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ISBN 92-870-1211-3
Printed in Switzerland
X-1999, 3,500
© World Trade Organization 1999
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(CEPR) London, England;
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London School of Economics,
London,
UNITED KINGDOM
Trade, Income Disparity and Poverty: An Overview
Håkan Nordström

A. Introduction

The eradication of poverty is a shared responsibility for the international community—indeed, a moral imperative. This task has become no less urgent in the last decade, in spite of rapid economic growth in many parts of the world. While the percentage of the world’s population living on less than $1 per day has fallen from 28.3 to 24.0% between 1987 and 1998, population growth (815 million) has kept the absolute number of poor steady at some 1.2 billion (Table 1.a). If we take a higher cutoff point of $2 per day, the poor have increased by 250 million over the same time period, encompassing 2.8 billion people, or almost half of the world’s population (Table 1.b). Nor do World Bank projections lend undivided hope for the future. Under the “business as usual” scenario (scenario A), the number of poor on the $1 per day scale will not change during the projection period up to 2008. However, should policy measures be taken to boost economic growth and make the growth process more inclusive to the poor (scenario B), the World Bank reckons that 500 million people could be brought out of extreme poverty by 2008. Even under this more optimistic scenario, Latin America and the Caribbean, and especially Sub-Saharan Africa would see little if any progress. The same pattern emerges under the higher cutoff point of $2 per day.

In the light of these dire statistics and projections, it is easy to appreciate the growing public concern that not enough is being done to address poverty and poverty-related social illnesses, such as poor work conditions, a lack of respect for human rights, and natural resource degradation. Indeed, such concerns have been vented with increasing frustration, including at the Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Seattle last year, and more recently at the joint spring meeting of the IMF and the World Bank.

One problem facing governments in poverty-stricken countries, the donor community, civil society, and international organizations is that poverty is a multi-dimensional problem with no simple solution—not least because of its sheer scale. The causes and expressions of poverty are not the same everywhere, although some common denominators can often be found, including a lack of access to education (especially for females), basic health care (including reproductive health care), and unequal distribution of productive assets (land, livestock, credits, etc.). Moreover, rural communities, which are often the hardest hit by poverty, face their own development problems related to poor infrastructure (roads, electricity, telecommunication, etc.), which either prevent or make it more costly to participate in the national and global economy. Another factor that perpetuates poverty is that the poor often lack political leverage to influence the polices and priorities of governments.1

The multi-dimensional complexity of poverty is analyzed in detail in the forthcoming issue of the World Development Report (Attacking Poverty) of the World Bank. The report also sets out a new framework for action to halve extreme poverty by 2015 (Box 1). The aim of the present WTO study is not to duplicate the comprehensive analysis of the World Bank, but to focus on one particular part of the issue—trade.

Let us begin by noting that the linkages between trade and poverty are not as direct and immediate as the linkages between poverty and national policies on education, health, land reforms, micro-credits, infrastructure, governance, and so on. Nor does trade compare to other international policies, such as debt relief, vaccination programs, or research on tropical (malaria) and other diseases (AIDS) that set back developing countries. Trade can nevertheless affect the income opportunities of the poor in a number ways—some positive and some negative. The aim of this study, which is based on two expert reports commissioned by the WTO Secretariat, is to clarify the interface between trade, global income disparity, and poverty.

The study is organized as follows: Chapter 2, by Professor Dan Ben-David of Tel Aviv University, takes an in-depth look at the linkages between trade, economic growth, and income disparity among nations. The main finding is that in a world economy marked by increasing income gaps between poor and rich countries trade can be a factor in bringing about convergence in incomes between countries. A parallel finding is that trade-related income convergence is accompanied by faster growth in the liberalizing countries. Many of the primary measures and institutions that facilitate the capturing of knowledge spillovers emanating from trade—such as widespread and improved education, a sound infrastructure, protection of property rights, and so on—are inherently the same measures that facilitate a move to faster growth and an alleviation of widespread poverty.

Chapter 3, by Professor L Alan Winters of University of Sussex, discusses the various channels by which trade may affect the income opportunities of poor people. The essay concludes that trade liberalization is generally a positive contributor to poverty alleviation—it allows people to exploit their productive potential, assists economic growth, curtails arbitrary policy interventions and helps to insulate against shocks. The author recognizes, however, that most reforms will create some losers (some even in the long run), and trade reforms could exacerbate poverty temporarily. The author argues that the appropriate policy response in those cases is to alleviate the hardships and facilitate adjustments rather than abandon the reform process. The essay also provides a checklist to help policy makers assess the poverty impact of trade reforms.

The remainder of this chapter offers a non-technical overview of the aforementioned expert reports.

1 World Bank (2000).

2 For an account of how the poor themselves—the true experts—perceive poverty, see World Bank (1999).
### Table 1a: Population living on less than $1 per day in developing and transition economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of people (millions)</th>
<th>Share of population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding China</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1183</td>
<td>1199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding China</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (2000), table 1.8a and 1.10a.*

### Table 1b: Population living on less than $2 per day in developing and transition economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of people (millions)</th>
<th>Share of population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding China</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2549</td>
<td>2801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding China</td>
<td>1797</td>
<td>2169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (2000), table 1.8b and 1.10b.*
Trade, growth and disparity among nations

It is an empirical fact that the income gap between poor and rich countries has increased in recent decades. Only a handful of developing countries—primarily in East Asia—have been able to grow out of poverty so far, although a second tier of developing, least-developed and transition economies have made rapid progress in more recent years, including countries as diverse as China, India, and Uganda. The uneven growth performance is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots average annual per capita growth between 1960 and 1990 for 104 countries against per capita GDP in 1960.

Had per capita incomes been on converging paths, the countries would have lined up nicely from left to right along a downward-sloping curve with the poorest country growing the fastest, the next-poorest growing a bit slower, and so on. This is clearly not the case. On the contrary, the estimated relationship between the initial level of income (1960) and subsequent growth (1960-1990)—marked by the line in the figure—is slightly positive, although not significantly different from zero from a statistical point of view. That is, if anything, richer countries have been growing faster on average than poorer countries, thereby increasing global income disparity.

Another noteworthy fact is the huge differences in performance among developing countries in the left-most quarter of the figure. A handful of developing countries, mainly in East Asia, have done extremely well (and continued to do so until the financial jitters in 1997-98) with annual average per capita growth rates of 6% or more, or about three times the world average. In contrast, some of the poorest countries have become poorer still, with negative per capita growth.

In a world marked by huge—and increasing—income disparity among countries, Chapter 2 asks whether trade has been a source of income divergence or convergence? In other words, has trade added to, or subtracted from the diverging forces of the world economy? A second issue is whether trade reforms spur economic growth for all parties concerned?

Is trade a source of income divergence or convergence?

In addressing the first issue, the paper begins by quantifying the growing income disparity in the world, which the author estimates will double in a century-and-a-half at the current trend. What is more, income divergence does not just characterize the world as a whole, but also different income segments. That is, if we look at a group of countries that start out at roughly the same income level—say, countries belonging to the third decile of the global income distribution—there is no tendency of catch-up convergence whereby the initially worse-off grow faster than the better-off. On the contrary, incomes tend to be diverging within each segment of the global income distribution, except at the lower end. And the convergence at the lower end is not very encouraging since incomes are converging downward and not upward. That is, the relatively better-off among the extreme poor have slipped backward as a result of negative growth.

Has trade been a source of income divergence or convergence? In tackling this issue, the author begins with some historical examples of regional integration. The diverging forces include differences in investment rates, human capital, macroeconomic policies, governance, and other factors that set countries on different growth paths.

Many countries in this group have been plagued by civil wars and ethnic conflicts, and as a result, falling living standards. The negative growth rates will presumably turn around when peace and social order is restored. A case in point is Mozambique, which has progressed since the end of the civil war, although the recent flood may now set the country back again.

---

Box 1: Development goals for 2015

**Economic well-being**
- Reduce extreme poverty by half.

**Social development**
- Ensure universal primary education.
- Reduce infant and child mortality by two thirds.
- Reduce maternal mortality by three fourths.

**Environmental sustainability and regeneration**
- Implement a national strategy for sustainable development in every country by 2005, so as to:
- Reverse trends in the loss of environmental resources by 2015.

Source: The joint Development Committee of the World Bank and the IMF (Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on Transfer of Real resources to Developing Countries): "Trade, Development and Poverty Reduction", DC/2000-05, March 31, 2000

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3 The data are expressed in purchasing poverty parities terms, that is, in internationally comparable prices. While it would be desirable to present data up to 2000, the PENN World Tables (5.6)—which is the main source of internationally comparable GDPs—ends at 1992. We have chosen 1990 as the end point for this figure, since 1992 data is lacking for some countries.

4 The diverging forces include differences in investment rates, human capital, macroeconomic policies, governance, and other factors that set countries on different growth paths.

5 Many countries in this group have been plagued by civil wars and ethnic conflicts, and as a result, falling living standards. The negative growth rates will presumably turn around when peace and social order is restored. A case in point is Mozambique, which has progressed since the end of the civil war, although the recent flood may now set the country back again.
first case study concerns the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 and subsequent enlargements. It turns out that the gradual removal of trade barriers among EEC members was followed by significant income convergence—a tendency that did not exist prior to liberalization. The same pattern was found between the United States and Canada in conjunction with the trade liberalization that they implemented within the Kennedy Round. In contrast, the creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1961 did not result in any income convergence at the outset, nor did trade increase very much. What set the convergence process in motion for the EFTA countries was instead the reduction of tariffs that resulted from the Kennedy Round Agreement, which allowed trade with the EEC—the EFTA countries’ main trade partners—to expand.

Has trade been a converging factor more generally? To investigate this issue, the author uses bilateral trade data to associate countries with their major trading partners. The question asked is whether a country is more likely to converge in income with its trading partners than with a random group of countries. The answer is affirmative. Both export and import relations seem to facilitate income convergence at roughly equal rates. What is more, the rate of income convergence increases with the bilateral trade volume. That is, countries that expand bilateral trade are likely to find their incomes converging more rapidly than otherwise.

Does trade lead to upward or downward convergence of incomes?

While income convergence may be an objective in itself, because it reduces income disparity in the world, the preferred kind of convergence is clearly upward and not downward. The direction of convergence is important to establish since richer countries may be reluctant to reduce trade barriers with poorer countries if they suspect that this would lead to a downward convergence in income, or if nothing else, lead to slower growth. Is there anything in the data that suggests this may be the case? Or do all categories of countries gain from trade liberalization through more rapid economic growth?

As shown in Section F and G of Chapter 2, growth rates have declined in developed countries following the growth spurts in the reconstruction era after World War II. As trade has increased at the same time, both in absolute volumes and as a share of GDP, the untrained eye may conclude that the reductions in trade barriers has resulted in falling growth rates. However, this is just a statistical fallacy, as shown by the author.

The first part of the argument is theoretical. Standard growth theory tells us that falling growth rates are a

---

6 On the export side, country j is defined to be a major trading partner of country i if j absorbs at least 4% of i’s exports. On the import side, country j is a major trading partner of country i if j comprise at least 4% of i’s imports.

7 Although it is too early to tell affirmatively, it seems like there has been a structural upward shift in the growth rates since the early 1990s, often attributed to the “new economy” (Internet, biotechnology, telecommunications, etc.).
normal consequence of falling returns on investment. Specifically, when a country is poor in productive capital, for example after a destructive war or a prolonged spell of bad economic policies, the returns on investment are high because of the capital shortage. Over time, as countries become more “fully invested”, investment returns will start to taper off, resulting in falling growth rates—a result unrelated to increased trade.

The second part of the argument is empirical. While growth rates have been trending downward in developed countries in the post-war period (at least up to the early 1990s), major trade liberalization events have coincided with movement to higher—and in the majority of cases, steeper—growth paths that lie above the lower and flatter pre-liberalization paths. These results, based on time series analyzes, parallel the findings of cross-country regressions that an open trade regime facilitates the economic growth process (see Annex Table 1). 8

Conclusion

There is no evidence that countries, in general, are converging in per capita incomes. In fact, the income gaps appear to be growing over time. Among those countries that are nonetheless converging, an important thread that appears to tie many of them together is trade. Countries that trade extensively with one another tend to exhibit a higher incidence of income convergence than other countries. Moreover, trade-related convergence does not appear to have come at the expense of the wealthier countries. In fact, not only have the relatively poorer liberalizing countries been able to move to higher and steeper growth paths, so have their wealthier trade partners. In sum, the results presented in Chapter 2 suggest that trade provides an important contribution toward the economic growth of nations—in particular, for those countries that are lagging behind their trade partners—and hence also potentially faster alleviation of poverty.

C. Trade and poverty: is there a connection?

Chapter 3 asks whether trade liberalization and poverty are connected, and what might be done to avoid negative outcomes.

The starting point of the analysis is the so-called ‘farm household’ model—a stylized model of a basic production-consumption unit in the economy. At the most general level of abstraction, an increase in the price of something the household sells (labour, goods, services), or a reduction in the price of something the household consumes (goods, services), increases the real income (purchasing power) of the household, and vice versa. Thus, whether a trade reform is pro- or anti poor depends not only on the induced price effects, which in turn depends on which tariffs are being reduced, and how much of a price change is passed through to the poor, but on how the poor earn and spend their incomes. More important than price changes is whether markets exist at all: trade reform can both create and destroy markets. Extreme adverse poverty shocks are often associated with the disappearance of a market, while strong poverty alleviation can arise when markets are introduced for previously un-traded or unavailable goods.

Trade reform is also likely to have major effects on the prices of factors of production—of which the wages of the unskilled are the most important from a poverty perspective. If reform boosts the demand for labour-intensive products, it boosts the demand for labour and then either or both wages and employment will increase. However, whether this reduces poverty depends on whether the poor are strongly represented in the type of labour for which demand has risen. If the poor are mostly in unskilled families, while trade reforms boost the demand for semi-skilled labour, poverty will be unaffected—or, indeed, may even worsen as wages of unskilled workers fall. It also depends on where the wage rate is relative to the poverty line. If wages are pushed up from subsistence to higher levels, or if the sectors expanding their employment offer wages above the poverty line, then poverty will be alleviated.

Trade reform can affect government revenue, but much less frequently and adversely than is popularly imagined. High tariffs tend to be associated with large exemptions, and a reduction of both may keep the tariff revenue unchanged. Even where it does not (as eventually must be true as tariffs fall to zero), it is not inevitable that the poor suffer. It is ultimately a political decision whether new taxes are introduced to make up the shortfall, or whether government expenditures are cut instead. In the former case, the impact on poverty depends on whether the new taxes fall disproportionately on the poor, and in the latter case, whether the expenditure cuts fall disproportionately on the poor. Again, this is ultimately a political decision. However, since trade reform will typically raise aggregate incomes, it should generally be feasible to raise revenue elsewhere than from the poor.

Opening up the economy will often reduce risk and variability because world markets (which have many players) are more stable than domestic ones. But sometimes it will increase risk either because official stabilization schemes are undermined or because residents switch completely from one activity to another that offers higher average rewards but greater variability. In these cases economic vulnerability could increase, which could increase the incidence of poverty even as the average incomes of the poor increase.

The key to sustained poverty alleviation is economic growth. While growth may not benefit everyone in an economy, the growth process must be strongly biased against poor people to produce perverse outcomes on poverty. There is little reason to fear that growth associated with freer trade will fall systematically into this class, and the argument that openness stimulates long-run growth has a good deal of empirical support.

All the above refers to long-run effects. But since the gains from trade rely largely on adjusting a country’s output bundle, there is a possibility that people will suffer temporary adverse shocks. This is particularly true of workers who suffer spells of unemployment. In such

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8 See Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) for a critical review of the trade and growth literature.
cases, general safety nets to protect against extreme poverty plus complementary policies supporting firms and individuals to realize their productive potential are desirable.

The essay ends with a checklist to help policy makers assess the poverty impact of trade reforms.

- Will the effects of changed border prices be passed through to the rest of the economy?
- Is reform likely to destroy effective markets or create them and allow poor consumers to obtain new goods?
- Is it likely to affect different household members differently?
- Will its spillovers be concentrated on areas/activities of relevance to the poor?
- What factors are used intensively in the most affected sectors? What will be the mix of wage and employment effects? Will wages exceed poverty levels?
- Will the reform actually affect government revenue strongly?
- Will it lead to discontinuous switches in activities? If so, will the new activities be riskier than the old ones?
- Does the reform depend upon, or affect, the ability of poor people to take risks?
- If the reform is broad and systemic, will any growth it stimulates be particularly unequalizing?
- Will the reform imply major shocks for particular localities?
- Will transitional unemployment be concentrated on the poor?

**Conclusion**

While there is no simple one-to-one relationship between trade and poverty, the evidence seems to indicate that trade liberalization is generally a positive contributor to poverty alleviation—it allows people to exploit their productive potential, assists economic growth, curtails arbitrary policy interventions and helps to insulate against shocks. However, most trade reforms will create some losers (some even in the long run), and poverty may be exacerbated temporarily. The appropriate policy response in those cases is to alleviate the hardships and facilitate adjustments rather than abandon the reform process.


## Annex Table 1: Cross-country evidence on the link between trade and growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source and country coverage</th>
<th>Trade Orientation Index</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Michael (1977), developing countries. | Rate of growth of export shares. | • Positive (rank) correlation between export and growth.  
• The link is more pronounced in a subsample of middle income countries. |
| Feder (1983), semi-industrialized | Export growth weighted by export shares. | • GDP growth is positively associated with export growth. |
| Syrquin and Chenery (1989), mixed country coverage. | Export shares of GDP controlling for country size and export specialization. | • Growth rate higher for outward oriented countries in all sub-groups: small primary-good exporters, large primary-good exporters, small manufacturing exporters, and large manufacturing exporters.  
• Outward orientation growth premium between 0.2 and 1.4 percentage points. |
| Balassa (1985), developing countries. | Trade orientation index defined on basis of difference between actual and predicted exports. | • Outward oriented countries grow faster. |
| Edwards (1992), developing countries. | Deviation between predicted and actual trade. | • More open (less interventionist) countries tend to grow faster.  
• Above result confirmed by eight out of nine other trade policy indicators. |
| World Bank (1987), developing countries. | Countries classified in four groups: strongly inward oriented, moderately inward oriented, moderately outward oriented, strongly outward oriented. | • Outward oriented countries tend to grow faster. |
| Sachs and Warner (1995), mixed country coverage. | A country is deemed to be closed if any one of the following criteria is satisfied: (1) average tariff rate above 40 %, (2) NTBs on more than 40% of imports, (3) socialist economic system, (4) state monopoly on major exports, and (5) black market premium on the exchange rate exceeding 20%. | • Open economies grow faster than closed economies by 2 to 2.5 percentage points.  
• Open economies have higher investment ratios, better macroeconomic balance, and a larger role of the private sector as the engine of growth. |
| Proudon, Redding, and Bianchi (1997), mixed country coverage. | Closed/open index on the basis of a number of measures of the stance on international trade policy. | • Open economies are found to converge to higher levels of income.  
• These differences remain even after making allowance for differences in relative levels of investment. |
| Barro (1991), mixed country coverage. | Price distortion index for investment goods. (Purchasing-power-parity deviation from sample mean for investment goods.) | • Price distortions on investment goods reduce growth. |
| Dollar (1992), developing countries. | Exchange rate distortions. | • Average per capita growth in the least distorted quartile of (mostly Asian) countries was 2.9%; the next quartile had a growth rate of 0.9%, the third quartile - 0.2%, and the most distorted quartile - 1.3%.  
• Reduction of the real exchange rate distortion to the Asian level would add 0.7 percentage points to Latin American growth and 1.8 percentage points to African growth. |
<p>| Easterly (1993), mixed country coverage. | Index measuring how much domestic relative prices are distorted away from world market relative prices. | • Increased distortion reduces growth. One unit increase in distortion reduces growth by 1.2 percentage points. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source and country coverage</th>
<th>Trade Orientation Index</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Lee (1993), mixed country coverage. | Index measuring the extent to which trade is distorted away from its free-trade level by real exchange rate and tariff distortions. | • Less distortion is associated with higher growth.  
• Trade distortions reduce growth relatively more in small, resource-scarce countries than in large, resource-rich countries. |
| Hammon (1995), developing countries. | Seven indexes:  
- Trade Liberalization (1960-84), (1978-88),  
- Black market premium,  
- Trade shares,  
- Real exchange rate distortions,  
- Movements toward international prices,  
- Bias against agriculture | • All statistically significant indexes show a positive relation between a liberal trade regime and GDP growth.  
• The causality between a liberal trade regime and growth runs both ways. Lagged values of growth are significant in explaining openness, and lagged values of openness are significant in explaining growth. |
• Trade is not the most important variable for explaining cross country differences in growth; initial GDP and human capital are more important.  
• Data exhibits conditional convergence. |
| Matin (1993), Sub-Saharan Africa. | Four indexes:  
- Trade shares,  
- Black market premium,  
- Trade liberalization index,  
- Real exchange rate distortion. | • All indexes that are statistically significant point to a positive relation between a liberal (less distictive) trade regime and growth.  
• The openness-growth performance link for Sub-Saharan Africa is as strong as in a control sample of other African countries. |
| Levine and Renelt (1992) mixed country coverage. | Sensitivity analysis for multiple indexes with cross-country regressions. | • Robust positive correlation between growth and the share of investment in GDP.  
• Robust positive correlation between the share of investment in GDP and the share of trade in GDP.  
• Two-link chain between trade and growth through investment. |
• Moreover, geographical factors that make trade more costly reduces growth.  
Land-locked countries grow 0.9 percentage points slower than coastal economies. |
| Coe and Helpman (1995), OECD. | not applicable | • Domestic productivity is positively affected by the import-weighted sum of the trading partner's R&D stock. |
| Keller (1997), OECD. | not applicable | • Trade facilitates productivity transmission both within and between sectors. |
| Balasa, Bramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford (1996), developing countries. | World Bank openness indicator | • Low trade barriers enhance the efficiency of FDI and indirectly growth. |
Trade, Growth and Disparity Among Nations
Dan Ben-David

A. Introduction

The pluses and minuses of openness between countries have been a source of heated debate for much of the 20th century—with domestic trade policies lying in the balance. The century began with movement towards relative openness that eventually reverted to the ejection of massive trade barriers during the inter-war period. The current trend towards greater openness began in the 1940s with the end of World War II.

