Disclaimer:
Opinions expressed in the case studies and any errors or omissions
therein are the responsibility of their authors and not of the
editors of this volume or of the institutions with which they are
affiliated. The authors of the case studies wish to disassociate the
institutions with which they are associated from opinions expressed
in the case studies and from any errors or omission therein.
> Case
Studies main page
> Introduction
ON THIS PAGE:
> I. The problem in context
> II. The local and external players and their roles
> The creation of the TF-WAR
> The constitution of the TF-WAR core group
> III. Challenges faced and the outcome
> A. The agriculture trade negotiation process
> B. The TF-WAR process
> IV. Lessons for others (the players views)
> The institutionalized participation of stakeholders is ensured
> A more informed, balanced and credible negotiating position is adopted
> A transparent process provides equal access and a neutral venue for stakeholders
> The commitment of all actors ensures credibility of position
> The TF-WAR supplies stability to the negotiations effort
> Broader dissemination of information domestically and alliance-building
internationally are ensured
> Stakeholders improve their understanding of the international trading system
> The TF-WAR core group ensures responsiveness and timeliness of feedback
> Technical experience that complements Geneva expertise is accumulated
> The quality of trade policy-making is improved
> Weaknesses
> V. Conclusion
|
I. The problem in context back to top
Agriculture is a major contributor to the
Philippines economy, accounting for 21.5% of its gross domestic product
(GDP),(1) generating exports valued at over US$1.5 billion,(2) and providing
one third of all employment, or 11 million jobs.(3) Its contribution
increases when ‘all economic activities related to agro-processing and
supply of non-farm agricultural inputs are included, (as) the
agricultural sector broadly defined accounts for about two-thirds of the
labour force and 40% of GDP’.(4) The strategic importance of this sector
makes it compelling for the government to enact a stakeholder-based
process that will fully and effectively render legitimacy not only to
its domestic economic policies but to its international economic
commitments as well, such as to the WTO.
In 1995 the Philippines acceded to the WTO in
the belief that its membership of the rules-based body would bring about
economic benefits, primarily to the rural sector, through increased
efficiency of industries required by exposure to global competition.
Jobs were promised and new industries were expected to emerge.
With the implementation of the WTO Uruguay
Round commitments in 1995 came also the increasing realization,
especially by the agriculture stakeholders, that the promised gains were
not forthcoming. The liberalization implied by the commitments was
perceived as too fast and beyond the country’s capacity to comply, and
so found poor general acceptance. Serious accusations were made about
the government’s lack of consultation with the affected sectors, and
blame directed towards government negotiators whom stakeholders felt
were not only vastly uninformed about the situation in the field, but
were also regarded as ‘blind’ advocates of rapid liberalization and
therefore insensitive to their needs. Stakeholders believed that
inadequate consultation had resulted in this serious disconnection
between the government negotiating position and the complex realities in
the field. There was an immediate call for a participatory and bottom-up
approach to the domestic process in agricultural trade negotiations.
The opportunity to transform the function of
formulating the negotiating position into an inclusive process was
provided by the preparations needed for the upcoming WTO Seattle
Ministerial in late 1999. Stakeholder participation and work could be
focused around a central objective, which was to prepare for the
Ministerial Conference and the global negotiations towards a new
agreement on agriculture.
The Task Force on WTO Agreement on Agriculture
(Re)negotiations (TF-WAR) was therefore established amidst increasing
public clamour, led by farmers and people’s organizations, as well as
industry groups, for transparency and representation in the formulation
of the Philippine negotiating position in the new round of WTO talks.
II. The local and
external players and their roles back to top
The creation of the TF-WAR
On 28 September 1998, the then Secretary of
the Department of Agriculture (DA), through Special Order No. 538(5) duly
constituted the Task Force on WTO Agreement on Agriculture (Re)negotiations,
a multi-sectoral task force composed of twenty-eight representatives
from farmer groups, industry associations, business federations,
non-government organizations, people’s organizations and other
relevant government institutions and agencies.(6) The main responsibility
of the TF-WAR was to consider, develop, evaluate and recommend
Philippine negotiating positions and strategies for the new round of
negotiations.
