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On 24 December 1998 the government of Pakistan received a Call Notice
from the US government for consultation regarding the establishment of
quantitative restraints on Pakistani exports of combed cotton yarn
(Category 301). The basis of this was the allegation on the part of the
United States that the exports of Pakistan were causing verifiable harm
to the US textile sector. The legal grounds employed by the United
States were the transitional safeguard measures sanctioned under Article
6 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) of the WTO.(1)
This was the first time in the trade history of Pakistan that a case
went through all the stages of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.(2)
After the failure of bilateral consultations as the first stage of the
case, Pakistan had to take the case to the Textile Monitoring Board (TMB)
and finally to the Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) of the WTO.
Although the eventual outcome was in Pakistan’s
favour, the pursuit of a positive decision was a challenging task
manifested by an array of problems relating to co-ordination and
co-operation between the public and the private sectors. The objective
of this case study therefore is not just to narrate the events which
occurred in this case but also to highlight the various obstacles faced
by the government and the business players in contesting the case at
each stage of the dispute settlement process. This is done so as to
underline the lessons that Pakistan learned about both its trade policy
administration and the role and value of the WTO in the management of an
important dispute.
I. The problem in context back to top
Since 1995 there has been a world-wide
increase in textile trade, primarily due to the phasing out of the
Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) and the introduction of the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) under the WTO. Under the new regime the
previously high quota restraints on the textile and clothing exports of
developing countries were to be gradually reduced to bring this sector
into compliance with the WTO rules. The textile sector of Pakistan
responded positively to the general reduction in quotas by the developed
world. The existing manufacturers embarked on an expansion strategy by
investing in the enhancement of their production capacity. At the same
time new manufacturers entered the industry increasing total production
and the volume of exports.(3)
Consequently in that period Pakistan became the second-largest exporter
of combed cotton yarn to the United States, inadvertently giving cause
to the United States to employ the transitional safeguard measures
sanctioned by the ATC.
The importance of the textile sector, often
referred to as the backbone of the Pakistan economy, cannot be
overstated. It is the country’s largest manufacturing sector with an
8.5% share in the nation’s GDP. The sector’s contribution to
employment is 38% and it generates a phenomenal 60% of the total export
earnings of Pakistan.(4)
Within the textile sector those directly
affected by the quota restrictions were the exporters and manufacturers
of combed cotton yarn. These restrictions not only threatened their and
the country’s economic well-being but also significantly increased the
scepticism of local business and government towards the West’s
commitment to free trade. As this was the second time the United States
had employed transitional safeguard measures, the general feeling among
the business players in the post-MFA era was that the US government was
using this as an alternative policy instrument for protecting its
textile manufacturers, putting at stake the viability of the Pakistan
textile industry. The prevailing views of the business players about the
quota restraints can be summed up by the following comment by an
exporter: ‘On one hand the West has been strongly advocating free
global market, but on the other they are imposing such restrictions
which themselves negate their actions and deeds.’(5)
Moreover, the type of role played by the
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO was of paramount importance.
Notwithstanding the fact that in 1996 Pakistan was able to deter the
United States from employing the safeguard measures at the bilateral
negotiations stage, there was still scepticism amongst local business
players about the WTO. The primary reason for this was the paucity of
information within the private sector about the workings and the
objectives of the WTO and a generally held notion of it being more
representative of Western trade interests. Thus this was an occasion
which could instil the credibility of the organization locally by
removing the prevalent doubts about its effectiveness in maintaining the
principles of free and fair trade between unequal partners.
Beside the direct economic benefits of lifting
the quota restraints, the importance of this case also hinged on the
legal precedent which it could potentially establish. In the words of
Akbar Sheikh, the local consultant representing the government of
Pakistan at the various stages of the case,
The legal grounds on which the quota restrictions
were imposed by the United States had to be challenged as these could
have led to the establishment of a precedent causing long term problems
not only for Pakistan but for the rest of the developing world in future
dispute settlement cases within this sector.(6)
Thus the role of the local players involved in
effectively managing the case at the various stages of the dispute
settlement mechanism of the WTO was crucial. The significance of a
positive outcome stemmed from both the restoration of confidence of the
local business in the new global trading environment and in affecting
the future trade policies of larger countries such as the United States.
