

Part II

Membership and representation

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3 Members, coalitions and the trade policy community

The theory of games shows how coalitions should be formed if there is an advantage in forming them and the rules do not forbid it. Any player, in fact, who fails to attempt a coalition in such circumstances will lose or, more exactly, will gain less. The rational player must make the pessimistic assumption that a coalition may be formed against him; and he must therefore attempt to form one himself.

John McDonald
Strategy in Poker, Business and War (1950)

Introduction

The ways that countries represent themselves in Geneva and coordinate action with other members have undergone important changes since the late GATT period. Four trends stand out: more countries have acceded (as discussed in Chapter 4), more of these members have established permanent missions in Geneva, more of those missions are dedicated exclusively to trade rather than to Geneva-based institutions in general, and the number of personnel assigned to both the dedicated missions and the general-purpose missions has risen. The net result was that the total diplomatic manpower that countries deployed in Geneva grew more than five-fold from 1982 to 2012. The composition of the Geneva negotiating community also evolved. Whereas the Quad (Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United States) had once dominated GATT, and were almost alone in having large and GATT-dedicated missions, many more negotiators now hail from developing countries. That is true not just for the largest emerging economies but also for several other developing country members that “punch above their weight” in the organization.¹

The conduct of negotiations has also changed. In much of the late GATT and early WTO periods, a great deal of criticism focused on the so-called green room. Originally used in both a metaphorical sense (alluding to a tradition in the theater) and in an architectural reference (there being an actual room of that hue),² this became a generic term for any closed negotiation in which only a small number of countries were invited to participate. The few contracting parties allowed in the room cut the most important deals, provoking resentment from those left outside. Over time, WTO members came to rely more on coalitions as a device for mobilizing, communicating and negotiating, and nearly all members are now represented in multiple coalitions that are formed along geographic, sectoral or other lines. Green rooms have not been eliminated altogether, but those on the inside are now expected to keep in close contact with their coalition partners. The result is a system that bears a closer resemblance to representative democracy than to oligarchy.

The Geneva trade policy community

Before delving into the representation of individual countries in the WTO, as well as their proclivities to form coalitions, it is appropriate to make a few observations on the trade policy community as a whole and the people who form it. In addition to the hundreds of diplomats who are accredited – some of them short-termers but others of whom become trade people for life – the group also includes hundreds of members of the WTO Secretariat and other institutions in the orbit of the WTO. Many of the people who work in these bodies were at one time posted to their countries' WTO missions. The members of this community often see themselves not solely as representatives of countries that are divided by their different interests and objectives but as individuals who are united by their similar backgrounds, perspectives and problems, as well as by their shared commitment to the system as a whole. The best comparison may be to a social club in which most of the members are salesmen. They may have very different wares to sell, and might even compete with one another in the same product lines and in the same sales territory, but that does not prevent them either from being social or from mixing business with pleasure.

People came to this community by varying paths in their professional careers. For a few of them, becoming a trade policy specialist was a lifelong ambition. One Latin American diplomat who eventually rose to become deputy director-general, for example, joined his country's foreign service with the express aim of being assigned to international economic issues and was prepared to leave government service if he was given any other responsibilities. Some of the economists have always concentrated on trade in their professional work, whether in the classroom or in government. Those cases are exceptional; most people interviewed for this history reported one form or another of accidental entry into the field. Some who became pillars of this community joined it because they were given a choice of several possible jobs at an early stage of their careers and thought that something about trade sounded intriguing, or were already in Geneva for one reason or another and simply needed a job, or were living elsewhere and looking for employment in an international organization, or were assigned to Geneva by their service, or followed an immediate superior who got the posting. Whatever route they took to the WTO, many of them decided to stay or return after that first experience. Sometimes that meant coming back to Geneva as ambassador after an earlier stint on one of the lower rungs of the diplomatic ladder; sometimes that meant moving laterally from their country's diplomatic service into the WTO Secretariat; and for others that meant finding a position in another Geneva-based international organization or in one of the trade-related think tanks, non-governmental organizations or schools that ring the city.

The shared experience in this community can be further reinforced by the similar backgrounds of its members. The members of this community tend to be well-educated: of the 93 people listed in the Biographical Appendix for whom data are available on the level of their degree,³ 58 (62.4 per cent) hold either a law degree or some form of master's degree. Among the remaining 35, just over half (18) obtained doctorates⁴ and 16 received bachelor's degrees; many of those with doctorates, master's degrees, or the equivalent obtained them from UK and US universities.⁵ Part of their sense of community comes from the problems they share in

common. When the diplomats who handle trade meet to negotiate or socialize, with the line separating one activity from the other being indistinct, they may find themselves commiserating over comparable difficulties that they have in managing sometimes tense relationships with their respective countrymen. Preparing for negotiations on trade in services, for example, may require them to deal with capital-based regulators who object to the very notion of allowing negotiators in another ministry to make commitments affecting their areas of jurisdiction. They may also have similar experiences in dealing with newly assigned trade ministers, a position that in some countries – perhaps even in most of them – may be filled by politicians whose knowledge of the field is not nearly as complete as trade professionals would prefer. Happy is the WTO ambassador whose minister can learn the basics of trade policy quickly, has the political skills needed to deal with his counterparts at other trade-related ministries and has both political capital and a willingness to spend it on behalf of his ministry's interests and initiatives. All too often, they must deal with ministers who fall short on one or more of those points. In the late GATT period, many believed that one of the system's main problems was the infrequency of ministerial involvement. In the WTO period, there is more concern over the form than the frequency of ministers' participation. Some ministers are more prone to treat meetings with their peers as an opportunity to play to the crowd at home than as a chance to advance or conclude negotiations.

With some notable exceptions, the members of this community tend not to count among their number the people at the apex of the multilateral trade system. This is an area where the folkways of the WTO differ somewhat from those of GATT. The GATT director-general was not just the leading figure in the community but a very active part of it, a position achieved by dint of his personal and political skills, his familiarity with the minutiae of the field and sheer longevity in office.⁶ The role of director-general underwent a change in the transition from GATT to the WTO. Peter Sutherland held this position in both bodies and, by force of personality, he elevated the office to one that could deal directly not just with ministers but with presidents and prime ministers. By all accounts, Mr Sutherland managed to strike a balance between that higher status and his connection to the Geneva community, being careful to ensure that ambassadors were either present when he met with heads of government or, failing that, were fully briefed on what transpired in the meeting. Some of his successors have been criticized for losing touch with their principal constituency. A similar sense of hierarchy and social distance prevents most trade ministers from being considered full-fledged members of this trade community. Unless the minister in question is among the few who previously served as an ambassador or in some other capacity in Geneva,⁷ or held the portfolio longer than the few years that most have in this office, or is an especially empathetic person or a quick learner, trade ministers tend to be seen as outsiders. Even trade ministers who leave a real mark on the trading system may be short-termers. Of the 18 ministers included in the Biographical Appendix to this book, for example, ten held at least one other ministerial position before and/or after they took charge of trade.

Whether or not ministers are treated as true members of the Geneva community, they are the ones who give it direction. They can be called upon to break its impasses; sometimes they exacerbate its divisions or even undo its achievements. As is the case for ambassadors, the

personal chemistry between ministers can be crucial to the outcome of negotiations and the resolution of disputes. They form a policy-making community of their own, albeit one that is much smaller, has a higher rate of turnover, and whose members are in less frequent contact than their counterparts. Nowhere is the importance of personal chemistry more apparent than in the relations between the EU trade commissioner and the US trade representative. Some transatlantic pairings have been great catalysts, while other combinations have proven to be caustic. Sir Leon Brittan, who served as commissioner from 1993 to 1999, was on good terms with US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor (1993-1996) but his relationship with Charlene Barshefsky (see Biographical Appendix, p. 573) (1997-2000) was not nearly as productive. Cooperation was also said to be poor during the roughly overlapping tenures of Peter Mandelson (2004-2008) and Susan Schwab (2006-2009) (see Biographical Appendix, pp. 585 and 592). The one such pairing that is reputed to have worked best was between Pascal Lamy and Robert Zoellick (see Biographical Appendix, pp. 583 and 598) who held their positions from 1999 to 2004 and from 2001 to 2005, respectively. They worked together closely in the opening years of the Doha Round, from the launch through the Cancún Ministerial Conference and its aftermath, sometimes going so far as to look out for one another's interests when dealing with third parties. Even when the representatives of these two largest and most influential WTO members are on the best of terms, however, that does not guarantee that negotiations will be successful. In some cases, what EU and US policy-makers portray as cooperation on behalf of the community may appear to their counterparts as self-interested collusion. That was most clearly the case in the lead-up to the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference, when Mr Lamy and Mr Zoellick devised an agricultural deal that, had it been struck in an earlier round, would likely have been the beginning of the end-game in the negotiations. The negative reaction that this deal provoked on the part of different developing country blocs marked the start of at least a decade of crises, suspensions and just enough incremental progress to keep the negotiations alive.

Membership, residency and participation

Imagine a country that starts with a blank page for a trade policy and must decide what role the WTO will play in its strategy. There are three questions that policy-makers must answer. First, will they join the WTO or remain outside the system? Second, if they do join the WTO, will they establish a permanent mission in Geneva or handle WTO matters from either the capital or another mission in some European capital? Third, if they do establish a permanent mission in Geneva, will that office be tasked with handling all of the country's business in the many Geneva-based international institutions or will it instead be a mission dedicated specifically to this one subject? The general trend over the course of GATT and WTO history has been for an ever-greater number of countries to accede, to follow up by establishing a permanent mission and eventually to convert that mission to one solely handling trade (with other issues being left to a separate mission). The net result has been a huge increase in the available diplomatic manpower in the Geneva trade community.