Other functions of the TF-WAR included
evaluating existing policies and programmes in the agriculture sector
and providing policy and programme recommendations to address gaps that
erode the benefits of WTO membership; reviewing General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) adjustment and competitive enhancement measures
(safety nets) drawn prior to the Philippines accession in 1995; and
identifying projects and sources of funds to enhance the competitiveness
of Philippines agriculture.
The TF-WAR reports to the DA Secretary, and is
chaired by the DA Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning. An
elected private-sector representative serves as vice-chair. The decision
on the final composition of the TF-WAR was a collective decision of the
body.
During the course of the preparations for the
Seattle Ministerial, the TF-WAR functioned as a formal group much like a
standard inter-agency and multi-sectoral committee in the department,
following the provisions of the Special Order. With the increasing
demands required by the faster pace of developments on the run-up to the
Seattle Ministerial, when gathering the entire membership more
frequently became difficult, an ad hoc technical working group was
formed to examine specific issues needing immediate feedback and
comment.
In late 2001, after the new WTO Round was
launched in Doha, the structure and organization of the TF-WAR underwent
changes following reorganization and movement of personnel in the DA who
were involved in the TF-WAR. A new Special Order was issued to
reconstitute the TF-WAR.(7) While the stakeholder membership remained
intact, this time it was a less formal organization and it was
streamlined to involve only those government agencies which had key
participation in trade policy-making. The secondary functions of the TF-WAR
were removed, and its work now focused on the sole responsibility of
formulating national negotiating position in agriculture. A significant
new feature, however, was the formation of a core group in early 2002.
The constitution of the TF-WAR core group
back to top
The TF-WAR core group was formed to improve
technical and policy work to support the TF-WAR, and to enable a quick
response to developments in the negotiations, expected to become more
intensive as the talks progressed. The chair recalls that ‘The process….
recognized the unwieldiness of the plenary/general assembly system.’
TF-WAR members who had good knowledge of a key sector and had some
technical competence were invited to join the core group as a ‘permanent
representation, on a voluntary but committed basis’. Representatives
sit in the group in an individual capacity and therefore do not
represent a particular sector or interest. They may represent the
country in the negotiations in Geneva, when resources permit, as
official delegates and advisers. As members, they are expected to render
objective analysis on the issue at hand, with the overarching
consideration that any recommendation put forward is the optimal
position regarded as best representing the interests of the entire
Philippines agriculture. The core group members are always on call,
required to convene at short notice, and consulted directly by the
Geneva office in real time when necessary.
The TF-WAR core group was constituted through
Special Order No. 231 dated 2 May 2002.(8) The members include the chairman
of the task force, five representatives from the private sector, and
staff from the DA Policy and Planning Office acting as technical
secretariat. Specific tasks include detailed evaluation of proposals
submitted by WTO members, in-depth analysis of both the overall and
specific impacts on Philippine agriculture, and the formulation and
elaboration of specific proposals based on these analyses guided by the
general policy direction decided in the TF-WAR.
III. Challenges
faced and the outcome back to top
The creation of the TF-WAR redefined the
consultation process in the Philippines on issues of national
significance such as trade negotiations. It is unique in that it
empowers the stakeholders by giving them a central role, involving them
from the very start of the process and throughout the entire
negotiations, going much farther than the token exchange of views that
had characterized previous consultation processes by the government.
A. The agriculture trade negotiation process
back to top
Figure 1 illustrates the process of
formulating the Philippines national negotiating position on
agriculture, and the institutions involved. The entire negotiation
process involves a complex two-level dynamic, first among the domestic
institutions involved, and second within and among members of the WTO,
aimed at reaching a consensus on what is known as the Geneva process.
The Geneva process of negotiations in agriculture drives the TF-WAR
process.
Figure 1. The agriculture trade negotiation
process.
Any new work by the TF-WAR begins with a
specific development in the WTO agriculture negotiations. The
Agriculture Office of the DA in Geneva regularly transmits developments
in the negotiations to the TF-WAR. This, together with the reports by
the DA Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning, who is both the
capital-based negotiator as well as the chair of the TF-WAR, of results
of special negotiating sessions in Geneva, is the basis for the
continuing work of the TF-WAR. The capital-based negotiator plays a
pivotal role in the negotiations, being the link between the internal
process and the external process. This entire dynamic is illustrated in
the diagram, where the Geneva Philippines mission/agriculture
negotiating team receives from and feeds into the TF-WAR process on one
hand, and receives from and feeds into the Geneva process on the other.