II. The local and
external players and their roles back to top
All Pakistan Textile Mills Association
The business/industry players, both exporters
and manufacturers, were represented by the All Pakistan Textile Mills
Association (APTMA). This is a broadly based body whose members come
from all categories and types of textile and clothing manufacturers and
traders. In 1998, when the quota restraints were imposed by the United
States, the association had a standing committee on anti-dumping and WTO
affairs.
The objective of this committee was initially
to co-ordinate with the Ministry of Commerce in the identification and
hiring of appropriate consultants and lawyers to represent Pakistan in
the bilateral negotiations with the United States and then in the
dispute settlement stages of the WTO.
Second, in order to facilitate the preparation
and proceedings of the case, the committee and hence APTMA had to act as
a liaison between the government and the business players. This was done
by providing trade and industry information to the local and
international consultants representing the government. Also, the
committee had to keep the members of APTMA abreast of the developments
in the case.
Finally, APTMA, in consultation with its
members and the Commerce Ministry of Pakistan, had to formulate an
acceptable mechanism for the payment of the high legal fees involved in
the case.
The Ministry of Commerce
back to top
The Ministry of Commerce, as the relevant
ministerial arm of the Pakistan government, was directly involved in all
the stages of the case — the bilateral negotiations with the United
States, the TMB review and finally at the DSB. The ministry’s Export
Promotion Bureau (EPB) had to co-ordinate with APTMA in the payment of
the legal costs incurred during the case.
At that time there was no effective
institutional framework within the Ministry of Commerce which could deal
with WTO-related dispute settlement cases. Due to the lack of internal
expertise, the ministry had to engage the services of a local
consultant, Akbar Sheikh. He acted as a representative of the government
at the WTO along with Nasim Qureshi, Joint Secretary at the Ministry of
Commerce.
The basis for Akbar Sheikh’s selection was
his past experience at the level of bilateral negotiations and an
in-depth knowledge of the textile sector of Pakistan. His role was to
build the defence case for Pakistan along with the international
consultants and lawyers and to present it effectively at both the TMB
review and the DSB stage. For this purpose he had to work closely with
both the Commerce Ministry (Nasim Qureshi) and APTMA.
The international lawyers and consultants
back to top
The lack of local expertise in international
trade law and WTO-related issues had led Pakistan to hire the services
of international consultants and lawyers in previous dispute settlement
cases. In the 1996 combed cotton yarn case APTMA and the Pakistan
government had hired the services of International Development Systems
(IDS), a Washington-based consultancy firm. IDS had successfully
defended Pakistan’s case during the negotiations with the United
States. Hence in 1998, when the United States issued the call notice for
a second time, APTMA, in consultation with the government, again engaged
IDS. The consultant from IDS was Brenda Jacobs, both at the bilateral
negotiations with the United States and at the TMB review. Along with
IDS another Washington based law firm, Travis, Sandler and Rosenberg,
was engaged for the TMB review.
However, once the case went to the final DSB
stage the Ministry of Commerce decided to engage the services of lawyers
based in Geneva, where the dispute settlement proceedings of the WTO are
held.
III. Challenges
faced and the outcome back to top
The TMB review
At the proceedings
After the failure of the bilateral
negotiations between Pakistan and the United States, on 5 March 1999 the
United States notified the Textile Monitoring Body (TMB) pursuant to
Article 6 of the ATC that it had decided to impose the quota restraints
for three years. This measure came into effect from 17 March 1999. The
matter was taken up at the 54th meeting of the TMB held in April 1999.
The Pakistan side was represented by Akbar Sheikh, Brenda Jacobs of IDS,
and Travis, Sandler and Rosenberg.