Membership and residency

The vast majority of the world's countries are either WTO members or are seeking to join. GATT started with just 23 contracting parties, and had 128 when it transitioned to the WTO in 1995. By the end of 2012, there were 158 WTO members, another 25 countries that were still in the process of accession, and an observer not seeking accession (the Holy See) (see Appendix 3.1). That left just 14 members of the United Nations that had no relationship whatsoever to the WTO, being neither members nor observers and not in the process of accession. The largest of these is the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (better known as North Korea), with 24.6 million people. Other countries with populations of more than one million that fall in this category include Somalia (9.8 million), South Sudan (8.3 million), Eritrea (5.8 million), Turkmenistan (5.2 million) and Timor-Leste (1.1 million). The remainder consists of microstates located either in Europe (Monaco and San Marino) or the Pacific Ocean (Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu), each of which has a population counted in the tens or hundreds of thousands. The hold-outs have a combined population of about 56 million persons, nearly the equivalent of Italy.

Non-residency was once a major problem, with as many as one fifth of the GATT contracting parties or WTO members being represented only intermittently (if at all) from the capital city or from a mission in Bonn, Brussels or London. The lack of a permanent mission in Geneva limited countries' ability to participate in, or even to monitor, negotiations and related activities conducted under the auspices of the WTO (Lamy, 2008), not to mention the other trade-related institutions that are based in Geneva.⁸ The data in Table 3.1 show the sharp drop in the level of non-residency during the WTO period, which has fallen in both absolute and relative numbers. The phenomenon peaked in 1997, when 28 members (21 per cent of the total) did not have permanent missions in Geneva, but by 2012 only 18 (12 per cent) were non-resident. As of 2012, the most typical non-resident member was a small island state that was developing but usually above the income level of a least-developed country (LDC); the LDCs are eligible for Swiss government subsidies that offset the cost of office space. That profile fits for Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Maldives, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It was also largely true for Samoa (an island LDC), and for Belize, Guyana and Suriname. The remaining five non-resident countries are all African LDCs: The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Sierra Leone and Togo. These are generally countries that can afford to have only a handful of diplomatic missions anywhere in the world, and are often limited to (for example) one or two in neighbouring countries, one in the largest country in their region, one or two in other major world capitals, and one in New York (for the United Nations). Establishing a mission in Geneva might require them either to close a mission elsewhere or to find more elasticity in a foreign ministry budget that is already stretched thin. Countries in some regions can overcome this problem through cooperative arrangements such as the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery and the Pacific Secretariat.

Table 3.1. The size and scope of GATT and WTO missions, 1982-2012

	Dedicated GATT/WTO missions			General-purpose missions			Total missions			
	Missions	People	Staff (average)	Missions	People	Staff (average)	Missions	People	Staff (average)	Non-resident CPs/members
GATT period										
1982	4	19	4.8	71	215	3.0	75	234	3.1	12 (13.8%)
1987	8	49	6.1	75	246	3.3	83	295	3.6	11 (11.7%)
1992	10	71	7.1	81	322	4.0	91	393	4.3	13 (12.5%)
WTO period										
1997	20	138	6.9	84	371	4.4	104	509	4.9	28 (21.2%)
2002	29	211	7.3	91	443	4.9	120	654	5.5	24 (16.7%)
2006	38	275	7.2	93	499	5.4	131	774	5.9	20 (13.2%)
2012	39	297	7.6	97	564	5.8	136	861	6.3	18 (11.7%)

Sources: GATT Secretariat; WTO Secretariat (telephone directories from 1982 to 2006 and the electronic directory of 2012). The 2012 data do not include all countries that acceded that year.

Notes: Some dedicated WTO missions include UNCTAD within the scope of that mission's responsibilities.

CPs: Contracting parties (the GATT equivalent of members).

A non-resident member can of course send people to Geneva as frequently as funds permit. Those experts can be especially important when the WTO takes up issues that are more technically difficult (e.g. specific service sectors or sanitary and phytosanitary measures). The countries that are not permanently on-site, however, find it challenging to keep up with even the basic operations of the organization, much less to participate in its deliberations on the more technically demanding ones.

Dedicated versus general-purpose missions

In addition to deciding whether or not to become a WTO member, countries have both qualitative and quantitative choices to make regarding the nature of their representation. A member may have either a dedicated WTO mission⁹ or a general-purpose mission that deals with both the WTO and Geneva-based UN agencies.¹⁰ It seems reasonable to assume that the establishment of a dedicated WTO mission indicates a strong commitment to dealing with negotiations in that body, and that those missions solely devoted to the WTO are better equipped to participate actively and effectively in the deliberations of the institution.

The dedicated WTO missions differ from the general UN missions not just in the quantitative devotion to WTO matters, but may also have a qualitatively different orientation towards the

subject. These missions may be more likely than others to report directly to home-country officials devoted to trade policy in particular rather than to foreign policy in general, and are also more likely to be composed of people with wider and deeper knowledge of trade issues. In many cases, the ambassador or other officials in a dedicated mission will be economists or lawyers with specialized training and experience in the subject, and are better equipped than many of their counterparts to move from mere monitoring of what is happening in the WTO to active representation. A dedicated mission is more likely to be a real player in WTO deliberations than one that must also deal with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the rest of the organizations headquartered in Geneva.

The rise of the dedicated mission is the most important trend in the growing resources that countries devote to the WTO. In 1982, there were only four GATT contracting parties with dedicated missions, or 5.3 per cent of all missions. These were manned by an average of 4.8 people. By 1997, this had grown to 20 dedicated WTO missions (19.2 per cent of the total) with an average of 6.9 staffers, and by 2012 the numbers rose to 39 such missions (28.7 per cent) with 7.6 people each. General-purpose UN missions have also grown over the past 30 years, doubling to an average of 5.8 employees in 2012.

Dedicated missions used to be the exclusive province of the developed countries, apart from the special case of Hong Kong, China, but today many developing countries also opt to establish them (see Table 3.2). In 2012, developing economies accounted for 12 of the 20 largest dedicated WTO missions. Eleven of the 19 Latin American missions were of this type, as were nine of the 19 Asian developing country missions. Among African countries, however, there were just three such missions. Even relatively small developing countries have established this type of mission, which in their cases can be taken as especially strong indicators of the importance that they attach to the WTO. Costa Rica, for example, established a dedicated WTO mission in 1992. Costa Rican officials report that it was difficult to win approval for the upgrade at home, both because of the financial burden and because other ministries were dubious. The establishment of their dedicated WTO mission was nonetheless a logical progression in the elevation of national institutions that are devoted to trade. It came after the creation of a special office of foreign trade in the office of the presidency in the mid-1980s (a body that was later upgraded by being granted cabinet status), and not long after Costa Rica acceded to GATT in 1990. Costa Rica was not alone in its level of commitment. By 2012, Nicaragua was the only one among the five Central American countries that was still represented in the WTO by only a general-purpose mission. Southeast Asian countries have also invested in dedicated WTO missions, with the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand having some of the largest of all WTO missions.

Table 3.2. Size of selected members' GATT and WTO missions, 1982-2012

	GATT period		WTO period	
	1982	1992	2002	2012
United States	8	11	16	24
China	—	—	11	22
Brazil	[4]	[9]	[12]	20
Chinese Taipei	—	—	14	17
European Union	9	18	21	15
Singapore	[3]	[3]	[7]	14
Mexico	—	8	9	13
Thailand	—	[8]	13	13
Canada	[5]	[12]	[13]	12
India	[3]	[3]	7	11
France	4	5	6	10
Philippines	[3]	[4]	[8]	10
Turkey	[6]	[9]	12	10
Australia	[3]	7	9	9
Germany	[5]	5	7	9
Spain	[6]	[8]	[11]	9
Haiti	[1]	[2]	4	8
Norway	[3]	[4]	[8]	8
Ecuador	—	—	[9]	7
Hong Kong, China	3	5	7	7

Sources: Calculated from the printed telephone directories of the GATT and WTO Secretariats from 1982, 1992 and 2002, and the electronic directory of 2012.

Notes: Based on the 20 members with the largest dedicated WTO missions in 2012; [brackets] indicate general-purpose missions.

The question then arises as to whether having a dedicated or a general-purpose mission affects the quality of a country's representation. Veteran negotiators observe that in a dedicated mission, the ambassador may well be more involved in the trade negotiations than are their counterparts in general-purpose missions. The difference may not be as notable for other members of the delegation. An ambassador from a dedicated mission is, however, more likely to chair the more important bodies in the WTO (see Chapter 14) and countries with dedicated missions are also more likely to bring dispute settlement cases (see Chapter 7). These are only general rules for which one finds notable exceptions. A general-purpose mission is not necessarily less active or influential, especially if it happens to have many staff. There is no reasonable standard by which the general-purpose mission of Japan, which had 20 people as of 2012, would be considered small or unimportant. There may indeed be some advantages to having a general-purpose mission, including the cost efficiencies (especially when one considers the high price of office space in Geneva), the ability of such missions to reallocate diplomatic resources in response to the changing ebb and flow of subjects in the international community, and the greater ease of ensuring coherence in the positions that a country takes in different international organizations. As a general rule, however, most of the key players in WTO deliberations have opted over the years to establish missions that are dedicated solely to trade.

