bananas III (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 18—19. See also the Awards of the Arbitrator on Australia — Salmon (Article 21.3(c)), para. 30; Canada — Autos (Article 21.3(c)), para. 39; US — 1916 Act (Article 21.3(c)), paras. 38—39; and Chile —Price Band System (Article 21.3(c)), para. 38. back to text
928. Award of the Arbitrator, EC — Hormones (Article 21.3(c)), para. 27. back to text
929. Award of the Arbitrator, Colombia — Ports of Entry (Article 21.3(c)), para. 67. back to text
930. Appellate Body Report, Chile — Price Band System (Article 21.5—Argentina), para. 136. back to text
931. Decisions by the Arbitrators, EC — Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 — EC) and EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 — EC), paras. 9—11. See also Decision by the Arbitrators, EC — Bananas III (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 — EC), paras. 37—38; Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil — Aircraft (Article 22.6 — Brazil), para. 2.8 and footnote 12; Decision by the Arbitrator, US — FSC (Article 22.6 — US), paras. 2.10 and footnote 18; Decision by the Arbitrators US — 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 — US), para. 3.2 and 3.5. back to text
932. Decision by the Arbitrators, US — 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6— US), para. 3.3. back to text
933. (footnote original) See also how this issue is addressed in the Decisions by the Arbitrators in EC — Hormones, Op. Cit., paras. 8 to 11. back to text
934. Decision by the Arbitrator, Brazil — Aircraft (Article 22.6 — Brazil), para. 2.8. See also Decision by the Arbitrators on US — FSC (Article 22.6— US), para. 2.10. back to text
935. (footnote original) Report of the Appellate Body, US — Wool Shirts and Blouses DSR 1997:1, 323, at 337. back to text
936. (footnote original) For previous application of these rules in arbitration proceedings under Article 22.6 of the DSU, see Decision by the Arbitrators, EC — Hormones (Canada) (Article 22.6 — EC), paras. 8 ff For an application in the context of under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, see Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil — Aircraft, (Article 22.6 — Brazil), paras. 2.8 ff; Decision by the Arbitrator, US — FSC (Article 22.6 — US), paras. 2.8—2.11. back to text
937. (footnote original) Report of the Appellate Body, US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 335. back to text
938. (footnote original) Report of the Appellate Body, Canada — Aircraft, para. 190. back to text
939. (footnote original) This approach is similar to those followed in all other arbitrations under Article 22.6 of the DSU and under under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement. back to text
940. Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada — Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 — Canada), paras. 2.6—2.8. back to text
941. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, para. 185 (referring to Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, paras. 132 and 133). See also Appellate Body Report, Japan — Apples, para. 221; Appellate Body Report, EC — Asbestos, para. 161; Appellate Body Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 266; Appellate Body Report, EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), paras. 170, 177, and 181; Appellate Body Report, EC — Sardines, para. 299; Appellate Body Report, EC —Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 125; Appellate Body Report, Japan — Agricultural Products II, paras. 141 and 142; Appellate Body Report, Korea — Dairy, para. 138; Appellate Body Report, Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, paras. 161 and 162; Appellate Body Report, US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 313; Appellate Body Report, US —Gambling, para. 363; Appellate Body Report, EC — Selected Customs Matters, para. 258; and Appellate Body Report, US — Carbon Steel, para. 142. back to text
942. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 135. back to text
943. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 267. back to text
944. (footnote original) See, for example, Appellate Body Report, US —Wheat Gluten, para. 151; Appellate Body Report, EC — Sardines, para. 299; and Appellate Body Report, US — Carbon Steel, para. 142. back to text
945. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US — Wheat Gluten, para. 151. back to text
946. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US — Wheat Gluten, para. 151. back to text
947. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), footnote 618 to para. 293. back to text
948. (footnote original) See Appellate Body Report, US — Carbon Steel, para. 338. back to text
949. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), para. 293. back to text
950. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), para. 292. back to text
951. Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1317. back to text
952. Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft, para. 872. back to text
953. Appellate Body Report, US — Steel Safeguards, para. 497. See also Appellate Body Report, Japan — DRAMS (Korea), para. 184. back to text
954. Appellate Body Report, EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft, para. 1318. back to text