This trend received a major boost from two complementary factors. The first important factor is the continuous decline in transportation costs—the natural barriers to trade—throughout the century. The second factor is the change in trade-related policies: those that affected regional trade and those that affected trade at the global level.

How has this increased openness affected the incomes levels of the trading countries? In a world marked by huge—and increasing—income disparity among countries, has trade been a source of the divergence, or is it a source of income convergence? Is this a question of a zero-sum game, where movement toward freer trade can only benefit some of the countries at the expense of others, or can freer trade benefit all of the countries concerned?

The focus of this paper is on exactly these questions. It begins in section B with the overall—non-trade-related—picture of income disparity between countries. Once this benchmark is illustrated, the emphasis then shifts towards a number of the more important instances of trade liberalization (in sections C and D) during the post-war period and examines how income disparity among the liberalizing countries compares with these benchmarks. The general relationship between trade and income disparity is analyzed in section E, while section F provides evidence on the long-run growth behaviour of countries that liberalized trade. Section G provides some explanations for the outcomes and section H concludes.

B. Income disparity among countries

How big are the income gaps between countries and how have these gaps been changing over time? The goal of this section is to provide some evidence on this question—evidence which will serve as the backdrop for the remainder of this paper.

One of the most important data improvements made during the past couple of decades has been the increasing availability and usage of purchasing power parities (PPPs) instead of official exchange rates for comparison of national products and incomes. Since PPPs are based on cross-country price comparisons of representative baskets of goods and services, they are less prone to exchange rate distortions. Hence, they provide much more reliable cross-country output comparisons than do official exchange rates.

The determination of purchasing power parities for a large number of countries over a span of several decades began with the seminal work of Heston, Kravis, Lipsey and Summers in the 1970s. This work evolved over several rounds and culminated with the most recent data set made available in 1995 by Summers and Heston which begins in 1950 for a number of countries and ends in 1992. In all, the dataset includes annual observations for 152 countries, though not all of the countries have data for all of the years.

Table 1 draws on this most recent Summers and Heston (1995) dataset and includes the 1985 per capita output of all 152 countries in US dollars. The conversion of GDPS in the table is via both PPPs and official exchange rates so that it may be possible to compare the degree of discrepancy that can exist between the two measures.

As the PPP conversions indicate, the average American in 1985 made over 30% more than the average German, 40% more than the average Japanese, nearly 50% more than the average citizen of the United Kingdom, and 5,500% more than the average Ethiopian. While PPP’s are much more accurate, the official exchange rates commonly used to convert national incomes into dollars paint an even grimmer picture.

These gaps nearly defy the imagination. As the growth rates between 1960 and 1992 indicate, several of these income gaps are much smaller today than they once were, while many of the other gaps have grown substantially. Overall, have these gaps been falling or rising between countries over time? From the table, the pattern is not very easy to discern.

Figure 1 displays the relationship between the initial income levels and subsequent growth rates of 113 non-communist countries.2 On the horizontal axis are the real per capita income levels of the countries in 1960 relative to the US, which was the wealthiest country at the time. The vertical axis measures the average annual growth rates of each country from 1960 to 1985. Dividing the graph into four quadrants are two lines that depict the average world income level in 1960 (which was just under 30% of the US level) and the annual growth rate of the average world income level over the subsequent 25 year span (which was just above 2%). Convergence requires that all countries be located in either the top left quadrant, or the bottom right.

The convergence curve represents the locus of all points that the countries would have had to have been on

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1 Tel-Aviv University, NBER and CEPR. This paper is part of a project aimed at merging together evidence and conclusions from a number of the author’s earlier studies into one manuscript that can provide a more comprehensive picture of the various related outcomes. Support by the World Bank for the first stage of this project is gratefully acknowledged as is support from the World Trade Organization for the project’s continuation. The author alone is responsible for this paper’s contents.

2 Data source: Summers and Heston (1988).
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**Figure 1**: Growth vs. real per capita incomes, 113 countries


**Figure 2**: Disparity within three income groups: 1960-85

to reach the world average level of income in 1985.\(^3\) As is clear from the graph, the countries of the world are nowhere near alignment along the convergence curve. Instead, they are arrayed in a mean-preserving wedge.

Rather than looking at the world as a whole, it is possible to divide it up into three income groups using the cutoff point of 60% of the 1960 US income to distinguish between wealthy and middle income countries and 25% of the US income as the dividing point between middle income and poor countries. Given this delineation, the poor group includes 82 countries, the middle income group 15 countries, and the wealthy group 16 countries.

Figure 2 displays the annual income gaps within each of the groups between 1960 and 1985 using the standard deviation of the income logs as the measure of intra-group income disparity. As the figure shows, the poorest group of countries had the largest (relative) income gap in 1960 and it diverged steadily over time. The group of middle-income countries exhibited the second-largest income gap and it too diverged over time. The group of wealthy countries exhibited the smallest income gap in 1960. As was the case within the other two income groups, this gap grew over time. In contrast with the two poorer groups, one of the main reasons for the divergence among the wealthier countries is one country, Venezuela, a country that was among the wealthiest in 1960 that experienced negative average growth over the next two-and-a-half decades. Exclusion of this outlier country yields weaker divergence evidence, if any still exists. In any event, none of the three groups exhibits any sign of a reduction in the degree of income disparity.

Rather than divide the world into three income groups using the admittedly subjective criteria above, it is possible to regroup the countries into five different groups according to quintiles based on the 1960 US per capita income. The poorest quintile (0-20% of the 1960 US per capita income) includes 72 countries, the second (20-40%) 18 countries, the third (40-60%) seven countries, the fourth (60-80%) 12 countries, and the fifth (80-100%) four countries. Figure 3 depicts the behavior of the income gaps over time. As in the earlier division of the world into three groups, the poorest countries exhibit the largest income gap in 1960 while the second poorest group exhibits the second largest income gap that year.

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\(^3\) The equation for this curve is \( ROG_{60-85}^{i} = 100 \left( \frac{y_{i}^{85}}{y_{i}^{60}} \right)^{\frac{1}{25}} \) \( - 1 \), where \( ROG_{60-85}^{i} \) represents the rate that country \( i \) would have had to have grown by between 1960 and 1985 to have reached the world’s average income level by 1985. The variable \( y_{i}^{60} \) is the level of the country’s real per capita income in 1960, and the variable \( y_{a}^{85} \) is the world’s average income level in 1985.
Box 1: Estimating the rate of convergence or divergence of income

It is possible to quantify the rate of convergence within a given group by using the following equation,

$$ (y_{i,t} - \bar{y}_t) = \phi (y_{i,t-1} - \bar{y}_{t-1}) + e_{i,t} \quad (2.1) $$

where $y_{i,t}$ is country $i$'s log real per capita income in year $t$, $\bar{y}_t$ is the group's average log per capita income in year $t$, $\phi$ is the estimated convergence coefficient, $e_{i,t}$ is the stochastic shock, and $\phi$ is the estimated convergence coefficient. The countries of the group are pooled together in order to estimate the equation so that $\phi$ represents the group’s rate of convergence or divergence.

The equation is basically a regression of the gap between country $i$ and the group average in year $t$ on the gap between country $i$ and the group average in year $t-1$. If there is no change in this gap, in other words, no convergence or divergence, then one would expect the estimated $\phi$ to equal one. Convergence implies that the gap is falling over time, hence the estimated $\phi$ in such instances should be less than one. In the case of divergence, $\phi$ should be greater than one.

Because of unit root issues associated with equation 2.1, the augmented Dickey-Fuller form of the equation is estimated,

$$ z_{i,t} = \phi z_{i,t-1} + \sum_{j=1}^{k} c_j \Delta z_{i,j} + e_{i,t} \quad (2.2) $$

where $z_{i,t} = y_{i,t} - \bar{y}_t$ and $\Delta z_{i,t} = z_{i,t} - z_{i,t-1}$.

The results are presented in Table 2. The first regression on all 113 countries in the sample between 1960 and 1985 is presented in the first line of the table. Note that the estimated $\phi$ is significantly greater than one, confirming that per capita incomes are diverging in the world as a whole.\textsuperscript{4} The rate of divergence over the 25 year period is such that the world-wide income gap will be doubled in one and a half centuries (or 146 years to be exact), as detailed in the last column.

Division of the world in half according to 1960 per capita incomes yields 57 countries in the "wealthier" half (country one to 57) and 56 countries in the "poorer" half (country 58 to 113). The top half exhibits neither significant convergence nor significant divergence while the bottom half diverged over time. A division of the world into three equally sized groups yields a significant outcome, divergence, only for the middle group. Continuing to divide the world into increasingly smaller ranges of countries begins to yield a pattern. As the size of the country ranges falls, we see increasing evidence of convergence at the bottom end, and divergence elsewhere.

Moving to the bottom of the table, the countries are divided into eight ranges containing 14 countries each (with exception of the first range that contains 15 countries). All of the estimated convergence coefficients are greater than one (most of these significantly so) with the exception of the poorest range of countries, as detailed in Figure 4. That is, it is only the poorest group of countries that exhibit income convergence among its members. Even with the exclusion of the outlier country, Venezuela, from the top range, there is very little support for the determination of convergence among the wealthy countries (from here on, Venezuela will be excluded from the sample).

Are these results, however, really indicative of who is converging and who is not? What is the likelihood of finding convergence within a group of, say, six countries, if this group is randomly selected from each range? Or, put differently, what is the percentage of sub-unity $\phi$’s (i.e. convergence) groups within each income group?

It is possible to create 3003 different possible groupings of six countries from each income range of 14 countries. The rate of convergence or divergence within each group of six countries is estimated using the methodology described in Box 1. The resultant estimated $\phi$’s for each of the groups is plotted in Figure 5. The horizontal axis lists the $\phi$’s and the vertical axis lists the cumulative distribution of the estimated $\phi$’s. For example, in the case of countries 30 through 43 in range 3 (curve “3rd 14” in the figure), the smallest $\phi$ in any of the 3003 groups was no less than 0.95 and the highest $\phi$ was greater than 1.06. The curve crosses the vertical line (dividing both sides of the graph at $\phi=1$) at a height of approximately 0.05 indicating that roughly 5% of the estimated $\phi$’s were less than one (i.e. convergence groups) while 95% of the groups exhibited divergence.

\textsuperscript{4} The degree of statistical significance is given by the “t-statistic” in column 4. The higher the absolute value, the more confidence (significance) can be attributed to the estimated coefficient. While the cutoff point between significance and insignificance is somewhat arbitrary (it depends on the number of observations and whether the significance is measured at the 1% level, the 5% level, or the 10% level), a t-statistic above two (in absolute terms) may be thought of as statistically “significant”.

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### Table 2: Convergence coefficients by range

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<td>86</td>
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<td>4.43</td>
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<td>113</td>
<td>0.96751</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.60</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The parentheses denote values without Venezuela.

* The half-lives are denoted by negative numbers.

Figure 4: Convergence coefficients by income range
Fourteen countries per range, eight ranges

1960 Rank of Countries within Each Income Range


Figure 5: Distribution of convergence coefficients

All 120 Possible Draw of Groups of 6 from Each Range of 14 Countries

The most evidence of convergence is among the poorest countries with nearly all of the groups in the range exhibiting convergence. With the exception of the wealthiest range of countries, there is non-convergence or divergence in over three quarters of the other randomly-created groups. And among the wealthiest countries, one is just as likely to find $\phi > 1$ as they are of finding $\phi < 1$.

Although the two ranges at both ends of the income spectrum exhibit the highest incidence of convergence, the nature of the convergence is different in each of them. While convergence at the top end of the spectrum is of the catching-up variety—where the poorer group members catch-up with the wealthier group members—the convergence at the bottom end of the income spectrum is one of negative growth by the initially better-off members of the poorest range, i.e. this is a downward convergence. Convergence at both ends of the income spectrum with divergence in between is also shown, using different methodology, in Quah (1993 and 1996).

The focus in the remainder of this paper will be on isolating one of the possible sources of the catch-up convergence. In particular, from among the wealthier countries within the top two ranges, are there any identifying characteristics that tie the converging groups together and sets them apart from the remaining groups? One possibility is that international trade may be one of the main threads connecting the convergers from the non-convergers.

What kind of a role might trade barriers play in yielding the non-convergence between countries—and what kind of an effect might their removal produce? Or more generally, how does one go about identifying trade’s effect on income differentials between countries?

One might want, for example, to compare the behavior of income differentials between US states to income differentials between countries. In this kind of an example, the US could represent a proxy for an integrated world economy with free trade and mobility of factors (both capital and labor).

As Figure 6 indicates, there has been substantial convergence within the US. Nearly all of the states are in the upper-left or lower-right quadrants—an indication that the below-average states (in terms of initial income levels) grew at faster than average rates while above average states grew at below average rates. This state-wide income convergence stands in stark contrast to the non-convergence observed in the world (Figure 1).

The question is whether it is the relatively free flow of goods between states that is the primary force behind this convergence outcome, or whether there might be other explanations as well. These would include the relatively unrestricted flows of factors—both capital and labor—

5 The convergence, while extensive, is nonetheless incomplete inasmuch as the below-average states are still a bit below the convergence curve while the above average states are a bit above it.
between states and regions of the US as well as the existence of a central government.

How might it be possible to isolate trade's contribution to the US convergence? The answer is that, without data on trade between states, this contribution is very hard to pin down. Trade data does, however, exist for countries.

In this regard, the European Economic Community (or EEC) provides a very useful arena for isolating the effects of trade on incomes. This is due to the fact that the EEC represents a fixed group of countries that formally integrated most of their trade policies. While the EEC exhibited significantly increased trade during its evolutionary period, (we'll look at these changes in the volume of trade in just a moment) there have been a considerable number of studies pointing out that the early years of the Community were not distinguished by significant improvements in factor flows—both capital and labor—among countries. Hence, the primary changes that occurred during the formative years of the EEC were in commodity flows rather than in factor flows.

How does the relationship between growth rates and initial income levels compare between the six founding members of the EEC and the 107 remaining countries of the sample? Correlation coefficients ranging from -1.0 (for a perfect negative correlation) and 1.0 (for a perfect positive correlation) —where 0 indicates no correlation at all—may be used to compare these relationships between the two sets of countries. For the 107 non-EEC countries of the world, the correlation coefficient between their 1960 per capita incomes and their 1960-85 growth rates is 0.13, which indicates a slight positive correlation. By comparison, the correlation coefficient for the EEC is -0.88, indicating a strong negative relationship between initial incomes and subsequent growth rates.

C. Trade liberalization’s impact on trade

Before going into a more direct analysis of the relationship between trade reform and income convergence, it is useful to examine whether the trade reforms discussed below had any sort of an impact on the actual trade of the reforming countries. Such an examination is the focus of this section.

Post-war trade liberalization between the countries that would later form the EEC began in earnest with the implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1947. As a part of the Plan’s conditions, the United States required recipient countries to begin liberalizing their trade. These steps led primarily towards a movement from discriminatory quotas towards non-discriminatory quotas and to a partial easing of some existing quotas.

That same year, 1947, saw the creation of the Benelux Union by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Union’s provisions for allowing unrestricted movement of goods and services, as well as the implementation of a common external policy, broke new ground and gave a hint of things to come. In the early 1950s, the Benelux countries were joined by France, Germany and Italy in a series of treaties that eventually culminated in the signing of the Treaties of Rome and the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957. Nearly all remaining internal barriers to trade within the EEC were eliminated.
by 1968. Thus, the relevant period for analysis of EEC liberalization includes the decade preceding and the decade following the formal creation of the Community in the late 1950s.

What kind of an impact did this integration have on intra-Community trade? As Figure 7 indicates, the proportion of imports by the EEC countries from each other (i.e. total intra-EEC trade) to total imports by the EEC countries from other, non-EEC, countries was roughly 15% in 1948. This proportion rose steadily throughout the liberalization period until leveling off in the late 1960s and early 1970s at about three times the 1948 ratio.

Figure 8 shows how this increase in intra-EEC trade compared with output growth in the Community. The intra-EEC trade-output ratio grew from about 3½% in the early 1950s along a relatively monotonous path until the 1970s when it reached a plateau of just over 10% of GDP.

A similar pattern emerged when the EEC was enlarged from six to nine countries in 1973 (upper panel of Figure 9). The ratio of imports into the six from the three to EEC six output was fairly constant until the enlargement was implemented. The ratio then began to rise to over double its pre-enlargement level.

While different EEC trade liberalization periods coincided with different periods of trade increases, it is important to note that not all EEC trade exhibited this kind of behavior. For example, the United States did not enjoy the unlimited access to EEC markets that the Community members enjoyed, and as the bottom panel of Figure 9 indicates, EEC imports from the US grew at the same rate as EEC output throughout the entire period.

In short, in the instances that EEC trade was liberalized, the impact on the affected trade volumes is readily apparent. Different instances of trade liberalization coincided with different instances of increases in trade-output ratios. In lieu of such trade reforms, trade-output ratios tended to remain unchanged.

D. Trade liberalization and income convergence

As the preceding section illustrated, trade liberalization appears to have had a visible effect on trade. But, what was its effect on income disparity among the countries? To get an idea of the relationship between the income differentials within the EEC, and the timing of its trade liberalization, it is useful to examine the behavior of the annual cross-country standard deviations of the log real per capita incomes (σ). A graphical depiction of this

The signing of the Treaty of Paris creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and consolidation of the coal and steel industries of the area was accompanied by a 16% reduction in σ. From 1954 to 1958, the σ's behaved in a cyclical manner, though they fell a bit.

The EEC was created with the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957. In 1959, remaining internal trade barriers began to be eliminated within this newly-created formal framework. That year, σ fell beneath its previous level and headed downward until 1962, the year that all remaining quotas were abolished. The next three to four
Figure 10: Per capita income dispersion


Figure 11: Per capita income dispersion within the US

years saw a stabilization around this lower level of income disparity. From 1965 to 1968, there occurred further, though moderate, reductions in the degree of income dispersion.

One of the first questions that arises when one looks at the EEC convergence outcomes is the question of whether this convergence should be attributed to the shocks induced by World War II. In other words, did the fall in income disparity following the war reflect a return to relatively low levels of σ’s that may have existed prior to the onset of World War II? Or, alternatively, was the reduction in income differentials a continuation of a long-term convergence trend? Existence of either of these scenarios would weaken the case for a link between trade liberalization and income convergence.

Long-term convergence has, in fact, been the case within the US. Figure 11 provides an indication of how interregional income differentials declined between 1880 and 1985. Despite a slight rise in disparity during the inter-war period, the US income convergence resumed and even returned to the earlier pre-World War II convergence path. There had been no regime of interstate trade barriers that had to be abolished and the graph reveals no abrupt change in direction that might have accompanied a major change in policy. Instead, it would appear that the primary trade barriers were the costs of transportation and communication and as these gradually declined over time, so did the income differentials between the different regions.

What was the path of the EEC income gap in the decades prior to the creation of the Community? Using Maddison’s (1995) data, it is possible to determine if either of the two alternative scenarios described above might be applicable. The income gaps between the EEC founders since 1870 appear in Figure 12 (the Maddison data does not include Luxembourg so it is not included in the calculations of the income gaps).

