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ON THIS PAGE:
> EC — Bananas III, para. 161
> EC — Bananas III, para. 163
> EC — Bananas III, para. 190
> EC — Bananas III, para. 200
> EC — Poultry, para. 93
> EC — Poultry, para. 100
> EC — Poultry, para. 106
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T.2.1 EC — Bananas III, para. 161
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(WT/DS27/AB/R)
… allocation to Members not having a substantial interest must be
subject to the basic principle of non-discrimination. When this
principle of non-discrimination is applied to the allocation of tariff
quota shares to Members not having a substantial interest, it is clear
that a Member cannot, whether by agreement or by assignment, allocate
tariff quota shares to some Members not having a substantial interest
while not allocating shares to other Members who likewise do not have a
substantial interest. To do so is clearly inconsistent with the
requirement in Article XIII:1 that a Member cannot restrict the
importation of any product from another Member unless the importation of
the like product from all third countries is “similarly” restricted.
T.2.2 EC — Bananas III, para. 163
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(WT/DS27/AB/R)
… the reallocation of unused portions of a tariff quota share
exclusively to other BFA countries, and not to other non-BFA
banana-supplying Members, does not result in an allocation of tariff
quota shares which approaches “as closely as possible the shares which
the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of the
restrictions”. Therefore, the tariff quota reallocation rules of the
BFA are also inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT
1994.
T.2.3 EC — Bananas III, para. 190 back to top
(WT/DS27/AB/R)
… The essence of the non-discrimination obligations is that like
products should be treated equally, irrespective of their origin. As no
participant disputes that all bananas are like products, the
non-discrimination provisions apply to all imports of bananas,
irrespective of whether and how a Member categorizes or subdivides these
imports for administrative or other reasons. If, by choosing a different
legal basis for imposing import restrictions, or by applying different
tariff rates, a Member could avoid the application of the
non-discrimination provisions to the imports of like products from
different Members, the object and purpose of the non-discrimination
provisions would be defeated. It would be very easy for a Member to
circumvent the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994 and the
other Annex 1A agreements, if these provisions apply only within
regulatory regimes established by that Member.
T.2.4 EC — Bananas III, para. 200 back to top
(WT/DS27/AB/R)
… The text of Article X:3(a) clearly indicates that the
requirements of “uniformity, impartiality and reasonableness” do not
apply to the laws, regulations, decisions and rulings themselves,
but rather to the administration of those laws, regulations,
decisions and rulings. The context of Article X:3(a) within Article X,
which is entitled “Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”,
and a reading of the other paragraphs of Article X, make it clear that
Article X applies to the administration of laws, regulations,
decisions and rulings. To the extent that the laws, regulations,
decisions and rulings themselves are discriminatory, they can be
examined for their consistency with the relevant provisions of the GATT
1994.
T.2.5 EC — Poultry, para. 93 back to top
(WT/DS69/AB/R)
… As the European Communities did not seek an agreement with
Thailand, the other contracting party having a substantial interest in
the supply of frozen poultry meat to the European Communities at that
time, the Oilseeds Agreement cannot be considered an agreement within
the meaning of Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994.
T.2.6 EC — Poultry, para. 100
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(WT/DS69/AB/R)
… We see nothing in Article XXVIII to suggest that compensation
negotiated within its framework may be exempt from compliance with the
non-discrimination principle inscribed in Articles I and XIII of the
GATT 1994. …
T.2.7 EC — Poultry,
para. 106 back to top
(WT/DS69/AB/R)
We agree with the Panel that the calculation of shares must be based
on the total imports of the product in question — whether those imports
originate from Members or non-Members. Otherwise, it would not be
possible to comply with the requirement in the chapeau of Article XIII:2
that:
In applying import restrictions to any product, Members shall aim at
a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as
possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to
obtain in the absence of such restrictions. …
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documents which are entrusted and kept at the WTO Secretariat in Geneva.
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