955. Prior to EC — Hormones, an Article 11 claim was raised on appeal in US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, but that claim addressed solely the issue of “whether Article 11 of the DSU entitles a complaining party to a finding on each of the legal claims it makes to a panel”. See Appellate Body Report, US — Wool Shirts and Blouse, p. 17. As such, the claim did not challenge the panels “assessment of the facts of the case”. In addition, in Canada — Periodicals, the appellant raised the issue of Article 11 when challenging the panels reliance on a “hypothetical example” to make a determination of “like products” under Article III:2 of the GATT 1994. See Appellate Body Report, Canada — Periodicals, p. 5. The Appellate Body, however, made no ruling on Article 11. (Appellate Body Report, Canada — Periodicals, pp. 20—23) back to text
956. Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 133. See also Appellate Body Reports, Japan — Apples, para. 221; EC — Asbestos, para. 161; Australia — Salmon, para. 266; EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), paras. 170, 177 and 181; EC — Sardines, para. 299; EC — Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 125; Japan — Agricultural Products II, paras. 141 and 142; Korea — Dairy, para. 138; Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, paras. 161 and 162; US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 313; US— Gambling, para. 363; EC — Selected Customs Matters, para. 258; US — Carbon Steel, para. 142; Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, para. 185. back to text
957. Appellate Body Report, Korea — Dairy, para. 137. back to text
958. Appellate Body Report, Japan — DRAMs (Korea), paras. 131—139. back to text
959. Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 132. back to text
960. Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 135. back to text
961. Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 138. back to text
962. Appellate Body Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 267. back to text
963. The Appellate Body referred to EC — Hormones, para. 133. back to text
964. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report on Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, paras. 161—162. See also Appellate Body Report on India — Quantitative Restrictions, paras. 143—144. back to text
965. Panel Report, Australia — Automotive Leather II, para. 9.25. back to text
966. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Korea — Dairy Safeguard, supra, footnote 29, para. 137. back to text
967. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (“European Communities — Hormones”), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:1, 135, at 183, para. 132. back to text
968. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Korea — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (“Korea — Alcoholic Beverages”), WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999, paras. 161 and 162. back to text
969. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Korea — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (“Korea — Alcoholic Beverages”), WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999, paras. 161 and 162. back to text
970. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Hormones, supra, footnote 138, at 183—188, paras. 131—142; Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Poultry, supra, footnote 119, paras. 131—136; Appellate Body Report, Australia — Salmon, supra, footnote 119, paras. 262—267; Appellate Body Report, Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, supra, footnote 139, paras. 159—165; Appellate Body Report, Japan —Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 1999, paras. 140—142; Appellate Body Report, India — Quantitative Restrictions on Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R, adopted 22 September 1999, paras. 149 and 151; and, Appellate Body Report, Korea — Dairy Safeguard, supra, footnote 29, paras. 137 and 138. back to text
971. Appellate Body Report, US — Wheat Gluten, para. 299. back to text
972. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 133. back to text
973. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US — Wheat Gluten, paras. 161—162. back to text
974. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 135. back to text
975. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US — Wheat Gluten, para. 151. back to text
976. Appellate Body Report, US — Carbon Steel, para. 142. back to text
977. (footnote original) As we have stated, “[t]his is a grant of discretionary authority: a panel is not duty—bound to seek information in each and every case or to consult particular experts under this provision.” (Appellate Body Report, Argentina — Textiles and Apparel, para. 84) back to text
978. Appellate Body Report, US — Carbon Steel, para. 153. back to text
979. Appellate Body Report, EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), para. 177. back to text
980. Appellate Body Report, EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), para. 181. back to text
981. Appellate Body Report, Japan — Apples, paras. 165—166. back to text
982. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Asbestos, para. 161. See also, for example, Appellate Body Report, EC — Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 125; Appellate Body Report, EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), paras. 170, 177, and 181; Appellate Body Report, EC — Sardines, para. 299; Appellate Body Report, Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, para. 138. back to text
983. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 267. back to text
984. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Asbestos, para. 161. back to text
985. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 133. back to text
986. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Asbestos, para. 177, quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, para. 161. back to text
987. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Asbestos, para. 159, quoting Appellate Body Report, US — Wheat Gluten, para. 151. back to text
988. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), para. 170; Appellate Body Report, US — Carbon Steel, para. 142, quoting Appellate Body Report, US — Wheat Gluten, para. 151. back to text
989. Appellate Body Report, Japan — Apples, paras. 221—222. back to text
990. (footnote original) Supra, para. 181, quoting from Appellate Body Report, US — Carbon Steel, para. 142. back to text
991. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 135. The Appellate Body further observed that “[t]he Panel cannot realistically refer to all statements made by the experts advising it and should be allowed a substantial margin of discretion as to which statements are useful to refer to explicitly.” (Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 138) back to text
992. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 133; Appellate Body Report, EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), para. 177. back to text
993. Appellate Body Report, Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 186. back to text
994.  Appellate Body Report, US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 188. back to text
995. (footnote original) see Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 132. See also Appellate Body Report, EC — Sardines, para. 299. back to text
996. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US — Carbon Steel, para. 142. See also Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, para. 133. back to text
997. (footnote original) Ibid. See also Appellate Body Report. US — Wheat Glute, paras. 160—162. back to text
998. (footnote original) See Appellate Body Report, US — Gambling, para. 330. back to text
999. (footnote original) See Panel Report, footnote 688 to para. 7.53. back to text
1000. (footnote original) Ibid., para. 7.53. (footnote omitted) back to text
1001. Appellate Body Report, US — Zeroing (Japan), paras. 82 and 88. back to text
1002. Appellate Body Report, EC — Hormones, paras. 132—133,135 and 138. See also Appellate Body Report, Japan — Apples, para. 222. back to text
1003. Appellate Body Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 267. back to text
1004. Appellate Body Report, Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, para. 164. back to text
1005. Appellate Body Report, Japan — Agricultural Products II, paras. 141—142. back to text
1006. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, para. 164. back to text
1007. Appellate Body Report, EC — Bed linen (Article 21.5 — India), para. 177. back to text
1008. Appellate Body Report, Chile — Price Band System, para. 176. back to text
1009. Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada — Continued Suspension, para. 481. back to text
1010. Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada — Continued Suspension, para. 481. back to text
1011. Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada — Continued Suspension, para. 482. back to text
1012. Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada — Continued Suspension, para. 482. back to text
1013. Appellate Body Reports, US/Canada — Continued Suspension, para. 615. back to text
1014. Appellate Body Report, Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines), paras. 147—161. back to text
1015.  (footnote original) As we have observed in two previous Appellate Body Reports, we believe that detailed, standard working procedures for panels would help to ensure due process and fairness in panel proceedings. See European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, adopted 25 September 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 144; India — Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, adopted 16 January 1998, WT/DS50/AB/R, para. 95. back to text
1016. Appellate Body Report, Argentina — Textiles and Apparel, paras. 79—81. back to text
1017 Panel Report, Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, paras. 5.24—5.25. back to text
1018. (footnote original) At the time of the second substantive meeting, we asked the parties a series of questions that could have led to the submission of new evidence or arguments. In order to ensure due process, we allowed each party 18 days (i.e., equivalent to the time between the deadline for the respondent’s first submission and the deadline for rebuttal submissions) in which to comment on any new evidence or arguments adduced by the other party in response to our questions. back to text
1019. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report on EC — Bananas III, para. 145. back to text
1020. Panel Report, Canada — Aircraft, paras. 9.73—9.74. back to text
1021. Panel Report, US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 7.2. back to text
1022. (footnote original) Article 15.1 of the DSU provides:
          Following the consideration of rebuttal submissions and oral arguments, the panel shall issue the descriptive (factual and argument) sections of its draft report to the parties to the dispute. Within a period of time set by the panel, the parties shall submit their comments in writing. back to text