Looking at the gaps since 1870, the behavior of the σ’s clearly indicates that, during the three decades prior to World War II, neither of the alternative two scenarios appears to hold. The dispersion of real per capita incomes was fairly stable during the inter-war period preceding World War II. Only after the onset of the post-war trade liberalization did the σ’s begin to drop in a sustained manner to gaps that had hitherto been unseen among the countries during the previous eight decades.6

The liberalization-equalization focus has, until now, been on the founding countries of the EEC. Would it be possible to reproduce similar convergence results for the next three countries that joined the EEC (Ireland, Denmark and the UK)? And, if these countries exhibit a reduction in income differentials after eliminating trade barriers amongst themselves, would this behavior be any different than their pre-liberalization behavior? The income gaps between the three new members are plotted in Figure 13. The σ’s between the three actually increased until the mid-sixties. With the implementation of the Kennedy Round agreements in 1968 and the subsequent accession of the three countries to the European Economic community in 1973, the σ’s began to stabilize and then decline as the countries began to converge with one another—and also with the six original members of the Community (the latter convergence is not shown here).

While the EEC countries have exhibited a significant reduction in the degree of income disparity among themselves, this has not been a prevalent feature of the international data, as was indicated earlier. An interesting experiment would be to compare the EEC to opposing benchmark cases and see to how the Community moved from one type of income gap path to another.

As noted above, the United States can be used as a best-case scenario for what may be accomplished within a completely integrated world economy, where there is unrestricted trade and factor flows. At the other end of the spectrum is the actual world economy, where there exist curbs on the mobility of goods and factors between countries. The EEC provides the intermediate case that depicts a steady liberalization of trade, but where factors do not flow as freely as within the US. This places it between the restrictive world case and the free trade, free factor flow, US case.

Figure 14 provides visual support for the worldwide divergence that occurred during the post-war period. However, such a grouping that includes extremely poor developing countries is not too useful a benchmark for comparison with the EEC. Instead, a subgroup comprising the 25 middle and high income countries of the world was formed and the income gap within this group plotted. For all but the latter years of the sample, the income gaps within this group display neither convergence nor divergence—a feature that resembles quite closely the relatively flat path of the inter-war EEC income gaps in Figure 12. The EEC income gaps moved from their flat pre-war path (that was at a relatively similar height as that of the 25 benchmark countries in the post-war) to a path that exhibits convergence rates and income gaps quite similar to those between the US states.

The estimation results in Table 3 support the visual evidence. Pre-war EEC convergence coefficients are not significantly different from one. Neither are the convergence coefficients for the top 25 countries or for the 14 countries with initial incomes between the wealthiest and poorest EEC countries.

On the other hand, post-war EEC convergence coefficients are significantly less than one, with the strongest convergence occurring during the ten-year transition period in which the EEC formally removed all remaining barriers on trade within it. It is interesting to

6 As Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) point out, the period between 1879 and 1901 was accompanied by increases in tariffs by Germany, France and Italy. As the figure indicates, incomes gaps rose considerably during this period—after which they fell by a substantial margin in the years prior to World War I. From the long-run perspective, σ was relatively stable during the inter-war years, though it is still noteworthy to point out that the erection of trade barriers in Europe during this period was accompanied by a slight, though noticeable, rise in the size of the income gaps. As Germany began to prepare for war in the 30s, the income of that country (which had been among the poorest of the group at that point) began to rise—an outcome that is reflected in the slight non-trade related reduction in income differentials that occurred in the 1930s, which later bottomed out by the outbreak of World War II.
Figure 12: Income dispersion between 5 future EEC countries

Figure 13: Per capita income dispersion

note that the half-life during the transition period was very similar to the half-life of the United States convergence over the past 55 years.

Until now, the emphasis has been on trade liberalization and income convergence between the countries forming the European Economic Community. But this is not the only instance of substantial trade reform coupled with declines in income disparity. Another example is that of the United States and Canada, two current members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These two countries embarked on the road to free trade a couple of decades prior to the creation of NAFTA, first with the signing of the auto pact in 1965 and then within the framework of the Kennedy Round Agreement signed under the auspices of the GATT. Under the terms of the Kennedy Round Agreement, they removed approximately 40% of the tariffs on their bilateral trade between the years 1968 and 1973. As the bottom panel of Figure 15 shows, the relatively stable trade-output ratio began to rise as the trade reforms were initiated. By the end of the reform period in the early 1970s, this ratio again stabilized—at over twice its pre-reform levels.

The top panel shows how the income gap between the two behaved during the post-war period. After fluctuating between 15% and 20% between 1950 and 1967 (as well as for many decades prior to World War II), the gap began to fall in 1968 and to level off in 1973 at levels between 0 and 4%—a very close reflection of the Kennedy Round trade reform dates.

A final example of the link between trade liberalization and income convergence is that of the European Free Trade Association, or EFTA as it came to be called. EFTA, which comprised eight countries, began to abolish tariffs on trade in manufactured goods in 1961 and completed the process by 1967. The EFTA countries included Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Portugal was exempt from a large number of the Association's trade reforms, hence it is not included in the EFTA analysis here. Another country omitted from the analysis is Austria, a country that was among the most developed in Europe at the turn of the century and devastated economically in the two World Wars. The resultant post-war resurgence of Austria led to substantial convergence with the EFTA countries that were initially wealthier following World War II. Since the focus here is on trade-related convergence, Austria is removed from the sample of EFTA countries in order to remove the pro-convergence bias that it introduces.

In contrast with the previous cases of trade liberalization examined above, the income gap in EFTA did not begin falling as the countries began to remove obstacles to trade (top panel of Figure 16). Instead, it began to decline later, between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s. This mismatch between the timing of the reforms and the timing of the convergence reflects an apparent contradiction with the earlier findings.

However, it turns out that EFTA did not represent a grouping of countries that traded extensively with one another as was the case in all of the examples studied.
above. Their primary trade partners belonged to the EEC and as such, it was the implementation of the Kennedy Round Agreement between the EEC and EFTA between 1968 and 1973 that brought about income convergence between the countries of the two groups (not shown here) as well as within EFTA as is borne out in the top panel of Figure 17. The bottom panel of the figure displays the behavior of EFTA imports from the EEC relative to EFTA output. The changes in this ratio appear to have coincided with the timing of the Kennedy Round agreement.

Table 4 provides a comparison of the convergence coefficients by liberalization group and by time periods. Significant income convergence in the 1950s occurred between the EFTA and EEC countries as they began to dismantle the quantitative restrictions on trade with one another. Between 1959 and 1967, the formative years of the EEC, it was only this group of countries that exhibited significant convergence. The subsequent decade began with the implementation of the Kennedy Round and it included income convergence within each of the affected groups. The last period, 1978 to 1985, involved no major trade reforms by any of the groups and it was not characterized by significant convergence either.

One last issue remains before this section ends. The previous examples have shown European convergence within the EEC and also among the EFTA countries. While these instances of convergence occurred at different times and in apparent conjunction with the relevant free trade agreements, there might still be a question of whether the post-war convergence was, in fact, a universal phenomenon among the European countries—even those that did not engage in trade liberalization.

The remaining non-EEC and non-EFTA countries of the Summers and Heston sample are collected in Figure 17. In contrast with the EEC and EFTA examples, the annual income gaps between these countries have not tended either downwards or upwards, i.e. no signs of either convergence or divergence.

### E. Trade (in general) and income convergence

The emphasis in the earlier sections has been on an examination of specific cases of trade liberalization and the impact of the trade reforms on trade volumes and income gaps. The goal of this section is to move beyond these limited instances of trade liberalization to an examination of the relationship between international trade in general and cross-country income differentials.

The experiment is as follows. The sample period is 1960 through 1985. All of the non-communist and non-oil-producing developing countries in the Summers and Heston (1988) dataset are ranked according to their per capita incomes. The IMF’s directional trade data declines in accuracy with the developmental level of countries, then all countries with per capita incomes below 25% of the wealthiest country’s—the United States—are omitted from the sample. The 25 remaining

### Table 3: Convergence coefficients, by group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>$\hat{\phi}$</th>
<th>$t$-stat. $H_0: \phi=1$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>Half life</th>
<th>Double life</th>
</tr>
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<td><strong>EEC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-war, 1900-1933</td>
<td>0.9909</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0094)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-war, 1951-1985</td>
<td>0.9709</td>
<td>-4.39**</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0066)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition Period</td>
<td>0.9494</td>
<td>-4.90**</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-1968</td>
<td>(0.0103)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED STATES, 1931-1984</strong></td>
<td>0.9558</td>
<td>-11.64**</td>
<td>0.961</td>
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<td>(0.0038)</td>
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<td><strong>WORLD (excl. EEC 6), 1960-1985</strong></td>
<td>1.0074</td>
<td>6.42**</td>
<td>0.996</td>
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<td>All 107 Countries</td>
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<td>Top 25 Countries</td>
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<td>(0.0056)</td>
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<td>14 Countries&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>0.973</td>
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<td>(w/o Venezuela)</td>
<td>(0.0093)</td>
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**a** Standard deviations are in parentheses.

**b** Does not include Luxembourg due to lack of data and excludes the World War I years, 1914-1919.

**c** These are the 14 countries with the same per capita income range as the EEC 6 in 1960.

** Significant at the 1% level.

Figure 15: Gap in per capita incomes and bilateral trade to GDP, United States and Canada, 1950-1985

Figure 16. Per capita income dispersion among EFTA 6, ratio of EFTA 6 imports to EFTA 6 GDP:

Per capita income dispersion among EFTA 6:

Switzerland, Sweeden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom.

Ratio of EFTA 6 imports to EFTA 6 GDP:

Switzerland, Sweeden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdom.

middle and high income countries with per capita incomes above the 25% threshold will heretofore be referred to as source countries (this group excludes countries that are primarily oil-producers and communist countries).

In light of the earlier evidence that trade liberalization among countries that trade extensively with one another is linked to income convergence amongst them, a list of each source country’s major trade partners is created, once on the basis of exports and once on the basis of imports. The criteria for determination of a given country j as a major trade partner of source country i is that i’s exports to j must comprise at least 4% of i’s total exports. Or alternatively, i’s imports from j must comprise at least 4% of i’s total imports.\[\text{This criteria yields trade-based groups ranging in size from three to nine countries in each.}\]

Hence, each source country has two trade groups associated with it, one created on the basis of its exports and one on the basis of its imports. The question at the

Table 4: Post-war convergence coefficients, by group\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>$\phi$</th>
<th>Std.Dev.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>t-stat. $H_0:\phi=1$</th>
<th>Half life</th>
<th>Double life</th>
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<td>EEC6</td>
<td>0.9709</td>
<td>0.0066</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>-4.39**</td>
<td>23.5</td>
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<td>0.9809</td>
<td>0.0097</td>
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<td>0.981</td>
<td>-1.98</td>
<td>35.9</td>
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<td>US-Can\textsuperscript{a}</td>
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<td>0.0240</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>-1.95</td>
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<td>0.976</td>
<td>-3.58**</td>
<td>21.0</td>
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<td>1951-1958</td>
<td>EEC6</td>
<td>0.9752</td>
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<td>0.991</td>
<td>-1.73</td>
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<td>EFTA6</td>
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<td>0.0180</td>
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<td>0.987</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
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<td>US-Can\textsuperscript{a}</td>
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<td>0.0559</td>
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<td>US-Can\textsuperscript{a}</td>
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<td>0.0125</td>
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<td>1968-1977</td>
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<td>0.990</td>
<td>-4.46**</td>
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<td>0.958</td>
<td>-3.02*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978-1985</td>
<td>EEC6</td>
<td>0.9784</td>
<td>0.0159</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>-1.35</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EFTA6</td>
<td>0.9972</td>
<td>0.0293</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>242.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US-Can\textsuperscript{ad}</td>
<td>0.7657</td>
<td>0.2298</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>-1.02</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EF6-EC6\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>1.0242</td>
<td>0.0313</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} The annual US-CAN data are gaps, rather than differences from a group mean as in the case of the other groups.

\textsuperscript{b} The annual EF6-EC6 data are differences between each of the EFTA 6 incomes and the EEC 6 average income rather than from the EFTA average as in the EFTA 6 rows.

\textsuperscript{c} Period: 1968-1973.

\textsuperscript{d} Period: 1974-1985.

** Significant at the 1% level.

* Significant at the 5% level.


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7 Data source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various editions.

8 This experiment is detailed more fully in Ben-David (1996).
The center of this experiment is whether these trade-based groups exhibit income convergence. The distinction between the export-based and import-based groups is made in order to allow for the possibility that the outcomes from each might not be the same.

The convergence equation (equation 2.2, Box 1) is estimated for each one of the trade groups and the outcomes appear in Table 5 with the left side of the table detailing the export groups’ results and the right side detailing the import groups’ results. In both the export and import cases, the source country’s name is listed in the left column. To the right of this column is a column of numbers representing the number of countries in each of the trade-based groups. The groups are sorted according to their t-statistics. Out of the 25 export-based groups—one per source country—24 have estimated $\phi$’s below one, 16 of these significantly below one. Twenty-two of the import-based groups have $\phi$’s below one with 17 of these significantly below one.

In other words, while most of the countries in the world have exhibited income divergence from one another, this experiment suggests that major trade partners tend to exhibit income convergence more often than not. But is the statistical significance of these results really indicative of this conclusion?

It turns out that if one creates a pool of all of the major trade partners and all of the source countries, then this pool will comprise 32 countries—just seven more than the total number of source countries. In other words, most of the source countries reappear as major trade partners of other source countries. So it may be that any randomly selected group from the pool of 32 countries might exhibit the same incidence of convergence as the trade-based groupings.

Since trade group sizes range from three to nine, then up to 5000 random groupings in each of these various sizes were created from the pool of 32 countries and equation 2.2 estimated for each grouping. Table 5.1 indicates the uniqueness of each of the trade group outcomes.

For example, take NZ (New Zealand), the 7th source country on the list of export-based groups. Its export-based group included five countries and yielded a convergence coefficient of 0.966, an outcome that is significantly less than one at the 1% level. What is the likelihood of reproducing such an outcome of 0.966 in a group of five countries that are randomly selected from the pool of 32? As the right-hand column indicates, there is less than a 5% likelihood that a randomly-created group will yield such an outcome.

The probabilities of attaining each of the trade group outcomes in random groupings is listed in the table for each of the groups for which this probability is less than 50%. In all, the likelihood of replicating the convergence coefficients is less than 10% in 35 of the 50 groups—i.e. in 70% of the trade groups. Further tests were also conducted (these are reported in Ben-David, 1996) to gauge the sensitivity of the results to various other possible reasons that might be behind these outcomes, but the conclusion remains that grouping the countries together on the basis of major trade ties yields income convergence in many instances where such convergence
is not otherwise found when these same countries are grouped according to different criteria.

Using more recent Summers and Heston (1995) data that includes output per worker rather than output per person, the incidence of convergence is even higher (Table 6). In this case, 22 of the 25 export-based groups and 21 of the import-based groups—or 86% of the trade-based groups—exhibit significant convergence at the 5% level.

These tables show that grouping countries according to trade criteria yields convergence results considerably more often than do random groupings of countries.

Moreover, as shown in Box 2, increases in trade, whether on the export and import side, contribute to

---

**Table 5: Trade groups’ convergence coefficients (Sorted by t-statistics)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Country</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>( \hat{\phi} )</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>Probability of random replication from among all 32 traders</th>
<th>Source Country</th>
<th>( \hat{\phi} )</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>Probability of random replication from among all 32 traders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>-4.571***</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>-4.571***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 AUSTR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>-3.760***</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>-4.452***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>-4.571***</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>-4.571***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 AUSTR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>-3.760***</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>-4.452***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 GER</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>-3.713***</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>SWED</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>-4.452***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 ICE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.957</td>
<td>-3.565***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>-4.380***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 JAPAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.984</td>
<td>-3.470***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>-4.024***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 FRA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>-3.236***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>GER</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>-3.526***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 NZ</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-3.057***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>-3.496***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 ITAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>-2.883***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>DEN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>-3.249***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 SWIS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>-2.883***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>SWIS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>-3.236***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 BELLU</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>-2.643***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>AUSTR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>-3.233***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 NETH</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>-2.643***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>AUSTL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-3.209***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 SPA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>-2.413**</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-3.209***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 AUSTL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>-2.309**</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.981</td>
<td>-2.643***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 SWED</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>-1.990**</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>-2.613***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 UK</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>-1.796*</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>ITAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>-2.300**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 FIN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>-1.745*</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>BELLU</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>-2.078**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 IRE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>-1.359**</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>NETH</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>-2.078**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 DEN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>-1.237**</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>-1.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 CHIL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>-1.117</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>IRE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>-1.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 NOR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.988</td>
<td>-1.037</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>-0.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 ARGN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>-0.909</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>URUG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 US</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.996</td>
<td>-0.731</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>MEX</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 URUG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>-0.404</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>SAFR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>0.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 MEX</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>-0.327</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.003</td>
<td>0.883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 SAFR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>1.782*</td>
<td></td>
<td>CHIL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.006</td>
<td>0.903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***Significantly different from one at the 1% level.
** Significantly different from one at the 5% level.
* Significant different from one at the 10% level.

a Export groups include all countries that receive over 4% of the source countries total exports.
b Import groups include all countries that are the origin of over 4% of source countries total imports.
The column heading, #, represents the number of countries in each group.
even faster rates of income convergence among major trading partners.

F. Economic growth

It is interesting to note that, while the post-war period has been characterized by movement towards freer trade, most countries experienced either growth slowdowns, or no noticeable growth improvements. Using structural break tests that endogenously determine the existence of a trend break along a given growth path—and determine its statistical significance—Ben-David and Papell (1998) examine the post-war growth paths of 74 countries between 1950 and 1990. We find that 54 of the countries exhibit a significant structural trend break in their growth path during this period. Of these 54 countries, 46 experienced significant slowdowns following their breaks and only eight countries out of the entire sample exhibited increases in their rates of growth.

The post-war growth paths of the three biggest EEC founding countries, France, Germany, and Italy, appear in the three panels of Figure 18. Together with the actual paths are the extrapolated paths (based on the coefficients derived in the structural break tests) that the countries would have continued to be on had they not experienced the trend breaks. As the pictures quite clearly illustrate, the original EEC’s Big Three experienced substantial growth slowdowns.

While most countries experienced a slowdown in economic growth during the post-war years, the majority of them exhibited increases in the volume of their trade (Ben-David and Papell, 1997). The evidence of heightened trade on the one hand, combined with growth slowdowns on the other, appears to indicate that the

---

Table 6: Convergence in output per worker
(Trade groups sorted by t-statistics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source country</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>( \phi )</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
<th>Source country</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>( \phi )</th>
<th>t-stat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>-7.05  ***</td>
<td>GERM</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-5.94  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>-5.19  ***</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>-5.74  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>-5.01  ***</td>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>-5.41  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERM</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>-4.64  ***</td>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>-5.35  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-4.14  ***</td>
<td>SWED</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>-5.22  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>-4.06  ***</td>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>-5.22  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>-4.01  ***</td>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>-5.19  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>-3.99  ***</td>
<td>JAP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>-5.15  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTR</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>-3.86  ***</td>
<td>AUSTL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>-5.10  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>-3.85  ***</td>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>-5.10  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>-3.72  ***</td>
<td>AUSTR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.938</td>
<td>-4.77  **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-3.53  ***</td>
<td>DEN</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>-4.48  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWIS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-3.53  ***</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-4.14  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELLU</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>-3.48  ***</td>
<td>SWIS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>-3.99  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETH</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>-3.48  ***</td>
<td>MEX</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>-3.58  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEX</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>-3.29  ***</td>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>-3.48  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>-3.19  ***</td>
<td>ITAL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.970</td>
<td>-3.25  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWED</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>-3.07  ***</td>
<td>IRE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.980</td>
<td>-2.70  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>-2.90  ***</td>
<td>BELLU</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>-2.57  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOR</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>-2.56  ***</td>
<td>NETH</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.976</td>
<td>-2.57  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEN</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>-2.29  ***</td>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>-2.54  ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARGN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.986</td>
<td>-2.25  **</td>
<td>SAFR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.992</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.991</td>
<td>-1.53</td>
<td>ARGN</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URUG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>URUG</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
<td>CHIL</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.006</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significantly different from unity at the 1% (***), and 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.

Source of Table: Ben-David, Dan, Free Trade and Economic Growth, MIT Press, forthcoming.

---

relationship between trade and growth, to the extent that one exists, is a negative one.

But this is not the only way to interpret the empirical evidence. The post-war period is, by definition, a period following a major upheaval. Standard growth theory tells us that in the aftermath of a negative shock as great as World War II, countries should be expected to exhibit growth rates that initially exceed their steady-state rates (upper panel in Figure 19). Eventually, as countries return to their original growth paths, their growth rates should fall back to the original steady-state values (Ben-David and Papell, 1995, calculates and compares the pre- and post-war steady state growth paths). One source for such an explanation of the post-war slowdowns would be the Solow growth model.