After an assessment of these developments by
the TF-WAR, further work is passed on to the core group, whose
recommendations go back to the bigger group for evaluation and approval.
These are then formally confirmed by the chair of the TF-WAR to the DA
Secretary for transmittal to the Cabinet Trade and Related Matters (TRM)
Committee or, in the case of specific positions within established
negotiating mandates, to the Geneva-based negotiators. Discussion on
recommendations or issues brought to the TRM are reported back to the TF-WAR.
The agriculture negotiating team is guided by
a negotiating mandate developed with the TF-WAR and with clearance from
the president. Issues within the mandate and clearance level of
Geneva-based staff are merely reported back to the capital. Meanwhile,
issues needing clearance at the level of the DA senior official are
transmitted to the capital for a decision. The core group is convened at
short notice and the issue(s) evaluated. Cleared instructions and
alternatives are then issued to Geneva. For major issues that require a
political decision,(9) the issue is transmitted to the capital for
evaluation and recommendation by the core group and the entire TF-WAR
membership, and for a final clearance and mandate by the Secretary.
Ministerial Conference mandates are obtained through a further route to
the cabinet TRM and the president.
The essence of stakeholder participation in
the negotiations is reflected on the left-hand part of the diagram,
which shows that the mandate of the TF-WAR flows from the stakeholders
which they represent and whose position they endorse. When the president
adopts it as the national position, it reflects the accountability of
the office to an important political constituency, recognizing that its
real mandate stems from this exercise of democratic governance.
B. The TF-WAR process back to top
The following activities characterize the TF-WAR
process.
Regular meetings. This is the heart of the
domestic process. Aside from regular updating meetings, the chair meets
the TF-WAR before and after each meeting of delegations in Geneva to
discuss the proposals of WTO members, to report the results of WTO
special sessions, and to provide the assessment of the negotiating team
and its implications for the Philippines negotiating position. Issues
discussed are organized along the structure of the Agreement on
Agriculture. Discussion ensues mainly on the substance of the ongoing
talks and possible issues to be raised, and the negotiating strategy to
adopt. Members provide feedback on the possible impact of these
developments or decision points on their respective sectors.
Issues are explained with emphasis on decision
points. Members recommend positions and attempt to reach a consensus. If
none is reached, further discussions are held if there is still
available time. If not, the issue is examined more closely by the core
group, who will look into the technical merits of each individual
position and at other arguments to try to balance the opposing views.
The TF-WAR deals with sensitive issues of
national significance, and in order not to compromise the integrity of a
position, members adhere to strict guidelines for security and
confidentiality of information. Information is released according to
levels of confidentiality.(10)
Consultations. Consultations with their
respective membership are held individually by each TF-WAR member
organization. Inputs and recommendations arising from these
consultations are gathered by the secretariat and discussed in the core
group meetings, where views are consolidated. These are then presented
in the TF-WAR and duly recommended to the Secretary. Interaction with
stakeholders not represented in the TF-WAR may be through DA-initiated
national and regional consultations with organization leaders, direct
consultations with stakeholders or public fora.
Workshops. The core group holds one-day or
two-day workshops when the issues require more study and analysis. For
issues requiring technical expertise otherwise not available within the
group, it invites resource persons from other government agencies or
institutions and practitioners from the private sector for input.
Technical work and research. The Core
Group is responsible for this, and is assisted by the secretariat, which
undertakes research and the gathering and consolidation of data,
processing them into the format required for analysis by the core group
with the use of simple economic tools to assist in the evaluation of
alternative scenarios arising from various possible negotiating
positions.
Approval process and recommendation. The
TF-WAR approves a final recommendation, after which the position is
recommended to the DA Secretary, which then recommends it to the TRM.
After deliberation, this is recommended to the president, who adopts it
as the Philippines negotiating framework. This framework defines the
parameters within which the DA negotiating team is mandated to work. It
forms the basis for Philippines submissions to the WTO, such as
proposals or statements.