1023. (footnote original) Article 15.2 of the DSU provides: back to text
1024. Appellate Body Report, EC — Sardines, para. 301. back to text
1025. Panel Report, Japan — Apples, paras. 8.49 and 8.56. back to text
1026. Appellate Body Report, US — Steel Safeguards, para. 5.3. back to text
1027. (footnote original) However, we recall that, in US — Cotton Yarn, the Appellate Body stated (when reviewing a textile safeguards determination) that a Member cannot be expected to examine “evidence that did not exist and that, therefore, could not possibly have been taken into account when the Member made its determination. … Consequently, a panel must not consider evidence which did not exist at that point in time.” (Appellate Body Report, US — Cotton Yarn, paras. 77 and 78 (emphasis original; footnote omitted)) We also note the Appellate Body’s statement in EC — Sardines that “[t]he interim review stage is not an appropriate time to introduce new evidence.” (Appellate Body Report, EC — Sardines, para. 301). back to text
1028. Appellate Body Report, EC — Selected Customs Matters, para. 188. back to text
1029. Appellate Body Report, US — Continued Zeroing, para. 190. back to text
1030. (footnote original) Kazazi, Mojtaba, Burden of Proof and Related Issues — A Study of Evidence Before International Tribunals, Malanczuk, Peter, ed., Kluwer Law International, The Hague, pp. 180, 184. back to text
1031. (footnote original) Korea — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, panel Report, WT/DS75/RWT/DS84/R, adopted 17 February 1999, para. 10.23 (issue not raised on appeal). This is unlike the situation before many international tribunals, which often refuse to admit evidence obtained during settlement negotiations between the parties to a dispute. The circumstances of such settlement negotiations are clearly different from WTO dispute settlement consultations, which are, as the Appellate Body has noted, part of the means by which facts are clarified before a panel proceeding. back to text
1032. Panel Report, EC — Bed Linen, paras. 6.32—6.35. back to text
1033. Appellate Body Report, Canada — Aircraft, para. 198. back to text
1034. Appellate Body Report, US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras. 150 and 154. back to text
1035. Appellate Body Report, US — Continued Zeroing, para. 357. back to text
1036. (footnote original) Exhibit US—24. back to text
1037. Panel Report, EC and certain member States — Large Civil Aircraft, para. 7.1919. back to text
1038. (footnote original) See, for example, EEC — Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain Products from Hong Kong, adopted 12 July 1983, BISD 30S/129, para. 33; Canada — Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, adopted 7 February 1984, BISD 30S/140, para. 5.16; United States — Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, adopted 13 March 1984, BISD 31S/67, paras. 4.5—4.6; United States — Manufacturing Clause, adopted 15/16 May 1984, BISD 31S/74, para. 40; Japan — Measures on Imports of Leather, adopted 15/16 May 1984, BISD 31S/94, para. 57; Japan — Trade in Semi—Conductors, adopted 4 May 1988, BISD 35S/116, para. 122; Japan — Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/163, para. 5.4.2; EEC — Regulations on Imports of Parts and Components, adopted 16 May 1990, BISD 37S/132, paras. 5.10, 5.22, and 5.27; Canada — Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37, para. 5.6; and United States — Denial of Most—Favoured—Nation Treatment as to Non—Rubber Footwear from Brazil, adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/128, para. 6.18. back to text
1039. (footnote original) See, for example, Panel Report, Brazil — Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, adopted 20 March 1997, WT/DS22/R, para. 293; and Panel Report, United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, AB—1996—1, adopted 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/9, para. 6.43. back to text
1040. (footnote original) See, for example, EEC — Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples, Complaint by Chile, adopted 22 June 1989, BISD 36S/93, para.12.20, where the panel explicitly stated that given its finding that the EEC measures were in violation of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1947 and were not justified by Article XI:2(c)(i) or (ii) of the GATT 1947, no further examination of the administration of the measures would normally be required. In that case, the panel nonetheless considered it “appropriate” to examine the administration of the EEC measures in respect of Article XIII of the GATT 1947 in view of the questions of great practical interest raised by both parties. back to text
1041. Appellate Body Report, US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, pp. 18—19. back to text
1042. Appellate Body Report, US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 18. back to text
1043. (footnote original) The “matter in issue” is the “matter referred to the DSB” pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU. back to text
1044. (footnote original) Japan — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, AB—1996—2, adopted 1 November 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, p. 13. back to text
1045. Appellate Body Report, US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, pp. 19—20. back to text
1046. Appellate Body Report, India — Patents (US), para. 87. back to text