The size of missions and the negotiating community

The total size of the Geneva negotiating community has grown steadily for decades, having numbered just 234 people in 1982 but expanding to 861 in 2012 (see Table 3.1).¹¹ The rate of growth is even more impressive if one weights the missions by type. If we were to assume that a typical, general-purpose UN mission devotes one third of its time to GATT or the WTO,¹² that means that in 1982 the missions in Geneva devoted 91 person-years to GATT matters (i.e. 19 actual person-years at the dedicated GATT missions and 72 calculated person-years at the others). Assuming that this one-third rule remains valid over time, the total rose to 178 in 1992, 359 in 2002 and 485 in 2012. In brief, over a 30-year period, the diplomatic manpower that missions devote to trade in Geneva has more than quintupled. This growth can be attributed to a variety of factors, including the accessions of new countries, the declining rate of non-residency among developing countries, the practice of moving from general to dedicated missions, and expanded staffing for both types of missions.¹³

The data in Table 3.2 show that the relative size of the most influential members' missions has changed radically over the past generation. That is most evident in the case of the European Union, which had long held the distinction of having the largest dedicated mission to GATT or the WTO. As recently as 2002, the EU mission was, at 21 people, notably bigger than that of the next-largest member. Just a decade later the staffing of the EU mission had declined in both absolute and relative terms, falling to fifth place. Even while the EU mission has declined, however, individual EU member states such as France, Germany and Spain have expanded their dedicated WTO missions. The combined weight of EU diplomatic talent in the WTO may thus remain as large as ever it was. As of 2012, the United States had surpassed the European Union *per se*, however, and was not the only member to do so. The changes wrought over recent decades are underlined by the fact that the second and fourth spots in 2012 were held by China and Chinese Taipei, two members that had not even been contracting parties at the end of the GATT period. As of 1982, the total representation of GATT contracting parties associated with China consisted of a dedicated mission of three people representing Hong Kong (then still a British colony).¹⁴ By 2012, there were 51 people in the dedicated missions representing: China; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; and Chinese Taipei. That amounted to 18.4 per cent of all representatives in dedicated WTO missions and was precisely equal to the number of people in the three Quad missions that are WTO-dedicated (i.e. Canada, the European Union and the United States). Nor were the qualitative and quantitative changes confined to the largest WTO members. No fewer than 18 developing countries each had dedicated missions staffed with at least five people. Most of the other members with dedicated WTO missions of this size in 2012 had been confined in the late GATT period to UN missions in which the complement rarely exceeded three people.

Coalition diplomacy

Thomas Hobbes observed in *Leviathan* that while some men may be stronger than others, nature has so contrived that even the weakest among them can best the strongest "either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself"

(Hobbes, 1651: 84). Much the same observation might be made regarding the power of small states in the WTO, especially in a system in which most decisions are made by consensus. Even the smallest and poorest countries can confederate or form coalitions in defence of their common interests. Coalitions are the hallmark of WTO diplomacy.

This represents an evolutionary change from the pattern of representation in the late GATT and early WTO periods. As Birkbeck (2009: 21) noted, whereas “proposals on WTO reform in the late 1990s focused on concerns about the exclusive nature of the ‘Green Room’ and called for formalization of negotiating process to enhance representation and transparency,” subsequent developments have led to “the expanding use of coalitions as tools for representation” and declining criticism of the green room. This is not to say that the style has changed altogether. The prior practice can be characterized as one in which coalitions played an important role in developing issues and options, but the most significant decisions – the final choice among those options – were finally made in the green room. This evolved into a system in which coalitions play a more prominent role, and in which green-room meetings usually allow members of the interested coalitions to be represented in the room. The practice of green-room diplomacy is examined in greater depth in Chapter 6.

Why members form coalitions

“Coalitions allow greater voice to countries that would otherwise have no say at all in the small group meetings that underpin WTO negotiations,” according to Narlikar (2012: 4974), as they “allow members not only greater possibilities of representation but also a more informed participation in the negotiation process.” Smaller and weaker countries that might otherwise be voiceless can be represented in this way, while also lending greater legitimacy to the outcome. Informal networks “play an important role in facilitating the development of a consensus and the conclusion of international agreements,” in the words of a negotiator from Singapore (Desker, 2011: 44) because:

The successful negotiation of international agreements requires the development of shared interpretations of major issues, the establishment of mutual trust and confidence, a willingness to go beyond one’s own perspectives on an issue so that the concerns of other parties can be factored into the negotiating process and an awareness of whether preferred options are possible in the current negotiating environment.

The diplomat also pointed to “evidence that such informal groups can play the role of blocking coalitions, especially when they are composed of participants with shared perspectives opposed to trends in such negotiations” (*ibid.*). Coalitions may thus serve to impede as well as impel negotiations, depending on the circumstances.

Coalition diplomacy does allow countries to pool their limited resources, but is complicated by the fact that countries within a region will often have similar, but never identical, interests. In the case of east and southern Africa, for example, Bilal and Szepesi (2005: 389) found that “the regional dimension... has had little direct impact so far on the preparation and conduct of WTO negotiations” because groups such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and

the Southern African Development Community “have too diverse a membership to allow for a meaningful co-ordination of their member countries’ positions on specific WTO issues.” That is not a universal perception; one diplomat from outside Africa observed that group dynamics in the region can sometimes reduce positions to what he called the “loudest common denominator”.¹⁵ In a geographically based coalition, “the interests of the individual members often get submerged,” according to this veteran negotiator, such that “if Country X really cares about this, and the others don’t care so much, it becomes the [group] position.” By backing other members in the region on their selected issues, the rest of the members in a group know that they can expect the same sort of solidarity on some other issue for which their own interests are higher.

Coalition diplomacy predates the WTO. The Uruguay Round was notable for a pair of North–South blocs, which might more properly be called North–South–*East* blocs, in recognition that each had at least one member that was still on the other side of the Iron Curtain at the start of the round. The first of these was the Cairns Group of non-subsidizing agricultural producers that first came together a month before the launch of the round.¹⁶ Its membership overlapped somewhat with the De la Paix Group of countries that cooperated on non-agricultural issues, so named for the restaurant of the lakeside Geneva hotel where they first gathered in 1987.¹⁷ Both groups were comprised primarily of mid-sized, trade-dependent countries that wanted a deal. The De la Paix Group helped to broker some of the most important deals in the Uruguay Round on issues such as dispute settlement and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.

One of the main trade-sceptical coalitions to emerge early in the history of the WTO was similar in composition to predecessors in the late GATT period. Under the leadership of India, the Like-Minded Group (LMG) initially brought together countries that opposed the placement of labour standards on the negotiating agenda in the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference (see Box 3.1). The original members included Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tanzania and Uganda; later entrants were the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. As the negotiations progressed over whether to launch a new round and how to structure it, this group stressed the importance of implementation issues for developing countries, and favoured a more inclusive negotiating procedure over the domination of large countries in the green room. According to Jones (2010: 38), the LMG “was attempting to restrike the balance of negotiating power in the WTO in favour of the growing majority of developing countries by bringing the negotiating process more into the open, where the large and rich countries would have to leave their backroom machinations behind.” The members of this group ultimately had little to show for their efforts, however, as few of the group’s demands made their way into the terms of the Doha Ministerial Declaration. Narlikar and Odell (2006: 116–117) chalked this failure up to the group’s decision to pursue what they deemed a “strict distributive strategy,” this being “a set of tactics that are functional only for claiming value from others and defending against such claiming” from others, doing so in a way “that is not tempered by any integrative tactics, such as an offer to exchange concessions that would make each party better off than before.” Or to reduce it to the simplest terms, the LMG adopted a stonewalling strategy that produced no benefits in the short term. Nevertheless, one might argue that, to the extent that this stonewalling ultimately contributed to the impasse that is typical of such tactics, the group achieved much of what it set out to do.

Box 3.1. The key of G: naming and numbering groups in the WTO

Anyone trying to follow the large and bewildering array of blocs, coalitions and forums in the WTO can be easily confused by the ways in which these groups are denominated. That confusion stems from four quirks in the naming conventions of commercial diplomacy.

First, the names usually draw no distinction between true coalitions and temporary forums. A title such as the “Group of Six” (G6) might designate six countries that have banded together in common cause; alternatively, it might mean six influential countries that represent different viewpoints in the negotiations but have created a temporary forum in which they hope to strike a compromise that can then be brought to the membership at large.

Second, groups often choose uninformative titles, typically hiding behind the anonymity of numbers. The common practice of naming groups according to the size of their original membership gives no clue as to their purpose or composition. Names such as G5, G7 or G20 are more common, yet less descriptive, than revealing titles such as the Friends of Fish or the Tropical Products Group. Even when members choose a title other than one of the “Gs” they may prefer a name that says nothing about the group’s purpose, apart from another numerical designation such as the Five Interested Parties or the Dirty Dozen, or names that are redundant (e.g. any coalition is by definition a Like-Minded Group) or potentially confusing (e.g. the Invisibles Group could be mistaken for an archaic reference to trade in services). The Buick Group got its name from the décor of a car-themed restaurant in which it first convened.

Third, the preference for numerical titles is so strong that groups may retain their original name even after the number changes. The most notorious example is the G77 in UNCTAD, named for the 77 developing countries that formed the original coalition in UNCTAD I (1964). That title has survived even though the group comprised 132 countries in 2012. Members of the G20 that emerged in 2003 tried to keep up, only to confuse matters by variously calling themselves the G20, G21, G22 or G20Plus.

Fourth, unlike some sports franchises the community of trade diplomats appears disinclined to “retire a number”. There have been several groups going by the titles G5 and G10, for example. The G20 is especially confusing, as the G20 that coalesced before the Cancún Ministerial Conference remained active even after an entirely distinct G20 acquired a much higher profile in the financial crisis of 2008.

Building and busting coalitions through side payments and threats

The most obvious way to negotiate with a coalition is to bargain with it over the terms of the agreement at hand. If it is a group formed around agricultural issues, for example, one might seek to reach an agreement with its members on agriculture. In some instances, that may entail making proposals by which one’s own country or group might make common cause with a coalition vis-à-vis some other country or group. Another approach is to engage in coalition-busting, a practice through which one seeks to coerce or entice individual members of a coalition to leave the group.

Larger countries are often at pains to convince smaller countries either to join and remain in their coalitions or, failing that, to persuade them not to join other coalitions with opposing positions. The “smaller members from the developing world naturally tend to be more

risk-averse,” as Narlikar (2012: 4905-4911) noted, and while “a preponderance of small allies in a coalition may increase the legitimacy of the group [it] may also heighten the risk of fragmentation if these smaller members defect.” The other, larger countries that seek either to prevent or promote those defections may use side payments or threats in pursuit of that aim. This has long been a practice on the part of the larger developed countries, but one of the differences between the GATT and WTO periods is that the larger developing countries have also become adept at such linkage.