This was apparently one of the longest cases
at the TMB, lasting for around six days. As mentioned earlier, this was
the first time Pakistan had gone to the TMB review, hence there was a
certain degree of anxiety about the nature and result of the proceedings
to follow. According to Akbar Sheikh the US team, owing to their
numbers, initially looked quite formidable. There were US government
functionaries, textile experts and trade lawyers and consultants present
during the review. Moreover, the importance the United States was giving
to this case was evident from the fact that the US chief textile
negotiator, ambassador Don Johnson, who is normally not required to
attend such meetings, was present even during the extended time of the
sessions. The case was strongly contested by both sides, as it was
clearly regarded as establishing a precedent.(7)
The questions and discussions were found to be
fairly challenging by Pakistan, but according to Akbar Sheikh they were
able to rebut most of the arguments put forward by the US side. Pakistan’s
case focused on the ‘spurious’ definition of domestic industry
employed by the United States and therefore on the viability of the data
used to draw an alleged causality between the imports from Pakistan and
the decrease in US textile production. The legal precedent aspect of the
case was the definition of domestic industry employed by the United
States. The United States had defined its domestic industry as the
producers of yarn for sale in the merchant market, excluding from the
data vertically integrated producers that were producing yarn as an
intermediate good. Pakistan claimed that this definition violated
Article 6.2 of the ATC, as it resulted in the failure of the United
States to consider its entire domestic industry.(8)
After six long days of deliberations,
arguments and counter-arguments the efforts of the Pakistan team bore
fruit and the TMB, accepting Pakistan’s central arguments, gave a
ruling in favour of Pakistan and recommending an immediate lifting of
the quota restrictions.(9)
The positive decision at the first ever TMB
review was a major achievement by Pakistan. The co-ordinated efforts of
the government, APTMA and the business players had been successful,
although as the TMB recommendations are non-binding on the countries,
the United States did not rescind the quota restraints and appealed
against the decision. The appeal was rejected, however, and the
recommendation to lift the quota restraints was reiterated by the TMB
panel.
Behind the scenes
The failure of the bilateral negotiations had
made it evident to the Pakistan government and APTMA that for the US
government this was a critical case, since it could lead to the
establishing of a legal precedent which could be utilized against
Pakistan at least for the duration of the ATC.(10)
Moreover, Pakistan’s response to the US action had to be determined
and strong so as to give a signal that in the post-ATC era (after 2005)
employing contingent measures such as anti-dumping duties would not go
unchallenged. These important aspects, to an extent, were conveyed
successfully by APTMA to the local business players involved, exporters
and manufacturers, which was reflected by their willingness to play a
pro-active role during the TMB review stage.
The first example of co-operation of the
business players with APTMA and the government was the provision of
relevant export and production data by the combed cotton yarn
manufacturers and exporters. This helped in the formulation of Pakistan’s
defence case at the TMB review and later at the DSB stage.
However, the lack of relevant experience on
the part of APTMA and the absence of an effective institutional
structure in the Commerce Ministry in terms of handling dispute
settlement cases meant that there was no set rule when it came to the
payment of the high legal fees charged by the international lawyers and
consultants. Hence APTMA had the onerous task of coming up with an
acceptable formula for sharing the costs. After some discussion and
bargaining with the Commerce Ministry, it was decided in a meeting held
with the Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) that 50% of the costs were to be
paid by APTMA and the other 50% by the EPB. APTMA’s 50% share was to
be divided equally between the affected members (the exporters of combed
cotton yarn) and the non-affected members of APTMA.
The willingness to share the financial burden
at this stage to some extent reflected the realization amongst members
of APTMA of the significance of the case and its long-term benefits. The
following excerpt from a letter written by one of the large
manufacturers and exporters of combed cotton yarn is indicative of the
willingness to co-operate with APTMA:
The Textile Industry is deeply indebted to your
good selves, and your TEAM on the strong stand that you have taken to
resist the imposition of QUOTA and the steps taken by APTMA, are highly
appreciable…. We wholeheartedly support your actions, and steps taken
for the waiver of quotas, and further extend our availability for any
kind of help and assistance which is required by APTMA to take up this
issue with the TMB.