The Task Force has produced at least five
proposals submitted to the WTO Committee on Agriculture-Special Session
since 1999, none of which has been rejected by the Secretary of
Agriculture, the cabinet or the president. Assistant Secretary Segfredo
R. Serrano, chair of the TF-WAR, recalls that ‘Many of the developing
country blocs’ operational concepts of SND and even the current
negotiations vocabulary owe much to TF-WAR deliberations:
Strategic/Special Products (SPs),(11) Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM),(12)
automatic countervailing/counterbalancing mechanisms, the concept of
interlinkage of pillar commitments, among others.’
IV. Lessons for others (the players views) back to top
The existence of such a group, representing
various parochial interests, strengthens the recommending authority of
the DA Secretary and lends greater legitimacy to the mandate of the
president, to whom all recommendations are submitted, to proceed with
the negotiating position in the WTO, the position having emanated from
his or her wider constituency. This is perhaps the strongest feature of
the TF-WAR process. More specific observations follow.
The institutionalized participation of
stakeholders is ensured back to top
The DA has institutionalized the participation
of stakeholders in trade negotiations, not only through the formal
creation of the TF-WAR by a Special Order, but by making it the central
player in the negotiation process, thus ensuring the continued active
involvement of these interested parties.
For TF-WAR members, ‘the process is
participatory and consultative, it enables members to input into the
negotiation process’. ‘It provides a venue to air our concerns
regarding the impact of liberalization on our respective sectors.’ ‘The
recommendation truly reflects the situation on the ground.’ ‘Industries
feel they are heard and their interests recognized by government.’ ‘The
mechanism thus far has been effective in addressing the systemic mistake
in the past Round wherein stakeholders played a relatively passive role
in the formulation of negotiating position.’ ‘There are less
accusations from the industries that they were not heard.’
Moreover, the TF-WAR experience has proved
that deeper involvement by stakeholders in the negotiating process can
be obtained at very minimal financial cost to the government, an
important consideration for developing countries with limited resources.
Members join on a voluntary basis and through representation enable the
government to reach out to more sectors without having to hold
individual consultations each time.
A more informed, balanced and credible
negotiating position is adopted back to top
Stakeholders’ experiences from the
implementation of Uruguay Round commitments provide very useful and
practical insights on the possible consequences of adopting a certain
position. Members perceive that with the TF-WAR process, the sensitivity
of agricultural interests is better reflected in the positions adopted.
There is, moreover, a practical importance to involving the private
sector, as they can better identify specific trade opportunities and
barriers to Philippine exports, or threats to their markets.
The TF-WAR has members representing upstream
and downstream users of agricultural commodities,(13) and can therefore be
regarded as a balanced group. As each member, however, is encouraged to
be parochial in advancing their interests and concerns, conflict between
different sectors is unavoidable. The chair observes, ‘Conflicting
interests are discussed openly. Differences in views are debated, and
are judged on substantive and technical merit. Any resolution must be
consistent with the existing negotiating mandate. If the government
decides to break the impasse, it can do so and would still need to
generate consensus.’ While these conflicting interests result in
dynamics that are difficult to manage, the resolution of any issue gains
more acceptance from all sectors when an equal opportunity to defend
individual interests has been given. The TF-WAR, therefore, is a venue
that ‘neutralizes’ the extreme positions that may be pushed for by
opposing sectors.
Stakeholder experience, insights, and better
knowledge of markets, balanced membership of TF-WAR, and adoption based
on consensus, all ensure that the negotiating position adopted is
informed, balanced and credible. It enables members, moreover, to feel
ownership of the positions adopted and proposals forwarded. ‘[This]
ownership is the bedrock of widespread political support which in turn
gave those positions and proposals, and the TF-WAR, longevity and
resilience in terms of official government support’, a member
observes.
A transparent process provides equal access
and a neutral venue for stakeholders back to top
Many stakeholder groups are not able to
advance their position with policy-makers in a continuing and sustained
advocacy, since very few sectors are organized enough to fund it and
carry it out. The TF-WAR process provides equal access and opportunity
to all stakeholders to be heard on agricultural trade issues in a
sustained manner. The process is transparent and is devoid of the
politicization that usually favours the more influential sector. The
neutrality of venue and this openness minimize the mutual mistrust that
often characterizes government and private-sector relations, and lends
greater credibility to the position that is eventually adopted by the
government.
The commitment of all actors ensures
credibility of position back to top
Sectors involved in the formulation are
committed to the position adopted and, as one member observes, can
support the government in explaining and advocating it to the public.
