CHILE – PRICE BAND SYSTEM AND SAFEGUARD MEASURES RELATING TO CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

Report of the Panel

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. FACTUAL ASPECTS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. CHILE’S PRICE BAND SYSTEM</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Regulatory framework</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Workings of the PBS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. CHILE’S SAFEGUARD MEASURES</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Regulatory Framework</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Provisional and definitive safeguard measures</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Extension of the safeguard measures</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PARTIES’ REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. ARGUMENTS RELATING TO CHILE’S PRICE BAND SYSTEM</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Procedural arguments</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Burden of proof</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Substantive arguments</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Infringement of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Whether the application of the PBS has led to customs duties higher than bound tariffs</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Can the PBS as such lead to customs duties higher than bound tariffs</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Article XIX as an exception to Article II of the GATT 1994</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Violation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Whether the PBS is a measure prohibited under Article 4.2 and should have been tariffed</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Whether the PBS is a variable levy or a similar border measure</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Distinction between variable levy or similar border measure and ordinary customs duty</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Relation between Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Other issues of interpretation relating to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance of the Chile-Mercosur Economic Complementarity Agreement No. 35</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior knowledge, negotiating history and subsequent practice</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat’s advice</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. ARGUMENTS RELATING TO CHILE’S SAFEGUARD MEASURES</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Procedural arguments</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Terms of reference</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Measures which are no longer in force</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(ii) The decision on extension was not the subject of consultations between the parties .......... 48
(iii) Withdrawal of some of the extension measures.............................................................. 51
(b) Burden of proof.................................................................................................................... 52
2. Substantive arguments ............................................................................................................. 53
(a) Compliance with the notification and prior consultation requirements.......................... 53
(b) Unforeseen developments .................................................................................................. 56
(c) Appropriate investigation ................................................................................................. 58
(d) Whether Chile failed to publish a report setting forth reasoned conclusions and findings.......................................................... 59
(e) Like product......................................................................................................................... 63
(f) Increase of imports ............................................................................................................. 66
(i) Edible vegetable oils .......................................................................................................... 68
Initiation of the investigation ................................................................................................. 68
Provisional safeguards .......................................................................................................... 69
Definitive safeguards ............................................................................................................ 70
Extension of the measures .................................................................................................... 70
(ii) Wheat flour......................................................................................................................... 71
Initiation of the investigation ................................................................................................. 71
Provisional safeguards .......................................................................................................... 72
Definitive safeguards ............................................................................................................ 72
Extension of the measures .................................................................................................... 72
(iii) Wheat................................................................................................................................. 73
Initiation of the investigation ................................................................................................. 73
Provisional safeguards .......................................................................................................... 73
Definitive safeguards ............................................................................................................ 73
Extension of the measures .................................................................................................... 74
(g) Evaluation of all relevant factors ........................................................................................ 75
Edible vegetable oils ............................................................................................................. 77
Wheat flour .............................................................................................................................. 79
Wheat ........................................................................................................................................... 79
(h) Threat of injury .................................................................................................................. 80
(i) Causal link .......................................................................................................................... 83
(j) Whether Chile's safeguard measure was not limited to the extent necessary to remedy injury and to facilitate adjustment ................................................................................. 86
(k) Provisional measures ......................................................................................................... 88
V. ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES............................................................................. 90
A. BRAZIL .................................................................................................................................. 90
B. COLOMBIA .......................................................................................................................... 93
VI. INTERIM REVIEW ........................................................................................................................................ 110
VII. FINDINGS .................................................................................................................................................. 120
A. THE CHILEAN PRICE BAND SYSTEM ........................................................................................................... 120
1. Requested findings .......................................................................................................................................... 120
2. Amendment to Article 12 of Law 18.525 in the course of the panel proceedings ................................. 120
3. Order of the Panel's analysis ........................................................................................................................ 122
4. The Chilean PBS and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture ....................................................... 124
   (a) Is the Chilean PBS a measure of the kind which has been required to be converted
       into ordinary customs duties? .................................................................................................................. 124
   (i) Is the Chilean PBS a border measure similar to those listed in footnote 1? ................................. 125
       "Border measure" ........................................................................................................................................... 126
       "Similar to" a "variable import levy" or a "minimum import price" ......................................................... 126
       Determination of the meaning of "similar to a variable import levy or a minimum import
       price" ....................................................................................................................................................... 126
       Application of the Panel's interpretation of "similar to a variable import levy or a
       minimum import price" to the Chilean PBS ......................................................................................... 131
       "Other than ordinary customs duties" ........................................................................................................ 135
       Determination of the meaning of "ordinary customs duties" ................................................................. 135
       Application of the Panel's interpretation of "other than ordinary customs duties" to the
       Chilean PBS ................................................................................................................................................ 139
       Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 141
   (ii) Is the Chilean PBS "maintained under balance-of-payment provisions or under other
       general, non-agriculture specific provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other
       Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement"? ........................................... 141
   (b) Other tools of interpretation .................................................................................................................... 143
      (i) "state practice" ......................................................................................................................................... 143
      (ii) Article 24 of Economic Complementarity Agreement No. 35 ("ECA 35") between
           Chile and MERCOSUR ................................................................................................................... 145
      (iii) Negotiating history of Article 4.2 ......................................................................................................... 146
   (c) Conclusion regarding Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture .................................................... 149
5. The Chilean PBS and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 ................................................................................. 149
B. THE CHILEAN SAFEGUARD MEASURES ON WHEAT, WHEAT FLOUR AND EDIBLE
   VEGETABLE OILS ........................................................................................................................................ 150
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The measures at issue</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Preliminary issues</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) The provisional safeguard measures</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The definitive safeguard measures and the extension of their period of application</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Withdrawal of safeguard measures while the panel proceedings were ongoing</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Published report (Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Documents examined by the Panel to assess Chile's compliance with its obligations under Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Unforeseen developments (Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Definition of like or directly competitive product (Articles XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 4.1(a) and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Increase in imports (Articles XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Threat of serious injury and evaluation of all relevant factors (Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Causal link (Articles 2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Measures necessary to remedy injury and facilitate adjustment (Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 3.1 and 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Appropriate investigation (Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Findings and reasoned conclusions (Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Provisional measures (Article XIX:2 of GATT 1994 and Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Notification and consultation (Article XIX:2 of GATT 1994 and Article 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Extension of the definitive safeguard measures (Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards)</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 On 5 October 2000, Argentina requested consultations with Chile pursuant to Article XXIII:1 of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1994 (the "GATT 1994") and Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU") – insofar as it is an elaboration of Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 – as well as Article 14 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture. This request was related to the Chilean Price Band System (hereafter "the Chilean PBS") and the imposition by the Chilean authorities of provisional and definitive safeguard measures on imports of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils.\(^1\)

1.2 The consultations took place on 21 November 2000, but the parties failed to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. On 19 January 2001, Argentina requested the Dispute Settlement Body (the "DSB") to establish a panel, pursuant to Article XXIII of the GATT 1994, Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU, Article 19 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 14 of the Agreement on Safeguards, in order to examine the Chilean PBS, its provisional and definitive safeguard measures on imports of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils, and the extension of those measures.\(^2\)

1.3 At its meeting on 12 March 2001, the DSB established a panel in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU. At that meeting, the parties agreed that the Panel should have standard terms of reference. The terms of reference of the panel were, therefore, the following:

"To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by Argentina in document WT/DS207/2, the matter referred to the DSB by Argentina in that document, and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements."\(^3\)

1.4 On 7 May 2001, Argentina requested the Director-General to determine the composition of the panel, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU. This paragraph provides:

"If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the establishment of a panel, at the request of either party, the Director-General, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee, shall determine the composition of the panel by appointing the panelists whom the Director-General considers most appropriate in accordance with any relevant special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or covered agreements which are at issue in the dispute, after consulting with the parties to the dispute. The Chairman of the DSB shall inform the Members of the composition of the panel thus formed no later than 10 days after the date the Chairman receives such a request."

1.5 On 17 May 2001, the Director-General accordingly composed the Panel as follows:

Chairman: Mr. Hardeep Puri

Members: Mr. Ho-Young Ahn
         Mr. Michael Gifford

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1 WT/DS207/1.
2 WT/DS207/2.
3 WT/DS207/3.
1.6 Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the European Communities, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Nicaragua, Paraguay, the United States and Venezuela reserved their rights to participate in the panel proceedings as third parties.


1.8 The Panel submitted its interim report to the parties on 21 February 2002. On 28 February 2002, Chile submitted comments and requested the revision and clarification of certain aspects of the interim report. Chile also requested the Panel to hold a further meeting with the parties, pursuant to Article 15 of the DSU and paragraph 16 of the Panel's Working Procedures. On 28 February 2002, Argentina submitted general comments to the interim report. An Interim Review meeting was held with the parties on 14 March 2002. The Panel gave the parties the opportunity to submit further comments the following day. The Panel submitted its final report to the parties on 4 April 2002.

II. FACTUAL ASPECTS

2.1 The dispute concerns two distinctive matters: (A) Chile's Price Band System ("PBS") and (B) Chile's provisional and definitive safeguards measures on imports of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils, as well as the extension of those measures.

A. CHILE'S PRICE BAND SYSTEM

1. Regulatory framework

2.2 Chile's regulations on its PBS are contained in Law 18.525 on the Rules on the Importation of Goods\(^4\), as amended. In particular, Article 12 of Law 18.525 provides for the methodology for the calculation of the price bands. This Article reads as follows:\(^5\)

"For the sole purpose of ensuring a reasonable margin of fluctuation of domestic wheat, oil-seeds, edible vegetable oils and sugar prices in relation to the international prices for such products, specific duties are hereby established in United States dollars per tariff unit, or \textit{ad valorem} duties, or both, and rebates on the amounts payable as \textit{ad valorem} duties established in the Customs Tariff, which could affect the importation of such goods.

The amount of these duties and rebates, established in accordance with the procedure laid down in this Article, shall be determined annually by the President of the Republic, in terms which, applied to the price levels attained by the products in question on the international markets, make it possible to maintain a minimum cost and a maximum import cost for the said products during the internal marketing season for the domestic production.

For the determination of the costs mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the monthly average international prices recorded in the most relevant markets during an immediately preceding period of five calendar years for wheat, oil-seed and edible vegetable oils and ten calendar years for sugar shall be taken into consideration. These averages shall be adjusted by the percentage variation of the relevant average"

\(^5\) Consolidated version of Law 18.525, Official Journal of the Republic of Chile, 30 June 1986 as amended by Law No. 18.591, Official Journal, 3 January 1987 and by Law No. 18.573, Official Journal, 2 December 1987. This consolidated text was included in Annex CHL-2 to Chile's First Written Submission (footnotes omitted).
price index for Chile's foreign trade between the month to which they correspond and the last month of the year prior to that of the determination of the amount of duties or rebates, as certified by the Central Bank of Chile. They shall then be arranged in descending order and up to 25 per cent of the highest values and up to 25 per cent of the lowest values for wheat, oil-seed and edible vegetable oils and up to 35 per cent of the highest values and up to 35 per cent of the lowest values for sugar shall be removed. To the resulting extreme values there shall be added the normal tariffs and costs arising from the process of importation of the said products. The duties and rebates determined for wheat shall also apply to meslin and wheat flour. In this last case, duties and rebates established for wheat shall be multiplied by the factor 1.56.

The prices to which these duties and rebates are applied shall be those applicable to the goods in question on the day of their shipment. The National Customs Administration shall notify these prices on a weekly basis, and may obtain information from other public bodies for that purpose."

2.3 Chile submitted a copy of Law No. 19.772, amending Article 12 of Law 18.525 at the second substantive meeting. Article 2 of Law No. 19.772, which entered into force on 19 November 2001, adds the following paragraph to Article 12 of Law 18.525:

"The specific duties resulting from the application of this Article, added to the ad valorem duty, shall not exceed the base tariff rate bound by Chile under the World Trade Organization for the goods referred to in this Article, each import transaction being considered individually and using the c.i.f. value of the goods concerned in the transaction in question as a basis for calculation. To that end, the National Customs Service shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the said limit is maintained."

2. Workings of the PBS

2.4 As a matter of practice, Chile's applied tariff rates are significantly below its bound rate. In the case of wheat, wheat flour, and edible vegetable oils, the applied rate can be increased by means of duty increases provided through the operation of the PBS. In each case, the PBS involves an upper and a lower threshold determined on the basis of certain international prices. The bands for each product are determined once every year through a Presidential decree when a table is published containing reference prices and related specific duties. Chile also sets weekly "reference prices" based on prices in certain foreign markets. A duty increase is triggered when the "reference price", lies below the lower threshold of the band. The duty increase is equivalent to the absolute difference between the lower threshold of the band and the "reference price". Conversely, a tariff rebate is triggered when the "reference price" lies above the price that determines the upper threshold of the band. The rebate (which cannot be greater than the applied ad valorem rate) is equivalent to the absolute difference between the "reference price" and the upper threshold of the band.

2.5 Article 12 of Law No. 18.525 foresees the application of specific duties expressed in US dollars per tariff unit or ad valorem duties, or both, as well as rebates on the amount payable as specific or ad valorem duties or both. For this purpose, Article 12 empowers the President of the Republic of Chile to issue decrees determining the price bands annually. These bands are calculated on the basis of average monthly prices observed for the last 60 months on specific exchanges. In the case of wheat, the calculation is based on Hard Red Winter No. 2, f.o.b. Gulf (Kansas Exchange).

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7 As indicated in paragraph 2.3 above, Chile has informed the Panel that pursuant to Law 19.772 effective on 19 November 2001, the combination of the applied ad valorem rate and the PBS duty increase are capped at the bound ad valorem rate. Prior to that, the combination did at times surpass the bound rate.
while for oils, it is based on the price of crude soya bean oil, f.o.b. Illinois, on the Chicago Exchange. As regards wheat flour, the price band for wheat is used to calculate the duty or rebate, which is then multiplied by a factor of 1.56 to obtain the specific duty or rebate for wheat flour. These average prices are adjusted by the percentage variation in the external price index (IPE) drawn by the Central Bank of Chile. After the prices have been readjusted, they are listed in descending order, with up to 25 per cent of the highest and lowest values being eliminated for wheat and edible vegetable oils. Tariff and importation costs (such as freight, insurance, opening of a letter of credit, interest on credit, taxes on credit, customs agents' fees, unloading, transport to the plant and wastage costs) are added to those prices thus determined in order to fix the lower and upper thresholds on a c.i.f. basis.

2.6 When a shipment of a product subject to the PBS arrives at the border for importation into Chile, the customs authorities determine the total amount of applicable duties as follows. The first step is to apply the ad valorem duty. Afterwards, the so-called "reference price" applicable to that given shipment has to be identified. This reference price is not the transaction price but a price which is determined weekly (every Friday) by the Chilean authorities by using the lowest f.o.b. price for the product in question on foreign "markets of concern to Chile". In the case of edible oils, the weekly reference price corresponds to the lowest f.o.b. price in force on the markets of concern to Chile for any of the types of covered edible vegetable oils. Unlike the prices used for the composition of the PBS, the reference prices are not subject to adjustment for "usual import costs". The applicable reference price for a particular shipment is determined in reference to the date of the bill of lading. The reference price can be consulted by the public at the offices of the Chilean customs authorities.

2.7 Once the customs authorities have identified the reference price applicable to that given shipment, they proceed to levy the duties. These will differ according to the position of the reference price as regards the upper and lower thresholds of the price band. If the reference price falls below the lower threshold, the customs authorities will levy an 8 per cent ad valorem duty (MFN duty), plus an additional specific duty. This additional specific duty will equal the difference between the reference price and the lower threshold. If the reference price is between the lower and upper thresholds, the customs authorities will only apply the 8 per cent ad valorem duty. If the reference price is higher than the upper threshold, the customs authorities will grant a rebate on the 8 per cent ad valorem duty equal to the difference between the upper threshold and the reference price.

B. CHILE'S SAFEGUARD MEASURES

1. Regulatory Framework


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8 See Chile's response to question 10 (CHL) of the Panel.
9 Article 12 of Law 18.525 and its amendment stipulates that the duties and rebates applicable to wheat flour shall be the same as for wheat, adjusted by a conversion factor of 1.41. This conversion factor was raised to 1.56 by Law 19.446 (extended by Law 19.604) (see Annex ARG-2).
10 With respect to wheat, these "markets of concern" include Argentina, Canada Australia and the United States. See Chile's response to question 9(c) (CHL) of the Panel.
11 See Chile's response question 9 (CHL) of the Panel.
2. Provisional and definitive safeguard measures

2.9 On 23 August 1999, the Ministry of Agriculture of Chile filed a request before the National Commission in charge of investigating distortions in the prices of imported goods (hereinafter "the Commission") to initiate *ex officio* a safeguards investigation on products subject to the PBS, that is, wheat, wheat flour, sugar and edible vegetable oils. The Chilean Ministry of Agriculture also requested the Commission to recommend the imposition of provisional safeguard measures. At its Session No. 181 held on 9 September 1999, the Commission decided to initiate a safeguards investigation against imports of wheat, wheat flour, sugar and edible vegetable oils. Imports of sugar, however, are not part of the present dispute. The decision to initiate is contained in Minutes of Session No. 181 of the Commission. The notice of initiation of the investigation was published in the *Official Journal of the Republic of Chile* on 29 September 1999 and notified to the WTO on 25 October 1999. Accordingly, the investigation was initiated on 30 September 1999.

2.10 At its Session No. 185 held on 22 October 1999, the Commission decided to recommend to the President of the Republic the imposition of provisional safeguard measures. The Commission's recommendations are contained in its Minutes of Session No. 185. Upon the recommendation of the Commission, the President through the Ministry of Finance imposed provisional safeguard measures on imports of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils by Exempt Decree No. 339 of 26 November 1999. Chile made an advance notification of these measures on 2 November 1999. The provisional safeguard measure consisted of an *ad valorem* tariff surcharge, corresponding to the difference between the general tariff added to the *ad valorem* equivalent of the specific duty determined by the PBS and the bound tariff in the WTO for these products.

2.11 At its Session No. 189 on 25 November 1999, the Commission held a public hearing in order to receive the views of the interested parties in the safeguards investigation. The arguments of the parties are annexed to its Minutes of Session No. 189. At its Session No. 193 held on 7 January 2000, the Commission recommended the imposition of definitive safeguard measures. The recommendations of the Commission are contained in Minutes of Session No. 193. On 18 January 2000, Chile notified the WTO of the finding by the Commission of threat of injury to its domestic industry for products subject to the Chilean price band system, and of that Commission's recommendation to the President of Chile to impose definitive safeguard measures.

2.12 On 22 January 2000, Exempt Decree No. 9 of the Ministry of Finance of Chile was published in the *Official Journal*, imposing definitive safeguard measures for one year on imports of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils. As in the case of the provisional measures, the definitive measures consisted, for each import transaction, of an *ad valorem* tariff surcharge, corresponding to the difference between the general tariff added to the *ad valorem* equivalent of the specific duty determined by the PBS and the bound tariff in the WTO for these products.

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15 The products concerned by the investigation procedure and the application of safeguard measures are: wheat, classified under tariff heading 1001.9000; wheat flour, classified under tariff heading 1101.0000; sugar, classified under tariff headings 1701.1100; 1701.1200; 1700.9100 and 1701.9900; and edible vegetable oils, classified under tariff headings 1507.1000; 1507.9000; 1508.1000; 1508.9000; 1509.1000; 1509.9000; 1510.0000; 1511.1000; 1511.9000; 1512.1110; 1512.1120; 1512.1910; 1512.1920; 1512.2100; 1512.2900; 1513.1100; 1513.1900; 1513.2100; 1513.2900; 1514.1000; 1514.9000; 1515.2100; 1515.2900; 1515.5000 and 1515.9000.


18 Document G/SG/N/7/CHL/2 of 10 November 1999.

19 Document G/SG/N/8/CHL/1 of 7 February 2000.
determined by the mechanism set out in Article 12 of Law 18.525 [i.e., the PBS] - and its relevant annual implementing decrees - and the level bound in the WTO for these products. 20

3. **Extension of the safeguard measures**

2.13 By Order No. 792 of 10 October 2000, the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture requested the Commission to consider an extension of the definitive safeguard measures imposed by Exempt Decree No. 9 of the Ministry of Finance of Chile on imports of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils. At its Session No. 222 held on 3 November 2000, the Commission decided to initiate a procedure for the purpose of deciding whether to extend the definitive safeguard measures. The notice of initiation was published on 4 November 2000. At its Session No. 223 on 13 November 2000, the Commission held a public hearing. The details of the hearing are contained in its Minutes of Session No. 223.

2.14 At its Session No. 224 held on 17 November 2000, the Commission decided to recommend the extension of the definitive safeguard measures established by Exempt Decree No. 9 of the Ministry of Finance. The decision of the Commission is contained in Minutes of Session No. 224. Further to this decision, the extension of the safeguard measures was imposed by Exempt Decree No. 349 of the Ministry of Finance of 25 November 2000. 21 This Decree provides for an extension of the safeguard measures, as described in paragraph 2.12 above, for one year from the date of their expiry. In practice, they were extended until 26 November 2001. Chile notified the WTO of the extension of the measure on 11 December 2000. 22 23

2.15 The extension measures for wheat and wheat flour were withdrawn by Exempt Decree No. 244 of the Ministry of Finance published on 27 July 2001. 24 The termination of these measures was notified to the WTO on 9 August 2001. 25

**III. PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

3.1 For the reasons put forward, **Argentina** requests that the Panel:

- conclude that the Chilean PBS is inconsistent with Article II.1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture;
- find that the safeguards investigation and the safeguard measures are inconsistent with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards; and
- rule on all of the claims made so as to avoid any unnecessary future proceedings if the findings are eventually overturned, bearing in mind that the Appellate Body exercises procedural economy.

3.2 In light of facts and law put forward, **Chile** requests that the Panel:

- conclude that the PBS is in compliance with Article II.1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture;

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20 Exempt Decree No. 9 of the Ministry of Finance.
21 Published in the Official Journal on 25 November 2000.
22 Document G/SG/N/14/L/CHL/1 of 22 December 2000.
23 Chile stated that the extension measure for edible vegetable oils expired on 26 November 2001 (Exempt Decree No. 559 from the Ministry of Finance).
24 See Chile's response to question 16 (ARG, CHL) of the Panel.
25 Document G/SG/N/10/CHL/1/Suppl. 3 of 16 August 2001.
find that: (i) both the provisional and definitive measures that are the subject of consultations and this procedure are not in force; and (ii) the extension measures, the only ones in effect at present, were not the subject of WTO consultations, and therefore that the Panel should not rule on whether the measures in effect are consistent with specific provisions of the WTO Agreements;

in the event that the Panel considers that it can rule on the consistency of the Chilean measures with Articles 2, 3, 4, 6, and 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards, as well as Article XIX of the GATT 1994, conclude that these are in compliance with the aforementioned Articles.

IV. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

A. ARGUMENTS RELATING TO CHILE’S PRICE BAND SYSTEM

1. Procedural arguments

(a) Burden of proof

4.1 Argentina refers to Article 3.8 of the DSU which reads:

"In cases where there is an infringement of obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the charge."

4.2 As regards the alleged violation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, Argentina claims that it has established a prima facie case before the Panel by providing evidence and legal arguments that suffice to demonstrate that the Chilean measure at issue (the PBS) is inconsistent with Chile's obligations under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Consequently, Argentina contends that Chile has acknowledged that it imposed duties in excess of its tariff binding. Nor has it refuted the argument that the PBS potentially violates Chile's commitments in its national schedule. As regards the alleged violation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Argentina claims that, by presenting legal arguments sufficient to demonstrate that the Chilean measure under review (the PBS) is inconsistent with Chile's obligations under review (the PBS) is inconsistent with Chile's commitments in its national schedule. As regards the special safeguard provisions in Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Argentina considers that the Chilean PBS does not qualify for the Article 4.2 exception for two reasons: (i) the possibility of

26 Argentina refers to para. 38 of Chile's First Written Submission.
27 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 61.
invoking this special provision expired on 31 December 2000; (ii) even if the provision were still valid, it would not apply, because Chile’s Schedule does not designate wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils with the symbol "SSG" (special safeguard) as required in Article 5.1.

4.4 Chile submits that Argentina has totally failed to comply with its obligation to prove that the Chilean PBS constitutes a variable levy or is otherwise inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.28

2. Substantive arguments

(a) Infringement of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994

4.5 Argentina makes two claims with respect to Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994:

4.6 The PBS as such violates Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 since its application has led Chile in specific cases to collect duties in excess of the rates bound in its National Schedule No. VII

4.7 The PBS also violates Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 because, by its structure, design and mode of application, it potentially leads to the application of specific duties in violation of the bound tariff of 31.5 per cent.29

(i) Whether the application of the PBS has led to customs duties higher than bound tariffs

4.8 Argentina submits that the violation by Chile of its obligations under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 has been recognized by Chile and proven in practice. In Argentina's view, whilst the possibility to exceed the bound tariff is sufficient, in itself, to establish violation of Article II:1(b), Chile has in fact imposed tariffs exceeding the bound rate since 1998 and has acknowledged doing so on several instances.30 In this regard, Argentina refers to the meeting of the Committee on Agriculture of 24-25 June 1999 where the representative of Chile stated that "in some cases, the applied tariff was greater than the bound commitment." According to Argentina, this statement constitutes an acknowledgement that Chile has violated its obligations under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.31 Argentina also refers to statements by Chile in the Dispute Settlement Body, to various documents relating to its safeguards investigation as well as Chile's First Written Submission.32 Additionally, Argentina states that Chile has been systematically violating its WTO commitments since 1998.33 Argentina claims that this repeated, successive and consistent acknowledgement by Chile of its own violation, in particular during the proceedings before this Panel, is more than sufficient for this Panel to find that the PBS is inconsistent with Article II.1(b) of the GATT 1994.34 In particular, Argentina contends that, contrary to what Chile claims, Chile imposed on Argentina effective ad valorem customs duties of up to 64.41 per cent for oils and 60.25 per cent for wheat flour, in violation of

28 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 43.
29 See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 4.
30 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 46.
32 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 38.
33 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 39.
34 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 39-42.
35 Argentina refers to Order 850 of the Ministry of Agriculture of Chile and Order 662 of the same Ministry.
36 Argentina refers to paras. 24, 25 and 26 of Chile's First Written Submission.
37 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 5.
38 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 5.
39 Argentina refers to para. 23 in fine of Chile's First Written Submission.
Article II.1(b), as confirmed by the actual documentation processed by Chilean customs. Argentina considers that this confirms that violation is not merely a theoretical possibility, but is something that actually occurred and that will necessarily continue to occur if the system in force is maintained. If Chile were to apply a specific duty whose ad valorem equivalent did not violate its tariff binding, its acknowledgement, that "[t]he Government of Chile therefore deliberately decided to allow the price band to operate at full regime, failing to comply with its commitment" would, according to Argentina, be absurd.

4.9 Chile acknowledges that the total tariff applied to imports of milling wheat has, on occasion, exceeded Chile's tariff binding under the GATT 1947. Chile observes that with respect to the 1990-1995 period, this happened during 1990 and 1991. Chile submits that the reasons why it exceeded its tariff binding under the GATT 1947 can be found in the existence of unforeseen circumstances which, at the time, caused a spectacular fall in the price of imports of certain products included in the price band. Chile claims that these circumstances were of so extraordinary a nature that Chile, at the time, could not reasonably foresee that a situation in which it was forced to exceed its tariff binding under the GATT 1947 – subsequently under the GATT 1994 – would recur. Chile stresses that these circumstances were not only extraordinary for Chile, but for the other GATT contracting parties as well, including Argentina and the third parties to this Panel. Indeed, Chile submits these countries never filed a complaint to the effect that their rights under the Treaty were being affected by the PBS nor did they challenge the system and its operation during the Uruguay Round negotiations, in spite of their knowledge that Chile had exceeded its bound tariff owing to force majeure.

4.10 Argentina contends that Chile has not refuted Argentina's allegations that it has actually exceeded its bound tariff, and that, as its previous recognition in this respect in various WTO fora indicate, Chile has not even tried to refute them. Argentina further submits that, added to all this is the evidence that Chile itself has contributed to these proceedings in its note dated 5 October 2001, in which its Permanent Representative to the WTO provides a series of statistical tables as a supplement to its reply to question 12(b) of the Panel. In Argentina's view, these tables specifically show that in all of the monthly series for "other wheat and meslin" (tariff heading 1001.90.00) from January 1998 to January 2001, the Chilean Ministry of Finance itself confirms that Chilean Customs systematically and continuously levied amounts ranging from 36.1 per cent to 67.1 per cent on average for the month of December 1999 on the totality of imports from any WTO Member, exceeding its bound duty. Examining the same submission by Chile with respect to edible vegetable oils, Argentina finds that the figures indicate that the binding was systematically exceeded as from June 1999. Argentina submits that these figures reach as much as 70.8 per cent in some instances, i.e. more than double Chile's binding under the WTO.

(ii) Can the PBS as such lead to customs duties higher than bound tariffs

4.11 Argentina claims that the PBS potentially violates Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Argentina argues that the obligation contained in Article II:1(b) of the GATT has been clearly specified by GATT/WTO precedent. In this regard, Argentina claims that it has been pointed out that, when a bound tariff has been recorded in a Member's schedule, that bound tariff constitutes a maximum limit of the duties that can legally be applied to products subject to the binding or, in the circumstances of this case, the limit for the combination of the normal customs duty and the specific

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40 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 47, and Annex ARG-15.
41 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 7-8.
42 Argentina quotes para. 25 of Chile's First Written Submission.
43 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 9.
44 See Chile's response to question 12(c) (CHL) of the Panel.
45 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 18-21 and Annex ARG40.
duty applied in accordance with the PBS. 46 Furthermore, Argentina contends that the WTO obligation contained in Article II:1(b) of the GATT is violated not only when, in a specific instance, a higher rate than the bound tariff is in fact applied, but also when the challenged measure is structured and designed in such a way as to make it possible for situations to arise in which the bound tariff is exceeded. 47 In Argentina's view, the PBS, by its design, structure and mode of application, has the capacity to cause Chile inevitably to violate its tariff binding. 48 49 Argentina states that, in cases in which the customs reference price for the day of shipment is lower than a given level, the tariffs effectively applied by Chile exceed the bound rate of 31.5 per cent. 50 Argentina presents a mathematical formulation of the working of the Chilean PBS which presumes that there are only two relevant prices to be considered for the purposes of such an analysis, i.e. the "transaction price" and the "reference price" and that these prices are, in general, not equal. Argentina argues that its analysis 51 shows that, when the c.i.f. import price and the f.o.b. reference price for a given shipment are below the price band floor beyond a point X (the "break even point"), the result of applying the variable specific duty is to exceed the WTO bound ceiling. In other words, Argentina explains, in order to demonstrate that the bound rate has been exceeded, the specific duty must be converted into an \textit{ad valorem} tariff, for which purpose the c.i.f. import price appearing in the invoices is used. Argentina argues that, at least in circumstances in which the reference price and the c.i.f. invoice price are below the break even point, the bound tariff (31.5 per cent) will be exceeded by the sum of the general tariff (6 per cent) and the specific price band tariff converted into an \textit{ad valorem} rate. 52 Argentina further submits that the bound level would also be violated in either of the two following situations: if the transaction price were equal to the mentioned break even price and the reference price were lower than both, or if the reference price were equal to the break even price and the transaction price were lower than both. 53 Consequently, Argentina argues, the lack of a so-called "cap system", added to the discretion allowed in fixing the reference price, means that in a low international price scenario, the effective level of \textit{ad valorem} equivalents levied can exceed the bound level in Chile's National Schedule for the products subject to the band. 54

4.12 In reference to the above 55, Chile states that Argentina acknowledges that the duty may be, and generally has been lower, than Chile's bound tariff and that, in fact, when international prices are high, the PBS may lower the import duty even as far as zero. 56

4.13 In Argentina's view, the mandatory nature of the Law and the decrees establishing the specific duties leave no alternative to Chile's customs officials but to levy the duty which, depending on the price of the goods, could potentially - at a certain price level - lead to a breach in Chile's WTO obligations. Argentina affirms that neither Chilean law nor its implementing regulations impose any limit that could prevent this from happening. Argentina further asserts that the Law as such, being mandatory, necessarily leads - in accordance with the fluctuation of international prices - to the violation of tariff commitments. 57 Argentina considers that Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the "WTO Agreement") and GATT/WTO precedents confirm that legislative provisions as such, however they may be applied in specific cases,
can violate the provisions of the GATT and the WTO. Argentina asserts that, regarding what Chile stated in the DSB, it is important to point out that unilateral statements by Members in the context of a dispute settlement proceeding have legal effects. In support of this statement, Argentina cites the case United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974. According to Argentina, the acknowledgement by Chile that the bound rate has been exceeded proves that even if Article 12 of Law 18.525 were to be interpreted as not being mandatory, but as granting discretionary powers to the Executive, it would nevertheless have to be considered inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.

4.14 Chile argues that paragraph (a) of Article II:1 of the GATT lays down a general prohibition on granting to imports treatment less favourable than that provided in the Member's Schedule. Paragraph (b), Chile says, "prohibits a specific kind of practice that will always be inconsistent with paragraph (a): that is, the application of ordinary customs duties in excess of those provided for in the Schedule". In Chile's view, Article II simply acts as a ceiling for customs duties so that Members are obliged to refrain from imposing import duties or other import charges that exceed the tariff commitments a Member has fixed in its own Schedule. Chile contends that specific tariff systems are not inconsistent with the obligations laid down in Article II:1(b) of the GATT. In reference to the Appellate Body's ruling in Argentina – Footwear (EC), Chile concludes that the sole fact that a PBS imposes a specific import duty as well as an 8 per cent ad valorem duty (and in some instances a reduced ad valorem duty), does not mean that the Law is inconsistent with the obligation under Article II:1(b). As long as the Chilean PBS involves the application of a tariff duty which, when translated into ad valorem terms does not exceed Chile's commitment to 31.5 per cent, the PBS, in Chile's view, is not inconsistent with the obligations under Article II:1(b). Thus, Chile contends, so long as the rate of duty applied is at, or below, the bound rate, Article II does not prohibit the application of any rate of duty, whether expressed in specific or ad valorem terms, or some combination of specific and ad valorem terms. Chile further claims that Article II does not prevent a party from changing the rate of duty that is applied, provided that the bound ceiling rate is respected.

4.15 Argentina claims that, contrary to the above, it in no way it questions Chile's right to apply specific duties on its imports. Argentina explains that what it is saying is that the PBS inevitably leads to the possibility of levying duties in excess of Chile's tariff binding, and this is in fact what happened. Argentina further clarifies that the Chilean PBS is not a specific duty. In Argentina's view, we are not dealing with a specific duty which constitutes an "ordinary customs duty" - a duty which, since it does not result in the levying of duties in excess of the bound rate, would not be the subject of a complaint by Argentina with respect to Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Argentina considers that the PBS is a surcharge whose structure, design and mode of application potentially leads to a violation of Chile's binding.

4.16 Argentina considers that it is neither the intentions or the declarations of Chile with respect to its readiness to obtain a waiver nor the issue of whether or not it deliberately permitted the full-scale application of the price band that the Panel should be evaluating. Rather, in Argentina's view, what counts in determining consistency or inconsistency is whether by its structure and design, the system could cause Chile to impose customs duties in excess of its tariff bindings in its National Schedule. Argentina submits that the example given starting with paragraph 29 of Argentina's First Written

58 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 36 and footnote 25.
59 WT/DS152/R, paras. 7.118 and 7.125.
60 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 43 and footnote 25.
61 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 21.
62 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 23. See also para. 23 of Chile's First Oral Statement.
63 See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 24.
64 Argentina refers to paras. 22 and 23 of Chile's First Written Submission.
65 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 7.
66 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 23-24.
Submission, presented in graphic form in Annex ARG-12, shows how the application of a reference price – set by the implementing authority at its own discretion – in certain conditions (drop in international prices) necessarily leads, in relation to the transaction price, to the bound tariff being exceeded. Argentina claims that exceeding the bound tariff is not merely a theoretical possibility, but a practical fact. Argentina reminds that this is illustrated in Annexes ARG-14 and 15, and was recognized by Chile itself. It further affirms that it could not be otherwise, since the system does not have any safety mechanism against such violation (Article II.1(b)).

4.17 Chile clarifies that the price bands operate in accordance with the law. Chile contends that the WTO Agreements, including Schedule VII, were approved by the Chilean Congress as a Law and with the hierarchy of an international treaty. Therefore, Chile explains, the WTO Agreements override existing law to the extent there is a conflict, and cannot be amended by future law. Chile argues that, from a legal point of view, the system cannot automatically exceed the bound rate. In response to a question of the Panel, Chile explains that, as both the legislation governing the price band and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO with its annexed Agreements, are part of the Chilean legal order, the customs authorities are subject to that order. Chile claims that there was no reason to presume that the duties resulting from the application of the PBS would exceed the WTO tariff binding. To prevent this from happening again, it further explains, Chile has adopted a new law that assures that the duties created under the PBS will not exceed Chile's bound rates.

4.18 Chile argues that its Government deliberately decided to allow the price band to operate at full regime, failing to comply with its commitment, in order to protect thousands of small-scale agricultural producers with low incomes from an economic and social catastrophe. Chile adds that its Government first informed its trade partners of the situation and started informal consultations with the view to obtaining a waiver from Chile's commitments under the WTO Agreements pursuant to Article IX of the WTO Agreement. Chile claims that it adopted this course of action in order to give temporary relief to producers who faced a financial crisis. According to Chile, its major trade partners were opposed to the granting of such a waiver and instead suggested that Chile should apply a safeguard or renegotiate the tariff bound under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. Chile argues that this was when Chile imposed a safeguard measure under Article XIX of the GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards, which has been contested by Argentina. Chile then claims that the above shows that Chile's failure to comply with its commitments was not the result of the automatic functioning of the PBS but was the result of a deliberate decision by its Government, which then did everything possible to obtain the required legal backing in accordance with the WTO's relevant provisions. Chile further argues that the situation at the root of the problem was not of its but rather was due to the massive subsidization from some other prominent countries.

4.19 Argentina submits that Chile's argument to the effect that Chile's failure to comply with its commitments was not the result of the automatic functioning of the PBS but was the result of a deliberate decision by its Government, is incomprehensible because it is the system itself, by its very structure and design, that automatically leads to the violation since it lacks any safety mechanism against exceeding the bound rate. Argentina argues that a customs official has no choice but to impose the duties established by the system, regardless of whether the Chilean Government deliberately permits it or not. And indeed, Argentina affirms, far from supporting Chile's attempt at

67 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 15-17.
68 See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 63.
69 See Chile's response to question 12 (CHL) of the Panel.
70 See Annex CHL-7.
71 See also Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 30.
72 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 25.
73 See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 30.
74 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 9, which refers to para. 25 of Chile's First Written Submission.
justification, the suggestion that this was the result of a deliberate decision implies a further recognition that the Chilean Government maintains legislation that is inconsistent with its WTO obligations.\footnote{See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 13.} Argentina submits that the continuation of the violation constitutes a flagrant breach by Chile of the principle of \textit{pacta sunt servanda} and of its international commitments and that Chile is not meeting its WTO obligations in good faith.\footnote{See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 14.} Whatever the case, Argentina submits, the argument is irrelevant, since Chile has no way of preventing the system, by its design and structure, from "automatically" violating Article II.1(b) of the GATT 1994, regardless of whether it was deliberate or not.\footnote{See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 31.}

In Argentina's view, the working of the PBS affects the predictability of the tariff concessions negotiated by Chile during the Uruguay Round and has been recognized as inconsistent with Article II.1(b) in various GATT/WTO precedents.\footnote{Chile refers to para. 16 of Argentina's First Oral Statement.}

4.20 According to \textbf{Chile}, while the PBS formula may appear complex, it is fully transparent and predictable. Chile submits that, contrary to Argentina's claim\footnote{See Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 10-11.}, there are no discretionary elements in the calculation to enable manipulation of the duty or rebate by officials. Chile argues that, contrary to assertions in some submissions, its PBS in no way depends on or uses domestic prices, or transaction prices, or target prices of any kind, to compute the duty or rebate. The objective of the system is to moderate the effect on Chile's market of short-term violent fluctuations in the international prices of these commodities. For this purpose, Chile claims, the band follows over time the trend in international prices, and uses duties or rebates.\footnote{See Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 12-18.} In its view, this series of monthly price averages (5 years means 60 monthly prices) is ranked, and the highest 25 per cent of the monthly prices is disregarded, as well as the lowest 25 per cent of monthly prices. According to Chile, this means that, in the descending list of average prices, the 16$^{th}$ lowest monthly price and the 44$^{th}$ lowest monthly price constitute the f.o.b. price for the ceiling and the floor, respectively. Chile explains that these two f.o.b. prices are adjusted to present the band in terms of import cost. Such an adjustment considers fixed and variable costs normally paid in import transactions, such as transportation, unloading, customs duties, cost of opening a letter of credit, interests, and \textit{ad valorem} rate. For simplicity, Chile explains, the annual decree that reports the band for each good contains a table for a range of f.o.b. prices and their corresponding rebate or duty when they fall outside the band. According to Chile, for the actual calculation of the specific duty or rebate, the National Customs Authority reports on a weekly basis the lowest price for the product quoted in a major commodity market relevant for Chile. Chile explains that this price is the f.o.b. price to be used in the table to determine the specific duty or rebate for all transactions which shipment occurred in the same week. Chile maintains that when the exporter decides to ship, he knows the duty or rebate. It is Chile's opinion that the trends in international prices are necessarily transmitted to the band, though smoothed over time. In this regard, Chile emphasizes that the band is determined without regard to domestic or target prices, and without regard to the actual transaction price, except in calculating the \textit{ad valorem} (8 per cent) duty.\footnote{See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 28 which refers to Chile's response to question 10(k) of the Panel.}

4.21 \textbf{Argentina} submits that Chile not only has not refuted the formal demonstration submitted by Argentina of the potential violation of the binding by the PBS or the arguments supporting that demonstration but, that, on the contrary, it acknowledged this inconsistency of the PBS with Article II.1(b) of the GATT 1994. Argentina refers to Chile's replies to the Panel where, allegedly, Chile recognizes, in response to specific questions, that the mode of calculation of the amount of the surcharge applied by customs on top of the regular tariff of 8 per cent potentially leads to the collection of an \textit{ad valorem} equivalent in excess of the 31.5 per cent binding.\footnote{See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 29-30.}

\footnote{See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 13.}\footnote{See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 29-30.}\footnote{See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 14.}\footnote{See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 31.}\footnote{Chile refers to para. 16 of Argentina's First Oral Statement.}\footnote{See Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 10-11.}\footnote{See Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 12-18.}\footnote{See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 28 which refers to Chile's response to question 10(k) of the Panel.}
Argentina, it is therefore difficult to understand how Chile can argue that when the WTO obligations entered into force it was unaware that the PBS would cause it to exceed its tariff binding, given the system's structure, design and mode of application.83

4.22 At the second substantive meeting, Chile indicates that Chile's domestic measures have now been strengthened by Law 19.722 which makes explicit that there is such an automatic cap system that will prevent recurrence of a breach of the binding in circumstances not justified under WTO rules.84

4.23 Regarding the new legislation presented by Chile, Argentina declares that it is not in position to confirm the precise content of the Chilean exhibit given that Argentina does not have adequate information to express a definitive view on this issue. On the other hand, Argentina argues, the PBS has already caused nullification or impairment to Argentina and in this regard Argentina wants to reserve its rights. Argentina submits that in case of no ruling by the Panel, Chile could easily change its law. Additionally, in case the Panel follows Argentina's suggestion and rules on the issues as reflected in Argentina's request for the establishment of the Panel, the Panel's report will have a normative value which Chile will have to take into account. Argentina concludes that the new Chilean law, from Argentina's point of view, shows that Chile acknowledges that its PBS violates Article II of GATT 1994.85

(iii) Article XIX as an exception to Article II of the GATT 1994

4.24 Chile argues that Article XIX constitutes an exception to the other WTO rules, including those in Article II of the GATT 1994.86 In particular, Chile contends that Article XIX explicitly provides that a Member country "shall be free" to suspend an obligation or withdraw or modify a concession where necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury. It submits that Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards allow a temporary waiver of concessions and the suspension of certain commitments. Chile claims that a Member country that has adopted a safeguard measure under Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards has not violated its commitments on tariff concessions as long as the safeguard measure remains in force, which is currently the case for Chile.88

4.25 Argentina submits that Chile's argument on Article XIX of the GATT 1994 whereby this would provide Chile with a legal umbrella enabling it to exceed the bound tariff, is erroneous from a legal point of view and should be rejected by the Panel. Argentina does not deny that it is theoretically possible, in applying a safeguard, to exceed the bound level, since safeguards are applied as a temporary measure in emergency situations to provide relief for the affected industry, subject to the requirements laid down in the Agreement on Safeguards. However, Argentina goes on to explain that, following the sequence of that Agreement, the bound rate may only legitimately be exceeded once the requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards have been met, and not in a case such as this one, where the bound level was exceeded before the requirements for applying safeguards had been verified. Argentina contends that the central issue in its claim in this respect is not the failure to comply with Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards, but the violation of Article II.1(b). It claims that the Panel will evaluate the consistency of the Chilean safeguard measure with Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards at the appropriate time. At this point, Argentina argues, the Panel is called upon to rule on the inconsistency of the PBS with Article II.1(b). Argentina submits that this is an independent claim, with a different and separate legal basis from the safeguards claim, and happens to coincide for a limited period of time with the period of application of the safeguards for certain

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83 See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 28 which refers to Chile's response to question 12(a) of the Panel.
84 See Chile's Second Oral Statement, para. 11.
85 See Argentina's response to question 45 (ARG) of the Panel.
86 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 26.
87 See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 28.
88 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 26.
products. As an example, Argentina refers to the lifting by Chile of its safeguards on wheat and wheat flour while maintaining its PBS which, by its design and structure, potentially violates Chile's bound tariff. Argentina argues that, if one was to follow Chile's argument, the safeguards would have to be maintained as long as the PBS was in force, regardless of the requirements laid down in the Agreement on Safeguards. Argentina further submits that, in case there should still be any doubts, Chile acknowledged before the Committee on Safeguards itself that the price bands as such were not safeguards.\(^{89,90}\)

4.26 **Argentina** submits that safeguard measures are emergency measures, which are applied only after each and every one of the requirements laid down in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and in the Agreement on Safeguards has been met. Argentina contends that they are not measures that can be applied to cover up or justify the violation of obligations arising from the national schedules. In Argentina's view, it would be unthinkable for the Panel even to consider such a possibility. Argentina submits that Chile is trying to distort the content of the obligations imposed by Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.\(^{91}\)

(b) **Violation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture**

4.27 **Argentina** considers that the PBS, in addition to violating the obligations contained in Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture because by its structure and design it lacks, as an instrument limiting access to markets, the kind of transparency and predictability that only ordinary customs duties can provide. Argentina submits that, in spite of the express prohibition contained in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Chile maintains a measure which should have been tariffied and included in its Schedule.\(^{92}\)

(i) **Whether the PBS is a measure prohibited under Article 4.2 and should have been tariffied**

4.28 **Argentina** argues that, prior to the negotiation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, a number of countries used a wide variety of non-tariff measures to limit imports of agricultural products. One of the most important results of the negotiations was the agreement to "tariffy" these measures - i.e. to prohibit the use of all non-tariff measures with respect to agricultural products, and to require their replacement with bound tariffs. This was achieved in Article 4.2 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.\(^{93}\) Argentina claims that the scope of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is all-inclusive and, therefore, no non-tariff measures of any kind can be maintained. It explains that, although an illustrative list of non-tariff measures is provided, in which variable levies are specifically included, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture also expressly covers "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties".\(^{94}\)

4.29 **Argentina** claims that Chile could have tariffied its non-tariff measures at the time of the Uruguay Round adopting a level of protection higher than the current bound rate of 31.5 per cent. Since it did not do so, it is in violation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture because any variable duty applied on an agricultural product – regardless of its "quantum" with respect to its binding – is inconsistent with Article 4.2, which was designed precisely to avoid such a situation.\(^{95}\) Argentina submits that the Chilean PBS fits perfectly into the category of measures that Article 4.2, footnote 1, identifies as being as inconsistent with the obligations negotiated under the Agreement on

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90 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 18-22.
91 See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 32.
92 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 34-35.
93 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 49.
94 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 51.
95 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 57-58.
Agriculture.\textsuperscript{96} Argentina is therefore of the view that the maintenance by Chile after the Uruguay Round of its mandatory legislation imposing variable specific duties is inconsistent with its obligations under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.\textsuperscript{97}

4.30 **Argentina** submits that even if the PBS were not considered a variable levy, it is a similar measure which should have been tariffied by Chile. Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture expressly prohibits the maintenance of "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties." Argentina argues that it is precisely by reading the words "shall not maintain" and "of the kind" together with the non-exhaustive list in the footnote that one arrives at the concept of similar border measures that are not ordinary customs duties. Argentina explains that this is what qualifies the PBS as something which should have been tariffied in the Uruguay Round, which was not tariffied, which Chile continues to maintain, and which it justifies by an interpretation of Article 4.2 and its footnote that reduces the terms of the text to inutility (contrary to the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation). Ultimately, Argentina argues, both the text of the Article and the wording of the footnote aim to cover a whole universe of measures which may not be identified and which do not constitute ordinary customs duties.\textsuperscript{98}

4.31 **Chile** considers that Argentina's argument that the Chilean PBS was and is indisputably a variable levy, which not only might have been tariffied but in fact had to be tariffied\textsuperscript{99}, is absurd and does not correspond to the normal practice of negotiations among Members of the WTO. In this regard, Chile argues that if there had been an intention to prohibit the Chilean PBS, neither Argentina nor any other Member of the WTO put forward this argument during the negotiations of the Agreement on Agriculture.\textsuperscript{100} Chile further claims that Argentina's interpretation of Chile's obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture differs totally from the interpretation which Argentina itself has used in its actions and the interpretation of other Members of the WTO when negotiating tariff schedules under the Agreement on Agriculture and applying it. It considers that, for Argentina's argument to be valid, Argentina would have to show not only that the Chilean price band is a "variable levy" or "similar border measure", within the meaning of footnote 1, but also that Article 4.2 prohibits such measures. Chile alleges that Argentina's argument falls short on both points.\textsuperscript{101} In Chile's view, reading Article 4.2, including its footnotes, in its context and in light of its object and purpose, it is clear that Article 4.2 does not prohibit the Chilean PBS. Indeed, Chile explains, Argentina and its supporters under Article 4.2 rely in their interpretation not on the text that was negotiated and implemented, but rather on the agreement that those countries appear now to wish they had negotiated.\textsuperscript{102}

4.32 **Chile** submits that Article 4.2 is oddly phrased, and the footnote uses terms such as "variable import levy" or "non-tariff measures maintained by state enterprises" that are not defined and whose contours are not immediately obvious. The text refers to "measures which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties". In Chile's view, that text would suggest that elsewhere in the WTO Agreements there is or was some provision that requires the conversion and explains what has to be converted, but there is no such provision elsewhere. However, Chile contends, the agreed Uruguay Round tariff schedules, which were negotiated during and after the drafting of the text of Article 4.2 and which entered into force at the same time as the Agreement on Agriculture manifest the results of the "conversion" process. Chile explains that these negotiations and the results of those negotiations are relevant context in seeking to understand whether a particular measure is one of the

\textsuperscript{96} See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 59.  
\textsuperscript{97} See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 57.  
\textsuperscript{98} See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 39-40.  
\textsuperscript{99} Chile refers to paras. 57-58 of Argentina's First Written Submission.  
\textsuperscript{100} See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 42.  
\textsuperscript{101} See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 30.  
\textsuperscript{102} See also Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 34-36.
"kind which ha[s] been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties." Chile notes that price band systems were not among the measures that in the negotiations were required to be converted into ordinary customs duties. Chile indicates that, while the European Communities did convert its variable import levies into ordinary customs duties in the Uruguay Round negotiations, the EC's conversion – and the acceptance of that conversion by other Members – put in place a system that clearly still has a duty that varies by a formula. Although the European Communities system is not at issue, Chile contends, that system and its conversion was a central issue in the Uruguay Round negotiations, and it is relevant in assessing the meaning of the less-than-crystal-clear words of Article 4.2 that Members did not object to that system.\(^{103}\)

4.33 **Chile** submits that, even if the contested law was considered a variable levy or similar border measure, *quod non*, it is not inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In Chile's view, Article 4.2 prohibits "any measures of the kind which have been required to converted into ordinary customs duties." Chile's price band mechanism is not a measure of this type, and Chile is not barred from maintaining this measure.\(^{104}\) Chile argues that Article 4.2 does not prohibit measures that do not have to be tariffied.\(^{105}\) In reference to the above tariffication argument by Argentina,\(^{106}\) Chile submits that the obligations in Article 4.2 relate only to non-tariff barriers and that this is clearly stated in footnote 1, which specifically excludes ordinary customs duties. According to Chile, the PBS only covers the payment of customs duties. Moreover, Chile argues, it was not required to eliminate its PBS nor to replace it by a bound duty system during the Uruguay Round. Chile claims that it has maintained its PBS in an open and transparent fashion before, during and after the Uruguay Round negotiations. Chile argues that, unlike the variable levies in the EC, which were not bound and had to be replaced by bound duties, the Chilean duties were bound at 35 per cent for the products affected by the PBS, even before the Uruguay Round, and were quite openly bound at lower levels as part of the Round after finalization of the Agreement on Agriculture. Hence, in Chile's view, it was quite clear for the other Members at that time that Chile was neither "tariffying" its PBS, nor eliminating or replacing it. On these grounds, Chile considers that it is inexplicable why Argentina, more than six years after the entry into force of the Uruguay Round Agreements, decided that the Chilean PBS had suddenly become a variable levy that Chile should have eliminated when the WTO Agreements entered into force.\(^{107}\)\(^{108}\)

4.34 **Chile** considers that Article 4.2 is oddly phrased, in that it appears to be cross-referencing some obligation or other agreement in which measures had "been required" to be converted from measures of one type to "ordinary duties". The odd syntax of Article 4.2, Chile claims, must be given meaning. Chile notes that it would have been very easy, if negotiators had so agreed, to write a prohibition of all non-tariff barriers. According to Chile, however, that is manifestly not what was done, notwithstanding the current arguments of Argentina and some third country participants. Indeed, to Chile's regret in many respects, there is no such obligation or simple prohibition elsewhere in the Agreement on Agriculture. Chile contends that the only place in the Agreement in which tariffication is mentioned is in the agreed tariff schedules of Members and in the Annex 5 reference to countries allowed to engage in delayed tariffication.\(^{109}\)

4.35 **Chile** claims that Argentina interprets Article 4.2 as containing a total prohibition against non-tariff barriers, including those listed in footnote 1 and that such an interpretation is based on unsustainable arguments, is excessively broad and is not justified in the light of the principles of

\(^{103}\) See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 28-29.

\(^{104}\) See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 50.

\(^{105}\) See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 30-31.

\(^{106}\) Chile refers to para. 49 of Argentina's First Written Submission.

\(^{107}\) See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 33-35.

\(^{108}\) See para. 4.97 below.

\(^{109}\) See Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 51-52.
interpretation of treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter "the Vienna Convention"). In this regard, Chile refers to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and the principle of effectiveness, as having been used by the Appellate Body. In this regard, Chile submits that Argentina disregards the usual meaning of the terms of Article 4.2 in its context and effectively ignores the qualifier that the measures that must not be maintained or reverted to are "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties". Consequently, in Chile's view, not only do all non-tariff measures of the kind described in footnote 1 not have to be abolished, but only those of the kind that have been specified must be converted into ordinary customs duties. Chile argues that the drafters did not have the intention to include a total prohibition of non-tariff measures but, instead, they introduce qualifying and limitative terms with the intention of giving the Article the meaning that only measures of the kind which have been required to be converted are prohibited.\textsuperscript{110} \textsuperscript{111}

4.36 \textbf{Chile} explains that there is also no definition of the "inclusive" terms of footnote 1, which is an odd mix of measures. Not all of those measures are prohibited under any other rule of the WTO, though arguably many were prohibited and many or most have been subject to abuses of various sorts over the years. In these circumstances, Chile argues, it is particularly important in trying to discern the meaning of Article 4.2 to examine the contemporaneous practice in the tariff agreements of the Members and negotiators in determining which measures were considered to be of the "type" which had to have been converted, and which were not. Chile affirms that the intent cannot be determined simply by looking at the bare words of individual "measures" listed in footnote 1 to Article 4.2. For example, Chile explains that footnote 1 refers to "non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises". Chile considers that such a term, taken literally, could mean any action of a state agency or state-owned enterprise. In Chile's view, however, it is obvious that Members did not have to convert all their state enterprise activities into tariffs, nor did they have to abolish those enterprises or activities or convert them into ordinary customs duties. Chile claims that such a broad reading was not intended derives knowledge from the contemporaneous conduct of the negotiators. Similarly, Chile argues, it is evident that neither Chile, nor, insofar as Chile is aware, any other Member was required or even urged to "convert" a PBS. Chile contends that these measures were at all times openly and transparently maintained, but, because they were not non-tariff barriers, they were not required to be converted into some new form of ordinary duties.\textsuperscript{112}

4.37 \textbf{Chile} notes that Article 4.2 is different from other obligations not only in its peculiar syntax, which it claims must be given meaning, but because the conversion process involved a privilege as well as an obligation. Chile argues that measures that were properly subject to Article 4.2 were not simply required to be eliminated or modified, as in ordinary WTO rules, but that, instead, the requirement was to change the form of the trade restriction from a non-tariff barrier to a tariff barrier. Chile claims that, together with the "requirement" to remove certain measures, came the right to increase duties without compensation to other trading partners, even if the duties had been bound at a lower level. Chile argues that the tariff rate quotas that were allowed, at tariffs often enormously higher than previous bound rates, have frequently proven to be scarcely less effective protection than the non-tariff barriers they replaced. Chile claims that this element of privilege was even greater, considering that many of the measures that were required to be converted were at risk of being found inconsistent with GATT rules or losing privileged waivers. Chile concludes that there was little or no incentive to refuse to "convert" a measure, if that had been believed to be legally "required", since conversion carried the privilege of substantially raising duties on the "converted" product, without the need to compensate trading partners, as is normally required under Article II and Article XXVIII. Chile states that, having waited, Argentina is now saying that Chile must eliminate the PBS because it is banned by Article 4.2, but it is also saying that it is too late for Chile to get the offsetting benefit of

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{See} Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 54-56.
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{See} Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 53-56.
increasing its tariffs. Chile contends that such an argument cannot be sustained. Chile claims that the reason why Chile did not convert its price band mechanism was and is that Article 4.2 did not require such a conversion and certainly does not now require simple elimination of the price band without tariffication. While Argentina and others may have wanted to negotiate a ban that would have included price band systems, that was not what was agreed.\textsuperscript{113}

4.38 **Chile** submits that the unusual use of the present perfect tense – "have been required" - can be easily understood in the context of the agricultural negotiations during the Uruguay Round. Chile argues that Article 4.2 logically refers to measures of the kind which, at the time the WTO entered into force, "have been required" to be converted. This was not the case for the price bands of Chile and other countries. In this regard, Chile claims that it was not required and would not be required to convert its PBS because it already operated as a tariff and not as a non-tariff measure, and was therefore already subject to binding in accordance with Article II.\textsuperscript{114} Chile refers to Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention which provides that "Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation shall be taken into account, together with the context" when interpreting its terms. In this regard, Chile refers to the interpretation by the Appellate Body of the "essence" of such subsequent practice whereby this lies in a ""concordant, common and consistent" sequence of acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernable pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."\textsuperscript{115} Chile considers that the subsequent practice supports Chile's position as regards Article 4.2. In Chile's view, this subsequent practice convincingly shows that, despite the Members' intention to reduce the number of non-tariff barriers and other measures covered, their intention was not to prohibit all such measures. Chile goes further to argue that the first evidence of State practice is precisely the Chilean PBS which was implemented in the 1980s and is still in place today. Chile notes that Argentina's first written submission does not refer to any record of the negotiations of the Agreement on Agriculture that proves that Chile was asked to convert its price bands into tariff measures. Chile therefore concludes that the system was not a measure of the kind "which have been required to be converted" in order to allow Chile to sign the WTO Agreements. Chile submits that, in addition to the Chilean PBS, there are other systems with duties that vary according to external factors and some that common sense leads one to equate with variable levies, and which are not required to be converted into a fixed tariff regime. In this regard, Chile refers to Argentina's customs duty on sugar imports\textsuperscript{116} and to the EU current duty system on imports of wheat and other cereals.\textsuperscript{117} In Chile's view, this evidence of practices by States is not confined simply to countries that import agricultural products but also includes major agricultural exporters. In Chile's opinion, it is possible that many agricultural exporting countries might initially have wished to prohibit all levies that fluctuated or varied for any reason and some Members certainly envisaged the possibility of exerting pressure to impose this interpretation of Article 4.2 during the tariff negotiations that accompanied negotiations on the text of the Agreement on Agriculture. Nevertheless, Chile argues, irrespective of the original negotiating goals of some of the Members, the prohibition now claimed by Argentina was not agreed. Chile further notes that the agricultural exporters did not wish to eliminate the Chilean PBS as a whole because it is transparent and predictable and can result in the application of duties lower than the bound tariff. Chile concludes by saying that this evidence of State practice (and consequently of the general context of Article 4.2) is "concordant, common and consistent" not only with the ordinary

\textsuperscript{113} See Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 57-61.

