

# GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

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Working Party on Structural Adjustment  
and Trade Policy

RECORD OF DISCUSSION ON COUNTRY CONTRIBUTIONS  
RELATING TO EXPERIENCE WITH STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

Australia  
(Spec(82)6/Add.3)

1. The Australian representative, referring to the contribution of his delegation, stated that in Australia the Federal Government retained responsibility for protection levels in industry whereas the State Governments had responsibilities in areas relevant to structural adjustment. The Australian economy had undergone a considerable process of structural adjustment over the last thirty years which had manifested itself in significant changes in the relative size of different industries and sectors. The most striking changes had been the decline in relative importance of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors and the increasing importance of mining and services. Nonetheless, agriculture remained crucial to Australian trade and contributed to over 40 per cent of export earnings, while manufacturing employed some 19 per cent of the labour force. Adjustment had been especially pronounced and sustained in the rural sector where the bulk of the change had taken place without government intervention. The basic factors which had determined structural adjustment in agriculture had been sustained cost-price pressures and the loss of markets caused by foreign government interventions to protect their agricultural producers. In cases where world markets had not been open, i.e. where other countries had introduced trade barriers such as import quotas or variable levies or had subsidized their domestic production, the Australian industry had been forced to adjust in ways not necessarily consistent with its comparative advantage or resource endowment. Australia's main rural industries were highly competitive internationally. However, they were not always permitted to compete on fair terms with other producers and in some cases they were not permitted to compete at all. As Australia exported a high proportion of its agricultural production, the rural industry was very susceptible to moves by other governments to restrict access to their markets and was perhaps even more vulnerable to the subsidisation of exports by other countries.

2. The Australian delegate went on to say that his delegation had presented a detailed account of its experience with structural adjustment in the rural and manufacturing sector. In manufacturing, the adjustment pressures which had operated throughout the 1970's included rapid domestic wage and price increases, changes in the value of the Australian dollar, liberalization of the world exchange rate system since 1971, increasing import competition, reductions in tariffs and the downturn in world economic activity and trade. Reduction in protection had increased the pressure for structural change by exposing Australian manufacturing industries, to increased competition from imports. In the last decade, the average nominal

rate of protection for Australian manufacturers against imports in all forms (including tariffs, quotas and bounties) had been reduced from 24 per cent to about 15 per cent. The average effective rate of protection over the same period had fallen from 36 per cent to 26 per cent. In a few instances the Australian government had felt constrained to moderate market forces in order to cushion the effect and costs of what could otherwise have been precipitously rapid restructuring. However, the general thrust of government policy was to develop a more competitive, specialized and innovative industry which was better able to compete with imports.

3. The Australian system of assistance to industry was open and transparent. Changes were made by the government only after a public enquiry by the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) which, in addition, published regular assessments of the overall protection levels in the Australian industry. This made it easier in Australia to identify and quantify protection, compared with countries which had no such institution. It could be expected that continuing progress would be made towards desirable structural adjustment in Australia in the 1980's, partly because this was now a clear objective of government policy, partly because the change in public perception was providing both pressure and a more receptive environment for adjustment, and partly because economic conditions in the 1980's were likely to make the need for structural change more pressing. It was recognized in Australia that most structural changes brought benefits to some but imposed costs on others. This was true both at the international and national level; it was in the best interest of the world trading community to ensure that necessary structural adjustment took place and that the costs of such adjustment were not borne solely by the smaller countries.

4. One member of the Working Party referred to three studies on structural adjustment that had been carried out in Australia in the past nine years. One of them, the Jackson report, had concluded that a consultation procedure was needed with industries and trade unions on structural changes in the manufacturing industry. He was interested, in this context, to know whether there had been arrangements made for greater involvement by industry and trade unions in planning for structural adjustment? If so, had this affected transparency?

The representative of Australia stated that in recent years government policy had been aimed at measures to improve consultation between government, employers and employees regarding, amongst other things, structural adjustment. The Australian government had established an Australian Manufacturing Council and a number of Industry Advisory Councils to improve consultation between government, industry and unions. The Councils provided advice to the government on changes occurring in manufacturing and assisted in the further development of industry policy. The Australian Manufacturing Council established in 1977, was comprised of representatives drawn from industry, trade unions, commerce, agriculture, mining, consumers and State Governments, and was concerned with policy matters germane to the whole of manufacturing industry, including production and cost patterns, trends in development and change in the sector, the overall performance of industry, and industry's interface with society generally. The Industry Advisory Councils, of which there were eleven, considered issues as they related to a particular industry sector and included industry representatives, unions, retailers, consumers and other interested groups. The Australian government had not established consultative mechanisms to specifically examine and plan for structural

change; however, the Australian Manufacturing Council and the Industry Advisory Councils were free to examine and advise the government on any matter that was of significance to manufacturing. The Australian Manufacturing Council as well as a number of the Industry Advisory Councils had, respectively, advised the government on structural adjustment in manufacturing generally and the changes occurring in particular industry sectors. In addition, the Australian government had an open inquiry system of examining changes in assistance to industries. All interested parties could give evidence to the Industries Assistance Commission, including evidence on structural adjustment in particular industry sectors.

5. The National Labour Consultative Council (NLCC), established in 1977, could also look at aspects of structural adjustment. Its function was defined by an Act of Parliament: "... is to provide, in the public interest, a regular and organized means by which representatives of the Government of the Commonwealth, of employers and employees may consult together on industrial relations matters, and manpower matters, of national concern". A recent example of NLCC consideration of structural adjustment issues involved a sub-committee of the NLCC which was established, inter alia, to update guidelines concerning notification and consultation by employers when technological change was to occur. The establishment of the sub-committee was a result of the government's response to the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia (CITCA). The sub-committee's consideration of this matter was suspended in July 1981 pending a job security "test case" which had been brought before the Arbitration Commission by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). The "test case" was aimed at establishing minimum standards with regard to notice and consultation on introduction of any structural change, period of notice of redundancy and redundancy payments. The "test case" thus constituted an attempt to develop legally enforceable requirements on industries introducing structural change. There was no evidence that any measures leading to greater involvement by industry and trade unions in planning for structural adjustment had led to increased barriers to trade or a movement to less visible means of protection.

6. The same member wondered what specific structural features were planned to increase the complementarity of Australia's economy with that of other countries in its region (as recommended in the Crawford Report)? What would be the consequences for commercial policy and the GATT if any?