Maintaining consistency of and commitment to a position is built in to
the process. Any change or adjustment in the TF-WAR adopted position
that the government intends to advance in the WTO must be referred back
to the stakeholders and subjected to the entire process of approval.
According to Assistant Secretary Serrano, ‘Many
developing countries have traumatically experienced frequent changes in
position and thus the problem of credibility and principled consistency.
The TF-WAR process solved that for the Philippines, even effectively
insulating the country’s negotiating positions from strong pressure
from external forces including the major parties in the negotiations.
Effectively, the internal pressure generated has always been stronger
than those coming from other quarters.’ He further explains that
for a small country like the Philippines
to advance its national interests in the negotiations successfully,
it must use its meagre negotiating resources to influence other
negotiating parties to its orbit. Allies, especially the developing
countries, can only be generated at critical mass if there is
credibility, statesmanship and consistency — roughly about 75% of
small country negotiating resources. The Philippines is a strong
member of the Cairns Group, the G20 and the SP and SSM Alliance
[G33] and has thus attained a high level of influence in the
negotiations representing developing country interests. The
Philippines is now also a consistent participant in the select Green
Room process, a level of influence never attained in the Uruguay
Round nor in the other negotiating areas of the Doha Round.
The TF-WAR supplies stability to the
negotiations effort back to top
The Department leadership frequently changes,
on average every eighteen months. Introducing the TF-WAR and obtaining a
fresh mandate can take time, which affects the continuity of work.
Traditional and conservative leaderships have also become a problem in
this respect.
As the capital-based negotiator puts it,
On the part of the Department,
anticipating the inevitable pressures on the government in any trade
negotiation and the frequent changes in leadership at the
ministerial and senior official level, the design of the TF-WAR
provides stability to the negotiations effort. As the decisions on
recommendations to the government are arrived at through consensus
in the TF-WAR, mirroring the WTO process,…. repudiation of or
changes in domestically negotiated positions can be very costly
politically. While this mode of arriving at recommendations is most
difficult and can only eventually come after an intense education of
members on the language and nuances of the negotiations, and the
difficult process of negotiations among themselves, joint ownership
by stakeholders and government provides a most robust and
sustainable anchor.
Broader dissemination of information
domestically and alliance-building internationally are ensured
back to top
The multi-sectoral membership, which includes
civil society, benefits the process at two levels — dissemination of
information to a wider constituency through their local networks and
advocacy at the international level through their international
networks. This way, it is possible to bring the position of developing
countries closer to each other, if not into convergence, when
stakeholders in their respective countries are persuaded to advocate
similar positions. At the WTO level, the advocacy of developing
countries may even be strengthened, through a consistent and coherent
position around issues of common interest to stakeholders across
developing countries, which creates an ‘informal’ or silent alliance
between these same countries when they articulate and advocate their
views in Geneva.
In addition, the civil society groups in the
TF-WAR also help in linking up Philippine negotiators with their
international counterparts. This greatly helps in generating support
among the WTO membership, particularly the developing countries.
Stakeholders improve their understanding of
the international trading system back to top
The TF-WAR increases awareness of developments
in the international trading system, which helps industries to identify
specific gains from trade negotiations. Without such advocacy, the
sectors have only vague notions of benefits or, worse, may get a ‘bad’
deal. Sectors are able to determine how their interests can best be
promoted or defended through the negotiations if they have a closer
understanding of its process and substance. It also helps to avoid
unreasonable demands being made on the government, and gives the private
sector a chance to evaluate and, if necessary, alter its recommendation
to the government, in order to get the optimum deal.
The TF-WAR core group ensures responsiveness
and timeliness of feedback back to top
Technical issues become unwieldy if discussed
in the bigger group. The core group enables the DA to respond quickly to
developments in the negotiations as new issues are immediately brought
to its attention for evaluation and study. In addition, since the
convenor of the core group is also the chair of the TF-WAR as well as
the negotiator, there is a seamlessness in the flow of the work being
undertaken, in terms of depth of familiarity with the subject, and an
established presence in Geneva and other negotiating circles, which
enables core group response and feedback to be obtained as fast as is
needed by Geneva.