\textsuperscript{114} See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 57.


meaning of the terms contained in Article 4.2, but also with the objective and purpose of this Article.\textsuperscript{118}

4.39 \textbf{Chile} contends that the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture is consistent with Chile's interpretation of Article 4.2. This object and purpose, Chile claims, can easily be seen in its provisions, including the Preamble, and in the structure and outcome of the negotiations on agriculture during the Uruguay Round. The Preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture starts by indicating that Members have decided "to establish a basis for initiating a process of reform of trade in agriculture in line with the objectives of the negotiations as set out in the Punta del Este Declaration". It continues by "Recalling" that the "long-term" objectives of the process include "a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system" and "substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time". One apparently more short-term commitment is "to achieving specific binding commitments" in several areas, including "market access". Chile also refers to the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration as it fixes the goals for the forthcoming negotiations on agriculture.\textsuperscript{119} In Chile's view, it is obvious that the object and purpose of the Uruguay Round negotiations was to reduce barriers to trade in agricultural products, while at the same time acknowledging that it would be a long-term process. It further notes that Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture underlines this by calling for negotiations to continue the reform process and stating that further commitments will be necessary to achieve the long-term objectives envisaged in the Preamble. Argentina's interpretation of Article 4.2, Chile claims, is not in harmony with this object and purpose. In this regard, Chile argues that Argentina suggests that, Chile could have raised its tariff protection for the products in question through tariffication, which is contrary to Chile's decision to lower the tariff.\textsuperscript{120} Furthermore, it claims that Argentina appears to believe that Chile should have applied a single invariable duty on all imports. Chile contends that the result would undoubtedly be less liberalization of trade than that currently existing under the PBS, in which the tariff usually applied is much lower than the bound tariff that Chile has the right to apply.\textsuperscript{121}

4.40 \textbf{Argentina} submits that, contrary to what Chile argues, Article 4.2 and its footnote No. 1 are not open to different interpretations, as this would be contrary to the interpretation of treaties in accordance with the Vienna Convention. In Argentina's view, an interpretation of the text as well as the context, object and purpose of the Agreement indicates that mechanisms such as the price band are clearly covered by the said Article.\textsuperscript{119} In other words, even if the PBS were not considered to be a variable levy, it is clearly a similar border measure regulated by Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture which constitutes a "\textit{lex specialis}" \textit{vis-à-vis} the GATT 1994. Argentina considers that the determining criterion for the inclusion of these mechanisms among the measures which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties does not, and cannot be an exhaustive list of the different schemes. Argentina contends that this is due to the obvious impossibility of listing all of the measures which, by their nature, are infinite, since they depend exclusively on human ingenuity in designing any non-tariff barrier.\textsuperscript{122}

4.41 \textbf{Argentina} argues that an intelligent interpretation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture must also take account of the principle of effectiveness (\textit{ut res magis valeat quam pereat}), a fundamental principle in the interpretation of treaties which forms part of the general rule of interpretation laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Argentina submits that, in the framework of the WTO, this principle has been upheld in the case \textit{US - Gasoline} and has been recognized and applied systematically in successive rulings of the Appellate Body.\textsuperscript{123} Argentina

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{118} See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 58-65.
    \item \textsuperscript{119} See para. 68 of Chile's First Written Submission.
    \item \textsuperscript{120} Chile refers to para. 57 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
    \item \textsuperscript{121} See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 66-70.
    \item \textsuperscript{122} See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 38-39.
    \item \textsuperscript{123} See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 40 and footnote 26.
\end{itemize}
contends that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture would be without effectiveness if one accepts Chile's interpretation that the PBS did not need to be tariffed because Argentina did not challenge "the system and its operation during the Uruguay Round negotiations". According to Argentina, applying the rule of effectiveness to the interpretation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture means ensuring that non-tariff measures - such as the Chilean price band system - cannot be maintained or reverted to after the entry into force of the Agreement. Consequently, Argentina argues, the only possible approach - assuming an analysis based on the text, context, object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture - is to analyse each case individually in terms of the nature and the economic effects of the system as compared to the scenario of ordinary customs duties, in order to determine which measures are covered by footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Argentina submits that if the analysis of the nature and effects were not the right approach, obligations such as "[M]embers shall not maintain, resort to or revert to …" and the phrase in the footnote "… and similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties …" would be pointless.

4.42 As regards Chile's argument whereby the PBS is not a variable levy, Argentina submits that anything that does not constitute an ad valorem tariff, a specific duty or a combination of the two, cannot under any circumstances qualify as an ordinary customs duty. Consequently, in Argentina's view, in accordance with the Agreement on Agriculture, if a measure does not come under one of that Agreement's exceptions, it is inconsistent. Argentina explains that the wording of Article 4.2 reflects the scope and complexity of the entire range of distortionary measures that Members must dismantle, refrain from reverting to in the future or refrain from maintaining where they are inconsistent with the new obligations negotiated under the Uruguay Round. The diversity of non-tariff measures to be dismantled and the possibility of some of them not being dismantled following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round is expressed in the word "shall not maintain". Argentina argues that, had there not been the possibility that some of the measures "which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" would remain in force after the Uruguay Round, the text would merely have stated "… shall not resort to, or revert to". In Argentina's view, the words "shall not maintain" only make sense where there is a possibility that a measure could remain in force. Argentina further argues that, at the same time, the fact that Chile has bound tariffs for certain products such as wheat, wheat flour and pure vegetable oils in no way means that the PBS does not have to be tariffed, i.e. converted into an ordinary customs duty, since the Chilean bound tariff was 35 per cent before the Uruguay Round, and was brought down to 31.5 per cent for those products. Neither Chile's schedule of bindings prior to the Uruguay Round – National Schedule No. VII – nor its schedule resulting from the Uruguay Round, records the variable levy that Chile has applied and continues to apply. This is contrary to the clear requirement in Article 4.2, which prohibits the maintenance of "measures of the kind" which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties.

4.43 Chile claims that there are logical economic policy reasons why the price band system or other systems with "duties that vary" were not prohibited under Article 4.2. Chile submits that the only trade restrictive effect of the price band system is caused by the imposition of a duty. Since under the rules of the GATT, Chile's obligation is to respect its tariff binding, Chile could honour this obligation by applying its duty at the bound level of 31.5 per cent at all times. Instead, Chile applies a
price band system in which the applied duty is usually below the bound rate, and can even be zero. Chile refers to Argentina's argument that the Chilean PBS has additional restrictive effects other than the duties because of the system's alleged complexity and lack of transparency and predictability. Chile notes that its system for varying the duties applied within the bound cap is still less restrictive of trade than if Chile applied its duties at the bound rate. Chile contends that there is no requirement that a duty system be simple and there is no prohibition on variation, so long as the bound level is respected.  

4.44 Chile submits that it is not arguing that the only measures prohibited by Article 4.2 are those that were in fact converted into ordinary customs duties. Chile contends that the fact that PBS duties were not converted and were not requested to be converted is another supporting indication that the Chilean PBS is not a measure of the kind that had been required to be. Chile submits that, where the scope of a term is in doubt, as is the case with the term "variable import levies", it is particularly important to examine context and negotiating history. Chile also notes that it had no incentive to maintain a measure that could be converted, because the conversion process included the right to raise bound duties to account for the price effects of those non-tariff barriers that had to be converted.

4.45 Chile submits that, in the event that the Panel had any doubts over the correct interpretation of Article 4.2, the legal principle in dubio mitius, which the Appellate Body has endorsed, would suggest that vagueness and ambiguity should not be resolved against Chile, but rather against the complaining party that seeks to invalidate Chile's long standing system. Chile submits that the principle of in dubio mitius holds that "[i]f the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties." Chile considers that its PBS is consistent with Article 4.2 by any reasonable interpretation, applying the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention, but this interpretive principle lends further force to that conclusion.

4.46 Argentina contends that Chile erroneously invokes the principle of in dubio mitius to deprive the obligation contained in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture of its content, when that principle – as defined by the Appellate Body – is only relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation, to which there is no need to resort in this case. Argentina explains that Chile does this by shifting the responsibility for requiring it to convert its system into a tariff to the complainant. It adds that the obligation not to maintain a measure that is incompatible with its WTO obligations rests with Chile (Article XVI.4 of the WTO Agreement). Argentina having provided sufficient evidence to prove that the Chilean PBS is a "variable levy" or a "similar measure", in the absence of any rebuttal by Chile, there is no reason to resort to a supplementary means of interpretation (in dubio mitius) when Article 31 of the Vienna Convention suffices to clarify the meaning of the provision (Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture: prohibition to maintain), and to apply it to the facts of the case. In other words, the PBS is included among the "measures of the kind" which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties precisely because it is a "variable levy" or "similar measure".

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129 See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 35-36.
130 See Chile's Rebuttal, para. 37.
132 See Chile's Rebuttal, para. 38.
134 See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 28.
135 See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 29.
(ii) Whether the PBS is a variable levy or a similar border measure

4.47 **Argentina** argues that the term "variable levies" means "complex systems of import surcharges intended to ensure that the price of a product on the domestic market remains unchanged regardless of price fluctuations in exporting countries". With this definition in mind, Argentina considers that the Chilean PBS unquestionably applies variable levies on imports of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils. Argentina explains that, when the Chilean customs reference price is lower than the floor of the price band, the shipment is subject to a variable specific duty (in addition to the customs duty normally applied) amounting to the difference between the price band floor and the f.o.b. reference price provided by customs for the day on which the bill of lading of the imported goods in question was issued. The percentage of such duties applied to each shipment would vary according to the c.i.f. price. The nature of the PBS as a variable tariff, in Argentina's view, is recognized by the WTO Secretariat's 1997 Report on Trade Policy Review of Chile, where it is said that "[t]he price stabilization mechanism works as a variable levy since the duty imposed on these goods varies according to their import price." Argentina further submits that Chile itself has admitted that its system imposes a "levy" on "imports" which "varies" according to the day of shipment. Consequently, Argentina claims, it is a variable import levy.

4.48 **Argentina** initially argues that, since, in the PBS, a specific duty is a variable which depends on the relationship between domestic prices and export prices, the system defines the specific duty (variable in accordance with the f.o.b. reference price of the day) to be applied for each shipment. According to Argentina, this results in a different tariff for each shipment that was sought to be eliminated via the tariffication process of the Uruguay Round for agricultural products. It is Argentina's view that, under the PBS, Chile imposes more than "ordinary customs duties". Argentina alleges that, on shipments whose price is below the floor of the price band, Chile imposes a border adjustment measure which is a form of variable tariff. Argentina argues that, regardless of what a Member might choose to call its border adjustment measure, that measure is prohibited if it is anything other than "ordinary customs duties".

4.49 **Chile** argues that the Agreement on Agriculture does not contain any definition of what is meant by variable levy nor is there any definition elsewhere in the WTO. Chile considers that it is apparent that it is not sufficient simply to say that any levy that varies is a "variable levy", because all levies in one sense or another vary. In Chile's view, a uniform specific duty varies when measured in ad valorem terms, and an ad valorem duty by definition produces a different specific rate of duty, dependent on the value of a product. Chile further claims that the definition used by Argentina is based on a commentator's views and does not actually support Argentina's position either. Chile argues that its price band mechanism does not keep the domestic market price unchanged, nor is it intended or designed to do so. Rather, it continues, Chile's system is designed to moderate the effect of fluctuations in international prices on the Chilean market. Chile submits that, in its PBS, the critical variable is the difference between world prices at the time of shipment and world prices over

136 Argentina is using a definition provided in Goode, Walter, Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms (Centre for International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide, 1997), p. 250. See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 52.
137 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 54.
139 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 55.
140 Argentina refers to para. 38 of Chile's First Written Submission.
141 See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 49.
142 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 56.
143 See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 38.
144 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 52.
145 See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 40.
the last five years. Chile's domestic price plays no role in this formula, nor does the actual transaction price of the product make any difference. Chile concludes that price competition is possible, not only between products of different countries imported into Chile, but also between imports and Chilean products.\footnote{See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 43.}

4.50 In response to the above argument by Argentina\footnote{Chile refers to para. 56 of Argentina's First Written Submission.}, Chile argues that the tariff does vary according to the date of export, but does not vary according to the shipment (for example, even if the transaction prices are different, two shipments exported on the same date will have to pay the same import duty in Chile). Chile further argues that nowhere is it stated that a tariff measure becomes a "variable levy" simply because the tariff level varies frequently.\footnote{See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 40.} Chile also indicates that Argentina omitted to mention certain critical aspects of the texts in question and their application.\footnote{See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 32.} As regards Argentina's argument that the WTO itself has recognized that the PBS is a variable levy,\footnote{Chile refers to para. 55 of Argentina's First Written Submission.} Chile claims that the referred to report by the Secretariat for the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) only contains the opinions and statements of the Secretariat, not those of the WTO, and reminds Argentina that the opinions in the TPRM may not be used in dispute settlement procedures. In addition, Chile indicates that, in the statement quoted by Argentina, the Secretariat does not assert that the Chilean PBS is a variable levy but that it "works as" a variable levy, because the levy varies according to the import price.\footnote{See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 39. See also para. 41 of Chile's First Oral Statement.}

4.51 In response to Chile's argument that domestic prices are not used, Argentina argues that nonetheless it is not within the WTO's competence \textit{per se} to provide for mechanisms which regulate or moderate fluctuations in international prices.\footnote{See also para. 41 of Chile's First Oral Statement.} On the contrary, Argentina considers that the primary objective of the WTO is confined -- as regards access mechanisms -- to the promotion of transparent, non-distortionary, predictable systems that contribute to the liberalization of trade. And indeed, the PBS is the very type of mechanism which, since it lacks transparency and is distortionary and unpredictable, conflicts with the Uruguay Round commitment not to maintain "measures of the kind". In Argentina's view, all systems of variable levies have similar characteristics and a similar objective, i.e. to preserve the domestic market, to a greater or lesser extent, from the evolution of the international market. As instruments, these mechanisms provide a minimum threshold of protection which in some instances, as in the case of the bands, is virtually impassable in situations where prices drop. Argentina argues that, here, it is of little importance whether the threshold parameters are fixed on the basis of a domestic target price or on the basis of representative averages from international markets over the past years. According to Argentina, what is important is to ensure that these mechanisms have the same transparency, predictability and consequent effective access level as "ordinary customs duties" would have provided".\footnote{See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 60-62 and Annexes ARG-41 and ARG-42, and Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 19 and footnote 14.}

4.52 Chile submits that imports can in fact enter the Chilean market at prices below the price band floor. According to Chile, there are two situations in which this can happen: (i) Since the specific duties are calculated in the middle of the year and are applied during the following year, there are import cost components that can change during that period. For example, Chile explains, international freight costs for the products may decrease, sometimes rather sharply. Chile further alleges that, in some cases, specific tariff headings are shipped at special prices, using ships that are heading for Chile in any case, with or without cargo. Chile explains that, similarly, there are trade operations carried out in better conditions than those foreseen when establishing the weekly reference price, which means
that the import cost is also below the estimated price band floor. (ii) The effective import price may possibly be lower than the reference price determined for the date of a particular import and, consequently, the product may be charged a lower specific duty upon entry, remaining below the price band floor.154

4.53 Chile considers that, going beyond the incontrovertible fact that Chile applies a price band, it is essential to understand that the PBS imposes a duty that varies only according to the date on which the export took place, in accordance with the prevailing price on international markets, and in relation to the levels of the same price over the previous five years. Chile claims that the duty does not vary according to the amount of the transaction or the corresponding invoice and does not change either according to the domestic market price. Consequently, it is Chile's view that the PBS does not in any way resemble a variable levy such as those imposed by the old European Communities system for several years prior to the entry into force of the Agreement on Agriculture; it is not similar either to minimum import price schemes, which occasionally utilize duties in order to force a rise in low import prices until they are comparable to the minimum domestic landed price fixed. Chile contends that the differences between the PBS and the old European Communities system are more than semantic. According to Chile, the PBS does not act as a non-tariff barrier to prevent the import of goods whose price is lower than the price under the band nor to force an increase in this price until it reaches a certain domestic level.155

4.54 Argentina claims that Chile's submission makes a partial and erroneous interpretation of the definition of a variable levy156 provided in Argentina's submission.157 Argentina asserts that the definition in fact covers various elements that could be examined separately and that must be interpreted as a single whole. The definition begins by recognizing that a variable levy implies "complex systems of import surcharges". Argentina argues that, in the specific case of the Chilean PBS, two elements of the definition apply: complexity, and the imposition of variable levies in addition to the general tariff. Moreover, any PBS presupposes the application of a levy in addition to the general tariff (i.e. a surcharge) which varies, not with respect to the transaction value but in accordance with some type of mathematical relationship between the reference price fixed arbitrarily and some threshold price or parameter. These elements alone are evidence enough of the complexity of the system. Argentina explains that the third element of the definition, namely ensuring "that the price of a product on the domestic market remains unchanged", needs to be interpreted intelligently and in accordance with the text of the definition (and the ultimate purpose of the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture). Specifically, in a low international prices scenario, the distortionary effect of the Chilean PBS is reflected, in particular, in the artificial change in the competition situation on the domestic market owing to the fact that once the reference price of the system has been activated, the domestic market becomes, to a large extent, impervious to price signals from the international market.158

4.55 Chile submits that, if the term "variable levy" had been intended to have the broad meaning urged by Argentina and certain third parties, it is impossible to explain why Argentina would maintain a sugar import system that is not distinguishable in any relevant way from the Chilean system that Argentina is challenging. Further, Chile argues, it is impossible to reconcile this attempt to stretch the meaning of "variable levy" with the position adopted by WTO Members, including Argentina, Brazil and the United States, in the Uruguay Round negotiations after the text on the Agreement on Agriculture had been agreed. Recalling that Chile's system has been openly and transparently in effect since 1983, Chile adds, it is inexplicable why WTO Members raised no objection to the Chilean PBS

154 See Chile's response to question 46 (CHL) of the Panel.
155 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 37-38. See also para. 42 of Chile's First Oral Statement.
156 See para. 4.48 above.
157 Argentina refers to para. 37 of Chile's First Written Submission.
158 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 29-33.
and similar PBSs of other countries without demanding tariffication or change. Chile explains that Members accepted the system of the European Communities which clearly continues to levy duties that vary with the difference between European Communities and world prices. Chile contends that it is not arguing that a failure to challenge an illegal measure at the first opportunity means that a WTO Member forfeits the right ever to challenge that measure. However, Chile does contend that – in interpreting a term of art like "variable levy" that is not defined in the Agreement, – it is highly relevant to examine the conduct of the negotiators at the time of the negotiations and in the implementation of those negotiations. Chile submits that this context uniformly supports the view that the Chilean PBS is not a variable levy within the meaning of footnote 1.159

4.56 **Chile** contests Argentina's suggestion that an element of the test to determine whether a given import duty is a forbidden variable levy might be the frequency or degree of changes in the tariff and the complexity of the system.160 Chile contends that, aside from being vague and even illogical, none of Argentina's suggested rules, definitions and tests is set out in the Agreement on Agriculture or any other WTO agreement, and none of these suggestions has any legal status. Chile submits that nothing in the WTO prescribes how frequently an applied tariff can be changed or on what basis, so long as the binding is respected. Chile considers that its system in fact is transparent, and changes in the duty from week to week are normally modest, based on a formula utilizing objective criteria. However, Chile adds, neither Article 4.2 nor its footnote requires that Chile's system meet these tests.161

4.57 **Chile** considers that an analysis of the relevant provisions of the WTO according to the principles laid down in the Vienna Convention shows that the Chilean PBS does not constitute a variable levy nor any other form of non-tariff barrier within the meaning of Article 4.2.162 Chile alleges that its PBS does not come within the scope of footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In Chile's view, this is obvious because footnote 1 does not include PBS. This omission, in Chile's view, cannot be attributed to the fact that the concept of price bands was not understood at the time of the negotiations on the Agreement on Agriculture since, on the contrary, price bands were widely used in Latin America in 1994 and continue to be used today. Chile claims that the negotiators in the WTO, Argentina in particular, undoubtedly knew of such regimes and specifically decided not to include them within the list of measures covered by footnote 1.163 Chile submits that the price band is a specific tariff that fluctuates according to external factors. In Chile's view, variable import levies are measures that were habitually used in Europe, particularly in the EC, to oblige the price of imported products to rise up to the level fixed by the EC. Chile explains that, typically, and sometimes exclusively, there were no bound tariffs for products subject to variable levies in the EC. According to Chile, the purpose of variable levies was in fact to erect a virtually insurmountable barrier against imported products compared with European like products so that exporters were unable to compete with the prices in the European Communities and thereby undermine the EC's domestic price support system.164 On those grounds, Chile claims that its PBS is nothing more than an ordinary customs duty, with a rate that is adjusted to reflect the trend in current world prices compared with world prices in the past. It further deduces that a more competitive supplier would not lose his opportunity to win a larger share of the market by offering lower prices, as was the case with the variable levy schemes in Europe.165

159 See Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 44-47.
160 Chile refers to paras. 30-33 of Argentina's Oral Statement.
161 See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 24-25.
162 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 43.
163 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 44.
165 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 45.
4.58 **Chile** argues that, in reference to the example of the EC's variable levies, unlike PBSs or other ordinary duties, a variable levy, like other typical non-tariff barriers, removes any incentive to compete on price in the products concerned. Chile submits that the special scope of application of Article 4.2 reflects the consensus that existed among those taking part in the negotiations on agriculture in the Uruguay Round that it was necessary to discourage non-tariff barriers because they are less transparent and give a higher and more unconditional level of protection than tariffs. Chile claims that its PBS, however, imposes a specific tariff on certain agricultural products. It further explains that, even though the duty applied varies, it does not change according to the import price or the domestic market price in Chile, but compensates for the difference between a representative global price and a price fixed in the same way corresponding to the previous five years, deducting maximum and minimum prices.\(^\text{166}\)

4.59 **Argentina** submits that, the first step, according to the procedure for interpretation laid down by the Vienna Convention, would be to produce a textual definition of the concept of "variable levy", a definition which, in Argentina's view, does have its importance as a means of defining the scope of the obligations, and ensures that the literal meaning incorporates the economic and commercial reality that the words are supposed to reflect. Argentina contends that a variable levy can be defined textually as a customs charge in the form of a levy, duty or fee which varies over time – in other words, a duty applied by customs with an in-built pattern of variation based on extraneous factors and which is designed to increase or reduce the isolation of the domestic market. According to Argentina, in GATT/WTO terms, and from a legal point of view based on a textual interpretation, the parameters defining the variation of a levy must be extraneous to the transaction price or the physical characteristics of the product, which are the elements of "ordinary customs duties" par excellence. Argentina claims that an interpretation of the words of Article 4.2 such as the one mentioned in the previous paragraphs is supported by the Article's context, Article 4.1, and the title of the Article, which refer, respectively, to the national schedules as the instrument in which the commitments must be specified, i.e. the result of the tariffying and the market access, which is ultimately what is affected by systems such as the PBS – illegal under Article 4.2 because their effects are reflected in the greater or lesser isolation they cause. Argentina submits that, if it is argued that a textual and contextual basis is not sufficient to define a variable levy, one should turn to the object and purpose of the provision, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, i.e. making the rules and disciplines of the GATT/WTO in the agricultural sector more effective.\(^\text{167 168}\)

4.60 **Argentina** furthermore does not agree with Chile's argument whereby it assimilates all variable levies with those applied by the European Communities "at the time the negotiations were held".\(^\text{169}\) Argentina argues that Chile's extensive comparison and contrast of its price band system with that of the European Communities does not alter the fact that Chile's measure is a variable levy which, like the EC's measure, is specifically designed to ensure that local producers remain isolated from price competition from more efficient foreign producers.\(^\text{170}\) Argentina claims that Chile, in differentiating its system from the one applied by the European Communities (which would seem to be the only definition that Chile accepts of a variable levy), defines its PBS exactly as Argentina defines a variable levy in paragraph 53 of its first written submission. In that paragraph, Argentina states, elaborating on the definition of variable levies in paragraph 52, that it considers a variable levy to be "a duty which varies in accordance with the export market price." Argentina argues that, similarly, Chile maintains that "the Chilean PBS, however, imposes a specific tariff on certain agricultural products. Even though the duty applied varies, it does not change according to the import

\(^{166}\) See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 49.

\(^{167}\) Argentina refers to the Preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture speaks of "… correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets".

\(^{168}\) See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 45-47.

\(^{169}\) See First Written Submission by Chile, para. 49.

\(^{170}\) See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 48.
price or the domestic market price in Chile, but compensates for the difference between a representative global price (the price of hard red winter No. 2 f.o.b. from the Gulf (United States)) and a price fixed in the same way corresponding to the previous five years …”. Argentina submits that this Chilean definition coincides precisely with Argentina's definition of a variable levy. It further argues that this definition by Chile reinforces the concept of variability of the levy. In reference to paragraph 38 of Chile's written submission, Argentina claims that Chile recognizes firstly that the levy varies, and secondly, that it varies at least in accordance with Argentina's second observation concerning the concept of a variable levy, i.e. in accordance with the export market price.

4.61 **Argentina** contends that the test for determining whether a PBS is or is not a measure of this kind begins with an analysis of the characteristics in order to determine to what extent the particular characteristics of variable levies (i.e. variability, application at the border, and existence of determining extraneous factors) contributes to the objective of ensuring greater or lesser isolation of the domestic market. Argentina argues that, even if it were argued that the Chilean PBS is any way different from a variable levy, it cannot be denied that it comprises the elements that are common to that type of levy. Argentina claims that absolute identity is certainly not required; what is required is a resemblance or similar nature, in other words the mechanisms, structures and mode of application must resemble each other. In Argentina's view, it is important to see whether the measure under examination, in this case the Chilean PBS, fits with the final objective of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and its footnote in particular, and with the objective of tariffication of agriculture in general, in conformity with the Agreement – i.e. to enhance transparency through the establishment of tariffs that discipline agricultural trade and to improve the predictability of such trade through "specific binding commitments" in the area of "market access". Argentina submits that, if upon examining the most common elements of a variable levy the PBS were considered to lack absolute identity and therefore fall outside that category, the economic effects of the PBS surely constitute a clear basis for determining the degree of "similarity" of the measure within the meaning of footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

4.62 **Chile** submits that its PBS is not a "similar border measure" because neither by its operation nor in its context is it similar to the non-tariff barriers described in footnote 1, but rather it corresponds to the category of measure which, in accordance with this footnote, fall outside its scope. Chile considers that footnote 1 makes explicit that "similar border measures" do not include ordinary customs duties. Chile submits that the Chilean price band mechanism restricts trade only through duties, and that these duties do not operate as a minimum price system or other non-tariff barrier. Rather, Chile explains, the PBS, like other ordinary duties, allows price competition. Chile notes that, although the Agreement on Agriculture does not define "ordinary customs duties", it is obvious that the PBS falls within the term because it only imposes duties. In Chile's view, the system is subject to the obligations in Article II of the GATT 1994, in the same way as all the other products subject to a bound tariff as such. Chile argues that no waivers are envisaged and conformity with the WTO Agreement is not due to any agriculture-specific provision. Chile claims that, consequently, the most reasonable interpretation of the text of footnote 1 is that the PBS is outside the scope of the measures covered by the obligations in Article 4.2.

4.63 **Argentina** argues against Chile's statement that "the price band system … corresponds to the category of measure which, in accordance with this footnote, fall outside its scope". Argentina

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171 Argentina refers to para. 49 in fine of Chile's First Written Submission.
172 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 33-37.
173 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 55-57.
174 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 46.
175 See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 48.
176 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 47.
177 Argentina refers to para. 46 of Chile's First Written Submission.
contends that Chile fails to identify the characteristics which would enable the PBS to be covered by the exceptions in footnote 1 of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. It is Argentina's understanding that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and footnote 1 thereto expressly prohibit Members from maintaining, resorting to or reverting to "any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties", establishing a limited number of exceptions in the case of "special safeguard provisions" (Article 5), "special treatment with respect to paragraph 2 of Article 4" (Annex 5), and "measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other multilateral trade agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement." In Argentina's view, the Chilean PBS does not meet the requirements for being considered as a special safeguard measure under Annex 5 or Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture nor, clearly, is it a measure "… maintained under balance-of-payments provisions". Nor can the PBS be covered by the third hypothesis "… other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994", since the Chilean PBS is applied exclusively in the agricultural sector. Thus, Argentina contests Chile's argument with respect to the PBS that "no waivers are envisaged and conformity with the WTO Agreement is not due to any agriculture-specific provision." Consequently, Argentina rejects Chile's argument that "… the most reasonable interpretation of the text of footnote 1 is that the price band system is outside the scope of the measures covered by the obligations in Article 4.2."  

4.64 In Chile's view, a "minimum import system" or a "variable levy" might be considered a non-tariff measure insofar as the systems could operate to exclude low-priced goods and preclude price competition. However, Chile adds, it must be conceded that a prohibitive tariff has similar effects, but clearly is not prohibited by Article 4.2. Thus, Chile concludes, given the imprecision of the language of Article 4.2, it may be necessary, as with other measures, to examine which of such measures were considered to be of the type that required conversion into ordinary customs duties in the Uruguay Round. Chile is not aware of any objective test of "similarity" within Article 4.2 or elsewhere in the WTO. In Chile's view, it seems probable that the category of "similar border measures" was intended to capture measures that were the same as those "required to be converted", but which were simply labelled differently. Given the vagueness of the terms for those measures specifically named and given the apparent absurdity of a literal or dictionary approach, Chile considers that it is evident that a cautious approach is necessary, and that it would be prudent to decide cases as narrowly as possible, rather than attempting on the basis of a single dispute to enunciate broad rules not written in the text and not agreed by the negotiators.  

4.65 Argentina contends that the essential features that determine whether a measure is a "variable levy" or a "minimum import price" basically relate to the effects of the measure. Argentina considers that the basic effects of a variable levy or minimum import price, as well as any other non-tariff measure within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, are lack of transparency and predictability and consequent nullification or impairment of market access. In Argentina's view, the degree of similarity must once again be analysed in terms of undesired economic effects (mentioned in the reply to question 6(a)) which are present to a greater or lesser degree in the case of all "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duty", whether those listed specifically in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture or those covered by the concept of "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties".  

4.66 Chile agrees that the mere fact that a duty may or does vary does not mean that the duty is a prohibited variable levy. In Chile's view, were the rule otherwise, a Member could never change its

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178 Argentina refers to para. 47 of Chile's First Written Submission.  
179 Argentina refers to para. 47 of Chile's First Written Submission.  
180 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 79-83.  
181 See Chile's response to question 6 (ALL) of the Panel.  
182 See Argentina's response to question 6 (ALL) of the Panel.
applied rate of duty and indeed would have to offer guarantees that the applied rate would not vary, independent of any binding. Obviously, Chile adds, there is nothing in any WTO rule to suggest that whether a measure is a variable levy depends on the scope and frequency of variation. Chile contends that, if it is accepted that the purpose of Article 4.2 is to address non-tariff barriers, then it might be considered that the defining characteristic should be whether the measure has the effect of a quantitative limitation, in the way a minimum import price system can effectively prevent imports of goods below a certain price. However, Chile affirms, it must be conceded that there is no such test in the language of the Agreement, and it is easy to demonstrate that the negotiators of the Agreement on Agriculture allowed conversion into ordinary duties in a way that is often prohibitive of any imports not within the preferential tariff rate quota. Chile considers that, in such circumstances, it may be that the European Communities are correct to say that the dispositive issue, at least in the case of a measure whose restriction is accomplished through a customs duty, is whether there is a ceiling binding, in which case the frequency, scope or criteria for variability are irrelevant under Article 4.2.183

4.67 **Argentina** submits that an infringement of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is not contingent on whether or not the bound tariff has been violated. It further states that if, as Chile claims, the variability of a measure were irrelevant as long as the bound level was not exceeded, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and its footnote would lose their effectiveness in that the obligation would be limited exclusively to the application of "cap" mechanisms to the different variable levy schemes, making their mandatory tariffication as stipulated in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture unnecessary and rendering their operation immutable. In Argentina's view, there is no legal justification whatsoever for such an interpretation, which would in any case be absurd from an economic standpoint. Argentina is of the opinion that Chile cannot disregard the value of certainty in economics and trade and the inconvenience of having to deal with such volatile access mechanisms as variable levies. Indeed, it says, the use of the PBS is yet another factor of uncertainty, and compared with ordinary customs duties which, as already stated184, are not subject to the variability of the system at issue, it would add to the cost of any commercial planning scheme.185

4.68 **Argentina** submits that Chile has recognized that the category "similar border measures" was included in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture for the purposes of disciplining similar measures to those which have been required to be converted, but which were labelled differently.186 Argentina contends that this is exactly what the price band system is. In Argentina's view, it is therefore contradictory for Chile to maintain, on the one hand, that it is unaware of the existence of a similarity test for categorising a measure as one of those which must be tariffied, while on the other hand recognizing what that category includes.187

4.69 **Argentina** further contends that the only alternative for defining whether a measure such as the PBS is a variable levy or a similar border measure is to analyse the effects of the measure. Argentina submits that this is so clear that Chile itself recognized it in its reply to question 6 of the Panel, in which it states that a variable levy is a non-tariff measure "insofar as the system operates to exclude low priced goods and preclude price competition."188 In Argentina's view, this means that Chile upholds Argentina's economic impact analysis criterion.189 As also upheld by Chile190, Argentina adds, the PBS is designed to moderate the effects of international price fluctuations. It is

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183 See Chile's response to question 8 (ALL) of the Panel.
184 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 69 and 70.
185 See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 21.
186 Argentina refers to Chile's response to question 6 (ALL) of the Panel.
187 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 58-59.
188 See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 52.
189 See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 19.
190 Argentina refers to para. 11 of Chile's First Written Submission.
implemented through a system which avoids or moderates the effects of the transmission\(^{191}\) of those prices to the domestic market, using as a trigger price or a reference price for the application or calculation of the specific duties the "lowest f.o.b. price for the product quoted in a major commodity market relevant for Chile".\(^{192}\) According to Argentina, this shows that Chile expressly recognizes that the PBS has effects other than those of an ordinary customs duty. Argentina claims that this is because unlike the PBS, both *ad valorem* tariffs and specific tariffs or a combination of the two always result in direct transmission to the domestic market of changes in international prices.\(^{193}\)

4.70 In *Argentina*’s view, the most important aspects of variable levies and other similar measures that are inconsistent with Article 4.2 are those that relate to the effect of their application, i.e. lack of transparency, lack of predictability and consequent impairment. The Chilean system incorporates all three of these characteristics, so that even if it is not a variable levy, it at least constitutes a similar border measure.\(^{194}\) According to Argentina, this is important because, in economic terms, these measures, as opposed to ordinary customs duties result in undesirable effects. Argentina explains that the PBS used by Chile is activated when the reference price fixed by the implementing authority falls below a certain threshold parameter, commonly known as the floor of the price band. According to Article 1 of the decrees establishing the duties, the reference price is the lowest f.o.b. price recorded for a given date in international markets representative of the product. Argentina submits that the lack of clarity surrounding the methodology for fixing the reference price, as illustrated in the paragraph of Chile's submission containing a brief description of the system\(^{195}\), is evidence of the lack of transparency in implementing the system.

4.71 As regards the lack of predictability, *Argentina* contends that this is due to the fact that the level of the levies is not determined according to the transaction price, but according to a reference price of which the exporter has no knowledge until shortly before the transaction takes place, since it is fixed at short intervals (on a weekly basis). According to Argentina, this implies that a transaction price on the market may, on a given date, be subject to a relatively low effective duty, while on a subsequent date a higher effective duty, or even one that violates the WTO bound level, may be applied for the same transaction value. Argentina submits that this fact, although sufficient in itself to establish a violation of Article 4.2, added to the fact that the PBS does not have any safety mechanism (cap) to ensure that the bound level is not exceeded, illustrates that the unpredictability in case of a significant fall in prices is total for the purposes of efficient commercial planning. With a cap, the unpredictability would be partial. Argentina claims that, even assuming that the bound level is not exceeded, the variability of the system increases with the liberalization of trade in the sector. Consequently, Argentina concludes, we end up with an absurd commercial situation in which the lower the customs duty, the lower the level of predictability, since the level of variability of the system increases. Argentina's view is that, contrary to what Chile claims in its first submission, the Chilean PBS is distortionary, since the more competitive the price, the higher the relative level of levies applied to each shipment. As a demonstration of this statement, Argentina refers to its Annex ARG-37 which contains a chart illustrating the relationship between the monthly average reference price fixed by Chilean customs and the corresponding prices of edible vegetable oils of Argentine origin. Argentina submits that this is particularly true for a producer like Argentina whose prices are perfectly correlated with international prices. Moreover, although Argentina is an efficient producer, the fact is that the reference prices fixed by the Chilean authorities for almost all of the most important products in terms of commercial value traded by Argentina are below the f.o.b. quotations for shipments from Argentina. In other words, Argentina affirms, the Chilean PBS ensures that the more

191 Argentina refers to para. 18 of Chile's First Written Submission.
192 Argentina refers to para. 17 of Chile's First Written Submission.
193 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 53-54.
194 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 38.
195 Argentina refers to para. 15 of Chile's First Written Submission.
efficient the exporter, the greater the relative impact of tariff duties. In its view, this sort of "competitive penalization" is even more regressive when international prices are low.\textsuperscript{196}

4.72 **Argentina** argues that the variability of the PBS makes any effective commercial planning impossible owing to the unpredictability factor. Argentina affirms that this is clearly reflected by a simple statistical indicator such as the standard deviation coefficient, i.e. the ratio between the standard deviation and the arithmetic mean, for the total effective level (as a percentage over the transaction value) of duties applied to imports, measured on the basis of monthly averages. Argentina explains that it has made an analysis of the PBS variability on the basis of Chilean statistics for wheat products and soya bean oil – in the case of wheat, for 1996/1997 and in the case of soya bean oil, for the period 1996/1998. These years were selected because in none of them, with the exception of 1998 for milling wheat, was the bound level of 31.5 per cent exceeded (or if so, only marginally). Argentina submits that the comparison made on this basis reveals that for crude soya bean oil, the deviation coefficient amounted to 28.5 per cent and 31.7 per cent for the years 1996 and 1997 – i.e. the variation of the total effective level of duties for that product was, with respect to the arithmetic mean, 31.5 per cent as a monthly average for the mentioned period. With respect to milling wheat, the indicators were 153.5 per cent, 27.5 per cent and 15.5 per cent respectively for 1996, 1997 and 1998. In other words, the variation of the total effective level of duty for that product was, with respect to the arithmetic mean, 65.5 per cent on average. These levels of variation, amounting to practically one-third against the annual average in the case of oils and two-thirds in the case of milling wheat, result exclusively from the operation of the PBS, since the effective level of ordinary customs duties by definition does not vary, or if so, it varies with a frequency that is totally predictable. Argentina explains that, if one adds to these considerations the fact that, as explained at length in previous submissions, the system lacks transparency, that the duties resulting from the PBS are fixed at very frequent intervals (one week) and that the potential range of variation is of 31.5 per cent \textit{ad valorem}, only an extraordinarily audacious and broad interpretation of the Agreement on Agriculture could include a system of this nature among the "ordinary customs duties".\textsuperscript{197}

4.73 **Chile** submits that, while Argentina has objected to the frequency and degree of changes that Chile makes to its applied duties and to the alleged complexity and lack of predictability and transparency of those changes, none of those considerations change the character of the duties from "ordinary customs duties". Further, far from being prejudicial to trade, it is clear that, relative to maintenance of the duty at the bound ceiling rate, the price band system duties result in less restrictive rather than more restrictive treatment of imports.\textsuperscript{198}

4.74 **Chile** disagrees with Argentina's claim that its PBS affects trade security and predictability\textsuperscript{199} by stating that the Chilean formula is totally transparent and on the day a product is shipped the duty is known.\textsuperscript{200}

(iii) **Distinction between variable levy or similar border measure and ordinary customs duty**

4.75 In **Argentina**'s view, the criteria for distinguishing between a "variable levy" or "similar border measure", within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and an "ordinary customs duty", are based on the fact that the application of an ordinary customs duty is determined by the transaction price – \textit{ad valorem} duty – or the physical characteristics (weight/volume) – specific duty – or a combination of the two. Ultimately, Argentina concludes, it is the economic effects –

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{196} See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 41-51.
\item \textsuperscript{197} See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 64-69.
\item \textsuperscript{198} See Chile's Rebuttal, para. 17.
\item \textsuperscript{199} Chile refers to para. 31 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
\item \textsuperscript{200} See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 50.
\end{itemize}
deriving from the features of a variable levy or a similar border measure – which result in their being given a legal status distinct from "ordinary customs duties". 201

4.76 **Argentina** affirms that the term "ordinary customs duties" within the meaning of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 cannot at the same time be considered "a measure of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Argentina considers that, in addition to listing certain cases, by exclusion footnote 1 to that Article clearly defines "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" as "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties". In Argentina's view, the meaning of the term "ordinary customs duties" under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is the same. Argentina explains that there are no legal grounds whatsoever in the texts of the WTO Agreements for contending that the same term, "ordinary customs duties", must be interpreted differently. Argentina concludes that, in the absence of any clear indication to the contrary, we must assume that the identical terms reflect identical concepts. Argentina claims that "ordinary customs duties" are those which by their nature are perfectly predictable and transparent, and which owing to their total permeability to the international market ensure competition in the domestic market. Argentina further specifies that "ordinary customs duties" are *ad valorem* tariffs, specific duties or a combination of the two. Argentina clarifies that a measure " ... of the kind which has been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" can never, by definition, constitute an "ordinary customs duty". Otherwise, Argentina adds, one would be depriving Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture of its effectiveness. 202

4.77 In **Argentina's** view, "ordinary customs duties" in the meaning of the first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 are those which, in their different forms (*ad valorem* duties, specific duties or a combination of the two), set the maximum effective protection level permitted at customs. 203 Argentina contends that the concept of "ordinary customs duties" applies to the means of levying customs duties which provide a degree of certainty, stability and predictability. It further affirms that, under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, other duties or charges are merely those that do not constitute "ordinary customs duties", such as the other duties or charges which appear in columns 6 and 8 of the national schedules, as appropriate. "Other duties or charges of any kind" within the meaning of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, Argentina explains, cannot be considered as "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties". Argentina argues that the bound duty level for what is considered to be "other duties and charges of any kind" is the rate registered in that column. Consequently, Argentina concludes, that level is the one to be considered in determining inconsistency with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, without prejudice to the consistency of other duties or charges with other obligations under the GATT 1994. 204

4.78 In **Argentina's** view, these levels of variability are more akin to exchange quotations than to ordinary customs duties which, by their nature do not vary (or at least vary in a totally predictable manner as in the case of specific duties) and do not cause isolation from the international market. Argentina stresses that the above estimates were made (with the exception of 1998 for milling wheat) on the basis of the bound level not being exceeded. Obviously, it concludes, the indicators are even more eloquent in the case of series in which Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 was violated. 205

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201 See Argentina's response to question 8 (ALL) of the Panel.
202 See Argentina's response to questions 1 and 2 (ALL) of the Panel.
203 In this regard, Argentina quotes para. 5.4 of the Panel report in *European Economic Community – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components*, adopted on 16 May 1990, BISD 37S/132.
204 See Argentina's response to question 3 (ALL) of the Panel.
205 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 70-71.
4.79 **Chile** submits that there is no definition of "ordinary" customs duties or of "other" duties and charges in any of the WTO Agreements including the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b). However, in Chile's view, it is not necessary for the resolution of this dispute to develop a comprehensive rule for determining what assessments might be "ordinary customs duties" as opposed to "other duties or charges". Chile asserts that the tariffs resulting from the PBS are collected in the same way and at the same time as other ordinary Chilean duties. Chile claims that it has never listed the additional specific duties or the rebates from the *ad valorem* duty as "other duty or charge", nor have any Members so treated the Chilean PBS. In this dispute, Chile contends, Argentina's complaint is that the PBS can result in a breach of Chile's bindings, not that the PBS is an "other" charge that would be illegal in any manifestation or amount because it was never scheduled as an "other" charge in accordance with the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b). Chile submits that, if the duties from a PBS could be regarded as an "other" duty or charge as opposed to an ordinary customs duty, then Chile could have escaped any liability for any of the system's mandatory effects merely by scheduling the PBS as an "other" charge or duty, since Article II:1(b) and the Understanding permit "other" duties or charges at any level, if they are the result of a mandatory system properly scheduled as an other duty or charge. Had Chile attempted to do so, it is certain, in Chile's view, that other Members would have challenged that action in the WTO, and doubtless would have succeeded. However, Chile considers that it properly never sought to claim that the PBS was an exempt other duty or charge.

4.80 **Chile** considers that the measures listed in the footnote to Article 4.2 are non-tariff measures, and therefore are unlikely to involve "other duties or charges", except as an incidental aspect of the non-tariff barrier. It is conceivable, Chile argues, that a minimum import price system, which is one of the measures prohibited by Article 4.2, could be enforced through a measure that might be considered an "other duty or charge" under Article II:1(b). Chile notes that Article II has always prohibited new or higher "other" duties and charges on bound products, but the Understanding on Article II:1(b) created a more transparent and effective mechanism for enforcement in regard to such charges. Chile contends that the prohibition regarding other duties and charges for products subject to a binding is such that, even if ordinary duties are applied at a rate below the bound rate, no new or higher "other duty or charge" than that in effect on the scheduled date (or pursuant to mandatory scheduled legislation) can be imposed on that product, even if the amount involved would not, when added to the ordinary duty applied, exceed the bound ordinary rate. In Chile's view, it is clear that in this dispute Argentina has never complained that the PBS *per se* was an illegal "other duty or charge," but rather has complained that the PBS can result in ordinary duties in excess of the bound rate. Chile adds that its schedule is consistent with this interpretation, in that the price band system was not listed as an "other duty or charge".

4.81 **Chile** submits that Argentina's suggested tests of what is a permissible "ordinary customs duty" are not logical and would not achieve the objectives of freer trade in agriculture. Chile argues that many, if not most, protectionist non-tariff barriers are simple, transparent and highly predictable whilst perfectly legal sanitary and phytosanitary measures and many legal activities of state enterprises are far from transparent, simple or even predictable. Chile considers that the degree of prejudice or trade restriction caused by a duty is clearly not the basis for determining its legality. Chile submits that a high duty applied at a high bound rate is legal, but damaging. It further submits that the tariff rate quotas that Members were permitted to adopt remain highly restrictive and prejudicial to the interests of export nations.

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207 See Chile's response to question 3 (ALL) of the Panel.

208 See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 26-27.
4.82 Chile notes that the United States, as a third party in the dispute, in response to the Panel questions has introduced argument for the first time that the duties resulting from the price band system should be considered "other" duties or charges under Article II:1(b) and that these duties should therefore be regarded as prohibited by the terms of Article II:1(b) and the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b).\(^{209}\) Chile considers that it is correct that other duties and charges are flatly prohibited unless scheduled in accordance with the Understanding. However, Chile submits, the PBS is and always has been treated as an ordinary customs duty, subject to the binding, and not an "other duty or charge."\(^{210}\) In Chile's view, it is clear that all Members up to now have treated the PBS duties as ordinary customs duties rather than "other" duties. Chile contends that neither Argentina nor any other WTO Member (including the United States) has made this argument in the nearly 20 years that Chile has maintained the price band system, and, of course, Chile has never treated the price band system as an "other" duty or charge. Chile submits that, had Chile inscribed the price band duties as an "other" duty or charge within six months of entry into force of the Uruguay Round, then Chile would have had the right pursuant to the Understanding to maintain the price band system duties at any level, since Article II allows such "other" duties at the level required by mandatory legislation that has been scheduled. Chile concludes that, in that case, other WTO Members would surely have immediately challenged Chile's attempt wrongly to obtain beneficial treatment for the PBS by pretending that the PBS was an exempt "other duty".\(^{211}\)

4.83 Chile argues that the Panel has ample basis to reject the U.S. argument. In its view, in the absence of a definition of an "ordinary customs duty" in the text of the WTO Agreements, the United States attempts to invent one to serve its argument. Chile submits that the United States bases its argument first on an English language dictionary of the word "ordinary", which the dictionary defines as "regular, normal customary or usual." In response to Panel questions, Chile points out that, in Spanish, the terms used instead of ordinary or "ordinario" is "propiamente dicho". Chile submits that the slightly different translation is indicative of a term of art, though admittedly neither "ordinary" nor "propiamente dicho" is instructive without considering the other elements of interpretation called for in the Vienna Convention. Chile contests the United States' statement, allegedly without authority, that what should be "regular, normal, customary or usual" is the form of the customs duty. Chile considers that Article II:1(b) and the Understanding do not speak of "forms" of customs duties and that the "authority" claimed by the United States for this proposition is a baffling reference to a Uruguay Round negotiating proposal that called for agreement to express tariff equivalents in \textit{ad valorem} or specific terms.\(^{212}\) Chile submits that, even if the United States' argument were accepted that ordinary duties were \textit{ad valorem}, specific or a combination, the Chilean duty would still meet the United States' definition of ordinary, since the Chilean duty is a combination of an \textit{ad valorem} and a specific duty. In the Chilean PBS, the PBS duty, while calculated according to the PBS formula, is a specific duty per unit of volume or weight of the product, which is added to (or rebated from) the \textit{ad valorem} duty. Chile concludes that unsupported United States (and Argentine) assertions aside, there is nothing in the Article II:1(b) that limits how a specific or \textit{ad valorem} rate may be set, so long as the bound rate is respected.\(^{213}\) Chile also contests the United States' argument whereby the Chilean PBS is not an ordinary customs duty in the sense of Article II on grounds of an alleged "lack of transparency and definiteness." Chile argues that there is nothing in Article II that supports fabrication of such a test, which is itself rather lacking in transparency and definiteness. Chile further argues that the test is also illogical, since other duties now must be transparent, and definite in the sense of the limitations on level provided in Article II. Chile contends that it would be circular at best to say that by inscribing the nature and level of other charges, those "other" duties then become

\(^{209}\) Chile refers to United States' responses to question 3(b) and 3(c) (ALL) of the Panel.
\(^{210}\) See Chile's Rebuttal, para. 8.
\(^{211}\) See Chile's Rebuttal, para. 10.
\(^{212}\) See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 11-12.
\(^{213}\) See Chile's Rebuttal, para. 13.
ordinary duties.\textsuperscript{214} Chile further quotes an official "Foreign Trade Barriers" Report of the United States Trade Representative for 2001, in which the USTR treats the PBS as part of the ordinary customs duties of Chile. Chile argues that it is rather remarkable that a country like the United States with a significant export interest and who was certainly a major participant in the Uruguay Round negotiations would only claim to discover in the autumn of 2001 that, come to think of it, those price bands have been flatly illegal for years.\textsuperscript{215}

4.84 In Chile’s view, a measure that is already a bound "ordinary customs duty" subject to the provisions of Article II:1(b) cannot be considered a measure "of the kind which have been required to be converted" into an ordinary customs duty in the sense of Article 4.2. Chile considers that the term "ordinary customs duties" has the same meaning in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture as it has in Article II:1(b) of the GATT. Chile notes that the term "ordinary" in the English language of both Article II and Article 4.2 is expressed in the same way in the Spanish and French texts of those Articles, even though the choice of terms in Spanish and French "propioamente dichos" and "proprement dit" does not follow the usual dictionary translation into Spanish or French of the English word "ordinary".\textsuperscript{216} Chile alleges that, in addition to illustrating the hazards of a simple dictionary approach to treaty interpretation, this identical somewhat unusual translation in both Articles is further indication of the intent that the terms have the same meaning. It should be noted, Chile adds, that the term "ordinary customs duties" does not, by itself, carry the connotation in Article II that the duties are already or necessarily bound, but rather is something that can be bound pursuant to Article II. However, in Article 4.2, it appears from context that a measure that was "converted" into an ordinary customs duty was intended to mean made into a bound ordinary customs duty.\textsuperscript{217}

(c) Relation between Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture

4.85 Chile points out that all parties to the dispute agree that "ordinary customs duties" has the same meaning in Article 4.2 and its footnote as in Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. It further states that Argentina, however, never faces up to the contradiction in the Argentine position under Article II:1(b) and Article 4.2. Chile explains that, under Article II:1(b), Argentina complains that the PBS duties have resulted and could result in a breach of Chile's bindings - the bindings on ordinary customs duties. Under Article 4.2, however, to avoid conceding that the Chilean PBS duties are ordinary customs duties exempt from Article 4.2, Argentina attempts to invent a new definition of what is an ordinary customs duty as opposed to a "variable import levy" or "similar" measure. The Argentine definitions, however, are simply fabricated by Argentina, without foundation in the text of the Agreement, and without logic and coherence as a matter of treaty interpretation.\textsuperscript{218}

4.86 Chile submits that Argentina's complaint under Article II:1(b) properly treats the PBS duties as "ordinary customs duties", even though Argentina has tried to ignore the implications of its own claim. Chile argues that Argentina's claim under Article II of the GATT is that the PBS duties and the ad valorem duties can potentially result in total applied rate of duty above the bound rate. Chile contends that, if Argentina had considered, erroneously, that the price band duties were an "other" duty or charge, then Argentina would have claimed that the price band duties were flatly prohibited, regardless of whether the binding is breached. The reason is that Article II:1(b) unconditionally prohibits "other" duties and charges that have not been scheduled, without regard to whether those "other" duties and charges, when added to ordinary customs duties, would result in a breach of the

\textsuperscript{214} See Chile's Rebuttal, para. 14.
\textsuperscript{215} See Chile's Second Oral Statement, paras. 16-17.
\textsuperscript{217} See Chile's response to questions 1 and 2 (ALL) of the Panel.
\textsuperscript{218} See Chile's Second Oral Statement, para. 23.
binding on ordinary customs duties. Because the PBS duties are ordinary duties, Chile naturally has never scheduled the price band duties as an other duty or charge. In Chile's view, it is puzzling that Argentina asserts in paragraph 24 of its second submission that the price band duties are not an ordinary customs duty but rather a "surcharge" (sobretasa) – a term not used in Article II:1(b). However, it adds, even in paragraph 24, Argentina does not claim that the PBS duties are therefore prohibited under Article II:1(b), as would be the case if they were unscheduled "other" duties or charges. Rather, Argentina simply argues that the "sobretasa" together with the ad valorem duty can potentially result in a breach of the binding.  

4.87 Chile submits that the nature of Argentina's complaint and argumentation under Article II:1(b) demonstrates that, for purposes of Argentina's complaint under Article II:1(b), Argentina regards the PBS duties as ordinary customs duties. Chile argues that if Argentina considered PBS duties to be "other" duties, then it would make no sense for Argentina to concede that the PBS duties do not necessarily breach the binding, but rather are only "potencialmente violatorio". Likewise, there would have been no need for Argentina in its first submission to set out an elaborate formula for determining when the PBS duties would have the effect of breaching the 31.5 per cent binding because under Article II:1(b) and the Understanding, "other" duties or charges are prohibited at any level, if they were not properly and timely inscribed in a Member's schedule. Chile affirms that it is transparent in its schedule that Chile made no attempt to list the PBS duties as other duties or charges, because, of course, the PBS duties are ordinary customs duties and have always been so treated.

4.88 Argentina, in reference to the above argument by Chile to the effect that it did not register its PBS because the duties resulting from it were "ordinary customs duties", states that, in fact, Chile is merely recognizing that while the resulting duties could be ordinary customs duties, the PBS as such cannot, since it does not have any limit as to the duties it is capable of imposing and varies over a wide range – both above and below the bound level – with a frequency that makes it incomparable to ordinary customs duties. Argentina explains that what counts under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which is a lex specialis vis-à-vis Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, is that the price band system, as its name suggests, is a "system" (a series of elements which interact to produce a result) and not an "ordinary customs duty". Argentina submits that the PBS, by its very nature – "variable levy" or "similar measure" – is one of the "measures of the kind" which have been required to be converted into "ordinary customs duties". It contends that it is the system that was required to be converted (the PBS) that is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and not the duties resulting from that system. Chile itself has said that "Chile's price band system duties are not variable import levies within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement". Regardless of the status of the duties resulting from the application of the PBS, Argentina submits, the system as such has been shown by Argentina to be a "variable levy" or similar measure within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

4.89 Argentina submits that the obligation contained in the first part of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 is a separate obligation and different from the obligation laid down in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. It further explains that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture prohibits certain measures involving restriction of market access independently of any breach of

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220 Chile refers to para. 21 of Argentina's Oral Statement.
221 See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 18-20.
222 Argentina refers to para. 20 in fine of Chile's Rebuttal.
224 Argentina refers to Chile's Rebuttal, title preceding para. 23.
225 See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 15.
226 See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 13.
Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 (Schedules of Concessions).\textsuperscript{227} It will later specify that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is \textit{lex specialis vis-à-vis} Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.\textsuperscript{228}

4.90 \textbf{Chile} considers that the prohibitions in Article 4.2 apply without regard to whether the measures breach a tariff binding. In Chile's view, for example, it is obvious on the face of the Agreement that one of the main purposes of Article 4.2 was to prevent a Member who had had the privilege of converting a non-tariff measure into an often prohibitively high tariff from then proceeding to restore that or some other non-tariff barrier at a later date. However, Chile argues, a measure that could violate Article II of the GATT 1994 is not likely to be a non-tariff measure prohibited under Article 4.2, unless the measure has non-tariff components as well.\textsuperscript{229}

4.91 \textbf{Argentina} argues that the only way of evaluating whether a measure which was maintained is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, particularly if it is a measure similar to those listed in footnote 1, is by analysing its economic effects as compared to ordinary customs duties. Consequently, Argentina submits, not having been tariffed and the results of the process not having been included in the corresponding schedule, failing a waiver or renegotiation of the commitments, the price band system is clearly in violation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, even without exceeding the bound level.\textsuperscript{230} Argentina further claims that Chile itself admits that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture can be violated without violating Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.\textsuperscript{231}

4.92 \textbf{Argentina} does not agree with the argument developed by the European Communities whereby a measure that would meet the test set out by the Appellate Body in \textit{Argentina – Footwear, Textiles and Apparel}, and would therefore not be contrary to Article II of GATT 1994, would not be subject to any further obligation in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The European Communities consider that such a conclusion would stand even if the measure in question resulted in the application of a "duty that varies" – inasmuch as this "variation" is maintained below the ceiling written in the Member's tariff binding. Thus, in the European Communities' view, the decisive element which distinguishes an "ordinary customs duty" from a "variable levy" is the existence of a ceiling in the tariff binding. Argentina considers that the European Communities are trying to link different obligations laid down in different agreements. In Argentina's view, Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 lays down the obligation to refrain from levying "ordinary customs duties" in excess of the bound duties set forth in the national schedules. On the other hand, Argentina explains, Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture lays down the obligation to change all "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties", as well as the obligation to refrain from maintaining, resorting to, or reverting to any measures of the kind set forth in the non-exhaustive list in the footnote. Argentina notes that, at the same time, the difference between the application of specific duties – in the case cited by the European Communities (violation of the bound level, Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994) – and the Chilean PBS (Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture) lies in the total predictability and transparency for the purposes of commercial planning in the first case (application of specific duties with a ceiling), and the total absence of predictability and transparency for the purposes of commercial planning in the second case (application of a variable duty or similar measure). Argentina concludes that the European Communities' interpretation of the obligations under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture deprives of its effectiveness a provision that was painstakingly negotiated by Members. As stated in Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Argentina submits, the obligations under the GATT 1994 apply with respect to agricultural trade to the extent that the specific Agreement concluded on agriculture does not provide

\textsuperscript{227} See Argentina's response to question 4 (ALL) of the Panel.
\textsuperscript{228} See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 15.
\textsuperscript{229} See Chile's response to question 4 (ALL) of the Panel.
\textsuperscript{230} See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 50-51.
\textsuperscript{231} Argentina refers to Chile's response to question 4 (ALL) of the Panel.
otherwise.\footnote{Argentina refers to Article 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture and quotes para. 353 of the Panel report in Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R) adopted on 10 January 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body report, as follows: "the provisions of the GATT 1994 apply to market-access commitments concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing with the same matter."} Argentina explains that the Members agreed, in the case of agriculture, that a certain kind of measures would be "required to be converted into ordinary customs duties", i.e. tariffied with a view to eliminating their distortionary effects and lack of transparency and predictability. These effects, Argentina asserts, which distinguish the "measures of the kind" that must be tariffied from "ordinary customs duties", are independent of any ceiling.\footnote{See Argentina’s response to question 5 (ALL) of the Panel.}

4.93 In Chile’s view, the above argument of the European Communities may be correct, although it would note that Chile has pointed out several bases for concluding that the Chilean PBS is not prohibited by Article 4.2, so it is not necessary to resolve the issue whether the existence of a binding by itself is sufficient to make a duty that varies not a prohibited measure under Article 4.2. While it is obvious that the mere existence of a binding on a product does not permit resorting or reverting to a prohibited non-tariff barrier on such product, Chile contends, the European Communities' distinction is salient for a measure whose only protection is achieved via a duty, where the degree of variation does not add any protection greater than that achieved if the duty were applied at the bound level. Chile believes that the logic behind accepting the European Communities' argument lies in three points: First, as Argentina has conceded, not every duty that varies is banned, since that would imply a rule that countries cannot change their applied rates, even to reduce them, even if bound rates are respected. Chile's annual reduction of its applied rates would become a prohibited variable levy, by such an absurd test. Argentina arguments notwithstanding, there is nothing in the WTO establishing rules about degree, frequency or predictability of variations. Second, the most important objective characteristic of the "conversion" of the European Communities' variable levies appears to be the binding of duties, and the European Communities' conversion was subject to ample discussion and negotiation by all parties before the WTO agreements went into force. It thus would seem to Chile that the European Communities were entitled to think all parties understood its conversion to be adequate. Indeed, Chile explains, the only complaints about the European Communities' conversion were that the levy did not vary enough. Chile considers that, while the European Communities' system is certainly not at issue in this dispute, it is reasonable to look at the practice of such a major Member, and the attitude of other Members toward that practice in establishing how it would implement the obligations even before the entry into force of the WTO agreement. Third, and most important, varying the applied rate below the bound level is less, not more protective than a perfectly legal system in which the applied rate is simply maintained at the bound level. According to Chile, while Argentina has tried to suggest that the variability of a duty is an additional barrier to trade, Argentina has no evidence for that proposition. Chile submits that it is undeniable that every Member has a right to apply its duties at all times at the level of its bindings. Chile claims that, in theory and in fact, it is impossible to see how it can be less advantageous to trade of other countries if instead of constantly applying duties at the bound rate, a Member maintains a system in which the duties assessed are usually less than the permissible bound rate, at least so long as the ceiling binding is honoured or an appropriate exception invoked. In Chile's view, the variation of the applied rates below the bound rates may mean that Members cannot rely on always having the benefit predictability of the voluntary benefit of lower rates than the tariff binding, but Members have no right to such lower rates in any event. Thus, Chile concludes, it is reasonable to assert that, in the case of measures whose only protective effect is through a duty, there is no basis for complaint about a duty that varies, so long as the ceiling binding and other obligations such as MFN are respected.\footnote{See Chile's response to question 5 (ALL) of the Panel.}
(i) Other issues of interpretation relating to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture

Relevance of the Chile-Mercosur Economic Complementarity Agreement No. 35

4.94 Chile refers to Article 24 of its Economic Complementarity Agreement ("ECA") No. 35 with Mercosur after the Uruguay Round where it is stated that the parties, Mercosur (including Argentina) and Chile recognize the existence of the PBS and establish certain rules to the effect that Chile will not add new products to the system nor modify it with the intention of imposing more stringent restrictions. Chile claims that, according to the principles of international law, therefore, Argentina recognized and accepted the existence of the system that it is now trying to contest in a different legal framework. In response to a question by the Panel, Chile clarifies that, by "the principles of international law", it means any collection of standards which, although not necessarily a treaty or a conventional source of rights and obligations, governs and determines international relations between States and other subjects of international law. In this particular case, Chile adds, it was referring to the following principles: the principle of good faith: "good faith shall govern the relations between states", as well as the performance of treaties concluded by them. According to Chile, Argentina is one of the States that participated in the Uruguay Round negotiations, and when the trade agreements were adopted, although it definitely knew of the PBS, it never suggested, in this forum, that it be eliminated, modified or replaced by a system of the bound duties. Chile submits that it is hardly in a position to do so since Argentina itself has its own PBS with respect to sugar imports. Subsequently, during the negotiation of ECA 35 between Mercosur and Chile, Argentina, although aware of the existence of the PBS and its technical aspects, did not suggest or require its elimination, modification or replacement by Chile with a system of bound duties. Even more importantly, Chile claims, the PBS was one of the trade issues that was expressly discussed and negotiated between Chile and members of Mercosur. Chile submits that the parties expressed their explicit and unequivocal acceptance of the price band and its technical aspects by including in Article 24 of ECA 35 a provision which directly mentions the system. Nevertheless, Chile adds, four years later Argentina itself tried to challenge the very system whose consistency with the WTO it had already accepted internationally, under a different legal framework. In Chile's opinion, this international behaviour clearly contradicts the principle of good faith which should govern international relations and the performance of treaties that have been negotiated, signed and ratified.