So maybe, instead of focusing on just the post-war, we should take a step back and look at the big picture. The fact that growth rates have fallen during the past several decades could very well be due to the return of countries to their long-run growth paths.

However, in light of the extensive trade liberalization that has occurred since the war, one might ask whether post-war steady-state paths are the same as the pre-war paths or are they new paths characterized by faster growth and higher incomes? In other words, could the relevant diagram be the lower panel in Figure 19 rather than the upper panel?

One illustration of post-war slowdowns in economic growth within the long-run context is Japan (Figure 20). The country had two significant trend breaks over the past century: in 1944 and 1973. The first was followed by a sharp drop in levels of growth and subsequent high growth. The period of high growth ended in 1973, and the slowdown began. But the levels of the new post-slowdown path followed by Japan are clearly above the levels of the pre-World War II path.

What happened to the EEC countries? The earlier sections showed that they converged with the onset of liberalization, but is the trade-related convergence that they exhibited a goal that countries should strive for? If,

Box 2: Increased trade speeds up the rate of income convergence among trading partners

Let $R_{i,t}$ equal the ratio of total intra-group trade to total group output for group $i$ at time $t$ and let $\sigma_{i,t}$ equal the standard deviation of the group members' log output per worker. Then an equation of the type

$$\sigma_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 R_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (5.1)$$

provides an indication of how changes in the trade-output ratio affect the income gaps. To eliminate fixed effects and focus just on the impact of changes in trade on changes in the rate of income convergence, Equation 5.1 is differenced,

$$D\sigma_{i,t} = \beta_1 + \beta_2 DR_{i,t-2} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (5.2)$$

and then estimated twice, once for the 25 export-based groups (which are all pooled together) and once for the 25 import-based groups. Simple convergence resulting from the trade-based groupings of the countries is reflected in a negative trend coefficient, $\beta_1$. As Table 7 shows, that is indeed the case for both exports and imports, indicating convergence in both which is not surprising given that most of the groups individually exhibited income convergence in the earlier analysis (Table 5 and 6).

The difference here is in the inclusion of the trade ratios in the equation. The significantly negative coefficients for the trade ratios ($\beta_2$) indicate that increases in trade contribute to even faster rates of convergence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\beta_1$</th>
<th>$\beta_2$</th>
<th>$N$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-11.39)</td>
<td>(-2.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-12.41)</td>
<td>(-2.86)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$t$-statistics in parentheses. $N$ is the number of observations.
for example, one comes from a country that is initially better off than its trade partners, then the distinction between convergence towards the middle as opposed to catch-up convergence towards the wealthier group members is not a trivial concern. Is this a zero-sum game where any benefits that accrue to one country must come at the expense of its trade partner?

A look at Belgium between 1870 and 1989, in the top left corner of Figure 21, is revealing. Growth rates prior to World War I were steady, while the export-output ratio of the country was also fairly stable. The outbreak of World War I resulted in a severe drop in levels of GDP per person. In the years following the war, while the export-output ratio continued to remain at its pre-war level, the country experienced a transition back to its original multi-decade growth path—just as predicted by the neoclassical growth model. However, the aftermath of World War II reflects another story altogether. While the export-output ratio increased throughout the post-war period, the country not only rebounded to its earlier path, it eclipsed it altogether and kept right on growing. The post-war slowdown, when it occurred, did not signal a return to the old growth path levels. It did not even signal a return to the old growth rates.

In France, World War I and its aftermath also fit the Solow model prediction. But, as in the Belgian case, World War II and its aftermath do not. In short, each one of the other original EEC countries ended up on higher growth paths in the latter decades of the sample.

The removal of trade barriers between these countries led to substantial increases in trade, with the average ratio of exports to GDP in five of the six original member countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands—no data for Luxembourg, the sixth country) during the post-war years exceeding the average ratio for these countries in the seven decades preceding World War II by a factor of 2.11. Although the increased openness of the post-war period is accompanied by higher growth rates, it would be presumptuous to attribute all of the faster growth following World War II to increased trade.

Nevertheless, it is still useful to compare results between the relatively free trade years prior to World War I (1870-1913) and the years following the onset of the post-World War II slowdown (1973-1989). The average export-output ratio across the five countries for the post-World War II slowdown period exceeds the pre-World War I ratio by a factor of 2.83. Likewise, the five country average growth rate of per capita real GDP for the post-slowdown period is also higher, exceeding the pre-World War I rate by a factor of 1.63. So, not only did the degree of income disparity among the EEC countries decline significantly in the post-World War II period, they all experienced faster economic growth as well.

What happened after World War II to some of the other countries for whom we have historical data? In general, in each of 16 OECD countries examined over the long run, the average ratio of post-war to pre-war growth rates (with the post-war period not including the very high-growth first few years following World War II) was greater than one (Table 8). Post-war growth rates for the group as a whole were 142% higher in the four decades following World War II than they were in the seven decades preceding it.
Sachs and Warner (1995) find a positive relationship between countries that removed trade barriers and countries that exhibited faster growth. Focusing on developing countries, for example, Sachs and Warner classify 34 developing countries as having been relatively closed to trade during the entire period between 1965 and 1986. They classify another seven developing countries as having been open to trade during this period. For comparison purposes, we will also look at 18 developed countries, that are also classified by Sachs and Warner as open economies.

It is interesting to compare between the growth rates of these three groups of countries (Figure 23). In particular, the group of seven open developing countries grew by an average of 3.5 percentage points faster than the group of 34 closed developing countries. By comparison, the group of open developed countries grew by an average of 1.5 percentage points faster than the group of closed developing countries.

Put differently, at the average growth rate of 1.15% exhibited by the closed developing countries, an average person’s real income would double after 62 years. Alternatively, an average person in one of the open developing countries would see their real income grow 16 fold during this 62 year span—and an average person in one of the open developed countries would experience a five-fold increase in their real income. These are not marginal improvements when one considers them from the perspective of an average citizen. They represent substantial progress up the income ladder, particularly for the average person in one of the open developing countries.

And finally, these results are also supportive of the divergence between developed countries that are relatively open to trade and developing countries which are relatively closed to trade. They also indicate an income convergence between the open developing countries with the open developed countries.

G. One explanation for the empirics

What might be the source of the income convergence described in the earlier sections? From traditional trade theory, the Factor Price Equalization Proposition (Samuelson, 1948; Helpman and Krugman, 1985) can explain how free trade might lead to an equalization of factor prices—but not necessarily the equalization of per capita incomes. From traditional growth theory, the neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965) can explain per capita income convergence, but this occurs within a closed economy model in lieu of trade. Furthermore, neither model is able to explain how trade policy might affect steady state growth. This is one of the gaps in the traditional literature that some of the new endogenous growth models have attempted to fill.12

How might trade have played a role in the heightened growth and the income convergence that occurred? The competition that trade induces between importers and exporters forces them to learn and utilize ever better technologies in the struggle to survive and grow. In the process, trade acts as a conduit for the dissemination of ideas.\(^{13}\) Trade barriers, to the extent that these are erected, inhibit the flow of ideas and diminish the ability of countries to develop.

In theoretical models, the level of technology plays an important role in determining a country's output level and growth. From an empirical standpoint however, technology is an intangible that is extremely difficult to quantify analytically. To get around this problem, empirical research uses the total factor productivity (TFP) as a proxy for technology,\(^{14}\) and the difference in TFP among countries as a proxy for the technological gap.

The "catch-up hypothesis" (Veblen, 1915; Gerschenkron, 1952; Abramovitz, 1979, 1986; and others), while not directly related to trade, suggests that the larger the technology gap between countries, the faster the laggard country should be expected to grow as it catches up to the leaders. But as Figures 2 and 3 indicate, the groups with the largest initial income gap do not exhibit the fastest convergence. In fact, they are not even converging at all.

What happens when we look at the TFP levels of the countries in the trade-based groups discussed earlier? As the discussion above indicated, the majority of these exhibited income convergence. Did they also exhibit technological convergence?

Convergence will be estimated by regressing \( \sigma \), the TFP gap, on trend. A negative trend coefficient implies convergence. As is indicated in Figure 24, most of the trade-based groups exhibited TFP convergence (i.e. 77% had significantly negative trend coefficients—82% export and 71% import). In addition, the trade groups with the highest initial technological gap were also the groups that tended to exhibit the fastest technological convergence. The correlation coefficient between the initial gap size and the speed of convergence in the export case is \(-0.83\). For imports the correlation coefficient between the initial gap size and the speed of convergence is \(-0.60\) with inclusion of the Argentinean import group and \(-0.82\) without it.

And finally, the speed of the TFP convergence appears to be fairly closely related to the speed of the income convergence. Groups that exhibit faster rates of TFP convergence tend to exhibit faster rates of convergence in output per worker as well. The correlation between the speed of output convergence and the speed of TFP convergence is 0.77 for exports and 0.68 for imports.

H. Conclusion

Before closing, let's put this all into perspective. There is very little evidence that countries, in general, are converging towards one another in terms of their income gaps. In fact, income gaps between the majority of countries appear to be growing over time.

Among those countries whose income gaps are nonetheless converging, an important thread that appears to tie together many of them is international trade. Countries that formally enacted trade liberalization policies exhibited a convergence in income gaps once they implemented trade reforms. The trade reform programs examined here were performed according to specific timetables that varied from group to group. Although no intra-group income convergence was evident prior to the inception of the individual trade reforms, significant convergence, together with significant increases in the volume of trade, began to occur simultaneously with the removal of the trade barriers.

In a generalization of this finding, it is shown that countries that trade extensively with one another tend to exhibit a relatively high incidence of income convergence. An increase in the extent of trade by these countries is associated with even faster rates of convergence.

\(^{13}\) Studies showing various channels through which trade acts as a conduit for the dissemination of ideas include: Dollar, Wolff and Baumol (1988); Marin (1995); Coe and Helpman (1995); Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997); Eaton and Kortum (1996) and Keller (1999). Grossman and Helpman (1995) formalize this relationship and also provide a review of the related literature.

\(^{14}\) Total factor productivity is given by the output after discounting for the input of physical labour, physical capital, and human capital in the production process.
The trade-related convergence does not appear to have come at the expense of the wealthier countries. In fact, not only have the relatively poorer liberalizing countries been able to move to higher and steeper growth paths, so have their wealthier trade partners. When put in a long-run perspective, the post-war slowdowns were to growth rates that were nonetheless higher than the growth rates of the pre-war decades.

In summing up, the results shown in this paper suggest that international trade provides an important contribution toward the economic growth of nations—in particular, for those countries that are lagging behind their trade partners.

That said, it should be noted that the results of this paper in no way imply that trade policy is the most important policy from a long-run growth perspective. Other aspects of openness such as foreign investments were not examined here and there are several studies that report the contribution of these. More importantly perhaps, is the fact that data limitations precluded the analysis of poor countries here—and it is far from obvious (at least to this author) that the impact of trade liberalization found on incomes in the middle and high-income countries could also be found in the poorest countries in the world. In the case of the poorest countries, a range of constraints to economic growth and development must be addressed if openness to trade is to have an impact on income levels and growth.

In this regard, the contribution of several critical institutions in providing the overall environment so that openness to trade can contribute to growth is extremely important. Although trade can serve as a conduit for knowledge spillovers, the capacity of each country to absorb these trade-induced spillovers is different. If a country wishes to develop and compete, then exposure to technology must be accompanied by a serious investment in domestic education—as well as in infrastructure, telecommunication, preservation of property rights, and all of the other essential ingredients so important in enabling a country to grow in general, and to enjoy the fruits of openness to the rest of the world in particular.
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Figure 19: Post-war slowdowns in long-run context.
Trade and Poverty: Is There a Connection?
L Alan Winters

A. Introduction

The issue

Openness and trade liberalization are now seen almost universally as key components of the national policy cocktail required for economic growth and aggregate economic well-being. They are believed to have been central to the remarkable growth of industrial countries since the mid-20th century and to the examples of successful economic development since around 1970.

The continued existence of widespread and abject poverty, on the other hand, represents perhaps the greatest failure of the contemporary global economy and the greatest challenge it faces as we enter the 21st century. This essay asks whether the two phenomena are connected. Specifically it asks whether the process of trade liberalization or the maintenance of a liberal trade regime could have caused the poverty that so disfigures modern life, or whether, in fact, it has contributed to its alleviation.

Extreme poverty—living on, say, $1 a day per head—is basically restricted to the developing countries, and so I focus exclusively on them. I also focus largely on the effects of those countries' own trade policies—i.e. how their own openness or trade liberalization might affect their own poverty. In almost all circumstances countries are more affected by their own trade policies than by their partners', and, of course, it is the former over which they have most influence. As will become plain, however, most issues concerning partners' policies or shifts in world markets can be analyzed using the same tools as I discuss below for countries' own policies.

The approach

If trade liberalization and poverty were both easily measured, and if there were many historical instances in which liberalization could be identified as the main economic shock, it would be simple to derive simple empirical regularities linking the two. Unfortunately, none of these conditions is met, and so we are reduced to examining fragmentary evidence on small parts of the argument. The key to interpreting this evidence in terms of the effects of trade on poverty, as well as to designing policies to alleviate any ill effects, is to understand the channels through which such effects might operate. That is, in the absence of clear empirical regularities, we need to develop a theory of how trade shocks might translate into poverty impacts in order to consider how plausible such links look in the light of what we do know about the way economies function; to identify the places in which it would be sensible to seek empirical evidence; and to help us to fit the jigsaw puzzle of fragmentary evidence into a single overall picture.

It will be obvious from the previous paragraph that tracing the links between trade and poverty is going to be a detailed and frustrating task, for much of what one wishes to know is just unknown. It will also become obvious below that most of the links are very case-specific. Hence general answers of the sort "liberalization of type a will have poverty impacts of type b" are just not available—poverty impacts will depend crucially on specifics such as why people are poor to start with, whether the country is well-endowed with mineral wealth and what sort of infrastructure exists. Rather the essay will develop a way of thinking about the poverty effects of trade and trade reform, ending up with a series of questions which will help policy makers to predict the effects of specific reforms.

In the broadest possible terms, the essay concludes that trade liberalization is generally a strongly positive contributor to poverty alleviation—it allows people to exploit their productive potential, assists economic growth, curtails arbitrary policy interventions and helps to insulate against shocks. The essay recognizes, however, that most reforms will create some losers (some even in the long run) and that some reforms could exacerbate poverty temporarily. It argues, however, that in these circumstances policy should seek to alleviate the hardships caused rather than abandon reform altogether.

A yardstick for economic policy

The fact that trade reforms can create some losers means that one needs to be explicit about the criteria for judging policy shocks. If one's approach is to condemn any shock that causes even one individual to suffer a reduction in income, it is unnecessary to carry out any analysis. Given the differences of interest between people and the strongly redistributive nature of trade policy internally, virtually any policy will fail this test. Even the requirement that no household fall temporarily into poverty is likely to be extremely restrictive in poor countries. The more utilitarian view that the number of households (or persons) in poverty should not increase in any one year, or even one individual to suffer, is just not practical. It will be obvious from the previous paragraph that tracing the links between trade and poverty is going to be a detailed and frustrating task, for much of what one wishes to know is just unknown. It will also become obvious below that most of the links are very case-specific. Hence general answers of the sort "liberalization of type a will have poverty impacts of type b" are just not available—poverty impacts will depend crucially on specifics such as why people are poor to start with, whether the country is well-endowed with mineral wealth and what sort of infrastructure exists. Rather the essay will develop a way of thinking about the poverty effects of trade and trade reform, ending up with a series of questions which will help policy makers to predict the effects of specific reforms.

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I do not seek to define to the appropriate metric for judging policies here, but it is important to be aware in considering the arguments below that all judgements ultimately have to be quantitative, not just qualitative.

What is poverty?

An important aspect of any analysis of poverty is the definition and measurement of the phenomenon itself. While recognizing that there are many legitimate approaches to this, I implicitly adopt here an absolute consumption—or, where necessary, absolute income—metric. In choosing this definition, I am not denying the importance of other aspects based, for example, on human development or social exclusion. I believe, however, that the first step towards understanding the effects of international trade on poverty is to focus on the simplest, most directly-impacted and easily-observable dimension of the question. Besides, the different dimensions of poverty are at least fairly well correlated, so that conclusions about income-poverty will be a reasonable indicator of other aspects.

A second measurement issue is how to combine the individual poor into an index of poverty. The standard approach among poverty-scholars is to define a poverty line and then measure one of three statistics—see, for example, Ferriera and Litchfield (1999). The first is the number of households (or people in households) that fall below the line, possibly expressed as a proportion of population. This is known as the head-count index: it pays no attention to the extent to which people fall below the poverty-line, but essentially asks whether a policy pushes more people from below to above the line than vice versa. The second statistic sums the shortfall of actual incomes below the poverty line across all people or households below the line. It is concerned with the depth of poverty, but values an extra dollar of income equally whether it goes to someone far below the line or very close to it. The final measure sums the squares of the shortfalls and thus gives an individual greater weight in the final index the further they are below the poverty line.

Clearly selection of the poverty line is an important aspect of these measures. Again I do not want to enter this debate, but since I have defined the issue in terms of low one. The poverty line is not necessarily the same for all countries—each country will have its own views according to custom, expectation, etc. However, once we have to aggregate across countries—for example, to consider global effects or effects on subsets of developing countries—it becomes difficult to make the case for differences.

There are many reasons why people are poor, and even within broad groups there are huge differences in circumstances between individual households. Thus the effects of most shocks will differ across ‘the poor’, and a crucial part of any practical analysis must be to identify different interests within that group. A first step towards this is a poverty profile, including information on the consumption and production (including employment) activities of the poor. I do not labour the point about heterogeneity below, but in truth it is hard to over-estimate its importance. Implicitly nearly all the factors discussed will vary across the poor within a single country.

While poverty profiles are a necessary input into thinking about the links between trade and poverty, they should not lead us to believe that poverty is a static and unchanging state. There is, in fact, a fairly rapid turnover of families into and out of poverty, and the determinants of those transitions appear to be rather different from those turned up by studies of the static correlates of poverty—Baulch and McCulloch (1999). This is potentially an important insight for our purposes, for if trade affects the transition probabilities it could have significant effects on the stock of ‘poor’, while apparently having little to do with that stock directly. Understanding these transitions is also a crucial component in designing policy to mitigate any adverse trade or trade policy shocks. Unfortunately, this is not an issue on which I know of any research at present; doing such work depends on first completing the more prosaic static analysis of trade and poverty that is the concern of this essay.

The structure of this essay

I will explore the static effects of trade and trade policy on poverty via four broad groups of institutions: enterprises, distribution channels, government and households. These are schematically arranged in Figure 1, and each is presented in a separate section below. In addition, I will discuss both longer-term dynamics—economic growth—and shorter-term dynamics—vulnerability to shocks and adjustment stresses.

None of the economic analysis for the individual institutions is very complex, but in each case I shall demonstrate the possibility of both pro- and anti-poor influences. Thus when I come to put them together, it will hardly be surprising that there are no general conclusions about whether trade liberalization will increase or reduce poverty. I do, however, derive some results about the sort of circumstances under which the effects are likely to be benign and, with them, the makings of a view about how liberalization can be designed to foster poverty alleviation. Thus the essay concludes with sections on policy implications and on key questions to ask about any trade reform. One of the inevitable conclusions from a taxonomy such as this is that the impacts of trade on poverty will differ across countries. Thus great care is needed in generalizing from one country’s experience to another, and policy positions for one country will be quite unsuitable for another.

B. The individual and the household

A basic view of the household

It is simplest to start with what economists refer to as the “farm household”—see, for example, Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986). This is not to be taken literally as referring only to people who work the land or the seas, although the rural poor account for the majority of world poverty, but to any household which makes production as well as consumption and labour-supply decisions. By

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3 Baulch (1996) offers a useful account of different poverty measures.
focusing on households I am consciously setting aside gender and intergenerational issues, but I will return to these very shortly.

In this simplest case, we can think of household welfare as depending on income and the prices of all goods and services that the household faces. The former must be measured as so-called ‘full income’ comprising (a) the value of the household’s full complement of time—the maximum amount of time that could be spent working, perhaps 12 hours per person per day—valued at the prevailing wage rate, (b) transfers and other non-earned income such as remittances from family members outside the household, official transfers, goods and services in kind, and benefits from common resources, and (c) the profits from household production. This view defines all the variables that need to be assessed in order to calibrate the effects of an international trade policy shock on income or consumption poverty. Of course, the approach applies to all households and all shocks, but here I concentrate only on households for which poverty is an issue, (i.e. those in poverty before or after the shock, or for whom the probabilities of being in poverty are materially changed) and on shocks emanating from trade policy.