While most of the affected exporters or
manufacturers of combed cotton yarn finally did contribute their
respective share, the EPB paid only 31% of their share of the costs,
thus reneging from their initial commitment to paying 50%. The shortfall
resulted in a five-month delay in the payment to Travis, Sandler and
Rosenberg, which charged a premium of 1.5% per month for the delay.(11)
Finally, the collaboration between APTMA and
the Ministry of Commerce was to a large extent facilitated by Akbar
Sheikh’s good personal links with both Nasim Qureshi and the Pakistan
ambassador to Switzerland, Munir Akram. The co-operative role played by
these two government representatives was a key reason for the success at
the TMB review. Thus in the absence of any institutionalized
co-ordination and collaboration between the public and the private
sectors, it was individual links which mattered in achieving a positive
outcome.(12)
The DSB stage
back to top
Delay in taking the case up to the DSB
As the United States refused to comply with
the recommendation of the TMB review, failing to do so even after their
appeal was rejected in June 1999, the only course of action left for
Pakistan was to take the case to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Board (DSB).
This was the final and hence most important stage of the case, as unlike
the TMB review the decision by the panel at DSB is binding on the
countries involved. However, it took the government almost an entire
year to request the establishment of a panel at the DSB. After the
success at the TMB review such a delay at this critical stage came at a
large cost to the exporters and manufacturers of combed cotton yarn. In
the international market the demand for combed cotton yarn was picking
up, so that the quota restraints were inhibiting Pakistan’s potential
exports and foreign exchange earnings even more.(13)
Immediately after the TMB review there was a
meeting of the APTMA standing committee on anti-dumping and WTO affairs
to give a briefing on the proceeding at the TMB. The convenor was of the
view that ‘in the case that the US action is not rescinded within
fifteen days, the Pakistan government must apply to the Dispute
Settlement Body of the WTO’. In August 1999 the United States in a
letter to TMB renewed its determination to retain the quota
restrictions, thus rendering the TMB review unresolved.
Following the failure of the TMB review, in a
letter in September to the APTMA chairman, Nasim Qureshi reiterated that
both APTMA and Pakistan government ‘may start preparations immediately
for initiating the dispute settlement process’. In the letter it was
also stated that after consultation with the Pakistan mission in Geneva,
the ministry had decided to hire the services of a Geneva-based firm.
The expected total cost of preparing, filing and contesting the case was
quoted as $125,000, which according to the ministry thus was far less
than the $200,000 quoted by the US-based law firm. According to Akbar
Sheikh the reasons for hiring Geneva-based lawyers was to avoid the
large miscellaneous costs (travel, board, etc.) of hiring consultants
based in Washington.(14)
Thus the reason for switching lawyers at the last stage of the case
seemed purely financial. Though hiring the lawyers was to take place
immediately, it was not until 1 March 2000 that APTMA and the Pakistan
government signed a contract with the Geneva-based legal adviser,
Frieder Roessler.
Another likely reason contributing to the
delay could have been the bilateral consultations between the United
States and Pakistan held in November 1999 and then in January 2000. The
hope of getting the quota restraints lifted after bilateral negotiations
might have caused the Pakistan government to wait till the outcome of
these talks. According to Akbar Sheikh there were some indications from
the US side of the possibility that the quota restraints would be
lifted, hence it was thought inappropriate to file a case with the DSB
close to the scheduled talks.
As the bilateral consultation failed, in
hindsight Akbar Sheikh felt that it could have been a delaying tactic
employed by the United States. The quota restraints had been imposed for
three years, and the United States was strategizing to buy time to cover
as much of this period as possible.(15)
Finally, in April 2000, the Pakistan government took the case to the DSB,
which established a Panel at its request.
The raising of funds to contest the case at the
DSB
As this was the first time Pakistan was
contesting a case at the DSB level there was no institutional set-up or
guidelines for the payment of the expenses involved. As with the TMB
stage, APTMA and the Commerce Ministry had to come up with an agreement.