4.95 Chile further mentions the principle of pacta sunt servanda: every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. According to Chile, this principle has a natural, complementary and explicit link with the principle of good faith, and hence the above remarks fully apply. Chile contends that Argentina and the other members of Mercosur undertook, in ECA 35, to respect the PBS unless Chile, following the entry into force of the Agreement, were to include new products, to modify the mechanisms or to apply them in such a way as to undermine Mercosur's market access conditions. Although none of the above has occurred, Chile stresses, Argentina has challenged the system, using a different legal framework to do so. Under the rules of international law on interpretation of treaties, Chile explains, ECA 35 constitutes an additional relevant context for interpreting the conformity of the PBS with the WTO and its Agreements. In conclusion, Chile asserts, the conduct of Argentina and the other participants in the negotiation of ECA 35 suggests that all of the Mercosur member countries viewed the PBS as a legitimate measure that was permitted under the WTO and required disciplines under ECA 35 so that the member countries of Mercosur could obtain a benefit beyond what they had already obtained as Members of

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235 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 36.
236 Chile quotes Article 24 of ECA 35 which reads as follows: "In using the PBS foreseen in its domestic legislation for the import of goods, Chile undertakes, in the framework of this Agreement, not to include new products or to modify the mechanisms or apply them in such a way as may undermine Mercosur's market access conditions."
237 See Chile's response to question 13 (CHL) of the Panel.
the WTO as a result of Chile's tariff concessions. According to Chile, this is obvious, since if members of Mercosur had felt that the entire PBS was illegal under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (as Argentina is now claiming in this dispute), then it would have been unnecessary and indeed pointless to negotiate limitations, as they did, on the use of the system under the ECA. Chile indicates that it does not claim or even attempt to argue that Argentina is not entitled to submit its complaint before the WTO on the basis of its new theory that the PBS is illegal under Article 4.2 on the Agreement on Agriculture (although Chile obviously considers that this theory is absolutely without merit). What Chile does maintain is that Argentina's prior conduct -- both during the Uruguay Round negotiations and during the negotiation of ECA 35 -- shows that Argentina did not, and does not, understand Article 4.2 to be a rule that prohibits the PBS, but on the contrary, it understands that Article to be a rule which permits the PBS. In Chile's view, this understanding constitutes a relevant context under the rules of international law for interpreting the meaning of Article 4.2. Chile clarifies that it is not asking the Panel to decide on the interpretation of ECA 35, as this would not be within its jurisdiction and competence. What Chile has done, it explains, is to introduce this Agreement merely as yet another element in the relevant context substantiating Chile's understanding of the interpretation of Article 4.2 in relation to its PBS. Chile further clarifies that it is not suggesting that the interpretation of WTO rules depends on who the parties to a dispute are. In Chile's view, the ECA is a relevant context because it shows that prominent Members of the WTO, including those that are parties to this dispute, negotiated another agreement immediately following the negotiation of the WTO Agreements, on a basis which suggests that they understood the WTO Agreements did not, and do not, prohibit the Chilean PBS.238

4.96 Argentina rejects the above argument that it bases its claim on a "new theory that the PBS is illegal under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture". Argentina is not aware of the existence of different theories concerning the obligations under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Argentina assumes that there are measures that are either consistent or inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture in general, and measures that are inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Consequently, Argentina submits that all that is needed is to apply the Vienna Convention to the interpretation of the scope of the obligations. Argentina contends that, in its international relations and in respect of treaties it has concluded with other States, it acts in conformity with the general principles of public international law. Argentina submits that, contrary to what Chile has claimed, in bringing its complaint concerning the inconsistencies of the PBS with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture before the WTO, Argentina acted in conformity with the principle of good faith and the principle of pacta sunt servanda. However, Argentina submits, Chile's conduct in maintaining provisions under its domestic legal system which violate Article XVI.4 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO after accepting the covered agreements is contrary to the principle of good faith in the fulfilment of agreements and in the actions of States, particularly when Chile has recognized that it has done this "deliberately".242

4.97 Chile clarifies that the ECA 35 did not deal directly with the issue of whether the PBS was or was not, for the purposes of the WTO, an ordinary customs duty or some other kind of duty, charge or tax. However, it is clear that none of the parties considered that the duties under the PBS were "other duties" under the WTO, since Chile did not include them as such in its tariff schedule, and the other Members did not attack them as such under the WTO.243 It further clarifies that it has never said that Argentina's acceptance of the price band in ECA 35 was an exception to the WTO. Chile explains that what it has said is that Argentina, through WTO, wants to upset the balance of rights and

238 See Chile's response to question 13(a) (CHL) of the Panel.
239 See Argentina's response to question 13(a) (CHL) of the Panel.
240 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 36-37.
241 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 84-85.
242 See Chile's response to question 13(a) (CHL) of the Panel.
243 See Chile's response to question 13(a) (CHL) of the Panel.
obligations assumed under their bilateral agreement, since Argentina made Chile pay to retain the price band in the bilateral agreement as if Argentina also considered the price band valid under WTO.\textsuperscript{244}

4.98 \textbf{Argentina} considers that Chile's argument that Argentina recognized and accepted the existence of the [price band] system\textsuperscript{245} in the framework ECA 35 ignores the essence of the WTO obligations contained in the "covered agreements" whose "enforcement" is achieved through the DSU. In this respect, Argentina submits that WTO precedent makes it clear that it is the commitments assumed under the WTO and not the bilateral agreements that constitute the relevant obligations of a Member under that Agreement. In other words, there are different legal frameworks: in one of them, the WTO, paragraph 4 of Article XVI lays down the obligation for Members to bring all of their legislation into conformity with the WTO Agreements, while in another, completely different framework – the regional Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) - relations between Mercosur and Chile are governed by ECA 35, which covers an ambitious agenda and in which the provisions cited by Chile could be given any number of meanings, as has been recognized by Brazil, another member of ECA 35, in its third party submission.\textsuperscript{246} Argentina submits that a simple reference to the PBS in the framework of a regional agreement can in no way be understood as a waiver of WTO obligations. Argentina declares that if a Member could be released from its WTO obligations and could obtain a sort of immunity against scrutiny of its measures on the basis of provisions to which it has adhered in other legal frameworks, such as regional agreements, the very basis of the multilateral trading system would be affected.\textsuperscript{247}

4.99 \textbf{Argentina} submits that each international treaty is an independent legal instrument and should therefore be considered as a self-sufficient entity based on the principle of \textit{pacta sunt servanda}. Argentina stresses that the ECA 35 does not have an auxiliary or complementary nature with respect to the WTO agreements: the ECA 35 does not clarify, complement, amend or modify the agreements covered by the Marrakesh Agreement. Argentina further submits that Chile is wrong to invoke ECA 35 in its defence in that ECA 35 does not say that Argentina "recognized and accepted" the Chilean PBS. On the contrary, Argentina contends, as Chile itself admits, the ECA 35 is the result of negotiations which led to the application of certain restrictions, albeit insufficient, to the PBS.\textsuperscript{248} Argentina claims that, as Chile recognizes, the ECA 35 requires Chile to refrain from increasing the market distortions caused by the PBS by not adding new products or making it more stringent and more restrictive of trade. In Argentina's understanding, far from accepting the PBS, Mercosur, through the ECA 35, tried to limit and restrict it. Argentina concludes that Chile's comments\textsuperscript{249} ultimately lead to the conclusion with respect to the ECA 35 that by permitting the PBS to operate at full regime, making the system more restrictive, in spite of Mercosur's attempts to impose limits on the system, Chile has in fact violated ECA 35, the very Agreement behind which it is now trying to hide.\textsuperscript{250}

4.100 According to \textbf{Argentina}, WTO Members cannot opt to disregard their WTO obligations simply because they have signed less restrictive agreements. \textit{A contrario}, Argentina argues, if one was to consider, for the sake of argument, that we are not dealing with two separate and distinct legal frameworks, as Argentina contends, and if ultimately, although nothing prevented Argentina from filing a complaint with the WTO, the ECA 35 served as a context for the analysis of the inconsistency of the Chilean price band system \textit{vis-à-vis} Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, in Argentina's

\textsuperscript{244} See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 65.
\textsuperscript{245} Argentina refers to para. 36 of Chile's First Written Submission by Chile.
\textsuperscript{246} Argentina refers to p. 4 of Brazil's Third Party Submission.
\textsuperscript{247} See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 59-61.
\textsuperscript{248} Argentina refers to para. 36 of Chile's First Written Submission.
\textsuperscript{249} Argentina refers to para. 25 of Chile's First Written Submission
\textsuperscript{250} See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 86-91.
view, it would have to begin by pointing out that Chile explicitly recognizes that the "ECA No. 35 did not deal directly with the issue of whether the price band system was or was not, for the purposes of the WTO, an ordinary customs duty or some other kind of duty, charge or tax ... "  

251 Argentina further argues that, if ECA 35 were even considered an "additional relevant 'context, Chile itself has also recognized that it did not include the PBS' as such in its tariff schedule"  

252 either in the WTO, or in the Annex and Additional Notes to ECA 35. Argentina considers that, "if the ECA 35 did not 'deal directly with the issue', and if there is an opinion to the effect that the PBS does not constitute another duty", and if Chile also failed to include the PBS as such in its tariff schedule and in the Annexes and Additional Notes to ECA 35, it is difficult to see how the PBS could serve as a context for the interpretation of obligations under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Argentina further argues that if the Panel were to consider that the ECA 35 provides a guide, because Chile itself excluded the PBS from its tariff schedule and because it takes the view that no preferences - the very purpose of ECA 35 - are applicable to the price band system, this reinforces the idea that the PBS is not a tariff – in WTO terms, "an ordinary customs duty" – but rather, it is what Argentina has been claiming it to be from the beginning of these proceedings, i.e. a "variable levy" or a "similar border measure" which is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  

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Prior knowledge, negotiating history and subsequent practice

4.101 Chile submits that the PBS has been in effect since 1983, having been established by law, and that the system is used by some countries of the Andean Community and was used by some Central American countries. It explains that, throughout the late 80s and early 90s, the World Bank encouraged countries, at least in Latin America, to convert their quantitative restrictions to price bands, which are more market oriented schemes. Chile contends that Argentina has a system similar to Chile's price band for imports of sugar that considers an additional duty that is the result of the difference of two prices; one called "Guía de Base" which is the result of the average international prices of the last eight years and the other called "Guía de Comparación" which is the London price.

4.102 Argentina considers that Chile's vague and general argument concerning the existence of PBSs in Latin America is irrelevant in justifying the kind of violation resulting from the Chilean PBS. Argentina is of the view that Chile's statement is not based on any concrete evidence of the existence of several PBSs in the region, and even if there were several, their mere existence would not suffice to make the Chilean system consistent with WTO rules - that, after all, is the subject of this proceeding.  

254 It further argues that the prior existence of the Chilean PBS and its subsequent maintenance following the entry into force of the Agreement on Agriculture does not preclude the fact that the system was contrary to Article 4.2 and its footnote. In Argentina's view, Article 28 of the Vienna Convention clearly states that the "provisions [of a treaty] do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place ... before the date of entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party." In this regard, Argentina considers that there was no possibility of filing a complaint prior to the entry into force of WTO Agreements on 1 January 1995. Argentina therefore concludes that Chile's argument that neither Argentina nor any other Member filed a complaint previously is without foundation. On the other hand, Argentina adds, as from the entry into force of the Agreements – i.e. the date on which the Members assumed the positive obligation to bring their domestic regulations into conformity with the system (pursuant to Article XVI.4 of the WTO Agreement) and to put an end to any measure that is inconsistent with the system - the Chilean measure has been liable to questioning under the DSU, not only as a result of previous rules, but because of what is expressly stipulated in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture itself, since Chile has continued to maintain a measure which should have been converted into a regular customs duty. Argentina submits that this

251 Argentina refers to Chile's response to question 13(c) of the Panel.
252 Argentina refers to Chile's response to question 13(c) of the Panel.
253 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 92-96.
254 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 58.
provision must be interpreted in the light of Article XVI.4 of the WTO Agreement, which also lays down an obligation for Members to act, in the following terms: "Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." Argentina considers that the fact that prior to the complaint filed by Argentina there had not been any other complaints lodged by Argentina or any other Member of the WTO does not lead to a presumption that the PBS is consistent with Article II.1(b) of the GATT 1994 or with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture since there is no WTO rule precluding Argentina's right to file a complaint for violation of both Article 4.2 and Article II.1(b) of the GATT 1994. If there had been such a rule, Argentina submits, it would have been up to Chile to include it in these proceedings as a legal basis for its general assertions.  

4.103 Chile agrees that there is no doctrine of estoppel in the WTO nor any other rule or practice in the WTO that provides that a measure cannot be challenged if its removal was not specifically addressed in negotiations or if the challenge is not made within some specific period after entry into force. However, Chile contends that Argentina misunderstands Chile's argument. Chile argues that there is no evidence that PBS were considered measures that had to be converted into ordinary customs duties, while the context of other parts of the WTO agreement, the negotiating history, and subsequent practice all support Chile's view that the PBS duties are not prohibited. Chile further indicates that, under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, the negotiating history is a valid tool for interpretation in case of doubt. Chile insists that Chile's negotiators recall that both the Secretariat and other delegations confirmed orally that the price band system was not a measure requiring conversion to ordinary duties, and claims that neither Argentina nor any interested party has offered any evidence to the contrary. Chile also stresses that subsequent practice supports Chile's view that the price band system is not a measure prohibited by Article 4.2. Chile mentions that Argentina has a sugar import duty system that Chile is confident Argentina would not maintain if it believed the validity of any of the interpretations it asserts against Chile. Chile submits that, while it might be argued that Chile's system or that of other Andean countries, or Argentina's sugar system is too small in its effects to be worth a challenge, the same could hardly be said of the EC's system. In Chile's view, the reason that PBS or the systems of the European Communities or Argentina were not challenged in the WTO has nothing to do with forbearance. Rather, it is because these measures are ordinary customs duties that are subject to the disciplines of Article II.1(b), but are not prohibited by Article 4.2.  

4.104 Argentina asserts that following the end of the Uruguay Round, "subsequent practice" (within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention) - if any - relevant to define the content of the provisions of the text of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which are not ambiguous, is the practice of the Members of the WTO. In this sense, Argentina submits, the only existing practice within the WTO, provides precisely the opposite outcome to what Chile has submitted before this Panel. Argentina quotes paragraphs 47 and 48 of document WT/L/77, containing the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ecuador to the WTO and indicates that the excerpt clearly shows that the overwhelming majority of WTO Members has agreed, within a formal context (that is, during the discussions leading to the accession of Ecuador to WTO) – reflected in a WTO official instrument – that PBSs are incompatible with WTO rules. Argentina concludes that this is the only relevant WTO practice in the sense of Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention, since it reflects the opinio juris of all WTO Members and not that of isolated Members.  

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255 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 52-57.
256 See Chile's Second Oral Statement, para. 30.
257 See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 30-34.
259 See Argentina's response to question 41 (ARG) of the Panel.
4.105 In response to a question by the Panel, Chile indicates that it believes that the text and context leave no ambiguity that the Chilean PBS is not a measure prohibited by Article 4.2. However, it adds, if the Panel is in doubt, the negotiating history and state practice are legitimate supplementary interpretive aids, and these all support Chile's position that Article 4.2 does not prohibit the Chilean PBS. Chile contends that there are four elements of this practice: first, the existence of similar measures to those of Chile in other countries (including Argentina and the European Community); second, the absence of "conversion" except by binding of the duty by any other Member having such a measure; third the absence of any challenge of such measures under Article 4.2, and fourth, the initiation of dispute settlement challenges of the European Community's system in 1995-1997 by Canada, the United States, Thailand and Uruguay under provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Customs Valuation Agreement, but never on grounds of a violation of Article 4.2. Chile submits that this practice, like the negotiating history and the tariff negotiations, does not by itself prove that the negotiators of Article 4.2 did not intend to prohibit duties that vary in the sense of the Chilean, Andean, Argentine or European Communities system. However, it argues, the practice, context and negotiating history all support the logical reading of Article 4.2, i.e. that the Article does not prohibit the Chilean PBS, at least so long as it operates within a system of bound ordinary customs duties.\(^260\)

4.106 In response to a question by the Panel as regards Argentina's reference to the Working Party Report on Ecuador's accession to the WTO, Chile submits that it includes the comment that "some members of the working party" thought that Ecuador's price band system was contrary to WTO rules. However, it argues, the discussion in paragraphs 42 to 48 of the Working Party Report does not reveal any general agreement that Ecuador's system was inconsistent with WTO rules. Chile submits that, even among those who voiced the view that Ecuador's system was inconsistent with the WTO, there does not even appear to have been agreement on what rules might be infringed, and in no case is there a specific reference to Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Chile contends that it is recorded that one Member thought that Ecuador should tariffy under the Agricultural Agreement. On the other hand, it explains, it is also noted that members of the Working Party who questioned Ecuador's system thought that it should either be eliminated or brought into conformity with WTO rules, which implies that even these Members, or at least some of them, thought that price bands \textit{per se} are not illegal. Chile claims that Ecuador itself ultimately committed to phase out its price band system over time "in order to comply with the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture." The Working Party took note of that commitment, but taking note of such a commitment, Chile argues, does not constitute acceptance that eliminating the price band system was required by the WTO. Chile submits that it is well known that it is a normal part of the accession process for existing Members to request an acceding Members to undertake changes in policies and practices, even if such changes are not required by the general rules of the WTO.\(^261\)

Secretariat's advice

4.107 Chile claims that it has received advice from the GATT Secretariat according to which the PBS would not be inconsistent with its obligations under either the GATT or the draft Agreement on Agriculture then under negotiation. Chile qualifies this statement by explaining that, during the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, i.e. during the Uruguay Round negotiations, the World Bank encouraged various countries, at least in Latin America, to convert their quantitative restrictions into price bands, which are mechanisms that permit competition. Chile claims that, on at least one occasion, during a seminar for Central American countries, in response to the concern that had been expressed over the maintenance of these mechanisms, a letter was presented originating in the GATT Secretariat arguing that it was not necessary to tariffy price bands since they were unrelated to the domestic price provided the price bands were maintained within the bound levels.\(^262\) Chile later clarifies that it was

\(^{260}\) See Chile's response to question 42 (CHL) of the Panel.
\(^{261}\) See Chile's response to question 42 (CHL) of the Panel.
\(^{262}\) See Chile's response to question 14 (CHL) of the Panel.
not a participant in the seminar (though some Chileans were present in their capacity as consultants or representatives of intergovernmental organizations) and that, since the letter was not addressed to Chile, Chile has been unable to get a copy of the said letter. It further adds that the date of the seminar is equally unclear but it could have taken place in 1993. \footnote{See Chile's response to question 40 (CHL) of the Panel.} Chile further claims that the advice given in that letter was subsequently endorsed orally by the delegations with which Chile was engaged in direct negotiations (United States, European Communities and New Zealand, among others) as well as in oral opinions provided by the Secretariat prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. \footnote{See Chile's response to question 14 (CHL) of the Panel.} 

4.108 **Argentina** responds that Chile has not submitted any documentary evidence regarding the above alleged advice by the Secretariat. Secondly, the Chilean argument in paragraph 31 of its second written submission refers simply to an oral confirmation rather than to a letter, and speaks not only of the Secretariat but of other delegations that allegedly stated that there was no need to tariffy the PBS. Argentina can merely state that evidence that has not been brought cannot be refuted, and takes the view that the Panel cannot accept the Chilean argument that evidence that has not been brought can be an additional tool for interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. \footnote{See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 28.} Argentina contends that, in view of Chile's alleged "letter … from an authority of the GATT Secretariat arguing that it was not necessary to tariffy price bands", the value of the report by the Secretariat in the 1997 Trade Policy Review of Chile takes on particular importance. That report, Argentina explains, is an institutional opinion by the WTO Secretariat, and it recognizes that "the [Chilean] price stabilization mechanism works as a valuable levy …." \footnote{Argentina refers to the Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review of Chile, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/28 (7 August 1997), para. 38.} Argentina further indicates that the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) undeniably provides for a thorough examination of the trade policies of Members and the extent to which they have adapted or failed to adapt to GATT/WTO rules. It claims that there can be little doubt as to its relative weight and value in trying to understand whether the PBS constitutes a variable levy or a similar border measure, since unlike the elusive mention of an alleged letter that Chile has not identified or submitted during these proceedings, it represents a respectable technical opinion, made available to all WTO Members in the form of a report. \footnote{See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 76-78.}

4.109 **Chile** contends that the above-mentioned statement by the TPRM does not represent a legal conclusion let alone a conclusion under Article 4.2. Further, the Secretariat did not say that the price band system is a variable levy but that it "works as" a variable levy, because the levy varies according to the import price. In Chile's view, statements in the TPRM are not supposed to be used in dispute settlement, under explicit WTO rules. \footnote{See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 39., See also para. 41 of Chile's First Oral Statement.}

B. **ARGUMENTS RELATING TO CHILE'S SAFEGUARD MEASURES**

1. **Procedural arguments**

   (a) Terms of reference

   (i) **Measures which are no longer in force**

4.110 **Chile** notes that Argentina requested consultations with Chile on 5 October 2000 under the WTO's dispute settlement procedure concerning the consistency of the provisional and definitive safeguard measures applicable to imports of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils. Chile states that the provisional measures ceased to have effect on 22 January 2000, the date on which the definitive measures on the same products entered into force. The Chilean authority decided to extend
the safeguard measures as of 26 November 2000\textsuperscript{270} for a period of one year from the date of their expiry.\textsuperscript{269} Chile contends that, although the mechanism for applying the extension measures is the same as that determined in the previous decree on definitive measures, this does not constitute grounds for asserting that this is the same measure that has been extended over a period of time as though they were one and the same. Chile submits that these new extended measures are the result of the receipt of new information, interested parties were given a hearing, which concluded with a recommendation on extension, and this was adopted under a new decree. Chile argues that the Chilean authorities might not have decided on an extension. If that had been the case, Chile affirms, the definitive measures would have ceased to have effect simply because the time-limit had been reached as according to Chilean legislation, the maximum duration of a safeguard measure, (including the period of the provisional measure) is one year, without prejudice to extension, which also may not exceed one year.\textsuperscript{271} Chile explains that an extension cannot take effect automatically, it requires a new decision adopting it, which constitutes a new measure, meaning that it is a new measure whether or not it is substantially identical to the definitive measure that preceded it.\textsuperscript{272}

4.111 **Chile** submits that when, on 19 January 2001, Argentina requested the establishment of a panel on this dispute, neither the provisional nor the definitive measures were in effect. Chile argues that, if it is presumed that the Chilean provisional and definitive safeguard measures were inconsistent with certain provisions of the Agreements, then the objective of the dispute settlement mechanism invoked by Argentina should be to conclude that the measures must be withdrawn by Chile. Chile refers to the line of reasoning adopted by the Appellate Body in the dispute *United States - Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities* when it determined that a panel erred in recommending that the DSB request the Member to bring into conformity with its WTO obligations a measure which the Panel found no longer existed.\textsuperscript{273} For these reasons, Chile considers that Argentina should have respected the provision in Article 3.7 of the DSU: "Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful."\textsuperscript{274}

4.112 **Chile** refers to Argentina's statement whereby it "requests the Panel to rule on all of the claims made so as to avoid any unnecessary future proceedings if the findings are eventually overturned, bearing in mind that the Appellate Body exercises procedural economy".\textsuperscript{275} Chile submits that the application of the principle of judicial economy by a panel means that it is not necessary to address all the claims made by the parties but only those that must be addressed in order to resolve the matter, in which case a finding is necessary to enable the DSB to make sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings to allow prompt compliance by a Member with those recommendations and rulings.\textsuperscript{276} Chile wonders how it would be possible for the Panel to recommend that Chile bring its provisional and definitive safeguard measures into conformity if such measures are not being applied. Hence, Chile requests the Panel to find that the provisional safeguard measures (adopted under Decree No. 339, published on 19 November 1999) and the definitive safeguard measures (adopted under Decree No. 9, published on 22 January 2000) were not in effect so it is not possible to make a recommendation that Chile bring these measures into conformity with its WTO obligations.\textsuperscript{277}

\textsuperscript{269}Exempt Decree of the Ministry of Finance No. 349, published on 25 November 2000.
\textsuperscript{270}See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 74-78.
\textsuperscript{271}Chile refers to Law No. 18.525, Article 9. Law notified in Document G/SG/N/1/CHL/2.
\textsuperscript{272}See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 79-82.
\textsuperscript{273}Chile refers to document WT/DS165/AB/R, para. 81.
\textsuperscript{274}See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 83-88.
\textsuperscript{275}Chile refers to para. 266 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
\textsuperscript{277}See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 89-91.
4.113 **Argentina** considers that the provisional and definitive safeguard measures, even though they may have been repealed following their extension in some cases (specifically, in the case of wheat and wheat flour), require a specific ruling by the Panel because they form part of its terms of reference. Argentina argues that, since they come under the Panel's terms of reference, the Panel is required, under Article 7.1 of the DSU, to examine them, in the light of the relevant provisions in the Agreement, as part of the matter referred to the DSB. Argentina contends that the fact that the definitive measure was repealed is irrelevant for the purposes of a ruling, since Chile explicitly recognized that it resorted to safeguards "to obtain the required legal backing in accordance with the WTO's relevant provisions".\(^{278}\) Argentina submits that safeguard measures may only be applied in accordance with procedures of the Agreement on Safeguards and in conformity with the strict standards established therein. It considers that Chile's recognition that it only sought to "obtain the required legal backing" is in fact a negation of the multilateral commitment to apply safeguards only in conformity with the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards.\(^{279}\) In Argentina's view, no interpretation of the Safeguard Agreement, however broad, would enable it to conclude that the "extension" is a new safeguard measure. Argentina contends that extension is not a notion that exists independently of other provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards. Argentina further submits that the Agreement must be interpreted as a single whole, and not as a series of separate articles. Argentina argues that when a Member, by a resolution or some other administrative act, decides to "extend" an existing measure, it is not converting it into a new measure.\(^{280}\)

4.114 **Argentina** argues that Chile continues to apply a safeguard measure on oils for precisely the same reason it applied all of its previous measures (including their extensions), i.e. because there was a PBS that was inconsistent with the WTO and caused it to violate its tariff binding. Argentina claims that, as long as the PBS is in force, the same situation can recur. In Argentina's view, if there is no ruling by the DSB establishing the inconsistency of the safeguard measures, the situation could recur, since the attempt at *ex-post facto* justification will have escaped the scrutiny of the DSB. Argentina submits that it is this very possibility of reintroducing measures for the same reasons that caused them to be adopted originally that has led to consistent rulings on repealed measures both prior to the WTO and under the WTO.\(^{281}\)

(ii) **The decision on extension was not the subject of consultations between the parties**

4.115 **Chile** claims that Argentina, when requesting consultations under the WTO dispute settlement procedure, only identified the provisional and definitive safeguard measures applied to certain goods subject to price bands. Chile indicates that the consultations were held on 21 November 2000 but, when requesting the establishment of a panel, as noted in its communication of 19 January 2001,\(^{282}\) Chile explains that Argentina nonetheless included in its request the provisional measures, the definitive measures and the decision to extend the safeguards. Chile notes that Argentina included in its request Chilean measures (the extension of the safeguards) that were not the subject of prior discussion during a WTO consultation procedure and this was recognized by Argentina itself in its request for the establishment of a panel. Chile considers that such recognition does not constitute sufficient grounds in terms of a WTO Member's obligation to respect the DSU. Chile submits that this is not a minor question nor simply a formality, but concerns respect for a basic guarantee of due process in the defence of the interests of a Member of the WTO.\(^{283}\)

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278 Argentina refers to Chile's First written submission, para. 25 *in fine*.


280 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 82-85.


282 Chile refers to WT/DSS07/2.

283 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 92-94.
4.116 Chile recalls that, on 1 February 2001, at the first meeting of the DSB at which Argentina requested the establishment of a panel, Chile drew attention to this anomaly 284 and Argentina replied that "the subject of the extension of the measure was included in the request for consultations since there was a legal similarity between the original measure and the subsequent extension thereof". 285 Subsequently, Chile continues, at the DSB meeting on 12 March 2001 286, Argentina again requested the establishment of a panel and mentioned the various consultations held by the parties 287, which, combined with its theory of the "legal similarity" of the definitive measures and the extension, intimate that Chile tacitly accepted that the extension measure was included in the consultations. Chile explains that the DSB decided to establish a panel with the standard terms of reference contained in Article 7 of the DSU 288 to examine the matter brought up by Argentina in its communication requesting the establishment of the panel. Chile questions whether these terms of reference could allow examination of another matter that was not included in the consultations. Chile further questions whether the DSB, with its terms of reference, can disregard certain provisions in the DSU that require a panel only to consider a matter that has previously been discussed in valid consultations at the WTO. Chile submits that, like all WTO Members, it is seeking to resolve the dispute with Argentina in good faith and considers that its good faith cannot lead to neglect of important provisions in the DSU that guarantee proper defence. 289

4.117 Argentina submits that, contrary to what Chile maintains, the then possible extensions of the definitive measures were in fact discussed during the consultations held with Chile. In this regard, Argentina claims that, between 5 October 2000 when Argentina requested consultations, and 21 November 2000 when the consultations were actually held, Argentina learned that the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture had requested the extension of the measures (3 November 2000), after which, on 13 November 2000, Argentina participated in the hearing before the Commission. Subsequently, Argentina explains, on 17 November 2000, the Argentine Mission in Geneva transmitted to the Chilean Mission a written questionnaire in which some of the questions referred to the extension of the definitive measures. 290 Argentina argues that, even if the extension of the definitive measures were not considered to have been properly addressed, this would not prevent them from being rightly subject to the jurisdiction of the Panel, as was recently confirmed by the Appellate Body. 291

4.118 Chile argues that the DSU states the following: the dispute settlement system is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system (Article 3.2); no solution to a dispute should nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member (Article 3.5); any request for consultations (to be valid in the WTO) must be submitted in writing and identify the measures at issue, the reasons and basis for the complaint and, lastly, be notified to the DSB (Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 4); the intervention of a panel may only be requested within a period calculated from the date of receipt of the request for the holding of consultations (Article 4, paragraphs 7 and 8); and the request for establishment of a panel must refer to the consultations (Article 6.2). It further argues that, in the report of the Appellate Body in Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, it is stated that: "Articles 4 and 6 of the DSU … set forth a process by which a complaining party must request consultations, and consultations must be held, before a matter may be referred to the DSB for the establishment of a panel." 292 Chile explains that it has met with Argentina on a number of occasions in order to find a comprehensive solution to this dispute.

284 Chile refers to WT/DSB/M/98, para. 83.
285 Ibid., para. 84.
286 Chile refers to WT/DSB/M/101.
287 Ibid., para. 52.
288 Ibid., para. 57.
289 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 95-97.
290 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 78-80.
291 See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 37 and footnote 32.
Nevertheless, it says, this does not mean that, *quod non*, Argentina had called for valid consultations in the WTO on the extension measures because it did not request such consultations in writing and made no notification to the WTO to this effect. 293 Chile submits that, for a question to be considered as properly addressed in a consultation proceeding under the WTO, the measure at issue first has to be identified in writing, and that document must be notified to the DSB. Chile submits that Argentina never submitted a written request for consultations with Chile, nor provided the DSB notification thereof, in which it mentioned the extension measures at issue. Chile considers that, if due process is to be guaranteed, it is essential that the DSU requirements with respect to the formalization of a claim under the dispute settlement system be respected, since this is what enables a Member to whom a claim is addressed to lay the foundations for its defence on the basis of the indications contained in the written request for consultations. 294

4.119 Chile submits that, in this particular case, the extension measures contain the same provisions as the definitive safeguard measures. In this respect, there is similarity, which Chile does not deny. Nevertheless, Chile argues, the extension was the result of a new request that gave rise to a new process, with a public hearing, and to subsequent determinations based on the evidence considered on that occasion. Chile contends that, even though the content of the final measure (extension) is identical to that in the previous measure, the new measure only exists because the competent Chilean authority formally had to issue a new administrative act that completed and validated the extension, otherwise the previous measure would have expired, and nothing more. Chile submits that the situation would have been different if the original measure had been automatically extended within a specified period without any interested party contesting it, as this would have lent weight to the Argentine theory of an alleged "legal similarity", but quite clearly this is not the case. 295

4.120 Argentina argues there are absolutely no legal grounds for accepting, as a possible interpretation of Article 6.2 of the DSU, that the extensions of Chile's definitive measures lack a legal identity with the safeguard measures, nor does such a suggestion make any sense. In Argentina's view, the fact that they were extended through a new decree is the logical result of the fact that the definitive measure had an expiry date. Otherwise, Argentina affirms, it would have violated various paragraphs of Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards (7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.6). Argentina contends that the legal identity of the measure is confirmed by the fact that the same authority issued the extension, through the same Commission, because the measure applies to the same products and because the measures apply exactly the same remedy. 296

4.121 Argentina claims that to agree on the issue raised by Chile would be to negate "due process", to the detriment of Argentina, by restricting access to jurisdiction. It considers that the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system would be seriously undermined since this could lead to a situation in which a safeguard measure which is extended will never be subject to scrutiny by the DSU. 297

4.122 Argentina argues that, given that under the Safeguards Agreement, "extension" is not an independent notion, it goes without saying that if the definitive measure is inconsistent, that inconsistency does not cease with the extension of the measure. Argentina points out that if the original measure had been repealed, and if Exempt Decree No. 349 adopting the extension had been a new measure, Chile's way of proceeding would still be inconsistent with Article 7.5 of the Agreement

293 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 98-100.
294 See Chile's response to question 30(a) (ARG, CHL) of the Panel.
295 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 101-103.
296 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 75-76.
297 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 77.
on Safeguards which prohibits new measures from being reintroduced until a specified period of time has elapsed. 298

4.123 Chile submits that Argentina is attempting to establish an innovative theory resting on the existence of a legal identity between the extension measures and the definitive safeguard measure and in this way make up for its failure to refer to these extensions anywhere in its request for consultations under the DSU. According to Chile, this identity exists because the extensions were adopted by the same authority, through the same Commission, that apply to the same products and that apply the same remedy. Chile contends that these elements on which Argentina bases its theory of legal identity do not prove that identity. According to Chile, the construction of Article 7.2 points to the contrary of Argentina’s argument, i.e. that extensions, from a substantive point of view, are measures that are distinct from the definitive measures. Indeed, an examination of the paragraph reveals that the reference to Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 merely imposes procedural or formal requirements in circumstances for which the substantive aspects are laid down in the paragraph itself and consist in the competent authority finding that a safeguard measure continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and that there is evidence that the industry is adjusting. 299

(iii) Withdrawal of some of the extension measures

4.124 Chile informs that, following this First Written Submission, the extension measures for wheat and for wheat flour were withdrawn by Exempt Decree No. 244 of the Ministry of Finance published on 27 July 2001. On these grounds, Chile submits that there is no point, from the legal point of view, in the Panel issuing recommendations on the consistency of these measures with the WTO obligations contained in the WTO Agreements, having found that the measures are no longer in force. Chile submits that, as stipulated in Article 3.7 of the DSU, “[t]he aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute”, and “[i]n the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.” Thus, Chile argues, where a panel concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it recommends that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. This is stipulated in Article 19.1 of the DSU, which goes on to say that the panel may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations. Chile argues that the entire reasoning behind Article 19.1 presupposes the existence of a measure, one that is in force. According to Chile, if the measure does not exist, the panel does not have the authority to ask that a Member be recommended to bring the measure into conformity with a provision of the WTO Agreements, much less suggest ways in which the recommendation could be implemented. 300

4.125 Argentina, on the contrary, considers that a ruling by the Panel on the inconsistency of the safeguard measures, even those that were recently repealed, would in fact have practical consequences in that as long as the price band system remains in force there is a possibility that these measures could be re-introduced – i.e. as long as the same reasons that caused them to be adopted in the first place remain. 301 Argentina refers to Chile’s explicit acknowledgement that it resorted to safeguards “to obtain the required legal backing” 302 and submits that this constitutes a negation of the multilateral commitment to apply safeguards only in conformity with the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and demonstrates that as long as the price band system exists, there will be a risk of the situation recurring. Argentina contends that Chile continues to apply safeguard measures for the same reason that it applied the previous measures, i.e. because of a price band system

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298 See Argentina’s First Oral Statement, paras. 88-89.
299 See Chile’s Second Oral Statement, paras. 56-60.
300 See Chile’s response to question 16 (ARG, CHL) of the Panel.
301 See Argentina’s Rebuttal, para. 102.
302 Argentina refers to para. 25 in fine of Chile’s First Written Submission.
that is inconsistent with the WTO and which, by its structure, design and mode of application causes it to violate its binding.\footnote{303}{See Argentina's response to question 16 (ARG, CHL) of the Panel.}

4.126 **Chile** considers that the above argumentation is fundamentally at odds with the foundations of the WTO dispute settlement system, in that it presumes that a WTO Member is acting in bad faith with the intention of taking advantage of the system. In Chile's view, this argument disregards the nature of the dispute settlement system, the aim of which is to "secure a positive solution to a dispute", clearly preferring a "solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute".\footnote{304}{See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 41-42.}

(b) **Burden of proof**

4.127 **Argentina** alleges that each one of Chile's violations of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, establish prima facie presumption that the safeguard measures applied by Chile are in violation of their obligations under those Agreements. Hence, according to the general rules of application of the burden of proof, it is up to Chile to demonstrate that it has not violated them. Argentina submits that Chile has not supplied a single argument to refute that presumption but that, on the contrary, it has recognized that the safeguard measures were inconsistent with its WTO obligations.\footnote{305}{See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 100-101.}

4.128 **Chile** submits that, in every statement made before this Panel, Argentina has based the above argument on a serious error of law. In Chile's view, Argentina considers that in a prima facie presumption, what is presumed is the violations committed by a Member of its obligations under the Agreements covered by the dispute. However, Chile argues, according to Article 3.8 of the DSU, this clearly is not the case: Chile contends that what is presumed is not the violations or inconsistencies, but something quite different, the nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing under the covered agreements that these inconsistencies may cause with respect to the Member or Members bringing the complaint. Chile stresses that the consequences of this error of law committed by Argentina are not insignificant. In this regard, Chile submits that, if the fact to be presumed were the violation of the obligations laid down in the WTO Agreements, the mere presentation of claims and arguments would suffice to establish the presumption, and there would be no need to submit precise, concordant and complete evidence to the Panel of the irrefutable truth of these claims. Chile further submits that this would of course be inadmissible under the DSU, since it would free the complaining Member from the obligation and burden of proving the facts on which its arguments rest, and the report of the Panel would be based on mere presumption. In addition, Chile contends that Argentina has neither produced nor brought before the Panel sufficient, precise and concordant evidence to establish irrefutably that Chile violated its obligations under Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. Consequently, Chile argues, Argentina can hardly be presumed to have suffered nullification or impairment of the benefits accruing to it under those Agreements as a result of Chile's safeguard measures. Chile submits that it has submitted complete and sufficient evidence during these proceedings of the full consistency of its measures with the mentioned Agreements. Chile objects to Argentina's statement to the effect that Chile recognized that its safeguard measures were inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO. Chile claims that Argentina has clearly taken a hypothetical statement out of its context in order to use it for its own purposes since this statement was made by Chile in connection with its position on the Panel's lack of jurisdiction to rule on measures that were not in force, and not with any violation of or inconsistency with a covered agreement.\footnote{306}{See Chile's Second Oral Statement, paras. 48-52.}
4.129 **Argentina** argues that this prima facie presumption exists because of the proofs submitted in these proceedings and not – as Chile argues – by a mere presentation of claims and arguments in connection with Article 3.8 of the DSU, which Argentina has not argued.

2. **Substantive arguments**

4.130 **Argentina** claims that Chile initiated the safeguards investigation on imports of vegetable oils, wheat and wheat flour in order to provide a legal justification for its PBS. According to Argentina, the safeguards case served to confirm that the PBS violated Chile's obligations under the WTO, since Chile acknowledged that, under that system, it exceeded its bound tariff. Given the true objective behind its investigation, Argentina argues, it comes as no surprise that the Commission (i.e. the competent Chilean authority) was unable to comply with any of the requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards. In particular, Argentina submits that the Chilean investigation to impose definitive safeguard measures and the identical extension of those measures on imports of edible vegetable oils, wheat and wheat flour, is inconsistent with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and with Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

4.131 **Chile** submits that the object and purpose of the investigation initiated by Chile for the application of the provisional safeguard measure, the definitive measure and subsequently the extension thereof, as well as the adoption of those measures, was not in any way to provide a legal justification of its price band system. The object and purpose of the measures was to enable Chile to readjust, temporarily, the balance between itself and, without distinction as to origin, other exporting countries, in respect of the level of concessions, in the wake of unexpected and unpredicted developments as a result of which imports of agricultural products under the band genuinely and substantially threatened to cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. These unexpected developments essentially consisted of an unusual and unpredicted persistence of very low international prices which affected agricultural products, including those covered by the price band, and which, in their turn, had such an impact on import trends that Chile was faced with a threat of serious injury to the domestic industry in question. Chile submits that it is not correct to state, as Argentina does, that the purpose of the safeguard measures is to justify the PBS as such because the purpose of a safeguard is to give the domestic industry temporary protection and, in Chile's particular case, this is limited to a period that may not exceed one year. Chile submits that it could hardly try to "justify" a longstanding permanent mechanism known to all Chile's trade partners - including Argentina - which had been notified to the WTO and appeared in many free trade agreements - including one signed with Argentina - by means of a temporary safeguard measure for such a limited period.

(a) **Compliance with the notification and prior consultation requirements**

4.132 **Argentina** claims that Chile violated Article XIX.2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 12.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards by failing to comply with the notification requirements laid down in Article 12.1(a) and 12.2 and by not holding prior consultations with Members having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned, as required by Article 12.3 and 12.4.

4.133 **Argentina** claims that the Appellate Body has already ruled on the criteria for the application of Article 12.1(a) that must be met in order to comply with the text. In Argentina's view, Chile's conduct does not, however, comply with the provisions of Article 12.1 of the Agreement on

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307 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 76.

308 See Chile's Second Oral Statement, paras. 43-45.

309 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 120-122.

Safeguards nor with the Appellate Body's conclusions on application of this Article. Argentina explains that this can be seen simply by comparing the date on which the Committee on Safeguards was notified of the initiation of the investigation and the date on which the initiation effectively commenced. Argentina indicates that the notification was in fact made on 25 October 1999, whereas the investigation was initiated on 30 September 1999. In view of this, Argentina argues that it is obvious that Chile did not comply with the requirements in Article 12.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. This means that the requirement on "immediacy", which must be met if the notification is to be considered as having been made in due form, was not respected. Argentina says that the result was that the Committee on Safeguards and the Members of the WTO were not given sufficient time to examine the notification.

4.134 As regards the infringement of Article 12.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, Argentina argues that it is clear that the elements which the Appellate Body considers to be minimum requirements for the notification were not present as far as the product and the definition of domestic industry are concerned, and there was no analysis of the factors. Argentina argues that Chile did not submit any argument to rebut the fact that its notification did not contain "all pertinent information".

4.135 Argentina claims that Chile violated Article 12.3 and 12.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards. It did not give Argentina, which is a substantial supplier of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils, the opportunity to hold consultations, either immediately after the imposition of the provisional measure or prior to the application of its definitive measure. Argentina argues that Chile failed to comply with these requirements in the Agreement on Safeguards inasmuch as the date of application of safeguard measures was 26 November 1999 whereas the notification to the Committee on Safeguards was dated 1 December 1999. It should also be noted that Argentina had to request the consultations indicated in the last sentence of Article 12.4.

4.136 Reading Argentina's claim regarding notifications and consultations, Chile submits that Argentina only referred to the following measures by Chile: (a) notice of initiation of the investigation in 1999; (b) the provisional measure; and (c) the definitive measure adopted in January 2000. Chile argues that this clarification is necessary because, if Argentina wishes the Panel to make a concrete ruling, it should have made clear to which Chilean notifications it was referring and in what way it considered that these violated the actual provisions of the WTO Agreements, which Argentina does not specify at all. If the Panel should rule on the conformity of the timing of Chile's notification of initiation of the procedure, (rather than the provisional and definitive measures, which were not yet in effect), Chile recalls that a recommendation by the Panel may only refer to the conformity of the measure as regards Chile's obligations under the WTO Agreements. Consequently, Chile argues, the Panel cannot conclude, as Argentina indicates – that "Chile's conduct does not, however, comply with the provisions of Article 12.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards nor with the Appellate Body's conclusions on application of this Article." Chile submits that, when the DSB adopts findings by

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311 Argentina refers to Chile's notification to the Committee on Safeguards, dated 25 October 1999, G/SG/N/6/CHL/2.
312 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 253-257.
313 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 259-265.
314 See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 40 and footnote 34.
315 Argentina refers to its notification to the Committee on Safeguards, dated 28 December 1999, G/SG/20.
316 Argentina refers to its notification to the Committee on Safeguards, dated 28 December 1999, G/SG/20.
317 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 259-265.
318 Chile refers to paras. 253-265 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
319 Ibid., para. 255.
the Appellate Body in the context of a specific dispute, it does so in order to require a WTO Member
to bring the disputed measures into conformity with its obligations under certain provisions of the
WTO Agreements. Consequently, Chile contends, Argentina's assertion that "Chile's conduct does not
comply … with the Appellate Body's conclusions" in the text mentioned above can only constitute
Argentina's own opinion, but not a recommendation by the Panel. Chile then refers to Argentina's
statement that "Chile's notification did not provide 'all pertinent information', in violation of
Article 12.2 …". Chile argues that, as Argentina does not specify to which Chilean notification it
refers, Chile is obliged to assume, by reading the next paragraph in the submission, that the measures
in question are only the provisional and definitive measures. In this context, Chile emphasizes that the
extension measure was not the subject of a WTO consultation procedure. Chile submits that
Argentina tries to restrict the scope of the Agreement on Safeguards so that measures are only adopted
on the basis of definition of a like product, but not including directly competitive products. In any
event, Chile points out that Article 12.2 refers to "all relevant information" on the one hand and, on
the other, specifically states "precise description of the product involved". Chile argues that this
precise description of the product is the identification of the product (like or directly competitive) to
which the safeguard measure applies. According to Chile, all Chile's notifications determine quite
clearly which products are the subject of the procedure and, subsequently, the measures.322

4.137 Chile explains that it notified the WTO Committee on Safeguards of its intention to apply a
provisional measure on 2 November 1999.323 It further explains that this provisional measure was
eventually applied as of 26 November 1999. Chile affirms that it complied with the requirement to
notify the intended measure before it was adopted, as called for by Article 12.4 of the Agreement on
Safeguards and, at the same time, gave the Members of the WTO the opportunity to examine the
measure, as required by Article XIX:2 of the GATT. Chile contends that Argentina's assertion that,
on 1 December 1999, Chile notified the provisional measure adopted on 26 November 1999 is not
relevant because, as already stated, Article 12.4 requires notification of the intention to adopt a
provisional measure before it is imposed, which Chile did. Chile further adds that it subsequently
notified the decree by which the provisional measure was adopted, something that Article 12.4 does
not require. Chile also refers to Argentina's statement that Chile "did not give … the opportunity to
hold consultations, … immediately after the imposition of the provisional measure …".325 Chile
disagrees with this Argentine reasoning because it goes beyond the actual requirements in Article 12.3
in relation to Article 12.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards. According to Chile, Article 12.4 of the
Agreement on Safeguards in fact deals exclusively with the obligations to notify and consult with
regard to those provisional safeguard measures referred to in Article 6 of the Agreement on
Safeguards. Chile submits that, when Argentina claims that it "had to request the consultations
indicated in the last sentence of Article 12.4",326 this appears to suggest – although it is not expressly
stated – that Chile should have indicated in its notification that it would give sufficient opportunity to
hold consultations. Chile claims that this assumption is not admissible because it is not a requirement
of the Agreement on Safeguards. The last part of Article 12.4 provides that "Consultations shall be
initiated immediately after the measure is taken", and here the imperative tone is directed both at the
Member imposing the provisional measure and any other WTO Member interested in holding
consultations, so responsibility in this respect does not only lie with the notifying Member. Chile
submits that it has always been ready to hold consultations with any Member who shows an interest
and understands that, in the light of the provisions in the Agreement on Safeguards, notification to the
Committee on Safeguards suffices to show its willingness to hold consultations with any party that so

320 Ibid., para. 263.
321 Ibid., para. 263.
322 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 212-216.
323 Chile refers to G/SG/N/7/CHL/2.
324 Chile refers to para. 265 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
325 Chile refers to para. 264 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
326 Ibid., para 265.
requests. Chile submits that the Agreement on Safeguards does not provide for an obligation to "offer consultations" which must be performed by providing a written statement to that effect to WTO Members.  

4.138 As regards Chile's claim that by merely notifying the measures, it had complied with its obligation under the provisions of Article 12 to offer to hold consultations, Argentina contends that the obligation to provide adequate opportunity for consultations both prior to and following the adoption of the measure to be a separate obligation under the Agreement. Argentina submits that Chile violated the above-mentioned Articles by failing to indicate expressly its readiness to offer these consultations. Argentina considers that there are no grounds for considering that the mere notification of measures is tantamount to offering to hold consultations.  

4.139 In response to the above argument, Argentina recalls that Article XIX.2 of the GATT 1994 expressly stipulates the following: "Before any contracting party shall take action … it shall give notice in writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES … and shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial interest … an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action." Argentina contends that this clearly shows that the obligation to notify and to offer consultations are two different obligations for which, contrary to what Chile has claimed, mere notification is not equivalent to offering consultations. Indeed, Argentina adds, the obligation to "afford … an opportunity" does not constitute and cannot constitute, "an obligation of immediate availability", as Chile contends, nor can it be considered to have been met merely because "Chile was … ready to hold consultations".

(b) Unforeseen developments

4.140 Argentina claims that Chile has infringed Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards by not identifying or making any findings with respect to unforeseen developments justifying the imposition of safeguard measures.

4.141 Argentina explains that, pursuant to Article XIX:1(a), safeguard measures (emergency measures) shall be taken as a result of unforeseen developments. In this regard, Argentina refers to various examples of the Appellate Body's interpretation of the concept of "unforeseen developments". Argentina submits that, as established by the Appellate Body in US – Lamb, the requirement of increased imports resulting from "unforeseen developments" is a fundamental characteristic of a safeguard measure because it lies at the beginning of a "logical continuum" of events justifying the invocation of a safeguard measure. In Argentina's view, for a Member to apply a safeguard measure in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations, it must, before applying the measure, have demonstrated as a matter of fact that as a result of unforeseen circumstances there has been an increase in imports which causes or threatens to cause serious injury to the domestic industry, and that consequently, the adoption of an emergency measure is justified. This demonstration of fact and of law, and the findings and reasoned conclusions, must be included in the report of the competent authority in accordance with Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. Argentina claims that neither the investigation conducted by the Commission, nor the WTO notifications, reveal that Chile

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327 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 217-221.
328 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 110.
330 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 78.
332 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 79.
333 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 83.
demonstrated, as a matter of fact, that the safeguard measure in question was applied, *inter alia*, "as a result of unforeseen developments".  

4.142 Chile points out that the reason why the Commission recommended the application of safeguards on products subject to price bands was the continued existence of unusually low prices over a period that could not be considered transitory. Chile contends that the unforeseen developments correspond to this special situation of global prices. Chile submits that the level of the bound tariff had been exceeded on previous occasions, but only for very short periods that did not justify the introduction of changes. On this occasion, Chile argues, the period was much longer and made it necessary to find a solution. Chile submits that keeping the band within the bound tariff would result in the serious injury explained in the submission. In Chile's view, the unforeseen development in this case is the continued existence of very low international prices for much longer periods, which greatly exceeded the forecasts by experts. Chile argues that a fall in international prices to such low levels over such a long period is unusual and unpredictable, especially in the case of products whose price fluctuates considerably. Chile submits that the trend in international prices of wheat (hard red winter No. 2, Gulf, and Argentine bread wheat), and soya bean oil (Illinois crude soya bean oil and Buenos Aires crude soya bean oil) show marked and persistent decreases between 1997 and 2000.  

4.143 Argentina submits that the fall of international prices was not an unforeseen development, nor was it unexpected or unusual. In Argentina's view, the creation of the price band system in 1986 clearly shows that Chile knew of, and had even tried to regulate, the alleged negative effects of these economic developments (variations in international commodity prices). Argentina concludes that the developments that led to the application of the safeguards were not unforeseen developments under the terms of Article XIX.1(a) of the GATT 1994.  

4.144 Chile notes that the purpose of the price bands has always been simply to moderate the strong short-term fluctuations in international prices of the products subject to the system, and not to compensate for medium- and long-term trends in those prices, so that the "fall in international prices to such low levels and for such a long period … " was a development that could not reasonably be foreseen. However, Chile argues, the preliminary question of fact which led Chile to adopt its safeguard measures was not these short-term fluctuations; quite to the contrary, it was the continued persistence of very low international prices over a long period of time. Chile submits that it is these developments that were obviously entirely unforeseen, and that Chile was not reasonably in a position to foresee. In Chile's view, these circumstances therefore fall outside the object and scope of the price band system.  

4.145 As regards Argentina's claim that there is no mention of unforeseen developments as a preliminary question in the Minutes of the Commission, Chile submits that the relevant examination and finding is recorded in the last part of the penultimate paragraph on page 3 of the Minutes of Session No. 193. Argentina affirms that none of the Commission records even mention unforeseen developments.

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334 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 80-82.  
335 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 141-144.  
336 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 95.  
337 See Chile's Rebuttal, para. 67.  
338 See Chile's Second Oral Statement, para. 65.  
339 See Chile's Second Oral Statement, para. 66.  
340 See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 42.
Appropriate investigation

4.146 **Argentina** claims that Chile has infringed paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 3 of the Agreement on Safeguards on the grounds that the competent Chilean authorities did not conduct an appropriate investigation.

4.147 **Argentina** submits that it did not have the opportunity to participate fully in the investigation. In this connection Argentina stresses that it did not have access to any public summary of any confidential information on which the Chilean authorities may have relied. Argentina states that Chile failed to conduct an appropriate investigation because none of the Minutes of the Commission contain any reference suggesting that the information submitted by the Argentine exporters was analysed.

4.148 As regards Argentina's argument that it did not have the opportunity to participate fully in the investigation, Chile argues that for it to be relevant, Argentina should have explained to the Panel the reason why it did not have the opportunity to participate in the investigation conducted by the Chilean authorities. Chile issued a Law (and regulations) giving the competent authority powers regarding safeguards. This Law was published in full in the Chilean Official Journal in May 1999 and the relevant regulations were published in the Chilean Official Journal in June 1999. These two notifications, which were public, are acknowledged by Argentina in its first written submission. In addition, Chile argues, all this Chilean legislation was notified to the WTO on 23 July 1999, as can be seen from document G/SG/N/1/CHL/2, as Argentina acknowledges in its first written submission. Chile further submits that the safeguards investigation into goods subject to price bands was initiated in accordance with the notice published by the investigating authority in the Chilean Official Journal on 29 September 1999, which clearly showed that the investigation was initiated on 30 September 1999. This fact is recognized by Argentina in its first written submission. On 29 October 1999, the Government of the Argentine Republic became party to the investigation, submitting a document setting out its position and requesting to take part in the public hearing. During the procedure, the Chilean investigating authority held a public hearing on 25 November 1999, as can be seen from the Minutes of Session No. 189. The notice of a public hearing was published in the Official Journal and was contained in Chile’s notification to the WTO. On 23 November 1999, in a letter from the Technical Secretariat, the Embassy of Argentina was given confirmation of the public hearing and asked to confirm whether it would attend, which Argentina did on 24 November. The Argentine Embassy in Chile took part in the hearing and presented its arguments. Its chargé d'affaires *ad interim*, a Minister and two Counsellors were present. A representative of the Argentine Milling Industry Federation and a representative of the Chamber of the Argentine Oil Industry (CIARA) also participated. Furthermore, Chile states, when the investigating authority decided to examine the request for an extension of the safeguard measures, it announced in the Official Journal that a public hearing would be held on Monday, 13 November 2000. Chile submits that the following took part in the public hearing before the investigating authority and put forward their arguments: the Argentine Embassy in Chile, represented by a Minister and a Counsellor; the Attorney for Molinos Río de la Plata (Argentine oil exporter); the Argentine Cereals Exporters Center; and the Executive Director of the Argentine Milling Industry Federation.