The representative of Australia stated that the Australian government was not planning specific structural changes in order to increase the complementarity between Australia's economy and that of other countries. Rather these structural changes were taking place by and large in response to market forces (as indicated in the body of the Australian paper on structural adjustment presented to this Working Party). Complementarity was encouraged through the free-trade arrangement operated with New Zealand, The Papua New Guinea Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement (which established a free-trade area) and the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement. All of these arrangements had been notified to the GATT. In addition, Australia operated a generalized system of tariff preferences which had assisted developing country neighbours of Australia to increase their exports to Australia. This had also contributed to complementary structural change in Australia. These policies had been notified to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and were subject to regular consultations under the General Agreement. It was notable that these measures had been trade creating rather than trade diverting.

7. The same member said that Australian experience with the Structural Adjustment Assistance Programme (SAA) and the Special Assistance to Non-Metropolitan Areas Programme (SANMA) appeared to illustrate difficulties of facilitating adjustment by compensatory payments. What alternatives, if any, were being used or considered?

The representative of Australia stated that the issue of whether an income maintenance scheme for retrenched such as the Structural Adjustment Assistance Scheme should be re-introduced was examined in the Report of the Study Group on Structural Adjustment (the Crawford Report) in 1979 and the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change in Australia (the CITCA report) in 1980. The Crawford Report concluded that measures of this type were not desirable because of their negative nature - namely they did not provide an incentive for labour to move back into employment in new industries or occupations - and because of the substantial equity, administrative and effectiveness drawbacks involved in such schemes. The Crawford Report saw the use of active manpower policies as a better means of facilitating structural adjustment. The CITCA Report on the other hand saw the need for additional income support to be provided to retrenched, both to redress the concentration of the costs of change borne by retrenched and also to reduce resistance to change. In its response to the CITCA recommendation in favour of income maintenance the government noted that temporary income maintenance raised complex and major issues and stated that before taking final decisions on the matter it would seek full consultation with employers and the union movement.

8. Another member said that it was necessary to look at the degree of commitment in quantitative and qualitative terms made by individual developed countries since 1947. Could Australia consider increasing the number of its tariff bindings in the GATT and adhering to more MTN Codes, in particular the Codes on Technical Barriers to Trade, Government Procurement, Customs Valuation and Anti-dumping?

The representative of Australia stated that Australia continued to be prepared to negotiate further tariff bindings in return for reciprocal concessions on products of interest to Australia. Australia noted however the reluctance of other countries to negotiate meaningful concessions on products in which it had a substantial trade interest. The effect of this was clearly reflected in the bilateral trade balances with countries like the EC, the US and the EFTA countries. The question of equity in respect of action on non-bound tariffs was therefore a matter for reciprocity in trade negotiations. The Australian government had accepted the Anti-Dumping Code and The Customs Valuation Code and had announced its intention to accept the Code on Technical Barriers to Trade as soon as a number of technical and administrative matters were resolved. At the conclusion of MTN, Australia had decided not to accept the Government Procurement Code at the time. The government continued to monitor its position with respect to all the Codes including membership of the Code on Government Procurement.

9. The same member was interested in supplementary information on the development of the mining sector and its role in the overall process of adjustment in Australia.

The representative of Australia stated that the discovery of extensive new mineral deposits in the 1960s and 1970s, and expanding overseas demand for raw materials (particularly iron ore, coal and bauxite, and particularly from Japan), had resulted in the mining sector's share of GDP

increasing from about 2 per cent in the late 1950s to 4.5 per cent at the present time. This was in contrast to trends in most other developed countries. Because of the capital intensive nature of mining, and the increasing adoption of labour-saving techniques over the years, the mining sector's share of employment had remained virtually unchanged at 1 per cent over the same period. Over 50 per cent of the output of the minerals industry was exported, and exports of minerals now accounted for a third of Australia's total exports, compared with one-tenth in the 1950s. When this fact was considered together with the fact that 45 per cent of Australia's total export earnings were accounted for by rural commodities, the susceptibility of Australia's trade to fluctuations in commodity prices, overseas agricultural protection policies and changed purchasing strategies on the part of major raw material importers, was readily understandable. Although still comprising a small proportion of Australian GDP and employment the rapid development of the mining sector had caused a number of significant pressures and adjustments in the Australian economy. Firstly, the fast pace of development, considered against the relatively small size of the Australian economy, had placed considerable strain upon Australia's available financial resources for investment. The relative attractiveness of investment in raw materials extraction (at least when world prices and buyers' policies were favourable and predictable) had in the last decade or so drawn financial resources from other sectors of the economy (as well as from overseas). Investment in the other sectors had probably been less than it would otherwise have been. Recently, poor world prices, stagnant international economic activity and uncertainty surrounding buyers' intentions, had contributed to a slowing down of investment in the mining sector. Secondly, the fast expansion of the mining sector in some past years had contributed, from time to time, to increased wage pressures. These wage rises had been a significant element behind structural adjustment in the manufacturing sector, with many labour-intensive firms closing down, or adopting more capital-intensive techniques of production. Rationalization of industry structures had occurred as firms strived for economies of scale. Adoption of labour-saving techniques had also been quite rapid in the tertiary industries (finance, commerce, etc.). Thirdly, in some periods increases in minerals exports of a substantial magnitude had contributed to appreciations of the Australian dollar. A leading Australian economist had attributed much of the \$A appreciations in the early 1970s (1971-74) to the rapid expansion of mineral exports in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He had estimated that the growth in mineral exports was, from the viewpoint of the import-competing manufacturing sector, equivalent to the removal of all Australian tariffs and the introduction of an import subsidy. (Source: R.G. Gregory, "Some implications of the Growth of the Minerals Sector", Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, August 1976).

10. Of course, at other times, slowdowns in mineral exports had contributed to depreciations of the \$A, and hence to structural pressures of a different kind in the manufacturing and rural sector. However, there was considerable evidence that the \$A revaluations of the early 1970s were

the watershed for many of Australia's more labour-intensive factories.<sup>1</sup> Fourthly, the growth of the Australian minerals industry had spawned growth in Australian minerals-processing industries. However, overseas policies protecting local processing industries had deprived Australia of realising its full potential in minerals processing, based on its comparative advantage in raw material and energy-intensive industries.

11. The same member wondered how successful the measures described in paragraph 22 were in encouraging innovation and competitiveness and in promoting the process of structural adjustment. Was there a danger of these measures leading to a return to policies of import replacement?