Positive inducements may be a more common means of persuasion than are threats, although the term “positive” does not necessarily connote a purely charitable and disinterested posture on the part of the country that makes the offer. As Wu (1952: 187) noted, “in the absence of a complete unity of political purpose, every act of conditional aid given by one country to another can be interpreted as coercion.” Imagine a not so hypothetical example in which a large country offers to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with a smaller one, or pledges to provide some form of assistance, but either way makes that offer conditional upon the smaller partner adopting a more accommodating position in the multilateral trade negotiations. There is, for example, a close correlation between the launch of FTA negotiations between the United States and several Latin American countries and the departure of those same countries from the Cancún-era G20. Nor are trade policy coalitions the only ones that may be at issue. There is also a close correspondence between the list of partners with which the United States initiated FTA negotiations from 2003 to 2005 and membership in the Coalition of the Willing, which supported the US invasion of Iraq.

Developed countries are not alone in practicing the politics of linkage, and for much the same purpose. The leaders of that same G20 coalition used inducements of their own to assemble the group and keep it intact. To some degree, this could be accomplished through moral suasion and appeals to solidarity among developing countries. India was able to draw upon decades of close cooperation with other developing countries. “Among all the large, developing countries it is India that has consistently worked with the Africans, with the ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific], with these smaller countries all across the world,” a former Indian ambassador observed, “and that is sort of an article of faith for us. On many occasions on several issues, India has had to subordinate its own national interest in the interest of that solidarity.”¹⁸ Moral suasion can go only so far, however, and it may be necessary for the larger members of the coalition to offer side-payments to their smaller allies in order to reduce the risk of defection. “The G20 was able to do this effectively,” Narlikar (2012: 4905-4911) reported, because the “leaders offered concessions in the form of preferential market access for LDCs, and also regional trade arrangements (economic and political) with various members, such as the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) initiative and India’s Africa Forum.”

Perhaps the most controversial way that countries are alleged to deal with the opposition that they encounter from coalitions or specific partners in them is to go over the heads of a country’s negotiators in Geneva. This might be achieved, for example, by making representations to the foreign minister, prime minister or president, in which the suggestion is made that the diplomat in question does not see the issue in the fuller context of the two

countries' relationship. The success of such an approach depends primarily on how the political leadership in the developing country chooses to respond. An example of this form of manoeuvre comes from the mid-point of the Uruguay Round, when in early 1989 Hamid Mamdouh of Egypt (see Biographical Appendix, p. 585) rallied developing countries on issues related to TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) and pharmaceutical patents. He had "gained considerable support from about 13 or 14 developing countries supporting the line taken by Egypt" on this issue, as Mr Mamdouh later recalled, but that support was not shared by developed countries. At that same time –

President Mubarak was visiting Washington to talk about much bigger things: the Middle East peace initiative at the time, US aid to Egypt and things like that. And the subject was mentioned to him, about Egypt's line taken in the TRIPS negotiations. And, you know, in diplomatic terms you don't need to go very far in something like this. So all of a sudden the mission here [in Geneva] received the instructions from the president's office to make a U-turn in the TRIPS negotiations ... [And] my ambassador here [in Geneva] said to me, "Please, you can go to the consultations but don't speak." So I went to the consultations and all those developing countries participating were supporting Egypt's proposal and the only developing country that didn't speak was Egypt.¹⁹

This was an experience that convinced Mr Mamdouh that the usefulness of his government service had come to an end. He left by the end of that year to join the GATT Secretariat as a legal adviser on dispute settlement, and soon moved from there to a distinguished career in the WTO Services Division.

Manoeuvres of this sort are not always successful. Similar efforts to bring pressure on other developing countries, as discussed elsewhere in this book, were blocked in one instance by close coordination between the president and the country's negotiating team (one member of which was his son), in another case, when the Geneva-based diplomat insisted that his role as chairman was distinct from his role as representative of his country, and in yet another instance by the unwillingness of coalition members to break ranks.²⁰ The haphazard nature of anecdotal evidence makes it difficult to know how frequently developed countries resort to such tactics, or whether it is these examples of successful resistance or the Egyptian case that is more representative of how countries typically respond. Jawara and Kwa (2003: 151) argued that these pressures are common, and allege that the United States has "a blacklist of ambassadors they would like to see removed," quoting one ambassador who said that because the majors will go to one's capital and "twist things around saying things like you are anti this and that", this is one reason why it is essential for developing country diplomats "to have a good rapport with the capital and it is also important that you refrain from reacting too quickly when you feel or suspect that you might be under threat." They also condemned a "bullying hierarchy" that included not just the Quad but also other upper- and even middle-income countries, arguing that "alliances with other developing countries" are strategically important to those latter countries, but –

they face a strong temptation to dance with the devil (the major players) and succumb to their divide-and-rule tactics; and reaping the potential benefits of doing so is generally uppermost on their agendas. One of the main bargaining chips they can offer in this process is the influence they can exert on other developing countries, particularly through regional and other groupings (*ibid*: 149).

Critics point to specific instances in which positive or negative inducements produced results, though the examples that they cite might be seen very differently by others who take a more favourable view of trade liberalization. Some countries' opposition to the launch of the Doha Round, for example, was reportedly muted or reversed as a result of deals made on other topics outside the WTO. Kwa (2003: 33) attributed a change in Pakistan's position to an aid package that was under negotiation in Washington, coupled with expanded preferences from the European Union, and linked Indonesia's change of heart to an investment agreement with Japan. She further implied (without providing specific evidence to support the claim) that similar arrangements may have been made to change the positions of Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria and Tanzania. Narlikar and Odell (2006: 130) casted doubt on whether such arrangements affected positions in Doha, observing that "several of these payoffs seem to have been related more to support for the US war on terrorism than compliance with the Quad in the WTO". The strength of that argument depends on the degree to which one believes that countries' trade and foreign policies are distinct. If they are indeed separate undertakings, then Narlikar and Odell were correct in dismissing the claimed linkage. For countries that take a more integrated view of the relationship between trade and foreign policy, or are under pressure from other countries that want them to do so, the objection is founded upon a distinction without a difference.

Blocs, coalitions and forums

Before examining the specific coalitions in the WTO that developed in the Doha Round, it is first useful to draw a distinction between three types of groups: the bloc, the coalition and the forum. A bloc may be defined as a group of countries with broadly congruent interests that form an association based on long-term or permanent similarities, which cooperate repeatedly across a range of issues and that come together in formal²¹ or semi-formal groupings that are intended to be long-lasting. The clearest examples of blocs are those groups that have either permanent secretariats (e.g. the Group of 77) or are common markets that act as unified members (e.g. the European Union). Other examples of blocs include those regional groups among developing countries that may also have (or have aspirations to create) a common market among themselves; the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is one such group. There is a trade-off in blocs between their size and their coherence. A group such as CARICOM is smaller than the G77, but it also stands a better chance of establishing a unified position among its less diverse membership. Blocs may be distinguished from coalitions or groups of countries with similar interests in narrowly defined matters that cooperate specifically on those topics.

Coalitions are usually temporary arrangements and rarely take formal shape. Examples include the “friends” groups in WTO negotiations (e.g. the Friends of Fish and the Friends of Antidumping Negotiations) and those “numbers” groups that are based on shared interests (e.g. the G33 and the Cancún-era G20). Where blocs may be of strategic significance, coalitions usually have a more limited, tactical aim. Both blocs and coalitions may be distinguished from negotiating forums, the members of which sometimes have important shared interests but in other cases are interested only in devising mutual solutions to shared problems. The WTO itself is a forum, as are the G20 that evolved in 2008 from a ministerial to a summit-level group (as opposed to the Cancún-era G20 coalition), the UN Security Council (and especially its permanent five, or P5, members), and other institutions in which countries seek to negotiate agreements, resolve disputes or handle crises. In addition to those forums that are formal and permanent, this term may be used to describe the temporary groupings that usually go by a numerical designation to reveal the limited number of members allowed in the room (G5, G7 etc.).

These distinctions are important to draw because the term “coalition” is sometimes used quite loosely, with some practitioners and analysts employing it to mean any of these three distinct phenomena. It is true that in practice the lines between these groupings can sometimes be blurry. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for example, is primarily a forum in which its developed members discuss issues but sometimes acts like a bloc – or at least is perceived to do so – vis-à-vis non-members.²² Similarly, when the Quad was active in the GATT period, it acted like a forum in which the leading countries settled matters between themselves, but also acted as a bloc with respect to its dealings with developing countries. This was partly a matter of sequencing: those issues on which the Quad negotiated within this circumscribed forum were, once they reached consensus among themselves, presented *en bloc* to the rest of the contracting parties. All blocs and coalitions involve some degree of internal negotiation and hence are partly forums, and the dividing line between the single-issue coalition and the multi-issue bloc can be hard to distinguish in some cases. As a general principle, however, the distinctions between these types are clear. It is especially important to recognize the differences between a bloc and a coalition, as this permits us to highlight some of the most important, long-term developments in the relationships between developed and developing countries. These include the decline of the Quad and the rise of the emerging economies, twin developments that have, in turn, manifested themselves in the emergence of the G20 as a forum.

The relative growth in blocs as compared with coalitions may also reflect, and perhaps be partly responsible for, the more challenging atmosphere of the WTO compared with GATT. “Twenty years ago, coalitions primarily formed around issues,” one veteran negotiator observed.²³ “And I always thought that was one of the strengths of the system, because the country who is in a coalition [against you] in a given issue might also at the same time be part of a coalition where you’re an ally.” When countries form coalitions “that conditions peoples’ behavior,” because “you don’t engage in a lot of take-no-prisoners approaches to things,” but when there are “more groups that are formed strictly on geographic lines” the WTO becomes “a little more UN-like.” This gradual movement from fluid, issue-based coalitions to a more

rigid system of regional or other blocs can make for a less cooperative negotiating environment. Coalitions exemplify the cliché that countries have no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests; blocs can sometimes put that aphorism to the test.

