|
Author |
Date and source |
Quotes |
|
|
|
| Joseph E. Stiglitz,
former Chief Economist of the World Bank |
3 August 2003
Daily Times, Pakistan |
I believe that globalization - the
removal of barriers to free trade and the closer integration of
national economies - can be a force for good and that it has the
potential to enrich everyone in the world, particularly the poor.
But I also believe that if this is to be the case, the way
globaliazation has been managed, including the international
trade agreements that have played such a large role in removing
those barriers and the policies that have been imposed on the
developing countries in the process of globalization, need to be
radically rethought. |
| Peter Morici,
Professor, University of Maryland |
1 April 2003
Financial Times |
Since the implementation of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1948, safeguards
provisions have been an essential element of trade agreements.
They are included because national governments cannot maintain
domestic political support for lowering trade barriers if
breathing space and the opportunity to adjust cannot be afforded
occasionally to domestic companies. |
| Doha Briefing notes |
October
2001
Trade facilitation
Doha
Briefing notes
|
"
UNCTAD estimates that the
average customs transaction involves 20-30 different parties,
40 documents, 200 data elements (30 of which are repeated at
least 30 times) and the re-keying of 60-70% of all data at
least once. With the lowering of tariffs across the globe, the
cost of complying with customs formalities has been reported
to exceed in many instances the cost of duties to be paid. In
the modern business environment of just-in-time production and
delivery, traders need fast and predictable release of goods.
An APEC study estimated that trade facilitation programs would
generate gains of about 0.26% of real GDP to APEC, almost
double the expected gains from tariff liberalization, and that
the savings in import prices would be between 1-2% of import
prices for developing countries in the region." |
| WTO Director-General, Mike Moore |
27 August
2001
Area Finanzas
|
"La
burocratización también puede ayudar a los que la dominan.
Muchos países cuentan con un laberinto de reglamentos
aduaneros complicados, con prescripciones en materia de normas
de origen y sistemas de licencias de importación variables.
Sólo los que tienen contactos encuentran la salida de este
laberinto, pero es posible que los demás tengan que ofrecer
algún pago a burócratas bien situados. |
| World Bank Report |
8 August 2001
The Wall Street Journal
|
"
The new aflatoxin standards would reduce health risks by only
about 1.4 deaths per billion a year but would cut African
exports 64%, or $670 million, compared with their level under
international standards" |
| Geoff Winestock |
2 August 2001
quoting a World Bank report, Wall Street
Journal
|
"The new
aflatoxin standards would reduce health risks by only about
1.4 deaths per billion a year, but would cut African exports
by 64% a year, or $670 million, compared with their level
under international standards" |
| National Post |
24 July 2001
National Post online
|
"Third
world leaders share very little ideological ground with the
protesters who claim to speak on their behalf. Most of them,
for instance, regard the whole idea of labour and
environmental "standards" as a ruse meant to exclude
them from the world's richest markets. Their suspicions are
correct. when former US President Bill Clinton championed
restrictive standards at the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle,
everyone knew he was standing up not for the world's poor but
for unionized US labour and its votes. As Western
environmental and work regulations are beyond the economic
reach of poor countries, they are de facto trade
barriers." |
| Former WTO Director-General, Renato Rugiero |
9 March 1998
WTO Press Release
|
"
As the classical trade barriers are disappearing less visible
barriers produced by inefficient administration and
organization of the trade transaction process are being
exposed to the public view. Attention has turned to the
"invisible" costs on account of documentation
requirements, procedural delays, or a lack of transparency and
predictability in the application of government rules and
regulations. I call these costs "invisible" as they
are not part of governments' actual commercial policy. They
are surely not invisible for traders and consumers. Estimates
of these costs vary, depending on the variables used for their
calculation. Yet, in many cases, it is evident that they
exceed the actual level of duties paid on the products
concerned. Administrative barriers for imports and exports are
certainly not effective instruments of restrictive trade
policy. Excessive documentation requirements and outdated and
slow procedures are crude, imprecise, and indiscriminate
measures which hinder all trade and create an overall negative
trading environment. National economic policy objectives are
often adversely affected. For example, a carefully devised
tariff structure with low tariffs for intermediate goods to
boost the competitiveness of the domestic industry could be
frustrated, if administrative barriers add additional costs on
the import of these goods. Unlike customs duties, which
benefit the government budget, the invisible costs of
administrative barriers are genuine deadweight losses,
benefitting nobody and achieving no meaningful policy
objective. " |
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