Technical experience that complements Geneva
expertise is accumulated back to top
The Agriculture Office in Geneva has
acknowledged the contribution of the core group to the quality of
interventions and proposals by the Philippines. With the Geneva Office
having a very limited number of people dedicated to handling all related
concerns, the core group becomes all the more important as the
capital-based working group which can make a more detailed and in-depth
analysis of the issues at hand, at the same time providing a more
comprehensive perspective based on their deeper understanding of
sectoral concerns.
Moreover, prior to the creation of the core
group only a few key personnel at the DA and very few from the private
sector had a good grasp of the Agreement on Agriculture and the
intricacies of the negotiations. Since then, the core group has become a
pool of resource persons, competent in their understanding of the
Agreement. The members are regularly invited as speakers and lecturers
to relevant fora and meetings organized by the government or the private
sector. They also complement the negotiating team in Geneva as advisers.
The quality of trade policy-making is improved
back to top
The rigid exercise of providing input,
obtaining consensus, clearance, and feedback that all negotiating
position is subject to at all levels in the process of negotiation
ensures the quality of policy formulation from the Philippine side.
Public support for the positions taken in the
negotiations, including by international civil society groups, is proof
that the positions have gained wide acceptance on their own merits.
According to Assistant Secretary Serrano, the Task Force also has a
perfect score in terms of positions recommended and adopted by the
president. A good number of these positions, expressed as formal
proposals submitted to the WTO, have likewise gained widespread support
among developing countries. All these attest to the effectiveness of an
improved domestic process in handling agriculture negotiations.
Weaknesses back to top
Weaknesses
- It is a very tedious process, since all
parties have to be consulted, according to one member. The process
is inherently slow and encourages contentiousness.
- Most members believe that the
participation of members can still be improved. In the assessment of
the chair, ‘In its early, “getting at the learning curve”
stages, participation was uneven, given the openness of
participation. Likewise, when developments appear to be encouraging
or trust in government negotiators has been firmly established,
participation tends to suffer. Being voluntary and interest-based in
nature on the part of private sector stakeholders, some groups have
not been represented or representation is uneven.’
- A smaller group addresses these
problems but sacrifices representativeness and the participation of
some sectors. While manageability will be an important
consideration, a complementary process or modality must be developed
to attain optimal inclusivity.
- The limited technical expertise of the
core group may not be sufficient to address the more detailed level
of technical work necessary to support future work in the
negotiations. Not all members have formal training in trade and the
WTO Agreements. Moreover, even if created through a Special Order,
involvement is voluntary, so that the level of involvement is
dependent mainly on individual commitment and availability. As such,
there is no assurance of continuity even of this limited expertise.
The quality of outputs may also be compromised owing to individual
responsibilities in the members’ regular jobs.
- There are limitations in resources to
undertake more detailed work, such as the lack of technical
personnel in the DA Policy and Planning Office to handle WTO
negotiations, the lack of a good information database, and the
unreliability of funding sources. This last is important for other
activities supporting the basic function of the TF-WAR, such as
wider information dissemination and education through workshops,
seminars and perhaps the attendance of members and the core group at
formal training sessions on WTO issues and negotiating skills, the
hiring of consultants and experts when rigorous analytical work is
necessary, and the conducting of studies, as well as travelling to
the regions for consultations and to Geneva for the negotiating
sessions.
- There is a lack of an overall feedback
mechanism. A member observes that ‘feedback at the sectoral and
organizational level is ensured. At the grassroots, this is largely
dependent on the member organizations’ fulfilling their downstream
feedback and consultative responsibilities. On this score, much
improvement needs to be made.’
Sectors, moreover, will benefit most from this
process if within the TF-WAR member organizations themselves, there is a
mechanism for internal consultation and feedback on the issues raised in
the TF-WAR. Views expressed by their representatives in the TF-WAR will
have the added benefit of having gone through a validation process. This
demands much of the leadership, but, if observed widely, will enable
sectoral interests to be more accurately represented in the formulation
of the national position and will certainly improve understanding and
perhaps generate more acceptance of the widely misunderstood workings of
the WTO.