The effect of a single small price change on household welfare depends on whether the household is a net supplier or net demander of the good or service in question: a price rise for something you sell makes you better off. To be more precise, to a first order of approximation, the effect of a very small price change on household welfare is proportionate to its net supply position expressed at current prices as a proportion of total expenditure.

For finite price changes the household’s responses to the price change also influence the size of the welfare effect, but they will not reverse its sign. Thus, if the household has alternatives to purchasing a good whose price has risen, it can mitigate the cost of a price rise. Similarly, if it is able to switch towards an activity that has become more profitable, it can increase its gains beyond the first order amount.

Responsiveness is particularly important when one considers the vulnerability aspects of poverty. Policies which reduce households’ ability to adjust to or cope with negative shocks could have major implications for the translation of trade shocks into actual poverty. Moreover, fear of the consequences of not being able to cope with negative shocks might induce households to rule out activities that would raise their average income significantly but run greater risks of very low income. Responsiveness is also important because it spreads shocks from the market in which the price change occurred to others, whose prices might not have been affected by trade policy at all. All these factors are considered below.

Generalizing the household

The simplest view of the household just expounded is very useful for getting our thoughts in order, but it is not very realistic. Thus we should consider a number of potential generalizations before seeking to apply it in
practise. Not all will be feasible or relevant in every case, of course, but among the factors to be included are:

(a) Households can provide several forms of labour, so we need to consider their endowments of all these types of labour and the wages they command;

(b) By talking of the ‘prevailing wage rate’, I imply that there is one wage per class of labour and that it is exogenously given to the household. In particular, this implies that household members are indifferent between working on their own farm or outside it, and that the farm is indifferent between ‘home’ and ‘outside’ workers. It is as if the farm (or family business) supplies labour to the labour market and buys it back at the given wage. But this separability might not apply—for example, because there are different costs to monitoring family and non-family workers or because family workers incur transportation costs in reaching other employers. In these cases we need to separate ‘home farm’ and ‘off-farm’ activities, with the prices of the former varying according to the ‘demand’ for them (i.e. their productivity) and the supply of labour to carry them out once outside activities are allowed for.

(c) Once labour can undertake more than one activity, we need a way of allocating time across alternatives. If prices are exogenous the choice is easy—take the activity for which the wage is highest—whereas, if ‘home’ prices are endogenous, time is allocated to equalize returns across activities (including leisure). These three generalizations allow us to think about the well-documented phenomenon that poor households typically earn income in a large variety of different ways, and that the mix of these may change significantly with trade policy changes. Indeed, the ability to switch between activities is an important aspect of adjusting to potentially impoverishing shocks—see above.

(d) Some activities—and possibly some sales and purchases—may be quantity-constrained. Most obviously, some external jobs may only be available for a fixed number of hours per day—e.g. factory work or service activities such as transportation services. Particularly if trade policy flips some workers from positive to zero hours (or vice versa)—i.e. if policy moves individuals in or out of work—it could have highly significant poverty impacts. The loss of a job is probably the common proximate cause of households descending rapidly into poverty.

(e) Finally, the set of factors of production owned by a household and their associated returns needs to be generalized to include land and other assets. While avoiding issues of long-run dynamics at this stage we need to recognize that such assets generate incomes and thus affect poverty. The unequal distribution of land is an important contributory factor to poverty, and while addressing it is not strictly a matter of trade policy, it clearly affects the outcomes of trade liberalization if the latter affects the rate of return to land.

Genderizing the household

A key extension of the approach above is to recognize the importance of intra-household distribution. It is frequently argued that the costs of poverty fall disproportionately on women, children and the elderly. Two approaches seem possible: either to work on the household and add some analytics for intra-household distribution, or to define welfare changes for individuals and add some analytics to describe inter-personal transfers. The former is probably the more straightforward route, and the fact that the majority of data and the bulk of interventions refer to households rather than individuals suggests that policy makers and legislators see households as the fundamental unit.

The easiest approach is to assume that household activities for generating welfare can be treated quite independently of those for distributing it. The analysis above describes the former, and if the determinants of the distribution of welfare across individuals are not affected by trade policy, the welfare of each person in the household will vary in proportion to the whole in response to a trade policy shock. This would more or less remove gender and age from the analysis and would be very convenient.

Unfortunately, however, the separability just outlined is not plausible, so we need to delve more deeply into the structure of the system, linking up the generation and distribution of welfare. First, shares are likely to vary systematically with total welfare levels—e.g. Kanbur and Haddad (1995). Second, for such separability to be plausible we have to believe that transfers of goods and services within the household will be used to compensate individuals who, because of their (non-transferable) characteristics (especially their suitability for certain types of work), bear the brunt of adverse shocks. If subsistence requirements or culture preclude such transfers, the separate treatment of generation and distribution is no longer feasible and the effects of specific prices or factor shocks filter through to specific individuals.

The distinction made in many traditional societies between “male” and “female” crops or activities is an important link here. So too are the arguments that falling male wages and/or employment can reduce female welfare because females are obliged to increase their work outside the home, but receive little compensatory help with their traditional in-home activities. Clearly the same effects could arise if the outside price of female labour rose—e.g. because of improved export prospects for clothing. If pressure on female labour for cash crops reduces women’s input to the family food crops, nutritional standards could also suffer: fieldwork described in Oxfam—IDS (1999) discovered some evidence of these kinds of problems in Southern Province, Zambia, see Winters (2000a) for a brief account.4

4 Elson (1991) and Haddad, Hodinott and Alderman (1994) provide useful overviews of these non-separabilities and their consequences, while Fontana and Wood (1999) operationalize some of them numerically.
Unfortunately while the arguments of the previous paragraph seem very plausible, they are very case-specific. Gender and intergenerational issues must be taken seriously, and the consumption and incomes of individual household members may be important in assessing poverty. But no robust and general approach to predicting the effects or even to analyzing them has emerged to date. Thus other than noting that, along with the points in the previous subsection, the gender/intergenerational issues call for attention and flexibility in the application of the basic results, it is difficult to specify how to proceed.

Finally, of course, information on intra-household distribution is difficult to obtain. Since it is almost impossible to disaggregate consumption across household members, it is likely that the best approach to these issues will call on physical indicators e.g. health or nutritional status, and time allocation data.

C. Price changes and the transmission of shocks

The direct effects of a price change: the distribution sector

I start by considering a change in the tariff facing a single good. Figure 2, adapted from Winters (2000b), summarizes the way in which such shocks might work through to the variables determining household welfare in a target country. Schematically, for any household the figure comprises five columns of information. The elements concerning distribution lie in the middle of the figure where I trace the transmission of price shocks from world prices through to final consumers (in the rectangles), and briefly describe the factors influencing the extent to which shocks at one stage are passed through to the next.

Consider the transmission of price shocks in pure accounting terms. For an import, the world price of a good, the tariff it faces and the exchange rate combine to define the post-tariff border price. Once inside the country, the good faces domestic taxes, distribution from the port to major distribution centres, various regulations which may add costs or control its price and the possibility of compulsory procurement by the authorities. I refer loosely to the resulting price as the wholesale price.

From the distribution centre the good is sent out to more local distribution points, and potentially faces more taxes and regulations. In addition at this point, co-ops or other labour-managed enterprises may be involved. It is useful to distinguish these because their behaviour in the face of shocks could be significantly different from that of commercial firms. I term the resulting price the retail price, although of course market institutions may well not resemble retail outlets in the industrial economy sense. Finally, from the retail point, goods are distributed to households and individuals. Again co-operatives may be involved, plus, of course, inputs from the household itself. More significantly, the translation of price signals into economic welfare depends on the household’s characteristics—its endowments of time, skills, land, etc.—technology and random shocks such as weather. The last two are important conceptually, because anything that increases the household’s productive ability permits it to generate greater welfare at any given price vector.

Figure 2: Trade policy and poverty-causal connection
A corresponding taxonomy can be constructed for export goods, starting at the bottom of the column. An export good is produced, put into local marketing channels, aggregated into national supply of the good and finally sold abroad. At each stage the institutions involved incur costs and add mark-ups, all of which enter the final price. If the export price of the good is given by the prevailing price on world markets, all such additions come off the farm-gate price that determines household welfare.

In determining the effects of world price or trade policy shocks on poor households it is vital to have a clear picture of these transmission channels and the behaviour of the agents and institutions comprising them. For example, sole buyers of export crops (i.e. those to whom sellers have no alternative) will respond differently to price shocks than will producers’ marketing cooperatives. Regulations that fix market prices by fiat or by compensatory stock-piling can completely block the transmission of shocks to the household level.5

Even more important, all these various links must actually exist. If a trade liberalization itself—or, more likely, the changes in domestic marketing arrangements that accompany it—lead to the disappearance of market institutions, households can become completely isolated from the market and suffer substantial income losses. This is most obvious in the case of markets on which to sell cash crops, but can also afflict purchased inputs and credit. If official marketing boards provided credit for inputs and against future outputs, whereas post-liberalization private agents do not, no increase in output prices will benefit farmers unless alternative borrowing arrangements can be made.

The importance of transmission mechanisms is well illustrated by the contrasting experience of markets in Zambia and Zimbabwe during the 1990s—Box 1 (Oxfam—IDS, 1999). In Zambia, the government abolished the official purchasing monopsony for maize; the activity became dominated by two private firms which possibly colluded to keep prices low and which abandoned purchasing altogether in remote areas. Even if the latter was justified economically in the aggregate, it still left remote farmers with a huge problem. This was exacerbated by the difficulties of their re-entering subsistence agriculture, given that the necessary seed stocks and practical knowledge had declined strongly during the (subsidized) cash-crop period. In Zimbabwe, by contrast, three private buyers for cotton emerged after privatization, including one owned by the farmers. Here the abolition of the government monopsony resulted in increased competition and prices and farm incomes rose appreciably. In a less extreme example Glewwe and de Tray (1989) show how transport and storage costs attenuated price changes of potatoes following liberalization in Peru.

The discussion above prompts three comments. First, and blindingly obvious, is that the effects of liberalization depends on where you set off from. If an import ban plus government monopoly subsidizes remote farmers, the first round effects of liberalization will be to hurt those groups.6 A second important example of this, based on the analysis of section D below, comes from Hanson and Harrison (1999). They suggest that Mexico’s trade liberalization in the 1980s has not boosted the wages of unskilled workers as many had expected precisely because its initial pattern of protection was designed to protect that group. In short, the analysis of the poverty impact of trade liberalization can be no more general than is the pattern of trade restrictions across countries.

Second, usually many goods are liberalized at once, so that the effects on individual households will be the sums of many individual shocks. When some of the goods affected are inputs into the production of others, the net effect is quite complex and it is important to consider the balance of forces. For example, Zambian liberalization raised the selling price of maize in the 1990s, but even where purchasing arrangements continued, input prices rose by more as subsidized deliveries were abolished; as a result, maize farming generated lower returns and output fell. (Oxfam—IDS, 1999).

Indirect effects and the domain of trade

Third, we need to know how the household will accommodate the price changes. This will first condition our view of how serious the shock is: an adverse shock may entail large losses of welfare if no alternative goods or activities exist, or relatively small losses if they do. Similarly positive shocks may deliver great benefits if households can switch their purchases or activities to take advantage of them.

An additional aspect of accommodating a shock is that the act of substituting one good or activity for another necessarily transmits the shock to other markets which may not have been directly affected by a trade reform. Thus it sets off a whole series of second-round effects. A critical consideration in assessing these effects is the domain over which the ‘second-round’ goods or services are traded, because this defines the range of agents whose behaviour will be altered as these markets come back into equilibrium. The trading domains are summarized on the far right of Figure 2.

The border price of a good that is traded internationally will be largely if not entirely determined by the world price. Hence putting aside any changes in the various margins identified above, the prices of such goods will not change further as the market equilibrates to a shock. That is, there will be no ‘second-round’ price effects because, in effect, with a world market, all producers and consumers in the world will adjust their behaviour a tiny amount to absorb the changes in the target country.

For goods that are traded on a national market, but not internationally, the second-round quantity shocks will be spread over the whole of the national economy; this too will probably display sufficient elasticity to absorb

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5 Lest blocking price transmission seems automatically a good thing, remember that many shocks are positive and that official bodies have a tendency to take a cut out of the price in return for providing the ‘service’ of insulation.

6 Second round effects could, of course, be positive—see below.
The over-riding conclusion of the field research described in Oxfam—IDS (1999) and Winters (2000a) is the critical role of markets in determining the poverty impacts of trade and other liberalizations. Where conditions for the poor have improved this has usually been associated with the better performance of and access to markets. Where they have worsened, faulty markets are generally to blame and in the extreme cases, the problem is often missing markets.

We illustrate this with two cases deriving from trade and associated reforms over the early nineties in Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Cotton in Zimbabwe:

Despite the hesitant and partial nature of formal liberalization policies in Zimbabwe, there appeared to be a substantial improvement in market outcomes over the period 1991-97, including an increase in competition in the cotton market (Table 1). Before the reforms, the Cotton Marketing Board used its monopsony to impose low producer prices on farmers in order inter alia to subsidize the textile industry. In absolute terms, the impact will have been greater for larger farmers, simply because they produced more cotton. But ultimately it probably affected smaller farmers most severely because they lacked the large farms’ ability to diversify into other crops such as horticulture.

Following deregulation and privatization, there is now substantial competition between three buyers, one of which is owned by farmers themselves. Again, in absolute terms this must have benefited larger farmers more than small ones, but there have been particular gains for the smallholders. These have included the fact that the buyers have chosen to compete with each other not only on price (which has increased significantly), but also by providing extension and input services to smallholders. While the latter are obviously reflected in the prices that the farmers receive, their provision fills a gap that would otherwise exist in small farmers’ access to inputs (including, in this case, information). Hence, the changes have assisted small farmers both through an increase in price and by enabling them to produce more.

Maize in Zambia:

Such changes are precisely what the reforms in Zambia were intended to achieve. But here the result was very different. In the case of maize (Table 2), the better-favoured areas have seen no effective change in market conditions, while the less-favoured regions have witnessed a deterioration. Given that the status quo ante was relatively favourable for smallholders, especially in remote areas, it is easy to see why these changes failed to improve the conditions of poor maize farmers.

Under the old regime, remote farmers were subsidized by those close to the line of rail (through pan-territorial pricing) and small farmers by larger ones with storage facilities (through pan-seasonal pricing). In addition, the agricultural sector as a whole was subsidized by mining. All of these subsidies have now been removed. Remote farmers are unambiguously worse off, whilst larger ones and those close to the line of rail are probably also less well off, since the subsidies from mining probably exceeded the tax in favour of remote areas.

But the deterioration in the situation of remote farmers is substantially worse than would have arisen solely from the removal of pan-territorial pricing. For them, functioning markets have largely disappeared. The status quo ante was one of a sole parastatal buyer; the status quo is that often there is no buyer at all or, if there is, the terms of trade are so poor that transactions occur on a barter basis.

It is difficult to disentangle the relative importance of institutional and infrastructural factors in this market failure. There has been such a sharp deterioration in transport infrastructure that it is difficult for traders to reach areas that are more than a relatively short distance from a major route. It is an open question whether trading would be more active if infrastructure were better, or whether there are also institutional impediments. But in other areas, there are clear institutional constraints on top of the logistical ones.

It might reasonably have been supposed that farmers would react to the change in relative prices of maize inputs and outputs to shift production into crops that are less dependent on imports. This has happened, but only to a limited degree. In some

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**Table 1: Changes to markets: cotton in Zimbabwe**

**Before:**
- monopsony buyer (CMB) used low producer prices to subsidize inputs into textile industry;
- commercial farmers diversified into unregulated crops such as horticulture and tobacco; small farmers suffered;

**Now:**
- deregulation and privatization;
- competition between three buyers;
- some buyers offering input supply;
- prices have risen (in current terms).
them with rather small resulting price changes. While small, however, the price changes will be widespread and through this mechanism shocks could be spread from one region of the target country to another. If things are traded only locally—say, because of transportation difficulties or because they are services rather than goods—the trading domain is smaller still: the price adjustment will be larger than in the previous cases, but the impact more narrowly focused geographically.

Several authors—e.g. Timmer (1997), Delgado (1998) and Mellor and Gavian (1999)—argue that it is second-round effects that make agricultural liberalization and productivity growth are so effective at alleviating poverty. Their demand spill-overs are heavily concentrated on employment-intensive and localized activities in which the poor have a large stake—for example, construction, personal servants and simple manufactures. These authors’ work assumes that developing-country rural economies have excess labour and can deliver extra output by taking on more workers without price increases. This, in turn, means that the increase in income has multiplier effects so that total income in the locality rises by more than the initial impact on the fortunate farmers. The basic insight, however, also generalizes to our situation. As farmers spend their extra income the prices of local goods and services are driven up, increasing the incomes of those who produce them.

Whichever model applies—with fixed or flexible prices—the policy conclusion remains that liberalizing world trade in agricultural goods is likely to have strong pro-poor effects.

Positive shocks to the urban economy are also desirable, of course, but will usually result in more diffuse spill-overs—to a wider set of goods and more directly to imports. Imports still generate spill-over benefits—output in the export sector has to grow, because the imports have to be paid for. But if the factors used intensively in the export sector or in domestic sectors on which urban residents spend their income are not among the poorest, the spill-over from urban shocks will be less pro-poor. Of course, in the end the relative benefits of different second-round effects is a matter for detailed empirical investigation case by case.

Finally there are two sets of goods for which explicit prices are not observed, but which nonetheless are important for assessing poverty impacts. First, subsistence activities and goods: of course, by definition these are not subject to direct trade shocks, but they will still be affected by spillovers from goods that are. It is easiest to think of these spillovers in terms of the ways in which inputs of labour and outputs of subsistence goods are impacted by changes in tradable goods’ and services’ prices. Recall as an example, the spillovers to kitchen-

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Table 2: Changes to markets: maize in Zambia

**Before:**
- subsidized inputs;
- government/co-operative crop purchasing;
- pan-territorial, pan-seasonal pricing;
- growth of (imported) input-dependent production across the country.

**Now:**
- input prices have risen;
- markets for crops have shrunk (especially away from line of rail and major roads);
- limited availability of sustainable seeds;
- fall in area planted to maize and production;
- only partly offset by growth in more sustainable coarse grains because of consumer preference for maize;
- shift to cotton which is less profitable, but in which ‘better’ markets exist.

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7 See below for a discussion of whether such changes actually alleviate poverty.
garding discussed above under the gender dimension of adjustment.

The second set of goods for which we do not observe prices is those that are just not available. While conceptually simple to deal with in our schema—the price of a good is infinite when it is not available—changes in the set create complex measurement problems. They may be important, however, even for the poor, as Booth et al (1993) document in Tanzania. They may also be critical from a policy perspective, as, for example, when non-tariff measures or regulation exclude certain goods from the market. An interesting case-study is Gisselquist and Harun-ar-Rashid (1998) who discuss the restrictions on inputs into Bangladeshi agriculture and show how their relaxation greatly increased the availability of, for example, small tractors and water pumps to small farmers.

Not only are prices affected by spill-overs and the trading domain, but the distribution chain may also be. Agents’ and institutions’ willingness and ability to pass price changes through will be partly determined by the domain of the market they serve. In practice the information required to predict second round effects is very complex. In many cases, however, the shocks induced by trade policy changes will be sufficiently specific and/or small for us to ignore the second-round effects, and we can focus just on the direct impacts described in rectangles in Figure 2.

D. Enterprises: profits, wages and employment

Three elements of the enterprise sector

The left hand side of Figure 2—the ellipses—describes a completely different and equally important link from trade to poverty—that arising through its effects on enterprises. ‘Enterprises’ includes any unit that produces and sells output and employs labour from outside its own immediate household. Thus as well as registered firms proper, it includes some of the informal sector and larger farms that employ workers part-time or full-time. The important distinction is that outputs are sold and inputs acquired through market transactions. Hence the link in the figure to border, wholesale and retail prices.

The analysis of the enterprise sector requires three elements—demand, firms and factor markets. Demand for the output of home enterprises is determined by income (of which more later), and export, import and domestic prices. The trade prices are largely or wholly exogenous to the average developing country, but domestic prices are endogenous, even if market forces mean that they are actually constrained always to equal one of the others.9 As noted above, domestic prices will be determined by interactions at several levels, but here we subsume this all into one term, and some goods will be non-traded internationally and so have only domestic prices.

The demand for the domestic good must be matched by supply, which stems from the second element—firms. These divide their output between home and export markets according to relative prices, and determine total output according to those prices relative to costs. Costs, in turn, depend on factor prices (wages, returns etc) and factor input-output coefficients (i.e. the inputs necessary per unit of output), the latter of which depend on technology and again on relative factor prices. If there are increasing returns to scale, input-output coefficients also depend on total output. In accordance with the analysis of households above, factors and their returns need to be disaggregated by type, including caste, gender and skill.