APTMA’s proposal of a cost-sharing formula was finally accepted in
February 2000 by the Commerce Ministry. It was decided that out of the
estimated total cost of $125,000 APTMA was to contribute the first $50,000, the balance to be given by the EPB using the revenue generated from
the Export Development Fund (EDF).(16)
The next stage for APTMA was to get the
concerned exporters/ manufacturers to contribute their share so as to
raise the agreed initial amount of $50,000. Unlike at the TMB stage,
there was a problem within APTMA in getting the concerned business
players to contribute a second time for the legal expenses at the DSB
stage.
Some large manufacturers/exporters of combed
cotton yarn saw beyond their immediate economic interest and understood
the value of persisting with the case at this last and most important
stage. These players were willing to contribute whatever was required of
them. At the same time there were others who had contributed at the TMB
stage but because of a lack of understanding of the mechanism of dispute
settlement at the WTO and frustration owing to US non-compliance saw no
reason to contribute in order to pursue the case further. It is safe to
say that these players did not quite appreciate the significance of the
case in terms of the long-term benefits of pursuing to the end a
positive decision. The following excerpts are an example of the degree
of divergence of views within the members of APTMA:(17)
Pakistan must move its case to the Dispute
Settlement Board. In my opinion, however expensive and cumbersome these
processes may be, we must do our utmost to fight these cases to protect
our existing and potential markets. In this connection I would request
you to call a meeting of the concerned members to develop a strategy to
contest the above case. (From a letter written to APTMA by a
co-operating large manufacturer/exporter)
Please note that we already are the largest quota
holders in this category from Pakistan. It is not in our interest to
have this quota removed as its imposition creates a barrier to entry for
others. It does not make any economic sense for us to ‘pay to cut our
own feet’. We therefore feel that it is unjust for APTMA to ask us to
pay for this contribution. (From a letter written to APTMA by a
non-co-operating large exporter/manufacturer)
These financing problems were eventually
resolved and APTMA was able to meet its commitment of paying the initial
$50,000 of the cost incurred at the DSB. In the words of Akbar Sheikh
on the issue of financing at the DSB, ‘Such disagreements within the
association are quite common and thus were anticipated. The important
thing was that in the end the business players, APTMA and the government
got together to contest the case successfully at the DSB.’
The proceedings
The first hearing of the case was held in
Geneva on 16 and 17 November and the second hearing on 13 and 14
December 2000. The hearings were before the three-member panel
established by the Dispute Settlement Body of WTO.(18)
A three-member team consisting of Akbar Sheikh, S. I. M. Nayyar (counsellor,
Pakistan permanent mission in Geneva) and Frieder Roessler represented
Pakistan. A ten-member team represented the US government. According to
Akbar Sheikh the proceedings of the DSB were quite different from those
at the TMB review. While at the TMB there was a lot of discussion and
argument, at the DSB there was more paper work, that is questions during
the hearings were focused on the written submissions by the United
States and Pakistan.
Pakistan contested the case successfully, and
on 31 May 2001 the Panel in its report recommended an immediate lifting
of the quota restrictions by the United States.(19)
The United States appealed against the decision on 9 July and the appeal
hearing was held on 16 August, when the Panel upheld its earlier
decision and recommended an immediate lifting of the quota restraints.
Finally, complying with the recommendations of
the DSB and the Appellate Body of the WTO, the US government in November
2001 lifted the quota restriction on Pakistani imports, much to the
relief of the Pakistani manufacturers and exporters. The whole process,
from the day the quota restraints were imposed to the day they were
lifted, lasted for almost two years and nine months, covering almost the
entire period of the three-year transitional safeguard measure-quota
restraint employed by the United States. The following comment by Akbar
Sheikh after being congratulated by Ambassador Don Johnson for winning
the case aptly summarizes the feeling at that time.
At the end of the day both parties won, Pakistan
because it got a decision in its favour and the United States because it
was able to keep the quota restraints for almost the entire three-year
period, thanks to the duration of the case.
IV. Lessons learnt
back to top
The government
The first major lesson which came out of the
case was that the government should in future play a much more proactive
role in traderelated disputes than it has done in the past. In this
particular case the primary factor behind the relatively high degree of
co-ordination and co-operation between the Ministry of Commerce and
APTMA (business players) had been the good personal relationship which
Akbar Sheikh enjoyed with the two important functionaries in the
government — the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, and the Pakistan
ambassador to Switzerland. There was an absence of any institutionalized
co-ordination between the government and APTMA specifically relating to
such trade disputes and WTO affairs.