V. Conclusion
back to top
The words of the Task Force chair summarize
well the benefits of the TF-WAR mechanism:
This process is transparent, fully
participatory beyond being merely informative or consultative. It
also resulted in positions and evaluations that fully reflect the
concerns and ambitions of stakeholders with full confirmation by the
government. More important, positions have greatly benefited from
the widest possible political support. In the Uruguay Round, the
Philippines was an insignificant ‘follower’ and ‘take-it-or-leave-it-but-has-no-choice-but-take-it’
country. Its negotiators suffered the humiliation of waiting outside
the small select group ‘green rooms’. It never could claim any
intellectual contribution to the negotiations. The concessions it
obtained and the commitments it made were condemned and repudiated
by the stakeholders although sustained by the country’s political
leaders. Now, the Task Force has turned all of that around and much
more. The country is now in an infinitely better position to
influence the negotiations in accordance with its national
interests.
The TF-WAR mechanism has its limitations and
constraints. It has proved, however, that stakeholder participation in
the trade negotiations process has no substitute in terms of accurately
and effectively harnessing the insights, concerns and ambitions of civil
society in a developing country context. It is cost-efficient, effective
and gives flesh to real democratic governance in action.
NOTES:
1.- National Statistical Co-ordination Board, National
Income Accounts 1st Quarter 2004, available at www.nscb.gov.ph. back to text
2.- 2001 data for agro-based products, 2002
Philippine Statistical Yearbook, National Statistical Co-ordination
Board. back to text
3.- National Income Accounts 1st Quarter
2004. back to text
4.- V. Bruce Tolentino, Cristina David,
Arsenio Balisacan and Ponciano Intal Jr, ‘Strategic Actions to Rapidly
Ensure Food Security and Rural Growth in the Philippines’, 29 March
2001, as cited by Walden Bello, ‘The WTO and the Demise of Philippine
Agriculture’, Focus on the Global South, 20 June 2003. back to text
5.- Issued by the Office of the Secretary,
Department of Agriculture, 28 Sept. 1999. back to text
6.- Original members included: from the
government, the National Agriculture and Fishery Council (NAFC), Minimum
Access Volume (MAV) Secretariat, DA Planning and Monitoring Service.
From the private sector, representatives from the Philippine Chamber of
Food Manufacturers, National Onion Growers Co-operative, Philippine
Association of Hog Raisers, Inc., Federation of Free Farmers, Coffee
Foundation of the Philippines, National Federation of Hog Farmers, Inc.,
Philippine Association of Meat Processors, Inc. From the NGOs, the
following were represented, Sanduguan, Pambansang Kilusan ng mga
Samahang Magsasaka, CODE-NGO, Philippine Business for Social Progress.
Membership expanded to include the grain, sugar, poultry and fishery
sectors. The last eventually formed their own task force as fishery
negotiations are being conducted separately in the WTO. back to text
7.- Special Order No. 450, issued by the
Office of the Secretary, September 2001. back to text
8.- Issued by the Office of the Secretary,
Department of Agriculture. back to text
9.- Such as joining the G20 (Group of 20) or
organizing the SP and SSM (Special Products and Special Safeguard
Mechanism) Alliance. back to text
10.- The guidelines state that ‘in deciding
the level of confidentiality to be accorded an information, the body
shall judiciously consider the twin issues of the right to public
information and national security — to strike a balance between
safeguarding the basic right of people to public information on matters
of public concern and access to official records, on the one hand, and
the need to protect vital secrets and information affecting national
security and interest, on the other…. Any breach of faith regarding a
commitment to confidentiality is ground for removal of membership from
the Task Force…. Task Force may take legal action against the
offending party’, Department of Agriculture, Guidelines for
Confidentiality, March 2000. back to text
11.- Special Products (SP) is a new concept
introduced in the current Round and agreed by Members as a modality for
further elaboration in the recently adopted framework agreement for the
famous July 2004 Package. It is a special and differential treatment (SND)
mechanism providing flexibility for developing countries in recognition
of the inherent difficulties they face in implementing their WTO
commitments, and a way of addressing the food security, livelihood
security and rural development objectives aimed at by the Doha
Development Agenda. Under the SP, developing countries will have less
onerous commitments in reducing barriers for certain sensitive products,
the number and modality of which are to be agreed. back to text
12.- The July 2004 Package also specifies
that a special safeguard mechanism (SSG) will be established for use by
developing countries. The modality is yet to be developed in the next
phase of negotiations. back to text
13.- For example, sugar and food processing,
corn and livestock/poultry. back to text
|
* Senior Economist, Philippines Sugar Millers Association, Manila.
|