Given total output and the input-output coefficients, total factor demand is given, and this is confronted with total factor supply in the factor markets—the third element. These are equilibrated by movements in factor prices, with the result that employment and wages—the two variables of most relevance to poverty—are determined. Implicit in this view is that the distribution of assets and skills across households is given and that household welfare depends only on factor rewards and employment opportunities. Increasing asset stocks is an issue of economic growth, and perhaps public expenditure (for education and health), both of which we treat below. Redistributing them between households is a separate issue quite independent of international trade policy. The distribution of the employment of factors across sectors, however, is not given. The movement of factors between sectors plays a crucial role in the poverty impact of trade shocks.

The remainder of this section considers two different approaches to enterprise effects—one assuming fixed economy-wide levels of employment for each factor of production so that shocks are reflected only in factor prices (a ‘trade theory’ approach), and one assuming infinitely variable levels of total labour employment at a given fixed wage (a ‘development theory’ approach). It observes that neither polar view is wholly correct and that a critical variable for enterprises in the real world is the degree of substitutability in demand between their output and that available via imports.

‘Trade theory’—inelastic factor supplies

Of course, all the processes described in the introduction to this section happen simultaneously, but the figure helps to explain some of the critical links. I start with traditional trade theory, in which total factor supplies are exogenously fixed, wages and returns are perfectly flexible and the domestic and foreign varieties of each good are identical.

Price changes, including those emanating from trade policy changes, affect the incentives for enterprises to produce particular goods and the technologies they use. The simplest and most elegant analysis of these incentives—the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (among the most powerful and elegant pieces of economic analysis

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8 Feenstra (1994) has pioneered methods of approaching this problem, particularly in the context of the availability of inputs into production.

9 If the domestic and imported varieties of a good are identical and there are no constraints on sales, domestic prices will equal import prices.
definitiveness are eroded. This erosion does not mean that the theorem has nothing to say—indeed, it is still a vital part of economists' tool-kits—but it does mean that it needs to be supplemented with further, usually case-specific, analysis to draw concrete conclusions.

The basic SS mechanism—derived from a formal model with two goods, two factors and two countries—is that as the price of the labour-intensive good rises, production of it increases, drawing factors of production away from the other, capital-intensive, sector. Since the labour intensive sector wishes to employ more labour per unit of capital than the capital intensive sector releases (by virtue of their factor intensities), this reallocation increases the demand for and the relative price of labour to capital. This change causes both industries to switch to less labour intensive production methods—i.e. to employ less labour per unit of capital—which, in turn, raises the marginal product of labour in both industries. If factors are paid their marginal products, labour receives a higher wage in terms of each good and so, a fortiori, has a higher real wage regardless of its consumption patterns. Similar reasoning shows why capital's real return falls.

The main assumptions in this chain of reasoning are described below, along with a brief indication of what happens when they are violated.

- **The functional distribution of income is not the same as the personal distribution of income**: the income of a given household is only indirectly linked to the returns to various factors of production. It depends on their ownership of the various factors, which is usually very difficult to ascertain empirically. Recently Lloyd (1998) has shown how to generalize SS to the personal distribution of income conditional on both households’ endowments and their consumption patterns.

- **Dimensionality**: The very powerful SS result holds only in a '2 x 2' model, with 2 factors and 2 goods. Once we move beyond this the results are much weaker. In an n x n model each factor has an 'enemy'—a good whose price increases definitely hurt the factor—but not necessarily a 'friend'. In non-square models, with different numbers of factors and goods, unambiguous results are even scarcer.

- **Mobility of labour**: independently of the number of different classes of labour distinguished, each is required to be perfectly mobile between all sectors and regions of the economy—i.e. there are perfect labour markets at the national level. If this is violated—i.e. labour markets are segmented—similar labourers in different markets must be treated as being different factors, and will fare differently from each other.

- **Diversified equilibrium**: to be sure of SS effects, the country must be producing all goods, both before and after the price change in question. If we distinguish many different goods at different levels of sophistication, this is unlikely. If countries do not produce all goods, the basic mechanism can break down and perverse results are possible—e.g. Davis (1996).

- **Differentiated goods**: SS is based on a model in which goods are homogeneous across foreign and domestic suppliers. Many argue that goods are better thought of as differentiated, in which case the critical issue is how closely domestic varieties are substitutable for the foreign varieties whose prices have changed. If the answer is 'rather little', the prices of domestic varieties will be only slightly affected by trade shocks but there will be little quantity response to the price increase for the imported variety, so the terms of trade losses from the price increase will be correspondingly unmitigated.

- **Constant returns to scale and smooth substitution between factors**: If industries are subject to economies of scale, their responses to price shocks will tend to be larger than a CRS approach suggests. Also, under such circumstances it is possible for all factors to gain or lose together, which weakens the inter-factor rivalry aspect of SS. Similarly, if technology is endogenous or if labour can be substituted for other factors only in discreet steps, there may be discontinuities in the way factor prices respond to shocks.

- **Perfectly competitive goods and factor markets**: these are required for the direct and simple transmission of goods price shocks into factor price effects. Once there are economic rents in the system, transmission becomes more complex and difficult to predict.

- **Non-traded goods**: if some goods are non-traded, their prices are no longer determined by world prices plus tariffs, but by the need to clear the domestic market. They will accommodate shocks through both price and quantity responses, rather than just the latter as for traded goods in a small country. This will tend to attenuate the rate at which tradable goods price shocks are translated into changes in the relative demands for different factors.
on any subject)—generates very powerful results indeed. It proves that, under particular conditions, an increase in the price of the good that is labour-intensive in production will increase the real wage and decrease the real returns to capital.\(^{10}\)

Unfortunately, for all its elegance, Stolper-Samuelson is not sufficient to answer questions of trade and poverty in the real world, and it must be supplemented by more heuristic but less specialized approaches—see Box 2 on ‘Why the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem can’t analyze poverty’. Its basic insight, however, applies under a very broad set of circumstances. An increase in the price of a good—exportable, importable or non-traded—will increase the incentive to produce it. This will raise the returns to factors of production specific to that good—e.g. labour with a specific skill, specialist capital equipment, brand image—and, assuming that some increase in output is feasible, will also generally affect the returns to non-specific, or mobile, factors. Typically, the returns to at least one such factor will increase and those to at least one other fall. Presuming that the poor have only their labour to sell, the focus for poverty studies is on wage rates—usually on unskilled labour and wages.

Broadly speaking, if the prices of unskilled-labour-intensive goods increase we would expect unskilled wages to increase. As these industries expand in response to their higher profitability, they absorb factors of production from other sectors. By definition, an unskilled-labour-intensive sector requires more unskilled labour per unit of other factors than do other sectors, and so this shift in the balance of production increases the net demand for unskilled labour and reduces it for other factors. If poor households depend largely on unskilled wage earners, poverty will be alleviated by the resulting wage increase (although, of course, head-count indices will vary only if the wage increase moves families from one side of the boundary to the other).

It is important to note that in the previous paragraph, the first-order effect is the total production effect, not any shift in factor proportions. It arises because the industry using relatively more unskilled labour increases its demand for all factors while other industries release all factors. It is the different compositions of these different sectors’ preferred bundles of factors that matters, not any shifts within them.\(^{11}\) A parallel analysis concerns technical progress. Increases in the general level of efficiency in an industry will reduce its price and/or increase its profitability. This will increase its level of output and thus generally increase demand for the factors that produce it.\(^{12}\) Factors specific to that sector will benefit, as will mobile factors that are used intensively in the sector. This effect could be offset if technical progress is heavily biased against one factor or another (the factor saved loses out), but if progress is concentrated on only a few sectors it is generally more important to know which sectors and to know their factor intensities, than to know the factor-bias of the technical progress. If, on the other hand, technical progress is uniform across sectors, the composition effects largely cancel out and factor bias is the key to predicting the factor demand effects of technical progress.

In world terms developing countries are clearly labour-abundant, so that freer trade (whether generated by their own or by industrial countries’ trade liberalization) gravitates towards raising their wages in general. However, within developing countries it is not clear that the least-skilled workers, and thus the most likely to be poor, are the most intensively used factor in the production of tradable goods. Thus while, for example, the wages of workers with completed primary education may increase with trade liberalization, those of illiterate workers may be left behind or even fall. One of the reasons that agricultural liberalization is such an important goal for future trade policy is that for this sector we can be reasonably confident that low-skilled workers in rural areas—the majority group among the poor—will benefit through the production responses.

It is sometimes suggested—at least implicitly—that the factor intensity approach to the distributional effects of trade policy is refuted by the failure of Latin American liberalization in the 1980s to alleviate poverty. Without denying the need for refinement in the argument, I believe that the alleged surprise arose more from faulty premises than from theoretical failure. Thus, as Wood (1997) argues, by the 1980s Latin America was not obviously the unskilled-labour abundant region of the world economy: both China’s ‘arrival’ in world markets and Latin America’s abundant natural resources suggest otherwise. Similarly the growth of outsourcing, for which Northern firms do not find it most efficient to seek the lowest-grade labour, suggests that Mexican exports are now intensive in labour that is relatively skilled by local standards—Feenstra and Hanson (1995). Finally, of course, it may take time for markets to clear. Thus while Chile’s liberalizations (trade and otherwise) were associated with worsening inequality over the 1980s inequality measures have now returned to pre-reform levels—and at vastly higher average income levels and lower poverty levels—World Bank (1997) and Ferierra and Litchfield (1999).

‘Development theory’—infinitely elastic factor supplies

One exception to the rule that an increase in the demand for a factor increases its wage (real return) is if the factor is available in perfectly elastic supply, i.e. if effectively any amount of the factor can be obtained at the prevailing wage. Then the wage (return) will be fixed exogenously—e.g. by what the factor can earn elsewhere, which is assumed to be unaffected by the trade policy shock that we are considering—and the adjustment will take place in terms of employment.

First, suppose that labour is the elastically supplied factor. Most generally this will be because the formal sector can draw effectively infinite amounts of labour out of the informal sector or subsistence agriculture at the subsistence wage. This is the famous ‘reserve army of labour’ model propounded by Nobel Laureate W Arthur

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\(^{10}\) The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is described in all international economics textbooks—see, for example, Winters (1991) or, in more detail, Bowen, Hollander and Viaenne (1998). A full account appears in Deardorff and Stern (1994).

\(^{11}\) In fact, if the wage for unskilled labour increases, all sectors will switch to slightly less unskilled-labour intensive techniques of production.

\(^{12}\) Only if demand is inelastic will the increase in demand fail to outweigh the savings in factors implicit in the greater efficiency.
Lewis (1954). Of course, if the formal wage is no more than the subsistence wage (as the model strictly implies), this transfer will have very little effect on poverty. Poverty will only be alleviated if the loss of labour in subsistence agriculture allows the workers remaining in that sector to increase their 'wage', either because the sector begins to run out of labour (the case of successful development) or because the workers had negative social product in that sector (e.g. overcrowding).

Another case where the supply of labour is effectively infinite is where the formal sector has an enforced minimum wage, at which lots of people are willing to work. In this case we can presume that as labour transfers to the formal sector it earns a higher wage and that, as a result, some poverty is alleviated. If trade liberalization raises the value of the marginal product of labour in the formal sector, e.g. by raising the price of an exportable output, it reduces the employment cost imposed by the minimum wage and alleviates poverty. If, on the other hand, trade reform reduces the value of the marginal product and thus reduces employment, it has adverse consequences.

One possibility that bears some thought is that trade reform could increase measured or perceived poverty even though it raises unskilled wages in the formal sector. In this case the workers who transfer to that sector experience a direct wage increase which almost certainly alleviates poverty. This is the situation in the Zambian Copperbelt where each mining job is reported to support 14 dependants (Oxfam—IDS, 1999) and in India, where the formal sector manufacturing wages are substantially above the poverty line (CUTS, 1999).

Consider two extreme assumptions. In Figure 1, I assume that the supply of labour to the formal sector is completely fixed. When the demand for labour shifts out from DD to D'D', employment cannot increase and the market must be brought back to equilibrium by an increase in wages from w0 to w1. If some of the workers in this market were poor or were part of poor families—the increase in wages has a direct and beneficial impact on poverty. This is the classic "Stolper-Samuelson" result that appeared to work so strongly in East Asia over the 1970s and 80s.

The second extreme is illustrated in Figure 2, where the supply of labour is perfectly elastic at the prevailing wage. Now an increase in labour demand is accommodated by increasing employment to L1, with no change in wages. The effect on poverty depends heavily on what the additional workers were doing before accepting these new jobs. If they were engaged in subsistence activities—agriculture, scavenging—and earning the equivalent of w0 initially, there is no change in their situation. Only if the switch into this labour market were so great as to significantly reduce labour supply to the subsistence sector and hence raise its "wage" for everyone would a poverty impact. This is no less than the case of successful development, through which whole economies are transformed over a period of decades. Trade liberalization is an important part of the process, but it is not the only one.

The alternative—and more common—case is that the wage in the formal sector exceeds the subsistence wage—possibly because it grants access to social services. In this case the workers who transfer to that sector experience a direct wage increase which almost certainly alleviates poverty. This is the situation in the Zambian Copperbelt where each mining job is reported to support 14 dependants (Oxfam—IDS, 1999) and in India, where the formal sector manufacturing wages are substantially above the poverty line (CUTS, 1999).

13 The expected wage is the actual wage multiplied by the probability of finding a job at that wage.

Box 3: Trade, poverty and the labour market—the simple analytic

The classic link between international trade and poverty in developing countries is via the labour market. If opening up to international trade allows a country to export more labour-intensive goods and replace local production of capital and skill-intensive goods by imports, it increases the demand for labour—typically in the formal sector. (Of course, if the country is not a labour-abundant one, or trade policy previously favoured labour very strongly, liberalization may not boost labour demand. If poverty is concentrated among people who are actually or potentially part of the labour market, increasing demand will help to alleviate poverty. But how, and whether, it does so depends significantly on how the labour market operates.

Consider two extreme assumptions. In Figure 1, I assume that the supply of labour to the formal sector is completely fixed. When the demand for labour shifts out from DD to D'D', employment cannot increase and the market must be brought back to equilibrium by an increase in wages from w0 to w1. If some of the workers in this market were poor or were part of poor families—the increase in wages has a direct and beneficial impact on poverty. This is the classic "Stolper-Samuelson" result that appeared to work so strongly in East Asia over the 1970s and 80s.

The second extreme is illustrated in Figure 2, where the supply of labour is perfectly elastic at the prevailing wage. Now an increase in labour demand is accommodated by increasing employment to L1, with no change in wages. The effect on poverty depends heavily on what the additional workers were doing before accepting these new jobs. If they were engaged in subsistence activities—agriculture, scavenging—and earning the equivalent of w0 initially, there is no change in their situation. Only if the switch into this labour market were so great as to significantly reduce labour supply to the subsistence sector and hence raise its "wage" for everyone would a poverty impact. This is no less than the case of successful development, through which whole economies are transformed over a period of decades. Trade liberalization is an important part of the process, but it is not the only one.

The alternative—and more common—case is that the wage in the formal sector exceeds the subsistence wage—possibly because it grants access to social services. In this case the workers who transfer to that sector experience a direct wage increase which almost certainly alleviates poverty. This is the situation in the Zambian Copperbelt where each mining job is reported to support 14 dependants (Oxfam—IDS, 1999) and in India, where the formal sector manufacturing wages are substantially above the poverty line (CUTS, 1999).
benefiting existing urban workers, who would receive a wage increase, and imposing no expected cost on migrants from the subsistence areas). However, if the urban poor are more readily measured or observed than the poor on rural subsistence farms, this could lead to the appearance of greater poverty.

In fact, neither of the polar extremes—of wholly fixed or wholly flexible labour supplies—is likely to be precisely true. Hence in practical assessments of the effects of trade shocks on poverty, determining the elasticity of labour supply and knowing why it is non-zero, is an important task.

A possible indicator of the relative importance of the sorts of effects just described comes from CUTS, (1999). Using the years 1987/8 to 1990/1 to reflect pre-liberalization performance and 1991/2 to 1994/5 post-liberalization performance, CUTS finds formal manufacturing sector employment in India growing faster after liberalization, and wages more slowly: employment at 3.8% and 9.4% and wages at 8.1% and 7.0% respectively. Similar results apply at the sectoral level. However, as Winters (2000a) observes, the success of the reserve army model in explaining the evolution of formal manufacturing in India is not really surprising: the sector accounts for only about 1.3% of the Indian workforce!

A much more perplexing aspect of the Indian reform of 1991 is that it appears to have been associated with a significant decline in employment in informal manufacturing, especially in labour intensive sectors. This decline outweighs the increase in formal employment and seems to have been concentrated in the rural areas. In Winters (2000a), I speculate that the most likely explanation—if, indeed, the data are to be believed—is that the real depreciation that accompanied liberalization (which will have raised the prices of traded relative to non-traded goods) switched output from non-tradables to tradables and that the former are disproportionate users of the informal sector. If true, this reminds us that poverty impacts must consider the fate of the non-tradables sector as well as that of tradables.

From a poverty perspective, of course, the important question is what happened to those who lost their informal jobs. If they could move back into subsistence or other agriculture at approximately the same wage, not much happened to them in poverty terms, and the observed increase in formal jobs seems to offer a net gain. If, on the other hand, the loss of an informal job signals a descent (deeper) into poverty, the net effects of these changes is negative for poverty alleviation. Unfortunately, we just do not know the answers to these questions, although other data in CUTS (1999) shows that wages in the informal sector are quite often below poverty levels. Formal sector wages, on the other hand, seem to be uniformly substantially above poverty levels.

Capital might also be available in infinite supply—e.g. say, from multinationals at the world rate of return. In this case the inflow of capital into the liberalized sector is likely to boost wages and/or employment, which will increase the welfare benefits and, if they exist, the poverty alleviation benefits, of a trade liberalization. It is important to remember, however, that if capital inflows make for larger effects when sectors gain from liberalization, they are equally likely to increase them in sectors that lose.

The latter is not to say, however, that capital mobility causes otherwise avoidable losses from trade liberalization. When capital has been attracted into a country by distortionary policies—e.g. tariff protection and tax holidays—the inflow could have been immiserizing. Then, while the outflow resulting from the reform of these policies will impinge directly on workers in the affected sector, the overall welfare effects taking account of spill-overs to other sectors will be positive—and larger than if there had been no immiserising investment to undo. If the distorted sector was particularly crucial in addressing poverty, however, it might be that such liberalization worsens poverty, at least in the short-run until the affected workers have found alternative jobs and/or the government has diverted some of the gains elsewhere in the economy into poverty alleviation policies in the stricken sectors.

Of course, if our target country does not face exogenously given prices for every good, developments in the enterprise sector will affect the prices faced by consumers and hence feed back into column 2 of Figure 2. For tradable goods this is probably not a major consideration because few developing countries have significant market power over the medium and long terms, but for non-tradables it will be important. Given weak infrastructure and trading institutions, many goods and services are effectively non-traded in the developing world; their prices will be determined by the need to equate local supply and demand and by the influence on supply of endogenous changes in factor prices.

**Differentiated products**

An important distinction in the analysis of the enterprise sector is whether or not goods are homogeneous across foreign and domestic suppliers. Homogeneous goods must have the same prices, and so international trade defines the prices of both traded and domestic varieties. Trade prices essentially determine internal producer and consumer prices and analysis is straightforward. The alternative view is that goods are differentiated, so that each variety faces its own separate downward-sloping demand curve, with links between goods depending on the degree of substitutability between varieties. In this case the transmission of trade policy shocks to domestic prices is less direct, usually affecting more goods but by less than in the homogeneous goods case. This typically also attenuates the shock to factor prices, because, as more goods are affected, the net shifts in the relative demands for different factors are less extreme. (The more goods involved, the more likely are changes in factor demand to be offsetting.) The degree of substitutability between domestic varieties and those traded varieties that are affected by the trade reform becomes a critical parameter in this view of the world—see Falvey (1999): the higher it is, the more the shock is focused on the related domestic varieties.

As I noted at the end of the preceding section, a trade reform will sometimes be sufficiently straightforward that it will not be necessary to trace all the connections
E. Taxes and spending

The right hand set of boxes in Figure 2—the trapezoids—illustrates the third of the major static links between trade and poverty: via taxes and government spending. The common presumption is that falling revenues can squeeze social expenditures and hurt the poor, but, in fact, this is far from inevitable.