Akbar Sheikh was of the view that in order to
facilitate institutional-level co-ordination in WTO-related dispute
settlement cases the government should have a properly functioning and
effective cell within the Ministry of Commerce. The government seemed to
have learnt that lesson right at the start of the DSB proceedings in
Geneva, when in October 2000, just before the hearings, a WTO cell was
established at the permanent mission office in Geneva.(20)
The cell was created to ‘safeguard Pakistan’s export and other
interest in international trade by communicating the changes in the
system and rules to the relevant authorities in Pakistan’.(21)
The Ministry of Commerce almost simultaneously opened a WTO wing which
now has a functioning cell. This cell has six working groups on
different WTO agreements.(22)
Although these steps by the Pakistan
government are in the right direction, Akbar Sheikh was of the view that
there is still room for improvement in developing an effective
institutional framework to contest future dispute settlement cases. He
pointed out that the WTO cell should provide appropriate guidelines on
both trade-related and dispute settlement issues to the players
involved. Research should be conducted within the cell to keep it up to
date with the current dispute settlement cases around the world. At the
same time the cell should maintain an archive of past cases and rulings.
According to Akbar Sheikh this would be immensely helpful to the private
and the public sector in developing the right strategy for contesting
future cases.
One of the central problems in this cotton
yarn dispute case was the hiring of expensive foreign consultants and
lawyers. According to Akbar Sheikh, the type of findings which some of
these firms produced could very easily have resulted from research
undertaken locally, had there been some basic level of legal expertise
relating to international trade and the WTO. Hence he suggested that the
government should invest in the training of lawyers and consultants who
in future could handle dispute cases without the government resorting to
hiring expensive foreign firms.
APTMA
back to top
During the course of this case APTMA already
had a committee on anti-dumping and WTO issues which was supposed to act
as a liaison between the business players and the government. However,
as mentioned before, it had been the personal links which Akbar Sheikh
had with both the government and APTMA which largely facilitated the
co-ordination and co-operation between the two. In order to rectify the
lack of an effective institutional structure APTMA has recently opened a
WTO cell, which according to the APTMA secretary, Anis-ul-Haq, is still
in its formative stage. The cell has currently hired a law firm which
advises the APTMA members regarding WTO issues. Anis-ul-Haq considers
that the primary objective of the cell should be to co-ordinate with the
parallel WTO cell at the Ministry of Commerce, so that future dispute
cases are handled smoothly. Also, this cell should advise the concerned
members of APTMA on the prevailing trade environment and international
trade law so as to pre-empt any action taken internationally against the
local business players.
A major problem in the cotton dispute case was
the collection of funds to meet the expenses involved. Both Anis-ul-Haq
and Akbar Sheikh were of the opinion that rather than the existing ad
hoc case-by-case approach there should be some set criteria established
by the government and APTMA. This would significantly reduce the costs
in terms of saving time currently wasted in coming up with an acceptable
distribution of the financial burden. Along with this, APTMA as an
organization should have a pool of resources allocated specifically to
meeting the expenses of future dispute settlement cases. This common
resource pool could be generated if APTMA helps to develop and foster
the concept of mutual insurance amongst its members, who, often because
of conflicting interests, are not willing to contribute.
The business players
back to top
The positive and effective role played by the
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO in resolving this trade dispute
between two unequal partners helped reinvigorate the confidence of the
local business players in the global trading environment. According to
Akbar Sheikh it also helped in improving the image of the WTO at the
level of both the government and business and enhanced its credibility
as an institution aimed at fostering free and fair trade.