The representative of Australia said that paragraph 22 described the government's major policy objectives for manufacturing industry, i.e. to make industry more "internationally competitive, innovative and export oriented". Specific measures had been introduced to achieve these objectives. These policy measures were embodied in a broader policy framework designed to assist the Australian economy in adjustment to the prevailing pressure towards change by creating an environment in which structural change could take place without undue economic and social disruption.

12. The government had acknowledged that technological innovation and the development of new and improved products were fundamental to Australian industry's efficiency and competitiveness. However, conscious of Australia's historical reliance on overseas industrial technology, and aware that Australian industry was not always price competitive using existing technology, the Australian Government encouraged greater effort in industrial research and development to assist Australian industry to gain a sound technological base. This encouragement was presently in the form of an industrial research and development incentives scheme. The scheme had been a useful policy instrument since its introduction in 1967 and had recently been upgraded and extended for a further five years as from 1 July 1981. While the scheme had in many cases led to the development of individual products or processes which had enjoyed market success, the achievement of the more general objectives of the "development of Australian industry" was more difficult to assess.

13. The government had recently announced following a review of certain budgetary assistance measures to industry that the Australian Industrial Research and Development Incentives Scheme would continue largely unchanged. The government also believed that Australian industry had to

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<sup>1</sup>In research on the economic consequences of development of the mineral sector, the Department of Trade and Resources has estimated that the prospective expansion of the industry may cause the value of the Australian real exchange rate to be 10 per cent to 12 per cent higher by 1990 than would otherwise be the case. This would be because of increases in mineral exports, and because of capital inflows which contribute finance to the mining sector's expansion. That is, further structural adjustment pressures are likely to be exerted upon the manufacturing and rural sectors due to developments in the mining sector. (Source: Department of Trade and Resources, Resource Investment in Prospect and the Balance of Payments - Some Implications for the Economy.)

increase production for exports to fully exploit the benefits of scale economies and overcome the limitations imposed on industry by a small domestic market. In 1978 an export development package was introduced which was designed to encourage promotion expenditure and improved export performance. The package encompassed a range of export development activities including a system of export incentives and intensive trade promotion, a publicity program in overseas markets across the whole range of Australia's exports, a strengthening of the Trade Commissioner Service to improve operational effectiveness in key markets, and the establishment of the Australian Overseas Projects Corporation to support exporters, contractors and consultants in developmental projects abroad.

14. The Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) had recently completed a review of the existing export incentive schemes. Following consideration of this report the government had decided to allow the Export Expansion Grants (EEG) scheme to lapse from 30 June 1983 and to upgrade and extend the Export Market Development Grants (EMDG) scheme until 30 June 1988. In addition measures had been introduced to encourage increased investment and replacement of outdated capital equipment. These included investment allowance and accelerated depreciation for plant. Many factors influenced the rate of investment and it was difficult to assess the extent to which provision of the allowance and the associated lowering of the relevant cost of capital had contributed to higher investment. Similarly it was a complex matter to determine whether existing measures constituted a fair depreciation regime and one that was adequate to encourage firms across the broad range of industries to undertake the level of capital investment necessary for strong balanced growth.

15. The reference to the IAC on budgetary assistance measures last year required the Commission to provide advice on the effectiveness of such measures and whether any changes, redirections or alternative means, including improvements in depreciation provisions and the investment allowance, would be more effective. Following detailed consideration of the IAC Report on this matter recently, the government had decided to improve significantly the depreciation provisions provided to industry, in particular: accelerated depreciation over either five or three years; new non-residential income-producing buildings and structures depreciable at the annual rate of 2.5 per cent; retention of the investment allowance; and improved depreciation provisions for the primary and mining sectors. The government's industrial development measures were aimed at encouraging those activities that were more suited to Australia's economic environment and had the best prospects for expansion without the need for excessive support from the community in the long term. Import replacement was also subject to these considerations.

16. Structural change had also been promoted by a deliberate reduction in the levels of assistance provided to certain industries which received relatively high protection. Several methods had been used to achieve this, such as an across the board 25 per cent cut in tariffs. The tariff review program which examined, over a ten year period, assistance provided to a wide range of industries, together with individual IAC industry reviews had also contributed substantially to structural adjustment. This was shown through two measures both of which included all forms of assistance (including tariffs, quotas and bounties). The first was the nominal rate of assistance with referred to the assistance provided to an activity's

output and was expressed as a percentage of the value of output. Between 1968-69 and 1980-81 the average nominal rate of assistance to the manufacturing sector had been reduced from 24 per cent to 14 per cent a reduction of 42 per cent. There had been a similar reduction in the second measure, the average effective rate of assistance from 36 per cent to 24 per cent. The effective rate of assistance was a net measure of assistance to an activity, taking into account assistance measures affecting both inputs and outputs, and was expressed as a proportion of value added. The combination of these measures and gradual reductions in protection represented an irreversible shift from import replacement policies per se.

17. The same member wondered how preferences granted by State Governments to producers in their own state (described in paragraphs 49 and 50 of the Australian submission) could be reconciled with a positive structural adjustment policy?

The representative of Australia stated that under the Australian Federal system of Government, the Commonwealth did not have constitutional power to compel State Governments to abandon their purchasing preference schemes. State Government schemes however, did not have a major quantitative impact and were unlikely to impede structural adjustment. Nevertheless there had been steps taken in the context of Commonwealth and State Industry Ministers and officials meeting to secure State Government agreement to abandon their preference schemes. Some progress had been made and two States (Victoria and South Australia) had agreed to drop purchasing preferences against each other.

18. The same member wanted to know whether it was possible to quantify or to give more indications concerning the influence, in the area of structural adjustment, of the States in Australia, as opposed to the Federal Government (reference: paragraph 19, page 5 of the Australian submission)?

The representative of Australia stated that he was not aware of any published report which specifically dealt with the role of State Governments in structural adjustment of the rural sector. Nevertheless, State Governments had constitutional responsibility for a variety of functions in agriculture, e.g. extension services, general education, substantial research activities, soil and water conservation services, etc.

19. The same member, referring to the statements in the Australian submission "Market is the main indicator of consumers' requirements and the economy's ability to satisfy those requirements", wondered how this squared with a publicly-stated policy of retaining 80 per cent of the domestic car markets for domestic producers (duty of 45 per cent plus 12.5 per cent after 1982 within quota, outside quota 1985, 1986, 1987 - 150 per cent, 1992 - 125 per cent; use of Article XIX for six and seven years concerning footwear, cars)?