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341 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 84-86.
342 See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 109.
343 Chile refers to para. 66 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
344 Ibid., para. 68.
345 Chile refers to G/SG/N/6/CHL/2.
347 Chile submits that this was notified to the WTO on 9 November 2000 in document G/SG/N/10/CHL/1/Suppl.2.
348 Session of the Commission on Distortions No. 223 of 13 November 2000.
argues that the foregoing shows that Argentina had sufficient opportunity to participate in the proceedings of the investigating authority.\(^{349}\)

4.149 **Chile** contests Argentina's argument whereby, in the investigation, the Chilean Authority based itself on confidential information. Chile points out that the investigating authority collected information and reached its conclusions on the basis of all the information gathered in the public record, that besides the information of the petition, contains the information and opinions rendered by the interested parties to the investigation - public hearing included – and the information gathered from other sources such as the Chilean Customs Service, the Central Bank of Chile and sectorial information from official sources (Office of Agricultural Studies and Policies (ODEPA)).\(^{350}\) According to Chile, there are thus no non-confidential summaries of confidential information because there was no confidential information discussed. Consequently, Chile submits, the situation envisaged in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Agreement on Safeguards did not exist, as Argentina claims. Chile adds that the information on these products is fully available to the public through an official body, the Office of Agricultural Studies and Policies (ODEPA), which keeps public statistics for the agricultural sector that are used by the Commission. Chile claims that Argentina also had an opportunity for access to the relevant file, which contained the submissions by other interested parties, and examined and obtained copies of all the information it requested.\(^{351}\)

(d) **Whether Chile failed to publish a report setting forth reasoned conclusions and findings**

4.150 **Argentina** claims that Chile has infringed Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards on the grounds that the competent Chilean authorities did not publish a report setting forth their reasoned conclusions and findings reached on issues of fact and law.

4.151 According to **Argentina**, Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) lay down very specific requirements concerning the content of the determination that the competent authorities must publish. Article 3.1 stipulates that "... the competent authority shall publish a report setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law." whilst Article 4.2(c) refers to Article 3.1, and lays down the additional requirement that the "competent authorities shall publish promptly, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3, a detailed analysis of the case under investigation as well as a demonstration of the relevance of the factors examined". Argentina submits that the Appellate Body in **Argentina – Footwear (EC)**\(^{352}\) and **US – Wheat Gluten**\(^{353}\) has ruled that the national authorities must explain how they arrived at their conclusions, based on the information and that the findings of the competent authorities must be contained in the decision itself.\(^{354}\)

4.152 **Argentina** submits that the verb "to publish" implies "to make public" through a report, published in some official medium, setting forth the investigating authority's findings of fact and law in accordance with Article 3.1 of Agreement on Safeguards. The Agreement on Safeguards uses the verb "publish" instead of referring to a "public" document. There may be documents which by their nature are "public", and hence accessible to anyone, but which are not "published" in any medium – an act designed to facilitate consultation of the said document.\(^{355}\)

4.153 **Argentina** argues that the Chilean Commission did not publish any report showing that it had examined all of the relevant information and including either a demonstration of the critical circumstances justifying the provisional measure or an examination of the relevant information and of

\(^{349}\) See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 126-133.

\(^{350}\) See Chile's response to question 17 of the Panel.

\(^{351}\) See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 134-137.

\(^{352}\) WT/DS121/R, adopted 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body report.

\(^{353}\) WT/DS166/R, adopted 19 January 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body report.

\(^{354}\) See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 87-94 and footnotes 50 and 51.

\(^{355}\) See Argentina's response to question 18 (ARG, CHL) of the Panel.
the conclusions with respect to increase in imports, like product, domestic industry, analysis of factors, threat of serious injury, causal link and unforeseen circumstances, either for the provisional measure or for the definitive measure, as required by Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards. In Argentina's opinion, the findings of law of the Commission (Minutes of Session Nos. 181, 185, 193 and 224) serving as a basis for its investigation and its conclusions merely cite numbers and figures relating to imports and economic and financial indices of the “industries”. Argentina submits that all of the information supplied is taken directly from the Ministry of Agriculture’s application for the initiation of an investigation, but was apparently never verified by the Commission and there was never the slightest confirmation of its accuracy.

4.154 In fact, Argentina claims, the Commission never submitted any review or analysis of the documentation backing its estimates, nor did it seek out any evidence that might shed doubt on its information or seriously consider the arguments of the parties in evaluating the imports or the state of the domestic industry. On these grounds Argentina submits that the Commission of Chile infringed Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards, and failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts support their determination. Argentina contends that neither the investigation conducted by the Commission, nor its findings and conclusions of fact and of law can back any safeguard measure, either provisional or definitive - as originally applied - or their identical extension. In particular, Argentina stresses that the Minutes of the Commission which according to Chile constitute the public official report do not contain any report demonstrating the existence of critical circumstances justifying the provisional measures, nor do they contain an examination of the relevant information and the conclusions concerning increased imports, the like product, the domestic industry, the analysis of the factors, the threat of serious injury, causality and unforeseen developments, either in the case of the provisional measures or in the case of the definitive measures, as required by Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

4.155 Chile submits that, to make the procedure consistent with the provision of the Agreement on Safeguards, what the Commission does is to make the Minutes public, placing them at the disposal of the interested parties once the decree or the excerpt from the resolution, as appropriate, has been published. Chile explains that the examination made by the investigating authority, as a whole, as well as its findings and recommendations, are contained in the respective records, which are public. Chile contests Argentina's claim that the investigating authority did not publish any report containing its findings and submits that all the Minutes of its sessions are public and that any interested party may obtain a copy of the records. In this regard, Chile indicates that the Commission published prior notice in the Chilean Official Journal of both the initiation of the investigation and the various public hearings conducted throughout the course of the investigation. As a result, Chile continues, Argentina had the opportunity to become an interested party to the investigation and thus was able to fully participate in all public hearings related to the safeguard measures. Chile further states that, although Argentina claims that the Commission violated the Agreement on Safeguards by not publishing a single document, the Commission did in fact make available to the public all Minutes from the case which contained the Commission's complete "findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law." Moreover, Chile argues, contrary to Argentina's allegations, the data on which these findings were based were all verified with the official records of the National Customs Service, the Central Bank, Reuters and official publications of ODEPA, thereby ensuring the accuracy of the data. Chile also indicates that the Commission made available all Minutes in this case to the public which include the Commission's findings of both fact and law.

356 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 91-94.
357 See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 106.
358 See Chile's response to question 18 (ARG, CHL) of the Panel.
359 Chile refers to para. 92 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
360 Chile refers to Annex 6 to its First Written Submission.
361 See Chile's response to question 17 of the Panel.
Chile contends that although the Commission did not publish one consolidated report, nothing in Article 3 of the Agreement on Safeguards requires that the findings to be all contained in one document as opposed to a series of documents.\(^{362}\)

4.156 **Chile** further submits that, by stating that "apparently" no verification was done, Argentina highlights the weakness of its argument. Moreover, the word "appearance" is alien to the concept of "findings of fact and of law". Chile submits that, in any case that comes before it, the Chilean authority must verify the information submitted and, in this particular case, it verified the information with the official records of the National Customs Service, the Central Bank and the sectoral information in official sources such as those published by the Office of Agricultural Studies and Policies (ODEPA), which are widely known in Chile, so Argentina's assumption that the authority did not take the trouble to carry out a responsible verification of the information in question is without foundation. Chile argues that Argentina notes the existence of "incomprehensible" differences in data but that these are simply the result of the revision and verification of the information between the time the investigation was initiated and the time the measures were adopted because there were marginal corrections to the information on oil imports on the basis of official information from the National Customs Service.\(^{363}\)

4.157 **Argentina** argues that the law establishes seven members of the Commission, two of whom are members of the Central Bank. Moreover, Law 19.612 stipulates that the approval of three quarters of the members of the Commission is required for decisions on safeguards. Argentina submits that, when the Commission of Chile voted to recommend the application of provisional and definitive safeguard measures, the relevant legal Minutes (Minutes of Session Nos. 185 and 193) reveal that the "majority" of the members of the Commission approved the decision, with the representatives of the Central Bank abstaining. Argentina argues that, if one checks the attendance of these sessions as established in the records, given the abstention of the Central Bank representatives, these measures appeared not to have met the requirement of approval by the competent Chilean authority as provided for in Chile's own legislation.\(^{364}\)

4.158 **Chile**\(^{365}\) points out that Law No. 19.383, published in the Official Journal of 5 May 1995, introduces an amendment to Article 11 of Law No. 18.525 to allow the participation of a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture in the Commission. Consequently, there are eight, not seven, members of this Commission; Chile assumes that Argentina based its argument on an old text of the Chilean Law, an issue that is relevant because the current Chilean law was duly notified to the WTO on 23 July 1999.\(^{366}\) Regarding the quorum for attendance and voting at sessions Nos. 185 and 193, Chile notes that on both occasions the eight members were present and that the respective votes were taken with the sole abstention of the two members representing the Central Bank, which means that six out of eight members voted in favour of the measure, representing 75 per cent or three quarters. Chile also notes that this is an essential requirement of Chilean law when a proposed safeguard measure exceeds the bound tariff and that these three quarters also constitute a "majority", as shown by the records. Chile therefore considers that the statements by the complainant have no foundation, and this is confirmed by the lack of conviction with which Argentina claims in this connection, that the Chilean measures "appeared not to have met" the legal requirement.\(^{367}\)

\(^{362}\) See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 72.

\(^{363}\) See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 145-150.

\(^{364}\) See Argentina's First Written Submission, footnote 54.

\(^{365}\) Chile refers to footnote 54 of Argentina's First Written Submission.

\(^{366}\) Chile submits that the updated text of its Law was notified to the WTO in document G/SG/N/1/CHL/2.

\(^{367}\) See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 139.
4.159 In response to a question from the Panel, **Chile** explains that the Commission gathers together all of the information submitted by the interested parties both during the public hearing and in the course of the investigation, and prepares a technical report, which is examined during a final meeting of the Commission (to take place within 90 days of the initiation of the investigation), after which the Commission decides whether or not to recommend the application of definitive measures.\(^{368}\)

4.160 **Argentina** claims that, although Chile asserts that it is a condition for all safeguards investigations, a technical report was not prepared prior to the recommendation to apply provisional measures, or another one prepared prior to the recommendation to apply definitive measures.\(^{369}\) Argentina further claims that, despite the above, Chile had already replied that the Minutes of the Commission "constitute the only official report of the investigating authority". Argentina considers that this contradiction suggests that in the present case, these technical reports were not prepared, or that they do not form part of the official report of the investigating authority.\(^{370}\)

4.161 **Chile**, in reference to Argentina's statement that the Minutes constitute the only official report of the investigating authority and that they do not appear to have met any of the requirements for resorting to the application of measures\(^{371}\), considers that it should be borne in mind that the Commission bases its recommendations on all of the information gathered and evaluated in the course of the investigation. Chile explains that, for each stage of the investigation, the Commission receives a technical report prepared by its Technical Secretariat, in addition to the public Minutes which contains all of the information gathered during the process, including the public versions of confidential information. The technical report is a supporting document which helps the Commission in making decisions and summarizes the information pertaining to the case. This report, together with the initial application and all of the documents supplied by the other interested parties and the information gathered by the Technical Secretariat itself throughout the investigation, including the information from the public hearing, makes up the information used by the Commission as a basis for its decisions. The technical report is classified as restricted since it is an internal working document, and above all because it is not binding \textit{vis-à-vis} the decisions taken by the Commission.\(^{372}\)

4.162 **Argentina** states that in spite of what Chile argues, the Commission based its recommendations on all the facts analysed during the investigation, and that argument does not alter the fact that the only Chilean official report does not contain the requirements set forth in the Agreement on Safeguards.

4.163 **Chile** states that the report is also restricted because it includes all of the confidential information contributed by the interested parties as such, on condition that it will not be disclosed. Chile indicates that this explains why the report is not placed at the disposal of any of the interested parties in the procedure. In the case at issue, Chile adds, although there was no confidential information, the non-binding nature of the report \textit{vis-à-vis} the final recommendation of the Commission was maintained, and hence, the report was not made available to the parties. Chile adds that this report does not constitute the document containing the findings and reasoned conclusions reached on issues of fact and law whose publication is required under Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. The report required under that Article, as stated, is made up of the Minutes of the Commission. Chile explains that these Minutes contain its recommendations and the findings of fact and law supporting those recommendations. Chile further submits that, as part of the investigation process, the Technical Secretariat, an entity which assists the Commission – i.e. the investigating authority – in its work, assumes an active investigative role, establishing and verifying the accuracy

\(^{368}\) See Chile's response to question 17 (CHL) of the Panel.

\(^{369}\) Argentina refers to Chile's response to question 17 of the Panel.

\(^{370}\) See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 108.

\(^{371}\) Chile refers to paras. 91 and 92 of Argentina's First Oral Statement

\(^{372}\) See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 60-62.
and relevance of the evidence submitted, gathering additional information, clarifying different elements and supplementing the information provided by the parties with information available from other sources. Consequently, Chile submits, the Commission plays a pro-active role in verifying the information supplied by the parties and supplementing it where necessary.\(^\text{373}\)

(e) Like product

4.164 Argentina claims that Chile has infringed Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 4.1(c) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards on the grounds that the competent Chilean authorities failed to define the like product properly.

4.165 Argentina submits that, pursuant to all three above-mentioned Articles, it is the "domestic industry" thus defined that must be examined under Article 4.2(a) to determine whether the increase in imports has caused serious injury or threat thereof. In Argentina's view, the Commission failed to identify the like product and did not conduct an analysis of the like product or products. Argentina therefore concludes that the entire analysis of the increase in imports and the determination of threat of serious injury is based on a mistaken premise which is devoid of legal validity.\(^\text{374}\) Argentina indicates that the Appellate Body has ruled that the wording of Article 4.1(c) is "clear and express" in stating that the term "domestic industry extends solely to the producers … of the like or directly competitive products."\(^\text{375}\) It further indicates that the Appellate Body also observed that "[t]he conditions in Article 2.1, therefore, relate in several important respects to the specific products. In particular, Argentina argues, according to Article 2.1, the legal basis for imposing a safeguard measure exists only when imports of a specific product have prejudicial effects on domestic producers of products that are 'like or directly competitive' with that imported product."\(^\text{376}\) Argentina submits that the Chilean Commission did not conduct that analysis. In Argentina's view, it is clear that, in this case, there were important elements to be identified concerning the issue of the like product. Argentina quotes the Appellate Body which maintained that "input products can only be included in defining the 'domestic industry' if they are 'like or directly competitive' with the end products."\(^\text{377}\) Once again, Argentina claims, this analysis did not take place. Argentina also refers to the Appellate Body statement\(^\text{378}\) whereby "the data before the competent authorities must be sufficiently representative to give a true picture of the 'domestic industry'". Argentina claims that, in this case, there is no way that the Panel could even consider the matter, since no like product was defined, nor were the producers of the like product identified. Thus, the decision does not meet the most elementary requirements of Articles 2.1, 4.1(c) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.\(^\text{379}\) Argentina claims that the Commission did not provide a legal analysis of how it arrived at these categories and how it determined that they constituted the "domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products" in accordance with Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

4.166 Argentina submits that, as regards edible vegetable oils, the Chilean Commission provides no reasonable explanation of why it appears to have grouped together colza (rape) seeds and various types of edible oils to form a single "product" for its investigation. According to Argentina, Chile is applying its price band to 25 different tariff items of the Harmonized System for edible vegetable oils - "products" which range from olive oil to palm oil, at various stages of processing (crude and refined). Argentina claims that, of these 25 items, Chile only records imports 21 different types of oil.

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\(^{373}\) See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 63-65.

\(^{374}\) See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 95-98.

\(^{375}\) See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 99-101.
Moreover, Argentina explains, Chile only produces colza (rape) and sunflower seeds and colza (rape) oil with seed produced locally, and a bit of soya bean oil with imported beans. In Argentina's view, it is not very clear on what basis the Commission determined the like product and the industry, and which domestic products are "like" or "directly competitive". Argentina claims that, when the Commission makes an estimate of threat of injury to the domestic industry, it refers indiscriminately to producers of rape, to the extracting industry and to the refining industry, without making it clear which is the domestic industry that is allegedly threatened with injury by imports of edible vegetable oils.  

4.167 **Argentina** submits that, as regards wheat flour, the Commission does not in fact provide any analysis of the wheat flour category to determine which products are "like" products or "directly competitive" with the imports. Argentina argues that the Commission merely states that "… for these purposes, flour represents an alternative way of importing wheat if direct imports prove to be more costly or are subject to higher tariffs, so it is necessary to apply a treatment similar to that applied to wheat". Similarly, Argentina submits, Chile states in its notification to the WTO of threat of serious injury that "[i]f the mechanism applied to wheat is not also applied to imports of wheat flour, a large increase in imports of wheat flour could cause injury similar to that caused to wheat production by imports of wheat."  

4.168 As far as wheat is concerned, **Argentina** submits that the Commission failed to carry out a legal analysis concerning the definition of the like product. In Argentina's view, it is not clear whether durum wheat has been subsumed under pasta and wheat under flour in its definition of "product", or whether other forms of wheat have also been included.  

4.169 **Chile** claims not to understand Argentina's reasons for limiting its understanding of the legal requirements for the imposition of a safeguard measure solely to determination of a like product. Chile contends that Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 in fact refers to "like or directly competitive products". Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards provides that "domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products", and Article 4.1(c) then refers to the "domestic industry", defining it as the producers as a whole of "the like or directly competitive products …". In this connection, Argentina cites the ruling of the Appellate Body in the case "US – Lamb", indicating that "The conditions in Article 2.1, therefore, relate in several important respects to specific products. In particular, according to Article 2.1, the legal basis for imposing a safeguard measure exists only when imports of a specific product have prejudicial effects on domestic producers of products that are 'like or directly competitive' with that imported product." Chile does not understand, therefore, why Argentina considers that the Commission should only have identified the like product. Chile argues that it is a fact that the categories of products involved correspond to products in the PBS which, in turn, was established some time ago and grouped categories of products that were directly competitive. In other words, if the PBS had not taken into account each agricultural product and its respective like or directly competitive products, the application of the system would have been ineffective. Nevertheless, Chile claims, as can be seen from the records, the Commission reaffirmed the analysis in that respect. Chile has specified each and every one of the products involved in the investigation and in the subsequent application of measures through its tariff position, its SACH code, Chile's harmonized system, taking into account as well, the explanatory notes to this system.  

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380 *See* Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 104-106.  
381 Argentina quotes document G/SG/N/8/CHL/1, subpara. 1(iv).  
382 *See* Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 107.  
383 *See* Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 108.  
384 Chile refers to para. 99 of Argentina's First Written Submission.  
385 Chile refers to para. 98 of Argentina's First Written Submission.  
386 *See* Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 151-156.
4.170 In response to the above argumentation, Argentina submits that, it never suggested that the determination of the like product was the sole legal requirement for the imposition of safeguard measures. According to Argentina, one of the basic requirements laid down in the Agreement on Safeguards is the identification of a like or directly competitive product so that the authorities can then make their determinations with respect to increased imports, serious injury and causality. Argentina affirms that it is hard to understand why Chile repeats the quotation made by Argentina in its first written submission from paragraph 86 of the Appellate Body report in United States – Lamb, which states, precisely, that the legal basis for imposing a safeguard measure exists only when imports of a specific product have prejudicial effects on domestic producers of products that are "like or directly competitive" with that imported product. In fact, Argentina adds, although there were important elements relating to the issue of the like product and the producers of the like product that needed to be identified in this case, the Commission did not carry out any analysis, and it was therefore impossible to identify the industries affected. In the case of oils, Argentina explains, the Commission refers indiscriminately to producers of rape, to the extracting industry and to the refining industry. Argentina further argues that Chile states that the Commission Minutes contain an analysis of the "directly competitive products" because the Commission repeated the analysis conducted when the price band system was introduced. However, Argentina argues, that analysis could not have been included in any of the records. Argentina repeats that the Minutes that served as a basis for the investigation and conclusions of the Commission contained no more than citations of numbers and figures relating to imports and financial and economic indices of the "industries", with information taken directly from the Ministry of Agriculture's application for the initiation of an investigation and no analysis or conclusions as to its accuracy.

4.171 Chile contends that the Commission acted consistently with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 4.1(c) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards by confirming not once but twice that both subject product categories were comprised of like or directly competitive products. Chile explains that the Commission confirmed that the categories of products chosen for the safeguard measure corresponded exactly to the categories used for the price band system, thereby assuring that the categories were comprised of only directly competitive products. Moreover, Chile argues, the Commission did an independent analysis of both wheat and wheat flour as well as the category comprising edible vegetable oils.

4.172 As regards wheat and wheat flour, Chile explains that, in view of the inherent nature of the products under investigation, domestic wheat was considered to be a like product to imported wheat since the imports correspond to the same product at the agricultural production level. It indicates that the same conclusion was reached for flour, which would be a like product to imported flour. In this connection, Chile explains, the Commission also took account of the fact that flour constitutes an alternative way of importing wheat if the import of wheat as such proves to be more costly or subject to a higher tariff: imported flour is directly competitive with domestic wheat in view of the fact that the latter is used almost exclusively for producing flour. Thus, Chile argues, the Commission found that wheat flour has a high rate of substitutability with wheat and thus the two products are directly competitive. Chile contests Argentina's statement that the Commission does not provide any analysis to determine which products are like and directly competitive with imports of wheat flour. Chile argues, establishing a safeguard for wheat and failing to do so for flour would be perfectly useless because imports would then tend to be in the form of flour. This was why a price band

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387 Argentina refers to para. 153 of Chile's First Written Submission.
388 Argentina refers to para. 155 of Chile's First Written Submission.
389 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 115-118.
390 See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 75.
391 See Chile's response to question 27(a) (CHL) of the Panel.
392 See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 75.
393 Chile refers to para. 107 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
directly related to that for wheat was then established for flour. In addition, Argentina states that it is not clear whether the Commission subsumed durum wheat for pasta and wheat for flour in its definition of product.  

Chile notes in this connection that imports of wheat subject to safeguards correspond to those under tariff heading 1001.9000, which only includes imports of wheat for making bread and pastry products, as determined in Minutes of Session No. 193. Imports of wheat for pasta are classified under another tariff heading (1001.1000) therefore, identification of the tariff headings makes it clear which products are covered by the investigation.

4.173 As regards edible vegetable oils, Chile contests Argentina's statement that "it is not very clear on what basis the Commission determined the like product and the industry". In this connection, Chile notes that rape-seed oil produced domestically is a like product to the other oils to which the measure applied because (i) they are physically and chemically very similar; (ii) they are consumed without distinction; (iii) they have the same final use; (iv) they utilize the same channels of distribution. Chile submits that one indicator of this is the wording on the labelling of edible vegetable oils for consumption, where the reference is usually only to vegetable oils or a mixture thereof, without specifying which oils. Chile claims that, from the point of view of the consumers, which is the relevant factor when determining if the products are directly competitive, it cannot be said that they are different products.

4.174 Argentina considers the above as ex post facto explanations by Chile. Argentina considers that Chile cannot simply claim that the Commission took the above parameters into account without indicating in what part of the report the said analysis and its conclusions can be found. Argentina argues that Chile itself recognizes that the implementing authority merely identified the products under investigation by their tariff heading. Argentina submits that this does not constitute a sufficient analysis of the like product for the purposes of applying a safeguard measure – on the contrary, it confirms that the parties are speaking of the same products that are subject to the price band system.

(f) Increase of imports

4.175 Argentina claims that the competent Chilean authorities failed to demonstrate an increase in imports under Article XIX.1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. Argentina contends that the increased imports is a fundamental requirement for the imposition of a safeguard measure provided for in the Articles concerned.

4.176 Argentina claims that an analysis of the content of the Minutes and notifications reveals that Chile did not demonstrate that there were increased imports, and hence failed to comply with its obligations under Article XIX.1(a) and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. Argentina refers to Argentina – Footwear (EC) where the Panel stated that "[t]he Agreement on Safeguards requires an increase in imports as a basic prerequisite for the application of a safeguard measure. The relevant provisions are in Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) and "[t]hus, to determine whether imports have increased in 'such quantities' for purposes of applying a safeguard measure, these two provisions require an analysis of the rate and amount of the increase in imports, in absolute terms and
as a percentage of domestic production."\(^{402}\) Argentina argues that the increase in imports has to have already occurred when the decision is made. In this regard, it refers to the Panel report in *Argentina – Footwear (EC)* which maintained that "… if only a threat of increased imports is present, rather than actual increased imports, this is not sufficient determination of the existence of a threat of serious injury due to a threat of increased imports would amount to a determination based on allegation of conjecture rather than one supported by facts as required by Article 4.1(b)."\(^{403}\) According to Argentina, the report of the Panel in *US – Wheat Gluten* confirmed this general notion, noting that Article XIX:1(a) and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards contains "the initial threshold requirement that there be an increase in imports."\(^{404}\)

4.177 **Argentina** also refers to *Argentina – Footwear (EC)*, where the Appellate Body established that the examination of the increase in imports must include an analysis of the trends over the period of investigation, and that recent imports must also be examined.\(^{405}\) Argentina reminds that the Appellate Body maintained that "not just *any* increased quantities of imports will suffice." … "[T]he increase in imports must have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively to cause or threaten to cause 'serious injury'."\(^{406}\) Argentina claims that Chile has not demonstrated a real increase in imports. Argentina submits that, in fact, the Commission does not bother with the question of whether imports increased. On the contrary, Argentina argues, it simply reaches an unfounded conclusion: "There were noticeable differences between recent import prices resulting from full application of the band and prices resulting from imposition of a tariff ceiling of 31.5 per cent. This substantiates the forecast of a greatly accelerated increase in imports that would occur (or has already occurred) unless the full duties specified in the bands are applied. …"\(^{407}\) Argentina further argues that, even if this analysis had any validity, *quod non*, the Commission did not provide objective evidence of its effect, nor did it specify to what degree imports would have increased. Argentina submits that an analysis of this type does not provide a sufficient basis for concluding that imports were in "increased" quantities, as required by Articles 2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.\(^{408}\) Argentina concludes that what counts in deciding on the application of safeguard measures being a demonstration of the actual increase in imports and affirms that Chile provided no such demonstration either for wheat, or for wheat flour, or for edible vegetable oils.\(^{409}\)

4.178 **Argentina** considers that the decision of the Commission to recommend the extension of the measures (Minutes of Session No. 224) contains some data in addition to that contained in the related documents. However, Argentina argues, the new data on which the extension is based suffers from the same shortcomings as the original investigation. Argentina submits that the Chilean Commission failed to demonstrate that imports were in such increased quantities as to justify the imposition of a safeguard measure. For all of these reasons Argentina concludes that the Chilean Commission failed to demonstrate that edible vegetable oils, wheat or wheat flour were being imported in increased quantities, absolute or relative.\(^{410}\)

\(^{402}\) Ibid., para. 8.141.

\(^{403}\) Ibid., para. 8.284.


\(^{405}\) Argentina quotes the Appellate Body report on Argentina – Footwear (EC), (WT/DS121/AB/R) adopted on 12 January 2000, para. 129.

\(^{406}\) Ibid., para. 131.

\(^{407}\) Argentina quotes the notification on threat of serious injury, G/SG/N/8/CHL/1, item 2 in fine.

\(^{408}\) See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 110-115.

\(^{409}\) See Argentina's Second Oral Statement, para. 44.

\(^{410}\) See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 116-118.
4.179 **Chile** submits that Chile considers that the requirement regarding an increase in imports and the impact of the PBS in this case are factors that cannot be examined separately. It refers to Minutes of Session No. 224 which states the following: "(i) In examining imports, the Commission took into consideration the fact that, for each of the products investigated, the normal functioning of the PBS had been decisive in containing an increase in imports and, consequently, the trend in imports cannot be examined without taking this factor into account. The analysis by the Commission takes into account the period from the adoption of each safeguard measure in effect for each product. Nevertheless, for the purposes of comparison and evaluation, information for previous periods is also taken into account."\(^{412}\)

4.180 **Chile** submits that it does not follow either from the letter of Article XIX.1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards, or from their object and purpose, that an extension measure requires that the competent authority find for a second time that there is an increase in imports to justify an extension. Chile argues that, taken literally, Article 7.2, refers to Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5, however as indicated earlier it refers only to procedural aspects regulated by those Articles and not to substantive aspects. Chile further argues that, if Argentina were right, there would be an essential contradiction between the requirements laid down in the last part of paragraph 2 and the requirement of a further increase in imports established in Article 2. Chile contends that, if one assumes that prior to the adoption of an extension, there must be a definitive measure whose object, *inter alia*, is to counteract the threat of injury presented by an increase in imports, there would be no reason for requiring evidence of the fact that the domestic industry is adjusting. Chile wonders how would it be possible for there to be any adjustment to a further increase in imports if the definitive measure were still in force.\(^{413}\)

4.181 In response to the above argumentation, **Argentina** submits that Minute 193 – which provides the outcome of the Commission's investigation for the definitive safeguard measures – is not WTO-consistent since, by not following the procedural requirements established in the Agreement on Safeguards, it does not meet any of the substantive conditions, compliance of which is necessary for any safeguard measure in order for it to be lawful. Therefore, it affords no legal basis for the application of the definitive safeguard measures. As a result, Minute 224, which is legally premised on Minute 193, can not possibly justify the extension of such WTO-inconsistent safeguard measures. Thus, the measures, whether as originally applied or as extended, are WTO-inconsistent. In addition, Argentina also maintains that Minute 224 itself violates various provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards as previously elaborated in various submissions by Argentina.\(^{414}\)

(i) **Edible vegetable oils**

Initiation of the investigation

4.182 **Argentina** submits that, with respect to oils, Minutes of Session No. 181 of the Commission states that: "Imports of oils pursued a growth trend, increasing from 82,000 tons in 1990 to 171,000 tons in 1998, reflecting a growth of 110 per cent for the period." Argentina considers that it is easy to understand the irrelevance of the data evaluated. In this regard, Argentina quotes the Appellate Body in *Argentina – Footwear (EC)*\(^{415}\) "... the competent authorities are required to consider the *trends* in imports over the period of investigation (rather than just comparing the end points)". Argentina submits that in this case, when Chile decided to initiate the safeguards investigation, it did so on the

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\(^{411}\) Chile quotes the Minutes No. 224, II.(i) of 17 November 2000.
\(^{412}\) See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 170.
\(^{413}\) See Chile's Second Oral Statement, paras. 61-63.
\(^{414}\) See Argentina's response to question 50 of the Panel.
\(^{415}\) Argentina quotes the Appellate Body report on *Argentina – Footwear (EC)*, (WT/DS121/AB/R) adopted on 12 January 2000, para. 129.
basis of an "end point to end point" analysis only, considering the increase in imports between 1990 and 1998, without analysing the rate and amount of the increase in imports, in absolute terms and as a percentage of domestic production. Consequently, Argentina claims, the analysis carried out by the Chilean authorities is inconsistent with the obligations contained in Article 4.2 (a). Argentina explains that this was the Panel's interpretation in Argentina – Footwear (EC), and it was confirmed by the Appellate Body, which stated with respect to the increase in imports in absolute terms that it is not enough to carry out an analysis from end point to end point, rather it is necessary to consider the intervening trends (up or down and the importance of mixing them to determine an increase in the amount) (rate and amount). 416 According to the interpretation of the requirements made by the Appellate Body in the same case, Argentina submits that "the increase in imports must have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause 'serious injury'". 417 Argentina further submits that it is incomprehensible that Chile should have presented different data in Minutes of Session No. 181 from the data it provided in Minutes of Session No. 224 for imports of oils between 1990 and 1998 or, at least, there is no explanation of this difference in figures. 418

4.183 Chile contests Argentina's statement whereby Chile decided to initiate the safeguards investigation into edible vegetable oils only on the basis of an "end point to end point" analysis (for the years 1990 and 1998). 419 Chile notes that, when determining the measures, the Commission's analysis did not only consider the most recent trend but also developments and other factors that had affected the situation of such imports, as can be seen from Minutes of Session No. 193. Chile also contests Argentina's claim regarding "incomprehensible" differences in the data (paragraph 125), which in any event are deemed to be marginal, can be explained as a result of the revision and verification of the information provided by Chile. 420

Provisional safeguards

4.184 Argentina submits that, regarding imports, Minutes of Session No. 185 of the Commission merely states that "... the Commission took into account the increase that would have occurred during the agricultural season 1999/2000 on the hypothesis of the bound import tariff of 31.5 per cent instead of the duties applicable under the price band. On the basis of this information provided in the application, the Commission estimated that the increase in imports would correspond, at least, to the volume needed to cover the production deficit resulting from the decrease in production under the related headings". In Argentina's view, the Minutes did not present any information with respect to an increase in imports in absolute terms or relative to domestic production and on whether the imports were under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury, so that Chile once again failed to comply with its obligations under Articles 2.1 and 4.2 (a). 421

4.185 Chile disagrees with Argentina's claim and refers to the import statistics before the Commission, updated in the Annex to Minutes of Session No. 224. Chile explains that, under the tariff heading corresponding to mixtures of oils (1517.9000), increasing quantities of edible vegetable oils started to be imported. This situation led to an increase of 45 per cent in imports of this product in 1999 and an increase of 431 per cent in 2000. Consequently, in 2000, 70 per cent of the imports of edible vegetable oils into Chile were classified as "mixtures" of oils. In Chile's view, this is relevant because, for example, between 1990 and 1996, this share did not exceed 0.4 per cent. The dramatic

417 Argentina quotes the Appellate Body report on Argentina – Footwear (EC), (WT/DS121/AB/R) adopted on 12 January 2000, para. 131.
418 *See* Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 119-125.
419 Chile refers to Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 121.
420 *See* Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 172,-173.
421 *See* Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 126-127.
increase in imports of mixtures of oils is reflected in an increase in total imports of vegetable oils (pure oils and mixtures of oils) of 16 per cent in 2000 compared with the volume imported the previous year. As a result of this situation, Chile argues, the Commission received a request to investigate the situation affecting mixtures of oils and initiated a safeguards investigation into this product. As shown in Minutes of Session No. 229, during this investigation the relationship between oils and mixtures of oils and the substantial increase in imports of the latter became evident. This situation led to the adoption of a provisional safeguard measure for mixtures of oils.422

4.186 In response to the above argumentation, Argentina submits that the Chilean reference to the increase in imports of mixtures of oils has no relevance in determining the safeguard measures and that Chile recognizes that imports of edible vegetable oils declined.423

Definitive safeguards

4.187 Argentina submits that Minutes of Session No. 193 of the Commission determines, with respect to imports of the two main edible vegetable oils only, that they increased by 23 per cent in 1998 as compared to the previous year. However, Argentina argues, it then goes on to point out that "... these imports dropped by 24 per cent ..." during the most recent period, which, according to the Appellate Body, is ultimately the relevant period for the application of the measure. Argentina further submits that the same Minutes also state that "... from 1993 to 1997, the level of imports is similar", i.e. there was no increase in imports either, even if we consider a series of more than ten years, as recorded in the notifications that we shall examine in detail further on, placing the recent behaviour of imports in the broader context of their trend which, at best, was stable. Argentina indicates that Chile's notification to the WTO of 7 February 2000 on finding a serious injury or threat thereof, in the section on increased imports, repeats what was mentioned in Minutes of Session No. 193, that imports of the two main vegetable oils fell by 24 per cent during the most recent period.424

4.188 Chile argues that an increase in imports is a basic requirement for the imposition of safeguard measures and submits that Minutes of Session No. 193 shows that "[i]mports of the two major products in the edible vegetable oils sector increased by 23 per cent in 1998 compared with the previous year. Over the first ten months of 1999, imports fell by 24 per cent. Regarding this decrease, the Commission notes that in 1999 there was an abnormal situation due to the behaviour of importers as a result of the tariff disputes concerning the headings under which oils should be imported. From 1993 to 1997, the level of imports recorded is similar."425

Extension of the measures

4.189 Argentina submits that Minutes of Session No. 224 of the Commission also states that "... Imports of edible vegetable oils fell by 37 per cent in the period January to September 2000 compared with the same period in the previous year. In 1999, these imports fell by 22 per cent. The level of imports from 1993 to 1997 is similar." Argentina argues that, although an end point to end point analysis does not help in determining the application of a measure, it does help to show the trend in imports, as sanctioned by the Appellate Body in Argentina – Footwear (EC), and, in this case, the trend is, to say the least, erratic and moreover was clearly downward during the period 1998-1999 (the most recent), both as regards the headings subject to safeguards and the others.426

422 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 167-169.
423 See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 124.
424 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 128-130.
425 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 166.
426 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 131-133.
4.190 Argentina submits that, in Chile's notification to the WTO dated 22 December 2000 – extending the measure in effect – the wording in the section on vegetable oils repeats that contained in Minutes of Session No. 224 to the effect that "... Imports of edible vegetable oils fell by 37 per cent in the period January to September 2000 compared with the same period in the previous year. In 1999, these imports fell by 22 per cent. From 1993 to 1997 the level of imports is similar." Argentina contends that, when it decided to extend the safeguard measures by means of Minutes of Session No. 224, Chile recognized that there had been a significant fall in imports, which in all respects is totally inconsistent with its WTO obligations. Argentina also refers to data provided by other sources which would show a net fall in imports in 1999 and 2000 both for soya bean and sunflower oils, which account for over 90 per cent of all Chile's imports of oil under the tariff headings subject to the safeguard. In Argentina's view, these data prove that there has been no increase in imports of edible vegetable oils in absolute terms nor do any of the Minutes or notifications provide any information concerning increased imports relative to domestic production or under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury. Argentina therefore submits that Chile fails to comply with the obligations under Article XIX.1(a) and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

4.191 In this regard, Chile quotes the following excerpt of Minutes of Session No. 224:

"(i) In examining imports, the Commission took into consideration the fact that, for each of the products investigated, the normal functioning of the price band system had been decisive in containing an increase in imports and, consequently, the trend in imports cannot be examined without taking this factor into account. The analysis by the Commission takes into account the period from the adoption of each safeguard measure in effect for each product. Nevertheless, for the purposes of comparison and evaluation, information for previous periods is also taken into account."

(ii) Wheat flour

Initiation of the investigation

4.192 Argentina submits that, when considering imports, Minutes of Session No. 181 simply states that "...for flour, there was an increase of over 80 per cent during the past year and the first six months of the last three years show increases of 321 per cent, 23 per cent and 15 per cent." Argentina alleges that this conclusion is not based on concrete statistical data, as can be seen from the information provided by the actual petitioner and from the data of the Commission itself in Minutes of Session No. 224, which show a marked downward trend as of 1996.

4.193 Chile contests Argentina's statement that Minutes of Session No. 181 on the initiation of the investigation determined that, for wheat flour, over the past year there was an increase of over 80 per cent and that the first six months of the last three years show increases of 321 per cent, 23 per cent and 15 per cent, which, according to Argentina, "are not based on concrete statistical data", because Minutes of Session No. 224 showed a marked downward trend as of 1996. Chile points out that this apparent contradiction is simply due to the fact that a different period was taken as a basis for comparison because, for the initiation of the investigation, the Commission took the half-yearly trend for the previous three years, whereas Minutes of Session No. 224 refers to a longer period and an

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427 Argentina refers to data provided by the Argentine Embassy in Chile, based on Chilean customs figures, published by the firm "Intelecta".

428 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 134-140.

429 Chile quotes the Minutes No. 224, II.(i) of 17 November 2000.

430 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 141-142.

431 Chile refers to paras. 141-142 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
annual not half-yearly trend. Chile claims that this is shown by the Minutes, which states "[i]mports of wheat flour fluctuate as far as increases and decreases are concerned, but this can be explained by their low volume. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that for these purposes wheat flour represents an alternative way of importing wheat if direct imports prove to be more costly or are subject to a higher tariff, so it is necessary to apply a treatment similar to that applicable to wheat. The Commission considers that if the total duties determined by the band were not applied and the duty was limited to a maximum tariff of 31.5 per cent, the result would be a very rapid increase in imports of the product." Noting both the levels and the rates of increase, the Commission concluded that the trend had been erratic during the period 1990 - January-September 2000. Chile submits that the mere fact that Minutes of Session No. 181 refers to a particular period does not mean that the Commission considered other data or did not take into account other periods in its analysis. In any event, Chile adds, the most important element when analysing the trend in imports of wheat flour is that they are an alternative product to imports of wheat and the Commission gave priority to this argument over and above the trend in imports itself.\textsuperscript{332}

Provisional safeguards

4.194 **Argentina** contends that, as in the case of oils, Minutes of Session No. 185 do not provide any information (data, statistics, etc.) concerning an increase in imports in absolute terms or relative to domestic production under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury, thereby failing to comply with the obligations under Article 2.1.\textsuperscript{333}

Definitive safeguards

4.195 **Argentina** submits that Minutes of Session No. 193 indicate that: "...Imports of wheat flour fluctuate, but this can be explained by their low volume. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that for these purposes wheat flour represents an alternative way of importing wheat if direct imports prove to be more costly or are subject to a higher tariff, so it is necessary to apply a treatment similar to that applicable to wheat." Argentina considers that the conclusion drawn by the Commission nullifies any subsequent inference by Chile from the figures because it acknowledges that these fluctuate and concern low volumes. Argentina submits that, in fact, there is a downward trend.\textsuperscript{334} Argentina submits that it can also be seen that the Minutes do not provide any data or statistics on imports of wheat flour, and therefore, the resolution on the application of definitive safeguard measures to wheat flour is extremely imprecise and partial. Argentina claims that, in the notification to the WTO dated 7 February 2000, concerning the existence of serious injury or threat of serious injury, the section concerning increased imports repeats the wording in Minutes of Session No. 193 regarding fluctuations in the volume of imports of wheat flour without specifying the period taken into account. In any event, Argentina concludes, the trend is downward rather than fluctuating, as can be seen from the information given by Chile in Minutes of Session No. 224.\textsuperscript{335}

Extension of the measures

4.196 **Argentina** submits that, like Minutes of Session No. 193, Minutes of Session No. 224 also state that "...imports of wheat flour fluctuate as far as increases and decreases are concerned...". Argentina claims that the tables accompanying the Minutes contradict the statement in the text since they clearly show a downward trend in imports of wheat flour.\textsuperscript{336} Argentina indicates that the Minutes later state that "[t]he Commission considered that if the total duties determined by the band were not

\textsuperscript{332} See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 174-179.

\textsuperscript{333} See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 143.

\textsuperscript{334} See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 144.

\textsuperscript{335} See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 145-147.

\textsuperscript{336} See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 148-150.
applied, and the duty was limited to a maximum tariff of 31.5 per cent, the result would be a very rapid increase in imports of the product.” In Argentina's view, it would appear that the Chilean authorities consider that an alleged increase in imports, which in fact did not occur when the measure was applied, could provide grounds for applying the measure. In this connection, Argentina submits that it must be borne in mind that a decision to apply a measure must be based on concrete facts and not on estimates or conjecture.\(^{437}\) Argentina indicates that Chile's notification to the WTO dated 22 December 2000 concerning the extension of the existing measure states once again that imports of wheat flour show an erratic pattern of increases and decreases, and reads "if the total duties determined by the band were not applied, and the duty was limited to a maximum tariff of 31.5 per cent, the result would be a very rapid increase in imports of the product”. Argentina claims that Table 3 of Minutes of Session No. 224 is attached to the notification and shows a clear downward trend in imports of wheat flour. Argentina submits that, based on the figures in the Decree extending the measure and its notification: imports of wheat flour showed a marked downward trend in 1998 and 1999 after peaking in 1996; the volume of imports of wheat flour fell by 21 per cent in 1998 compared with 1997; imports fell by a further 11 per cent during the first nine months of 2000 compared with the same period in 1999.\(^{438}\)

(iii) Wheat

Initiation of the investigation

4.197 **Argentina** contends that, as far as wheat is concerned, it can be seen that Chile decided to initiate the safeguards investigation by means of Minutes of Session No. 181 on the basis of partial data that do not give an overall view of the trend, particularly since the imports peaked in 1996 and this did not occur subsequently.\(^{439}\)

Provisional safeguards

4.198 **Argentina** submits that, with regard to wheat imports, Minutes of Session No. 185 do not provide any information either to justify the application of provisional safeguard measures to imports of wheat.\(^{440}\)

Definitive safeguards

4.199 **Argentina** submits that, as regards imports of wheat, Minutes of Session No. 193 indicate that, although there was an increase in imports from 1993 to 1996, these fell in 1997 and only rose by 6 per cent in 1998 compared with the previous year. They also indicate that, over the first ten months of 1999, imports increased by 281 per cent in comparison with the same period the previous year. Argentina further submits that, in the publication by ODEPA entitled *El Pulso de la Agricultura* of February 1999, No. 27 there are specific references to the seriousness of the drought in 1998/1999. According to this publication, 55 per cent of the agricultural communities were in a state of alert. Argentina claims that, in its report on the first half of 1999, the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture stated that the drought during the 1998/1999 season had led to a decrease in the area under cultivation and a fall in wheat yields and production throughout Chile. Consequently, Argentina submits, it is clear that this factor, which was not taken into account in the relevant Record, had a decisive effect on domestic production of wheat and possibly on other products subject to the safeguard, and, as a result, on imports. **Argentina** indicates that the section on increased imports in the notification to the WTO

\(^{437}\) Argentina refers to the Panel report on **Argentina – Footwear (EC)**, (WT/DS121/R) adopted on 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body report, para. 8.284.

\(^{438}\) See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 151-155.

\(^{439}\) See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 156.  

\(^{440}\) See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 157.
dated 7 February 2000 on finding a serious injury or threat thereof repeats the wording in Minutes of Session No. 193.\footnote{See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 158-159.}

4.200 **Chile** submits that an increase in imports is a basic requirement for the imposition of safeguard measures and quotes Minutes of Session No. 193\footnote{Chile quotes the Minutes No. 193 of 7 January 2000.} which reads: "Imports of wheat (in tonnes) increased by 6 per cent in 1998 compared with the previous year. Over the first 10 months of 1999, imports increased by 281 per cent in comparison with the same period the previous year. From 1993 up to 1996, there was an increase in imports, which then fell in 1997. Import of wheat flour fluctuated, but this can be explained by their low volume."\footnote{See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 164.}

4.201 In response to the above argument, **Argentina** claims that that increase is irrelevant in order to decide the application of a safeguard measure considering that the 511,187 tons imported in 1999 represented almost 30 per cent less of the total imported in 1996 (638,946 tons) as shown by data provided by Chile in Minutes of Session No. 224.\footnote{See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 122.}

**Extension of the measures**

4.202 **Argentina** refers to Minutes of Session No. 224 which state that "[d]espite the fact that imports of wheat (in tons) fell by 18 per cent in the period January to September 2000 compared with the corresponding period for 1999, the Commission took into account that, in annual terms, imports remained above the annual average for the period 1990-1999." In Argentina's view, it is clear that the figures given do not suffice for the purpose of deciding whether or not to extend the safeguard measure and, in light of the interpretation given by the panel in *Argentina - Footwear (EC)* concerning the increase in imports in absolute terms to the effect that an end point to end point comparison does not suffice and that intervening trends (up or down and the importance of mixing them in order to determine an increase in the amount), the rate and amount, within a fixed period of investigation, must be analysed, which is not the case in this instance, serious doubts are cast on the consistency and coherence of the figures. Argentina therefore claims that it does not suffice to consider different figures for incomplete periods in some cases or figures that are not viewed as a whole, because this deprives the period of any relevance. Argentina further argues that, bearing in mind that in the same *Argentina – Footwear (EC)* case the Appellate Body considered that the increase in imports must have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause "serious injury", the decrease of 18 per cent in imports of wheat during the most recent period is decisive for invalidating the application of the measure.\footnote{See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 160-163.}

4.203 **Argentina** explains that, regarding wheat imports, the Minutes include a Table 1 with figures which, on the one hand, do not show a growing trend in imports of wheat and, on the other, indicate that the trend is to say the least erratic. Consequently, Argentina submits as particularly serious, the fact that Minutes of Session No. 224, which extend the safeguard measures for one year, not only fail to record an increase in imports of wheat but acknowledge a fall of 18 per cent in the most recent period,. According to Argentina, Minutes of Session No. 224 and the notification of the extension also contain figures on imports of "other wheat", which reached a peak in 1996 and then declined. Argentina argues that, although imports increased in 1999, this increase has been estimated on the basis of historically low levels such as those in 1997 and 1998. Imports fell again in the year 2000. Argentina claims that the section on wheat imports in the notification to the WTO dated 22 December 2000 concerning the extension of the existing measure repeats the wording in Minutes of Session No. 224 of the Commission: "[d]espite the fact that wheat imports (in tons) fell by 18 per cent in the
period January to September compared with the corresponding period for 1999, the Commission took into account that, in annual terms, imports remained above the annual average for the period 1990-1999." Argentina questions the relevance this statement has in support of the decision to apply a safeguard measure. Argentina indicates that it has also obtained figures concerning Chilean imports of wheat (tariff heading 1001.9000 - Wheat, other) from other sources for the last three full years. According to Argentina, these figures clearly show the fall in wheat imports in the year 2000. In any event, Argentina states, as far as this product is concerned, the impact of the drought in 1998/1999 must be taken into account and yet was not considered by the Chilean authorities under "other factors".

(g) Evaluation of all relevant factors

4.204 Argentina contends that the competent Chilean authorities did not evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of the industry, as required by Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. In particular, Argentina considers that the determination of threat of serious injury made by the Chilean authority applying the measure is not supported by the evidence obtained during the investigation. Argentina maintains that the determination of threat of serious injury by the Commission is inconsistent because of two instances of non-compliance: (i) contrary to their obligations under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the Chilean authorities did not evaluate all the factors related to the situation of the industry; (ii) the findings and conclusions of the Commission regarding the factors investigated were not substantiated by evidence.

4.205 Argentina notes that neither the Minutes of the Commission nor the notifications to the WTO contain any analysis of each of the factors specified in Article 4.2(a) during the investigation period, but only isolated data referring to some of the factors related to the appraisal of an alleged threat of injury. Argentina explains that, for example, neither the Minutes nor the notifications contain any evaluation of the rate and amount of the increase in imports, the share of the domestic market taken by imports, nor any figures regarding sales, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, employment or any other relevant factor concerning the situation of the domestic industry. In Argentina's view, this does not mean that the competent authority must confine itself to examining the factors listed in the Agreement on Safeguards, but it does mean that, at the very least, it should examine these factors, because Article 4.2(a) uses the words "in particular" when referring to them. For example, Argentina adds, in addition to the aforementioned profitability (profits and losses), the competent authority should have examined cash flows in the major firms in this sector. Argentina submits that the investigation carried out by the Commission did not comply with the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards because it did not evaluate all relevant factors and did not undertake a substantive analysis of each factor. Argentina suggests that the Commission may have simply accepted the information on the industry's indicators submitted by the petitioner, in this particular case the Ministry of Agriculture. Argentina considers that the Final Determination does not really contain data but only some partial statistics for the three products mentioned therein. It further explains that it is only possible to extract some isolated data that are not very clear because there is no sequential information of the type needed to undertake comparisons. In Argentina's opinion, it is not possible either to identify the source of the statistics on which the investigation was based nor the process by which the statistics were verified and re-evaluated in terms of their reliability. Furthermore, Argentina affirms, the data themselves appear to be based on some type of "forecast" because the text is written in the conditional tense. Argentina contends that, it has not proved possible to identify any analytical basis to substantiate the forecast. Argentina also contends that the comparison between the periods

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446 Argentina refers to data provided by the Argentine Embassy in Chile, based on Chilean customs figures, published by the firm "Intelecta".
447 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 164-172.
448 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 173-176.
examined is not very clear and the data given have not been evaluated in relation to previous years. According to Argentina, in essence, the data do not prove anything concerning the existence of a serious threat of injury to the industry. Argentina submits that the gravity of the measure adopted by the Commission is not justified by the mere statement that "limiting import duties to 31.5 per cent at a time when international prices for these products have fallen obviously constitutes a threat of serious injury ...".  

4.206 **Chile** submits that Article 4.2(a) requires Members to "evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature" when investigating whether the increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury. Although Article 4.2 does contain certain factors to be evaluated, the Article does not contain a definitive list, thereby leaving Members latitude and even a duty to determine what are the relevant factors in particular cases.

4.207 **Argentina** disagrees with the above interpretation of Article 4.2 by Chile and considers that this interpretation is definitely contrary to the actual text of the Article, according to which Chile had a minimum obligation to analyse the factors mentioned therein – given that the Article refers to them "in particular" – aside from other relevant factors. Argentina argues that this interpretation is consistent with different Appellate Body precedents as in "Argentina – Footwear (EC)", and "US – Lamb".

4.208 **Chile** submits that the Chilean authority complied with the requirement to evaluate all relevant factors laid down in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. As indicated in that paragraph, "all relevant factors" must be analysed. Chile submits that relevance is fundamental when considering factors affecting injury or threat of injury and it must be considered on a case-by-case, product-by-product basis. Chile maintains that the Commission therefore considered it highly relevant to include the impact of the PBS on trade flows in the products investigated that were subject to price bands. It further argues that failing to take this impact into account would have been inconsistent with Article 4.2(a). Chile explains that during the investigation period, the band functioned with positive specific tariffs. It would be simply inadmissible not to take into account the existence of this tariff and its effect on the flow of imports and "consequently, the trend in imports cannot be analysed without taking into account this factor". Chile indicates that this is why the authority considered it necessary to evaluate the injury that would have been caused to domestic industry in the absence of the band during the period prior to application of the safeguards. In this connection, Chile submits that Minutes of Session Nos. 181, 185, 193 and 224 again refer to the impact that would have been caused by failure to apply safeguards. The effects of the increase in imports take into account both the income level of producers and the value of production, the decrease in net profits, including losses, as well as the physical downturn in the domestic industry which would be absorbed by imports and, lastly, the effect on employment. Chile claims that this analysis was undertaken for each and every one of the products covered by the investigation, namely, wheat, wheat flour and oils.

4.209 **Chile** contests Argentina's claims that it did not evaluate "all the relevant factors", as required by Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. Chile submits that the Agreement on Safeguards...
does not determine nor specify what is the proper method for deciding on the relevance of the factors, so Argentina's statement in its claim regarding the need to consider "for example, (...) cash flows in the major firms in this sector" should not be taken into account because the relevance of factors is the result of the criteria used by the investigating body and may vary from case to case. Chile further submits that, if the Agreement on Safeguards itself lists certain aspects that should be given particular attention and does not include the factors cited by Argentina, Chile does not consider that it violated this Article by not including a separate analysis of cash flows in the major firms. Moreover, Chile argues, for this type of product, the most important factor is price. Chile refers to *US – Lamb*, and submits that the Appellate Body clearly indicated "that the competent authorities are not required 'to show that each listed injury factor is declining' but, rather, they must reach a determination in light of the evidence as a whole". Chile submits that failure to include a factor that in Argentina's opinion, was decisive or critical, even if it really was, which remains subject to discussion – does not suffice to affirm non-compliance with the Agreement on Safeguards. Furthermore, Argentina indicates that "[i]t appears that the Commission simply accepted the information on the industry's indicators …", but does not reject the factors taken into account. Consequently, Chile argues, these factors cannot be nullified simply because another additional factor was not taken into account in the investigation. Chile submits that this would only apply to the extent that the information included did not, as a whole, lead to an appropriate conclusion.

4.210 In response to a question from the Panel, Chile explains that all of the factors on which the Commission had information were considered. It adds that the factors that were not considered were those for which information was unavailable from public sources and could not be found by consulting other sources either.

4.211 In response to Argentina's claim that the gravity of the measure adopted by the Commission is not justified by the mere statement that "limiting import duties to 31.5 per cent at a time when international prices for these products have fallen obviously constitutes a threat of serious injury", Chile submits that Minutes of Session No. 193 contain detailed information concerning the serious injury to the domestic industry concerned if the recommended measures are not applied. In addition, Chile claims, Argentina fails to draw attention to other Minutes that formed an integral part of the investigation, namely, Minutes of Session No. 181 of 9 September 1999 and Minutes of Session No. 185 of 22 October 1999, where the injury to the domestic industry that would occur if the recommended measures were not adopted is confirmed and explained in detail.

Edible vegetable oils

4.212 Argentina contends that it is not clear what type of product or industry is being examined under the heading "vegetable oils", and therefore, it is impossible to determine the relevance of the information obtained in the investigation or whether such data are representative of the industry. It further states that it is impossible to determine what periods are being examined because no dates are given. Argentina affirms that, although the Commission highlights decreases in production and employment levels, reading the documents it is not clear whether the slowdown in the production of edible vegetable oils did in fact occur or would occur. In addition, Argentina points out that the Commission does not deal either with the other factors listed in Article 4.2(a), namely, the share of the

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459 Chile refers to para. 179 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
460 Chile quotes WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, para. 144.
461 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 183-186.
462 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 187.
463 See Chile's response to question 21(b) (CHL) of the Panel.
464 Chile refers to footnote 88 of Argentina's First Written Submission where Argentina refers inter alia to Minutes No. 193, p. 2, and Minutes No. 224, pp. 1 and 2.
465 See Chile's First Written Submission, para. 188.
domestic market taken by imports, changes in the level of sales, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, *inter alia*.

In Argentina’s view, although the extension of the safeguard measure, reported in Minutes of Session No. 224 and in the notification of extension, includes some additional data, the following points should be made: Firstly, the data are not analysed in the aforementioned Record; secondly, the figures contained in the tables attached to the Minutes imposing the measure in fact invalidate any possible determination of threat of injury. For example, Argentina explains, prices appear to have risen significantly between 1996 and 1999 in terms of pesos and then stabilized during the period examined for the year 2000.

4.213 **Argentina** indicates that Table 16 of Minutes of Session No. 224 recommending the extension contains figures relating to colza (rape) and sunflower, in terms of area sown, harvest and yield. In Argentina’s opinion, it is not clear why these seeds should be representative of the edible oils industry because no explanation of their relevance is given. Argentina submits that, in any event, it can easily be seen that the total number of hectares sown and harvested increased sharply in the period beginning in 1998, and sowing increased threefold between 1997 and 1999, returning to the 1998 level in the year 2000, although the figure was still higher than that for the previous years, and that harvests reached their maximum level in 1999 following an increase in 1998. In terms of employment, Argentina adds, the figures presented relate solely to the seed sector and there is no information at all on the milling and refining sector, which raises doubts as to their relevance. Nevertheless, Argentina argues, the number of people employed increased in 1998 and 1999.

4.214 **Chile** contests the above statement from Argentina that the data provided “in fact invalidate any possible determination of threat of injury.” In Chile’s view, Argentina’s assertion regarding rising prices is based on only one of the three columns in Table 12, attached to Minutes of Session No. 224 (for the purpose of determining the price in question), and is precisely the column that does not contain any adjustment for national currency. Chile argues that Argentina does not refer to the other prices shown. In column two of this table, Chile submits, it is clearly indicated that the prices in United States dollar terms decreased over the same period.

4.215 In response to a question by the Panel, Chile explains that, in the case of the oil industry, the relevant factors analysed by the Commission were the rate and amount of the increase in imports, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, production (in the case of oils, only production information was available, which in any case is similar to the level of sales), capacity utilization, and profits and losses. Domestic prices were also evaluated. Chile also indicates that no information was available concerning productivity and employment in the oils industry.

4.216 With respect to Chile’s reply to question 21 of the Panel regarding the factors that it investigated, Argentina argues that, apart from the fact that it is impossible to find any reference in any of the Records to the share of the market taken by imports or changes in the level of sales, for example, it must be stressed that the findings and conclusions of the Commission were not supported by evidence.

4.217 In reference to the above argument on lack of information on productivity and employment, Argentina claims that Chile is contradicting itself since the Commission, having stated that it did not

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466 Argentina refers to Minutes No. 193, p. 4. See also the notification of threat of serious injury, G/SG/N/8/CHL/1, pp. 1 and 2.
467 See Argentina’s First Written Submission, paras. 183-187.
468 See Argentina’s First Written Submission, para. 188.
469 Chile refers to para. 187 of Argentina’s First Written Submission.
470 See Chile’s First Written Submission, para. 189.
471 See Chile’s response to question 21(a) (CHL) of the Panel.
472 See Argentina’s Rebuttal, para. 130.
have data on productivity and employment in the oils industry, then claims that the information provided by the sector via the questionnaires was sufficient.  

Wheat flour

4.218 **Argentina** submits that, as far as wheat flour is concerned, in its final determination the Commission did not provide any evidence of the factors of injury specified in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.  

Argentina explains that the notification of threat of serious injury simply indicates that: "[i]f the mechanism applied to wheat is not also applied to imports of wheat flour, a large increase in imports of wheat flour could cause injury similar to that caused to wheat production by imports of wheat." On the basis of the information in the final determination and the notification of extension, Argentina considers to be obvious that the most important change in the price of wheat flour – at least at the global level and in terms of pesos – occurred during the period 1996/1997, when prices fell by almost 20 per cent. Argentina claims that this trend was reversed in 1998, however, and again in 1999, and, after having reached a peak in 1999, prices stabilized in 2000. Accordingly, Argentina submits that, in the case of wheat flour, no factor was evaluated in the final determination and this cannot be compensated by a vague reference to the situation in the wheat production industry.

