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ON THIS PAGE:
> EC — Bananas III, para. 132
> EC — Bananas III, para. 135
> EC — Bananas III, paras. 136-138
> Mexico — Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 — US),
paras. 73-74
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset
Review, para. 86
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset
Review, para. 89
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R.5.1 EC — Bananas III,
para. 132 back to top
(WT/DS27/AB/R)
We agree with the Panel that “neither
Article 3.3 nor 3.7 of the DSU nor any other provision of the DSU
contain any explicit requirement that a Member must have a ‘legal
interest’ as a prerequisite for requesting a panel”. We do not
accept that the need for a “legal interest” is implied in the DSU or
in any other provision of the WTO Agreement. …
R.5.2 EC — Bananas III, para. 135 back to top
(WT/DS27/AB/R)
… we believe that a Member has broad
discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against another Member
under the DSU. The language of Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 and of
Article 3.7 of the DSU suggests, furthermore, that a Member is expected
to be largely self-regulating in deciding whether any such action would
be “fruitful”.
R.5.3 EC — Bananas III, paras. 136-138 back to top
(WT/DS27/AB/R)
We are satisfied that the United States was
justified in bringing its claims under the GATT 1994 in this case. The
United States is a producer of bananas, and a potential export interest
by the United States cannot be excluded. The internal market of the
United States for bananas could be affected by the EC banana regime, in
particular, by the effects of that regime on world supplies and world
prices of bananas. We also agree with the Panel’s statement that:
… with the increased interdependence of the
global economy, … Members have a greater stake in enforcing WTO rules
than in the past since any deviation from the negotiated balance of
rights and obligations is more likely than ever to affect them, directly
or indirectly.
We note, too, that there is no challenge here
to the standing of the United States under the GATS, and that the claims
under the GATS and the GATT 1994 relating to the EC import licensing
regime are inextricably interwoven in this case.
Taken together, these reasons are sufficient
justification for the United States to have brought its claims against
the EC banana import regime under the GATT 1994. This does not mean,
though, that one or more of the factors we have noted in this case would
necessarily be dispositive in another case. …
R.5.4 Mexico — Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 — US),
paras. 73-74
(WT/DS132/AB/RW)
back to top
… [the first sentence of Article 3.7 of the
DSU] reflects a basic principle that Members should have recourse to WTO
dispute settlement in good faith, and not frivolously set in motion the
procedures contemplated in the DSU. …
Given the “largely self-regulating” nature
of the requirement in the first sentence of Article 3.7, panels and the
Appellate Body must presume, whenever a Member submits a request for
establishment of a panel, that such Member does so in good faith, having
duly exercised its judgement as to whether recourse to that panel would
be “fruitful”. Article 3.7 neither requires nor authorizes a panel
to look behind that Member’s decision and to question its exercise of
judgement. Therefore, the Panel was not obliged to consider this issue
on its own motion.
R.5.5 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset
Review, para. 86
(WT/DS244/AB/R)
back to top
… a measure attributable to a Member may be
submitted to dispute settlement provided only that another Member has
taken the view, in good faith, that the measure nullifies or impairs
benefits accruing to it under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. …
R.5.6 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset
Review, para. 89
(WT/DS244/AB/R)
back to top
We observe, too, that allowing measures to be
the subject of dispute settlement proceedings, whether or not they are
of a mandatory character, is consistent with the comprehensive nature of
the right of Members to resort to dispute settlement to “preserve
[their] rights and obligations … under the covered agreements, and to
clarify the existing provisions of those agreements”. As long as a
Member respects the principles set forth in Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the
DSU, namely, to exercise their “judgement as to whether action under
these procedures would be fruitful” and to engage in dispute
settlement in good faith, then that Member is entitled to request a
panel to examine measures that the Member considers nullify or impair
its benefits. …
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The texts reproduced here do not have the legal standing of the original
documents which are entrusted and kept at the WTO Secretariat in Geneva.
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