The representative of Australia said that the market mechanism operating through the decisions of consumers and of public and private enterprises was the principal determinant of the allocation of resources within the Australian economy. The government, however, recognized that a few industries which were significant in terms of employment and with important inter-relationships with the rest of the economy might, from time to time, require special support measures to alleviate particular problems and to insulate them from the full force of the market while desirable structural adjustments were made. This was the case with the motor vehicle

and textile, clothing and footwear industries. The sectoral policies adopted by the Australian government had been designed to maintain pressure for adjustment by gradually reducing the level of protection and increasing market access to imports at pre-determined rates.

20. Another member asked whether Australia believed that the dependence on foreign markets for agricultural products lead to the policies of trading partners having a great influence on domestic structural adjustment.

The representative of Australia said that the domestic policies of Australia's trading partners had shaped international trade in agriculture. The organization of markets, price support schemes, domestic and export subsidies, high levels of production and non-tariff barriers in other countries had had an adverse effect on efficient, export-oriented Australian producers. Much of the structural adjustment which had taken place in the Australian agricultural sector had been made necessary by these policies which had flourished in the absence of equitable GATT rules on trade in agriculture. For example the United States Section 22 waiver had adversely affected the development of the Australian dairy industry, as had the production and export subsidies of the EC. Other products adversely affected by the EC system of subsidies included wheat, sugar, meat, canned and dried vine fruit.

21. The same member asked whether the Australian delegation could quantify the effects on its economy of policies followed by other countries.

The representative of Australia said that it would not be possible to quantify precisely the total effect on Australia's economy of policies followed by other countries. However, the impact of other countries policies was documented for some sectors of the Australian economy. The Australian Bureau of Agricultural Economics had estimated, for example, that the European Community's sugar subsidy system had cost the Australian sugar industry some \$US83 million a year. The impact on the Australian dairy industry of policies adopted abroad was documented in paragraph 7 of Australia's submission. The dominance of agricultural products in the composition of Australia's exports and the predominance of barriers to agricultural trade suggested that the effect of other countries' policies on the Australian economy was significant.

22. The same member referred to a statement in the Australian submission that international trade in agricultural products was significantly influenced by the organization of markets, national support schemes and high levels of production. He wondered whether the Australian delegation could elaborate what it meant by high levels of production.

The representative of Australia said that high levels of production, in this context, referred to a level of production which as a result of support schemes was considerably higher than that which would exist if production decisions were based on prices determined by open markets.

23. Another member referring to the trade restraints especially in the field of agriculture, wondered how Australia determined the way to adjust in the light of these restraints, and which factors were taken into account in order to minimize their damage.

The representative of Australia stated that agricultural industries in his country had historically had to cope with both short-term fluctuations and major long-term changes in market conditions, largely reflecting their heavy dependence on overseas markets. A major factor had been the need to

develop new export markets to replace former traditional markets in the United Kingdom and other European countries, particularly following the formation and enlargement of the European Economic Community and the application of its Common Agricultural Policy. In this climate many industries had faced quite severe international trading constraints.

#### Dairy Industry

24. The industry in Australia at both the producer and processor levels had contracted substantially in size over the last ten years<sup>1</sup> as a direct reaction to trading constraints, mainly from the EEC. The accession of the UK to the EEC from the beginning of 1973 had resulted in a total suspension of exports of Australian dairy products to that market. This market collapse had coincided to some extent with a general downturn in the world market for dairy products, particularly skim milk powder, and had created the conditions for rationalization and restructuring of the Australian industry during the seventies. Rationalization and restructuring had occurred through a variety of means: the industry had concentrated operations in the more "climatically suitable" south-east regions (Victoria), remaining dairy farmers in the other States had concentrated on supplying liquid milk locally, the total numbers of both dairy farms and processing establishments had declined (through amalgamations etc.), and there had been emphasis on overseas market diversification (Japan, Middle East, South-East Asia) and negotiation of long-term contracts.

#### Sugar industry

25. For many years Australian sugar had been sold in two markets (the UK and the United States) under special arrangements which had ensured security of sales and relatively stable prices. Following accession of the UK to the EEC the Australian industry had negotiated long-term contracts with other established overseas buyers (in excess of 50 per cent of Australian export sugar was now marketed under these arrangements) as well as maintaining the US as an important outlet. Since 1970 the Australian industry had had a good deal of success in terms of market diversification but it had now come under considerable pressure from the EEC following rapid increases in Community export sugar subsidies (and consequent larger volumes of subsidized exports onto the world free market) in the post-1975 period. Another form of constraint accepted by Australian industry was the regulation of world sugar supply as determined by the International Sugar Agreement (ISA). The mechanism of control involved the manipulation of

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#### CHANGES IN THE AUSTRALIAN DAIRY INDUSTRY 1970-1 to 1980-1

	<u>1970-71</u>	<u>1980-81</u>
Milk Output (ML)	7249	5181 (a)
Cow Numbers ('000) 31 March	2601	1819
Dairy Factory Numbers 30 June	388 (1972)	270

(a) Not strictly comparable with earlier figure which includes on-farm use of milk.

export quotas and special stocks, thus placing the main burden on exporting countries such as Australia. The most important restraint on the operation of the ISA was the fact that the EEC was not a member and could, therefore, continue to place surplus sugar on the world market.

Meat industry

26. Australian meat exports were highly dependent on developments in countries of the Pacific basin, in particular the United States and Japan. The present uncertainty of these markets and the relative stability of the wheat and wool industries was expected to result in some degree of diversification. Another important developing market was the Middle East although competition from subsidized EEC beef might limit opportunities. The Australian government was responsible for negotiating bilateral trade agreements which might assist in gaining access for Australian exporters in the face of trade constraints. Furthermore, bilateral settlements in the context of the MTN had also given the Australian industry additional guarantees in supplying beef and veal to the markets of the United States, Japan, EEC and Canada. More recently, the Australian government had agreed to strengthen the powers of the Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation (AMLC) with regard to trading in meat. The new legislation would permit the AMLC, subject to ministerial approval, to be the sole trader or restrict the number of licensed exporters where there was a single buyer which controlled all or substantially all of the imports into a country. The new legislation had yet to come into effect.

Dried fruit

27. The EEC had been the destination for about 40 per cent of Australian dried fruit exports for many years but this market was now presenting serious problems, following Greece's accession in 1981. Because of an oversupply of dried fruit now existing within Greece arising from EC's subsidies and marketing policies there was concern within the industry in Australia that the proposed EEC sales onto world markets might seriously affect Australian markets.

