

**MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS
THE URUGUAY ROUND**

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COMMUNICATION FROM TANZANIA

The following statement, made by the representative of Tanzania at the Trade Negotiations Committee meeting held at official level on 26 November 1992, is circulated to participants at the request of that delegation.

Mr. Chairman,

At the outset, we express our appreciation at the untiring endeavours you have been making to ensure a balanced outcome of the Uruguay Round Negotiations. We can only hope that such an outcome, responding to the expressed interests of all participants in the Round will be forthcoming at the end of the resolution of all outstanding issues, to which you had made quite specific reference in your statement to the TNC on the tenth of this month.

As in all probability I shall be speaking for the last time as Head of my delegation participating in the Uruguay Round, please permit me to place before all participants the position of my delegation.

1. Much as my delegation would have wished a single statement to emanate to which all developing countries could subscribe unequivocally, it has no choice but to place on record, through this intervention what it believes it is under obligation to articulate as clearly as it can. It is my sincere hope that my observations are shared by all the least-developed countries.
2. My delegation attaches very great significance and importance to paragraph 8 of your statement¹ of 10 November of this year to the TNC.
3. From the outset, having participated in negotiating the Punta del Este Declaration which set out the mandate and objectives of the Round, we have been witnessing, almost helplessly, the steady erosion not only of the letter but of the spirit of that Declaration, certainly as far as the grossly under-developed economies are concerned.
4. Only a few days ago we were confronted with a communication from the GATT Secretariat, presumed to be assisting ACP and least-developed

¹MTN.TNC/26.

participants. It is a classical document, insisting that the least-developed countries and the ACP countries which are party to the Lomé Convention, commit themselves to becoming members of the still-to-be structured MTO because for all practical purposes the GATT will become a carcass of its previous self. Since then a communication in identical language has been addressed to our Minister, with an invitation to participate in a meeting convened here to take place on 8-11 December. These dates are most inconvenient to us for many reasons, not least because of the very arbitrariness of the procedure. The communication states, inter alia, that agreements and legal instruments from the Uruguay Round dealing with trade liberalization and improved trade rules "would be available only to those countries which become members of the MTO. Countries which remain outside the MTO will be unable to share fully in the results of the Round and will lack a voice in the new organization that will provide the future framework for multilateral trade relations. In the longer run, a non-member of the MTO may find even its present benefits as a contracting party to the GATT eroded, since many governments which join the MTO may withdraw from the present GATT". Furthermore that "all contracting parties to the GATT are eligible to become original members of the MTO. But conditions will be attached to this right. A basic requirement for membership is likely to be that each government undertakes certain commitments and concessions as regards opening its domestic market to goods and services exported by other MTO member countries. It is agreed that commitments sought from developing countries, especially least-developed countries, shall not be inconsistent with their development, financial and trade needs. However, it is likely that at least some commitments must be made by all, or eligibility to join the MTO as an original member may be lost. While later accession to the MTO would still be possible, this would require fresh negotiations".

My delegation would prefer to let that communication speak for itself, while recalling that from the very outset of the Round of negotiations, we have been stressing the dangers inherent in placing under-developed countries in a straitjacket so constricting as to prevent them from breathing and growing. To the best of my delegation's recollection, no serious negotiations have taken place on the structure and the mandate of the so-called MTO. The fact that the provision for the evaluation of the results of the GNG has not been extended to the GNS would logically indicate that these are two separate areas of engagement. We can understand that for reasons of cost-saving, a single secretariat may serve the two separate arrangements. But it is difficult to see how the MTO can be presented as a 'fait accompli' not to mention our persistently expressed position that our level of an under-developed economy does not permit us to make any commitments in respect of Trade in Services.

5. My delegation has been tirelessly arguing in favour of a just and equitable framework of multilateral trade relations. It has made specific observations, in the context of the actual functioning of the GATT, how much of initial privileges in the form of waivers, derogations, special marketing arrangements, and both non-acceptance and non-implementation of

panel reports has been resorted to by the industrialized countries for the past half a century in order to expand global economic space for themselves. This they have been able to do with impunity, while it is the sword of Damocles that is most visible in the communication to the ACP countries from GATT. Some might even describe it as 'coup de grâce'.

6. Late as the hour is, and anxious as we continue to remain aboard a sustained and sustainable international multilateral trading system, we yet again ask the more advanced countries to take a very hard, objective look at the history of their respective political economies, and at the skeletons, often invisible to ill-equipped eyes, in their own cupboards.

7. With each passing day since the launching of the Uruguay Round, not only has the world been witnessing major contortions taking place in the global market place from the East to the West and from the North to the South, but analysis after analysis by informed professionals, technically competent, has been surfacing, computing the eventual gainers and losers at the end of the Round. These are no men and women of straw, nor do they belong only to economically under-developed societies.

8. What my delegation has stated in the past and wishes to say now on this occasion as the year 1992 approaches its end, applies with very specific relevance to the United Nations' classified least-developed countries. To declare them, for all practical purposes, as outcasts is to take on a terrible historical responsibility for which sometime, somehow, an increasingly heavy price will have to be paid, and not in environmental degradation alone, vitally important as that is to humanity as a whole.

9. Under-developed as our economies are, we are not short of professionally knowledgeable and competent analysts in our own societies. Almost all of them are persuaded that the market is a weighty tool for the management of resources. Very few are convinced that, left to itself in this highly unequal world, it can ensure balanced social development thus providing a durable basis for political stability.

10. However much the negotiators of the advanced economies in the course of the Uruguay Round insist that we are concerned here with technical negotiations, they all know only too well that it is the political imperatives that become the final determinants. If evidence was needed at all, the limbo of the past twelve months has more certainly provided it.

11. Finally, more out of sorrow than any perverse satisfaction, my delegation will be failing in its duty if it did not reiterate its deeply felt perception that in embarking on the Uruguay Round, the international community has bitten more than it can chew, let alone digest, and that when the outcome of the Round comes to be translated into an operational reality, what I have just expressed as our fears will predictably be reflected in matters appearing on the agenda of the expanded machinery.

12. Mr. Chairman, you have proposed a politically conclusive outcome to be achieved by 31 December 1992. It is difficult to perceive a great deal of realism in that proposal, certainly seen from the point of many developing countries whose across-the-board -- both vertical and horizontal -- capacity is least likely to be able to do a satisfactory job of the exercise. A politically conclusive outcome implies political feasibility of substantial conclusion themselves.

In conclusion, I would have much preferred to remain silent knowing that events will take their course through sheer compulsion that riders of tigers inescapably experience, but for the fact that on more occasions than one may care to count, it has been asserted that silence means consent. Our cruel dilemma has been that "you are damned if you do and damned if you don't". To articulate this dilemma is the minimum we feel we have an obligation to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to all participants, for the courtesy of listening to me.