Wheat

4.219 **Argentina** contends that, in its final determination, the Commission refers to some indicators, but it does not provide any analysis of the figures or their relevance. It is thus impossible to see, according to Argentina, whether the factors of injury were examined on the basis of the same period of time because there is no reference whatsoever in this regard. Regarding the figures given, Argentina explains, the wide range in some of the figures such as the reduction in the net profit margin, which ranges from 20 to 90 per cent, is striking, an aspect for which the Chilean authorities offer no explanation. Although Argentina could consider that one of the reasons for this might be the grouping of different products in the same section, or the scale of production or any other factor, this is not explained. Argentina further states that the final determination does not analyse the factors listed in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards concerning market share, changes in the level of sales or productivity. In this regard, Argentina claims that the document determining the extension and the notification of the extension for the first time provides certain data on the industry, but the time scales given are not evaluated by the Commission on Distortions in the determination itself. Argentina concludes that there are no substantiated conclusions in respect of the few data furnished and that, moreover, even the information itself does not prove the existence of a threat of serious injury.

4.220 **Argentina** explains that Table 9 on domestic prices expressed in pesos ("Domestic prices, wheat") shows the largest drop between the years 1996 and 1997. Prices then increased in 1997/1998 and 1998/1999, falling by only 1.5 per cent in 1999/2000. Concerning the area sown, 1998 was essentially the same as 1997, but harvests increased by 14 per cent and yield by 16 per cent. Argentina submits that, contrary to what is alleged by Chile, this shows that the sector not only increased production but also productivity. Argentina further submits that, although the aforementioned reduction occurred in 1999, in 2000 the sown area, harvests and yield all increased. Although in historic terms annual variations are quite normal and decreases in one year are followed by increases, Argentina argues, the years 1997 and 1998 appear to have been years of strong growth.

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473 *See* Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 133.
474 *Argentina refers to* Minutes No. 193, p. 4.
475 *Argentina refers to* Minutes No. 224, notification of extension, G/SG/N/14/CHL/1, p. 16, Table 10.
476 *See* Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 191-193.
477 *See* Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 194-197.
both as far as sowing and harvesting are concerned. Argentina thus conclude that there is no
evaluation of all the factors, as required by the Agreement on Safeguards, because there are no
references to the share of the domestic market taken by imports, changes in the level of sales,
productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, etc.

4.221 In response to a question by the Panel, Chile explains that, in the case of wheat, the relevant
factors analysed by the Commission were the rate and amount of the increase in imports (in absolute
and relative terms), the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, production (no
information available on sales), productivity, profits and losses, and employment. Surface area and
domestic prices were also considered. Chile indicates that the capacity utilization was not evaluated
because it was not relevant to this agricultural crop, as stated in Minutes of Session No. 193.479

4.222 In reference to the above on the lack of relevance of the capacity utilization factor, Argentina
recalls that according to panel and Appellate Body precedents, the investigating authority cannot
refrain from analysing factors listed in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, let alone
provide an ex post facto justification during the dispute settlement proceeding of why it did not
analyse a factor. Argentina questions how the Commission managed to determine, in Minutes of
Session No. 185, that "[t]he number of registered farms would decrease by 25,000 from a total of
89,700. The sown area would decrease from the current 370,000 hectares to 243,000. 390,000
tonnes, i.e. 28 per cent of the current total, would no longer be produced", without analysing capacity
utilization, which is absolutely necessary in order to determine threat of injury. Consequently,
contrary to the requirements laid down in Article 4.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, this
conclusion was based on conjectures and remote possibilities.480 In connection with the same answer
given by Chile to question 21, Argentina highlights its inconsistency with the answer given by Chile
to question 35, since, according to Argentina, in the first one Chile states that the Commission on
Distortions analysed the rate and amount of the increase in imports in absolute and relative terms,
while in the second one Chile points out that the Commission focused its analysis of imports on their
evolution in absolute terms, without mentioning where that analysis could be found in the Minutes of
the Commission.481

4.223 Argentina claims that the Chilean authorities did not prove the existence of a threat of serious
injury in the terms laid down in Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and
4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

4.224 Argentina elaborates on the existing case law of the Appellate Body. In this regard, it
indicates that the Appellate Body stated that, in making a determination of threat of injury, the concept
of "serious injury" was essential and panels must be mindful of the very high standard of injury
implied by these terms  and that "... there must be a high degree of likelihood that the anticipated
serious injury will materialize in the very near future".483 In Argentina's view, the information
submitted by the Commission does not, however, define the extraordinary circumstances that would
justify imposition of a safeguard measure. Argentina indicates that, as regards the period of review
for the evaluation of the relevant factors when determining threat of injury, the Appellate Body has
ruled that it must be determined "... whether there is an appropriate temporal focus for the competent

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478 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 198-200.
479 See Chile's response to question 21(a) (CHL) of the Panel.
480 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 131-132.
481 See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 134.
483 Ibid., para. 126.
authorities' 'evaluation' of the data in determining that there is a 'threat' of serious injury in the imminent future". Argentina also indicates that the Appellate Body also stated that "... data relating to the most recent past will provide competent authorities with an essential, and, usually, the most reliable, basis for a determination of a threat of serious injury".

4.225 **Argentina** submits that, in its determinations, the Commission repeatedly relies on forecasts, hypotheses and conjecture in order to establish the threat of serious injury which its domestic industries are allegedly experiencing, in violation of Article 4.1(b) and the principles laid down by the Appellate Body. It argues that the Commission's determinations employ the conditional tense and lack any basis or proof. Argentina provides some specific examples below: (i) Minutes of Session No. 181 of the Commission containing the decision to initiate the investigation states with regard to the three products that: "The quantification of the injury was based on forecasts that were made on the basis of the hypothesis of application of the bound tariff of 31.5 per cent and the effect this would have on a series of variables for each of the products in question". (ii) In the case of wheat, the Commission states that: "the application of the price band mechanism has ensured that the injury is not significant. If application of the price band were limited to a total duty of 31.5 per cent, domestic prices would fall and affect the producers' income levels". (iii) Minutes of Session No. 185 recommending application of the provisional safeguard measure states that: "With regard to injury, the Commission had before it the information contained in the application, which quantifies the injury on the basis of forecasts elaborated according to a hypothesis of application of the bound tariff of 31.5 per cent and the effect this would have on a series of variables for each of the products in question." (iv) In the case of oils, the same Minutes simply conclude that "... the ceiling of 31.5 per cent would lower the price and value of production ..."

4.226 **Chile** contends that a "threat of serious injury" means serious injury that is "clearly imminent", according to Article 4.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards. It further submits that Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, when referring to an increase in imports (in absolute or relative terms), also indicates that such imports must be "under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry ...". Chile argues that the Chilean authorities followed an analytical forward-looking approach based on the facts when determining the threat of serious injury. In this regard, Chile refers to the analysis of the "threat of injury" done by the Appellate Body in the United States – Lamb Meat where it said that "this term is concerned with 'serious injury' which has not yet occurred, but remains a future event whose actual materialization cannot, in fact, be assured with certainty" and emphasized that "in order to constitute a 'threat', the serious injury must be 'clearly imminent'. The word 'imminent' relates to the moment in time when the 'threat' is likely to materialize". Chile further submits that the Appellate Body later states that "as facts, by their very nature, pertain to the present and the past, the occurrence of future events can never be definitively proven by facts. There is, therefore, a tension between a future-oriented 'threat' analysis, which, ultimately, calls for a degree of 'conjecture' about the likelihood of a future event, and the need for a fact-based determination ... Thus, a fact-based evaluation, under Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards must provide the basis for a projection that there is a high degree of likelihood of serious injury to the domestic industry in the very near future." Chile considers that, in

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484 Ibid., para. 127.
485 Ibid., para. 137.
486 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 202-207.
487 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 208-213.
489 Ibid.
490 Ibid., para. 136.
accordance with this statement, a threat of serious injury must always be based on a projection, which must be consistent with the data on which it is based.\footnote{See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 190-195.}

4.227 **Chile** submits that, in the case of the goods investigated, according to the Commission, it is irrefutable that the local and the imported product are easily interchangeable. Clearly, this was also taken into account when analysing the threat of injury. Chile argues that the close relationship between agricultural commodities and products that require a certain degree of processing that allow them to be considered directly competitive has been described above. Chile explains that the Commission based its threat determination on the price of the products corresponding to each sector of the production industry involved, which is a key element when determining injury for such products.\footnote{See also Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 79.} Chile considers that this way of assessing threat of injury meets the requirements of Article 4.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. Chile further submits that when it was noted that the price band for oils could not operate to the full, it was verified that, in the absence of a safeguard, its incomplete functioning would in the short term lead to a serious impairment for agricultural producers, given the agreed conditions under which the product was marketed. Chile explains that competition from imported oil at very low prices would lead to a very low domestic price for the agricultural producer, which would absorb the whole of the reduction, with significant losses that are estimated in the submission. In the medium term, Chile states, the producers might cease to sow and the industrial plants would lose profits because they had no product to process. Chile contends that, once again, in the case of a band that is only partly functioning and in the absence of any safeguard measure, the price the industry would have to pay would fall to such a level that agricultural producers would lose the volume estimated as threat of injury; not because of inefficient management but because of a change in the rules of the game fixed prior to the sowing season. In addition, Chile declares, if the industry met its commitment to pay a predetermined price, it would suffer losses. Chile argues that, in either of the two cases, in the following season, there would be a sharp fall in prices and, as a result, in the area sown, with the result that there would be an internal deficit, an increase in imports and greater injury.\footnote{See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 196-199.} Chile adds that the Commission took notice of the fact that if the price band system was limited to a 31.5 percent ad valorem ceiling, prices would drop even further raising the likelihood of serious injury even more. Accordingly, Chile submits, the Commission based its threat determination on a consistent basis in the record\footnote{See Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 79.} and took account of the fact that the normal functioning of the price band had been decisive in containing an increase in imports and the resulting injury.\footnote{See Chile's response to question 22(a) (CHL) of the Panel.}

4.228 **Argentina**, in reference to the above argumentation by Chile\footnote{Argentina refers to para. 79 of Chile's First Oral Statement.}, submits that, in none of the Minutes did the Commission analyse or even define the affected industry and that the correlation of prices is not, in itself, sufficient for the purposes of determining the existence of a threat of injury. Argentina repeats that Chile did not demonstrate that increased imports threatened to cause serious injury to the domestic industry, but rather, used hypothetical and unsubstantiated circumstances for the sole purpose of not complying with its obligation to apply its WTO tariff binding of 31.5 per cent applying safeguard measures to justify the inconsistency of its price band system. In addition, Argentina, in reference to Chile's statement\footnote{Argentina refers to Chile's response to question 22(a) (CHL) of the Panel.} that the Commission took account of the fact that the normal functioning of the price band had been decisive in containing an increase in imports and the resulting injury, wonders how, without an increase in imports – since the price band was functioning at full regime – and without threat of injury, given the existence of the price band, could the Commission find that there was a threat of injury. Argentina concludes that Chile is trying to argue
before the Panel, as a justification of its violation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, the application of safeguard measures, while on the other hand, it is trying to justify the non existence of imports in such quantities and the absence of evidence of threat of injury by pointing to the existence of the price band system which it maintained in violation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 498

4.229 (i) Causal link

Argentina maintains that Chile did not comply with its obligations under Articles 4.2(b) and 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards inasmuch as it did not establish any causal link between the alleged increase in imports and the alleged threat of injury to the domestic industry. Argentina also considers that Chile failed to comply with its obligations under Article XIX.1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards inasmuch as it did not establish any causal link between the existence of factors other than the increase in imports which at the same time were causing injury to the domestic industry. 499

4.230 Argentina contends that, in this case, contrary to what is required in the above-mentioned Articles, there was no evidence of an increase in imports or threat of serious injury. Argentina indicates that the Appellate Body Report in Argentina – Footwear (EC) stated that a causal link cannot exist if there is no increase in imports or serious injury. 500 However, in order to conclude its examination of the inconsistencies in the findings of the Commission, Argentina also considers that there is no evidence of the existence of a causal link. 501

4.231 As far as the determination of a causal link is concerned, Argentina notes first and foremost that the alleged threat of serious injury to the domestic industry evaluated by Chile is not based on a threat caused by increased imports but is related to Chile's obligation in the WTO to apply the bound tariff of 31.5 per cent. Argentina indicates that this is specifically stated in Minutes of Session No. 181 of the Commission, which reads: "[t]he quantification of injury was based on forecasts that were made on the basis of the hypothesis of application of the bound tariff of 31.5 per cent and the effect this would have on a series of variables for each of the products in question". Likewise, Argentina contends, Minutes of Session No. 185 state that: "[r]egarding imports, the Commission took into account the increase that would have occurred during the 1999/2000 agricultural season on the hypothesis of application of the bound import tariff of 31.5 per cent instead of the duties applicable under the price band." Argentina also refers to Minutes of Session No. 224 in order to claim that this reconfirms that "[i]n examining imports, the Commission took into account the fact that, for each of the products investigated, the normal operation of the price bands had been decisive in curbing an increase in imports and, consequently, the trend in imports cannot be analysed without taking this factor into account …". In Argentina's view, this clearly shows that it was not increased imports that led to the application and extension of the safeguard measures but the hypothesis of application of the bound tariff. 502

4.232 Argentina fails to understand how a simple statement such as "given the recent and future situation of international prices …" 503, without any analytical support, can constitute the basis for determining the existence of a causal link. Argentina affirms that Chile failed to comply with its obligations under Articles 4.2(b) and 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards by not establishing a causal link between the alleged increase in imports and the alleged injury to the domestic industry. In

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498 See Argentina's Rebuttal, paras. 137-142.
499 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 238-239.
500 Argentina quotes the Appellate Body report on Argentina – Footwear (EC), (WT/DS121/AB/R) adopted on 12 January 2000, para. 145.
501 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 217.
502 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 218-222.
503 Argentina refers to Minutes No. 224, p. 5, para. 3.
Argentina's opinion, as the Appellate Body stated in the US – Wheat Gluten case: "We begin our reasoning with the first sentence of Article 4.2(b). That sentence provides that a determination shall not be made unless [the] investigation demonstrates … the existence of the causal link between increased imports … and serious injury or threat thereof." (emphasis added). Thus, the requirement for a determination under Article 4.2(a), is that 'the causal link' exists. The word 'causal' means 'relating to a cause or causes', while the word 'cause', in turn, denotes a relationship between at least two elements, whereby the first element has, in some way, 'brought about' 'produced' or 'induced' the existence of the second element. The word 'link' indicates simply that increased imports have played a part in, or contributed to, bringing about serious injury so that there is a causal 'connection' or 'nexus' between these two elements. Taking these words together, the term 'the causal link' denotes, in our view, a relationship of cause and effect such that increased imports contribute to 'bringing about', 'producing' or 'inducing' the serious injury. Argentina refers now to Argentina – Footwear (EC), where the Panel determined a three-stage sequence to justify the causal link (the Appellate Body supported this method and approach). Argentina adds that, regarding the last stage of the causal link in US – Wheat Gluten and US – Lamb, the Appellate Body supported a "logical process" for the competent authorities' determination of 'whether 'the causal link' exists between increased imports and serious injury, and whether this causal link involves a genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect between these two elements", in accordance with the obligations under Article 4.2(b). This process means separating the injurious effect of increased imports from the injury caused by other factors. Argentina claims that the Appellate Body considers that Article 4.2(b) presupposes that the injurious effects caused to the domestic industry by the increased imports must be distinguished from the injurious effects caused by other factors. In this regard, Argentina mentions that the Appellate Body noted that "[w]hat is important in this process is separating or distinguishing the effects caused by the different factors in bringing about the 'injury'."

4.233 **Argentina** examines the application of the three-stages methodology designed by the Appellate Body to this case: (i) Simultaneity of the trends: Argentina indicates that the determinations do not contain sufficient bases to conclude that the trends are simultaneous. Indeed, Argentina states, the import trends have not been analysed in relation to the changes in the industry's economic and financial indicators. In fact, this could not have been done because the Minutes do not contain any analysis nor sufficient data for this purpose. What is even worse is that the period examined for the indicators of threat of injury are not even known, so the authorities could not have analysed the relative fluctuations in trends. (ii) Conditions of competition (under such conditions): Argentina explains that the few references to prices which appear in the Minutes clearly do not allow any analysis of the conditions of competition between the imported product and the like product. Consequently, Chile could hardly try to establish the existence of a causal link under specified conditions of competition. (iii) Other factors caused injury to Chile's domestic industry producing wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils, but not increased imports: Argentina indicates that the third element of a causation analysis is the consideration of whether factors other than increased imports caused injury.

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505 Argentina quotes the Panel report on Argentina – Footwear (EC), (WT/DS121/R) adopted on 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body report, para. 8.229, and Appellate Body report on Argentina – Footwear (EC), (WT/DS121/AB/R), adopted on 12 January 2000, paras. 144 and 145. See Argentina’s First Written Submission, footnote 117.


509 See Argentina’s First Written Submission, paras. 223-226.
imports are causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the domestic industry. If so, Article 4.2(b) requires that such injury not be attributed to increased imports.\textsuperscript{510}

4.234 Argentina claims that the Commission did not undertake an analysis to evaluate the injury or threat of injury to the domestic wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils industry caused by "other factors". As an example, Argentina indicates that, although the Commission showed that international prices were falling, this was not properly evaluated and, bearing in mind that these are agricultural and agro-industrial products, climatic conditions within Chile – which are extremely relevant to the local supply situation – were not evaluated.\textsuperscript{511} Argentina asserts that the request for extension of the measure by the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture\textsuperscript{512}, clearly shows that the low level of international prices was one of the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture's main concerns. Argentina argues that the Commission did not evaluate this additional factor – namely, international prices – in terms of their impact on the domestic industry, distinguishing this effect from the effect of imports.\textsuperscript{513} Argentina further states that the ODEPA Publication "El Pulso de la Agricultura" of February 1999, No. 27, contains specific references to the seriousness of the drought in 1998/1999. According to this publication, Argentina claims, 55 per cent of agricultural communities were in a state of alert. In its report on the first half of 1999, the Chilean Ministry of Agriculture stated that the drought during the 1998/1999 season had led to a decrease in the area under cultivation and a fall in the yield and production of wheat throughout Chile.\textsuperscript{514} Argentina submits that the Commission did not analyse this factor, even though it had a decisive effect on domestic wheat production of wheat and possibly on other products subject to the safeguard.\textsuperscript{515}

4.235 As regards Argentina's statement that the Chilean authorities did not make any determination of a causal link in any Minutes or notification\textsuperscript{516}, Chile points out that, as shown in Minutes of Session No. 193, the Commission took into account the fact that average c.i.f. prices of Chilean imports were closely related to world prices (trend in commodities). In fact, Chile argues, the correlation coefficient calculated between the average c.i.f. price and the international price over two periods, for wheat and oil, was 91 per cent and 92 per cent respectively. Chile explains that these variables are therefore closely related, so it can be stated that the trend in domestic prices is strongly affected by the trend in import costs.\textsuperscript{517}

4.236 As regards the above argumentation, Argentina considers that Chile's claim whereby the relationship between prices of Chilean imports and world prices proved that there was a causal link is worthless since the causal link must be between the increase in imports and the threat of injury.\textsuperscript{518} Argentina further argues that the correlation of prices is not, in itself, sufficient for the purposes of determining the existence of a threat of injury. Argentina further argues that if one delves deeper into Chile's analysis, and checks this statement in Minutes of Session No. 193 against the graph showing the evolution of the international price of soya bean oil (US$/ton), one would find that there are inconsistencies in this reasoning. Argentina points out that this graph shows a sharp fall in international prices between November 1998 and September 2000, whereas according to Minutes of Session No. 193, "imports [of oils] fell by 24 per cent..." during the first ten months of 1999. In

\textsuperscript{510} See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 228-231.
\textsuperscript{511} See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 232-234.
\textsuperscript{512} Argentina refers to the request for extension of the safeguard measure for price-band-related products, Ministry of Agriculture, Order No. 792, 10 October 2000. (See Annex ARG-22).
\textsuperscript{513} See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 235-236.
\textsuperscript{514} Argentina refers to the Temporada Agrícola, No. 13, first half of 1999, ISSN 0717-0386, Government of Chile, ODEPA (Ministry of Agriculture), pp. 21 and 22, attached as Annex ARG-30.
\textsuperscript{515} See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 237.
\textsuperscript{516} Chile refers to para. 218 of Argentina's First Written Submission.
\textsuperscript{517} See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 200-203.
\textsuperscript{518} See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 105.
\textsuperscript{519} Argentina refers to para. 201 of Chile's First Written Submission.
Argentina's view, the alleged inverse correlation between international prices – their fall – and the evolution of imports – their increase – is not valid. To illustrate this, Argentina has provided, as Annex ARG-35, two graphs that show a direct correlation between the fall in international prices and the decrease in imports, based on the graph which Chile itself provided in its submission and on import data for soya bean oil provided in Table 7 of Minutes of Session No. 224. Argentina claims that there could hardly have been a threat of injury when the trends presented by Chile itself point to the contrary.

4.237 Chile stresses that it had already stated that the Commission, in explaining the threat of injury situation, took account of the following information: the evolution of imports – bearing in mind that the operation of the price band had been decisive in containing their increase; the correlation between international prices, import prices and domestic prices; and the low level of international prices. This was the basis for the prediction that a rapidly accelerating increase in imports would occur if the total duties under the price band were not applied, and led the Commission to the conviction that there was an imminent threat of injury. In Chile's view, this is particularly true for commodity type products, such as those at issue. Regarding Argentina's claim that the inverse correlation between the fall in international prices and the increase in imports was not valid in the case of oils, Chile submits that two factors must be borne in mind: (i) that the operation of the price bands was decisive in containing imports; and (ii) that since 1999 there has been an abnormal situation in the pattern of imports - explaining their decrease - owing to the disputes concerning the tariff headings under which oils should be imported. Chile further submits that, with respect to the impact of these disputes, Minutes of Session No. 224 point out that a close look at these headings reveals an increase in imports of vegetable oils, and not a decrease.

4.238 Specifically with respect to oils, Argentina submits that the Commission failed to take into account in its causation analysis a number of other factors which had been raised by the Oil Industry Association of the Argentine Republic (CIARA) in the proceedings. In particular, Argentina submits that the Commission failed to analyse the shift of the industry to more profitable sectors; the increase in local demand for seed; the elasticity of oil-seed supply in relation to the real tariff on oils; whether the threat of injury to the industry would be eliminated by the transfer of the input price increase resulting from the increased tariff to consumers, or whether on the contrary, the threat of injury to the industry was attributable to the tariff increase that caused the increase in the sales price of oils generating a fall in demand; imports as a commercial strategy of the Chilean oils industry deriving from the shortage of local sources of supply; the sustained growth of the economy, the increase in domestic demand, the increase or variations in private consumption and the increase in GDP in relation to imports of oils over the past decade; the population growth and increase in per capita consumption; the fact that international prices causing the variation in tariffs under the price band do not affect oil-seed production; the structural problems of oil-seed production; the shift of the industry to more profitable sectors; the analysis of other factors affecting agricultural production must take account of meteorological circumstances that could have affected productivity and profitability of the crop.

(j) Whether Chile's safeguard measure was not limited to the extent necessary to remedy injury and to facilitate adjustment

4.239 Argentina submits that Chile's safeguard measure violates Articles XIX.1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 3.1 and 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards because it was not limited to the extent necessary to remedy injury and to facilitate adjustment.

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520 See Argentina's First Oral Statement, paras. 101-103.
521 See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 68-69.
522 See Argentina's response to question 24 (ARG) of the Panel.
4.240 **Argentina** contends that the Commission did not consider whether or not the measure was "necessary" to prevent injury and facilitate readjustment and no substantive analysis was undertaken (for example, "reasoned conclusion"). Argentina argues that Chile based its safeguard measure on the difference between the bound tariff and the combination of the PBS duty and applied rate, and this is in no way related to a threat of injury from imports.  

4.241 **Argentina** noted that Chile's Ministry of Agriculture stated that: "The surcharge will allow the current level of tariffs on products subject to the band system to be maintained in order to meet Chile's obligations to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994." Argentina claims that, in violation of Articles XIX.1(a) of the GATT 1994 and 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the Commission did not prove that its safeguard measure was necessary to remedy serious injury and facilitate the readjustment of the industry. Argentina argues that, in *Korea - Dairy*, the Appellate Body considered that Article 5.1 imposed an "obligation" to ensure that the safeguard measure was applied only to the extent "necessary".

4.242 **Chile** submits that, in accordance with its obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards, it instituted a measure that protected its domestic producers from serious injury, but which provided no further amount of protection. Chile explains that, having found the requisite conditions justifying a safeguard action, the action recommended by the Commission and taken by the Government involved the least possible trade disruption consistent with preventing serious injury: an increase in duties to enable the price band to apply without regard to the bound level of duties. Chile further explains that the Chilean Safeguard Law only allows imposition of duties; it does not allow a quota. It limits the safeguards to one year plus an additional year. Chile submits that, in this particular case, the Commission recommended that the surcharge be in the form of the duty in excess of the bound rate under the price band, instead of a flat surcharge. Chile argues that the flat surcharge would have to have been very high, while the price band could result in lower rates, as indeed has been the case.

4.243 **Chile** explains that the safeguard measures applied by Chile include a special mechanism for their application, which is based on the same world price considerations as those in the PBS. According to Chile, this means in practice that the measure is one of variable applications in order to reflect in the most appropriate way the impact of imports in relation to the injury suffered by the domestic industry. Chile argues that the variable nature of the measure means that there is an immediate response to trends in the injury, so that the measure can be automatically adjusted to the necessary level to remedy the injury. In Chile's view, this flexibility can be seen in the fact that there were periods when, even though the measure had been decreed, tariff surcharges were not applied. Chile submits that the authority showed its intention not to apply a safeguard higher than that strictly necessary by calculating it on a weekly basis so as not to give the industry producing the product subject to the safeguard protection over and above the minimum required.

4.244 **Argentina**, in reference to Chile's statement to the effect that the safeguard measures applied by Chile include a special mechanism for their application, which is based on the same world price considerations as those in the PBS system, submits that, if this is the case, Chile's actual mechanism for the application of safeguard measures violates the Agreement on Safeguards, which does not take world prices as a basis, but rather, imports in such increased quantities, absolute or

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523 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 240-242.
526 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 243-245.
527 See Chile's First Oral Statement, paras. 81-82.
528 See Chile's First Written Submission, paras. 207-209.
529 Argentina refers to para. 207 of Chile's First Written Submission.
relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products.\textsuperscript{530}

4.245 \textbf{Chile} submits that its statement did not refer to the increase in imports as a requirement for the application of a safeguard measure, but rather, as Argentina itself mentions, to the mode of operation of the adopted measure, which was fixed in accordance with the proportionality requirement established in Article 5 of the Agreement on Safeguards for the purpose of preventing the imminent injury that threatened the domestic industry affected and to permit its adjustment.\textsuperscript{531}

4.246 \textbf{Argentina} argues that the serious injury cannot be repaired and the adjustment made with identical measures, both for the definitive safeguards and their extensions. It further submits that it is also hard to understand how these measures - which, according to Chile itself, were justified by the threat of injury caused by a fall in international prices – could be maintained over time in a market in which there could necessarily always be price fluctuations. In Argentina's view, the adjustment does not depend on the Chilean industry, but on the evolution of international market conditions. Argentina contends that, following Chile's logic, if the fall in prices were to persist, the safeguards would have to be permanent. Conversely, it adds, the proposed remedy is so far from meeting the requirements of Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards that an increase in international prices would lead to the termination of the measures independently of the state of the industry or of any other economic factor that could have a bearing on the industry.\textsuperscript{532}

4.247 In reference to the above argumentation of Argentina, \textbf{Chile} stresses that the problem was not the short-term fluctuation in prices, but the sharp and sustained fall in those prices over a long period. Contrary to Argentina's assertion, Chile adds, if the fall in prices were to persist, the measures would not be permanent, but would be applied for the time necessary to facilitate adjustment and adaptation to the new price conditions, and in any case, for not more than two years. Chile considers that, in this scenario, as in the case of an increase in prices, the measures would continue to be applied in full conformity with Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, since the purpose of their adoption and the amount involved was limited to what was necessary to prevent serious injury and facilitate adjustment.\textsuperscript{533}

4.248 \textbf{Chile} submits that the short period during which the measures were applied together with the safeguard formula adopted was based on considerations of proportionality which maintained domestic competition without neutralizing or equalizing domestic prices and international prices. Chile also notes that based on the facts of this case the purpose of the safeguards must be to prevent a threat of serious injury from materializing and not to repair serious injury that has already taken place. According to Chile, it is perfectly logical that the extension measures should have adopted the same formula as the definitive measures, because in spite of the recovery shown by the domestic industry, the measures, as established, continued to be necessary to prevent serious injury.\textsuperscript{534}

(k) Provisional measures

4.249 \textbf{Argentina} claims that the competent Chilean authorities did not comply with Article XIX:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which lay down the requirements for the application of provisional measures.

\textsuperscript{530} See Argentina's Rebuttal, para. 99.

\textsuperscript{531} See Chile's Second Oral Statement, paras. 46-47.

\textsuperscript{532} See Argentina's First Oral Statement, para. 107.

\textsuperscript{533} See Chile's Rebuttal, paras. 72-73.

\textsuperscript{534} See Chile's Second Oral Statement, paras. 72-73.
4.250 **Argentina** contends that both Article XIX.2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards provide that "critical circumstances" must exist before provisional measures can be adopted. In other words, Argentina claims, the authority may only adopt provisional measures in circumstances "where delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair". Article 6 also states that such measures may be taken "pursuant to a preliminary determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury". Argentina claims that the resolution of the Commission recommending the adoption of provisional measures ("provisional determination") does not in any way analyse why a delay would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair. Consequently, Argentina considers, in the light of the text itself, the resolution of the Commission does not comply with the requirements of Article 6. Argentina indicates that, furthermore, the provisional resolution of the Commission fails to comply with Articles 2.1, 4.1 and 4.2, as well as Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards, because there is no evaluation of "like product", and an increase in imports a threat of injury or a causal link are not proven.

4.251 **Argentina** explains that the analysis of the Commission is divided into three categories of product but there is no examination of whether this categorization of "like product" and "domestic industry" is in conformity with Articles 2.1, 4.1(c) and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards. In Argentina's opinion, the Commission does not undertake any analysis of increased imports but simply concludes that imports would increase if duties were limited to the bound tariff. There is no evidence, however, that imports did in fact increase. The sole reference to increased imports is on page 2 of the Resolution where the authorities indicate that they based their recommendation on "available evidence" which shows the "possibility" of an increase in imports of the products in question "if the tariff falls to 31.5 per cent" - in other words, Argentina claims, the level bound by Chile. However, not even in this case is the relevant information provided. Argentina also indicates that the analysis of the indicators of threat of injury are incomplete because not all the factors have been evaluated, as required by Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. Argentina contends that, even for those factors that have been evaluated, the analysis has no meaning because there is no investigation period and no reference to any other period that might give an overall view of the relevance of the "decreases" inferred. According to Argentina, it appears that the figures are simply forecasts because the findings are set out in the conditional tense. Argentina argues that the basis for such forecasts and their source are not identified. For the foregoing reasons, Argentina claims that the provisional resolution does not comply with Article 4.2(a).

4.252 **Argentina** contends that there is no analysis of causality. In other words, Argentina explains, there is no attempt to relate the trends in imports (which are not provided) with the trends in indicators for the industry (in the few cases where these are provided the data are not specified). Consequently, Argentina claims that the resolution does not comply with Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

4.253 **Chile** submits that Minutes of Session No. 185, of 22 October 1999, sets out the critical circumstances and assessments required in order to determine the need for the recommended

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535 Argentina refers to Minutes No. 185.
536 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 246-248.
537 Argentina refers to Minutes No. 185.
538 Ibid.
539 Ibid.
540 Ibid.
541 Ibid.
542 See Argentina's First Written Submission, paras. 249-251.
543 Argentina refers to Minutes No. 185.
544 See Argentina's First Written Submission, para. 252.
provisional measures, as required by Article XIX:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards.545

4.254 **Chile** explains that if Chile's bound rate of 31.5 percent was observed in the future, the Commission estimated that imports would increase dramatically causing significant injury to the wheat, sugar and oils producers. Given the price elasticity of the products, it could be calculated that there would be a significant import surge, a decline in prices and serious injury to Chilean producers. Therefore, the Commission properly found that any delay in adopting a safeguard measure would cause damage which "would be difficult to repair". 546

4.255 **Argentina** considers this an *ex post facto* explanation. Argentina also questions to what "factual basis" is Chile referring when Chile itself considers the elasticity of products to be "given", without bothering to make any analysis in this respect. Argentina states that it is incorrect for Chile to suggest that "it could be calculated" that there would be a significant import surge, a decline in prices and serious injury to Chilean producers, without actually making any calculation. Argentina submits that Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards clearly stipulates that such a measure may only be taken "pursuant to a preliminary determination that there is clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury". 547

V. **ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES**

5.1 The main arguments of those third parties to these proceedings which have submitted their commentaries to the Panel, i.e., Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, the European Communities, Guatemala, Japan, Paraguay, the United States and Venezuela are as follows:

A. **BRAZIL**

5.2 Brazil submits that an examination of the Chilean PBS, as well as of the detailed Argentine explanation of how the system operates can give the impression that it is a very complex mechanism, devised with an almost scientific zeal. However, in Brazil's view, the PBS is, at heart, very simple. If one discards all the tables, measurements and equations, Brazil argues, what is left is a weekly reference price that determines the additional duty that will tax imports of wheat, wheat flour, vegetable oils and sugar. Brazil explains that this weekly reference price, which is fixed by the Chilean Government, substitutes for the transaction value contained in the invoice. According to Brazil, an element that is very clear, and that is not contested by Chile in its first submission to the Panel, is that the price band system has allowed for the violation of Chile's bound tariffs for the products under consideration, as well as for sugar.

5.3 Brazil argues that, in theory, Chile is correct in claiming that the adoption of safeguards could legally justify the violation of bound rates. The point is that in the current case, the violation of bound tariffs occurred before the safeguards were even envisaged. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the safeguards were justified. Brazil contends that, in case they are found not to be justified, Chile will have automatically incurred a violation of Article II.1 of GATT 1994. Brazil further stresses that the current design of the price band system allows for violations of the bound rates. Brazil agrees with Argentina that the Chilean price band system is suspiciously similar to what Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture sought to eliminate: it operates as a variable levy that is modified weekly; it includes reference prices which are not allowed under Article 4.2, if they constitute minimum prices; it also contains elements of the modality of special safeguards provided for in Article 5.1(b) of the Agreement on Agriculture. According to Brazil, the problem, as Argentina rightly pointed out, is that

545 *See* Chile's First Written Submission, para. 210.
546 *See* Chile's First Oral Statement, para. 83.
547 *See* Argentina's Rebuttal, paras.150-151.
Chile does not have the legal right to use such an instrument. It may be argued that as long as Chile does not violate its bound tariff the operation or characteristics of its price band system are irrelevant and that the claim under Article 4.2 is useless. Brazil notes, however, that the objective of the Chilean system is to create exactly the type of barrier that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture sought to eliminate.

5.4 Brazil submits that Chile's argument to the effect that the PBS is an ordinary customs duty is a surprising affirmation because, at the regional level, Chile argues exactly the contrary: since the surtax that results from the operation of the price band system is not a tariff, tariff preferences are not applicable. Brazil points out that this difference in interpretation is currently one of the difficulties in the tariff negotiations concerning sugar. Brazil adds that Chile's reference to the ECA 35, which includes Brazil, can also be used as an example of misuse, by Chile, of a line of reasoning that could be summarized as "since you did not complain before, you cannot complain now". Brazil cannot find any provisions in the WTO Agreements that impose time-limits or expiration dates on Argentina's right to claim a violation of Article II.1 of GATT 1994 and of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture in the current dispute. In addition, Brazil notes that the language in ECA 35 that refers to the price band system can be read in different ways and that Chile's reading does not stress the fact that the system can be questioned if it has a negative impact on trade.

5.5 In response to a question by the Panel, Brazil submits that a duty cannot at the same time be considered an "ordinary customs duty" and "a measure of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties". In Brazil's view, the term "ordinary" refers to customs duty as such: it can be an "ad valorem" tax, a specific duty or a combination of both. It further explains that the term "ordinary" is used to qualify a general import tax that is not "all other duties or charges of any kind". Brazil notes that, in the case of agricultural products, and, in particular, those affected by the Chilean PBS, Article II can not be read independently from Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Brazil contends that a Member may have an additional tax that applies to all imports, like a "statistics tax", or an administrative tax, that applies to all imported products. It could even be a flat tax, with no relation to the value of the import transaction. In Brazil's view, the distinction should be made between "ordinary customs duties" and "other" duties, which are not "customs duties" in nature; the text in Article II:1(b) establishes a parallel between "customs duties" and "duties or charges" which are not properly characterized as "customs duties". These are, it explains, simply "imposed on or in connection with the importation". Brazil considers that this distinction is also apparent in the structure of the Schedule of Concessions, since these "other" duties must be recorded in the appropriate column of the Schedule. Finally, Brazil points out that the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 creates legal obligations concerning "other duties and charges" that are different from those regarding "ordinary" customs duties.

5.6 Brazil submits that the objective of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is to guarantee tariffication, or, to follow the line of inquiry of the Panel, to guarantee that Members would simplify matters by resorting solely to "ordinary customs duties" and, therefore, in order to comply with that Article, "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties" should have been, converted into "ordinary customs duties". In Brazil's view, the measures listed in the footnote of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture are the ones which "have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties". "Other duties and charges" were not required to be converted into "ordinary customs duties" in the Uruguay Round since they could have been consolidated into the appropriate column of the Schedule. Therefore, Brazil submits, "similar border measures" as referred to in the footnote of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is distinct from "other duties or charges of any kind" mentioned in Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. Since the end of the Uruguay Round, however, they fall within the prohibition of Article II:1(b), last sentence. Brazil submits that a violation would exist if these "other duties or charges of any kind" had not been recorded in the Schedule of Concessions or had been raised or changed in such a way as to violate commitments recorded in the column reserved for "Other Duties and Charges".
5.7 Brazil explains that a variable levy is a duty that is modified in accordance to criteria related to "various values in different instances or at different times" based on exogenous factors (such as historical and current world prices), as determined by any specific mechanism by a Member. According to Brazil, the objective of this measure is to control prices of imports in order to meet or approach a domestic target price that isolates the domestic production marketing from international current prices. Brazil affirms that the PBS is a good example of a variable levy. On the other hand, Brazil argues, a minimum import price is a price, other than the transaction value of the imported product, which is the minimum price at which a product can enter a market. It can be used to calculate the duty to be applied or to trigger the operation of the variable levy. Brazil submits that the term "include" in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that the list is illustrative and not exhaustive.

5.8 As regards Chile's claim that the PBS is a type of measure that is used in all Latin America, Brazil fails to see the relevance of such an affirmation since, in its view, the fact that a measure is of widespread use does not make it legal. Brazil explains that one of the main justifications put forward by those that defend the maintenance of the price band system in Chile is the supposed existence of widespread subsidization by other WTO Members for the agricultural products protected by the system. Brazil contends that the price band system, apart from the Chilean explanation concerning supposed "price stabilization" needs, is justified internally as a means to counter agricultural subsidies. In Brazil's view, the main problem here is that by doing so Chile treats equally countries that foster their exports by means of export subsidies and those that do not. In the case of sugar, for instance, the main suppliers for the Chilean markets are Guatemala, Argentina and Brazil, countries widely known for not subsidizing their exports. Brazil submits that if it is Chile's intention to counter agricultural subsidies, the WTO provides a wide range of more selective and accurate measures in order to do so.

5.9 Brazil is of the view that the safeguards were used by Chile as an *ex post facto* justification for a violation of bound rates and as a means to justify new violations. Brazil submits that Chile itself recognizes that safeguards were resorted to as a second best option as a means to legalize the violation of the bound rates. In Brazil's view, this should be sufficient to invalidate the measures, since there is a clear violation of the procedures contained in the Agreement on Safeguards. Brazil contends that it would certainly be very convenient if every time a Member decided to violate its bound tariffs it could simply apply safeguards a posteriori as a means of obtaining legal justification. Brazil argues that this kind of procedure, though, was certainly not in the minds of the drafters of the Agreement on Safeguards, who were trying to avoid the proliferation of the so-called grey area measures that existed before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Brazil further submits that the Agreement on Safeguards calls for very special situations and for the respect of clearly stipulated procedures and that this is even more applicable if one considers measures to protect agricultural products, which were some of the favourite targets of grey area measures.

5.10 As regards price stabilization, Brazil stresses that Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards make no direct reference to such issues. It submits that safeguards were not devised to deal with the objective of guaranteeing the stabilization of prices of certain agricultural products. As regards Chile's reference to the lack of justification for questioning a measure no longer in place, Brazil submits that, although it respects the importance of the principle contained in Article 3.7 of the DSU, it is concerned with the possibility that if the measures applied by Chile are left unexamined, they could lead to similar measures against the same products or other goods. Brazil submits that if the safeguards were applied incorrectly and unjustifiably, this should be known; otherwise, Members could have an incentive for maintaining an illegal measure up to the moment when a panel was convened.
B. COLOMBIA

5.11 Colombia is convinced that the Chilean PBS is consistent with Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Colombia suggests that the Panel conducts a legal analysis linking the two measures in question, namely the imposition of the safeguard and the application of the price band system. In its opinion, the consistency of the measures applied by Chile should be analysed using a combined approach that establishes a close relationship between the two, given that Chile has used the PBS as a mechanism for applying the safeguard measure which is also an issue in this dispute.

5.12 Colombia submits that, in examining the consistency of the measures applied by Chile with the latter's commitments in the WTO, the Panel must make an interpretation that links Articles 4 and 21 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Articles II and XIX of the General Agreement, and the Agreement on Safeguards. In Colombia's view, such an analysis would enable the Panel to distinguish between two different scenarios for the PBS, namely its application in normal circumstances and its use as a safeguard measure. In normal circumstances, and as mentioned above, price bands are consistent with Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. From a systemic perspective, Colombia argues, it is crucial to take account of each and every one of the elements set forth in Article XIX of the GATT when analysing the consistency of the safeguard measure applied by Chile. In addition to the points mentioned by Argentina in its written submission, another factor needs to be considered, namely the "effect" of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under the General Agreement. In Colombia's view, the term "effect" specified in Article XIX implies that a Member making use of a safeguard measure must be able to demonstrate that, within the period defined by it for analysing the other requisite variables, imports to its territory complied with the obligations under the GATT, which obviously also include tariff concessions. Colombia considers that this requirement must be fulfilled in addition to the provision of evidence regarding unforeseen developments and factors relating to trends in imports, serious injury and the causal link. Colombia submits that the fact that Chile has exceeded the bound level implies that the safeguard measure applied fails to meet one of the essential requirements of Article XIX of the General Agreement, which is that the trend in imports, the injury and the causal link should result precisely from a scenario under which tariffs are lower than or at least equivalent to the bound level. Colombia submits that the safeguard measures applied by Chile are inconsistent inasmuch as they establish the use of a PBS, a mechanism that does not guarantee that the safeguard is applied exclusively to the extent necessary to remedy the injury.

5.13 According to Colombia, the process of determining whether the Chilean PBS is consistent with Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture would certainly require prior demonstration that, as a result of the Uruguay Round, these systems were tariffied because they were classified as variable levies or as border measures other than customs duties. Colombia disagrees with Argentina's interchangeable use of the terms "variable levies" and "variable tariffs" since it believes them to mean different things. Colombia explains that considering that the PBS does not correspond to the definition of variable levies, (a special term used in the Agreement on Agriculture that is not equivalent to variable tariffs) but on the contrary fall within the definition of customs duties, they are consistent with Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Colombia is of the opinion that a ruling on the inconsistency of the Chilean PBS with Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture would imply that this type of mechanism has been classified as a variable levy and that therefore any tariff undergoing change within a specified period of time would fall within this category.

5.14 Colombia considers that to be able to answer the question of whether the Chilean PBS is consistent with Article II of the GATT, the Panel first needs to examine the normal operation of the price band system and determine whether its structure includes factors that would make it possible to exceed the bound tariff. As a second step, Colombia explains, the Chilean measure might be found to be consistent if it could be regarded as a safeguard that meets the requirements of Article XIX of the GATT - in which case it would be possible to exceed the bound level. Should the Panel find that the
Chilean safeguard was not applied in accordance with all the requirements set forth in Article XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards, Colombia argues, the price band system would be inconsistent with Article II of the General Agreement.

C. ECUADOR

5.15 Ecuador emphasizes that both the Argentine and Chilean assessments of the issue should be understood in the light of the close interrelationship between the application of the Chilean price band system and the application of safeguards. In Ecuador's view, only the question of the consistency of the Chilean measure as a whole has been brought before this Panel and, therefore, the Panel should only rule on the consistency or inconsistency of the Chilean measure in question with the WTO rather than conduct a conceptual analysis of the PBS.

5.16 Ecuador considers that PBSs can be operated differently from the one implemented in Chile and remain consistent with WTO rules, that is to say, respecting bound tariff levels and other commitments under Article II of the GATT 1994 as well as the market access commitments referred to in the Agreement on Agriculture, specifically under Article 4. According to Ecuador, PBSs do not necessarily constitute variable tariffs as described in the footnote to Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture, especially if such systems are applied in a transparent and predictable manner with the simple aim of countering major swings in the international prices of a limited number of agricultural products, thereby guaranteeing acceptable domestic production conditions. If PBSs are used as tariff measures, Ecuador argues, they do not require tariffication in order to be consistent with Uruguay Round provisions. Moreover, Ecuador argues, GATT-WTO regulations allow the tariff levels applicable to imports to be altered provided that they do not exceed the maximum levels and that the market access conditions bound in Members' schedules are guaranteed. Ecuador further submits that the implementation of PBSs also treats all Members to which the MFN tariff applies without distinction, and applies equally to all goods classified under the same tariff subheading which reach port within a period of time determined sufficiently in advance and with sufficient predictability, independently of the country of origin, the import or export agent and the customs value of the product. Ecuador concludes that this is clearly a tariff system and it will not therefore have had to be tariffed since it complies with the letter and spirit of Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In Ecuador's view, any PBS based on the relevant international agricultural product prices is as predictable as regards the applicable tariffs as any other tariff-setting system, in that the tariff payable depends on the customs value of the goods. It is Ecuador's opinion that a tariff-setting system which clearly establishes the mechanism for modifying tariffs and furnishes adequate and timely information on such changes should be considered predictable as regards the application of such tariffs. Moreover, Ecuador adds, if such a mechanism for modifying tariffs is disassociated from the domestic market conditions of the importing country and precludes discretionary intervention by the competent authorities, the system is also highly transparent.

D. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

5.17 In the European Communities' view, the most important question that the Panel should address first, is whether the extension of Chile's definitive safeguard measure is properly before it. The European Communities consider that the Chilean safeguard measure which is in force (the definitive measure, as extended) is not a separate measure from the one on which consultations were held, and in any event is properly before the Panel in accordance with the relevant provisions of the DSU. The European Communities fully agree with Chile that no DSB action can to any extent modify the provisions of the DSU, including those concerning consultations prior to dispute settlement. It is the view of the European Communities that abidance by those provisions has however to be reviewed also in the light of the other WTO provisions relevant in each particular case. The European Communities contend that the issue of whether the extension of a definitive safeguard measure under the Agreement on Safeguards constitutes the continuation of the original measure, or rather a different
measure, should be examined first of all in the light of Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards, containing specific indications in this respect. The European Communities submit that the language of Article 7.1, specifically the reference to one period of duration, already suggests that an extension is not separate from the original measure, and that the only effect of an extension is to change its duration or in other words extend "the period". Further, it adds, Article 7.2 dictates the conditions for such extension to be decided, and allows Members to extend a definitive safeguard measure. According to the European Communities, the reference in the wording to the measure (in force) in the singular indicates that, in the mind of the drafters of the Agreement on Safeguards, Article 7.2 was not to regulate the adoption of a new and separate measure, but simply refers to the possibility of modifying "the period" of the same measure. In the same vein, the last sentence of Article 7.4 refers to "[a] measure extended under paragraph 2". The European Communities submit that this is further supported by Article 7.3 which, by determining the total duration of safeguard relief, that provision makes a reference, on the one hand, to the "provisional measure", and, on the other hand, to the initial application and extension of a (same) safeguard measure. The European Communities point out that Article 7 includes the above language notwithstanding the fact that in order to authorize extensions it requires the collection and evaluation of new data. Thus, the European Communities argue, the fact that the extension is the result of the evaluation of different data compared to the original definitive measure does not affect the categorization of the extension, contrary to Chile's contention. The European Communities conclude that, even if, the continued duration of the measure requires a new expression of will on the part of the domestic authorities, in the light of the clear wording of Article 7 this alone is not sufficient to make the relevant decision a new "measure". The European Communities submit that if Chile was correct in arguing that the extension of its definitive safeguard measure constitutes a separate measure from the one originally taken on 20 January 2000, by the very adoption of such alleged separate measure Chile would be in breach of Article 7.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards since it clearly results from the wording of this provision that a WTO Member cannot apply two "separate" measures in a row on the same product or products. As a last remark on this issue, the European Communities recall the obligation of progressive liberalization set out in Article 7.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards which provides that if one and the same definitive measure is extended, the period of extension is also subject to the "progressive liberalization" obligation. The European Communities argue that if a Member could at pleasure categorise the extension of a definitive measure as a separate measure, simply based on its domestic legislation, it could effectively extend the duration of safeguard relief at full level by a series of allegedly "separate" measures and thus easily escape the obligation of progressive liberalization.

5.18 The European Communities submit that even if the extension were a separate measure, it would still be properly before the Panel. The European Communities explain that Chile relies on several provisions of the DSU as well as on certain Appellate Body pronouncements which, in their view, do not support Chile's contention. As to the DSU, the European Communities agree with Chile when it points out that pursuant to Article 3.4 DSB recommendations and rulings aim at a satisfactory solution of a dispute, and that pursuant to Article 3.3 a dispute arises when a Member's rights are nullified or impaired by a measure taken by another. Likewise, the European Communities argue, it is correct that under Article 3.7 of the DSU the main aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute, preferably through the removal of a measure found to be inconsistent with the WTO. Chile does not dispute, however, that the extension of the definitive safeguard measure is in force – so that, if required by WTO rules, it could be removed. As regards the Appellate Body pronouncements referred to by Chile, the European Communities submit that they also do not support Chile's objection. Chile first refers to Brazil – Aircraft in support of essentially a "due process rights" defence and, in this case, does not support Chile's claim that review of the extension by the Panel would violate such rights. The European Communities submit that, as in that case, the extension of the definitive safeguard measure at issue in the present dispute concerns the same "matter" and, as Chile expressly admits, corresponds exactly to the original definitive measure, apart from the duration.
According to the European Communities, it is thus clear that the matter and the applicable regime for which the establishment of the panel was requested are the same as those on which consultations were held. The European Communities contend that the responding party's rights of defence are therefore in no way impaired. The European Communities explain that Chile further refers to the Appellate Body report in *United States - Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities*. However, the European Communities explain, the application of the very criteria laid down by the Appellate Body in that report would confirm that the extension of Chile's definitive safeguard measure at issue in this dispute is not a separate and distinct measure from the one on which the parties held consultations.

5.19 Further to receiving the news that the Chilean safeguard measure, as extended, was terminated as far as imports of wheat and wheat flour are concerned, the European Communities note that, in its view, the Panel is entitled to continue its review of Chile's safeguard measure, as extended, including the parts of such measure which have been terminated. The European Communities assume that in any event, those products continue to be subject to the price band system as such.

5.20 The European Communities recall that domestic authorities are under a duty to evaluate all facts before them or that should have been before them in accordance with the WTO safeguards regime. In the European Communities' view, this broad obligation of the domestic authorities is paralleled by a broad review that panels are called to exercise on safeguard measures. The European Communities submit that the Panel is not limited in its review by the "record of investigation".

5.21 The European Communities submit that all the basic requirements for the adoption of safeguard measures must be met and demonstrated before a safeguard measure is taken, and all must be accounted for in the report of the competent authorities. The general issue raised by Chile's measure, as extended, is that in a number of respects Chile's competent authorities failed to properly examine and evaluate, or to examine and evaluate at all, whether the requirements for the adoption of a safeguard measure were met. The European Communities submit that this consideration applies in the first place to the decisions (Exempt Decrees) of the Ministry of Finance, which Chile identified as its "measures" in its notifications to the WTO. In its view, those measures themselves simply establish the type and duration of the safeguard relief accorded, and contain no reference or analysis whatsoever of the underlying justifications. The same consideration largely applies to the Recommendations of the Commission. The European Communities add that the decrees establishing the provisional measure, the definitive measure and the extension, include no reference to either of those Recommendations or to the Minutes of the Commission's investigation. Rather, each of those decisions refers to a different document (oficio reservado) of the Commission's President. The European Communities submit that it has not had the benefit of examining such oficios reservados and it is not clear to the Community whether the Recommendations reprinted in the Minutes of the meetings of the Commission of Distortions actually correspond to the "official communications" referred to in the Decrees or not. If they do not, the European Communities cannot see how those Recommendations may be examined as relevant basis for the decrees.

5.22 The European Communities submit that the safeguard measure taken and identified by Chile does not include any "demonstration as a matter of fact" that certain circumstances constituted "unforeseen developments". The same applies to the Recommendations of the Commission reprinted in the Minutes of its meetings. The fact that Chile submits before the Panel that the time extension of the downwards price trends on the international markets constitutes such "unforeseen development" is

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548 The European Communities refer to the Appellate Body report on *United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities* ("US – Certain EC Products"), (WT/DS165/AB/R) adopted on 10 January 2001, Chile's First Written Submission, para. 87.

549 The European Communities refer to the Panel report on *Korea – Dairy*, (WT/DS98/AB/R) adopted on 12 January 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body report, paras. 7.30-31, 7.54.
not capable of redressing a flaw in the competent authorities' determinations. The European Communities explain that the imports analysis of Chile's authorities seems to have taken into account not only the actual increase in imports observed, but also the fact that the operation of the price band system has contained a greater increase. In the view of the European Communities, the "threat of increased imports" is not the standard laid down in the WTO safeguard regime.

5.23 As regards Chile's analysis of the domestic industry, the European Communities submit that, as a matter of principle the fact that an analysis of the competitive relationship between some of the products subject to the safeguard measure may have been conducted for the adoption of the price band system does not absolve Chile from fulfilling the requirements of the WTO safeguard regime and conduct an investigation in accordance with those requirements. As regards Chile's analysis of the serious injury or threat thereof caused by the increased imports, the European Communities submit that even assuming that the Recommendation in Minutes of Session No. 193 forms part of Chile's safeguard measure, the factors which must be examined under Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards are disposed of in a few lines per type of imported product under investigation, simply stating the conclusions at which the Commission arrived without any further explanation or elaboration. Moreover, this does not address the issue of whether other "relevant factors" may have existed and possibly be brought to the attention of the domestic authorities. There are even fewer indications as concerns the causal relation between the increased imports and the serious injury or threat thereof.

5.24 As regards the PBS, the European Communities take the view that assessing the violation of Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 is sufficient for the Panel to conclude that, by adopting and maintaining its price band system, Chile has violated its WTO obligations. By its structure and design, that system takes away the predictability as to the maximum amount of Chile's tariff protection, which the other WTO Members thought they had achieved by negotiating tariffs with Chile. What is more, it alters the balance of concessions carefully achieved through the Uruguay Round.

5.25 The European Communities submit that Article 4.2 prohibits the maintenance, after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, of pre-Uruguay Round measures "which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" (i.e. to be "tariffied"). It also prohibits the introduction ex novo of the same types of measures, as well as their re-introduction. In the European Communities' view, given that the obligations in Article 4.2 concern measures that had to be converted into ordinary customs duties, it necessarily follows that measures which already fall within the definition of "ordinary customs duties" do not need "conversion". As a result, the European Communities argue, measures that are "ordinary customs duties" in the sense of Article II:1(b), as interpreted by the Appellate Body, are not caught by the obligations of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The European Communities contend that a measure that would meet the test set out by the Appellate Body in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, and would therefore not be contrary to Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, would not be subject to any further obligation in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. This conclusion stands even if the measure in question resulted in the application of a "duty that varies" - inasmuch as this "variation" is maintained below the ceiling written in the Member's tariff binding. Thus, the European Communities submit, the decisive element which distinguishes an "ordinary customs duty" from a "variable levy" is the existence of a ceiling in the tariff binding. The European Communities consider that the term "variable import levies" does not include all "duties which vary" or all duties which vary according to certain parameters.

5.26 In response to a question from the Panel concerning the concept of ordinary customs duties, the European Communities explain that, under GATT 1947, there seems to have been no agreement among the contracting parties that the clause "ordinary customs duties" would be limited to particular types of duties. The only indication in connection with that clause in the Analytical Index to the GATT turns on a formal distinction, namely on whether a certain duty is or is not inscribed in the columns of a contracting party's Schedules. The European Communities refer to Argentina – Textiles
and Apparel” where the Appellate Body further clarified that the only limit imposed by Article II:1(b) on the WTO Members relates to the maximum amount of tariff protection that they are allowed to apply once they have a binding in their Schedules. The European Communities explain that the Appellate Body excluded that, other than the requirement of an upper limit on the amount of duties, Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 imposes any other limit, notably on the type of duty that can be indicated in the column “ordinary customs duties”. The European Communities submit that, even under GATT 1947, it had been noted, in respect of variable duties: “[i]t is obvious that, if any such duty or levy is imposed on a ‘bound’ item, the rate must not be raised in excess of what is permitted by Article II of the Agreement.” In the European Communities’ view, it is clear that this position can only be correct if it is first assumed that variable levies may fall within the scope of Article II of GATT 1994.

5.27 In practice, the European Communities explain, the types of duties inscribed by the contracting parties to GATT 1947 in the column “ordinary customs duties” of their Schedules have greatly varied, including, inter alia, forms of duties commonly designed as “specific duties”, "ad valorem" duties", "mixed" duties, and also tariff quotas. The European Communities submit that it should however be clear that categories like "specific duties", or "ad valorem" duties are not given legal relevance in Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, and are not in any way mandatory under such provision. Accordingly, they do not in any way limit the liberty of WTO Members as to the device, the mention of which, in the column “ordinary customs duties” of their Schedule, indicates how those Members ensure that they will not exceed their bindings. The European Communities in particular disagree that certain basic, if not simplified, definitions set out for the purposes of economic theory may be of great assistance in identifying the content of legal obligations agreed upon by sovereign WTO Members, if those Members did not incorporate such definitions in the legal texts which they agreed.

5.28 In the European Communities’ view, the Chilean PBS is a measure that falls and can be reviewed under Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 as an ordinary customs duty. The European Communities submit that the Chilean PBS does not always result in the application of an additional, or "supplementary" duty to the one recorded in the "ordinary customs duty" column in Chile's Schedule. Quite to the contrary, it argues, there are cases in which, depending on the import prices, the "ordinary" duty is returned in full or in part. Therefore, the European Communities argue, the PBS seems more a mechanism for the application of Chile's "ordinary customs duty" rather than a separate and supplementary duty.

5.29 As regards the difference between "ordinary customs duties" and "other duties and charges", the European Communities explain that Article II:1(b) also provides with respect to "other duties and charges" that they cannot exceed a given amount, but gives no indication as to whether certain "types" of duties would or would not be considered as "other duties and charges". The European Communities submit that the similarity of language compared to that used for the "ordinary customs duties" suggest that the second sentence of Article II:1(b) has to be read similarly to the first sentence, that is, as only embodying an obligation not to exceed the amounts of "other duties and charges" provided for in their domestic legislation. The European Communities contend that, in practice, the expression "other duties or charges" in Article II:1(b) has been deemed to cover measures such as stamp duties, statistical fees, revenue fees. As for the Understanding on Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, while obliging Members to record their "other duties and charges" in their Schedule, on penalty

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550 The European Communities refer to the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Questions Relating to Bilateral Agreements, Discrimination and Variable Taxes, Note by the Executive Secretary, L/1636, 21 November 1961, p. 3, para. 7 (also excerpted in Analytical Index to the GATT, 1995, Vol. I, p. 72).

of losing their right to apply such "other duties and charges"\textsuperscript{552}, the European Communities explain, it does not limit the types of duties that can be scheduled as "other duties and charges". The European Communities conclude that the difference between "ordinary customs duties" and "other duties and charges" is mainly based on a formal criterion (that is, where in a Member's Schedule a "duty or charge" is recorded), but is not based on a difference in the types of duties that fall under one or the other category.

5.30 The European Communities consider that, as the principal obligation in the second sentence of Article II:1(b) is to refrain from imposing "other duties and charges" \textit{in excess of} those provided for in domestic legislation (and, after the entry into force of the Understanding on Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, in excess of those recorded in a Member's Schedule), these measures are also characterized by a ceiling. It concludes that, as such, they cannot be assimilated to the measures referred to in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, including the measures "similar" to those expressly listed in the first part of the footnote. The European Communities further explain that, given that a separate obligation not to exceed the level of "other duties and charges" is laid down in Article II:1(b) compared to that laid down for "ordinary customs duties", there is a separate ceiling for such "other duties and charges". In the European Communities' view, the basic obligation not to exceed the ceiling has not been changed by the Understanding on Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, which simply adds, for reasons of transparency, that the ceiling must be recorded in the Schedules.