Canned peaches and pears

28. Production subsidies introduced recently by the EEC for its canned peach industry (1978) and canned pear industry (1979) had encouraged substantial increases in output in Italy and more recently Greece, and severely depressed Australian export prospects in traditional markets (United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany). As a consequence the Australian industry had been forced to reduce both production and the prices paid to growers. There had also been a major rationalization of the associated processing industries. In Victoria the number of canning outlets had been reduced from three to two and canneries in South Australia and New South Wales were facing operating difficulties due to reduced throughput. Following the release of an Industries Assistance Commission report on the Canning Fruit Industry, the Australian government had announced in January 1983 a number of measures intended to facilitate the continuing process of structural adjustment in the canning fruit industry in response to declining export opportunities.

29. The same member asked whether the Australian authorities had a clear picture of how investment, employment, inflation and purchasing power were quantitatively affected by the trading conditions faced by Australia.

The representative of Australia said that levels of investment,

employment, inflation and purchasing power in Australia were, of course, affected by the trading conditions. While in some cases these effects on those indicators would be clear, in most cases it would not be possible to give a meaningful quantitative estimate of the effects of a particular change in trading conditions. Due to the large number and complexity of the factors involved it would often be only possible for a qualitative assessment of such changes to be made. It was, however, clear that the trading policies of foreign countries, particularly those relating to tariff and other barriers to trade, could stave off structural adjustment in their own country and force it upon another. The effects of such trading policies were therefore reflected in the investment, employment, inflation and purchasing power of the affected country.

30. The same member wondered what percentage of Australian GNP was accounted for by external trade.

The representative of Australia said that the ratio of exports of goods and services to Australia's Gross Domestic Product was of the order of 16-19 per cent (16 per cent in 1978/79, 19 per cent in 1979/80, 16.6 per cent in 1980/81). Rural exports accounted for around 45 per cent of total merchandize export earnings, fuels and minerals for around one-third, and manufactures for about 20 per cent (merchandize exports accounted for 85.3 per cent of exports of goods and services in 1980/81). Imports of goods and services were equivalent to 17.3 per cent of GDP in 1978/79, 18.4 per cent in 1979/80, and 18.5 per cent in 1980/81. A large proportion of Australia's merchandize imports comprised capital goods and other manufactures. Food and beverages accounted for about 4-5 per cent of merchandize imports; fuels and lubricants for around 14 per cent; capital goods for around 25 per cent; industrial supplies for 28 per cent; transport equipment for 13 per cent; and consumer goods for 15 per cent (merchandize imports accounted for 75.9 per cent of imports of goods and services in 1980/81).

31. The same member wanted to know whether Australia had encountered trading problems as a result of rigidities elsewhere in the world economy.

The representative of Australia said that rigidities in the world economy impeded the free flow of goods and services. Rigidities were particularly prominent in world agricultural trade and they had caused serious, long-standing trading problems for Australia.

32. Statistical information provided by the delegation of Australia, upon request by the same member, is attached as Annex 1.

33. Another member of the Working Party noted that the secretariat study on structural adjustment and a large number of the country submissions dealt with the major trends influencing structural change and the factors influencing those trends, e.g. demography, technology, investment, trade. While he agreed that it was important to keep all these factors in mind, work should be focused on government policies that directly affected trade, in accordance with the mandate of the Working Party. He was therefore most interested in policies directed at adjustment in specific industries and the policy aspects related to trade flows. He noted that as far as policies in the industrial sector were concerned, four major sectors were mentioned in the Australian contribution. He wondered whether these were the only sectoral policies in the industrial field.

The representative of Australia stated that sectoral policies had originally been applied to form industries. At present only two industries were subject to sectoral policies, namely, the textile, clothing and footwear industries and the passenger motor vehicle industry. The whitegoods industry and shipbuilding which had previously been subject to sectoral policies were no longer considered to be in this category. In both cases significant adjustment had occurred resulting in a rationalization of production facilities and an improvement in industry efficiency and competitiveness.

34. The same member, referring to the term "nominal assistance" in paragraph 35 of the Australian submission, wondered whether Australia could provide information on the percentage of that assistance provided by tariffs as opposed to other forms of assistance.

The representative of Australia said that paragraph 35 referred to an average nominal rate of assistance to the manufacturing sector of 15 per cent in 1978/79. The Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) had estimated that the average nominal rate of assistance had been 15 per cent in each of the years from 1977/78 to 1980/81 inclusive. In its information Paper No. 1 (Trends in the Structure of Assistance to Manufacturing, May 1980), the IAC had estimated that in the absence of quotas, the average nominal rate of assistance for the sector would have been about two percentage points lower than the 15 per cent recorded in 1977-78. The IAC had found that less than 1 per cent of manufacturing production in 1977-78 had been affected by subsidies, and that the value of direct subsidies had been almost insignificant compared with subsidy equivalents of tariffs and quotas. Furthermore, export incentives had contributed 0.4 percentage points to the overall nominal rate of assistance in 1977-78 (Source: IAC, Annual Report, 1978/79, pp. 80-81). The analysis indicated that tariffs accounted for about 12.5/15ths of the total nominal assistance to the manufacturing sector in 1977/78, i.e. about 83 per cent. It was unlikely that this ratio had changed markedly since 1977/78.

35. The same member asked how Australia responded to increased international competition in any given line of industry. While Australia notified measures under Article XIX, it might be that due to the very low percentage of bound tariffs in Australia, that many measures were never notified to contracting parties as they affected unbound rates.

The representative of Australia stated that his country's system of setting tariff rates and determining industry assistance levels was very open. Before the level of assistance to any primary or secondary industry could be changed the government generally had to first refer the matter to either the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) or the Temporary Assistance Authority (TAA) for report -- the IAC on long term industry assistance matters and the TAA on urgent temporary assistance needs. Approaches by industry for a reference to either the IAC or TAA were made in the first place to the relevant Commonwealth industry department, such as the Department of Industry and Commerce in the case of rural industries. Both the IAC and TAA provided independent advice to the government on the nature and extent of assistance to be given to Australian industries. Both bodies were established by and operated under the IAC Act which required that they held inquiries in public, with interested parties, including local producers, importers, consumers and unions, being invited to submit evidence. The government was not bound to accept the recommendations made by the IAC and TAA, although in practice it

usually did. He mentioned furthermore that the trend in decisions on industry assistance levels had resulted in significant reduction in these levels in recent years. This situation was in marked contrast to that in many of Australia's trading partners where the trend was to apply automatic safeguard measures, such a variable levies, or a range of non-tariff measures, including voluntary export restraints, and subsidies, which were often not notified under Article XIX. Concerning the issue of bindings he referred to the answer given earlier.