The forums that look like coalitions

The melding of green rooms with coalition diplomacy has also produced hybrid efforts that might be described as floating green rooms. These are small forums that sometimes develop during periods of a negotiation in which negotiators share a need for progress, but agree that the talks are in danger of reaching stalemate. A group of members may respond by forming groups that bring together a variety of participants, meeting outside the confines of the General Council or other formal settings to sound one another out and discuss potential ways forward. These are not so much coalitions as groups that are intended to explore ways that they might break the deadlock caused by the existing coalitions, and to that end may include one or more members that unofficially represent the views of the regional, sectoral or other coalitions of which they are members and often leaders.

One example is the Invisibles Group, a gathering that brought together senior, capital-based officials from some 15 to 20 members from 1995 to 1999. Originally convened by the United States and chaired by different Quad countries, the group incorporated developed and developing members as well as the WTO director-general and the chairman of the General Council. The membership included representatives from other regional or interest-based coalitions such as the Cairns Group, the newly industrialized economies, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and others. Though not a decision-making body, it was a useful device for communication and planning: “the inputs during these discussions allowed delegates to take up these ideas at the General Council,” one participant recalled (Desker, 2011: 50), “aware of the sentiments of significant elements of the WTO membership, while it alerted the WTO director-general to the concerns of these members” and also “sensitized capital-based officials to the negotiating environment in Geneva.” The Invisibles Group neither prevented nor survived the disaster of the Seattle Ministerial Conference. A comparable initiative developed in the aftermath of the (also failed) Cancún Ministerial Conference. At a time when there were growing concerns over the ability of both the round and the institution itself to survive, key players came together in what was then called the Five Interested Parties (FIPs): Australia, Brazil, the European Union, India and the United States. “Through intensive meetings and a process of reaching out to others,” Harbinson (2005: 124) recalled, the FIPs managed to produce a framework for establishing modalities in agriculture. This became a key part of the “July Package” of 2004.²⁴

Blocs and forums in and around the WTO


Even though states are juridically equal, the fact remains that – as George Orwell noted in *Animal Farm* (1945) – “Some animals are more equal than others.” That is just as true in the WTO period as it was in the time of GATT, although the alignments are more complex and

dynamic. Compared with the late GATT period, power is now more widely distributed, several key players that had been outside the system are now near its centre, the most influential members now participate in a greater number of blocs and forums and some of those groups that carry over from the GATT period have larger memberships than they once did.

In the international order that coincided with the GATT period, the centres of power could be imagined in a series of concentric circles. Those circles partly corresponded with, but were also different from, the key groupings in the GATT itself. The innermost circle during the Second World War and in the immediate post-war years was a G2 of the United Kingdom and the United States. The circle grew in later decades to become the G5 (with the addition of France, Germany and Japan) and then the G7 (when Canada and Italy joined). The next circle was the Quad, consisting of the G7 plus the remainder of the European Community (which grew to 12 countries by the end of the GATT period), followed by the larger circle of member states of the OECD. By the end of the GATT period, the OECD had two dozen member states, composed of the Quad plus Australia, New Zealand and several western European countries that were outside the European Community.

The Venn diagram at the top of Figure 3.1 illustrates the more complex relations between the leading groups and their members in the new international order. The WTO forms a part of that order, and there is now a closer correspondence between composition of the leadership groups inside and outside of the trading system. One change has come in the expanding access to the key forums and blocs: by 2012, the entry of the Russian Federation had transformed the G7 into the G8²⁵; the European Union more than doubled from 12 to 27 members; and the OECD acquired ten new members. The power of the Quad has also declined as it lost relevance as a forum among its members. Whereas Quad meetings were a staple of GATT diplomacy, after the failed Seattle Ministerial Conference of 1999, the Quad never again met at the ministerial level. There are also some wholly new groupings. Chief among these is the G20, formerly a technical body that met at the ministerial level but was elevated to a summit-level forum during the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009.²⁶ The G20 bridges the gap between the inner circles of the GATT era and the new powers that form the BRICS. Taken together, the 47 countries that are clustered in various groupings at the top of the figure – including four EU member states that are sometimes represented independently and sometimes with the other members of their regional bloc – comprise huge shares of global population and trade. They still account for less than one third of the membership of the WTO, however, and less than one sixth if the European Union is counted as just one. Even if they could resolve the differences between themselves they could still not be certain that the remaining members would go along with any deal that they reach.

At the risk of over-simplification, the remaining 111 WTO members can be roughly divided into two groups. One is a bloc formed by the poorest countries in the G90, which consists of the overlapping membership of ACP countries and LDCs. The countries in this group tend to have greater concerns over the implications of trade liberalization for their development strategies and for the margins of preference that they enjoy in the markets of developed countries. This bloc of developing countries was created in 2003 largely as a reaction to the formation of

Figure 3.1. Membership in selected blocs and forums

Source: WTO Secretariat, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm.

Notes: Groups that are principally blocs are inside solid lines; groups that are principally forums are inside dashed lines. ^aBulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania are members of the European Union (and therefore the Quad and the G20) but not the OECD. ^bSouth Africa is a member of the African Group (and the ACP and the G90) as well as the G20.

another G20 coalition that is not to be confused with the forum shown in Figure 3.1. The Cancún-era G20 was composed of developing countries that demanded greater concessions from the European Union and the United States on agriculture (see Chapter 12). From the perspective of the G90 countries, this new group violated the solidarity that was expected of countries in the old G77 bloc, and the positions that they advocated were seen to prejudice the interests of ACP/LDC countries. The poorer developing countries therefore formed a bloc of their own in opposition to the G20 demands. Or to put it in the sometimes convoluted math of bloc diplomacy, $G77 - G20 = G90$.

There is a great diversity among the remaining 44 members of the WTO, all of which are either developing countries or in transition from non-market economies. They are eagerly sought as members of coalitions. These members vary greatly in demographic size, economic attainment, and development strategy, including some of the most open economies in world and others in which the state plays a large role. They are not shown here as members of any bloc, although most of them would (together with the G90 and some of the G20) be part of the G77 bloc. Some are members of other blocs that also include countries shown elsewhere in Figure 3.1.

Coalitions in the Doha Round

Coalition diplomacy is a critical element in the Doha Round. Appendix 3.2 indicates which members are associated with eight blocs and 17 coalitions. As of early 2013, only five WTO members were not members of any blocs or coalitions. All of them were relatively small countries and four of them were in the Middle East. Another four were members only of the blocs for LDCs and the G90 (of which all LDCs are members). All remaining WTO members joined at least one of the issue-based coalitions in the Doha Round negotiations, and most members joined two or more of them. Mauritius holds the record, being a member of nine groups (three blocs and six coalitions), but it is not uncommon for members to be in six groups.

The appendix further divides WTO members according to the types of coalitions that they join. It shows that 56 members, including the European Union and its 27 member states, joined only those coalitions with offensive interests. That is a much larger number than the 12 members that joined only coalitions with defensive interests. The largest group of members, however, consists of the 76 with mixed interests. These countries that joined at least one offensive and at least one defensive coalition include almost all of the other WTO members that, beyond the European Union, are typically identified as global or regional leaders. Among this group are Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Switzerland and the United States. This mixture of interests is a general pattern for the Doha Round, in which most countries have at least some offensive objectives but balance these against their own defensive interests. That pattern is especially notable in the case of agricultural trade, the most divisive topic in the round.


The analysis that follows is limited to a review of the membership of the main coalitions operating in the Doha Round. The ways in which these coalitions and their members have interacted in the round is discussed in Chapters 11 and 12.

Coalitions in the agricultural negotiations

The differences between the negotiating dynamics of the Uruguay and Doha rounds are neatly summarized by the reformation of agricultural coalitions from one round to the other. The Cairns Group exemplified two of the defining characteristics of the Uruguay Round, being focused on offensive rather than defensive interests and bringing together a mix of developed and developing countries. In those respects, it was comparable to the aforementioned De la Paix group, and indeed these two North–South coalitions shared several members in common. That same Cairns Group remains in existence, if not a very active one, in the Doha Round. The relations between the developed and developing country members of this coalition were seriously strained in the run-up to the Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003, when they disagreed over the best response to the deal that the European Union and the United States had proposed for agricultural issues in the round. While Australia favoured treating this proposal as the point of departure for the negotiations, hoping to extract more serious concessions from its authors, developing countries in the group insisted on taking a more confrontational and ambitious approach. Led by Brazil, these countries then formed a new G20 group composed wholly of developing countries. As shown in Figure 3.2, 14 of the 23 members of this group (as it stood in 2012)²⁷ were also members of coalitions with defensive interests on other aspects of the agricultural negotiations,²⁸ thus replicating in this subject the general pattern by which the offensive interests of the countries participating in the Doha Round tend to be diluted either by their own membership in defense-oriented coalitions or by their collaboration with other countries that have defensive or mixed interests.

That pattern can be better appreciated by comparing the memberships of the offensive coalitions illustrated in Figure 3.2 and the defensive coalitions illustrated in Figure 3.3. In the Doha Round, there are 35 countries in these four coalitions with offensive interests, versus 60 in the coalitions with defensive interests. The latter group outnumbers the former by 71.4 per cent. That disparity is magnified when one takes into account the cross-over between these two groups: 16 countries are in both types of coalitions, meaning that the number of WTO members with “pure” positions on agricultural trade is reduced to 19 with offensive interests and 45 with defensive interests; adjusted this way, the defence outnumbers the offence by more than two to one. Perhaps the best comparison to be made is between the Cairns Group and the G10. Both are North–South coalitions, which became a great rarity in the Doha Round, but whereas the Uruguay-era Cairns Group was offensive in its orientation, the Doha-era G10 is decidedly defensive.