5.31 The European Communities consider that the obligation in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture is not "independent" of the one in Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 insofar as the interpretation of Article 4.2 is concerned. In fact the latter provision employs the same language "ordinary customs duty", which also appears in Article II:1(b), without any specific definition of such term being provided either in the Agreement on Agriculture or elsewhere in the WTO Agreement. The European Communities submit that the term "ordinary customs duty" is only found in one provision of GATT 1994, namely Article II and concludes that it is therefore to that provision and to its interpretation given over time that one must turn to understand the content of the main obligation in Article 4.2. The European Communities admit that it is nonetheless correct that there is a distinct and additional obligation in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, thus an added value compared to Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994. The European Communities explain that that obligation is the obligation to "tariffy" and not to revert, maintain or resort to measures that were required to be "tariffied". In fact, Article II of GATT 1994 does not provide an obligation to eliminate certain forms of import protection other than tariff protection, nor to limit tariff protection by binding maximum amounts for agricultural products. The European Communities explain that it merely imposes, \textit{if and when} a Member has decided to place a maximum limit on its right to tariff protection by inscribing a binding in its Schedule, that such a Member cannot come back on its decision (except of course by fulfilling the requirements in Article XXVIII of GATT 1994). According to the European Communities, if a Member had not "tariffied" and then applied a variable import levy, it will in certain cases violate Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture without, however, simultaneously violating Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994.

5.32 As regards footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture ("similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties"), the European Communities contend that this residual list is important because it indicates that the list of measures which had to be "tariffied" (and which cannot be reintroduced, maintained or introduced) is not exhaustive and because it implies that the measures expressly listed in footnote 1 share some common feature (which in turn also has to be shared by non-listed measures in order for these measures to fall under the residual clause), and that the obligation to "tariffy" all those measures has a single rationale. The European Communities submit that, setting aside "variable import levies", all measures listed in the first part of footnote 1

\textsuperscript{552} The European Communities refer to the \textit{Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994}, paras. 3, 7.
have in common the effect of eliminating price competition, and of preventing imports. This indeed is the effect of quantitative import restrictions, but also of minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures through state trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints. The European Communities recall that this feature was also highlighted in the debates on "variable levies" under GATT 1947. In fact, "variable import duties" were criticized under GATT 1947 where they had the capacity of always perfectly offsetting the difference in prices between imports and domestic products, thus, the capacity of always eliminating imports' price competitive advantage vis-à-vis domestic products, ultimately operating like a quantitative restriction. The European Communities submit that these effects, however, are only characteristic of variable levy systems which can "fluctuate" freely, without any upper limit. In fact only in that case will a variable levy system allow exactly to offset import prices lower than domestic prices and thus operate like a quantitative restriction. By contrast, the European Communities argue, a variable import levy with an upper limit will not ensure perfect equalization of imports' and domestic products' prices in every case. There will still be the possibility of imports at a price level with respect to which the application of the highest possible duty within the upper limit does not fully eliminate the price differential compared to domestic products. Therefore, the European Communities conclude, the reference, in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, to "variable import levies" to be tariffied, must be read as a reference to variable levy systems which have the characteristic of eliminating price competition between imports and domestic products and of operating as import restrictions – which, in turn, means variable levy systems characterized by the absence of any upper limit to the maximum duty that may result from their application. According to the European Communities, Chile's price band system does not always result in the perfect equalization of prices of imports and domestic products. In fact, the European Communities explain, because there is a band, there is an upper limit beyond which the duty resulting from the application of the system cannot increase any further – no matter how low the import price. Therefore, the European Communities submit, in certain cases of particularly low import prices (thus of particularly strong price competition), the duty cannot offset exactly the price differential with domestic prices.

E. GUATEMALA

5.33 Guatemala declares that it shares Argentina's view that, inasmuch as the price band system implies the application of a tariff that exceeds the 31.5 per cent commitment by Chile or there is a risk that this will occur, the price band system is inconsistent with obligations under Article II.1(b) of the GATT 1994. As regards Chile's argument that the very low bound tariff, together with the drastic fall in international prices for many agricultural products, explain to a large degree why Chile was forced to resort to the safeguards, Guatemala submits that this clearly shows that Chile departed from the legitimate object and purpose of the safeguard measure. As regards Chile's acknowledgement that it deliberately decided to allow the price band to operate at full regime, failing to comply with its commitment, Guatemala concludes that Chile improperly used this safeguard measure as a tool to provide a temporary solution to its violations of the WTO Agreements and thereby invalidate all the action taken by the Chilean authority.

5.34 Guatemala considers that, even though Chile is trying to make the Member affected and all Members of the WTO responsible for monitoring Chile's compliance with the Agreements, putting forward in its defence acquiescence and estoppel, what is certain is that such a form of defence has not been accepted in our dispute settlement system, according to which every Member of the WTO is empowered to question measures by other Members that violate the WTO Agreements. Furthermore, Guatemala adds, according to Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO "Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements".

5.35 In general, Guatemala considers that both the imposition of the safeguard measure and its extension fail to comply with some of the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards. As regards the
concept of "unforeseen developments" in Article XIX of the GATT 1994, Guatemala submits that it implies a pressing need for action that was possibly not foreseen or expected and this must be proved by the competent authority. In Guatemala's view, this concept per se must be assessed. In Guatemala's reading of the Appellate Body precedents, the Appellate Body appears to suggest two circumstances that must be taken into account when demonstrating the unforeseen developments, namely, an examination of the changes that may be considered an unforeseen development and an explanation of that interpretation. In this case, Guatemala declares not seeing an indication that the Chilean authority demonstrated the existence of an "unforeseen development" as required by Article XIX of the GATT 1994. Moreover, it adds, we cannot see in which part of the administrative file or with which resolution the Chilean authority complied by indicating that it had taken into account the unforeseen development, as required by Chilean legislation itself in Article 17 of the Regulations on the Application of Safeguard Measures (Decree No. 909). Hence, Guatemala supports Argentina's claim that the Government of Chile acted inconsistently with Article XIX of the GATT by not having demonstrated, prior to application of the safeguard measure, as a matter of "fact" the existence of an "unforeseen development".

5.36 Guatemala considers that Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards lays down an obligation that goes beyond the mere fact of making a file available to the public. It claims that simply examining a file does not allow interested parties to know which questions of fact and law were analysed by the competent authority when setting forth its findings and conclusions. Guatemala notes that the Chilean authority did not comply either with the obligation to provide copies to interested parties. Hence, Guatemala considers that the Government of Chile acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards inasmuch as the Chilean authority did not comply with the obligation to publish a report or detailed analysis and simply provided access to the public file or furnished "copies" thereof.

5.37 Guatemala contends that the first thing that the Chilean authority should have done prior to imposing a safeguard measure was to determine whether imports of a particular product had affected domestic producers of products that were "like" or "directly competitive" with that imported product. Moreover, in this particular case, the investigating authority should have carried out such an analysis for each of the products subject to the safeguard measure, namely, wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils. In Guatemala's opinion, even if the price band system operating in Chile took into account each agricultural product and its corresponding like or directly competitive products, this does not absolve the Chilean authority from carrying out its own analysis in order to comply with Article XIX.1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 4.1(c) and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. Guatemala contends that it could not find in any part of Chile's submission "references" that would allow it to find in the Minutes the analysis carried out by the Commission. Furthermore, Guatemala submits, it is a matter for concern that none of the Minutes in the file (Minutes of Session No. 181 of 9 September 1999, Minutes of Session No. 185 of 22 October, Minutes of Session No. 193 of 7 January 2000, and Minutes of Session No. 224 of 17 November 2000) contain this analysis. Accordingly, Guatemala supports Argentina's claim that the Government of Chile acted inconsistently with Article XIX.1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 4.1(c) and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. In Guatemala's view, the Minutes do not mention any analysis of the like or directly competitive product that should have been carried out by the competent authority pursuant to the aforementioned Articles. Likewise, and as a result of the foregoing, Guatemala considers that the Chilean authority could not have determined which products constituted the domestic industry because the entire evaluation which the Chilean authority made in relation to this concept is inevitably wrong and cannot be remedied.

5.38 As regards the increased imports requirement, Guatemala considers that the periods examined by Chile do not allow any proper conclusions to be drawn regarding the trend in imports. In this regard, Guatemala explains that the Chilean authority sometimes evaluated short-term trends and in other instances evaluated data corresponding to long-term trends. In Guatemala's view, evaluating
data in isolation or placing emphasis on some data corresponding to a particular number of years while at the same time leaving aside other data for more recent periods can indubitably lead to errors. Far from showing that there was an increase in imports, Guatemala contends, the Chilean authority recognizes that, in recent periods, there has been a decrease in imports of products affected by the safeguard measure. Guatemala further submits that the competent authority did not carry out a serious analysis in order to determine that the "alleged increase" in imports was taking place "under such conditions" as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury. Guatemala therefore supports the claim by the Government of Argentina that the Government of Chile acted in a manner inconsistent with Article XIX.1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

5.39 Guatemala points out that Argentina claims that the determination by Chile of the existence of threat of injury is inconsistent with Article 4.2(a) because the Chilean authority did not properly evaluate "all relevant factors", as required by that Article. Guatemala agrees that the Chilean authority did not evaluate "all relevant factors" since it could not find in the Commission's Minutes any kind of evaluation of the relevant factors set out in Article 4.2. of the Agreement on Safeguards. Although it is true there are isolated data or a straightforward list of some of these factors, Guatemala submits, this does not mean that the Chilean authority complied with its obligation "to evaluate" these factors, as required by Article 4.2. Guatemala further submits that Article 4.2 imposes on the Chilean authority the obligation to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of its determination. In the Commission's Records, however, Guatemala finds no kind of explanation that would allow it to understand the analysis and the criteria used by the Chilean authority in order to understand how such factors confirmed its determination.

5.40 Guatemala supports Argentina's claim that the Chilean authority failed to comply with its obligations under Article XIX.1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards for the following reasons: (i) in document G/SG/Q2/CHL/5 of 27 September 2000, Chile indicates that the cause of the injury was the significant fall in international prices. This statement can be found in several parts of the administrative file. In Guatemala's view, the Chilean authority was obliged to examine "other factors", which were referred to by various parties during the administrative proceedings. However, Guatemala contends, the file does not contain any analysis by the Chilean authority showing that it examined these "other factors" mentioned during the procedure. (ii) the Chilean authority did not make a "determination" within the meaning of Article 4.2(b) because it did not manage to establish the existence of a causal link between the increased imports and the injury or threat of serious injury. In Guatemala's view, the Chilean authority did not undertake an evaluation of the "other factors" and therefore was not empowered to determine or to ensure that the alleged injury or threat of injury was attributable to the increased imports. Guatemala concludes that the Chilean authority could not find that the "alleged increase in imports" was the cause of the injury or threat of injury.

F. JAPAN

5.41 Japan is concerned with the consistency of Chile's measures with relevant WTO rules on several points. Japan indicates that there is a possibility that taxes or surcharges in excess of Chile's bound tariff rate agreed in the Uruguay Round may be imposed under this PBS on its face. Japan further indicates that it is not necessarily clear whether the following basic requirements for applying safeguard measures are fulfilled so that, as the Chilean Government insists, such measures are justified: (a) the demonstration of the existence of unforeseen developments; (b) the proof of a causal link between increase of imports and serious injury; and (c) the proper definition of "like or directly competitive products" and "domestic industry." In this regard, Japan argues that, although the existence of a directly competitive relationship between materials (primary products) and final products (in this case, wheat and wheat flour) seems not to be demonstrated, producers of the both products are included in the "Domestic Industry" in the meaning of Article 4.1(c) of the Agreement of Safeguards.
Furthermore, Japan notes that the Agreement on Safeguards does not allow a Member to adopt safeguard measures before the investigation. In any event, Japan submits, careful consideration is called for in order to ensure that the measures inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 are not justified as measures taken under the Agreement on Safeguards.

Japan is of the view that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture does not regulate the tariff level but prohibits certain forms of border measures other than ordinary customs duties, except as otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5 of this Agreement. Thus, Japan considers, insofar as a measure does not fall into such measures so regulated by Article 4.2, the measure does not give rise to violation under Article 4.2 of Agreement on Agriculture.

According to Japan, since Chile made tariff concessions for wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils in the Uruguay Round, Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 does not allow Chile to levy ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in Chile's Schedule of Concessions. While Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 also provides for "other duties or charges", if the "specific duty" based on the Chilean PBS is not set forth as "other duties or charges" in the Schedule, Japan is of the view that it is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 to the extent that the applied rate inclusive of the added "specific duty" exceeds the bound rate of concessions.

Paraguay considers that when a bound tariff has been recorded in a Member's Schedule, this tariff constitutes the maximum limit of duties that can legally be applied to the products bound. Paraguay agrees with the Appellate Body's statement in Argentina – Textiles and Apparel 553 regarding the structure and form of the measure inasmuch as it considers that, although in certain cases the implementation of Chile's price band system does not violate its obligations under the Agreements, on other occasions the system jeopardizes the rights of other Members, and so automatically becomes inconsistent with the Agreements. Paraguay refers to Chile's statement to the effect that the sharp and sustained fall in international prices of the agricultural products made it no longer possible to maintain the system without exceeding the level of bound duties and declares that this appears to suggest that Chile had failed to comply with its obligations under Article II of the GATT 1994.

Paraguay also claims that Chile has not provided any solid legal grounds for its statement that the PBS is not a variable import levy nor a similar border measure within the meaning of footnote 1 and that it does not come under the scope of Article 4.2 but is rather a specific tariff that fluctuates according to external factors. Paraguay is of the opinion that, even though it is not specifically mentioned in the text, Chile's price band system is one of the measures which the drafters of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and in particular of footnote 1, were seeking to prevent. As regards Chile's safeguard measures, Paraguay finds that, if the PBS was fully applied in Chile in order to maintain a stable domestic price, away from the fluctuation of products in global markets, the argument that the rapid fall in global prices had caused or threatened to cause serious injury to Chilean producers is inconsistent. Paraguay declares that, by recognizing that the measures in force in Chile are being analysed by this Panel, it is tacitly concluding that they are merely an extension of the original measure, and that Chile's argument that the extension is a different measure is out of place because neither the nature nor the characteristics of the original measure have altered - there has merely been an extension of the implementation period. Paraguay further submits that Chile adopted the safeguard measures after it had infringed its bound tariffs by applying the price band system. In Paraguay's view, this means that it used the safeguard measures as a mechanism for

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legalizing those violations, contrary to both the objective and nature of such measures. At the same time, Paraguay considers that Chile has not acted in accordance with Article XIX of the GATT 1994, since it failed to demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments prior to applying the safeguard measure. Paraguay further submits that Chile has not convincingly demonstrated injury or threat of injury caused by increased imports. Paraguay considers that such injury or threat thereof can be imputed to other factors, for example international product prices, and this is clearly proscribed in Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

H. UNITED STATES

5.48 The United States disagrees with the interpretation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture advanced in Chile's first submission. According to the US, Chile's argument is two-fold: (1) the price band regime is not a "variable import levy" within the meaning of Article 4.2 and, therefore, is not proscribed by Article 4.2 and (2) even if it is a variable levy, the system was not "required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" during the Uruguay Round tariffication exercise and, hence, is not in violation of Article 4.2. As regards the second argument, the United States considers that it raises a fundamental interpretive issue regarding Article 4.2. According to the US, Chile effectively reads Article 4.2 as only prohibiting Members from using "any measures that have been converted into ordinary customs duties." According to this argument, if an agriculture-specific non-tariff barrier existed at the time of the Agreement on Agriculture's entry into force, but was not "converted" into a tariff at that time by a Member, then the measure must not "have been required to be converted" and, accordingly, falls outside the scope of Article 4.2's prohibition. The United States submits that this strained reading of Article 4.2 ignores key parts of the text as well as the object and purpose of the provision. The United States explains that, read according to its ordinary meaning, Article 4.2 imposes a general requirement to eliminate and refrain from using or readopting any agriculture-specific non-tariff barriers and to use a system of tariff-only protection. Therefore, the United States argues, if the Chilean PBS is a variable import levy, it (and all other variable import levies) is prohibited by the express language of Article 4.2 and its accompanying footnote, regardless of whether Chile actually tariffied the levy in its Schedule of tariff commitments. In the United States' view, Chile's interpretation of Article 4.2 fails to give all of the terms of that provision "meaning and effect" and does not read those terms according to their ordinary meaning. One phrase that Chile quotes but then disregards is "of the kind." The United States claims that, according to its ordinary meaning, "kind" refers to a "class, sort, or type," indicating that Article 4.2 prohibits general classes, sorts, or types of non-tariff measures, not simply those particular, country-specific measures that were actually tariffied in the Uruguay Round. According to the US, Chile's interpretation not only denies meaning to the phrase "of the kind," it also renders inutile the verb "maintain." The United States submits that if the only measures that Article 4.2 prohibits are non-tariff barriers that were, in fact, tariffied in the Uruguay Round, then the language in Article 4.2 that Members shall not "revert to" such measures would suffice. Thus, Chile's reading contravenes the general rule of treaty interpretation that no terms of a treaty (in this case, "maintain" and "revert to") shall be reduced to redundancy or inutility. The United States argues that the requirement that a Member shall not "maintain" a prohibited measure contemplatesthat there could be some measures "which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" that were not, in fact, converted. The United States submits that such measures, even if they had not been converted, would still be prohibited and actionable under Article 4.2.

5.49 The United States also disagrees with Chile's assertions that its measures are immunized from challenge because (1) its price band system has not previously been challenged and (2) other Members allegedly use similar measures. The United States submits that, according to paragraph 3 of the Marrakesh Protocol, there is no waiver of Members' rights to challenge Chile's variable import levy merely because Chile submitted its Schedule for multilateral examination. The United States further submits that Chile's (or other Members') use of WTO-inconsistent measures does not rise to the level of "subsequent practice" that establishes the parameters of Article 4.2's prohibition.
5.50 As regards Chile's second argument, the United States submits that Chile's price band regime clearly falls within the ordinary meaning of the term "variable import levies" as used in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 when interpreted in light of its context, object and purpose. The price band mechanism varies the import levy assessed depending on the relationship between historical and current world prices. Chile has not offered any interpretation of the ordinary meaning of "variable import levy" that demonstrates that its price band regime is not encompassed by this term. However, the United States does not fully subscribe to Argentina's definition of a variable import levy as an import surcharge that "ensures" that the domestic market price "remains unchanged regardless of price fluctuations in exporting countries." In the US' view, variable import levies may be effected through a number of possible mechanisms, which may or may not "ensure" a specific domestic price. It further adds that a variable levy, however it is designed, prevents or ameliorates price variability in the domestic market caused by movements in import prices. The United States argues that Chile's price band regime does exactly that by calculating the import levy as the difference between a present "target" price and a current world price.

5.51 The United States defines a variable levy as an "assessment, duty, or tax" that has "different values in different instances or at different times" as determined by an administrative, formulaic mechanism. This mechanism, it explains, defines parameters based on any number of exogenous factors, such as a target price (e.g., historical world prices) and a current price (e.g., a reference price), to set the levy. The levy at any particular point in time is determined on the basis of those exogenous factors so as to prevent or ameliorate price variability in the domestic market caused by movements in import prices. The United States also defines a minimum import price as a similar mechanism whereby the price of each import shipment is compared to an officially established "minimum import price," often based on an internal domestic support price. The United States explains that where the declared value (i.e., transaction value) of the specific shipment is lower than the minimum import price, a penalty, additional charge, or duty is often then assessed, which may be equal to the difference between the minimum import price and the declared value.

5.52 The United States claims that Chile's argument to the effect that its price band mechanism cannot be a variable levy because it is not identical to the EC's pre-Uruguay Round variable levy regime actually serves to highlight the price band system's operation as a variable import levy. The United States explains that the main distinctions that Chile points to are that its system uses a moving five-year average "band" of past world prices to establish a minimum (and maximum) target price, whereas the EC's prior variable levy system used an internal European Communities price to set the target price, and that the price band system uses a current international reference price, whereas the European Communities system used a shipment-specific invoice price. The United States submits that these are distinctions without a difference since how Chile sets its target price and current price does not fundamentally distinguish its regime. Rather, the United States argues, it is the fact that the levy varies based on exogenous factors, such as world prices, not the particular factors used to determine the levy amount, that defines the price band mechanism as a variable levy. The United States adds that another distinction Chile draws is that, unlike the prior European Communities variable levy regime, the price band system permits low-cost foreign producers to compete on the basis of price. The United States contends that, while it is technically true that the system does not completely eliminate price competition, this does not fully capture the economic impact of Chile's price band regime. The United States explains that, when international prices decline, the variable levy assessed under Chile's price band regime exacts a higher duty, on an ad valorem basis, on low-cost goods than it does from high-cost goods. Thus, the United States argues, the prohibition on variable import levies in Article 4.2 serves to eliminate the disproportionate impact of these measures on low-cost producers. The United States contends that Chile's definition of "ordinary customs duty" would also capture the EC's prior variable import levy, which was a specific duty that fluctuated, in part, on the basis of external world price factors. Thus, Chile's definition cannot be accepted as it does not distinguish the very European Communities measure that Chile has conceded is a prohibited "variable import levy." The United States submits that the term "ordinary customs duties" is generally recognized to refer to
specific duties that are based on a physical quantity or measure of imported product or *ad valorem* duties that are based on a fixed percentage of the value of the imported product. It concludes that such ordinary customs duties do not vary based on world and/or domestic prices.

5.53 The United States submits that, even if the Panel were to conclude that Chile's price band mechanism is not a "variable import levy," the price band regime is a "similar border measure" that is prohibited under footnote 1 to Article 4.2. The United States contends that, due to the similarities in both structure and effect between Chile's price band system and measures recognized by Chile as being variable import levies, the Chilean regime must at least be a prohibited "similar border measure."

5.54 In response to a question from the Panel, the United States submits that, pursuant to the customary rules of interpretation of international law, which are reflected in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Accordingly, the term "ordinary" should be defined in accordance with its ordinary meaning in its context in Article II:1(b). The United States explains that the dictionary definition of "ordinary" is "belonging to the regular or usual order or course; . . . occurring in the course of regular custom or practice; regular, normal, customary, usual." The United States indicates that, in its context as an adjective of "customs duty," the term can be understood to refer to those types of customs duties that have been the customary, usual types of customs duties used by Members. The United States submits that the regular, normal forms of customs duties used in international trade (both now and at the time of the Uruguay Round) are the *ad valorem* duty and the specific duty (or compound rates based on combinations of the two). It contends that a review of Members' domestic tariff schedules (including Chile's) would reveal that the "regular, normal, customary, usual" forms of customs duties expressed therein are *ad valorem* or specific duties. The United States notes that this understanding of "ordinary customs duties" was apparently expressed during the process of tariffication in the Uruguay Round in which border measures other than ordinary customs duties were converted into tariff equivalents. Thus, "ordinary customs duties" are *ad valorem* and/or specific customs duties inscribed in a country's domestic tariff schedule with a rate expressed for each individual tariff heading.

5.55 Finally, the United States notes that Chile's domestic tariff schedule confirms that the levy imposed through Chile's price band mechanism is not an "ordinary customs duty." It explains that for all Chilean products, even those on which it imposes price bands, under the column labelled "duties," the Chilean tariff schedule shows only an *ad valorem* rate. For products subject to price bands, however, the product description following the tariff number indicates a footnote. The United States points out that the footnote text discloses that an additional "specific duty" is imposed (no rate is specified) and refers to the decree then in effect. However, it adds, such decrees only establish the price band mechanism, that is, a list of international reference prices with the corresponding additional duty to be charged. The United States submits that an importer seeking to ascertain what duty would be imposed on imports would also have to know the Chilean customs authority's weekly determination of the current international reference price. Thus, it concludes, the rate of customs duty imposed through the price band mechanism is neither disclosed by Chile's national tariff schedule nor disclosed by the decree establishing the price band mechanism. The United States indicates that this complicated levy mechanism differs importantly from "ordinary customs duties" in its lack of transparency and definiteness.

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556 The United States refers to the *GATT Analytical Index*, § II.A.2(3), p. 78 (1995 ed.).
5.56 In response to a question by the Panel, the United States suggests that the category of "all other duties and charges of any kind" in Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, second sentence cannot usefully be defined "positively". It submits that the very use of the term "all other" means that this category of duties and charges must be described "negatively," that is, in terms of what it is not. According to the US, this category consists of all import duties and charges "of any kind" that are not "ordinary customs duties." The United States further notes that "all other" duties or charges are generally prohibited under Article II:1(b), second sentence, and the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 unless they have been separately inscribed in a Member's Schedule in accordance with the Understanding. The United States also indicates that it is conceivable that some "similar border measures" within the meaning of footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture might in some circumstances be considered "other duties or charges of any kind" within the meaning of Article II:1(b), second sentence, of GATT 1994, provided that any such measure constitutes a duty or a charge and is imposed "on or in connection with the importation" of a product. However, it explains, the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 requires such a "similar border measure" that is an "other duty or charge" to be inscribed in a Member's Schedule. In this regard, the United States considers it relevant to note that Chile has not recorded any such "other duty or charge" for wheat, wheat flour, or edible vegetable oils. The United States is of the opinion that a Member generally may not impose an "other duty or charge" at all unless it is bound in the Member's schedule. It explains that if such a duty or charge is omitted from a Schedule a Member may not subsequently add such duties or charges to its Schedule.

5.57 In response to a question by the Panel, the United States indicates that it considers it neither essential nor necessarily helpful to designate a degree of similarity that is required to be met in order for a measure to qualify as a "similar border measure." The notion of degree of similarity is, the United States believes, intrinsic to the term itself and is to be taken into account in the determination of whether something is "similar" or not similar. The United States notes that the plain text of footnote 1 does not further modify the term similar, e.g., "very similar" or "somewhat similar." The United States explains that the ordinary dictionary meaning of "similar" is "having a marked resemblance or likeness; of a like nature or kind." Thus, it contends, a measure at issue should "resemble" the mechanics, structure, and operation of a listed measure. The United States submits that whether the measures share sufficient characteristics with each other to qualify as being "similar" to each other is a matter that must be determined on a case-by-case basis according to a Panel's best judgement. The United States argues that in interpreting the term "similar border measures," it is important to look to the object and purpose of Article 4.2 and footnote 1. Article 4.2 prohibits any and all measures that have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, regardless of the degree to which such measures disadvantage imports. The United States considers that two of the goals of Article 4.2's tariffication process were the achievement of transparency in import barriers and the advantage of fixed tariffs for the promotion of trade in agricultural products. Thus, in the US' view, when determining whether a measure is a "similar border measure," it is enough that the measure is similar to a listed measure in its mechanics, structure, and operation, regardless of its efficacy. Finally, the United States notes that footnote 1 states that "these measures include" the listed measures and "similar border measures." Thus, it concludes, the identified measures and "similar" border measures of footnote 1 are not an all-inclusive list of the measures that have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties. According to the US, measures that are not "similar" to the specifically listed measures could still be prohibited by Article 4.2.

5.58 The United States agrees with Argentina's claim that Chile's price band system, as implemented through laws, regulations, and "complimentary provisions and/or amendments," is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. The United States argues that Chile concedes in its First Submission that the price band system will result in a breach of its tariff bindings if international prices are sufficiently low but seeks to excuse the breach on the basis that its

557 The United States refers to The Oxford English Dictionary, p. 490 (2d edition).
Government consciously took the decision to allow the price bands to operate in full trespassing the bound rate. The United States submits that this concession should itself suffice for the Panel to find a breach of Article II. The United States notes that the deliberateness of the breach is irrelevant because Article II is concerned not with good or bad intentions but with the "treatment" accorded to the commerce of another Member. The United States concludes that because violations of Chile's bound rates may occur and have occurred precisely because of the "structure and design" of the price band system, such as Chile's failure to cap the specific duties that could be applied to particular shipments, the price band system is inconsistent with Chile's obligations under Article II. The United States further submits that the price band system is mandatory, does not impose any \textit{ad valorem} cap on the duties that can be collected on a particular shipment, and continues in effect to this day. Thus, it argues, regardless of the operation or legal status of Chile's safeguard measures, Chile continues to apply measures that are inconsistent with its tariff bindings under Article II.

5.59 In response to a question by the Panel, the United States disagrees with the implied assertion in the European Communities' oral statement to the effect that a measure that is not inconsistent with Article II of GATT 1994 cannot be prohibited under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. According to the United States, the statement of the European Communities suggests that Article II would delimit the "scope of Article 4.2" but this reverses the proper order of the analysis. The United States is of the opinion that Article 4.2 must be interpreted first as the \textit{lex specialis} applicable to "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" that are applied to agricultural products. The United States concludes that because price bands are a "variable import levy" or "similar border measure", they are prohibited under the terms of that provision, which makes no reference to the existence of a tariff binding. The United States explains that Article II:1(b) allows a Member to assess ordinary customs duties not in excess of the level bound in its Schedule. However, it argues, the levies assessed by the Chilean PBS are not "ordinary customs duties." Therefore, the United States concludes, the European Communities' assertion that the Chilean price bands are being "maintained" under Article II of GATT 1994 cannot be credited. The United States further indicates that, contrary to the EC's assertion that a tariff binding is all that separates a variable import levy from an ordinary customs duty, the Agreement on Agriculture draws a marked distinction between the two. The United States explains that Article 4.2 sets the scope of its prohibition as "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties," and footnote 1 identifies one such measure as the "variable import levy." Thus, in its view, any valid interpretation of Article 4.2 must make sense of that distinction.

5.60 In response to a question by the Panel, the United States considers that Members have the right to alter their ordinary customs duties on items so long as those duties do not exceed the relevant tariff binding. It clarifies that this is different, however, from a variable levy, where the value of the levy is not set and then altered in succession. The United States submits that because the variable levy mechanism creates impediments to trade regardless of whether a tariff binding is exceeded, Members agreed in the Agreement on Agriculture to refrain from maintaining, resorting to, or reverting to variable import levies and similar border measures.

5.61 As regards Chile's safeguards measures, the United States submits that competent authorities must base their determination concerning increased imports on objective (i.e., unbiased) data and that they should consider carefully data from the more recent past in the context of examining the entire period of investigation. The United States claims that both Argentina and Chile appear to be relying in their submissions on information that was not in the Minutes compiled and considered by the Chilean competent authorities. In the United States' view, such extra-record information should not be considered by the Panel in this dispute. The United States explains that the review of the serious injury determination of a competent authority is to be conducted based on the information that was before the authority at the time of its investigation. The United States submits that by relying on new information that was never before the Chilean competent authorities, both Argentina and Chile would have this Panel become another authority before which evidence could be submitted on the underlying
facts. The United States is of the opinion that, in that case, the process would be exactly the de novo review which has been condemned by the Appellate Body. The United States further submits that, in considering Argentina's claims regarding Chile's provisional safeguard measure, the Panel should keep in mind that Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards places a special obligation on a party imposing a provisional safeguard – that there be "clear evidence that increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury". The United States explains that "clear" means "[e]asily seen (lit. & fig.); distinctly visible; intelligible, perspicuous, unambiguous; manifest, evident." Thus, the United States argues, if the Panel concludes that the evidence upon which Chile relied for its provisional measure was ambiguous, the Panel should find that measure to be inconsistent with the Agreement on Safeguards. The United States points out that, in performing this evaluation, the Panel should note that the Article 6 standard is different from, and distinctly higher than, the standard Article 4 requirements for imposition of a definitive safeguard measure. In this regard, the United States submits that mixed evidence might be sufficient to support a definitive safeguard measure, but still be insufficient to support a provisional measure.

5.62 The United States further argues that Chile is mistaken in treating the extension as an entirely new measure. However, it adds, Article 7.2 also establishes that Articles 2 through 5 regulate the procedures used in an extension proceeding. The United States explains that Article 7.2 itself provides the substantive standard, which conflicts in important ways with the substantive requirements of Articles 2 through 5. Thus, the United States concludes, Argentina errs in arguing that Chile was obligated to satisfy the substantive requirements of Articles 2.1 and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards that imports be increasing before extending its safeguard measures.

I. VENEZUELA

5.63 Venezuela agrees with Argentina that preservation of the commitments made within the framework of tariff negotiations is a key element of the multilateral system and that the principle of predictability and certainty of tariff concessions granted has been recognized in a number of precedents as a fundamental part of the structure of the GATT/WTO system. Venezuela does not however agree with those who interpret Members' obligations under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 as requiring a constant tariff. Venezuela is of the opinion that, provided that the ceiling established by the bound tariff in Members' respective Schedules of commitments is not exceeded, the fluctuation in either direction and with greater or lesser frequency of the tariff actually applied to imports does not constitute a violation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, nor does it affect the predictability or certainty of the tariff concessions.

5.64 Venezuela is of the opinion that, to settle this dispute, the Panel needs to take into consideration what was meant by variable levies at the time of the negotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture. Venezuela believes that the term "variable levy" in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture refers to levies designed to cover the difference between the price of imports at the border and an official price below which foreign goods cannot be admitted. This implies, it argues, a different tariff for each import, even where applied to identical products at the same time. Venezuela considers that there are significant differences between these "variable levies" and the variable duties resulting from PBS. These differences, it explains, relate to both the objectives and nature of these two types of measures: whereas the objective of the variable levies which in our opinion are proscribed by footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture was to "insulate" the domestic market from fluctuations on the international market, the objective of PBSs is to stabilize domestic prices by in fact passing on the trends in the international prices of the products concerned for a specific period. Venezuela stresses that particularly low international prices might lead to a tariff
increase up to the bound level in each Member's schedule of commitments, but high international prices can lead to a tariff reduction.

5.65 In response to a question by Argentina, Venezuela stresses that PBSs may be set up differently from the one used by Chile, and may be compatible with WTO rules. It is Venezuela's understanding that the Chilean PBS, as it currently operates, can in certain circumstances result in the application of specific duties to products subject to the system. Specific duties, Venezuela explains, consist in a specific amount collected for a given quantity (unit/kilo/litre) of the imported good, and are not based on the value of the good. Thus, it concludes, as Argentina in fact points out in its question, the transaction value is not used to determine the amount of the specific duties. Venezuela submits that specific duties are permitted under WTO rules, and are applied by certain Members, to agricultural goods in particular.

5.66 In response to a question by the Panel regarding the definition of ordinary customs duty, Venezuela explains that the Kyoto Convention defines customs duties as "the duties laid down in the Customs tariff to which goods are liable on entering or leaving the Customs territory". Venezuela further explains that the term "ordinary", as translated into Spanish ("propiamente dicho"), means "as such", which amounts to repeating the above definition. Venezuela indicates that a distinction must be made between duties and charges such as those involved in paying a service (freight, insurance, customs service fee), and ordinary customs duties, which are fiscal contributions collected by Customs on goods from another country. Venezuela explains that what distinguishes an "ordinary customs duty" from a "variable duty" is not the existence of a bound "ceiling" or maximum applicable level according to each party's schedule. In Venezuela's opinion, a customs duty is valid in the WTO as long as it does not exceed the indicated "ceiling", while the "variable levy", which is prohibited by the footnote to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, is a levy which involves a different tariff for each import transaction, even for identical products at the same time.

5.67 In response to a question by the Panel, Venezuela explains that "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties" within the meaning of footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture cannot be considered "other duties or charges of any kind" within the meaning of Article II:1(b), second sentence, of GATT 1994. Venezuela contends that the obligations established by the two Articles are different.

VI. INTERIM REVIEW

6.1 The Panel issued its interim report on 21 February 2002. On 28 February 2002, Chile provided comments and requested the revision and clarification of certain aspects of the interim report. Chile also requested that the Panel hold a further meeting with the parties pursuant to Article 15 of the DSU and paragraph 16 of the Panel's Working Procedures. Argentina provided general comments in a letter dated 28 February 2002. The Panel held a meeting on 14 March 2002. Both parties made oral statements and were given the opportunity to provide written statements by close of business the next day.559

559 At the beginning of the meeting, Chile complained that the Panel had impaired Chile's rights of defense and due process, by (1) not having postponed the first substantive meeting with the parties as requested by Chile; (2) having given insufficient time for preparation of written comments on the interim report; (3) having one Panel member participating in the interim review meeting through a telephone link, rather than through physical presence; and (4) organizing a session of limited duration as a result of a Panel member's scheduling constraints.

The Chairman of the Panel responded to Chile's comments at the meeting that the Panel had shown maximum flexibility towards both parties throughout the proceedings and had always tried to accommodate requests for schedule modifications by both parties and in agreement with both parties. Indeed, all requests made by the parties at the organizational meeting were met. With regard to the postponement of the first
With regard to paragraphs 7.3 to 7.8 of the interim report, Chile argued that a distinction must be drawn between Articles 1 and 2 of Law 19.722. According to Chile, Article 2 is the provision that expressly and conclusively states that the total of the specific duties resulting from application of the price band system and the general ad valorem (most-favoured-nation) tariff may not exceed the bound tariff. Chile submits that this provision does not require any further implementation as it is a law and as such applies in Chile as of its publication in the Diario Oficial de la República de Chile, which occurred on 19 November 2001. Chile argues that the case of Article 1 of this Law is different in that it has to be implemented by the customs authorities, who took an active part in the elaboration, discussion and drafting of this Law. This implementation took effect at the same time as the publication of the Law, in the form of Exempt Resolution No. 4326, published in the Diario Oficial de la República de Chile on the same date as Law 19.722, i.e., 19 November 2001. Argentina responded that Chile did not inform the Panel about the existence of Exempt Resolution No. 4326 prior to the interim review meetings, and that Argentina could therefore not have been aware of this Exempt Resolution.

We note that Chile did not request any specific action by the Panel in this respect and, taking note of the late submission of this evidence by Chile, we consider that no changes to the interim report are warranted by Chile's comments.

With respect to paragraphs 7.17, 7.18 and 7.19, Chile argued that the Panel is mistaken in attributing to Chile the argument that the fact that the PBS was not challenged or that there were no requests to tariffy the measure, either during or after the Uruguay Round negotiations (particularly on the Agreement on Agriculture), means that the PBS cannot be challenged or considered a measure prohibited by Article 4.2. According to Chile, it had argued that the absence of any challenge or request, before, during or after the negotiations is valid evidence in support of Chile's position regarding the correct interpretation of Article 4.2. Chile therefore requests the Panel to reformulate or delete these paragraphs. Argentina considered that the Panel had correctly understood and reflected Chile's arguments, and cited a passage in Chile's rebuttal submission which it considered to confirm this understanding.

In paragraph 7.17 we summarize Chile's interpretative argument regarding Article 4.2 as follows:

Chile argues that the phrase "of the kind which have been required to be converted" and the illustrative list in footnote 1 contain two separate conditions to be met for a measure to be prohibited under Article 4.2: only those measures listed in footnote 1 which effectively "have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" would be prohibited under Article 4.2. Chile argues that no other Member has ever requested Chile to "tariffy" its PBS during the Uruguay Round negotiations, and that, therefore, its PBS
is not a measure "of the kind which [has] been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties".

In paragraph 7.18, we state that such an interpretation "would imply that Members decided to forego their right to challenge measures which had not been specifically identified and converted at the end of the Uruguay Round" (emphasis added).

6.6 We note that in para. 56 of its first submission, Chile states,

In its arguments, Argentina disregards the usual meaning of the terms of Article 4.2 in its context and effectively ignores the qualifier that the measures that must not be maintained or reverted to are "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties". Consequently, not only do all non-tariff measures of the kind described in footnote 1 not have to be abolished, but only those of the kind that have been specified must be converted into ordinary customs duties. If the intention of those who drafted Article 4.2 had in fact been as Argentina argues, it would have been extremely easy for them to draw up an obligation to prohibit "all measures of the kind listed in footnote 1". But they did not do this; and anyone interpreting the treaty cannot disregard the drafters' decision to include, in its place, qualifying and limitative terms with the intention of giving the Article the meaning that only measures of the kind which have been required to be converted are prohibited. (emphasis added)

6.7 In light of the above, we are of the view that we have accurately summarized Chile's arguments. Chile appears to be arguing that we examined their position as an estoppel argument. We recognized explicitly that Chile was not doing this in paragraphs. 7.79 and 7.100 and footnote 654 of this report.

6.8 With respect to paragraphs 7.28 to 7.32 of the interim report, Chile considered that the text did not accurately reflect Chile's arguments. In Chile's view, it has made it clear that its argument is that a measure which is a customs duty as such cannot be considered a measure which, according to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, would have to be converted. Chile argues that it never claimed that Article 4.2 was confined to measures prohibited under Article XI of GATT 1994, nor did Argentina or the third parties to this dispute. According to Chile, "[t]he Panel should not explicitly or implicitly misinterpret the points of view of the parties or third parties", and therefore requested the Panel to reformulate or delete these paragraphs. Argentina considered that the Panel had correctly understood and reflected Chile's arguments.

6.9 In para. 7.28 of the interim report, we stated,

As a preliminary matter, we note Chile's statement that "the obligations in Article 4.2 only relate to non-tariff barriers"\(^{560}\) whereas "the PBS only covers the payment of customs duties"\(^{561}\). Although Chile concedes that there is no such test in the language of the Agreement on Agriculture, it also asserts that "it might be considered that the defining characteristic should be whether the measure has the effect of a quantitative limitation".\(^{562}\) Thus,

\(^{560}\) (original footnote) Chile's First Written Submission, para. 33. Chile's reply to Panel question 6. Emphasis added.

\(^{561}\) (original footnote) Ibid. Emphasis added.

\(^{562}\) (original footnote) Chile's response to Panel question 8. Emphasis added.
Chile appears\(^{563}\) to argue that Article 4.2 was not meant to prohibit measures taking the form of duties levied by customs authorities, but only "non-tariff barriers" or quantitative restrictions. Along those lines, "similar border measures" would need to have the effect of a quantitative restriction. (emphasis added)

6.10 In addressing Chile's comments, we first recall that Chile explicitly made the argument at one point in its submissions that "it might be considered that the defining characteristic should be whether the measure has the effect of a quantitative limitation". Thus, by complaining about the way the Panel has summarized its argument, while not withdrawing the quoted statement, Chile must be drawing a distinction between measures whose defining characteristic is that they have the effect of a quantitative limitation, on the one hand, and quantitative restrictions, on the other. In the absence of any explanation by Chile, however, as to what such difference could be, we have proceeded by verbatim quoting Chile, while at the same time juxtaposing this argument with Chilean statements which could suggest a different path of reasoning. The issue, however, is of considerable importance for the purpose of interpreting Article 4.2 and must therefore be addressed in any event.

6.11 In light of Chile's comments, we have amended the third sentence of paragraph 7.28.

6.12 Similarly, we have also amended the second sentence of paragraph 7.29.

6.13 With respect to paragraph 7.39 of the interim report, Chile argued that the Panel mistakenly describes the structure and operation of the Chilean PBS as "rather complex". In Chile's view, the PBS is not complex at all. Argentina recalled that Chile itself, in its first written submission, had stated that "the price band formula may appear complex", and considered that the Panel's conclusion corresponds to an objective analysis.

6.14 We have reviewed the descriptions provided by the parties, including their answers to many questions by the Panel, and in light of this do not consider that Chile's comments in this respect warrant any changes to the interim report.

6.15 In the same paragraph, Chile claims that the Panel incorrectly states that the Chilean customs authorities determine the total amount of duty applicable. According to Chile, this is not correct because the calculation is made by the customs agents, which are private service organizations that provide services to importers, who must use such agents in their dealings with the customs authorities. The calculation made by these individuals may be subject to revision by the authorities, in the same way as annual income tax declarations. Argentina responded that this factual information was not provided by Chile until the interim review meeting and should therefore not be taken into account by the Panel. According to Chile, the information was not provided earlier because the Panel never put a question to Chile regarding this matter.

6.16 In the second sentence of paragraph 7.39 of the interim report, we stated,

> When a product covered by the Chilean PBS arrives at the border for importation into Chile, Chilean customs authorities will determine the total amount of applicable duties. (emphasis added)

6.17 We note that the factual correction proposed by Chile is based on new information not presented to us before the interim review. According to Chile, the use of the term "determine" in the

\(^{563}\) (original footnote) Chile has also argued that "despite the Members' intention to reduce the number of non-tariff barriers and other measures covered, their intention was not to prohibit all such measures". Chile's first submission, para. 59. Emphasis added.
interim report is not correct, because the *calculation* of the applicable duties is made by private customs agents and then *revised* by the customs authorities. Since the customs authorities may revise the “declared” duties, however, it appears to us that it is the customs authorities who, at the end of the day, *determine* the total amount of applicable duties, “in the same way as annual income tax declarations”. Nonetheless, as we wish our description of the operation of the Chilean PBS to be as accurate as possible, we have changed the second sentence of paragraph 7.39.

6.18 With respect to paragraph 7.41 of the interim report, Chile argues that the Panel did not take account of the facts and the evidence put forward by Chile to the effect that its PBS is legally subject to Chile's tariff binding within the WTO for products covered by the system. According to Chile, by disregarding this fact, the Panel fails to recognize that it is perfectly possible for the import cost of a product subject to the PBS to be lower than the band's lower threshold. Argentina responds that the Panel is not even addressing the bound level of Chile in paragraph 7.41 of the interim report, since it has analyzed the PBS as challenged by Argentina in these procedures. The bound level of Chile is by no means part of the Panel's argument in paragraph 7.41. Argentina therefore concludes that Chile's comments are of no relevance and are not related to the Panel's findings.

6.19 In paragraph 7.7 of our report, we state that "[w]e can only assess the relevance of the change introduced by Chile to the WTO-consistency of its PBS after having determined what Chile's obligations are with respect to its PBS under the provisions of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Agriculture included in Argentina's request for establishment." We therefore agree with Chile that, in line with this reasoning, we should assess the relevance of the cap introduced by Chile in the course of the proceedings. We consider, however, that the change introduced by Chile is of limited relevance to our findings, and does not detract from their validity. We have amended paragraph 7.41 accordingly.

6.20 Chile stated that it could agree, in general terms, with the content of original footnote 599 of the interim report (new footnote 607 of the final report). According to Chile, however, the last sentence is inaccurate because, even though the published price for markets of concern is always taken into account, the individual prices of trade transactions are not considered. Consequently, in Chile's view, there may be imports from one of these markets at prices lower than the published prices (perhaps because of payment terms, the need to sell, the time of sale, etc.). Argentina recalled that Chile did not respond to part (b) of question 46 of the Panel, which specifically requested: "In this connection, have goods entered the Chilean market at prices below the lower level end of price band? If so, please identify as many instances as possible, and provide supporting documentation". Argentina also posited that in terms of the PBS mechanics, the freight is far from being an element of any operational significance. According to Argentina, the irrelevance of the eventual freight variations is clearly reflected in the example provided by Chile itself in its answer to question 46, which shows an import cost differential, in percentage terms, of less than 2% (US$ 213/US$210). Argentina considered that it forcefully proved the insulation effects of the PBS in exhibit ARG-41. According to Argentina, the referred exhibit shows that for a period of 24 months the weekly reference price set by the Chilean authorities was systematically lower than the weekly average f.o.b. quotations in Argentina. Therefore, Argentina argues, it can hardly be argued, as Chile did, that the entry of imports at costs below the lower end of the PBS could be of any significance, either in terms of import cost differential or in volume.

6.21 Much like the situations already discussed in the footnote, Chile has merely described a situation where the Chilean authorities relies on a published price and, therefore, may mistakenly not accurately identify the true lowest price. We decline to further amend this footnote.

6.22 According to Chile, original footnote 602 of the interim report (new footnote 611 of the final report) is correct, but incomplete. Chile considers that if the trend continued for a further year, this would be reflected in the band for the following years because the new year would be incorporated in the system for five years. According to Chile, this shows that market trends are incorporated,
although in an attenuated form. With reference to paragraph 7.43 of the interim report, Chile reiterated that an Argentine exporter can export at an f.o.b. price lower than the reference price, if it is an Argentine price, because this is fixed on the basis of the prices published for the market as a whole, but many transactions take place at varying levels, either higher or lower. Taking into account the comments in the preceding two points, Chile requested the Panel to clarify why, in its opinion, despite the examples cited by Chile, which are not hypothetical but have occurred in practice, there can be no imports at f.o.b. prices lower than the reference price. In Argentina's view, the content of footnote 611 and the development of paragraph 7.43 are self-explanatory and require no further elaboration.

6.23 In light of Chile's comments, and in line with our changes to paragraph 7.41, we have changed paragraph 7.43.

6.24 With respect to paragraph 7.44 of the interim report, Chile argued that exporters do not encounter problems in finding out exactly what the reference price is at any given time. Chile claims that (1) since 1997, information on the reference price has been given on the web page of the National Customs Service; (2) any exporter's representative or customs agent in Chile has been able to consult the Customs Service directly; (3) this information is regularly transmitted to the Customs Chambers, composed of the various customs agents. Argentina reiterated that the Panel's finding that the PBS is characterized by a lack of transparency and predictability is based on an objective analysis of the evidence and facts submitted, as well as on the analysis of the way the PBS operates.

6.25 We note that we addressed Chile’s first argument, raised only in its comments on the descriptive part, in paragraph 7.44 and footnote 604. We further note that the second and third arguments, both related to the role of private customs agents, have been raised for the first time by Chile during the interim review. Notwithstanding the novel character of these arguments, we have changed the second sentence of paragraph 7.44.

6.26 With respect to the same paragraph, Chile argued that it is incorrect to state that no regulation or legislation provides that the relevant date is the date of the bill of lading because this is contained in the last paragraph of Article 12 of Law 18.525. Argentina pointed out that it does not arise from the paragraph under discussion that the Panel had concluded this, particularly considering that the Panel has quoted the full text of Article 12 of Law 18.525 in the descriptive part of the interim report, paragraph 2.2.

6.27 We agree with Chile that the text of the interim report required clarification in this respect, and have changed the fifth and sixth sentences of paragraph 7.44.

6.28 With respect to paragraph 7.46, Chile argued that it would appear that the Panel wishes its conclusion on similarity to be a question of fact, which, in Chile's view, is quite clearly wrong. What is a question of fact is the operation of the PBS. The degree of similarity and how such similarity is assessed or determined is obviously a question of law. Argentina noted that in the Panel's consideration of the fact of whether the PBS constitutes a measure similar to those listed in footnote 1 to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, the Panel defined – as a factual matter – the PBS as a hybrid instrument sharing the characteristics of both a variable levy and a minimum import price.

6.29 In consideration of Chile's comment, we consider that the interpretation of what constitutes a "variable import levy", "minimum import price" and "similar" border measure is, of course, a matter of law. Whether or not an existing border measure, however, is, in fact, similar to a variable import levy or minimum import price, requires an assessment of the factual evidence submitted. Such an assessment is simply an application of the law, as interpreted by us, to the facts of this case. Our determination of whether or not a particular measure is "similar to" any of the measures listed in footnote 1 is roughly analogous to a determination of whether two products are "like" or "directly
competitive or substitutable” in the context of Article III of GATT 1994. We therefore decline to make the requested change.

6.30 Regarding the conclusions on other means of interpretation and specifically in relation to ECA 35 and the regulation laid down therein, Chile argued that Article 24 of ECA 35 constitutes recognition that both parties have the same understanding concerning the scope and content of the Agreement on Agriculture and, in consonance with this understanding, both parties agreed to this provision in good faith. Chile requested that, if the Panel considers that this provision does not reflect such an understanding, it clarifies what, in its view, is the meaning of this provision. Argentina considered that Chile's request of clarifications from the Panel about Article 24 of the ACE 35 is not appropriate, since the Panel itself has made its rulings and Chile has made no specific comments about the paragraphs of the Interim Report addressing this matter. Consequently, the Panel should not consider Chile's comments to this paragraph.

6.31 We take note of Chile's arguments but fail to see what changes, if any, Chile considers are warranted by its comment. In our view, our conclusions in this regard are explained sufficiently and we decline to make any changes in this regard.

6.32 With respect to paragraphs 7.112, 7.113 and 7.124, Chile requested the Panel to clarify what it means by "to secure a positive solution" to the dispute and how making findings on measures that have expired would fulfill this objective, "as it is not mentioned in any part of the interim report". Argentina considered that the Panel has clarified what it understands by "to secure a positive solution" to the dispute and why the making of findings regarding "expired" measures would meet this objective.

6.33 We fail to see the relevance of Chile's comments as they relate to paragraphs 7.112 and 7.113. In paragraph 7.115, we conclude that we do not find it necessary to make findings regarding the provisional safeguard measures in order to "secure a positive solution to the dispute", a phrase drawn verbatim from Article 3.7 of the DSU. Chile's comment as regards paragraph 7.124 is addressed below.

6.34 With respect to paragraphs 7.124 and 7.125, Chile considered that it has demonstrated that, following the entry into force of Law 19.722, the specific duties resulting from the PBS would no longer exceed the bound tariff, so the situation could not recur. Chile asked how findings by the Panel on these measures will help in reaching a prompt settlement of the overall dispute or a positive solution thereof. Argentina considered that Chile's comment on the sense of making findings regarding expired safeguard measures is clearly explained by the Panel both in paragraph 7.125 and in paragraphs 7.6 and 7.7 relating to the relevance of Law 19.722 to analyze the consistency of the Chilean measures vis-à-vis WTO obligations. Argentina considered that this is strengthened by the Panel's conclusion of the partial identity between the Chilean PBS and the safeguard measures.

6.35 We consider that we have clearly explained in paragraph 7.125 of our report why making findings on the withdrawn definitive safeguard measures is in our view necessary to ensure a prompt settlement of the overall dispute.

6.36 With respect to paragraphs 7.116 to 7.120, Chile claimed that the Panel confines itself to citing extracts from the text of Article 7 to support its position that an extension is not a measure distinct from the definitive safeguard measure, but merely an extension of the duration of that measure. According to Chile, nowhere does the Panel give consideration to the textual and substantive arguments put forward by Chile in support of the opposite view. Chile requested the Panel to explain why it only cited certain paragraphs of Article 7 to substantiate its conclusion, and why it did not undertake a more in-depth analysis of Article 7 for this purpose, as Chile argued in its submissions. Argentina responded that the Panel starts paragraph 7.116 by mentioning and
specifically considering the two objections made by Chile, and, thus, that the Panel did consider those objections. Argentina also argued that Chile did not identify what those arguments of text and substance are that have not been considered by the Panel. According to Argentina, Chile limits itself to make a general comment with no specific detail about the arguments that in its view are missing.

6.37 We take note of Chile's comments, but consider that our report sets out in sufficient detail why we consider that Chile's arguments in this respect cannot be endorsed. We therefore decline to change these paragraphs.

6.38 With respect to paragraphs 7.131 and 7.179, Chile claimed that the Panel did make use of the Minutes of Session No. 224 to reject previous records and to make comments that go beyond a finding of inconsistency with the WTO rules. According to Chile, paragraph 7.179 is "one example". According to Argentina, the Panel specifically uses the minutes of session No. 224 to link the drop in production in the period mentioned in this paragraph to drought and thus reject the minutes of session No. 193, because they do not contain any analysis of injury caused by other factors. Argentina considered that the Panel can use the Minutes of Session No. 224 as factual evidence, as suggested by Chile itself, and that the Panel has done so in order to clarify and complement the minutes of session No. 193, taking into account its complete lack of data.

6.39 In commenting on Chile's arguments, we first note that Chile refers to paragraph 7.179 as only "one example", but does not provide any other such "examples". The one concrete example given by Chile to support its allegation that the Panel does not adhere to the rule it sets out in paragraph 7.131 concerns a subsidiary finding by the Panel on causation, where the Panel has already found on other grounds that the CDC failed to establish a proper causal link (see paragraphs 7.176 and 7.177). In paragraph 7.179, the Panel, addressing a particular argument by Argentina, finds that the CDC should have examined the other factor, i.e. drought, to which Argentine exporters had drawn its attention during the investigation. Argentina had raised the argument and adduced evidence showing that the competent authorities must have been aware of the possible impact of the drought factor. It was the failure by the CDC to investigate or evaluate this factor which we find fault with. The minutes of session No. 224 are therefore merely used as an observation on our earlier finding, consistently with paragraph 7.131, not as a basis for our finding. To avoid any misunderstanding in this respect, we have changed paragraph 7.179.

6.40 With respect to paragraph 7.128, Chile claimed that the Panel does not conform to the usual meaning of the word "publish" and, by analogy, refers to the publication requirement in the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements of the WTO. According to Chile, in no part of its arguments does the Panel explain the reasons why this usual meaning does not reflect the real scope and meaning of the obligation to publish required by Article 3.1, nor why, referring to context in determining such a meaning, the WTO Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements apply. Argentina considered that the Panel made use of the methods of interpretation in compliance with the DSU in order to make findings regarding the obligations contained in Article 3.1 of the Safeguards Agreement.

6.41 In our view, the explanation in paragraph 7.128 is sufficient. We refer both to the dictionary meaning of the term and, in accordance of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the context provided by the WTO Agreement and its annexes. We therefore take note of Chile's comments, but consider that they do not warrant any change to paragraph 7.128.

564 It should be recalled that, according to the Appellate Body in US – Wheat Gluten, "the competent authorities – and not the interested parties – [are required] to evaluate fully the relevance, if any, of 'other factors'", and "where the competent authorities do not have sufficient information before them to evaluate the possible relevance of [...] an 'other factor', they must fully investigate that 'other factor' [...]"Appellate Body report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 55.
With respect to paragraphs 7.171 and 7.172, Chile stated that it cannot understand how the Panel could find that the Minutes of the CDC do not indicate whether the data used to determine the threat of injury were, or were not, based on the most recent past and on data for the entire investigative period. According to Chile, it is obviously not necessary for the Minutes to state explicitly and specifically the commencement and the end of the period within which the data were collected when this is clear from the context of the Minutes and its considerations and conclusions. Chile requests the Panel to explain why it considered that the data relating to the most recent past should have been indicated in explicit and specific terms by the investigating authorities, without meeting the obligation in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, when this can be clearly derived from the Minutes, and on what legal grounds the Panel based its conclusion. Argentina responded that if the CDC neither provided in its minutes the data of the most recent past, nor analyzed them in the context of all the investigative period – which was not even determined –, Chile cannot expect the Panel to conclude that it did comply with its obligations under Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

6.43 In consideration of Chile's argument, we observe that we can only determine whether data for the most recent past have been used, if the published report indicates what the period of examination is in the first place. Contrary to Chile's allegation, in our view this is not clear "from the context of the Minutes". We therefore consider that no change to our report is warranted in this respect.

6.44 Also as regards paragraph 7.172, Chile argued that it is not clear what led the Panel to conclude that the CDC's projection of what would have occurred if the PBS had not been fully applied did not suffice to substantiate its determination of threat of injury. Chile stated that it fails to understand how the Panel reached this conclusion, bearing in mind that the factor analysed is not injury already caused but the threat of injury. According to Chile, the foregoing indicates that, following the Panel's line of reasoning, the Panel focused on actual injury rather than on threat of injury. Chile acknowledges that when the safeguards were adopted, the PBS was operating and sometimes, as Chile has acknowledged, the bound tariff was exceeded. In Chile's view, however, this does not detract from the fact that it is perfectly legitimate for the CDC to have estimated what would occurred in the domestic industry in the absence of this situation (exceeding the binding), precisely because the safeguard justifies exceeding the threshold in the WTO. According to Chile, by forecasting what would have occurred in the absence of unrestricted operation of the PBS, the CDC did not fail to extrapolate from current trends but, quite the contrary, based its determination of threat of injury on these trends. According to Argentina, the threat of injury claimed by Chile was not backed by a projection of the future condition of the industry based on recent data in the context of the investigation period, but based on the hypothesis of the injury that would be produced if the measure were to be removed, reasoning that is contrary to the prescriptions of Article 4.1(b) and Appellate Body precedents.

6.45 We consider that our report leaves no doubt that we were addressing Chile's argument regarding the presence of a threat of injury, not actual injury. We agree with Argentina that Chile's argument in its interim review comments requires a hypothesis of the state of the industry in the absence of the PBS. We do not see how use of a hypothesis in any form is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards. We therefore do not consider that Chile's comments warrant any change to our report.

6.46 As regards the quotation from Chile's reply to question 7(b) from the Panel in paragraph 7.173, Chile claimed that this is only given in part as the reply did not solely refer to the situation that would have occurred if a measure already adopted were withdrawn, but also to the situation that would have occurred if an initial measure had not been adopted. Argentina considered that the Panel used Chile's answer to question 7(b) in an adequate manner.

6.47 The paragraph of Chile's answer which we did not quote in the report reads:
Similarly, in the process of determining whether or not the conditions for adopting an initial safeguard measure have been met, it is also possible to consider what would happen if a measure, then in force, were withdrawn, given that when a safeguard measure, whether provisional or definitive, is adopted, there has to be a need to prevent or remedy serious injury. (emphasis added)

6.48 Quite clearly, and contrary to Chile's assertion, this paragraph does not address "the situation that would have occurred if an initial measure had not been adopted". On the contrary, its proposition is to envisage what would happen if an existing measure were to be withdrawn. We consider that the last sentence of paragraph 7.173 explicitly rejects this argument presented by Chile. In any event, as noted above, we do not see how it advances Chile's position if the investigating authorities had substituted one hypothesis for another.