36. The same member wanted to know how the trade flows had correlated with trends in nominal assistance mentioned in table 1.1 of the Australian submission.

The representative of Australia said that table 1.1 of the Australian submission indicated that the overall nominal rate of assistance to the manufacturing sector had experienced a significant decline over the same period (and table 1.2 indicated that such a decline had also occurred in effected rates). The fact that real imports had experienced "ups and downs" over the same period was evidence of the fact that the level of imports was influenced not only by rates of assistance to domestic industries, but also by such factors as changes in the exchange rate, changes in overall economic activity, and changes in activity sectors of the economy. For example, it had been estimated that: "Over the two years 1973 and 1974 the rapid rise in gross national expenditure, appreciations of the Australian exchange rate and shortages of Australian supplies contributed in equal proportions to the increase in total and dutiable imports. The 25 per cent tariff cut (the general tariff reduction of 19 July 1973) was of minor importance". "Over the 18 months from 19 July 1973 to December 1974 exchange rate changes have had a much greater effect on the flow of total imports than the general reduction of tariffs. In terms of their effects on the total import flow, the exchange rate changes were approximately four times more important than the general tariff reduction" (Source: R.G. Gregory and L.D. Martin, "An Analysis of Relationships Between Import Flows to Australia and Recent Exchange Rate and Tariff Changes", Economic Record, March 1976). The IAC had estimated that the 1973 general tariff reduction was equivalent to a revaluation of 6 per cent (IAC, Annual Report, 1973/74, page 127). For import data see table 1 in Annex 2.

37. As another example, there had occurred a marked downturn in real merchandise imports between the September quarter of 1974 and the June quarter of 1975, which probably could be attributed significantly to the 12 per cent devaluation of the Australian dollar in September 1971. Economic activity had been moderate from 1975/76 to 1977/78, particularly in 1977/78 when real GDP increased by 0.8 per cent. This moderate activity would have had an impact on import levels. Real imports had increased strongly since 1978/79. A number of factors would have contributed to this trend, including: quite strong real consumption and GDP growth in this period; overall appreciation of the Australian dollar between June 1979 and June 1981; strong investment in the minerals sector, contributing to a surge in imports of capital equipment."

38. Table 1.1 of the Australian submission provided figures on nominal rates of assistance over the 1968/69 to 1980/71 period for ASIC industry groups. The IAC had estimated that between 1968/69 and 1977/78, imports as a proportion of total market supplies had increased in each of the

industry groups, except ASIC Industry 26 (Paper, paper products, etc). (The IAC's results are summarised in table 2 in Annex 2. More recent figures on import penetration are not available). The figures in table 2 in Annex 2 indicated that import penetration had increased quite strongly in most industry groups, including those which had experienced increases in their nominal rates of assistance over this period (ASIC industries 23 (Textiles) and 24 (Clothing and Footwear)).

39. The same member wondered with respect to paragraph 41 of the Australian submission which refers to the Export Market Development Grants (EMDG) and Export Expansion Grants (EEG) schemes, what were the costs and the effects of these schemes on structural adjustment.

The representative of Australia provided information on expenditure under these schemes which is attached at Annex 3. He stated furthermore that following an inquiry by the IAC, the Australian government had recently decided to strengthen the EMDG scheme, involving an estimated additional expenditure of \$A36 million in 1982/83. The EEG scheme was to be wound down, and would lapse on 30 June 1983. The IAC had estimated that the two export incentive schemes had contributed 0.4 percentage points to the nominal rate of assistance to the manufacturing sector in 1977-78 (15 per cent), and one percentage point to the effective rate (26 per cent).<sup>1</sup> (Source: IAC, Annual Report, 1978/79, pp. 80-81). Export incentive payments for goods exported in 1978/79 had been about \$A100 million higher than in the previous year; the IAC had estimated that this had increased the effective rate of assistance to the manufacturing sector by 0.25 percentage points. Later estimates of the schemes' impact upon assistance rates were not available. These measures indicated that the EMDG and EEG schemes would have had only a marginal impact upon structural adjustment in the manufacturing sector. However, the two schemes had been implemented in response to the government's commitment, increasingly recognized in the second half of the 1970s (and made official policy in the 1977 White Paper on Manufacturing Industry), to encourage a more outward-looking manufacturing industry (one in which the concept of import replacement of the 1950s and 1960s was no longer a part of policy). As the White Paper stated, the government "endorses the view that it is desirable to give encouragement to new investment that will be efficient, internationally competitive and export-oriented". The White Paper also stated that "as a long-term objective the community will be best served by a manufacturing structure which requires minimum levels of Government support". As discussed in the original Australian submission, overall Australian assistance rates had fallen substantially over the last decade or so. Since 1977/78, Australian exports of specialized manufactures had increased quite strongly, partly in response, it was believed, to the EMDG and EEG schemes. However, other factors had also played a role. It was difficult to isolate the various influences on manufactured exports performance.

40. The same member wondered whether industries for which sectoral policies were in operation were required to submit plans for structural adaptation in order to obtain assistance. The representative of Australia said that his government did not require industries operating under

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<sup>1</sup>The first EEG payments had been made in 1978-79, but had related to increases in exports achieved during 1977-78.

sectoral policies to submit restructuring plans to the government or prove that they were restructuring in order to receive assistance. The sectoral policies adopted by the government had been designed to maintain pressure for adjustment on these industries by gradually reducing the level of protection and increasing market access to imports.

41. The same member asked whether Australia could provide an estimate of the cost and expenditure involved in structural adjustment policies.

The representative of Australia stated that his government no longer provided structural adjustment assistance to the manufacturing sector. Between 1974 and 1976 the Australian government had two structural adjustment assistance programs: the Structural Adjustment Assistance (SAA) Program; and the Special Assistance to Non-Metropolitan Areas (SANMA) Program. Payments to firms and individuals under these programs totalled \$65.7 million (\$60.6 under SAA and \$5.1 under SANMA). Assistance to the rural sector was detailed in the table "Progress of Rural Adjustment Assistance Schemes up to 30 June 1981" in Appendix B of Australia's submission.