Figure 3.2. Coalitions with offensive interests in the Doha Round agricultural negotiations



Source: WTO Secretariat, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm, accessed 6 June 2013.

Notes: *Also a member of at least one of the coalitions with defensive interests in the Doha Round agricultural negotiations. ^aCountries with offensive interests in exports of tropical products. ^bCountries that oppose US subsidies in cotton production.

Figure 3.3. Coalitions with defensive interests in the Doha Round agricultural negotiations



Source: WTO Secretariat, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm, accessed 6 June 2013.

Notes: *Denotes a country that is also a member of at least one of the coalitions with offensive interests in the Doha Round agricultural negotiations. ^aCoalition seeking flexibility for developing countries to undertake limited market opening in agriculture. ^bCountries seeking to make agriculture be treated as diverse and special because of non-trade concerns. ^cSeek to secure the same treatment as least-developed countries.

These comparisons also highlight one of the more significant bilateral relationships within the Doha Round, in which Brazil and India have collaborated in the G20 despite the fact that Brazil has more offensive interests than India. India is among the countries that sit in both the offence-oriented G20 coalition and in the more defence-oriented Friends of Special Products (also known as the G33). This group is concerned only with special products that are so sensitive that they should be kept out of the negotiations, and with the special safeguard. In one sense, the position of the G33 does not conflict with that of the G20, insofar as the G33 is focused on market access and the G20 on subsidies, but in the larger scheme of the negotiations, it is apparent that the interests of these two groups are incompatible. The only ways to reconcile that incompatibility would be for those countries that are in both the G20 and the G33 either to adopt positions that place their defensive before their offensive interests or do just the reverse. Thus far in the Doha Round, these countries – together with many other WTO members – have leaned more in the direction of the first than the second option.

Coalitions in other goods-related negotiations

In contrast to the agricultural negotiations, where the multiple issues on the table lead to the formation of multiple, overlapping offensive and defensive coalitions, the non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations are relatively simple and produce correspondingly simple coalitions. They can generally be reduced to a North–South split in which the leading developed countries call for greater ambition and three coalitions of developing countries express their defensive demands in varying ways. The developed countries that seek to maximize tariff reductions in the NAMA negotiations formed a coalition known as the Friends of Ambition. In addition to the Quad, this group included Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. As for the defensive developing countries, they included ten countries in the misnamed NAMA 11 group, 20 self-identified Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), and a dozen Paragraph 6 countries (eight of them African) that sought exceptions for specific products. Table 3.3 shows that the 42 countries in these three coalitions do not have overlapping memberships.

The coalitions that emerged around the negotiations on geographical indications (GIs) offer a more complex example of how developed and developing countries can form diverse groupings on opposing sides of an issue. GIs are defined in Article 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement as “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.” Examples include specific types of wine (e.g. Champagne) or cheese (e.g. Gouda). At issue in the Doha Round are the rules by which GIs might be enforced on wine, an initiative that divides countries into two camps that defy the usual North–South divide. The European Union is among the sponsors of a paper known as W52 (shortened from WTO document number TN/C/W/52). The paper proposes a multilateral registry for wines and spirits and extending a higher level of protection beyond wines and spirits, as well as stricter rules of disclosure under which patent applicants would be required to disclose the origin of genetic resources and traditional knowledge used

Table 3.3. Coalitions of developing countries with defensive interests in the Doha Round NAMA negotiations

Group	Description	Members	
NAMA 11	Developing countries seeking flexibilities to limit market opening in industrial goods trade	Argentina Brazil Egypt India Indonesia Namibia	Philippines South Africa Tunisia Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Small, Vulnerable Economies	Despite efforts to develop a formal definition, WTO members came to no consensus on what constitutes either smallness or vulnerability	Antigua and Barbuda Barbados Bolivia, Plurinational State of Dominica Dominican Republic El Salvador Fiji Grenada Guatemala Honduras	Jamaica Maldives Mongolia Nicaragua Papua New Guinea Paraguay Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Trinidad and Tobago
Paragraph 6 countries	Countries with less than 35 per cent of non-agricultural products bound and which want to exempt some products	Cameroon Congo Côte d'Ivoire Cuba Ghana Kenya	Macao, China Mauritius Nigeria Sri Lanka Suriname Zimbabwe

Source: WTO Secretariat, "Groups in the WTO", updated 2 March 2013, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.pdf.

in the inventions. As can be seen from the list in Table 3.4, most of the developing countries that joined the European Union in sponsoring W52 are also members of the ACP (principally consisting of countries that obtained independence from European countries in the 1950s and 1960s); the sponsors also include Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, India and Peru. Most of the significant wine-producing countries outside of Europe, whether they are developed or developing, are opposed to the strict enforcement of Old World GIs. The members of the Joint Proposal group advocate –

a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and spirits that facilitates the protection of wines and spirits GIs through a system that is voluntary, that preserves the existing balance of rights and obligations in the TRIPS Agreement, that preserves the territoriality of intellectual property rights for geographical indications, and that allows WTO Members to continue to determine for themselves the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement within their own legal system and practice.²⁹

Table 3.4. Coalitions of countries dealing with geographical indications in the Doha Round negotiations

	Developed countries	Developing countries
W52 sponsors	European Union, Switzerland	Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Joint proposal	Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United States	Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Chinese Taipei, South Africa

Source: WTO Secretariat.

Notes: The Dominican Republic is in the ACP and South Africa is in the African Group, but each of these countries is also a sponsor of TN/IP/W/10/Rev.2 on geographical indications. Ecuador is a sponsor of both proposals.

In short, this is the one issue that has given rise to the largest pair of opposing coalitions, in which almost all of the most active and influential members of the WTO. There are very few bystanders on this subject, but also little prospect of resolving the two groups' differences in anything other than a large negotiation in which trade-offs are made between this topic and others.

A few other issues are notable for the North–South coalitions that they have inspired. One example is the Friends of Anti-dumping Negotiations, a group of countries that find themselves on the receiving end of anti-dumping investigations more often than they initiate such cases. Most of the 15 members are developing countries, but the group also includes Japan, Norway and Switzerland.³⁰ It notably does not include either the European Union or the United States; those two members may be said to be in an informal coalition that seeks to ensure that any commitments made on the anti-dumping laws do not seriously constrain their ability to use this instrument of trade defence. The Friends of Fish is another North–South coalition that merits mention. The members of this group, which seeks to reduce fisheries subsidies, include developed countries (Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and the United States) as well as developing countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Pakistan and Peru). From time to time, other WTO members also identify themselves with this group. Conversely, a subgroup among the Small, Vulnerable Economies sponsored a proposal³¹ with a very different view. All 15 members of this group are developing countries.³²

Endnotes

- 1 See Appendix 3.1 for details on individual WTO members' status, including the year of their entry into GATT/WTO as well as the type and size of mission they have.
- 2 See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the origins of the term and the negotiating practice of the green room.
- 3 Many of the people providing information for the Biographical Appendix declined to specify the field in which they received a degree, so more information is available on the level (as reported here) than the discipline (as reported elsewhere).
- 4 This figure does not include the honorary doctorates that some of these individuals have received.
- 5 The more specific statistics on this last point are reported in Chapter 7, in the context of the disproportionate degree to which people from common-law countries are assigned to dispute settlement panels and members of the Appellate Body are graduates from law schools in common-law countries.
- 6 As is discussed in Chapter 15, the GATT directors-general served terms that were on average three times longer than those of their WTO successors.
- 7 There are some WTO ambassadors who go on to serve as ministers, notably including the Brazilians Luiz Felipe Lampreia, Celso Lafer and Celso Amorim (each of whom later became foreign minister) and Rubens Ricupero (who became finance minister); similarly, Tim Groser (see Biographical Appendix, p. 579) of New Zealand went from ambassador to trade minister. Sergio Marchi of Canada appears to be the only one whose path moved in the opposite direction, having gone from trade minister (1997-1999) in the government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to Canada's WTO ambassador (1999-2003). That move was prompted by what in many other cases is seen as an evasion or a cliché, the desire to spend more time with his family. Both ministers and ambassadors have hectic schedules, but the demands on ministers are usually much greater than those on ambassadors.
- 8 These include the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), among others.
- 9 Some dedicated WTO missions also represent a country in one or more of the other trade-related organizations in Geneva, especially UNCTAD and WIPO. In this sense, they might best be termed the "trade-dedicated" rather than the "WTO-dedicated" missions.
- 10 Some of the Geneva missions actually do triple-duty, representing their countries not just to the WTO and to other international organizations in Geneva but also to the Swiss capital, Bern.
- 11 Note that the numbers discussed here do not count the Secretariat staff, observers from other international organizations, or the various non-governmental organizations and academic institutions in and around Geneva that have relationships with GATT and the WTO.
- 12 This estimate is based on informal inquiries with diplomats from numerous general-purpose missions. They report a wide variation in the investment of time that a mission makes in the WTO versus other Geneva institutions, ranging anywhere from less than 20 per cent to over 50 per cent; the one third figure is thus a very rough midpoint. Diplomats also stress that the answer will vary according to what is "hot" at the time, such that the WTO may attract most or all of a mission's attention during intense periods of negotiations, and can fall close to zero time during "down" periods, but that the time available for WTO matters may also be affected by what is happening in other Geneva-based institutions.