6.49 With respect to paragraph 7.185, Chile pointed out to the Panel that the fact of using an Appellate Body report (US – Line Pipe) which has not yet been adopted "appears to indicate on the Panel's part excessive zeal to determine inconsistency of the safeguards adopted by Chile with Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT and Article 5.1 of the AS." Argentina responded that the Panel used as a legal precedent for the interpretation of the obligation contained in article 5.1 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Appellate Body report in Korea – Dairy. Argentina considered that the Panel quotes the referenced Appellate Body report with the purpose of additionally pointing out that Chile did not refute the prima facie case presented by Argentina only once it had determined the inconsistency of Chile's safeguard measures with Article 5.1 of the Safeguards Agreement. In addition, Argentina recalls that the report was adopted by the DSB on 8 March 2002.

6.50 We note that the Appellate Body report on US – Line Pipe referred to in our report was, in fact, adopted by the DSB on 8 March 2002. Moreover, we consider that Chile's comments would not, in any event, have warranted any change to our report. We noted the US – Line Pipe decision as further support for a conclusion we reached independently. In our view, we would have been remiss in our duties to do otherwise.

6.51 With respect to the interim report's section on the extension of the safeguard measures, Chile made three comments. Firstly, if the Panel determines that this claim does not come within its terms of reference, Chile does not understand the purpose and object of the Panel's finding of inconsistency, whether indirect or implicit, as clearly shown in paragraph 7.198, and why the Panel did not rather simply declare that it had no mandate to reach a finding on this aspect. Secondly, taking into account Chile's comments that the definitive safeguard measures and the extension measures are identical measures, Chile requested that, if the Panel insists on making findings of indirect inconsistency with Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards, even though this issue is outside its Terms of Reference, it should review the findings on the basis of the arguments put forward by Chile but disregarded by the Panel. Thirdly, Chile did not find any argument in the Panel's analysis that explains the reasons it took into account when determining that a definitive safeguard measure, assuming that it is inconsistent with the Agreement on Safeguards, cannot be "remedied" through an extension. In Chile's view, if the Panel, despite the fact that it has no mandate on this issue, also puts forwards arguments and makes an indirect finding of inconsistency of the extension of the Chilean safeguard measures with Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards, it must legally substantiate its arguments and findings. Chile therefore requested the Panel to revise this section on the basis of the arguments put forward. Regarding Chile's three comments on this issue, Argentina agreed with the Panel that the inconsistency of a definitive measure cannot be "cured" with the extension of the same measure. In Argentina's view, the Panel has analyzed in extenso and concluded that the extensions of safeguard measures are not new measures different to the definitive measure. Therefore, and in agreement with the finding of inconsistency of the definitive measures with different provisions of the Safeguards
Agreement, there is no other way for the Panel but to conclude that "[s]uch inconsistency cannot of course be 'cured' by a decision to extend their duration".

6.52 In consideration of Chile's comments, we note that in paragraph 7.198 we stated:

If the definitive safeguard measures are inconsistent with Chile's obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards, such inconsistency can of course not be "cured" by a decision to extend their duration. On the contrary, the decision to extend their duration must, by definition, be tainted by inconsistency as well. We recall, however, that Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which sets out the conditions for an extension, is not within our Terms of Reference. We will therefore refrain from making any finding regarding the consistency of the decision to extend the safeguard measures' duration with Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards. (emphasis added)

6.53 Consequently, we clearly and explicitly refrained from making any finding of inconsistency with Article 7, considering that such a claim is not within our Terms of Reference. For the same reasons, we did not present any conclusion regarding the consistency of the extension of the definitive safeguard measure in Section VIII of our report.

VII. FINDINGS

A. THE CHILEAN PRICE BAND SYSTEM

1. Requested findings

7.1 Argentina requests that the Panel conclude that the Chilean PBS is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Argentina argues that the Chilean PBS violates Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 since its application can result and has repeatedly resulted in the collection of duties in excess of the rates bound in Chile's National Schedule No. VII, i.e. 31.5 per cent. Argentina also considers that the PBS, in addition to violating the obligations contained in Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, because Chile maintains a measure of the kind which has been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties pursuant to Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

7.2 Chile requests that the Panel conclude that the PBS is consistent with both Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

2. Amendment to Article 12 of Law 18.525 in the course of the panel proceedings

7.3 At the second meeting with the parties, the Panel was informed by Chile that a new law 19.722 had entered into force on 19 November 2001 which inserts the following paragraph after the last paragraph of Article 12 of Law 18.525:

"The specific duties resulting from the application of this Article, added to the ad valorem duty, shall not exceed the base tariff rate bound by Chile under the World Trade Organization for the goods referred to in this Article, each import transaction being considered individually and using the c.i.f. value of the goods concerned in the transaction in question as a basis for calculation. To that end, the National Customs Service shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the said limit is maintained."
7.4 According to Chile:

"(…) these Chilean actions have eliminated the measures that Argentina has challenged before this Panel under Article II of the GATT 1994 […] Even if Argentina were correct in every respect in its allegations under those WTO provisions -- which Chile denies -- it is difficult to understand how, in terms of the purpose of the dispute settlement system, there could be a more "positive solution" to the dispute for Argentina than […] the enactment of legislation assuring that the tariff binding will not be breached in the future."^565

7.5 Our understanding from Chile's explanation is that this amendment to Article 12 of Law 18.525 puts in place a cap on the Chilean PBS duties to avoid that those duties, in conjunction with the 8 per cent applied rate, exceed the 31.5 per cent bound rate. Argentina has informed us in this respect that it:

"(…) is not in position to confirm the precise content of the Chilean Exhibit given that Argentina does not have adequate information to express a definitive view on this issue. As far as Argentina knows, Chile has not yet even issued the regulations necessary to implement the new measure."^566

7.6 We note in this respect that the Panel in Indonesia – Autos stated that:

"(…) [i]n previous GATT/WTO cases, where a measure included in the terms of reference was otherwise terminated or amended after the commencement of the panel proceedings, panels have nevertheless made findings in respect of such a measure."^567

7.7 We see no reason to deviate from this practice of other panels. Furthermore, we note that we would be prejudging our examination of Argentina's claims regarding the Chilean PBS if we were to accept without further analysis that the change introduced by Chile is relevant to the consistency of the Chilean PBS with its obligations under the WTO Agreement. We can only assess the relevance of the change introduced by Chile to the WTO-consistency of its PBS after having determined what Chile's obligations are with respect to its PBS under the provisions of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Agriculture included in Argentina's request for establishment. We would be acting in a manner inconsistent with our duties under Article 11 of the DSU if we were to refrain from making findings for the sole reason that Chile amended the challenged measure at a late stage of the proceedings.

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^565 Chile's Oral Statement at the second meeting with the parties, para. 6.

^566 Argentina's response to question 45 of the Panel.

7.8 We will therefore examine the Chilean PBS as challenged by Argentina in these proceedings, and make findings accordingly.

3. Order of the Panel's analysis

7.9 Argentina argues that the Chilean PBS is inconsistent with both Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Both Argentina and Chile have first presented their arguments regarding Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, and subsequently regarding Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We will first examine whether we should conduct our analysis in the same order, or whether it would be more appropriate to start our analysis with the Agreement on Agriculture, and only then turn to GATT 1994.

7.10 Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 provides:

"The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date."

7.11 Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides:

"Members shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, except as otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5."

1 These measures include quantitative import restrictions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing, non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises, voluntary export restraints, and similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties, whether or not the measures are maintained under country-specific derogations from the provisions of GATT 1947, but not measures maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement.

7.12 The Appellate Body explained in its report on EC – Bananas III that a panel should start with an examination of the claims under the agreement which "deals specifically, and in detail," with the matter at issue. Consequently, in determining under which agreement we should proceed with first – GATT 1994 or the Agreement on Agriculture –, we will examine which agreement deals specifically and in detail with the matter at issue.

7.13 We note in this respect that the Chilean PBS applies exclusively to agricultural products, as defined in Annex 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture. Consequently, the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture are applicable to the Chilean PBS.

568 We also note, however, that Argentina has asserted that the Agreement on Agriculture is lex specialis vis-à-vis GATT 1994.
570 Ibid., para. 204.
The general aim of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture was to "achieve greater liberalisation of trade in agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines". As explained by the Panel in Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, the object and purpose of the resulting Agreement on Agriculture is:

"to establish a basis for initiating a process of reform of trade in agriculture in line with, *inter alia*, the long-term objective of establishing a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system. This objective is pursued in order to provide for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets."

We consider that Article 4.2 is central to the establishment and protection of a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system in the area of market access. Members "committed to achieving specific binding commitments [on, *inter alia*,] market access". In particular, following Ministerial Mid-term review of the Uruguay Round negotiations and the December 1991 Draft Final Act, the negotiations on agricultural market access were undertaken on the premise that trade in agriculture was to be conducted on the basis of bound ordinary customs duties and that border measures other than ordinary customs duties would be prohibited. This involved the conversion of a wide range of border measures into ordinary customs duties, a process which has commonly been referred to as "tariffication". In general terms, the purpose of this exercise was to enhance transparency and predictability in agricultural trade, establish or strengthen the link between domestic and world markets, and allow for a progressive negotiated reduction of protection in agricultural trade. Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, by prohibiting Members from maintaining, resorting to, or reverting to any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, accordingly provides the legal underpinning for what, in ordinary parlance, is referred to as a "tariff-only" regime for trade in agriculture.

We note that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 both use the phrase "ordinary customs duties". Provided this phrase has the same meaning in both provisions, neither provision can therefore be interpreted independently from the other. However, having regard to the above, we believe that Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture deals more specifically and in detail with measures affecting market access of agricultural products. We will

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572 (original footnote) Preambular paragraph 1.
573 (original footnote) Preambular paragraph 2.
574 (original footnote) Preambular paragraph 3.
576 Preambular paragraph 4.
577 MTN.TNC/W/FA, para. 1 of Part B, Annex 3, Section A, at L.25:

The policy coverage of tariffication shall include all border measures other than ordinary customs duties [...]"
578 See para. 7.48 below.
579 We also note in this respect that Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides that "[t]he provisions of GATT 1994 [...] shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement." The Appellate Body, in its report on EC – Bananas III has commented on this provision,
therefore start our analysis with an examination of the Chilean PBS under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

4. **The Chilean PBS and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture**

(a) Is the Chilean PBS a measure of the kind which has been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties?

7.17 This dispute revolves mainly around the question of what "kind" of measures have been required to be "tariffied", i.e. converted into ordinary customs duties, at the end of the Uruguay Round. Argentina and Chile disagree as to whether the Chilean PBS is such a measure "of the kind which [has] been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties". According to Argentina, although the Chilean PBS duties constitute ordinary customs duties for the purpose of Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, the Chilean PBS *per se* constitutes a measure of the kind which has been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties. According to Chile, the Chilean PBS duties are ordinary customs duties. Chile argues that the phrase "of the kind which have been required to be converted" and the illustrative list in footnote 1 contain two separate conditions to be met for a measure to be prohibited under Article 4.2: only those measures listed in footnote 1 which effectively "have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" would be prohibited under Article 4.2. Chile argues that no other Member has ever requested Chile to "tariffy" its PBS during the Uruguay Round negotiations, and that, therefore, its PBS is not a measure "of the kind which [has] been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties".

7.18 Substantial elements of Article 4.2 would in our view be rendered void of meaning if that provision were to be read as only prohibiting those specific measures which other Members actually and specifically required to be converted and which were in practice converted *at the end of the Uruguay Round*. We believe that such an interpretation, which would imply that Members decided to forego their right to challenge measures which had not been specifically identified and converted at the end of the Uruguay Round, is not tenable. Pursuant to Article 4.2, measures *of the kind* which have been required to be converted cannot be *maintained*, resorted to or reverted to by any Members, whether or not the Member concerned in fact took advantage of the tariffication modalities. Thus, firstly, the insertion of the phrase "of the kind" between "measures" and "which have been required" in Article 4.2, as well as the reference to "similar border measures" in footnote 1, indicates that the drafters of the Agreement were aware of the fact that all the specific measures subject to tariffication might not be precisely identified at the time of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in April 1994 or, in some cases, could be subject to the provisions of Annex 5 of the Agreement. On the other hand, what was clear at that time by virtue of Article 4.2 was that all measures "of the kind which have been required to be converted" would become prohibited for all Members as from the subsequent entry into force of the WTO, whether or not the measures concerned had or had not in fact been converted into ordinary customs duties in accordance with the Uruguay Round "tariffication" modalities. *A fortiori*, the mere fact that Members did not single out a specific measure at the end of the Uruguay Round and requested its tariffication at such time does not imply that the measure enjoys thereafter immunity from challenge in WTO dispute settlement. Secondly, by prohibiting all Members from *maintaining* such measures, the drafters of the Agreement also clearly envisaged the possibility that a Member at the end of the Uruguay Round had in place measures "of the kind which have been required to be converted", but decided not to convert those measures. The decision whether to tariffy a particular border measure, to eliminate that measure, or to adopt some other course, was a matter for each participant in the negotiations to decide.

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Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994 […] apply to market access commitments concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter.

It can therefore not be argued that only those measures which in practice were "tariffied" in accordance with the Uruguay Round tariffication modalities are measures "of the kind which have been required to be converted" for the purposes of Article 4.2.

7.19 Furthermore, we note that "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted" include the measures listed in footnote 1. The measures listed in footnote 1 are therefore not exhaustive, rather they are examples of "measures of the kind" and serve an illustrative purpose. We also note in this respect that footnote 1 is inserted in the text of Article 4.2 at the end of the phrase "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties". The first sentence of footnote 1 reads "[t]hese measures include [...]". Consequently, the phrase "these measures" in footnote 1 refers back to the entire phrase "measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties", and the specific measures listed in footnote 1 are all example of "measures of the kind which have been required into ordinary customs duties", provided they are not "maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994 or the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement". In our view, Chile's position that a measure listed in footnote 1 is only prohibited under Article 4.2 if such a measure, in addition, had been singled out, or challenged, by other negotiators and "been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" would logically only be tenable if footnote 1 had been inserted immediately following the term "measures" in the text of Article 4.2, rather than following the entire phrase ending with "ordinary customs duties". If that were the case, the specific measures listed in footnote 1 could indeed have been examples of measures susceptible to being considered of the kind which have been required to be converted, and not of measures necessarily being of such a kind. As we explained, however, the text provides differently.

7.20 Argentina has argued that the Chilean PBS is a "variable import levy", a "minimum import price", or, in any event, a "similar border measure other than ordinary customs duties", within the meaning of footnote 1. As explained above, if the Chilean PBS constitutes a measure listed in footnote 1, including such a "variable import levy", "minimum import price" or "similar border measure", it will be a measure "of the kind which [has] been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties", provided it is not "maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994 or the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement". Thus, pursuant to footnote 1, for a measure to be considered "of the kind which [has] been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" and thus prohibited for the purposes of Article 4.2, we need to establish that:

(a) it is a quantitative import restriction, a variable import levy, a minimum import price, discretionary import licensing, a non-tariff measure maintained through state-trading enterprises, a voluntary export restraint, or a similar border measure other than ordinary customs duties;

(b) it is not maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994 or the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement.

7.21 Below we will address each of these requirements separately.

(i) Is the Chilean PBS a border measure similar to those listed in footnote 1?

7.22 Argentina argues that the Chilean PBS is a "variable import levy", a "minimum import price", or a border measure similar to these measures. Chile argues that its PBS does not constitute any of those measures.
7.23 We note that the illustrative list of footnote 1 contains, on the one hand, specific measures (i.e. "quantitative import restrictions", "variable import levies", etc.), and, on the other hand, a residual category of measures ("similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties"). Consequently, if the Chilean PBS is a border measure other than an ordinary customs duty which is similar to any of the preceding examples, it would be a measure of the kind which has been required to be converted for the purposes of Article 4.2, provided it is not maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994 or the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex IA to the WTO Agreement.

7.24 We recall that, subject to the proviso that it is not maintained under balance-of-payments provisions or under other general, non-agriculture-specific provisions of GATT 1994 or the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex IA to the WTO Agreement, a measure explicitly listed in footnote 1 will ipso facto be of the kind which has been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties. Consequently, such measure is necessarily not, at the same time, an ordinary customs duty. For the same reason, we consider that a measure which is "similar to" any of the measures listed in footnote 1 will also be "other than ordinary customs duties". Our findings regarding one of those two aspects can therefore be expected to reinforce our findings regarding the other. For the sake of clarity and comprehensive analysis, however, we will address each of those two aspects in separate sections.

"Border measure"

7.25 The Chilean PBS applies exclusively to imported goods and is enforced at the border by Chilean customs authorities. It is therefore clear that the Chilean PBS is a border measure.

"Similar to a "variable import levy" or a "minimum import price"

Determination of the meaning of "similar to a variable import levy or a minimum import price"

7.26 First, as regards the term "similar", dictionaries define this term as "having a resemblance or likeness", "of the same nature or kind", and "having characteristics in common". Two measures are in our view "similar" if they share some, but not all, of their fundamental characteristics. If two measures share all of their fundamental characteristics, they are identical rather than similar. A border measure should therefore have some fundamental characteristics in common with one or more of the measures explicitly listed in footnote 1. It is then a matter of weighing the evidence to determine whether the characteristics are sufficiently close to be considered "similar".

7.27 Second, as regards the measures in footnote 1 referenced by Argentina, it has been pointed out by Chile that the exact features of terms of art such as "variable import levy" and "minimum import price" may be difficult to establish on the basis of the text of the Agreement. We note in that respect that "variable import levy" and "minimum import price" are terms which may often be understood by the drafters of trade agreements in reference to one or more particular schemes used by one or more Members. In that sense, they could indeed be referred to as "terms of art". Nonetheless, we recall that these terms are subject to the rules of treaty interpretation laid down in Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention. According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, we should first determine the ordinary meaning of the terms, in their context, and in light of the Agreement's object and purpose. Pursuant to that same provision, we should also take into account certain other international agreements and relevant rules of international law, as well as subsequent practice. Only if necessary to resolve ambiguity or to confirm the ordinary meaning determined using the tools offered by

581 Ibid.
582 Webster's Encyclopaedic English Dictionary, at 957.
Article 31, Article 32 instructs us to take recourse to supplementary means, including the preparatory work and the circumstances of the treaty's conclusion. Accordingly, below we will proceed by first examining the ordinary meaning of these terms. In addition, we will draw, as appropriate, on other means of interpretation, including those categorized by the Vienna Convention as supplementary means.

7.28 As a preliminary matter, we note Chile's statement that "the obligations in Article 4.2 only relate to non-tariff barriers" whereas "the PBS only covers the payment of customs duties". Although Chile concedes that there is no such test in the language of the Agreement on Agriculture, it also asserts that "it might be considered that the defining characteristic should be whether the measure has the effect of a quantititative limitation." This would seem to imply that Article 4.2 was not meant to prohibit measures taking the form of duties levied by customs authorities but only "non-tariff barriers" or quantitative restrictions. Along those lines, "similar border measures" would need to have the effect of a quantitative restriction.

7.29 We cannot agree with the proposition that only measures with the effect of a quantitative restriction are measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties. Such a proposition rests on the assumption that the generic term "tariffs" can be equated with the specific phrase "ordinary customs duties". This assumption is in our view flawed: Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 makes clear that the universe of "tariffs" is not made up of "ordinary customs duties" alone, but also includes "other duties". By deliberately limiting the mandatory result of the conversion required by Article 4.2 to "ordinary customs duties", the drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture did not exclude the possibility that certain other types of "tariffs" would need to be converted as well. If the drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture would have wanted to require conversion of only measures "other than tariffs", they would have said so, and they would not have used the specific phrase "ordinary customs duties". If they only wanted to require conversion of quantitative restrictions, they could have drawn on the language of Article XI:1 of GATT 1994, for instance, which prohibits "prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges", without distinguishing between "ordinary customs duties" and other types of duties or charges.

7.30 Certainly, there may be some degree of co-extensiveness between the scope of "restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges" with the scope of "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties". We consider that "restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges"

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583 Chile's First Written Submission, para. 34. Chile's response to question 6 of the Panel. Emphasis added.
584 Ibid. Emphasis added.
585 Chile's response to question 8 of the Panel. Emphasis added.
586 We note that Chile has also argued that "despite the Members' intention to reduce the number of non-tariff barriers and other measures covered, their intention was not to prohibit all such measures". Chile's first submission, para. 59. Emphasis added.
587 Chile has also argued that "despite the Members' intention to reduce the number of non-tariff barriers and other measures covered, their intention was not to prohibit all such measures". Chile's first submission, para. 59. Emphasis added.
588 This does not mean that Members cannot schedule other duties or charges with respect to goods covered by the Agreement on Agriculture in the corresponding column of their Schedules. We are only saying that, if a measure is "of the kind which has been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties", it cannot take another form than an ordinary customs duty. Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture does not, of course, prevent Members from maintaining as other duties or charges measures which are not of that kind.
589 As we will indicate below, under GATT 1947, a panel considered a minimum import scheme, for instance, a restriction within the meaning of Art XI:1. Pursuant to footnote 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, "minimum import prices" are now measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties. Similarly, with respect to state trading operations, the panel in Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef found that:
will be apprehended by the measures referred to by footnote 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture, including "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties". However, this does not imply that, therefore, all "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties" need to have the effect of a quantitative restriction. In our view, the scope of footnote 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture certainly extends to measures within the scope of Article XI:1 of GATT 1994, but also extends to other measures than merely quantitative restrictions. The group of measures included in "duties, taxes or other charges" is clearly broader than only "ordinary customs duties", and includes in our view "other duties or charges of any kind" (or, at least, "other duties") within the meaning of Article II:1(b), second sentence, of GATT 1994. Consequently, the fact that a measure is not a "restriction other than duties, taxes or other charges" within the meaning of Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 does not prevent that measure from being a "similar border measure other than ordinary customs duties" within the meaning of footnote 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture. The "restrictions other than" referred to in Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 constitute a narrower category than the "similar border measures other than" in footnote 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture.

7.31 We find our reasoning confirmed in Annex 5 to the Agreement on Agriculture. Paragraphs 6 and 10 of that Annex both provide that "ordinary customs duties" shall be established on the basis of tariff equivalents to be calculated in accordance with the guidelines prescribed in the attachment hereto (emphasis added). This language makes clear that the generic term "tariff" is to be distinguished from the phrase "ordinary customs duties", in that the former merely refers to the numerical form of any duty, whereas the latter connotes a specific type of duty. Put simply, all ordinary customs duties are tariffs, but not all tariffs are ordinary customs duties.

7.32 Finally, we see no reason why all the measures listed in footnote 1 should a priori be considered restrictions within the meaning of Article XI:1 of GATT 1994. On the contrary, it is clear that the measures listed in the footnote to Article 4.2 include a number of measures whose status under Article XI:1 was never definitively resolved under the GATT 1947. These measures included price-related measures such as variable levies, as well as measures which could be used to the same effect, such as voluntary restraint agreements and non-tariff measures applied through state trading enterprises. Moreover, one of the principal objectives of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture, as stated in the 1986 Punta Del Este Declaration, was strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines, in line with Recommendations adopted by the Contracting Parties at their Fortieth Session in November 1984. In these recommendations explicit reference was made to the elaboration of approaches, as a basis for possible negotiations, of appropriate rules and disciplines "relating to voluntary restraint agreements, to variable levies and charges, to unbound tariffs, and to minimum import price arrangements", and in so doing made a distinction between these measures (for which there were no specific and explicit GATT rules and disciplines) and "quantitative restrictions and other related measures". In our view the object and purpose of Article 4.2 is to bring measures whose definitive legal status had long remained unresolved, including when dealing with measures relating to agricultural products which should have been converted into tariffs or tariff-quotas, a violation of Article XI of GATT and its Ad Note relating to state-trading operations would necessarily constitute a violation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and its footnote which refers to non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises.


590 We note that a particular minimum import price scheme was found inconsistent with Article XI by a panel under GATT 1947 (EEC – Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, adopted 18 October 1978, BISD 25S/68). Nonetheless, it was a price-based measure other than a traditional quantitative restriction such as a quota.

591 BISD, 33S/19, at 24; 31S/10, at 11.
price-related border restrictions, under more effective GATT disciplines on the basis of an explicit
prohibition, in order to protect a regime for agricultural products based on the use of ordinary customs
duties which resulted from the Uruguay Round negotiations. Accordingly, we consider that the scope
of the Article 4.2 prohibition is broader than that of Article XI:1.

7.33 We will now turn to an interpretive analysis of the specific measures in footnote 1 with which
Argentina argues, the Chilean PBS is similar: "variable import levy" and "minimum import price".

7.34 As regards the literal meaning of "variable import levy", we note that a levy is a duty or
charge; an import levy is a duty assessed upon importation; a levy is variable when it is "liable to vary".\(^{592}\) These features can of course not be conclusive as to what constitutes a "variable import
levy", since any "ordinary customs duty" could also fit this description: Members may periodically
change the level or type\(^{593}\) of their applied rates, provided they remain below the bound rate. Thus, mere
variability does not distinguish ordinary customs duties from "variable import levies". As
regards the literal meaning of "minimum import price", on the other hand, this phrase would logically
refer to a certain price level below which imported products may not enter a Member's market.\(^{594}\) As
regards the context of those terms in footnote 1, we note that all the measures listed there are
instruments which are characterized either by a lack of transparency and predictability, or impede
transmission of world prices to the domestic market, or both.

7.35 We consider, however, that the text and context of "variable import levy" and "minimum
import price" alone do not enable us to determine the meaning of those terms without ambiguity. The
determination of their meaning should therefore include an analysis which "go[es] beyond a purely
grammatical or linguistic interpretation".\(^{595}\) Pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, we will
take recourse to supplementary means of interpretation. In this case, we consider that certain
documents, which predate the entry into force of the Agreement on Agriculture but are strictly
speaking not part of the preparatory work\(^{596}\), can shed light on what the WTO Members meant to
express by using those "terms of art".\(^{597}\)


22 April 1998, para. 46.

\(^{594}\) We consider that, as a practical matter, this could result from a prohibition on imports priced below
the minimum, or because such imports are subject to an additional charge in order to raise their entry price
above the specified minimum.


\(^{596}\) We believe that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows us to use such documents, to which all
GATT Contracting Parties had access before and during the negotiations of the Uruguay Round, as a
supplementary means of interpretation. First, in our view, they are part of "the circumstances of the conclusion"
of the WTO Agreement, including the Agreement on Agriculture. Second, it should be recalled that a treaty
interpreter is not restricted to the supplementary means explicitly listed in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
The use of the term "including" clearly indicates that the supplementary means explicitly mentioned by article
32 are not the only ones a treaty interpreter can have recourse to (Yasseen, L'interprétation des traités d'après
la Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités, Rec., 1976-III, at 79 and 98; Sinclair, The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra, at 153). As stated by Mr. Ago at the 872\(^{nd}\) meeting of the ILC,

[...]


We see no reason why we could not draw on the referenced GATT 1947 documents pursuant to
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. As stated by Mr. Yasseen, then Chairman of the ILC, at its 873\(^{rd}\) meeting:
7.36 Both variable levies and minimum import price arrangements, along with other border restrictions, were the subject of extensive examination in bodies established by the GATT Contracting Parties. These included Committee II (1958-1962); the post-Kennedy Round Agriculture Committee (1967-1973); and the Committee on Trade in Agriculture (1982-1986) which developed the parameters for negotiations in the Uruguay Round on improved and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines for trade in agriculture. The work of these Committees was undertaken on the basis, \textit{inter alia}, of notifications by Members covering all instruments of support and protection. Thus, in the case of the 1982-1986 Committee on Trade in Agriculture, reference was made in the information provided by the Contracting Parties to the GATT 1947 provisions under which individual border measures were being maintained.\textsuperscript{598} On the basis of the notifications submitted on variable levies and minimum import prices, as well as the related examinations undertaken by Contracting Parties, it appears to us that such measures can be analysed as generally having the following fundamental characteristics:\textsuperscript{599}

\begin{itemize}
  \item [(a)] Variable levies generally operate on the basis of two prices: a threshold, or minimum import entry price and a border or c.i.f. price for imports. The threshold price may be derived from and linked to the internal market price as such, or it may correspond to a governmentally determined (guide or threshold) price which is above the domestic market price. The import border or price reference may correspond to individual
\end{itemize}

\begin{quote}
[T]he very nature of a convention as an act of will made it essential to take into account all the work which had led to the formation of that will - \textit{all material which the parties had had before them when drafting the final text.}

\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{597} We note that GATT 1947 jurisprudence provides only limited guidance in this respect.

As regards variable import levies, the Panel in \textit{The Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII} (adopted 16 November 1962, BISD 11S/95, 100) examined a number of measures described as "import charges" (varying according to divergences between domestic prices and imported prices but not exceeding the bound rate); "variable surtaxes" (charged over and above the normal duties and varying from time to time to take account of differences between domestic and imported prices); "variable import levies" (raising the price of the imported product approximately to the levels maintained for the domestic product); "variable charges" (price supplements levied in order to maintain the price of imported products at the level of the like domestic products) (\textit{Ibid.}, at 104, 107, 134, and 143). The Panel did not consider it "appropriate to examine the consistency or otherwise of these measures under the [GATT 1947]", although it considered that there were "a priori grounds for assuming that those measures could have an adverse effects on Uruguayan exports. " (\textit{Ibid.}, at 135)

As regards minimum import prices, we note that the Panel in \textit{EEC – Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables} (adopted 18 October 1978, BISD 25S/68) ruled that a particular minimum import price scheme maintained by the EC was inconsistent with Article XI of GATT 1947 (\textit{Ibid.}, para. 4.14.). The Panel in that case considered that the minimum import price system, as enforced by the additional security, was a restriction other than duties, taxes, or other charges within the meaning of Article XI:1, although one member of the Panel considered that the minimum import price system was not being enforced in a manner which would qualify it as a restriction within the meaning of Article XI:1 (\textit{Ibid.}, para. 4.9).

\textsuperscript{598} \textit{AG/W/2 and "Information on Measures Affecting Trade" in the series AG/FOR/…}

shipment prices but is more often an administratively determined lowest world market offer price.

(b) A variable levy generally represents the difference between the threshold or minimum import entry price and the lowest world market offer price for the product concerned. In other words, the variable levy changes systematically in response to movements in either or both of these price parameters.

(c) Variable levies generally operate so as to prevent the entry of imports priced below the threshold or minimum entry price. In this respect, i.e. when prevailing world market prices are low relative to the threshold price, the protective effect of a variable levy rises, in terms of the fiscal charge imposed on imports, whereas this charge declines in the case of ad valorem tariffs or remains constant in the case of specific duties.

(d) In addition to their protective effects, the stabilization effects of variable levies generally play a key role in insulating the domestic market from external price variations.

(e) Notifications on minimum import prices indicate that these measures are generally not dissimilar from variable levies in many respects, including in terms of their protective and stabilization effects, but that their mode of operation is generally less complicated. Whereas variable import levies are generally based on the difference between the governmentally determined threshold and the lowest world market offer price for the product concerned, minimum import price schemes generally operate in relation to the actual transaction value of the imports. If the price of an individual consignment is below a specified minimum import price, an additional charge is imposed corresponding to the difference.

7.37 These fundamental characteristics of variable import levies and minimum import prices, which can be distilled from the pre-Uruguay Round notifications and examination thereof by the GATT Contracting Parties, provide in our view a useful indication of what GATT Contracting Parties understood to constitute variable import levies and minimum import prices. To that extent, we believe that they are also helpful in interpreting those terms as they appear in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In conclusion, we consider that a measure will be similar to a variable import levy or minimum import price if, based on a weighing of the evidence before us, it shares sufficiently the fundamental characteristics outlined above.

Application of the Panel's interpretation of "similar to a variable import levy or a minimum import price" to the Chilean PBS

7.38 We now turn to an examination of the Chilean PBS in light of the meaning of "similar border measures other than ordinary customs duties", as determined above. In particular, we will examine whether the Chilean PBS is similar to a variable import levy or a minimum import price if, based on a weighing of the evidence before us, it shares sufficiently the fundamental characteristics of those measures outlined above.

7.39 We will first recall the rather complex structure and operation of the Chilean PBS. When a product covered by the Chilean PBS arrives at the border for importation into Chile, Chilean customs authorities will determine whether the total amount of applicable duties declared by the importer corresponds to the amount due under Chilean legislation, and, if necessary, revise the amount accordingly. In application of the Chilean PBS, they will levy an 8 per cent ad valorem duty, plus an "additional specific duty" if an administratively determined lowest offer price from a selected foreign market (hereinafter referred to as "the Reference Price") falls below the lower threshold of the PBS.
They will apply only the 8 per cent *ad valorem* duty if the same Reference Price is between the lower and upper thresholds of the PBS. They will grant a “rebate” on the 8 per cent *ad valorem* duty if the Reference Price is above upper threshold of the PBS. The PBS is determined annually on the basis of f.o.b. prices observed on a particular international market over the course of the preceding 60 months, which are adjusted in accordance with a Central Bank of Chile index, and listed in descending order. The lower and upper thresholds of the PBS are obtained by discarding 25 per cent at the bottom and at the top of that list and adding "usual import costs" to the prices. The lowest and highest prices which are obtained after these operations constitute the lower and upper thresholds of the PBS. The specific duties and rebates corresponding to different f.o.b. prices are published in the official Journal of Chile. The Reference Price is determined weekly, every Friday, using the lowest f.o.b. price for the covered products on foreign “markets of concern to Chile”. Unlike the prices used for the composition of the PBS, it is not subject to adjustment for "usual import costs". The applicable Reference Price for a particular shipment is determined in reference to the date of the bill of lading. The Reference Price is not published, but can be consulted by the public at the offices of the Chilean customs authorities. As indicated, if the Reference Price falls below the lower threshold of the PBS, an "additional specific duty" will be levied in addition to the 8 per cent *ad valorem* applied rate. We will term this additional duty the PBS duty. The PBS duty will equal the difference between the Reference Price applicable on the date of the bill of lading and the lower threshold of the PBS.

7.40 The stated objective of the Chilean PBS is to "ensur[e] a reasonable margin of fluctuation of domestic wheat, oil-seed, edible vegetable oil and sugar prices in relation to the international prices for such products", by "introducing a controlled distortion which maintains a minimum import cost if the international price is too low [...]". As explained below, on the basis of the evidence before us, we consider that the Chilean PBS has many fundamental characteristics of both a variable import levy and a minimum import price.

7.41 The Chilean PBS operates on the basis of two prices: the lower threshold of the PBS and the Reference Price. The variable PBS duty represents the difference between the lower threshold of the PBS and the lowest relevant market price for the product concerned. Generally, a covered product will not be able to enter the Chilean market at an import cost below the lower threshold of the PBS.

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600 The international markets used for the calculation of the PBS are, according to Chile’s response to questions 9(c) and (e) of the Panel, Hard Red Winter No. 2 on the Kansas Exchange, f.o.b Gulf, for wheat, and Crude Soya Bean Oil on the Chicago Exchange, f.o.b. Illinois.
601 Chile’s first submission, para. 15(h).
602 With respect to wheat, these “markets of concern” include Argentina, Australia, and Canada. Chile’s response to question 9(c) of the Panel.
603 Chile’s response to question 9(d) of the Panel.
604 Chile’s response to question 10(e) of the Panel. However, in contrast to this response, in its comments on the draft descriptive part of this report, Chile requested the following text to be inserted:

The reference price is published weekly on the webpage of the Chilean Customs Service. It is also distributed to all Chilean Customs branches and Customs Chambers (formed by Customs Agents) through official communications.* [a newly inserted footnote referred to www.aduana.cl.]

Nowhere in its submissions or answers did Chile provide this information. Argentina, however, appears to confirm that the daily Reference Prices are currently available on the referenced website, in a footnote to the Panel’s last question to Argentina (see Argentina’s response to question 53 of the Panel). We have no means of knowing, though, as of when this information would have been made available through the internet.
605 Article 12 of Law 18.525.
606 Chile’s response to question 9(f) of the Panel. Emphasis added.
607 In its response to the Panel’s question regarding this matter, Chile has indicated that the import price *can* nevertheless go below the lower threshold in two instances. First, when international freight costs decrease
Indeed, for all practical purposes, and subject to the exceptional instance where the total applied duties would exceed Chile’s 31.5 per cent bound rate in the absence of an effective cap, the PBS duty will equal the difference between the lower threshold of the PBS and the Reference Price. As a result, whenever the Reference Price falls below the lower PBS threshold, and subject to the exceptional instance where the total applied duties would exceed Chile’s 31.5 per cent bound rate in the absence of an effective cap, a duty will be applied equaling the difference between those two values. The Reference Price is the lowest f.o.b. price observed at the time of the shipment in the markets of concern to Chile. Consequently, if we take the example of an exporter from a "market of concern to Chile" for the purpose of setting a particular week's Reference Price, unless he exports his product at such a low price below the lower threshold of the PBS that the total applied duties would exceed Chile's bound rate in the absence of an effective cap, he will generally not be able to export his product at a duty-paid price below the lower PBS threshold, because even if he can export at a lower price than exporters from other markets of concern, a PBS duty will still be applied for an amount equal to the difference between the weekly Reference Price, set on the basis of the fob price in his market (which is the lowest among the markets of concern to Chile), and the lower threshold of the PBS. Imports from other markets will, by operation of the system, normally come in at higher f.o.b. prices. Thus, the Chilean PBS operates to insulate the Chilean market from world market prices.

7.42 This insulation of the Chilean market from world market prices is accentuated by the fact that the PBS thresholds are determined, inter alia, after discarding 25 per cent of "atypical observations" at the bottom and at the top. By eliminating the lowest quarter of prices observed, Chile substantially

 sharply. Second, when the import price is lower than the Reference Price. This reply by Chile, however, does not invalidate our view that the lower threshold operates generally as a minimum import price. First, we had asked Chile whether "goods [have] entered the Chilean market at prices below the lower end of price band", and, if so, "to identify as many instances as possible, and provide supporting documentation" (Question 46). Chile, however, has not provided us with any such evidence. Second, Chile's reply to Question 46 refers to two hypothetical instances which merely confirm that the purpose of the measure is to function as a type of minimum import price and that this measure, if implemented "correctly", in fact operates that way. The first scenario results only from the requirement of Article 12 of Law 18,525 that freight costs be estimated. If Chilean authorities make a wrong estimation, it appears possible that the actual c.i.f price might be a little lower than the lower PBS threshold. This scenario, however, is contingent upon the Chilean authorities themselves not adequately making the estimation required by law. The second scenario would only arise either if Chilean authorities fail to identify the lowest f.o.b. price on the markets of concern, or in the equally marginal hypothesis that an exporter from a market other than those of concern to Chile would export to Chile at a price below the Reference Price. Exporters from markets of concern to Chile cannot, by definition, undercut the lowest price set by themselves.

608 Chile has stated that the total applied duties exceeded the bound rate only "on occasion", and that the circumstances leading to this exceeding of its bound rate were of "an extraordinary nature". See para. 4.9 of our report. In such exceptional instances, it is possible that the imported product comes in at a total import cost below the lower threshold of the PBS. However, even then, a cap at any level, whether it be 80, 50 or 31.5 per cent may ameliorate the inhibition of the transfer of world market prices into the Chilean market which results from the PBS, but it cannot eliminate it.

609 This can be expressed mathematically in the following way:

Where Imp = Import price; CIF = c.i.f. price; PB = lower threshold of the Price Band; RP = Reference Price; r = applied ad valorem rate; (PB - RP) = Price Band duties:

(a) \[ \text{Imp} = \text{CIF} + (\text{PB} - \text{RP}) + (\text{CIF} \times r) \]

(b) \[ \text{Imp} + \text{RP} = \text{CIF} + \text{PB} + (\text{CIF} \times r) \]

(c) \[ \text{CIF} < \text{RP} \]

(d) Therefore, after removing CIF and RP from the equation: \[ \text{Imp} < \text{PB} + (\text{CIF} \times r) \]
increases the likelihood that the lower threshold of the PBS will equal or exceed the higher internal price. Chile admits that "25 per cent may seem excessive", but explains that "this percentage is linked to the actual purpose of the [PBS], which is to maintain a domestic price that is related to international prices in the medium term". In our view, by discarding 25 per cent of the lowest 60-month values observed, the PBS clearly eliminates much more than just "atypical observations". In fact, by not accounting for the lowest of each four observed prices over the course of five years, the PBS may result in the imposition of highly trade-distortive duties.

7.43 For example, an Argentinean wheat exporter will generally not be able to export wheat at an f.o.b. price below the Reference Price, since Argentina is "a market of concern to Chile". If the Argentinean wheat exporter becomes more efficient and can export at lower f.o.b. prices to Chile, the Reference Price will fall accordingly. The lower the Reference Price, the larger the gap between the lower threshold and the Reference Price, and the greater the PBS duty. If Argentinean wheat exporters happen to export at the Reference Price level, their wheat will normally enter Chile at a total import cost equal to the lower threshold of the PBS. If Argentinean wheat exporters can only export at an f.o.b. price above the applicable Reference Price – because exporters from other relevant markets produce more efficiently – their wheat will come in at a total import cost which normally exceeds the lower threshold of the PBS.

7.44 Moreover, we observe that several crucial stages of the operation of the Chilean PBS are characterized by a considerable lack of transparency and predictability. For instance, exporters can be expected to have difficulties knowing how the applicable Reference Price is arrived at. No legislation or regulation in Chile specifies which international markets are used for the calculation of the Reference Price. Chile's replies to the Panel's questions indicate that these are "markets of concern to Chile". Chile has informed the Panel that it uses the lowest f.o.b. price on these markets of concern to determine the Reference Price. None of these practices appear to be provided for in Chilean legislation or regulation. Article 12 of Law 18.525 only provides that the relevant date is the date of the bill of lading. When asked whether the Reference Prices, determined on a weekly basis, are published, Chile informed the Panel that they are "available to the public at the National Customs Service". In its comments on the descriptive part of our report, however, Chile has added that they are also available now through a Chilean governmental website. Moreover, as regards the application of the Chilean PBS to the edible vegetable oils identified by reference to 25 tariff lines, Chile has stated that "[i]n general, the Reference Price has coincided with the price of crude soya bean oil, but in some cases it has corresponded to that of crude sunflowerseed oil". Apparently, there is no means of knowing when one or the other Reference Price will be used. Furthermore, although the PBS values themselves are published each year, exporters have no means of knowing how the PBS values are actually arrived at: no published legislation or regulation in Chile sets out which international markets are used for the determination of the PBS values, or how the "usual import costs" which are added to the f.o.b. prices are calculated. It appears to us that exporters can be expected to encounter serious difficulties in their commercial planning efforts in a system where weekly variations in duties are based on factors unknown, i.e. the future evolution of prices in "markets of concern to Chile". Such lack of predictability must affect the competitive conditions of imports vis-à-vis domestic production.

610 Chile's response to question 10(d) of the Panel.
611 For example, if prices on the international market were stable or rose during the first four years of the 60 month period, and have steadily declined during the last year of the 60 month period, to a price level below the lowest price in any of the first four years, the values corresponding to that last year would all be discarded in application of the 25 per cent rule. As a result, if the trend of decreasing prices continues or even simply halts without rebounding during the period immediately following the 60 month period, all imports during that period will nevertheless be subject to PBS duties equalling the difference between current international prices and much higher international prices of more than a year earlier.
612 See footnote 604.
613 Chile's response to question 43(a) of the Panel.
7.45 We recognize that, on the face of it, the Chilean PBS does not share all the characteristics of both "variable import levies" and "minimum import prices". First, whereas a "variable import levy" will generally use as a reference price an administratively determined lowest world market offer price, a "minimum import price" will generally use the actual transaction value of the imported good. The Reference Price used in the context of the Chilean PBS is clearly disconnected from the actual transaction value, unlike minimum import price schemes. It does use a lowest "market of concern" price, however, similar to the lowest market offer price generally used in variable import levy schemes. Second, the lower threshold of the Chilean PBS is not explicitly derived from, or linked to, an internal market-related price, as is often the case in variable import levy schemes. Instead, it corresponds to an administratively determined threshold price which may, but will not necessarily, be equal to or above the domestic market price. Nonetheless, we consider that, on the basis of the evidence before us, it cannot be excluded that the lower threshold of the PBS, given the way in which it is designed, particularly with the many adjustments made by the administering agencies to the basic world market price quotations employed, including for inflation, operates in practice as a "proxy" for such internal prices. It should be recalled in this respect that the PBS thresholds are determined, *inter alia*, after discarding 25 per cent of "atypical observations" at the bottom and at the top, hence substantially increasing the likelihood that the lower threshold of the PBS will equal or exceed the higher internal price.

7.46 We consider that the Chilean PBS is a hybrid instrument, which has most, but not all, of its characteristics in common with either or both a variable import levy and a minimum import price. After careful assessment of the evidence before us, however, we consider as a factual matter that the Chilean PBS shares sufficient fundamental characteristics with those schemes for it to be considered similar to them, and that the observed differences between the Chilean PBS and either of those schemes are not of such a nature as to detract from this similarity.

7.47 We therefore find that the Chilean PBS is a border measure "similar to" both a "variable import levy" and a "minimum import price".

"Other than ordinary customs duties"

Determination of the meaning of "ordinary customs duties"

7.48 We have already noted above that our findings regarding "similar to variable import levy and minimum import price" and "other than ordinary customs duties" are mutually reinforcing. We also note that, in Chile's view, the Chilean PBS duties constitute "ordinary" customs duties.

7.49 We recall that the use of the phrase "ordinary customs duties" is common to Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Given the central place of this phrase in both provisions, it would appear that the scope of the obligations resulting from these provisions is, in part, determined by the interpretation of that phrase. We note in this respect that the parties and third parties to this dispute all agree that the phrase must have the same meaning in both provisions. We see no reason to disagree with this proposition. Nothing in the text of either GATT 1994 or the Agreement on Agriculture suggests that this identical phrase should be given a different meaning in each of those two provisions. On the contrary, it appears from the drafting history of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture that the drafters of that Agreement actually drew on Article II:1(b) of GATT 1947 with

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614 We consider that the fact that the PBS operates symmetrically by rebating import duties when world prices are relatively high is not a relevant consideration for the purposes of our examination of whether the PBS is a measure of the kind prohibited under Article 4.2.

615 See para. 7.24 above.

616 Responses by Argentina and Chile to question 2 of the Panel.
Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 provides therefore relevant context for the interpretation of this phrase in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

Neither Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 nor Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, however, defines explicitly what should be understood by "ordinary" customs duties. Both provisions do give some indication as to what is not an "ordinary" customs duty. On the one hand, Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 distinguishes "ordinary" customs duties in its first sentence from "all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on, or in connection with, the importation" in its second sentence. The latter category of "other duties or charges of any kind" appears to be a residual category, encompassing duties or charges imposed on or in connection with importation which cannot be considered "ordinary" customs duties. On the other hand, Article 4.2 prohibits Members from maintaining, resorting to, or reverting to any measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties. As indicated above, all the measures listed in footnote 1 are, by definition, not "ordinary" customs duties.

We note that "ordinary customs duties" appear in the co-authentic French and Spanish versions as "droits de douane proprement dits" and "derechos de aduana propiamente dichos". The dictionary meaning of "ordinary" is "occurring in regular custom or practice", "of common or everyday occurrence, frequent, abundant", "of the usual kind, not singular or exceptional, commonplace, mundane". "Propiamente dicho" has been translated as "true (something)" or "(something) in the strict sense". "Proprement dit" has been explained as "au sens exact et restreint, au sens propre" and "stricto sensu". It appears from these dictionary meanings that the English text, on the one hand, and the French and Spanish texts, on the other, differ in terms of the perspective from which they define "ordinary": the use of "ordinary" in the English text appears to define a particular kind of "customs duties" in reference to the frequency with which such customs duties can be found, whereas the French and Spanish texts suggest that the narrow sense of the term "customs duties" is being referred to. Thus, the English version describes a particular kind of customs duties.

We also note in this regard that an earlier draft text of the Agreement on Agriculture by the Chairman used the phrase "normal customs duties" ("Framework Agreement on Agriculture Reform Programme, Draft Text by the Chairman", MTN.GNG/NG5/W/170, para. 12). The fact that the drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture subsequently replaced "normal" with "ordinary" confirms in our view that the phrase "ordinary customs duties" in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture was drawn from Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 and intended to have the same meaning.

According to the Report of the Review Session Working Party on "Schedules and Customs Administration" (L/329, adopted 26 February 1955, 3S/205, 209, para. 7), "[1]t is considered that the language of this sentence [. . . the second sentence of Art II:1(b),] is all-inclusive [...]". A WTO panel considered as "duties or charges of any kind" certain interest charges, costs and fees. See Panel report on United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities, WT/DS165/R and Add.1, adopted 10 January 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body report, WT/DS165/AB/R. GATT working parties and panels have considered as "duties or charges of any kind" certain import surcharges, interest charges and costs in connection with the lodging of an import deposit, and charges imposed by import monopolies. See Contracting Parties Decision, French Special Temporary Compensation Tax on Imports ("France – Compensation Tax"), 17 January 1955, BISD 3S/26; Panel report, EEC – Programme of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and Security Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables ("EEC – Minimum Import Prices"), adopted 18 October 1978, BISD 255/68; Panel Report, Republic of Korea – Restrictions on Imports of Beef – Complaint by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States ("Korea – Beef"), adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 365/202. We also note that the Report of the Working Party on the accession of the Democratic Republic of the Congo states that "revenue duties", which were levied only on imports, at the border and in addition to the regular customs duties, were to be considered an "other duty or charge of any kind" (L/3541, adopted 29 June 1971, paras. 8-10).
duty from an *empirical* perspective, whereas the French and Spanish versions describe it from a *normative* perspective. We will therefore proceed to examine what should be considered "ordinary" both on an empirical and a normative basis.  

7.52 Article II:1(b), first sentence, of GATT 1994 provides that Members cannot impose "ordinary customs duties" in excess of those listed in their Schedules. As an *empirical* matter, we observe that Members, in regular practice, invariably express commitments in the ordinary customs duty column of their Schedules as *ad valorem* or specific duties, or combinations thereof. All "ordinary" customs duties may therefore be said to take the form of *ad valorem* or specific duties (or combinations thereof). As a *normative* matter, we observe that those scheduled duties always relate to either the value of the imported goods, in the case of *ad valorem* duties, or the volume of the imported goods, in the case of specific duties. Such ordinary customs duties, however, do not appear to involve the consideration of any other, exogenous, factors, such as, for instance, fluctuating world market prices. We therefore consider that, for the purpose of Article II:1(b), first sentence, of GATT 1994 and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, an "ordinary" customs duty, that is, a customs duty *senso strictu*, is to be understood as referring to a customs duty which is not applied on the basis of factors of an exogenous nature.

7.53 The above determination of the ordinary meaning of "ordinary customs duties" confirms that there is a *normative* dimension to the term "ordinary", and that a "tariff" must have certain fundamental characteristics for such a "tariff" to be considered an "ordinary" customs duty. For this reason, we disagree with an argument presented by the European Communities, apparently endorsed by Chile. According to this position:

"(…) the decisive element which distinguishes an 'ordinary customs duty' from a 'variable import levy' is the existence of a ceiling in the tariff binding."  

7.54 This position appears to be based on the proposition that the phrase "ordinary customs duties" in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) would have been interpreted by the Appellate Body in its report on Argentina – Textiles and Apparel as including *any kind of* duties on imports, and that, according to

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622 We note that the panel in *Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products* ("Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents") was confronted with an analogous situation when examining the various dictionary meanings of the term "normal":

As so defined, the term can be understood to refer either to an empirical conclusion about what is common within a relevant community, or to a normative standard of entitlement. The Panel concluded that the word "normal" was being used in Article 30 in a sense that combined the two meanings.


623 We also note that the Attachment to Annex 5 to the Agreement on Agriculture ("Guidelines for the Calculation of Tariff Equivalents for the Specific Purpose Specified in Paragraphs 6 and 10 of this Annex") provides, in its paragraph 1, that "[t]he calculation of the tariff equivalents, whether expressed as *ad valorem* or specific rates, shall be made using ….”

624 We do not believe, however, that, conversely, the fact that a duty ultimately is labelled as an *ad valorem* or specific duty necessarily qualifies that duty as an ordinary customs duty. As a matter of fact, quite some "other duties or charges", registered as such in the "other duties and charges" column of Members' Schedules, appear to be expressed in specific or *ad valorem* terms. Put another way, a duty or charge can be expressed either in *ad valorem* or specific terms, but nevertheless not constitute an "ordinary" customs duty.

625 Chile has stated that the position expressed by the European Communities "may be correct". Chile's response to question 5 of the Panel.

626 Oral Statement by the European Communities, para. 38 *in fine.*
that report, the imposition of any kind of duties is consistent with Article II:1(b) provided that such duties do not exceed the bound rate for "ordinary customs duties".627

7.55 We disagree with the proposition that the imposition of any kind of duties is consistent with Article II:1(b) provided that such duties do not exceed the bound rate for "ordinary customs duties". In our view, the cited Appellate Body report cannot be read as suggesting that any duty or charge can be considered an "ordinary customs duty" as long as the total amount of applied duties does not exceed the bound rate for "ordinary customs duties". As already indicated, whether or not a duty can be considered "ordinary" is not merely and simply a function of whether or not a Member applies a total amount of duties and charges in excess of the bound rate for "ordinary customs duties". If this view were to be accepted, the distinction between "ordinary" and "other" duties in the first and second sentence of Article II:1(b), and the corresponding existence of two separate columns in the Schedules, would be rendered void of all meaning, particularly in light of the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994. We do not believe either that this view was espoused by the Appellate Body in the cited report. In that report, the question of whether or not the duties at issue constituted "ordinary customs duties" was not even addressed by the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body merely stated:

"The principal obligation in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) [...] requires a Member to refrain from imposing ordinary customs duties in excess of those provided for in that Member's Schedule. However, the text of Article II:1(b), first sentence, does not address whether applying a type of duty different from the type provided for in a Member's Schedule is inconsistent in itself, with that provision."628

7.56 Thus, the Appellate Body stated what the obligation of the first sentence of Article II:1(b), regarding the application of "ordinary customs duties", entails. The Appellate Body recalled that there may be various "types" of duties within the category of "ordinary customs duties", and that applying a "type" of duty different from the "type" recorded in the Schedule is not necessarily inconsistent with the first sentence of Article II:1(b). By different "types" of duties, however, the Panel and the Appellate Body were merely referring to the distinction between ad valorem and specific duties.629 Both parties, as well as the Panel and the Appellate Body, agreed in that case that the specific and ad valorem duties in question were all "ordinary" customs duties. Thus, the issue was not whether Argentina's applied duties were "ordinary", but rather whether Argentina could apply one type of ordinary customs duty even though its WTO Schedule identified another type of ordinary customs duty. In our view, therefore, it is clear that the cited Appellate Body report has no bearing on the question before us, i.e. what distinguishes an "ordinary" customs duty from other duties and charges.

7.57 We find our interpretation of what constitutes an "ordinary" customs duty confirmed by our analysis of the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture. The object and purpose of this Agreement is, according to the Panel in Canada - Dairy,

"to establish a basis for initiating a process of reform of trade in agriculture630 in line with, inter alia, the long-term objective of establishing a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.631 This objective is pursued in order to provide for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over

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627 Ibid., para. 36 in fine: "[...] measures that are 'ordinary customs duties' in the sense of Article II:1(b), as interpreted by the Appellate Body [...]". In the preceding paragraphs the European Communities provided its reading of the Appellate Body report on Argentina – Textiles and Apparel.

628 Appellate Body report on Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 46. Emphasis in original.

629 Ibid., para. 50.

630 (original footnote) Preambular paragraph 1.

631 (original footnote) Preambular paragraph 2.
an agreed period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets. 632

The general aim of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture was to ‘achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines’. 633 […] 634

7.58 As indicated earlier, an important aspect of this exercise was the "tariffication" process, involving the conversion of certain, particularly distortive trade barriers into ordinary customs duties. Key objectives of tariffication were to make agricultural market access conditions more transparent and predictable, and establish or strengthen the link between national and international agricultural markets. As stated in the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round:

"Contracting Parties agree that there is an urgent need to bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions including those related to structural surpluses so as to reduce the uncertainty, imbalances and instability in world agricultural markets." 635

7.59 As explained by the Panel in Turkey – Textiles, this object and purpose is based on the premise that ordinary customs duties "are GATT's border protection 'of choice'" because they "permit the most efficient competitor to supply imports", and are "more transparent price-based" measures. 636

7.60 In our view, customs duties of the ordinary kind scheduled by the GATT Contracting Parties since 1947 and thereafter the WTO Members, which are exclusively based on either the value or the volume of the goods or a combination thereof (i.e. not based on exogenous factors), were considered by the Uruguay Round negotiators to be most amenable to achieving the objectives of progressively reducing protection in agricultural markets through tariff reductions and ensuring predictability and more transparent, price-based competition. By no longer allowing for instruments of protection which, through the use of exogenous factors, result in highly uncertain and unstable levels of protection often isolating the domestic market from international price competition, the drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture decided to bring such instruments under "strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines", in pursuit of the long-term objective of establishing a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.

Application of the Panel's interpretation of "other than ordinary customs duties" to the Chilean PBS

7.61 In our analysis of whether the Chilean PBS is a border measure similar to a variable import levy and a minimum import price, we have already highlighted the features of the Chilean PBS which reveal its intrinsically unstable, intransparent and unpredictable nature, as well as the insulation of the domestic market from international price competition which it achieves. Nonetheless, in furtherance

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632 (original footnote) Preambular paragraph 3. Emphasis added.
635 Punta del Este Declaration, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, MIN.DEC, 20 September 1986, p. 6. (Emphasis added). We recall that the objectives of the Punta del Este Declaration are explicitly referenced in the first tier of the Preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture.
637 This can include both quantitative restrictions and certain price-based border measures. See our discussion at para. 7.32 above.
of our analysis, we will more explicitly contrast some other aspects of the structure and operation of the Chilean PBS with those of an "ordinary" customs duty.

7.62 Most importantly, we note that the Chilean PBS duties are neither in the nature of *ad valorem* duties, nor specific duties, nor a combination thereof, in the sense that they are not just assessed on the transaction value of individual shipments, nor just on the volume of the goods. The amount of the applicable duty is a function of a price which is disconnected from the actual transaction value of the imported good. In fact, the applicable duty is determined on the basis of exogenous price factors, i.e. the lower threshold of the PBS and the Reference Price.

7.63 We also note that several features of the Chilean PBS are bound to artificially inflate this margin between the lower threshold of the PBS and the Reference Price, and, consequently, the level of the applicable PBS duty. Most strikingly, the level of the lower threshold of the PBS is considerably raised over that of the Reference Price by discarding the lowest 25 per cent of all observed international market prices over the preceding 60 months. The prices observed on "markets of concern" used for the calculation of the Reference Price do not undergo the same operation. Second, as confirmed by Chile, the f.o.b. prices used for the PBS values are adjusted, *inter alia*, for "usual import costs", whereas the f.o.b. prices used for the Reference Prices are not. These differences can in our view only result in increasing the margin between the lower threshold of the PBS and the Reference Price, and thus the applicable PBS duty. We find that those aspects of the structure and operation of the Chilean PBS do not reflect the structure and operation of an "ordinary" customs duty.

7.64 Finally, we note that under the Chilean PBS, the Reference Price, and therefore the applicable duty or rebate, is determined in reference to the date of the bill of lading. Consequently, when two shipments from two different exporting Members leave their respective port of origin on two different dates, but arrive at the Chilean port of entry at the same time, they can be assessed a different duty, to the extent that the Reference Price may very well vary as regards those two shipments. We are fully aware that Argentina did not present any claim under Article I of GATT 1994, and that no such claim is therefore within our Terms of Reference. Whereas we cannot and do not make any finding of law regarding the consistency of the Chilean PBS with Article I of GATT 1994, we do find, as a matter of fact, that the Chilean PBS *inherently* carries the risk of resulting in higher duties on one shipment than

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638 In addition, in light of the object and purpose of the Agreement on Agriculture, we consider that a measure such as the Chilean PBS may be considerably less amenable to negotiated reduction than an ordinary customs duty, in particular in the absence of an effective "cap". In the case before us, Chile has at an advanced stage in the proceedings argued that a recent legislative amendment constitutes such a "cap" on the Chilean PBS. We do not need to decide, however, whether or not the Chilean PBS would therefore become more amenable to progressive reduction, as we consider that several aspects of the structure and operation of the Chilean PBS quite clearly distinguish this measure from an ordinary customs duty.

639 It is not a combined duty either, which is a straightforward *ad valorem* duty plus a specific duty levied simultaneously. We also note that, although Chile calls the PBS duty a "specific" duty when the Reference Price falls below the lower PBS threshold, the applicable PBS rebate is expressed *ad valorem* when the Reference Price is higher than the upper PBS threshold.