1047. Appellate Body Report, Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133. back to text
1048. Appellate Body Report, Brazil — Retreaded Tyres, para. 257. back to text
1049. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC — Poultry, para. 135. (emphasis omitted) back to text
1050. Appellate Body Report, US — Lead and Bismuth II, paras. 71 and 73. back to text
1051. Appellate Body Report, Argentina — Footwear (EC), para. 145. back to text
1052. Panel Report, EC — Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, paras. 7.201—7.202. back to text
1053.See Panel Report, EC — Countervailing Measures on DRAM Chips, para. 8.3. back to text
1054. Panel Report, India — Autos, para. 7.161. back to text
1055. Appellate Body Report, Canada — Autos, paras. 116—117. back to text
1056. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133. back to text
1057. (footnote original) The Panel stated that it did not believe it “necessary to conduct any additional examination”. (Panel Report, footnote 1061 to para. 7.882). back to text
1058. (footnote original) The United States asserts that “the Panel properly exercised judicial economy in not examining threat of circumvention for agricultural products with respect to which it found actual circumvention”. (United States’ appellee’s submission, para. 42). back to text
1059. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 223. See also Appellate Body Report, Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133. back to text
1060. Appellate Body Report, US — Upland Cotton, para. 718. back to text
1061. Appellate Body Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 223. See also Appellate Body Report, US — Upland Cotton, para. 732; Panel Report, EC — Sardines, paras. 7.148—7.152; Appellate Body Report, US — Steel Safeguards, para. 10.703;Panel Report, EC — Commercial Vessels, para. 7.225. back to text
1062. Appellate Body Report, Japan — Agricultural Products II, para. 111. back to text
1063. See para. 649 of this Chapter. back to text
1064. (footnote original) Panel Report, United States — Anti—Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea (“United States — Korea Steel”), WT/DS179/R, adopted 1 February 2001, para. 5.11. back to text
1065. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, United States — Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Iamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia (“United States — Iamb Safeguards”), WT/DS177/AB/R and WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, para. 194. back to text
1066. Panel Report, Argentina — Ceramic Tiles, para. 6.81. back to text
1067. See Appellate Body Report, Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133. back to text
1068. (footnote original) To address the claims of the Complaining Parties under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, the Panel would have had to examine, as a preliminary matter, whether Article 3 of the SCM Agreement applies to the export subsidies in this dispute. back to text
1069. Appellate Body Report, EC — Export Subsidies on Sugar, para. 335. back to text
1070. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133. (emphasis original; footnote omitted) back to text
1071. (footnote original) See Appellate Body Report, Australia — Salmon, para. 223. back to text
1072. (footnote original) For the same reason, we also do not find it necessary to consider Mexico’s arguments, in paras. 119—126 of its appellant’s submission, related to Articles 1 and 18.3 of the Anti—Dumping Agreement. back to text
1073. (footnote original) Mexico’s response to questioning at the oral hearing. See also Mexico’s appellant’s submission, para. 120. back to text
1074. (footnote original) Mexico’s appellant’s submission, para. 125. back to text
1075. (footnote original) Panel Report, para. 7.81. (emphasis added). back to text
1076. (footnote original) See Appellate Body Report, EC — Bed Linen (Article 21.5 — India), para. 170. back to text
1077. Appellate Body Report, US — Anti—Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods, paras. 178—180. See also US — Zeroing (EC), paras. 223—225, 248—250. back to text
1078. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, Canada — Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 133. back to text
1079. (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, para. 339. back to text
1080. Panel Report, US — Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 7.742—7.746. back to text
1081. Appellate Body Report, Mexico — Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 — US), paras. 52—53 and 67. back to text
1082. Appellate Body Report, US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 220. back to text
1083. (footnote original) In the light of the above, we need not decide here whether the requirements of Articles 11 and 12.7 are applicable to a panels consideration of a request for a suggestion pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU. back to text
1084. Appellate Body Report, US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 — Argentina), para. 183. back to text
1085. Appellate Body Reports, US — Shrimp (Thailand) /US— Customs Bond Directive, para. 310. back to text
1086. Appellate Body Reports, US — Shrimp (Thailand) /US— Customs Bond Directive, para. 319. back to text
1087. Appellate Body Report, China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 213. back to text

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