- 13 These numbers may understate the actual amount of manpower available to some missions. They can sometimes enhance their capacity by drawing on the assistance of students from their home countries who might receive little or no pay but gain invaluable experience. Some of those students have gone on to have careers in this field. Ambassador Ronald Saborio of Costa Rica, who holds the record for the longest service as chairman of WTO bodies (see Chapter 14), offers a notable example of a such a career path.
- 14 Note that three missions – Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; and Chinese Taipei – are necessarily WTO-dedicated for the simple reason that these WTO members are not recognized in the United Nations as independent countries and hence cannot be represented as such in the Geneva-based UN agencies.
- 15 Interview with the author.
- 16 As originally constituted the Cairns Group included three industrialized countries (Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), nine developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay), as well as one other country that was still in the non-market bloc but has since become a member of the European Union (Hungary).
- 17 The members of the De la Paix Group included at various times nine industrialized countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), eleven developing countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, Uruguay, and the former Zaire), and two non-market countries (Hungary and Czechoslovakia).
- 18 Author's interview with Ujal Bhatia on 27 September 2012.
- 19 Author's interview with Mr Mamdouh on 25 September 2012.
- 20 The first of these cases is discussed in Chapter 13; see Chapter 10 for the latter two cases.
- 21 A formal bloc is understood to be one that takes on some of the characteristics of an international organization, such as an agreement laying out its objectives and rules, a headquarters and a secretariat. Semi-formal blocs may delegate organizational authority to individual members on a revolving basis, but do not have permanent headquarters or secretariats.
- 22 In the case of the OECD, it may be more appropriate to say that it is perceived to act like a bloc, in the sense that the term "OECD countries" is often used interchangeably with "developed countries" or "industrialized countries".
- 23 Interview with the author.
- 24 See *Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004*, WTO document WT/L/579, 2 August 2004.
- 25 The Russian Federation first became associated with the G7 in 1994 (i.e. the very end of the GATT period) and formally joined what became the G8 in 1997.
- 26 Note that throughout this book the term G20 is generally used to mean this group, while the other group that goes by the same name is so identified either by context or by explicitly calling it "the Cancún-era G20".
- 27 The fact that the so-called G20 had 23 members in 2012 illustrates the point that groups with numerical titles tend to indicate the original numbers of their membership rather than the current number (see Box 3.1). Similarly, the G33 had 45 members in 2012. The fact that the Group of Ten has ten actual members thus makes it almost unique among the numbered coalitions for the accuracy of its title.

- 28 Note that the only groups shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 are those specifically formed around agricultural issues *per se*. Some other groups (e.g. the Recently Acceded Members) also take positions on agricultural issues, among other topics.
- 29 See *Proposed Draft TRIPS Council Decision on the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits*, WTO document TN/IP/W/10/Rev.4, 31 March 2011, p. 1.
- 30 The members include: Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Republic of Korea; Mexico; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; and Turkey.
- 31 See *Small, Vulnerable Economies (SVEs): Statement on Key Aspects of Article III of the Fisheries Subsidies Annex*, WTO document TN/RL/W/226/Rev.5, 22 September 2008.
- 32 Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Honduras, Jamaica, Maldives, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Tonga.

Appendix 3.1. Representation of WTO members, 2012

Member	Year of joining GATT	Means of joining GATT	Year of membership in the WTO	Type of delegation in 2012	Size of mission in 2012
Albania	–	–	2000	UN	3
Angola	1994	Succession	1996	UN	9
Antigua and Barbuda	1987	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Argentina	1967	Accession	1995	UN	7
Armenia	–	–	2003	UN	1
Australia	1948	Original	1995	WTO	9
Austria	1951	Accession	1995	WTO	4
Bahrain, Kingdom of	1993	Succession	1995	UN	6
Bangladesh	1972	Accession	1995	UN	6
Barbados	1967	Succession	1995	UN	7
Belgium	1948	Original	1995	UN	12
Belize	1983	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Benin	1963	Succession	1996	UN	9
Bolivia, Plurinational State of	1990	Accession	1995	UN	6
Botswana	1987	Accession	1995	UN	10
Brazil	1948	Original	1995	WTO	20
Brunei Darussalam	1993	Succession	1995	UN	6
Bulgaria	–	–	1996	WTO	2
Burkina Faso	1963	Succession	1995	UN	10
Burundi	1965	Succession	1995	UN	4
Cambodia	–	–	2004	UN	6
Cameroon	1963	Succession	1995	UN	9
Canada	1948	Original	1995	WTO	12
Cape Verde	–	–	2008	UN	2
Central African Republic	1963	Succession	1995	UN	3
Chad	1963	Succession	1996	UN	7
Chile	1949	Accession	1995	WTO	5
China	1948	Original**	2001	WTO	22
Colombia	1981	Accession	1995	WTO	6
Congo	1963	Succession	1995	UN	7
Costa Rica	1990	Accession	1995	WTO	4
Côte d'Ivoire	1963	Succession	1995	UN	15
Croatia	–	–	2000	UN	5
Cuba	1948	Original	1995	UN	11
Cyprus	1963	Succession	1995	UN	5
Czech Republic*	1993	Accession	1995	UN	3
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1971	Succession	1997	UN	2
Denmark	1950	Accession	1995	UN	4
Djibouti	1994	Succession	1995	UN	3
Dominica	1993	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Dominican Republic	1950	Accession	1995	UN	7
Ecuador	–	–	1996	WTO	7

Member	Year of joining GATT	Means of joining GATT	Year of membership in the WTO	Type of delegation in 2012	Size of mission in 2012
Egypt	1970	Accession	1995	UN	13
El Salvador	1991	Accession	1995	WTO	5
Estonia	–	–	1999	UN	4
European Union	–	–	1995	WTO	15
Fiji	1993	Succession	1996	Non-resident	0
Finland	1950	Accession	1995	UN	7
France	1948	Original	1995	WTO	10
Gabon	1963	Succession	1995	UN	8
The Gambia	1965	Succession	1996	Non-resident	0
Georgia	–	–	2000	UN	3
Germany	1951	Accession	1995	WTO	9 WTO, 2 UN
Ghana	1957	Succession	1995	UN	4
Greece	1950	Accession	1995	UN	5
Grenada	1994	Succession	1996	Non-resident	0
Guatemala	1991	Accession	1995	WTO	4
Guinea	1994	Succession	1995	UN	3
Guinea-Bissau	1994	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Guyana	1966	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Haiti	1950	Accession	1996	WTO	4
Honduras	1994	Accession	1995	WTO	3
Hong Kong, China	1986	Succession	1995	WTO	7
Hungary	1973	Accession	1995	WTO	4
Iceland	1968	Accession	1995	UN	4
India	1948	Original	1995	WTO	11
Indonesia	1950	Succession	1995	UN	8
Ireland	1967	Accession	1995	UN	7
Israel	1962	Accession	1995	UN	5
Italy	1950	Accession	1995	UN	5
Jamaica	1963	Succession	1995	UN	7
Japan	1955	Accession	1995	UN	20
Jordan	–	–	2000	UN	3
Kenya	1964	Succession	1995	UN	14
Korea, Republic of	1967	Accession	1995	UN	14
Kuwait, State of	1963	Succession	1995	UN	3
Kyrgyz Republic	–	–	1998	UN	2
Latvia	–	–	1999	UN	2
Lesotho	1988	Succession	1995	UN	4
Liechtenstein	1994	Succession	1995	UN	3
Lithuania	–	–	2001	UN	4
Luxembourg	1948	Original	1995	UN	2
Macao, China	1991	Succession	1995	WTO	5
Madagascar	1963	Accession	1995	UN	3
Malawi	1964	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Malaysia	1957	Succession	1995	WTO	5
Maldives	1983	Accession	1995	Non-resident	0

Member	Year of joining GATT	Means of joining GATT	Year of membership in the WTO	Type of delegation in 2012	Size of mission in 2012
Mali	1993	Accession	1995	UN	4
Malta	1964	Accession	1995	UN	3
Mauritania	1963	Accession	1995	UN	4
Mauritius	1970	Succession	1995	UN	7
Mexico	1986	Accession	1995	WTO	13
Moldova, Republic of	–	–	2001	UN	1
Mongolia	–	–	1997	UN	5
Montenegro	–	–	2012	UN	3
Morocco	1987	Accession	1995	UN	12
Mozambique	1992	Succession	1995	UN	2
Myanmar	1948	Original	1995	UN	3
Namibia	1992	Succession	1995	WTO	1
Nepal	–	–	2004	UN	2
Netherlands	1948	Original	1995	UN	8
New Zealand	1948	Original	1995	WTO	5
Nicaragua	1950	Accession	1995	UN	5
Niger	1963	Succession	1996	UN	6
Nigeria	1960	Succession	1995	WTO	6
Norway	1948	Original	1995	WTO	8
Oman	–	–	2000	UN	3
Pakistan	1948	Original	1995	WTO	6
Panama	–	–	1997	WTO	3
Papua New Guinea	1994	Succession	1996	Non-resident	0
Paraguay	1994	Accession	1995	UN	8
Peru	1951	Accession	1995	UN	8
Philippines	1979	Accession	1995	WTO	10
Poland	1967	Accession	1995	UN	4
Portugal	1962	Accession	1995	UN	3
Qatar	1994	Succession	1996	UN	7
Romania	1971	Accession	1995	UN	2
Rwanda	1966	Succession	1996	UN	3
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1994	Succession	1996	Non-resident	0
Saint Lucia	1993	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1993	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Samoa	–	–	2012	Non-resident	0
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	–	–	2005	WTO	3
Senegal	1963	Succession	1995	UN	5
Sierra Leone	1961	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Singapore	1973	Succession	1995	UN	14
Slovak Republic*	1993	Accession	1995	UN	3
Slovenia	1994	Accession	1995	UN	2
Solomon Islands	1994	Succession	1996	Non-resident	0
South Africa	1948	Original	1995	WTO	6
Spain	1963	Accession	1995	WTO	9
Sri Lanka	1948	Original	1995	UN	1

Member	Year of joining GATT	Means of joining GATT	Year of membership in the WTO	Type of delegation in 2012	Size of mission in 2012
Suriname	1978	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Swaziland	1993	Succession	1995	UN	6
Sweden	1950	Accession	1995	WTO	3
Switzerland	1966	Accession	1995	UN	8
Chinese Taipei	–	–	2002	WTO	17
Tanzania	1961	Succession	1995	UN	9
Thailand	1982	Accession	1995	WTO	13
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	–	–	2003	UN	3
Togo	1964	Succession	1995	Non-resident	0
Tonga	–	–	2007	UN	2
Trinidad and Tobago	1962	Succession	1995	UN	7
Tunisia	1990	Accession	1995	UN	4
Turkey	1951	Accession	1995	WTO	10
Uganda	1962	Succession	1995	UN	4
Ukraine	–	–	2008	UN	5
United Arab Emirates	1994	Succession	1996	WTO	4
United Kingdom	1948	Original	1995	UN	6
United States	1948	Original	1995	WTO	24
Uruguay	1953	Accession	1995	WTO	5
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	1990	Accession	1995	UN	11
Viet Nam	–	–	2007	UN	11
Zambia	1982	Succession	1995	UN	7
Zimbabwe	1948	Original	1995	UN	11

Sources: Data on countries' status under the GATT are from GATT (1995), *Guide to GATT Law and Practice*. Data on countries' status under the WTO are from the WTO website. Data on the type and size of countries' missions in Geneva are from the WTO's electronic telephone directory.