For most countries, the early stages of trade liberalizations in the 1980-90s entailed converting quantitative restrictions and regulations into tariffs and reducing high tariff rates. Particularly when the latter was accompanied by a reduction in the scope of tariff exceptions and exemptions it was as likely to increase tariff revenue, as to reduce it—Pritchett and Sethi (1991) and Hood (1998). Thus in this first stage, concerns over revenues can be overstated, although, of course, the effective increase in taxation implied by reducing exemptions could raise prices. If these increases in prices impinge heavily on the poor, they could worsen poverty even if they increase economic welfare overall—particularly if the government is not efficient in spending the revenue it collects. On the whole, however, given that exemptions are mainly granted to the rich and influential, it is unlikely that their loss is anti-poor.

Eventually, however, trade liberalization will reduce tariff rates so far that government revenue falls. This triggers the more common worry that the government, finding its revenue constrained, will curtail expenditure on social and other poverty alleviating policies and/or levy new taxes on staple and other goods consumed heavily by the poor. Given the association between structural adjustment, stabilization, liberalization and poverty over the 1980s, these worries have some historical basis, but it would be mistaken to assume that the association is immutable. It is clear, however, that governments must display care and maintain a clear focus if they are to ensure that this indirect route does not have adverse effects on poverty. Experience in East Asia over the late 1990s suggests that pro-poor expenditure can be at least partially protected even in the face of far larger shocks than a trade reform.

A further question under this heading is whether trade liberalization restricts a government’s ability to manage spending and taxation in a way that impacts poverty. To start again at the less obvious end of the question, a trade liberalization bound at the WTO makes the price-reducing effects of tariff cuts less reversible: it constrains the government’s (and its successors’) ability to manipulate policy in arbitrary ways. Given that such manipulation very often redistributes real income from the poor to the rich, and that uncertainty reduces the incentives to invest, the constraints are likely to be beneficial. Put more positively, WTO may allow governments to tie their own, or their successors’, hands in ways that would otherwise be politically impossible.

Much more common is the fear that bindings and/or commitments at the WTO prevent governments from pursuing pro-poor interventions. For example, if price variability is a problem it has been argued that the ban on variable levies, which stabilize the domestic prices of internationally traded goods, could hurt the poor by subjecting them to greater uncertainty. It is sometimes argued that the Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies precludes production subsidies that could stimulate output and development—see, for example, the positions of India and Korea during the negotiations—Croome (1995, p201). Moreover, consumption subsidies—a more promising anti-poverty tool—were not affected by the Round. There is a slight danger that the Agreement on Agriculture could undermine food subsidy schemes. This occurs if countries’ nominal subsidy requirements have increased above low base year levels of support, and if direct consumption subsidies can not be substituted for the production-based subsidies that the Agreement constrains. But again, few developing countries face such problems.

All these arguments are essentially specific examples of the analysis above: they are trade interventions whose direct effects can be traced via the distribution and enterprise sectors. In addition, however, they have systemic effects because they affect whole classes of policies. For example, even if some particular subsidies would be advantageous, given the difficulty of identifying these cases and preventing their capture by interest groups, a blanket ban may be advantageous. Alternatively if governments have established good reputations for using trade policy contingently to stabilize the real incomes of the poor, blanket bans may raise perceived uncertainty in sectors that have not, to date, been subject to intervention. Clearly making such determinations in practice is going to be very complex, and all one can do is plead that they be made on the basis of the evidence on, rather than the theoretical potential of, government performance.

Finally, some have argued—e.g. Rodrik (1997)—that increased openness reduces governments’ abilities to raise revenue because mobile factors can no longer be taxed so readily. If so, social and redistributive expenditure could be under threat. In its direct form this argument applies only to factors that can move locations in response to taxation (or other) incentives, so international trade policy is only indirectly relevant. For example, the general reduction in trade barriers since the mid-1980s has made it easier to ‘cut up the value chain’, which presumably fosters capital mobility.

On the trade side, increasing world competition makes it more costly for an individual country to tax exports in terms of both eroding the tax base and distorting production patterns. However, it is not clear that individual countries have ever had much scope for such taxes in manufactures, which is where trade barriers have come down most strongly in recent decades. An example where a country’s own policy rather than world conditions (others’ policies) matter would be if reducing

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14 The Agreement does restrict production subsidies in principle but for developing countries the disciplines are relatively weak. A trading partner would have to demonstrate actual harm before acting against them, which seems very unlikely for the sort of subsidies that might help to alleviate poverty.
tariffs on a good made it more difficult to tax local producers because they could more plausibly threaten to move off-shore and supply the market from abroad. In this case overall efficiency considerations would still mandate the tariff cut. However, if, for some reason, consumption of the good could not be taxed instead of production (and remember that the tariff cut will have reduced consumer prices, so there will be space for the former) there is a danger of governments losing revenue. Of course, as I noted above, falling revenue does not inevitably lead to declining poverty-alleviation.

An inability to tax capital is clearly a problem for governments intent on redistributive policies, and it clearly reduces the set of available options. It should not, however, be taken as precluding all possibilities. First, most countries collected only a small proportion of their revenues from capital taxation even when their economies were very closed. Second, in fact, many governments subsidize inward investment rather than fret about not being able to tax it. Third, there are other redistributive policies which are not vulnerable to this difficulty. For example, for tackling poverty, Bowles (1999) lists land reform, re-assigning property rights implicit in use of the commons, public-brokered risk sharing, greater accountability in the provision of public services, and removing or reducing discrimination. None of these is easy, but they certainly show that taxing capital is not the only route to helping the poor.

F. Shocks, risks and vulnerability

The static analysis that I have presented so far compares two perfectly stable scenarios, but, in reality, the real world is full of shocks. Thus we should ideally try to deal more directly with the effects of trade liberalization on the chances of falling into poverty (or of emerging from it) in an uncertain world. We need also to recognize that economic actors’ responses to these probabilities may, in turn, feed back onto the static effects just discussed.

The simplest analysis of risk supposes that both foreign and domestic economies are subject to independent random shocks. By increasing foreign exposure, trade liberalization increases the weight of foreign relative to domestic shocks in the determination of domestic welfare.\(^\text{15}\) The simple notion of risk spreading suggests that at low levels of trade, further trade liberalization would tend to reduce overall risk because it is very unlikely that both international and domestic conditions would both be very good or both be very bad together—i.e. they would tend to off-set each other. However, if foreign shocks are much greater than domestic ones, risk could increase, and if foreign and domestic shocks were strongly positively correlated, the off-setting will be rather weak.

The most obvious application of the independent risks approach is if farmers produce a crop which a trade liberalization transforms from a non-tradable into a tradable good. Postponing for now any consideration of price stabilization policies, this change seems most likely to reduce overall variability since in addition to the risk spreading argument, most world markets are more stable than local ones because they already aggregate a lot of off-setting shocks. Another possibility, however, is that liberalization leads farmers to switch from crop x (subsistence food, say) to crop y (cash crop). Their overall risk then switches from that for x to that for y, and thus could obviously increase. However, if this switch is made knowingly and has no spill-over effects beyond the farmers who make the decision, it is not obviously welfare worsening, for even if the risk increases, the returns might do so too. Thus, just as with the rural-urban migration example above, higher expected welfare might be associated with increasing observed poverty if farmers accept higher risk in order to reap higher returns but periodically suffer the bad luck that that entails.

Of course, the switch from subsistence to cash crops may not be made knowingly (governments do not always convey information on risk accurately) and there may be important spill-overs. Oxfam—IDS (1999) report how, in rural Zambia, switches to maize as a cash crop apparently eliminated the knowledge and seed supplies required for subsistence varieties, preventing farmers from reverting to traditional methods when the cash crop market disappeared. Additionally, switches between crops may have serious implications for intra-household income distributions. If, for example, adult males receive the returns from cash crops but females and children bear the risks of failure in terms of nutrition or schooling, the decision to switch could worsen female and child poverty, and may even not be welfare enhancing for the household overall. The important point analytically, however, is that not every ex post descent into poverty is the result of an ex ante flawed trade liberalization.

An alternative lens on the previous paragraph is the observation that the inability to bear the risks entailed in producing cash crops can explain the unwillingness to pursue higher average returns created by trade and hence may explain some apparently disappointing supply responses to trade reforms. If they face catastrophe if things go badly, the poor may not be able to afford to be entrepreneurial—Morduch (1994). The policy implication of this is to call for serious consideration of whether the inability to bear risk reflects distortions in, for example, asset ownership or in capital markets. Creating a guaranteed minimum level of real income through policies such as standing public employment schemes could increase the supply responses and income benefits of trade liberalization significantly—see section I below.

One fear is that, because trade liberalization (especially in the context of a WTO Round) alters the set of feasible policies, it affects the ability of governments to operate price stabilization policies. Thus, for example, if prior to liberalization domestic food prices were stabilized by varying the restrictiveness of trade policy (e.g. variable levies, or by allowing imports only in periods of shortage), moving to a fixed tariff could increase domestic instability.\(^\text{15}\) Foreign shocks are, of course, transmitted through the links discussed above. As above, they will pass through different amounts of the risk onto the poor according to the specifics of the case—e.g. much if a sector makes heavy use of casual labour, little if price shocks are mostly absorbed by an official purchaser of export crops. Thus sectors with apparently similar distributions of international shocks can have very different implications for the probability distribution of shocks facing the poor.
Thus, for example, the Uruguay Round constraints on variable levies or on export subsidies could increase instability, and hence poverty, in certain economies even if they raise average incomes. It is not clear how important this possibility is, however: I know of no documented cases that it has actually occurred.\footnote{And would be pleased to hear if such cases exist.}

Turning briefly to country-level data, there is a presumption that more open economies suffer more heavily from terms of trade shocks, e.g. Rodrik (1998) and that this, in turn, slows their development or worsens their welfare. The first part of this question has at least two elements. First, if openness encourages specialization one would expect the net barter terms of trade (the ratio of import to export prices) to become more volatile with openness. In fact, this appears not to happen—see Lutz and Singer (1994), and also Easterly and Kraay (1999), who find that very small countries have no worse volatility than larger ones. Second, a given volatility in the terms of trade implies a greater volatility in national income the more open the economy, and we expect openness to increase with trade liberalization (and also as country size falls). This second element does receive empirical support—Rodrik (1998) and Easterly and Kraay (1999).

An important related question is whether more open and liberal economies generate larger or smaller domestic shocks; this could go either way. Krueger (1990b) argues that openness encourages better policy positions in general. Rodrik (1998), on the other hand, suggests that more open economies have greater volatility in total income, which suggests that the terms of trade element dominates the local shocks elements. However, income volatility does not necessarily imply greater consumption volatility, for open economies may be better able to smooth consumption (and investment and government spending) by importing. Thus, overall, trade liberalization has somewhat ambiguous implications for macroeconomic stability.

The connection between trade liberalization and risk and vulnerability is clearly very important and yet is very poorly researched. One can certainly find examples in which adverse shocks have led to some people falling into poverty that they may have plausibly avoided in the absence of reform, but such observations alone do not constitute a case against liberalization. As well as the trade-offs between individuals that we noted above in the static results, we need to consider the trade-offs for any individual over time and between states of nature. It would be perfectly rational to voluntarily increase the ex ante risk of poverty in return for a sufficiently higher average income.

G. Economic growth, development and technology

Economic growth is the key to permanent poverty alleviation. It is also strongly related to contemporaneous reductions in poverty—see, for example, Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1996) or Roemer and Gugerty (1997). Unless growth seriously worsens income distribution the proportion of the population living in absolute poverty will fall as average incomes increase. The balance of the evidence seems to be that although growth can be associated with growing inequality (or economic decline with narrowing inequality), the effects on poverty tend to be dominated by the advantageous direct effects of growth—see, for example, Demery and Squire (1996) on Africa. This effect also appears to generalize to the very poor (below $1 per day)—Ravallion and Chen (1996) or Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1996), although, at such very low levels of income, small shocks loom large, and Demery and Squire (1996) find hints of contrary evidence in Africa. In recent work, Dollar and Kraay (2000) have found that the incomes of the poorest fifth of the population grew one-for-one with GDP per head in a sample of 80 countries over four decades. This was as true of growth induced by openness to trade as of that due to other stimuli. Possibly lying behind these results, but possibly independent of them, is that it is generally easier for the government to raise the resources for poverty alleviating policies if incomes are higher and/or growing.

Overall, therefore, if there is any truth in the claims that openness enhances growth, we might reasonably expect it to have beneficial effects on poverty through that route alone. Certainly we should require very strong case-specific information that a particular trade liberalization seriously worsened income distribution before adopting the contrary view. On the other hand, it is well to note that ‘neutral’ growth has to be strong if it is to stabilize the absolute number of poor in an expanding society. Each year output growth has to keep pace with population growth and then to add some more to pull the incremental numbers of poor out of poverty. Thus relying on growth and the growth effects of trade liberalization is probably not sufficient to address poverty problems over the medium term. Conscious policy is also required.

What about trade liberalization and growth? Controversy rages. There is evidence that, even allowing for adjustment strains, liberalization typically boosts growth in the relatively near term—e.g. Operations Evaluation Department (1992), Greenaway et al (1998). Whether this reflects just a one-off improvement in efficiency or long-run increase in the latter’s rate of growth is not clear, however. The former is still worth something, but it is the latter that really matters.

There is widespread belief that openness, fairly broadly defined, stimulates growth. Frankel and Romer (1999) is among the most recent and most convincing of studies advancing this view, although some of the other more commonly cited studies—e.g. Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998)—have received pretty rough treatment recently from Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999). Moreover, from the perspective of this paper it is important to note that these latter studies include open trade (the result of trade liberalization) as only one of several indicators of openness and one which generally seems to weigh rather lightly in the overall result—e.g. Harrison (1996).

In part, I believe, the weakness of the empirical link between liberal trade and growth reflects the great
difficulties of measuring trade stances once one comes inside the boundary of near autarchy: for example, tariffs need to be aggregated, quantitative restrictions assessed and then aggregated, and the degree of credibility level of enforcement measured—see Winters (2000c). Overall, the fairest assessment of the evidence is that, despite the clear plausibility of such a link, open trade alone has not yet been unambiguously and universally linked to subsequent economic growth. It has certainly not, however, been identified as a hindrance. Moreover, trade liberalization has a positive role as part of a package of measures promoting greater use of the market, more stable and less arbitrary policy intervention, stronger competition and macro economic stability. With the exception of the last, an open trade regime is probably essential to the long-run achievement of these stances, and it probably helps with the last as well (Krueger 1990b). Thus, taken as a whole, trade liberalization is a major contributory factor in economic development.

Any link from openness to growth probably operates at least partly by enhancing technical progress: for example, by making new inputs, new technologies, or new management techniques available to local producers. Such flows could arise from trade—either imports or exports—or from direct flows of technology from abroad.

The evidence that access to imports enhances performance is quite strong—Esfahani (1991) and Feenstra et al (1997)—while that which postulates a link from exporting to technology is, surprisingly to some, weaker. While macro studies and case-studies have suggested links, detailed and formal work based on enterprise data is doubtful: Bigsten et al (1999) find links for Africa, while Kraay (1997) is ambiguous for China and Tybout and Westbrook (1995) find nothing for Latin America. Similarly it is quite difficult to prove that FDI boosts efficiency e.g. Haddad and Harrison (1993). In both cases the problem is one of causation: efficiency and exporting are linked because efficient firms export, FDI and efficiency because investors choose efficient firms and sectors. While there is undoubtedly a connection between openness and the dynamism of an economy, it is more complex than economists sometimes choose to believe. Openness probably needs several concomitant policies or conditions before it will generate growth.

Of course technological flows need not depend just on trade or commercial transfers of know-how; they may arise autonomously or through direct interventions in research and development in favour of developing countries. An example of the latter is the green revolution, which produced and disseminated high-yield varieties of grain to many parts of the developing world. While most commentators hold the green revolution to have been a significant step forward in poverty alleviation, the mechanisms identified are quite complex. For example, non-farmers have sometimes been major beneficiaries via increased demand for purchased inputs where local industries existed to satisfy the demand for consumption goods and equipment—Moseley (1999)—or where demand for local services increased—Mellor and Gavian (1999). Both are examples of significant intermarket spill-overs. Alternatively, income has been transferred from farmers to net buyers of food through policies that forced agricultural output to be domestically absorbed rather than exported—see Quizon andBinswanger (1986) on India.

A very sensitive issue in the area of openness and technology is intellectual property—TRIPs. The Uruguay Round TRIPs agreement certainly results in developing countries having to pay more for using certain technologies, and in those cases will both reduce income and curtail the use of the technologies. On the other hand, the increased rewards may stimulate the flow of technology to developing countries, although, to date, firm evidence to that effect is lacking. The commercialization of intellectual property may also bias it away from meeting the needs of the poor, since collectively they represent such a small market. Thus coterminous with the creation of intellectual property rights, serious attention should be paid to the older publicly funded sources of technology, and to ensuring that IPRs do not shut off routes for the cost-effective development of crop technologies and health products for the poor. The critical examples of this are, perhaps, South Africa’s difficulties in acquiring anti-AIDS cocktails at reasonable cost and the failure of pharmaceutical companies to work seriously on malaria.

It seems impossible at present to make convincing generalizations about how technology and trade liberalization might interact in their effects on poverty. However, I would re-iterate the argument in section D that the sectoral composition and factor intensities of the affected sectors will be major factors in determining those effects, not whether in any particular industry, the technology is labour-using or labour-saving.

Growth does not appear explicitly in the analytical scheme of Figure 2, but it should not be forgotten on that account. Growth will affect relative prices as well as the incomes generated by the enterprise sector both in terms of average wages and rates of return and the number of people working in that sector. By generating greater demand, growth will assist governments to raise revenue. To the extent that growth is based on technological improvements it will affect the incomes generated by the enterprise sector as well as increase the output that farm households can generate at any given price level.

H. Short-term adjustment

Adjustment costs

Trade liberalization is generally held to have long-run benefits, but it more or less requires adjustment in a country’s output bundle to achieve them. If adjustment is costly, liberalization could lead to periods of decline and/or poverty before things get better.

For assessments of the overall economic benefits of liberalization, the distinction between the social and private costs of adjustment is critical. The former are net losses to society, through, for example, higher unemployment. The latter are private costs that are counterparts to private gains elsewhere—for example, the loss of jobs that existed only by virtue of subsidy or distortion. For the purposes of poverty impact analysis, however, the distinction is less significant. Our question is just whether individuals or households slip temporarily
into poverty as an economy adjusts to open trade, and what can be done to prevent this and help them if they do.

The most significant adjustment problem lies in factor markets, especially employment, and so I concentrate on that. There are two separate questions: how long do spells of unemployment/underemployment last and who suffers. (It is the nature of adjustment or transition costs that they are temporary. Permanent losses are strictly the business of previous sections, although, of course, in practice it requires great confidence in one’s analytical and empirical tools to claim to be able to separate permanent from temporary job loss ex ante.)

How long does unemployment last?

The key to answering this question lies in the speed of labour turnover and the flexibility of the labour market. Unfortunately, there is apparently very little research directly on labour turnover in developing countries—Matusz and Tarr (1998). The latter suggest that, in industrial countries (where liberalization more frequently entails the contraction of a sector, not its demise), it is surprisingly rapid in many circumstances. If so, unemployment of displaced workers will be relatively short-lived. In some cases workers displaced from low-paid jobs not only found new jobs quickly, but at higher wages—Jacobson (1978). In developing countries such benign effects are also a realistic possibility, although the evidence is based on aggregate employment data rather than surveys of workers. For example, Mauritius has successfully combined a limited trade liberalization (in an Export Processing Zone) with poverty reduction—see, for example, Milner and Wright (1998), who identify increasing unskilled and female wages as exports boomed. Panama is another case: a strong liberalization of trade in 1996/7 and of domestic regulations in previous years led to a decrease in unemployment (16.2 to 13.2 in one year) and to reduced poverty as informal sector wages rose and poor workers entered formal employment. Harrison and Revenga (1998) find manufacturing employment increasing almost immediately after half the liberalization’s they study; the other half are mostly transitional economies in which much more than trade liberalization was happening and in which the general reorientation created a very unfavourable environment for trade-displaced workers.

Life is not necessarily so rosy, however, even in “regular” (i.e. non-transition) liberalizations. Workers may suffer long-lived and deep losses of income if they have previously enjoyed very high levels of protection or if they had built up strong firm-specific human capital. For example, Jacobson et al (1993a,b) find that the US workers laid off after long job tenure earned 25% below their pre-dismissal wages after five years. Rama and Maclusaac (1999) find that employees displaced from the Ecuadorian Central Bank in 1994 had regained on average only 55% of their pre-dismissed salaries after 15 months despite generally low unemployment levels. Mills and Sahn (1995) found that of Guinean public sector workers laid off over 1985-88, half of those who found new jobs increased their earnings. However, their average unemployment duration exceeded two years and fully 30% of them were still unemployed by 1992.