42. The same member wanted to know what had been the circumstances and basis on which Australia's Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) had decided to support the four industries mentioned in paragraph 13, as well as the agricultural products listed in paragraph 20 of the Australian submission.

The representative of Australia said that the IAC had since its inception reported on a considerable number of subject matters (a list of these reports is attached as Annex 4). The basis of the various recommendations made by the Commission on these reports had varied with the circumstances of the industry concerned.

43. The same member said that paragraph 13 of the Australian submission noted that Australian adjustment support in the industrial sector had generally taken the form of import restraints; support in the rural sector (see paras. 19-31 on pages 31-34) had only been in the form of orderly marketing schemes and price stabilization arrangements. He wondered whether any import restraint actions in the agricultural (or rural) sector had taken place under the former Australian Rural Reconstruction Scheme (RRS) or the current Rural Adjustment Scheme (RAS).

The representative of Australia stated that no import restraints in the rural sector had taken place either under the former Rural Reconstruction Scheme or the present Rural Adjustment Scheme. Neither scheme provided for such intervention. The main provisions of the Rural Adjustment Scheme (which were very similar to those under the Rural Reconstruction Scheme) were to help restore to economic viability those farms and farmers with the capacity to maintain viability once achieved; to provide carry-on assistance to farm enterprises and to facilitate the adjustment out of farming of those without prospects of achieving long-term viability. Assistance was only available to bona fide farmers who had sound prospects to maintain viability but were unable to obtain finance on reasonable terms from any other normal source. Those who did not have sound prospects and would suffer personal or family hardship if not assisted qualified for assistance to adjust out of farming. Assistance under the scheme was provided in the form of: debt-reconstruction to allow more time for payment and reduction of interest charges; farm build-up to encourage amalgamation of small properties; farm-improvement and carry-on finance. For non-viable producers assistance was provided for rehabilitation purposes. Household support was also provided whilst a farmer was considering leaving farming to enter another occupation.

44. The same member wondered what was the nature of the "short-term emergency relief" recommended by the IAC in paragraph 41 on page 36 of the Australian submission.

The representative of Australia said that the short-term emergency relief recommended by the IAC and mentioned in paragraph 41 entitled Agricultural Adjustment in Australia related to carry-on finance. The carry-on finance provisions of the Rural Adjustment Scheme enabled loans to be made for essential carry-on purposes in times of severe market down turn or similar situation in those rural industries that the Commonwealth and States agreed from time to time required such assistance. It was designed to ensure that farmers were not forced to make inappropriate adjustments which might not be warranted in view of longer term prospects. Assistance took the form of loans at concessional interest rates. To date, carry-on assistance had been provided to dairy farmers, to beef producers, to wine grape and canning fruit growers.

45. Another member said that in paragraphs 65-69 of the Australian submission a seven-year assistance plan to textiles, clothing and footwear industries was mentioned. He wondered what would be the assistance regime applied to these industries at the end of the seven-year period.

The representative of Australia said that the assistance program for the textile, clothing and footwear industries would be reviewed by the government prior to its expiry in 1987 and the government would then determine what assistance regime should apply to these industries.

ANNEX 1

Table 1

AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT

YEAR	Employment Total ( '000)	Employment in Agriculture and Services to Agriculture	
		Numbers ( '000)	Share of Total (%)
1969-70	5183.0	398.7	7.7
70-71	5395.6	413.3	7.7
71-72	5515.7	390.1	7.0
72-73	5609.9	421.8	7.5
73-74	5783.0	401.5	6.9
74-75	5855.2	383.1	6.5
75-76	5841.3	380.3	6.5
76-77	5897.8	370.5	6.3
77-78	<u>5995.4</u>	<u>383.3</u>	<u>6.4</u>
78-79 (a)	5969.6	353.0	5.9
79-80	6041.5	375.7	6.2
80-81	6246.7	378.3	6.0
81-82	6356.3	384.7	6.0

(a) At August: from 1978 the basis of estimation was changed and may have affected the level of the series.

Source: The Labour Force, ABS 6203.0 , 6204.0

Table 2

CAPITAL FORMATION

YEAR	Gross Fixed Private Capital Expenditure (GFPCE) - Equipment (\$ million)		Share of GFPCE to Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting
	AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, FISHING AND HUNTING	TOTAL	
1969-70	383	2555	15.0
70-71	346	2910	11.9
71-72	396	3100	12.8
72-73	573	3200	17.9
73-74	641	3600	17.8
74-75	670	4160	16.1
75-76	916	5150	17.8
76-77	1080	5890	18.3
77-78	1008	6590	15.3
78-79	1340	8465	15.8
79-80	na	9035	na
80-81	na	11576	na

Source: Australian National Accounts, National Income and Expenditure, ABS 5204.0

Table 3

OUTPUT PER UNIT OF LABOUR

Year	Gross Farm Product at Market Prices (GFP) (\$ million)	Gross Value of Farm Production GVP (\$ million)	Total Employed Persons in Agriculture and Services to Agriculture (a) ('000)	GFP per Employed Person (\$)	GVP per Employed Person (\$)
1969-70	2137	3730	398.7	5360	9355
70-71	1943	3580	413.3	4701	8662
71-72	2217	3968	390.1	5683	10172
72-73	3085	4957	421.8	7314	11752
73-74	4200	6412	401.5	10461	15970
74-75	3724	5876	383.1	9721	15338
75-76	3765	6173	380.3	9900	16232
76-77	4191	6757	370.5	11312	18238
77-78	3933	6972	<u>383.3</u>	10261	18189
78-79	6490	10225	353.0	18385	28966
79-80	7442	11764	375.7	19808	31312
80-81	7123	11610	378.3	18829	30690
81-82	7412	12420	384.7	19267	32285

(a) At August; from 1978 the basis of estimation was changed and may have affected the level of the series.