However, the fact remains that the quota was
rescinded just three months before the expiry of the three-year period
of the safeguard measures. Thus the cost to the local business players
was not just in terms of contesting the case but also in the form of the
lost revenue/earnings due to the length of time the restraints were in
place. The fact that at the DSB stage quite a few business players
initially refused to participate in financing the case indicates a
prevalent frustration with the duration of the dispute settlement
process. There was also a certain amount of scepticism about the ability
of the WTO to make countries like the United States comply with its
recommendations and decisions. Finally, there was still a general
feeling that even after the DSB decision there was no guarantee that the
United States would comply, since it could not be credibly threatened
into compliance by a small economy like Pakistan even if retaliatory
measures were sanctioned by the WTO.
NOTES:
1.- These safeguard measures allow the
establishment of quota restraints by a member country if it is ‘able
to demonstrate that a particular product is being imported into its
territory in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage or
actual threat to its domestic industry producing like and/or directly
competitive products. back to text
2.- The first time the United States tried to
impose transitional safeguard measures on Pakistani exports was in 1996,
on the same variety of combed cotton yarn. However, Pakistan was able to
defend its case at the bilateral negotiation stage and the United States
chose not to impose the quota restraints. back to text
3.- Information provided by Anis-ul-Haq,
secretary, All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTMA). back to text
4.- Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey
1998-99 (dates relevant to the period of the case). back to text
5.- Pakistan Economist, 15 Aug.
1999. back to text
6.- The definition of domestic industry
employed by the United States in the case was challenged by Pakistan.
This according to Akbar Sheikh was the crucial legal definitional issue
on which the entire case of the United States rested. For details see
Report of the Appellate Body, WTO,
WT/DS192/AB/R, 8 Oct. 2001. back to text
7.- Correspondence between Akbar Sheikh and
APTMA, 16 April 1999 (2nd Call Notice CAT-301 Combed Cotton Yarn, APTMA
Files). back to text
8.- For details of the case see the TMB report
of the WTO. back to text
9.- The TMB concluded that ‘the United
States had not demonstrated successfully that combed cotton yarn was
being imported into its territory in such increased quantities as to
cause serious damage, or actual threat thereof, to its domestic industry
producing like and/or directly competitive products’.
WT/DS192/1,
3 April 2000. back to text
10.- At the end of 2005 the ATC expires,
bringing to an end all quota restraints sanctioned under different
measures such as transitional safeguards. back to text
11.- After the payment of US$32, 175 to IDS,
Washington, there were not sufficient funds left to settle the invoice
of US$28, 125.16 of Travis, Sandler and Rosenberg (APTMA paper on USG
call notice on combed cotton yarn (CAT 301)). back to text
12.- Information provided by Akbar
Sheikh. back to text
13.- The export of cotton yarn to the United
States had increased from 599, 926 kg in April 1999 to 2, 380, 545 kg in
December 1999 (2nd Call Notice CAT-301 Combed Cotton Yarn, APTMA
Files). back to text
14.- The actual charges of the Geneva-based
legal adviser, Frieder Roessler, were approximately US$60,000. The
expected amount quoted by the government must have included
miscellaneous expenditure, i.e. travel, board, etc. of the government
consultants and representatives (2nd Call Notice CAT-301 Combed Cotton
Yarn, APTMA Files). back to text
15.- Information provided by Akbar
Sheikh. back to text
16.- The Export Development Fund (EDF) is
collected by the government (by the EPB) by charging the exporters a
certain proportion of their export earnings. back to text
17.- 2nd Call Notice CAT-301 Combed Cotton
Yarn, APTMA Files. back to text
18.- The panel consisted of the chairman and
two members, one from the EU and the other from India. back to text
19.- For details of the panel’s decision
see the WTO, Panel Report, 31 May 2001. back to text
20.- Nasim Qureshi, who was the Joint
Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, during most of the duration of case,
was appointed as the deputy chief of the Pakistan mission in Geneva and
head of this new WTO cell. Since the cell was created right at the end
of this particular case, it could not contribute substantively to the
proceedings of the case. back to text
21.- http://dawn.com/2000/10/08/ebr9.htm.
back to text
22.- According to the 2002 Trade Policy
Review of Pakistan by the WTO, these steps by the government to change
and modify the existing institutional framework have strengthened the
Ministry of Commerce in dealing with future trade-related issues. back to text
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