Where major reform is undertaken, it is frequently argued that things must get worse before they get better. Fiscal retrenchment is necessary immediately and the ‘old ways of doing things’ comprehensively dismantled in order to lend credence to the claim that new ways will emerge. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that transitional unemployment occurs, and the key factor in its duration will be the institutional structures for new activity to grow. The latter include such things as the freedom to establish new firms, the ability to obtain service by utility companies, the security of property rights and the existence of credit markets. They do not include policies to delay change by protecting employment and existing employers except, possibly, in the very short run. Such delays undermine the credibility of reform and hinder the development of new activities, as, for example, we saw in Poland over 1990-91 (Winters and Wang, 1994) and India over the early nineties (CUTS, 1999).

The conclusion is, yet again, that it is difficult to generalize about how deep and how durable transition losses will be. One needs to know about the specific circumstances of the affected sectors. It does seem likely, however, that costs will be greater the more protected the sector originally was and the greater the shock. In particular, labour markets suffering very large shocks can become dysfunctional because even normal turnover ceases as incumbents dare not resign for fear of not finding a new job. Thus major reforms—e.g. transition—or concentrated reforms—e.g. closing the only plant in a town—do seem more likely to generate transitional losses through unemployment than more diffuse reforms. On the other hand, it is precisely the sectors with highest protection or the economies with most widespread distortion that offer the greatest long-run returns to reform.

Transitional unemployment and poverty

Transitional unemployment (or declining rewards for skills) is unfortunate for anyone who suffers it, but it does not necessarily lead to poverty. Individuals who have lived beyond the reach of poverty for some time will generally have assets, or access to credit, with which to smooth consumption. Thus for such individuals it is only longer shocks that fall within the remit of this paper. The poor, on the other hand, will have very few assets, and so will be unable to smooth over even short spells of unemployment. Hence, even switching from one unskilled informal sector job to another could cause severe hardship, especially if temporary stress led to permanent or semi-permanent consequences, such as losing one’s place in the queue for rented housing or education services. This suggests that attention to transitional unemployment should mainly be focused on those who were poor or near-poor initially. This is not always the case in practice, for typically the middle class will be more articulate and more influential politically than the poor.

I. Trade and poverty: the policy implications

This paper is primarily about the positive economics of trade policy and poverty (i.e. the facts, as we can best infer them), but ultimately these are of interest mainly because they inform the normative question of ‘what
should we do’. I conclude, therefore, with a brief discussion of some of the policy issues involved.

The discussion above suggests that trade liberalization can have both positive and negative effects on poverty. If poverty alleviation is a major goal of national policy, it is important to think how international trade policy can be harnessed to assist it. This section briefly considers some possible policy responses starting with trade policy and moving through to a broad set of what I call complementary policies. It does not deal with the trade-off between poverty and other goals, but it starts by reiterating that even within the poverty arena trade-offs exist.

Judging policy

If one is to enter the debate, one needs a yardstick against which to judge policy. If that is to condemn any shock that causes even one individual suffer a reduction in income, it is unnecessary to carry out any analysis. Given the heterogeneity of households and that trade policy is strongly redistributive between people in the domestic economy, all policies will fail this test. Even the requirement that no household fall temporarily into poverty is likely to be too restrictive to permit any action in poor countries. The more utilitarian view that the number of households (or persons) in poverty should be reduced is more appropriate. Even this, however, needs to be mediated by attention to the depth of poverty and to the different ways in which different dimensions of poverty respond to shocks.

In practical circumstances, it is also important to recall that it is easier to identify losers from trade policy than potential gainers. The losers from reform are identifiable, concrete and personified—Krueger (1990a)—whereas the gains are diffuse and appear merely prospective and theoretical. Only in a proportion of cases can one confidently identify the sectors that will gain (e.g. when large export taxes are removed), and even then, although one might identify capital or resource owners who stand to benefit, it is almost impossible ex ante to name the workers who will fill the new jobs and/or benefit from pay rises. Couple this with a natural tendency to place greater weight on (and hence to be more vocal about) declines in welfare than on equal increases, and it is easy to see how attitudes towards liberalization policy are biased towards antipathy. Moreover it is usually the case that the poor are much less able to articulate their concerns than the middle and elite classes.

None of this should be construed as saying that all criticism of trade liberalization is misguided and biased, but it is a warning that the volume of opinion is not a sufficient indicator of the true merits of a policy change. It also re-emphasizes the importance of political leadership in explaining the relative merits of different policies, even difficult and subtle ones like trade liberalization.

Trade policy

Consider, first, how trade reform itself might be managed from a poverty perspective. One response to the fear that a trade liberalization will cause poverty is “don’t do it”, but this is not satisfactory. While it has proved hard to isolate the effects of liberal trade on economic growth empirically, there is widespread agreement that it has an important role to play. It not only brings advantages directly but it is also important in the constellation of policies designed to ensure efficiency and competition in markets, and transparency and predictability in policy-making. Thus in the long run liberal trade assists poverty alleviation and should figure in the poverty-conscious government’s armory.

Another response is “don’t do it all: while everyone is in favour liberalization in general, certain sectors or products should be exempt”. In fact, all countries have such exceptions—e.g. agriculture in Europe, clothing in the United States—but that does not necessarily make them good economics. There undoubtedly are cases where an isolated intervention in trade would be beneficial to immediate economic welfare and/or to poverty alleviation. However, given the difficulties of identifying these cases, of preventing their capture by interest groups and of avoiding the systemic signal that lobbying for intervention pays, it is unlikely to be beneficial overall to try to pursue them. Thus while one does not need to progress all the way to free-trade to reap the benefits of liberalism, the case for planning a series of exceptions is not strong. One needs very strong evidence of the efficacy of such interventions, and this is, on the whole, missing. Simply appealing to the experience of East Asia is not persuasive. It is not beyond dispute that their trade interventions were important or beneficial (Lee, 1995, suggests the very opposite for Korea), and it is far from certain that other countries have the policymaking institutions to be able to replicate East Asian policy stances effectively.

A third response is “don’t do it now”. This is a more useful response in some circumstances. For example, trade reform in the midst of recession seems likely to suffer more, and more durable, transitional unemployment than reform in a boom; where investment is necessary to allow the production of export-quality goods, time may be desirable to permit it to occur. There is, however, a world of difference between committing to policies with long adjustment periods and postponing liberalization because ‘the time is not ripe’. The key is credibility that reform will actually occur. Adjustment costs may be lower if adjustment can be spread somewhat through time, but they are probably enlarged if adjustment is resisted in the hope that the threat of liberalization will go away. It is notable that some trade reforms have been accelerated once they have been launched—e.g. implementation of free trade in the EEC, of the Kennedy Round tariff cuts, and of the tariff cuts planned in the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement—usually at the behest of the private sector. This presumably reflects the fact that, once it is accepted that reform will occur, business is keen to adjust rapidly.

Thus sequencing a major trade liberalization is probably desirable—just as, say, the Uruguay Round permitted long adjustment periods. This should not merely entail postponing the largest adjustments longest, however, but should pay attention to the different adjustment needs of different sectors and to the interactions between different parts of the package. For example, if the inputs and outputs of a particular sector
are liberalized at very different rates, the sector could face either negative incentives for production during the transition (if tariffs on the output fall faster than those on inputs) or excessively positive ones. Whatever the transition period, credible commitment to the final goal is important, for without it neither current nor potential production activities will look desirable and there will be a diversion of effort into lobbying.

Specific compensatory policies

If trade liberalization causes poverty among certain sections of society, a natural response is to ask whether society can not offset the effect directly. Despite their theoretical attractions for economists, governments are not generally attracted to simple budgetary transfers because of their cost, their transparency (and the transparency of their abuse) and the appearance that they do little to cure ‘the problem’ that the individuals face. Rather assistance is usually offered, if at all, in terms such as retraining, relocation assistance, and temporary income support. In fact, while they probably do have a contribution to make, even these approaches face severe difficulties. Official retraining has mixed success under any circumstances; worse, there are problems in separating those cases where trade is to blame from those where it is not. Thus unless one is willing to undertake almost any adjustment, identification of cases is a major difficulty.

Making a general commitment to compensate individuals for adverse shocks is most unattractive, however. It has potentially huge cost and it shifts private risk to the public sector, with all the attendant problems of people taking on extra risk precisely because they keep any gains while the government gets the losses. It is not the role of the state, nor is it feasible, to absorb every negative shock that might afflict individuals. On the other hand it is difficult to make a moral case as to why trade shocks warrant adjustment assistance while other do not.

A further complication is giving compensation in a way that encourages rather than discourages adjustment. European agricultural policy is essentially designed to protect farmers from the consequences of their declining competitiveness in food production, and yet it has the effect of rewarding current not ex-farmers. Compensation is no longer so strongly related to farmers’ current output, but because it is paid only to those who keep their farms it has the effect of supporting farming as an activity.

In cases where trade liberalization leads to the loss of jobs, government can insist on, and perhaps help to finance, redundancy payments. These can help some people to avoid poverty, but is not guaranteed to do so as shown by the so-called ‘new poor’ in Zimbabwe who failed to use their money productively and ended up among the poor (Oxfam—IDS, 1999). Moreover, redundancy payments typically reward past service not current need and so are not particularly well targeted for poverty purposes.

General compensatory policies

These policies—often referred to as safety nets—are designed to alleviate poverty from any source directly. They replace the problem of identifying the shock with one of identifying the poor. Ideally, countries should already have such programmes in place. Indeed, a major part of their effect arises from their mere existence rather than their use: they facilitate adjustment by assuring the poor that there is a minimum (albeit barely acceptable) below which they will not be allowed to fall. If trade-adjusting countries do already have these schemes, they have the advantages over tailor-made schemes of automaticity, immediacy and a degree of ‘road-testing’. Sensibly constructed, safety-nets need not entail huge expenditure: there is rather little chance of people using them by choice if the thresholds are set low enough; and, since relieving poverty is more or less universally recognized as a responsibility of the state, there is little argument about the legitimacy of such interventions.

Targeting is a major problem for safety nets, for the middle classes are often better able to access them than are the poor. Moreover, a major trade shock could put severe financial pressure on them. However, Ravallion (1999) offers some useful thoughts on setting them up. Workfare is a good start, provided that the wage is low enough, that there is little or no administrative discretion in its application, and that the tasks set are seen to be of communal interest. In fact, Ravallion suggests that local communities select the projects to be undertaken under workfare and that the richer ones should also be asked to co-finance them. Workfare needs supplementing, however, by schemes to provide food to people such as the elderly and infirm who cannot work, and for children —e.g. food-for-education schemes. These supplementary schemes may be tripped on and off according to need, but should have a permanent infrastructure and sensitive and quick triggers. Expenditure on safety nets is almost by definition counter-cyclical, and so it will need firm commitment by government to ensure that the money does not dry up in times of greatest need.

Safety nets can not be the only response to the threat of increasing poverty from trade liberalization, but, they are an important part of it. They can generally be better targeted than other polices and they are not very distortionary of market forces. If countries do not have them already, they should consider setting them up as part of the context for a trade reform that may create short-term poverty. They should not, however, be trade-shock-specific.

Complementary policies

Complementary policies are those which it would be useful to have in place or to implement simultaneously with a trade liberalization. They are not directly compensatory, but are rather designed to ease the adjustment strains and help households avoid poverty by allowing them a greater degree of economic viability.

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17 See Decker and Conson (1995) on the USA’s Trade Adjustment Assistance Program. This doubles unemployment insurance cover from 26 to 52 weeks for workers certified as displaced by trade liberalization. After serious abuse in its early years when it was merely a transfer—over 70% of claimants went back to work for the employer from whom they were said to have been displaced—a training element was added. This had the effect of screening out claimants who did not want/need training, but apparently did nothing to increase the earning power of recipients.
Strictly, these policies include very general prescriptions for addressing poverty, such as the distribution of productive assets, adequate education and health provision, and the encouragement of civil society and participation and voice among the poor. However, I restrict this brief discussion to those that refer rather specifically to reaping the benefits and avoiding the costs of trade liberalization.

The critical issue in the poverty impacts of trade liberalization, especially for surprises therein, is the functioning of markets. A trade liberalization needs to be preceded by thought about whether any markets are likely to fail and accompanied by monitoring of the same. Policies designed to ensure that markets continue to function or develop where required seem likely to have high pay-off for both aggregate income and for poverty alleviation. Among the important factors identified by Winters (2000a) are:

**Infrastructural support**

Potential opportunities for poor producers to benefit from a more open trading regime have been lost because critical infrastructure was either absent or had deteriorated. In both Zimbabwe and Zambia remote farmers have found their opportunities constrained by an inability to reach major market centres. In the same way, many of the benefits of relaxed retailing regulations and the availability of new and/or cheaper goods have been confined to urban and peri-urban areas.

**Market institutions**

Just as important are failures in market institutions. The poor frequently seem unable to attain the economic mass required for the establishment of markets that once established may be viable. Policy should aim at the creation of the market as an institution, not the ongoing subsidization of market activity. Part of facilitating the poor’s participation in markets may be finding means to allow them to combine very small consignments of inputs or outputs into reasonably sized bundles. This is not the poor combining to achieve a measure of market power, which is not usually realistic, but of reducing transactions cost sufficiently to make it worth dealing with them. Box 4 cites two examples of market support from Oxfam—IDS’s African field-work.

**Missing credit markets**

Development economics has many examples of missing credit markets preventing development, and the same phenomenon is visible in responses to trade liberalization. Thus, for example, achieving minimum consignment size might entail hiring draught power or seasonal labour, but this is not possible without credit. Similarly, establishing informal businesses in activities such as trading may require more capital than the poor can raise. These cases in which poverty constrains the responses to incentives replicate the results of Lopez, Nash and Stanton (1995) in their panel study of Mexican agriculture. I have nothing to add by way of solutions, but note the issue as one of considerable importance.

**Establishing business**

If trade liberalization opens up business opportunities in new areas, new businesses are likely to be required. If the regulations for establishing these are restrictive, and their ability to get inputs (especially utilities) weak, these opportunities will go begging. Similarly regulations on expansion and on labour recruitment and separation could curtail the willingness of existing firms to expand. The reservation of particular sectors for small firms in India

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**Box 4: Creating markets in Africa**

The IDS—Oxfam fieldwork in Africa turned up several examples of external assistance in creating apparently viable markets of use to the poor. For example:

### Horticulture in Zimbabwe

Whilst horticulture is relatively underdeveloped in most of the smallholder areas, an increasing number of resettled and communal households are now becoming involved as producers of the main crops. This has primarily been the result of ‘Outgrower’ schemes and the sourcing or subcontracting by the large-scale commercial farms. The Horticultural Promotion Council (HPC) estimates that around 3,000 smallholders are now growing for export on a contract basis, accounting for approximately 10% of Zimbabwe’s exports. (These small-scale ‘outgrowers’ tend to supply the four main pack-houses in Zimbabwe, which are the large-scale producers looking for added volume and to diversify risk). The HPC established the Smallscale Linkage Programme in January 1999, designed to provide communal and resettled farmers with the knowledge and skills to produce high-value, out-of-season export crops. Quality is a critical issue. Study of the Mbare fruit market demonstrated that communal and resettled farmers sold limited amounts of produce to Harare Produce Ltd., and the remaining (deemed ‘sub-standard’) to the local market.

### Craft products

Women interviewed in the Sese communal area, involved in the production of pottery, were being linked to European markets through the Craft Enterprise Programme executed by the Rural Unity for Development Organization. The programme covers more than 165 households. In addition to servicing the export market, the women were trading in the domestic market to tourist resorts and along the major roads. They noted significant growth in the export sales of pottery, which enter duty free in the European and US markets. An added incentive for sales to these markets, is that the buyers meet the cost of transportation. Annual income for these women was very low, even by subsistence standards, but it is still a useful supplement to their households.

*Source: Oxfam—IDS (1999)*
Domestic trade deregulation has created many new opportunities for small-scale agro-processing, particularly within the maize sub-sector. For example, in Zimbabwe 3,500 new hammer mills have opened up since liberalization, mainly in the rural areas, and the share of hammer millers in total maize milling has increased to almost 80% (The USAID-funded 1995-96 Zimbabwe National Hammer Miller Status Study). These mills are mechanically simple and robust (being based on swinging or rotating hammers in a grinding chamber), and can be used by unskilled labour. They provide quality maize meal products to nearby customers in the poor communities in areas such as Mashonaland Central, Manicaland, Masvingo, and Matebeleland North and South, saving them significant transport costs.

The hammer mills have provided a new source of livelihood in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe hammer mills were estimated to employ 7,512 permanent workers; including casual workers, the sector employs a total of 10,000 workers; and if hammer mills in commercial farming areas are included, this takes the total to 12-13,000 workers. About 18% of employees in urban hammer mills are female and 8% in rural areas (ibid.).

Indeed, large-scale millers in Zimbabwe are now believed to have a combined market share of only 20-25% of maize meal trade. According to The Herald newspaper (6/6/97), one large-scale commercial miller is reported to have closed six of its nine milling plants around the country, in response to the intensified competition provided by the new small-scale millers. Whilst poor producers have benefited from this opportunity, so too have poor consumers.

### Key questions for policy makers

- **Will spillovers be concentrated on areas/activities of relevance to the poor?**

  Sectors of an economy are interlinked and, if substitutability is high, a shock will be readily transmitted from one to another. Frequently the diffusion will be so broad that it has little effect on any particular locality or sector, but sometimes—e.g. where services are traded only very locally—the transmission is narrow but deep. Then it is necessary to ask whether the second round effects have serious poverty implications. Agricultural stimuli can confer strong pro-poor benefits on local economies via benign spillovers.

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18 In particular, in the absence of a clear and monitorable plan for specific pieces of infrastructure, a general wish to wait until the roads or ports are ‘ready’ is just a recipe for indefinite postponement.
What factors are used intensively in the most affected sectors? What is their elasticity of supply, and why?

Changes in the prices of goods affect wages according to factor intensities. Predicting either the price effects or the factor intensities of affected sectors can be complex, as was seen with the Latin American reforms of the 1980s and 90s. In addition, if factor supplies show some elasticity, part of a trade shock will show up as changes in employment rather than in factor prices. In the limit, a perfectly elastically supplied factor will experience only employment effects. This is most pertinent for labour markets. If the prevailing wage is determined by subsistence levels, switching people from one activity to another has no perceptible effect on poverty. If, on the other hand, the trade-affected sector pays higher wages (because, say, it has an institutionally enforced minimum wage), increases in activity will tend to reduce poverty and declines increase it. The formal/informal divide is important in this respect.

In all this, it is important to remember the difference between the functional and the personal distribution of income. Falling unskilled wages generate poverty only to the extent that the poor depend disproportionately on such wages.

Will the reform actually affect government revenue strongly?

One’s immediate reaction is that cutting tariffs will reduce government revenue. While in the limit this clearly true—zero tariffs entail zero revenue—many trade reforms actually have small or even positive revenue effects, especially if they convert NTBs into tariffs, remove exemptions and get tariff rates down to levels that significantly reduce smuggling. Even where revenue falls, it is not inevitable that expenditure on the poor will decline. That, ultimately, is a policy decision.

Will reform lead to discontinuous switches in activities? If so, will the new activities be riskier than the old ones?

If a trade liberalization allows people to combine ‘national’ and ‘international’ activities, it is most likely to reduce risk: foreign markets are likely to be less variable than domestic ones and even if they are not, risk spreading is likely to reduce overall risk. If, however, trade reform leads to more or less complete changes in activities, there is a possibility that risk increases as the new activity is riskier than the old one.

Does the reform depend upon or affect the ability of poor people to take risks?

The very poor can not bear risk easily. Because the consequences of even small negative shocks are so serious for the poor, they may be unwilling to take opportunities that increase their average income if they also increase the chance of losses. This might leave them with only the negative elements of a reform package. Similarly, if a reform makes it more difficult for the poor to continue their traditional risk-coping strategies, it may increase their vulnerability to poverty even if it increases mean incomes.

If the reform is broad and systemic, will any growth it stimulates be particularly unequalizing?

Economic growth is the key to sustained poverty reduction. Only if it is very unequalizing, will it increase absolute poverty.

Will the reform imply major shocks for particular localities?

Large shocks can create qualitatively different responses from smaller ones—for example, markets can seize up or disappear altogether. Thus if a reform implies very large shocks for particular localities mitigation in terms of phasing or, better, compensatory-complementary policy, could be called for. There is a trade-off, however, for typically larger shocks will reflect bigger shortfalls between current and potential performance and hence larger long-run gains from reform.

Will transitional unemployment be concentrated on the poor?

The non-poor will typically have assets that carry them through periods of adjustment. This might be unfortunate for them, but it is not poverty strictly defined. The poor, on the other hand, have few assets, so even relatively short periods of transition could induce descent deep into poverty. If the transition impinges on the poor there is a strong case for using some of the long-run benefits of a reform to ease their adjustment strains.
References