Notes: Myanmar was called Burma when it joined GATT, just as Sri Lanka was called Ceylon and Zimbabwe was called Southern Rhodesia. Chile was intended to be among the original 23 contracting parties but failed to complete its domestic approval procedures within the allotted time, and hence did not become a contracting party until early 1949. The Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic were original GATT contracting parties that withdrew after dissolving their customs union in 1951; the Republic of Liberia acceded to GATT in 1950 but then withdrew in 1953. All three countries were in the process of accession as of early 2013. *Czechoslovakia was among the original GATT contracting parties; its two successor states acceded individually after they separated. **China withdrew from GATT in 1951.

WTO: A dedicated mission to the WTO.

UN: A mission to the WTO and to United Nations agencies in Geneva.

Appendix 3.2. Blocs and coalitions of WTO members in the Doha Round

	Coalitions based on shared interests						Regional blocs & other
	Offensive interests			Defensive interests			
	NAMA	Agriculture	Other	NAMA	Agriculture	Other	
Offensive interest-based coalitions (56 members)							
Angola			W				9 A C L
Austria	O		W				E
Belgium	O		W				E
Bulgaria	O		W				E
Burkina Faso			4	W			9 A C L
Burundi				W			9 A C L
Central African Rep.				W			9 A C L
Chad			4	W			9 A C L
Colombia			G T	D F W			
Cyprus	O			W			E
Czech Republic	O			W			E
Dem. Rep. of Congo				W			9 A C L
Denmark	O			W			E
Djibouti				W			9 A C L
Estonia	O			W			E
European Union	O			W			E
Finland	O			W			E
France	O			W			E
Gabon				W			9 A C
The Gambia				W			9 A C L
Germany	O			W			E
Greece	O			W			E
Guinea				W			9 A C L
Guinea-Bissau				W			9 A C L
Hong Kong, China				D			P
Hungary	O			W			E
Ireland	O			W			E
Italy	O			W			E
Latvia	O			W			E
Lesotho				W			9 A C L
Lithuania	O			W			E
Luxembourg	O			W			E
Malawi				W			9 A C L
Malaysia			G				P
Mali			4	W			9 A C L
Malta	O			W			E
Mauritania				W			9 A C L
Morocco				W			9 A
Netherlands	O			W			E
Poland	O			W			E

Coalitions based on shared interests							
	Offensive interests			Defensive interests			Regional blocs & other
	NAMA	Agriculture	Other	NAMA	Agriculture	Other	
Portugal	O		W				E
Romania	O		W				E
Rwanda			W				9 A C L
Sierra Leone			W				9 A C L
Singapore			D				P
Slovak Republic	O		W				E
Slovenia	O		W				E
Solomon Islands			W				9 C L
Spain	O		W				E
Swaziland			W				9 A C
Sweden	O		W				E
Thailand		2 G	D W				P
FYR Macedonia			W				
Togo			W				9 A C L
United Kingdom	O		W				E
Uruguay		2 G					M
Defensive interest-based coalitions (12 members)							
Armenia					I	R	
Dominican Republic			[W]*	V	3 S	H J	9 C
El Salvador				V	3 S	H J	
Honduras				V	3 S	H J	
Jordan						R	
Macao, China				6			
Maldives				V	S	H	9
Mongolia				V	3 S	R	
Oman						R	
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of						R	
Ukraine						R	
Viet Nam						R	P
Offensive & defensive interest-based coalitions (76 members)							
Albania			W			R	
Antigua and Barbuda			W	V	3		9 C
Argentina		2 G	F	N		J	M
Australia	O	G	F			J	P
Barbados			W	V	3 S	H	9 C
Belize			W		3		9 C
Benin		4	W		3		
Bolivia, Pluri. State of		2		V	3 S		
Botswana			W		3		9 A C
Brazil		2 G	D W	N			M
Cameroon			W	6			9 A C
Canada	O	G				J	P
Cape Verde			W			R	9 A C
Chile		2 G	D F			J	P
China		2	W		3	R	P

Coalitions based on shared interests							Regional blocs & other
Offensive interests			Defensive interests				
NAMA	Agriculture	Other	NAMA	Agriculture	Other		
Congo			W	6	3		9 AC
Costa Rica		G T	D			J	
Côte d'Ivoire			W	6	3		9 AC
Croatia			W			R	
Cuba		2	W	6	3 S	H	9 C
Dominica			W	V	3	H	9 C
Ecuador		2 T	FW			JR	
Egypt		2	W	N			9 A
Fiji			W	V	S	H	9 C
Georgia			W			R	
Ghana			W	6			9 AC
Grenada			W	V	3		9 C
Guatemala		2 G T		V	3 S	J	
Guyana			W		3		9 C
Haiti			W		3		9 C L
Iceland			FW		1		
India		2	W	N	3		
Indonesia		2 G	W	N	3		P
Israel			D		1	J	
Jamaica			W	V	3	H	9 C
Japan		O	D		1	J	P
Kenya			W	6	3		9 AC
Korea, Republic of			D		1 3	J	P
Kyrgyz Republic			W		1	R	
Liechtenstein			W		1		
Madagascar			W		3		9 A C L
Mauritius			W	6	1 3 S	H	9 AC
Mexico		2	D			J	P
Moldova			W		1	R	
Mozambique			W		3		9 A C L
Namibia			W	N			9 AC
New Zealand		O	G	F		J	P
Nicaragua			T	V	3 S	H J	
Niger			W				9 A C L
Nigeria		2	W	6	3		9 AC
Norway		O	DF		1		
Pakistan		2 G	FW		3		
Panama		T			3	R	
Papua New Guinea			W	V	S	H	9 C P
Paraguay		2 G		V	S	J	M
Peru		2 G T	FW		3		P
Philippines		2 G		N	3		P
Saint Kitts & Nevis			W	V	3		9 C
Saint Lucia			W	V	3	H	9 C
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines			W	V	3	H	9 C

Coalitions based on shared interests							
	Offensive interests			Defensive interests			Regional blocs & other
	NAMA	Agriculture	Other	NAMA	Agriculture	Other	
Senegal			W		3		9 A C L
South Africa		2 G	[W]*	N		J	9 A C
Sri Lanka			W	6	3		
Suriname			W	6	3		9 C
Switzerland	O		D W		1		
Chinese Taipei			D		1	J R	P
Tanzania		2	W		3		9 A C L
Tonga			W			H R	C
Trinidad and Tobago			W	V	3 S		9 C
Tunisia			W	N			9 A
Turkey			D W		3		
Uganda			W		3		9 A C L
United States	O		F			J	P
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of		2		N	3		
Zambia			W		3		9 A C L
Zimbabwe		2	W	6	3		9 A C
No interest-based coalitions (6 members)							
Bangladesh							9 L
Brunei Darussalam							P
Cambodia							9 L
Myanmar							9 L
Nepal							9 L
Samoa							9 C L
No coalitions (5 members)							
Bahrain, Kingdom of							
Kuwait, State of							
Montenegro							
Qatar							
United Arab Emirates							

Source: WTO Secretariat, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm, accessed 6 June 2013.

Notes: *The Dominican Republic is in the ACP and South Africa is in the African Group, meaning that each is a sponsor of W52, but each of these countries is also a sponsor of TN/IP/W/10/Rev.2 on geographical indications.

Key to blocs:

9 = Group of Ninety

A = African Group

C = African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries

E = European Union

L = Least-developed countries (LDCs)

M = MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market)

P = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum

Key to coalitions:

- 1 = Group of Ten (defensive interests on agriculture)
- 2 = Group of 20 (offensive interests on agricultural subsidies)
- 3 = Group of 33, aka "Friends of Special Products" (defensive interests on agricultural market access)
- 4 = Cotton-Four (offensive interests on cotton subsidies and tariffs)
- 6 = Paragraph 6 countries (defensive interests on agricultural market access)
- D = Friends of Anti-dumping Negotiations (offensive interests on rules)
- F = Friends of Fish (offensive interests on fisheries subsidies)
- G = Cairns Group (offensive interests on agricultural subsidies)
- H = Small, Vulnerable Economies – rules (defensive interests on fisheries subsidies)
- I = Low-Income Economies in Transition (defensive interests on agriculture)
- J = Joint Proposal (defensive interests on geographic indications)
- N = NAMA 11 (defensive interests on NAMA)
- O = Friends of Ambition (offensive interests on NAMA)
- R = Recently Acceded Members (RAMs)
- S = Small, Vulnerable Economies – agriculture (defensive interests on agriculture)
- T = Tropical Products Group (offensive interests on agricultural market access)
- V = Small, Vulnerable Economies – NAMA (defensive interests on NAMA)
- W = W52 Sponsors (offensive interests on geographic indications)