Source: Australian National Accounts, National Income and Expenditure, ABS 5204.0  
The Labour Force, ABS 6203.0, 6204.0

Table 4

AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS

YEAR	Total Exports of Merchandise (\$ million)	Principal Exports of Rural Origin -	
		Value (\$ million)	Share of Total Merchandise (%)
1969-70	3998	2061	51.6
70-71	4242	2075	48.9
71-72	4773	2362	49.5
72-73	6073	3200	52.7
73-74	6758	3427	50.7
74-75	8541	3780	44.3
75-76	9399	4119	43.8
76-77	11489	5057	44.0
77-78	12050	4960	41.2
78-79	14073	5717	40.6
79-80	18604	8054	43.3
80-81	18949	8072	42.6
81-82	19306 (p)	na	na

Source: Overseas Trade Australia, Part 2. Comparative and Summary Tables.  
ABS 5410.0

(p) preliminary

Table 5

CAPITAL/LABOUR INPUTS

YEAR	Depreciation of Farm Capital (excludes land) (\$ million)	Wages, Salaries and Supplements (WSS) Paid to Farm Sector (\$ million)	Depreciation/ WSS Ratio
1969-70	445	364	1.22
70-71	417	374	1.11
71-72	417	366	1.14
72-73	441	404	1.09
73-74	418	512	0.82
74-75	472	607	0.78
75-76	518	659	0.79
76-77	616	644	0.96
77-78	626	713	0.88
78-79	725	777	0.93
79-80	799	863	0.93
80-81	na	na	na
81-82	na	na	na

Source: Australian National Account, National Income and Expenditure,  
ABS 5204.0

ANNEX 2

The table below provides the real value of Australian imports (which are predominantly manufactures) over the 1968/69 to 1980/81 period.

Table 1

AUSTRALIAN IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE  
1974-75 \$A Million

<u>PRICES (\$M)</u>	
1968/69	6,081
1969/70	6,552
1970/71	6,453
1971/72	5,922
1972/73	6,032
1973/74	7,879
1974/75	7,964
1975/76	7,326
1976/77	8,186
1977/78	7,732
1978/79	8,615
1979/80	8,560
1980/81	9,303

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Summary of Statistics Australia (various issues).

Table 2

IMPORTS, VALUED AT DUTY PAID PRICES, AS A PROPORTION OF MARKET SUPPLIES (%)				
Industry		1968/69	1973/74	1977/78
ASIC Code	Description			
21-22	Food, beverages and tobacco	4.8	6.1	7.7
23	Textiles	32.8	40.3	40.3
24	Clothing and Footwear	7.3	17.0	22.8
25	Wood, wood products and furniture	8.1	10.7	10.9
26	Paper, paper products, etc	17.1	16.3	17.0
27	Chemical, petroleum & coal products	24.8	28.4	33.2
28	Non-metallic mineral products	9.0	9.3	10.4
29	Basic metal products	7.7	9.2	8.2
31	Fabricated metal products	8.7	8.4	11.3
32	Transport equipment	28.2	29.3	30.3
33	Other machinery & equipment	33.1	35.1	45.4
34	Miscellaneous manufacturing	20.7	23.0	27.0
	Total Manufacturing	17.6	19.5	22.9

Source: IAC, Information Paper No. 1 op.cit page 118

ANNEX 3

Expenditures under the Export Market Development Grants (EMDG) Scheme and Export Expansion Grants (EEG) scheme have been as follows:

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	<u>EMDG</u> <u>Scheme</u> <u>SA million</u>	<u>EEG</u> <u>Scheme</u> <u>SA million</u>
1975-76	17	-
1976-77	24	-
1977-78	30	-
1978-79	38	20
1979-80	45	170
1980-81	60	200
1981-82 (Budget provision)	84	197

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Source: IAC Report, Export Incentives, 28 February 1982;  
Budget Speech, 1981-82

ANNEX 4

REPORTS BY THE INDUSTRIES ASSISTANCE COMMISSION (IAC)

(Copies of these reports may be obtained directly from the Commission.)

Commodities

Almonds - TAA Report (30 September 1981)  
Almonds - By-law (7 February 1975)  
Apples and Pears (28 March 1980)  
Australian Citrus Industry (2 June 1978)  
Beef Cattle Industry (30 September 1975)  
Brandy, Whisky, Gin and Vodka - TAA Report (24 March 1977)  
Brandy and Whisky - Interim Report (30 November 1977)  
Short Term Assistance to Brandy (26 June 1978)  
Short Term Assistance to Canned Ham (2 February 1981)  
Canning Fruit - Interim Report (25 March 1982)  
Cheese (15 March 1979)  
Dairy Industry (23 October 1975)  
Dairy Industry Marketing Arrangements (9 September 1976)  
Fisheries and Fish Processing Industry (20 September 1978)  
Fruit and Fruit Products (24 August 1981)  
Ginger and Ginger Products (15 June 1981)  
Grapes and Wine (31 July 1979)  
Manufactured Tobacco (23 January 1981)  
Mushrooms - TAA Report (5 April 1974)  
Mushrooms (16 December 1974)  
Mushrooms - NAFTA (15 November 1977)  
Australian Olive Industry (3 December 1976)  
Orange Juice Imports - TAA Report (15 July 1976)  
Orange Juice (Australian Citrus Industry) Interim Report  
(28 February 1977)  
Orange Juice (Australian Citrus Industry) Further Interim Report  
(23 May 1978)  
Plywood - TAA Report (28 July 1976)  
Plywood and Veneer - Interim Report (10 March 1977)  
Polyunsaturated Margarine (2 December 1981)  
Potatoes and Processed Potato Products (17 June 1977)  
The Sugar Industry (31 March 1979)

Spirits, Spirituous Beverages Etc (8 June 1979)  
Timber and Timber Products and Plywood and Veneer (12 May 1978)  
Tomatoes, Tomato Paste, etc - By-law (13 November 1974)  
Vegetable Oils and Fats: Animal Oils and Fats, etc (27 October 1978)  
Wheat Stabilization (30 June 1978)

General

Bovine Brucellosis and Tuberculosis Eradication Campaign  
(28 January 1982)  
Brucellosis and Tuberculosis (10 April 1975)  
Financing Promotion of Rural Products - Interim Report on Export  
Inspection (12 December 1975)  
Financing Promotion of Rural Products - Final Report (30 August 1976)  
Financing Rural Research (25 June 1976)  
Fruit growing - Interim Report (30 October 1975)  
Fruit growing - Final Report (16 January 1976)  
Miscellaneous Edible Foodstuffs (7 September 1981)  
New Land Farms in WA (21 May 1975)  
Nitrogenous Fertilizers Subsidy (5 September 1975)  
Phosphatic Fertilizers Bounty - Interim Report (31 July 1975)  
Phosphatic and Nitrogenous Fertilizers (26 February 1982)  
Rural Income Fluctuations - Certain Taxation Measures (30 June 1975) .  
Rural Income Fluctuations (10 February 1978)  
Rural Reconstruction (13 January 1976)