640 Chile's response to question 9(e) of the Panel.

641 We also note that Chile uses different markets to determine the PBS values, on the one hand, and the Reference Price, on the other. Normally, fluctuations of international prices can be most adequately measured by making inter-temporal comparisons of prices on one and the same international market. Although the products to the Chilean PBS are commodities, it cannot be entirely excluded that the prices observed on the Kansas or Chicago Exchanges (used for the calculation of the PBS values) are different from those observed on the "markets of concern to Chile" (used for the calculation of the Reference Price). Indeed, the evidence before us is that Argentina is often the most important designated "market of concern to Chile", not the United States. Consequently, it cannot be entirely excluded that a low Reference Price today may not be fully reflected in the PBS values 60 months later, faulting the inter-temporal comparison of international prices.
on another, despite the fact that those shipments arrive at the same time at the Chilean border, which is not consistent with the characteristics of an "ordinary" customs duty.

Conclusion

7.65 In light of our findings above, we conclude that the Chilean PBS is a border measure similar to a variable import levy and a minimum import price, other than ordinary customs duties, within the meaning of footnote 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture.

(ii) Is the Chilean PBS "maintained under balance-of-payment provisions or under other general, non-agriculture specific provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement"?

7.66 Chile has not asserted a defence of the Chilean PBS under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture in reference to the balance-of-payment provisions of GATT 1994 or other general, non-agriculture specific provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A other than GATT 1994. Regarding the relationship between Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, Chile has stated that "[t]he prohibitions in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture apply without regard to whether the measures breach a tariff binding". At the same time, however, Chile has also stated that the following position, expressed by the European Communities in the course of these proceedings, "may be correct":

"(…) a measure that would meet the test set out by the Appellate Body in Argentina – Footwear, Textiles and Apparel, and would therefore not be contrary to Article II of GATT 1994, would not be subject to any further obligation in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. This conclusion stands even if the measure in question resulted in the application of a 'duty that varies' – inasmuch as this 'variation' is maintained below the ceiling written in the Member's tariff binding. Thus, the decisive element which distinguishes an "ordinary customs duty" from a "variable levy" is the existence of a ceiling in the tariff binding."

7.67 In light of Chile's position, we consider that we should address the argument advanced by the European Communities.

7.68 According to the European Communities, Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994 is a "non-agriculture-specific" provision of GATT 1994 under which a measure such as the Chilean PBS could be maintained, provided it does not exceed the "ordinary customs duties" binding. Consequently, if the measure is consistent with Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, it would not be subject to the obligation laid down in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We cannot agree. First, the text of footnote 1 makes clear that the drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture did not mean to exempt from the obligation of Article 4.2 all measures maintained under any "general, non-agriculture-specific" provision of GATT 1994. Footnote 1 only excludes from the scope of Article 4.2 measures maintained under balance-of-payment provisions or under other general, non-agriculture specific provisions of GATT 1994. The use of the term "other" before "general, non-agriculture specific provisions" makes clear that balance-of-paymet provisions are one example of what is meant by the category of "general, non-agriculture-specific" provisions of GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A Agreements. Balance-of-payment measures can be adopted in accordance with Article XII of GATT 1994. Article XII is clearly in the nature of an exception to the general obligations of GATT 1994. In our view, therefore, footnote 1 was meant to exclude from the scope of Article 4.2 only those
measures which are maintained on the basis of GATT 1994 provisions which allow Members, subject to certain conditions, to act inconsistently with their general obligations under GATT 1994. Article XIX regarding safeguard measures\textsuperscript{645} and Article XX regarding general exceptions, for instance, would in our view provide other examples of such "general, non-agriculture-specific provisions".

7.69 Second, we note that Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides,

"The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement."

7.70 In commenting on this provision, the Appellate Body stated in \textit{EC – Bananas III}:

"Therefore, the provisions of the GATT 1994 […] apply to market access commitments concerning agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter."\textsuperscript{646}

7.71 If the general rule is that the provisions of GATT 1994 only apply to market access commitments concerning agricultural products to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture does not contain specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter, it is difficult to see why the drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture would have turned that rule in effect upside down in footnote 1 by excluding from the scope of the Agreement on Agriculture's market access obligations those measures maintained in accordance with the general obligations of GATT 1994. If this view were to be accepted, footnote 1 would be rendering Article 21.1 void of meaning as regards the Agreement on Agriculture's market access provisions. A treaty interpreter, however, may not adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.\textsuperscript{647} In our view, such an interpretation requires us in this case to read footnote 1 as excluding from the scope of Article 4.2 those measures which Members are allowed to maintain in accordance with the provisions in GATT 1994 laying down exceptions to the general obligations of GATT 1994, such as its balance-of-payment provisions.

7.72 We find this interpretation confirmed by the preparatory work of the Agreement on Agriculture. The agriculture section of the 1991 Draft Final Act provides:

"The policy coverage of tariffication shall include all border measures other than ordinary customs duties* such as […]."\textsuperscript{648}

* Excluding measures maintained for balance-of-payments reasons or under general safeguard and exception provisions (Articles XII, XVIII, XIX, XX and XXI of the General Agreement).

7.73 We consider that this language confirms that the drafters of the Agreement on Agriculture did not intend to include Article II of GATT in the category of "other general, non-agriculture specific provisions of GATT 1994".

7.74 We note that, in any event, the question of whether or not the Chilean PBS duties have exceeded the "ordinary customs duties" binding of 31.5 per cent only becomes relevant after it has

\textsuperscript{645} We note that Chile has invoked Article XIX of GATT 1994 with respect to Argentina's claims regarding Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994, but that it has not done so with respect to Argentina's claim under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

\textsuperscript{646} Appellate Body report on \textit{EC – Bananas III}, para. 155.


been determined that the Chilean PBS duties do indeed constitute such "ordinary" customs duties. As we have indicated earlier, in our view, the Chilean PBS is a border measure similar to a variable import levy and a minimum import price, other than ordinary customs duties. The corresponding binding of 31.5 per cent is therefore irrelevant for the purpose of assessing the Chilean PBS duties' consistency with Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994. We will revert to this matter below, in our discussion of Argentina's claim under Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994.

(b) Other tools of interpretation

7.75 Chile has argued that the Panel, in its interpretation of Article 4.2, should draw on the following elements:

(a) "state practice", including: the alleged existence in other Members of measures similar to the Chilean PBS; the fact that these Members never converted their measures to ordinary customs duties; and the absence of any challenge of such measures on the basis of Article 4.2;

(b) Article 24 of Economic Complementarity Agreement No. 35 ("ECA 35") between Chile and MERCOSUR;

(c) negotiating history of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, including communications by or with individual members of the GATT Secretariat.

7.76 We will first examine to what extent Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention instruct or allow us to consider these elements in our interpretation of Article 4.2, in particular the question as to whether Article 4.2 was meant to prohibit measures such as the Chilean PBS. Only if we find that we should consider some or all of these elements for the purpose of interpreting Article 4.2, we will subsequently address them.

7.77 According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, we should draw, as context, on any agreement relating to "the treaty", i.e. the WTO Agreement, which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, as well as any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the WTO Agreement and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the WTO Agreement. We should also take into account any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; and any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. Finally, according to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, we may draw on preparatory work and circumstances of the Treaty's conclusion to confirm the ordinary meaning or to resolve ambiguity.

(i) "state practice"

7.78 Presumably, by referring to these elements under the banner of "state practice", Chile is suggesting that we consider these elements either as "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" under Article 31, or as a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. First, we do not consider that the alleged "state practice" can be qualified as subsequent practice within the

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649 Legally speaking, the Agreement on Agriculture is part of an annex (Annex 1A) to the WTO Agreement. When Article 31 Vienna Convention speaks of "the treaty", it is the WTO Agreement as a whole which should be referred to.
meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. As stated by the Appellate Body in its report on *Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II*:

"(...) in international law, the essence of subsequent practice in interpreting a treaty has been recognized as a 'concordant, common and consistent' sequence of *acts or pronouncements* which is sufficient to establish a discernable pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. An isolated act is generally not sufficient to establish subsequent practice; it is a sequence of acts establishing the agreement of the parties that is relevant."

Thus, first, the mere fact that Argentina or other Members did not challenge the Chilean PBS through the WTO dispute settlement system until recently does not constitute a "sequence of acts or pronouncements". Second, the fact that a few Members of the WTO would have in place measures similar to the Chilean PBS is not a "sufficiently concordant, common and consistent sequence of acts" establishing the agreement of the WTO Members regarding the interpretation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We will address the question of state practice as a supplementary means of interpretation below.

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652 (original footnote) Sinclair, footnote 24, p. 137.


654 We note in this respect that Chile is not arguing *estoppel*. See Chile's response to question 13(a) of the Panel.

655 We note in this respect that Argentina has drawn our attention to the July 1995 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ecuador, which was adopted by consensus and which shows that several Members considered an Ecuadorian PBS inconsistent with various covered agreements, including the Agreement on Agriculture:

Some members noted that the use of minimum import prices and variable charges appeared to be in conflict with Ecuador's obligations under Articles II, VI and VII of the General Agreement 1994, the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. In their view, Ecuador should either phase out this mechanism or bring it into conformity with the aforesaid obligations. (WT/L/77, para. 42)

In response, the Ecuadorian delegate has been recorded to state that,

in order to comply with the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Ecuador would gradually eliminate the price band system within a seven year period in accordance with the time table annexed to Ecuador's Protocol of Accession. During the period for the phase-out of this mechanism, Ecuador would not enlarge the coverage of the system nor reintroduce products back into the system. The Working Party took note of these commitments. (WT/L/77, para. 48)

In our view, however, in the absence of more specific information regarding the structure and operation of the measure at issue in this report, we cannot determine to what extent this measure is comparable to the Chilean PBS, and, consequently, assess its relevance for our analysis. We are therefore not in a position to take this into account.
Article 24 of Economic Complementarity Agreement No. 35 ("ECA 35") between Chile and MERCOSUR

7.80 ECA 35 between Chile and MERCOSUR was signed on 25 June 1996 and entered into force on 1 October of that year. Article 24, which is listed under the heading "Customs Valuation", reads:

"When using the Price Band System provided for in its domestic legislation concerning the importation of goods, the Republic of Chile commits, within the framework of this Agreement, neither to include new products nor to modify the mechanisms or apply them in such a way which would result in a deterioration of the market access conditions for MERCOSUR."

7.81 According to Chile, by signing ECA 35, Argentina has expressed the understanding that Article 4.2 does not prohibit the Chilean PBS, because it would not have negotiated Article 24 of ECA 35 if the Chilean PBS was prohibited outright under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

7.82 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention instructs us to consider other international agreements for the purpose of interpreting Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, provided they meet certain conditions. In our view, however, it is clear that ECA 35 does not meet the conditions of the agreements referred to in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. First, ECA 35 is clearly not an "agreement relating to the Treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty", nor an "instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the Treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the Treaty".

7.83 Second, ECA 35 is in our view not a "subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions". Leaving aside the question of whether such an agreement should be concluded between all parties to the WTO Agreement – which we need not address –, it suffices to note that the Preamble to ECA 35 reads:

"(...) the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization constitutes a framework of rights and obligations to which the commercial policies and compromises of the present Agreement shall adjust."

7.84 If the policies and compromises embodied in ECA35 have to "adjust to" the WTO Agreement, we find it difficult to see how ECA35 could be an agreement "regarding the interpretation" or "the application" of the WTO Agreement.

7.85 Finally, Article 24 of ECA 35 does not constitute in our view a "relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between the parties". Again, leaving aside the question of whether such a rule of international law should be applicable between all parties to the WTO Agreement, the language of ECA 35 itself makes clear that Article 24 cannot be "relevant" to the interpretation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. First, the Preamble states that the commercial policies and compromises of ECA 35 shall "adjust to" the WTO framework of rights and obligations. A fortiori, Article 24 of ECA 35 cannot influence the interpretation of the WTO Agreement. Second, Chile's commitment regarding its PBS in Article 24 of ECA 35 has been explicitly made "within the framework of" ECA 35. Such language suggests that the parties to ECA 35 did not intend to exclude

656 Our translation. Emphasis added.
657 ECA 35 provides that the "partes contractantes" (contracting parties) are Chile and MERCOSUR, and that Argentina is a "parte signataria" (signatory party).
658 Our translation. Emphasis added.
the possibility that different commitments regarding the Chilean PBS may have been or will be made in the context of other international agreements.

7.86 In any event, even if we were somehow to take into account Article 24 of ECA 35 for the purpose of interpreting Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, quod non, we would fail to see how a simple stand-still commitment by Chile vis-à-vis MERCOSUR and its members regarding its PBS would detract from the position that the Chilean PBS is a measure "of the kind which has been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties" within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

(iii) Negotiating history of Article 4.2

7.87 Chile is of the view that the text and context of Article 4.2 leave no ambiguity that its PBS is not a prohibited measure. However, according to Chile, should the Panel consider that there is any ambiguity, the negotiating history of the Article 4.2 will demonstrate that the negotiators did not intend to prohibit the maintenance of the PBS.

7.88 We note that Chile links its arguments regarding the negotiating history with elements of subsequent practice and maintains that under the general rubric of "state practice" it becomes clear that Members did not consider the PBS inconsistent with Article 4.2. We have already dealt with the issue of subsequent practice above; here we will turn to the issue of the negotiating history.

7.89 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that:

"Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31:

(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or

(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."

7.90 Chile has argued that the PBS was in place before the start of the Uruguay Round and, therefore, all Uruguay Round negotiators were fully aware of its existence when preparing the text of Article 4.2. According to Chile, none of the negotiators required that it be converted.

7.91 We cannot agree with Chile's position that it results from the negotiating history of Article 4.2 that the Chilean PBS is not a measure of the kind which has been required to be converted. As we have discussed extensively above, the text and context of Article 4.2 make it clear that Article 4.2 and footnote 1 both are provisions of general application. Article 4.2 refers to measures of the kind that were to be converted. Footnote 1 provides an illustrative list of such measures, but generalizes to include other similar border measures. Thus, neither the text of the Article nor the footnote contemplate the need for negotiators to conclusively agree on what measures should be converted. Quite the contrary; there was a textual requirement that measures of this kind were not to be maintained. Thus, the lack of an explicit agreement that the PBS was required to be converted does not help Chile's argument.659

7.92 We can find no evidence in the negotiating history that it was intended by the negotiators to exclude the Chilean PBS from coverage of Article 4.2. We note, for example, that the Draft Final Act version of Article 4.2 provided that:

659 See para. 7.18 above.
"Participants undertake not to resort to, or revert to, any measures which have been converted into ordinary customs duties pursuant to concessions under this agreement."  

7.93 As can be seen, this text used different language. It referred to a requirement that any measures which actually had been converted, would not be resorted to or reverted to. In contrast, Article 4.2 requires that Members not "maintain, resort to or revert to any measure of the kind which have been required to be converted." (emphasis added) So, the word "maintain" was added implying that not every measure had been explicitly addressed because there is no reason to have a prohibition on maintaining a measure which had been explicitly negotiated out of existence. The prohibition on reverting to or resorting to would have been sufficient otherwise. This is made conclusively clear by the addition of the phrase "of the kind" which broadened the language of Article 4.2 beyond those which had actually been subject to negotiations.

7.94 Chile has also reported that during the early 90s, during a seminar held in a Central-American country, "a letter was presented from an authority of the GATT Secretariat arguing that it was not necessary to tariffy price bands since they were unrelated to the domestic price – provided the price bands were maintained within the bound levels." Chile was unable to produce the said letter. However, even if we had been able to verify the exact contents of said letter, we consider that such a letter could not have changed our interpretation of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The mere fact that an individual in the GATT Secretariat might have made a statement – orally or in writing – along the lines described by Chile is not determinative. The WTO Agreement gives the Ministerial Conference and the General Council the exclusive right to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement. While the Secretariat has in the past, and will in the future be requested to provide advice to Members of the WTO, we believe the general rule of reserving the legal right to adopt interpretations to the Members to be the appropriate standard in this context, while, of course, recognizing that the WTO rules were not in force at the time in question.

7.95 The Secretariat's advice might prove a part of a more comprehensive compilation of preparatory work if there were evidence that negotiators specifically adopted an approach recommended by the Secretariat, but that is not the case here. Even at face value, the advice referenced by Chile would appear to have been isolated advice offered at a regional seminar held in Central America. There is a complete lack of comprehensive evidence in this case that would correspond with any such advice. Indeed, Chile's argument seems to turn more on the silence of the negotiators regarding its PBS rather than positive evidence that it was intended to be excluded from the application of Article 4.2.

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661 Chile's response to question 14 of the Panel.
662 Article IX.2 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO.
663 In any event, we note that, on the one hand, Chile tabled its negotiating offer on the basis of the Draft Final Act modalities and draft rules on agriculture on 5 March 1992, and, on the other hand, has stated that "[t]he date of the seminar is [...] unclear but it could have taken place in 1993." (Chile's response to question 40 of the Panel).
664 In this context, we also note that Argentina has referred to the WTO Secretariat's 1997 Trade Policy Review Report on Chile, which reads that "[t]he price stabilization mechanism works as a variable levy" (WT/TPR/S/28, para. 38). We consider that such a Report should not be taken into account in the context of dispute settlement proceedings. Paragraph A(i) unequivocally states,

[The Trade Policy Review Mechanism] is not, however, intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures [...].
7.96 Chile's general argument regarding "state practice" is in many ways like a non-violation argument.\footnote{665}{See Article 26.1 of the DSU ("Non-Violation Complaints of the Type Described in Paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994") and Article XXIII:1(b) of GATT 1994. The Appellate Body has stated with respect to Article XXIII:1(b) of GATT 1994, Article XXIII:1(b) sets forth a separate cause of action for a claim that, through the application of a measure, a Member has "nullified or impaired" "benefits" accruing to another Member, "whether or not that measure conflicts with the provisions" of the GATT 1994. Thus, it is not necessary, under Article XXIII:1(b), to establish that the measure involved is inconsistent with, or violates, a provision of the GATT 1994. Cases under Article XXIII:1(b) are, for this reason, sometimes described as "non-violation" cases; we note, though, that the word "non-violation" does not appear in this provision. (Appellate Body report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products ("EC – Asbestos"), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, para. 185) Consequently, we will disregard the information contained in the report referred to by Argentina.} In effect, Chile argues that it had a reasonable expectation that it was not required to convert. The nature of Chile's argument can be seen in light of Chile's affirmation that it is not arguing that Argentina is legally estopped from pursuing the claim against the PBS system. Rather, Chile argues all of this constitutes the broader interpretative context. In other words, Chile should not now be required to convert a system that it had a reasonable basis for concluding was not prohibited by article 4.2. Of course, non-violation is not at all applicable here given the fact that Chile as a respondent could not raise a non-violation claim.

7.97 Chile's "negotiating history" argument might have served as a valid defence by Chile had Argentina argued that it had a non-violation claim under Article 26 of the DSU. In such a case, the existence of the PBS since 1983 would be an issue, \textit{inter alia}, which Argentina would have to explain if it were to establish all the elements of a non-violation claim.

7.98 There is another aspect of the contrast between violation and non-violation claims which is useful to note here. As the Appellate Body pointed out in \textit{EC – Computer Equipment}, non-violation rests on reasonable expectations in a primarily bilateral context whereas violation claims rest ultimately in a multilateral context. In order to serve as a useful tool in a violation context, there must be positive evidence in the negotiating history of a common understanding of the various parties to the negotiation.\footnote{666}{Appellate Body report, European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment ("EC – Computer Equipment"), WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998, at para. 93.} Hence the need for some \textit{comprehensive} evidence of negotiators' intentions to sustain a defence\footnote{667}{We note in this regard that this issue of examining preparatory work in accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention has been raised by Chile as a defence. Argentina has made its arguments based upon a textual analysis.} based on preparatory work.\footnote{668}{For example, even if we had considered the evidence of GATT Secretariat advice probative, it would have needed to be seen as part of a comprehensive multilateral pattern of advice combined with negotiators' actions.}

According to the Panel in \textit{Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper}:

"[t]he text of Article XXIII:1(b) establishes three elements that a complaining party must demonstrate in order to make out a cognizable claim under Article XXIII:1(b): (1) application of a measure by a WTO Member; (2) a benefit accruing under the relevant agreement; and (3) nullification or impairment of the benefit as the result of the application of the measure." \footnote{669}{Panel report, Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998, para. 10.41}
7.99 Thus, just as with subsequent practice, we cannot agree that silence by negotiators regarding such a measure as the Chilean PBS provides meaningful evidence that the negotiators intended to exclude the Chilean PBS from the requirements of Article 4.2.

7.100 We should also note here that we do not see the evidence regarding the negotiating history as helpful in establishing a defence based on "state action" which includes subsequent practice. We remain uncertain about the legal basis of Chile's defence of "state practice". We raise this point here because we have now examined the second aspect of the defence, i.e., the negotiating history. The first aspect, "subsequent practice", was dealt with above. Viewed in light of the facts of this case, this argument of "state practice" might rest more firmly on a legal basis of estoppel or a defence against a claim of non-violation nullification or impairment. What Chile really seems to put forward in this case, however, is an argument of "state inaction". That is, because Members allegedly were silent about the Chilean PBS before and after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, any claim by such Members against the PBS should fail. We have noted above that "subsequent practice" requires overt acts, not mere toleration. Whereas there may be circumstances in which the silence of negotiators might indicate acquiescence and, therefore, may be probative evidence regarding the negotiating history, in this case, such silence could perhaps have been more significant if, for instance, Chile had included the PBS in its Schedule. In such a case, Chile's assertion of silence during the verification period in early 1994 might arguably have had significance. However, as the PBS is not in its Schedule, there was nothing to verify.

7.101 We therefore conclude that, in asserting the defence of "state action" (to the extent it is based on the negotiating history), Chile has not produced sufficient evidence to call into question our interpretation of Article 4.2 as requiring conversion of the Chilean PBS into ordinary customs duties.

(c) Conclusion regarding Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture

7.102 Having regard to our analysis above, we find that the Chilean PBS is "a similar border measure other than ordinary customs duties" which is not maintained "under balance-of-payment provisions or under other general, non-agriculture specific provisions of GATT 1994 or of the other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement", within the meaning of footnote 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture. We therefore conclude that the Chilean PBS is a measure "of the kind which has been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties", within the meaning of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. By maintaining a measure which should have been converted, Chile has acted inconsistently with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

5. The Chilean PBS and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994

7.103 According to Argentina, the Chilean PBS duties are ordinary customs duties within the meaning of the first sentence of Article II:1(b). Argentina has argued, and Chile has acknowledged, that the Chilean PBS duties can potentially exceed and, at several instances in the past, have effectively exceeded, Chile's binding of 31.5 per cent in the bound rate column of its Schedule. Argentina therefore concludes that the Chilean PBS is inconsistent with Article II:1(b).
7.104 We have found above that the Chilean PBS is a border measure "other than an ordinary customs duty", which is prohibited under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. We have also found that "ordinary customs duties" must have the same meaning in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994. Consequently, the Chilean PBS duties not constituting ordinary customs duties, their consistency with Article II:1(b) cannot be assessed under the first sentence of that provision, which only applies to ordinary customs duties.

7.105 The next question is whether the Chilean PBS duties could be considered as "other duties or charges of any kind" imposed on or in connection with importation, under the second sentence of Article II:1(b). We have already indicated that all "other duties or charges of any kind" should in our view be assessed under the second sentence of Article II:1(b). Pursuant to the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b), such other duties or charges had to be recorded in a newly created column "other duties and charges" in the Members' Schedules. Paragraph 1 of the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994 ("the Understanding") reads:

"(…) [i]n order to ensure transparency of the legal rights and obligations deriving from paragraph 1(b) of Article II, the nature and level of any 'other duties or charges' levied on bound tariff items, as referred in that provision, shall be recorded in the Schedules and concessions annexed to GATT 1994 against the tariff item to which they apply. It is understood that such recording does not change the legal character of 'other duties or charges'."

7.106 According to the second paragraph of the Understanding:

"(…) [t]he date as of which "other duties or charges" are bound, for the purposes of Article II, shall be 15 April 1994. 'Other duties or charges' shall therefore be recorded in the Schedules at the levels applying on this date."

7.107 Other duties or charges must not exceed the binding in this "other duties and charges" column of the Schedule. If other duties or charges were not recorded but are nevertheless levied, they are inconsistent with the second sentence of Article II:1(b), in light of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II:1(b). We note that Chile did not record its PBS in the "other duties and charges" column of its Schedule.

7.108 We therefore find that the Chilean PBS duties are inconsistent with Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994. 674

B. THE CHILEAN SAFEGUARD MEASURES ON WHEAT, WHEAT FLOUR AND EDIBLE VEGETABLE OILS

1. The measures at issue

7.109 At issue in this dispute are safeguard measures on imports of wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils, adopted by the Chilean government in accordance with the recommendations by the competent investigating authorities, the Chilean Distortions Commission ("CDC"). The safeguard measures consist of an additional duty on wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils which "shall be determined by the difference between the general tariff added to the ad valorem equivalent of the..."
specific duty determined by the mechanism set out in Article 12 of Law 18.525 – and its relevant annual implementing decrees – and the level bound in the WTO for these products. 675 Thus, whenever the Chilean PBS duty exceeds, in conjunction with the 8 per cent applied tariff, the 31.5 per cent bound rate, the portion of the duty in excess of that bound rate shall be considered to constitute a safeguard measure. Put another way, the duty applied pursuant to the safeguard measure is the Chilean PBS duty to the extent it exceeds the 31.5 per cent bound rate.

2. Preliminary issues

7.110 Chile argues that none of the safeguard measures challenged by Argentina are within the Panel's jurisdiction. According to Chile, the provisional and definitive safeguard measures were no longer in effect on the date of Argentina's request for establishment of the Panel. Chile therefore requests the Panel to rule that it cannot recommend that Chile bring these measures into conformity with its WTO obligations. To support its thesis, Chile refers to the text of the respective decrees imposing the provisional and definitive safeguard measures, Articles 3.4 and 3.7 of the DSU, and the Appellate Body report on United States – Import Measures on Certain Products from the European Communities. 676 According to Chile, the definitive safeguard measure is distinct from the measure extending its application, and has therefore expired, notwithstanding the extension measure.

7.111 As regards the extension, Chile submits that the Panel cannot examine the measure extending the application of the definitive safeguard measure, as it was not included in Argentina's request for consultations. Chile states that, although it has had some consultations with Argentina, "this does not mean that [...] Argentina had called for valid consultations in the WTO on the extension measures because it did not request such consultations in writing and made no notification to the WTO to this effect." 677 Chile does not deny that "the content of the final measure (extension) is identical to that in the previous measure", but argues that the new measure is the result of a new request, new hearings and new evidence, and only exists because of a formal decision by the Chilean authorities. 678 Finally, Chile posits that the Panel should not make findings with respect to the extended safeguard measures which it has recently "withdrawn".

(a) The provisional safeguard measures

7.112 We note that the Appellate Body in US – Certain EC Products stated that "the panel erred in recommending that the DSB request the US to bring into conformity a measure which the panel has found no longer exists." 679 In this regard, we recall that Article 19.1 DSU provides that "when a panel [...] concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement". Put another way, a panel is required to make the recommendation to bring a measure which it has found inconsistent into conformity if that measure is still in force. Conversely, when a panel concludes that a measure was inconsistent with a covered agreement, the said recommendation cannot and should not be made. However, in our view, Article 19.1 DSU would not prevent us from making findings regarding the consistency of an expired provisional safeguard measure, if we were to consider that the making of such findings is necessary "to secure a positive solution" to the dispute. We would not, however, formulate recommendations with regard to those measures.

675 Minutes of CDC session No. 193.
677 Chile's first submission, para. 100.
678 Chile's first submission, para. 101.
In our view, this approach is fully consistent with the Appellate Body's findings in *US – Certain EC Products* and the findings in other WTO disputes. While the Appellate Body in *US – Certain EC Products* found that the Panel should not have made a recommendation regarding a measure that no longer existed, it nowhere suggested that the Panel erred in making findings regarding that measure. To the contrary, the Appellate Body stated that the Panel "should have limited its reasoning to issues that were relevant and pertinent" to the expired measure. And, while we note that the Panel in *Argentina – Textiles and Apparel* decided not to address a measure which had been terminated before commencement of the Panel proceedings, we do not understand that Panel to have found that it lacked *jurisdiction* to make findings on an expired measure. To the contrary, the Panel considered US arguments that it should rule on the expired measure because of the threat of recurrence, but found no evidence to that effect. This suggests that the Panel merely exercised its discretion not to rule on the expired measures in that case.

Further, to argue, as Chile does, that the provisional measures lie necessarily outside the scope of the Panel's jurisdiction, because those measures have elapsed, is not tenable, because this would imply that the Panel could examine all aspects of the investigation, except those relating to the provisional measures. We are concerned that if the conformity of such measures cannot, as a matter of principle, be addressed by panels solely because they are no longer in effect at the time of the request for establishment, then provisional safeguard measures generally will escape panel scrutiny, since they are generally terminated before the matter reaches the panel stage. Members could then adopt provisional safeguard measures, the WTO-consistency of which, could never be examined by panels. In our view, the drafters of the DSU cannot have meant to exclude, in such a manner, provisional safeguard measures from its scope.

Although we do not consider that the termination of a measure before the commencement of panel proceedings deprives a panel of the authority to make findings in respect of that measure, we would only make findings regarding the provisional safeguard measures in this case if we were to consider this necessary in order to "secure a positive solution" to the dispute. As explained below, this is not the case.

(b) The definitive safeguard measures and the extension of their period of application

Chile raises two different objections regarding the Panel's jurisdiction with respect to the definitive safeguard measures and the extension of their duration: first, the definitive safeguard measures had "expired" before the request for establishment was made; second, the "extension measures" were not formally included in the request for consultations. We cannot accept either of those objections, for one and the same reason. Both of Chile's objections are based on the proposition that the extension of the period of application results in a measure distinct from the definitive safeguard measure. We disagree with this proposition. In our view, Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards makes it clear that what is at issue is not an extension "of the safeguard measure", but, rather, an extension "of the period of application of the safeguard measure" or of "the duration of the safeguard measure". Article 7 is entitled "Duration and Review of Safeguard Measures". Article 7.1 provides:

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683 According to Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the duration of a provisional safeguard measure shall not exceed 200 days. Furthermore, it is unclear under the line of reasoning proposed by Chile why it is of such significance that a measure has been terminated just before or just after establishment of a panel. In both cases the panel would be requested to reach findings and conclusions with respect to a measure that had been terminated. This seems to us a distinction without a difference.
684 See para. 7.195.
"A Member shall apply safeguard measures only for such period of time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. The period shall not exceed four years, unless it is extended under paragraph 2." (emphasis added)

7.117 Article 7.2 reads:

"The period mentioned in paragraph 1 may be extended provided that the competent authorities […] have determined […] that the safeguard measure continues to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and that there is evidence that the industry is adjusting […]" (emphasis added)

7.118 Article 7.3 reads:

"The total period of application of a safeguard measure including the period of application of any provisional measure, the period of initial application and any extension thereof, shall not exceed eight years." (emphasis added)

7.119 This language is sufficiently clear for us as to conclude that the "extensions" are not distinct measures, but merely continuations in time of the definitive safeguard measures. As a result, we consider that the definitive safeguard measures were not terminated before the request for establishment, but, rather, that their duration was simply extended at that time. Thus, we need not further consider Chile's argument that we lack the authority to make findings in respect of the definitive measures on the grounds that they have expired.\footnote{We note, in any event, our view that panels do not lack the legal authority to make findings in respect of expired measures. See paras. 7.112-7.113, supra.} For the same reason, we also consider the fact that the extension was not mentioned in the request for consultations irrelevant for the determination of our jurisdiction: pursuant to Article 4.4 of the DSU, Argentina had to, and did, identify the definitive safeguard measures in its request for consultations. The fact that the duration of the identified measures was extended by Chile after the request for consultations cannot affect Argentina's compliance with Article 4.4 of the DSU.\footnote{Accordingly, we need not decide whether the failure to identify a measure in a request for consultations would deprive a panel of the legal authority to make findings in respect of a measure otherwise within its terms of reference.}

7.120 We note, moreover, that the "extension" did not in any way amend the content of the safeguard measures and that there were, in fact, exchanges between Argentina and Chile during the period of consultations regarding the "extension". Chile must therefore have been fully informed about Argentina's intention to challenge the safeguard measures, as extended in time. Thus, even if the "extension" were to be considered a separate measure, quod non, Chile's due process rights would not have been impinged upon.\footnote{We note, however, that we are not examining the consistency of the extension decision with the requirements of Article 7.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, as that is not within our Terms of Reference.}

(c) Withdrawal of safeguard measures while the panel proceedings were ongoing

7.121 On 14 August 2001, the Panel received a communication from Chile stating that the safeguard measures on wheat and wheat flour had been terminated as of 27 July 2001. At the second meeting with the parties, the Panel was informed by Chile that the safeguard measure on vegetable oils would be terminated as of 26 November 2001.

7.122 Argentina has nevertheless explicitly requested the Panel to make findings regarding those measures. Argentina posits that the safeguard measures, even though they may have been repealed
following their extension, require a specific ruling by the Panel because they form part of its Terms of Reference. Argentina contends that the fact that the definitive measures were repealed is irrelevant for the purpose of a ruling, since Chile explicitly recognized that it resorted to safeguards "to obtain the required legal backing" for its PBS.\footnote{Argentina refers to Chile's First Written Submission, para. 25 \textit{in fine}.} In Argentina's view, if there is no ruling by the DSB establishing the inconsistency of the safeguard measures, the situation could recur, since the attempt at \textit{ex-post facto} justification will have escaped the scrutiny of the DSB.

7.123 We first recall in this respect that the safeguard measures are defined by reference to the difference between the PBS duty plus the 8 per cent applied tariff and the 31.5 per cent bound rate. Consequently, it appears to us that the duty covered by the safeguard measure could \textit{de facto} continue to be applied as long as the PBS duties plus the 8 per cent applied tariff exceed the 31.5 per cent bound rate. Formally, however, the portion of the PBS duty exceeding the 31.5 per cent bound rate would then presumably no longer be motivated by the objective of safeguard protection.

7.124 We also recall that, in our view, Article 19.1 DSU does not prevent us from making \textit{findings} regarding the consistency of an expired provisional safeguard measure, if we were to consider that the making of such findings is necessary "to secure a positive solution" to the dispute. We would not, however, formulate \textit{recommendations} with regard to those measures.

7.125 In determining then whether or not to make findings regarding the "withdrawn" safeguard measures, we note that the challenged measures are indeed within our Terms of Reference. Argentina has in effect argued that it has suffered nullification or impairment as a result of the withdrawn measures and that it is entitled to a ruling on the matter which has been referred to us by the DSB. Considering our findings and conclusions regarding the Chilean PBS, on the one hand, and the particular nature of the safeguard measures by which a portion of the PBS duties were justified, on the other, we believe that it would be in the interest of a prompt settlement of the overall dispute to make findings regarding the safeguard measures at issue, even though they have been withdrawn in the course of the proceedings. By making findings on the "withdrawn" safeguard measures, we thus wish to make it clear that the partial identity between the Chilean PBS and the safeguard measures is bound to affect the question of consistency of such safeguard measures with the substantive requirements of Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.126 In accordance with past practice of GATT and WTO panels\footnote{See the panel and Appellate Body reports referenced in footnote 567.}, we will therefore examine the "withdrawn" safeguard measures challenged by Argentina in these proceedings, and make findings accordingly.

3. \textbf{Published report (Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards)}

7.127 Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards provides \textit{in fine} that "[t]he competent authorities shall publish a report setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law". Chile has confirmed that the Minutes of Sessions Nos. 181, 185, 193 and 224 of the CDC constitute the "published report" within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.\footnote{Letter by Chile dated 10 July 2001.} Argentina argues that Chile has acted inconsistently with its obligation to "publish" the report of the investigating authorities.

7.128 In this regard, we note that the Minutes of the relevant CDC sessions have not been "published" through any official medium. Rather, they were transmitted to the interested parties and placed at the disposal of "whoever wishes to consult them at the library of the Central Bank of...
Chile”. In order to determine whether it is sufficient under Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards to make the investigating authorities’ report “available to the public” in such a manner, we first refer to the dictionary meaning of “to publish”. The term can mean “to make generally known”, “to make generally accessible”, or “to make generally available through [a] medium”. We therefore turn to the context of Article 3.1 provided by similar publication requirements in the AD and SCM Agreements. We note that both Article 22 of the SCM Agreement (“public notice and explanation of determinations”) and Article 12 of the AD Agreement (“public notice and explanation of determination”) distinguish between giving "public notice" and "making otherwise available through a separate report", which must be "readily available to the public". In addition, we also note that various “transparency” provisions in the covered agreements, such as Article III of the GATS, Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, and Article 2.11 of the TBT Agreement all distinguish between "to publish" and "to make publicly available". In the light of these considerations, we find that the verb "to publish" in Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards must be interpreted as meaning "to make generally available through an appropriate medium", rather than simply "making publicly available". As regards the minutes of the relevant CDC sessions, we therefore find that they have not been generally made available through an appropriate medium so as to constitute a "published" report within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

4. Documents examined by the Panel to assess Chile's compliance with its obligations under Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards

7.129 In the previous section, we have found that the Minutes of the CDC meetings that Chile considers to represent the basis for its decision to impose the definitive safeguard measures at issue in this dispute do not constitute a "published" report within the meaning of Article 3.1. Given that the CDC did however seek to explain the bases for its imposition of the definitive safeguards measures, that these bases may be found in the publicly available Minutes referred to above, and that Argentina has not disputed that Chile may seek to motivate its decision to impose a safeguard measure on the basis of unpublished but public minutes, we will proceed to examine Argentina's substantive claims on that basis.

7.130 There is however an issue regarding which of those Minutes we may refer to in our review. Chile has designated minutes of CDC sessions Nos. 181, 185, 193 and 224 as jointly constituting the "report" referred to in Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. We note, however, that the Minutes of Session No. 224 only concern the extension, and that it contains statistical data not included in the Minutes of Sessions Nos. 181, 185 and 193. According to Chile, "the information in Record No. 224 and its annexed statistical tables" are "useful in clarifying the analyses made in the investigation for the recommendation of the definitive measures in Record No. 193", because "much of the information contained in the later of these two records (Record No. 224) is updated data from the investigation concerning the measures initially recommended".

7.131 For the purpose of our analysis of the consistency of the definitive safeguard measure, and the investigation preceding its recommendation by the CDC, with the requirements of Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, we shall only consider findings and reasoning by the CDC reflected in the Minutes of Sessions Nos. 181, 185 and 193, respectively recommending the initiation of the investigation, the adoption of provisional measures and the adoption of definitive safeguard measures. We consider that our duty under Article 11 of the DSU to make an objective

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691 Chile's response to question 18 of the Panel.
693 Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article 22 of the SCM Agreement. Paragraphs 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 of Article 12 of the AD Agreement.
694 Footnote 53 to the SCM Agreement. Footnote 23 to the AD Agreement.
695 Chile's response to question 50 of the Panel.
assessment of the matter requires us to assess the consistency of the definitive safeguard and the preceding investigation with Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards on the basis of explanations provided by the CDC before or at the time of its recommendation to apply definitive safeguard measures. Consequently, whenever we refer below to information contained in the Minutes of Session No. 224, we will do so, at the most, to provide observations on our findings made on the basis of the Minutes of Sessions Nos. 181, 185 and 193.  

5. **Unforeseen developments (Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards)**

7.132 Argentina claims that Chile has infringed Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards by not identifying or making any findings with respect to unforeseen developments justifying the imposition of safeguard measures. Chile points out that the reason why the CDC recommended the application of safeguard measures on products subject to the PBS was the continued existence of unusually low prices over a period that could not be considered transitory. Chile contends that the unforeseen developments correspond to this special situation of global prices.

7.133 Article XIX:1(a) reads:

"If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession."

7.134 We recall that the Appellate Body in *US – Lamb* stated that "unforeseen developments" is a circumstance whose existence must be demonstrated as a matter of fact for a safeguard measure to be applied consistently with Article XIX.  

According to the Appellate Body, the demonstration of the existence of this circumstance must feature in the published report of the investigating authorities.  

If the published report does not discuss or offers any explanation as to why certain factors mentioned in it can be regarded as "unforeseen developments", that report does not demonstrate that the safeguard measure concerned has been applied as a result of "unforeseen developments".

7.135 According to Chile, the CDC made its findings and reasoned conclusions relating to the requirement of "unforeseen developments" in the Minutes of Session No. 193, where it states that:

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696 We note that the Appellate Body in its report on *United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan ("US – Cotton Yarn")*, WT/DS192/AB/R, adopted 5 November 2001, para. 78, stated in the context of a determination in accordance with Article 6 of the ATC:

"In our view, a panel reviewing the due diligence exercised by a Member in making its determination under Article 6 of the ATC has to put itself in the place of that Member at the time it makes its determination. Consequently, a panel must not consider evidence which did not exist at that point in time."


"(…) [t]he increase in imports, and the potential for further substantial increases, has occurred at a time when international prices of the products investigated have been subject to sizeable and rapid decreases."  

7.136 We note that the CDC did not discuss or offer any explanation in its report as to why the reported "sizeable and rapid decrease in international prices" could be regarded as an unforeseen development. In fact, nothing in the CDC's report suggests that this reference was intended to relate to the issue of unforeseen developments. Consequently, we consider that the CDC did not demonstrate that the safeguard measures at issue have been applied "as a result of unforeseen developments", as required by Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994.

7.137 Argentina has claimed that Chile failed to set forth reasoned findings and conclusions regarding unforeseen developments in its report, as required by Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. We recall in this respect the statement by the Appellate Body in *US – Lamb*:

"(…) we observe that Article 3.1 requires competent authorities to set forth findings and reasoned conclusions on 'all pertinent issues of fact and law' in their published report. As Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 requires that 'unforeseen developments' must be demonstrated, as a matter of fact, for a safeguard measure to be applied, the existence of 'unforeseen developments' is, in our view, a 'pertinent issue[ ] of fact and law', under Article 3.1, for the application of a safeguard measure, and it follows that the published report of the competent authorities, under that Article, must contain a 'finding' or 'reasoned conclusion' on 'unforeseen developments'."

7.138 In light of our finding that the CDC did not discuss or offer any explanation in its report as to why the reported "sizeable and rapid decrease in international prices" could be regarded as an unforeseen development, we find that Chile has failed to set forth reasoned findings and conclusions in its report regarding unforeseen developments, as required by Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.139 According to Chile, the statement by the CDC regarding declining international prices reflects the fact that a fall in international prices to such low levels and for such a long period is unusual and unpredictable, especially with respect to products whose prices tend to undergo strong fluctuations. We wish to point out that, although this *ex post facto* explanation provided by Chile cannot, in any event, cure the CDC's failure to make findings and reasoned conclusions in its report, this explanation would not meet the requirement to demonstrate the existence of "unforeseen developments" either. First, Chile in its explanation and the CDC in its determination seem to refer to different events. Whereas the CDC spoke of "sizeable and rapid" decreases in international prices, Chile now argues that it was the "sustained" fall in international prices which could not have been foreseen. Second, it should be recalled that the safeguard measures do not impose any duty which was not already being applied under the Chilean PBS. The duty applied pursuant to the safeguard measures is merely a different label for the portion of the Chilean PBS duties exceeding the 31.5 per cent bound rate. The Chilean PBS has the stated objective of providing additional protection to offset declining international prices. The very fact that Chile established its PBS with such an objective constitutes, in our view, evidence that declining international prices cannot have been unforeseen. If the safeguard measures are not adding any protection to what already resulted from the Chilean PBS, in force since

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700 Emphasis added.
701 Appellate Body report, *US – Lamb*, para. 76.
702 Chile's response to question 20 of the Panel.
1983, it is difficult to see how those safeguard measures could then have been adopted as a result of developments which could not have been foreseen at the end of the Uruguay Round.\textsuperscript{703}

7.140 In conclusion, we find that Chile failed to demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments, as required by Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994, and set forth findings and reasoned conclusions in this respect in its report, as required by Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

6. **Definition of like or directly competitive product (Articles XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 4.1(a) and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards)**

7.141 Argentina claims that Chile has infringed Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1, 4.1(c) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards on the grounds that the CDC failed to properly identify the product that was like or directly competitive to each imported product, and thereby failed to identify the affected domestic industries. Accordingly, Argentina contends, the entire analysis of increased imports and of threat of injury is based on false premises and lack legal validity. Chile argues that the categories of products subject to the safeguard measures correspond to products subject to the PBS, which groups categories of products that are directly competitive. According to Chile, if the PBS had not taken into account each agricultural product and its respective like or directly competitive products, the application of the system would have been ineffective. Chile claims that the CDC reaffirmed this analysis, as reflected in the Minutes.

7.142 We recall that the Appellate Body in *US – Lamb* stated:

"(…) according to Article 2.1, the legal basis for imposing a safeguard measure exists only when imports of a specific product have prejudicial effects on domestic producers of products that are 'like or directly competitive' with that imported product. In our view, it would be a clear departure from the text of Article 2.1 if a safeguard measure could be imposed because of the prejudicial effects that an imported product has on domestic producers of products that are not 'like or directly competitive products' in relation to the imported product. [...] Accordingly, the first step in determining the scope of the domestic industry is the identification of the products which are 'like or directly competitive' with the imported product. Only when those products have been identified is it possible then to identify the 'producers' of those products,"\textsuperscript{704}

7.143 With respect to wheat, the CDC provided in its report only an implicit assertion of likeness or direct competitiveness, without offering any reasoned conclusion regarding the products which, in its view, should be considered like or directly competitive. The report of the CDC does, in the final section containing the recommendation, identify the tariff heading (1001.9000, "wheat other than durum wheat") of imported products to which the safeguard measures will apply. However, the identification of the tariff lines of the imported products to which the safeguard measures shall apply, does not say anything about whether the domestic product is like or directly competitive with the imported products.\textsuperscript{705}


such "emergency actions" are to be invoked only in situations when, as a result of obligations incurred under the GATT 1994, an importing Member finds itself confronted with developments it had not "foreseen" or "expected" when it incurred that obligation.

\textsuperscript{704} Appellate Body report, *US – Lamb*, paras. 86-87.

\textsuperscript{705} We note that Chile has offered some *ex post facto* explanation for the CDC's conclusions. Chile indicates that, as far as wheat is concerned:
7.144 With respect to wheat flour, Chile has asserted that wheat and wheat flour are directly competitive products. In Chile's view, this reasoning is reflected in the CDC's report, where it reads that:

"(…) wheat flour represents an alternative way of importing wheat if direct imports prove to be more costly or are subject to a higher tariff, so it is necessary to apply a treatment similar to that applicable to wheat."  

7.145 This comment, however, relates to a possible relationship of likeness or direct competitiveness between two imported products, imported wheat and imported wheat flour, not between domestic wheat or wheat flour and the imported wheat flour.

7.146 Finally, as regards vegetable oils, Chile has confirmed that the safeguard measures on vegetable oils apply to both crude and refined oils. The CDC, however, does not provide any reasoned conclusions or finding as regards the likeness or direct competitiveness between domestic crude and refined oils and the imported crude and refined oils included in the 25 tariff lines subject to the safeguard measures. Chile has offered the following *ex post facto* explanation:

"(…) colza-oil (rape) produced domestically is a like product to all oils to which the measure applies since: (i) they are physically and chemically very similar, (ii) they are consumed without distinction, (iii) they have the same final use, and (iv) they utilize the same distribution channels."

7.147 Even if these assertions were to be substantiated, however, they do not provide any explanation as regards the relationship of likeness or direct competitiveness between other domestic oils, such as maize and olive oil, and the imported oils included in the 25 tariff lines subject to the safeguard measures. In any event, we recall that even this incomplete explanation was not provided, as a reasoned conclusion, in the CDC's report, but only offered by Chile as *ex post facto* rationalization.

7.148 Furthermore, when asked by the Panel to identify the domestic industry as regards edible vegetable oils identified in reference to 25 tariff lines, Chile stated that "[t]he relevant domestic industry is the oils industry, which includes the rape-seed oil industry". Nevertheless, Chile has clarified that the injury data in the minutes of CDC session No. 193 regarding production, employment and "marginalization" of producers concern the agricultural production of rape-seed, and not "the oils industry". Thus, by considering injury data relating to agricultural producers of rape-seed, the CDC would appear to have included such producers in its definition of the domestic industry. The CDC, however, provided in its report no explanation of how domestic rape-seeds can be regarded as like or directly competitive with imported vegetable oils. We note in this respect that,

"(…) in view of the inherent nature of the products under investigation, domestic wheat was considered to be a like product to imported wheat since the imports correspond to the same product at the agricultural production level." (Chile's response to question 27(a) of the Panel).

As indicated earlier, such *ex post facto* explanation, even if it were sufficient to support the CDC's likeness determination, could not cure the CDC's failure to provide such analysis in its report.

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706 Minutes of CDC Session No. 193.
707 Chile's response to question 27(b) of the Panel.
708 Chile's response to question 27(b) of the Panel.
709 Ibid.
710 Chile's response to question 27(b) of the Panel.
711 Chile's response to question 38 of the Panel.
according to the Appellate Body in *US – Lamb*, the input and end-product need to be like or directly competitive for their respective producers to be included in the definition of the domestic industry.\footnote{712}{Appellate Body report on *US - Lamb*, paras. 83-96.}

7.149 We therefore find that the CDC failed to make adequate findings and reasoned conclusions with respect to the issue of likeness or direct competitiveness, and, consequently, failed to identify the domestic industry, as required by Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7. Increase in imports (Articles XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards)

7.150 Argentina claims that an analysis of the content of the Minutes of the CDC sessions and the notifications reveals that Chile did not demonstrate that there were increased imports, and that Chile therefore failed to comply with its obligations under Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. Chile submits that the requirement regarding an increase in imports and the impact of the PBS in this case are factors that cannot be examined separately. According to Chile, the CDC’s investigation did identify increased imports in accordance with the requirements of Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. In addition, as regards the extension of the definitive measure, Chile argues that the justification of such an extension cannot require that the competent authority find for a second time that there is an increase in imports.

7.151 The relevant section of the Minutes of Session No. 193 of the CDC, at which the CDC decided to recommend the adoption of the definitive safeguard measures, reads as follows:

"In its analysis of imports, the Commission has taken into account the fact that the normal operation of price bands has been a decisive factor in preventing a greater increase in imports, and consequently the trend in imports cannot be considered without bearing this factor in mind. Even so, there has been an increase in imports in absolute terms which threatens to cause injury to the production sectors concerned. In its analysis, the Commission has taken into account the period commencing when, for each product, the specific tariffs determined by the application of the price band, added to the general tariff, exceeded the level bound in the WTO. Without prejudice to this analysis, information prior to this period shall also be considered for comparison and assessment. In this regard, the Commission points out that:

- Imports of wheat (in tons) increased by 6 per cent in 1998 in comparison with the previous year. Over the first ten months of 1999, imports rose by 281 per cent compared with the same period in 1998. There was an increase in imports from 1993 to 1996, with a drop in 1997. Imports of wheat flour fluctuated, but this can be explained by their low volume. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that wheat flour represents an alternative way of importing wheat if direct imports prove to be more costly or are subject to a higher tariff, so it is necessary to apply a treatment similar to that applicable to wheat.

- [...]"

- Imports of the two main edible vegetable oils increased by 23 per cent in 1998 compared with the previous year. Over the first ten months of 1999, imports fell by 24 per cent. In relation to this reduction, the Commission
points out that there was an abnormal situation in 1999 concerning the behaviour of importers as a result of the tariff disputes regarding the tariff headings for oil imports. From 1993 to 1997, the level of imports was similar.

The Commission notes the significant differences between recent import prices resulting from full application of the band and prices resulting from imposition of a tariff ceiling of 31.5 per cent. This substantiates the forecasts of a greatly accelerated increase in imports that would occur (or has already occurred) unless the full duties specified in the bands are applied. The increase in imports, and the potential for further substantial increases, has occurred at a time when international prices of the products investigated have been subject to sizeable and rapid decreases."

7.152 We recall that the Appellate Body in its report on Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear stated:

"[W]e agree with the Panel that the specific provisions of Article 4.2(a) require that 'the rate and amount of the increase in imports … in absolute and relative terms'… must be evaluated. […] Thus, we do not dispute the Panel's view and ultimate conclusion that the competent authorities are required to consider the trends in imports over the period of investigation (rather than just comparing the end points) under Article 4.2(a).

[…] Although we agree with the Panel that the 'increased quantities' of imports cannot be just any increase, we do not agree with the Panel that it is reasonable to examine the trend in imports over a five-year historical period.

[…] [T]his language in both Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994, we believe, requires that the increase in imports must have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause 'serious injury'."

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7.153 In addition, we recall that the Appellate Body in its report on US – Lamb stated:

"[W]e believe that, although data from the most recent past has special importance, competent authorities should not consider such data in isolation from the data pertaining to the entire period of investigation. The real significance of the short-term trends in the most recent data, evident at the end of the period of investigation, may only emerge when those short-term trends are assessed in the light of the longer-term trends in the data for the whole period of investigation. If the most recent data is evaluated in isolation, the resulting picture of the domestic industry may be quite misleading."713

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7.154 We consider that the analysis by the CDC contained in the minutes of its session No. 193 does not demonstrate that the products concerned are "being imported […] in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause or threaten to cause serious injury," as required by Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

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714 Appellate Body on US – Lamb, para. 138. We are aware that the Appellate Body made this observation with respect to the investigating authorities' injury analysis, and not with regard to their examination of import trends. We consider, however, in the light of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, that this reasoning is equally applicable to the analysis of actual import trends.
7.155 First, according to the Minutes of Session No. 193, imports of "the two main" edible vegetable oils fell 24 per cent over the first ten months of 1999. Thus, in the period immediately preceding the opening of the investigation, imports of the product concerned actually fell significantly. In addition, although the Minutes of Session No. 193 do also indicate that imports increased by 23 per cent in 1998, they only state with respect to long-term trends that "[f]rom 1993 to 1997, the level of imports was similar". We consider, therefore, that the CDC failed to identify such increase in imports of edible vegetable oils as required by Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.156 Second, as regards wheat flour, according to the Minutes of Session No. 193, imports "fluctuated". Such a statement does not identify a discernable upward trend in the growth of these imports. In the absence of this discernable trend, we find that the CDC did not demonstrate that there was an increase in imports of wheat flour recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause "serious injury". We consider, therefore, that the CDC failed to identify such increase in imports of wheat flour as required by Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.157 Third, with respect to wheat, the CDC identified in the Minutes of Session No. 193 a 281 per cent increase in the first ten months of 1999. Although the Minutes of Session No. 193 do also indicate that imports increased by 6 per cent in 1998, they only state with respect to long-term trends that "[t]here was an increase in imports from 1993 to 1996, with a drop in 1997". We consider that such a conclusory statement does not meet the requirement of assessing short-term trends "in the light of the longer-term trends in the data for the whole period of investigation". For example, the import volumes for 1999, even though they represented a 281 per cent increase over the preceding year, were still smaller than the import volumes for 1995 and 1996. The CDC should have provided a reasoned analysis as regards the significance of the import volumes for 1999 in the context of the import volumes for 1995 and 1996. Accordingly, we find that the CDC did not demonstrate that there was an increase in imports of wheat recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to cause or threaten to cause serious injury. We consider, therefore, that the CDC failed to identify such increase in imports of wheat as required by Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.158 Moreover, we note that table 3 annexed to the Minutes of Session No. 224 of the CDC (containing the recommendation to extend the period of application) actually shows a decrease in imports of wheat flour of 14 per cent in 1999, of 21 per cent in 1998, and of 28 per cent in 1997. In addition, table 7 annexed to the Minutes of Session No. 224 of the CDC shows a decrease of 4 per cent in total imports of vegetable oils during 1997, and increases of 4 per cent and 21 per cent in 1996 and 1998, respectively. As for wheat, the tables show a decrease of 60 per cent in 1997 and increases of 5, 11, and 4 per cent in 1995, 1996 and 1998, respectively.

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715 Ibid., para. 131.
716 We draw these data from the tables annexed to the Minutes of Session No. 224 of the CDC, which concerns the extension of the measures’ duration. However, the Minutes of Session No. 193 contain an assessment of increased imports on the basis of unidentified data for the period 1993-1997, 1998 and the first ten months of 1999, and Chile has stated that "much of the information contained in the later of these two records (Record No. 224) is updated data from the investigation concerning the measures initially recommended" (Chile's response to question 50 of the Panel). Thus, Chile implicitly acknowledges that the CDC had such data on actual import trends that it should have examined and explained.
717 Ibid., para. 131.
718 We wish to emphasize that in making these observations it was the CDC's responsibility to identify a discernable upward trend in imports at the time it recommended that definitive safeguard measures be applied.
7.159 Finally, as regards all three product categories subject to the safeguard measures, we find fault with the CDC’s analysis on two additional grounds. First, Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards provides that:

"(…) the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of the industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative terms … ." (emphasis added) 719

7.160 When conducting its investigation, the CDC does not appear to have made any analysis at all of import trends relative to domestic production. As a matter of fact, in the Minutes of Session No. 193, the CDC states only that "there has been an increase in imports in absolute terms". 720 In its reply to a question by the Panel, Chile has clarified that the CDC analysed the increase in imports "both in absolute terms and in relation to production, information which was available in the Technical Report prepared by the Technical Secretariat", but that it "focused its analysis of imports on their evolution in absolute terms, which is why only that information was recorded in the records of the Commission." 721 We note Chile's statement which said that the Technical Report is "non-binding and classified information", and was not part of the CDC's report. We therefore consider that Chile acted inconsistently with Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards by reason of the failure of the CDC to evaluate the increase in imports in relation to domestic production.

7.161 Second, the CDC has stated in Minutes of Session No. 193 that "[i]n its analysis of imports, [it] has taken into account the fact that the normal operation of price bands has been a decisive factor in preventing a greater increase in imports, and consequently the trend in imports cannot be considered without bearing this factor in mind". Moreover, the CDC has stated that "the significant differences between recent import prices resulting from full application of the band and prices resulting from imposition of a tariff ceiling of 31.5 per cent […] substantiates the forecasts of a greatly accelerated increase in imports that would occur (or has already occurred) unless the full duties specified in the bands are applied". These statements confirm that the CDC's analysis of import trends somehow accounted for the fact that greater import increases would have occurred in the absence of Chilean PBS duties exceeding the 31.5 per cent bound rate. Accordingly, the CDC's analysis of import trends is, at least partly, based on hypothetical import increases, i.e. increases which would have occurred but for Chilean PBS duties granting additional protection by exceeding the 31.5 per cent bound rate. We consider that this analytical approach is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which clearly requires that actual imports have increased. A threat of increased imports is not sufficient.

719 Article 2.1 of the Agreement does not detract from this obligation on the investigative authorities by requiring that a safeguard measure may only be applied if "a product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, […]". Article 4.2(a) provides how the investigating authorities must determine whether increased imports threaten to cause serious injury, whereas Article 2.1 provides that the investigative authorities may decide to apply a safeguard measure only when such a determination has been arrived at.

720 Although to the Minutes of Session No. 224 tables regarding sown surface and domestic output have been attached, the Minutes of Session No. 193 – in which adoption of the definitive measure is recommended by the CDC – do not contain any analysis in relative terms. Argentina has argued that this increase in imports of wheat during 1999 was due to extreme drought in Chile, severely affecting domestic output that year. We note in this respect that table 13 annexed to the Minutes of Session No. 224 shows a drop of 28 per cent in crop, 19.8 per cent in output of wheat, and 10.2 per cent in the sown surface during 1999.

721 Chile's response to question 35 of the Panel.

722 Chile's rebuttal submission, para. 63.

723 The CDC states in the Minutes of Session No. 193 that "even so, there has been an increase in imports".
7.162 In conclusion, we find that the CDC failed to demonstrate increased imports of the products subject to the safeguard measures, as required by Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

8. Threat of serious injury and evaluation of all relevant factors (Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards)

7.163 Argentina claims that the CDC did not establish the existence of a threat of serious injury in the terms laid down in Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. Argentina also contends that the CDC did not evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of the industry, as required by Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. Argentina maintains that the determination of threat of serious injury by the CDC is inconsistent because of two instances of non-compliance: (i) contrary to the requirements of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the CDC did not evaluate all the factors related to the situation of the industry; and (ii) the findings and conclusions of the CDC regarding the factors investigated were not substantiated by evidence.

7.164 Chile submits that the CDC followed an analytical forward-looking approach based on the facts when determining the threat of serious injury. In this regard, Chile refers to the analysis of "threat of injury" by the Appellate Body in US – Lamb, where it was said that the occurrence of future events can never be definitively proven by facts. Chile considers that, in accordance with this statement, a threat of serious injury must always be based on a projection, which must be consistent with the data on which it is based. Chile also submits that the CDC complied with the requirement to evaluate all relevant factors laid down in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. As indicated in that provision, all "relevant" factors must be analysed. According to Chile, that relevance is fundamental when considering factors affecting injury or threat of injury and it must be considered on a case-by-case, product-by-product basis. Chile maintains that the CDC therefore considered it highly relevant to include the impact of the PBS on trade flows in the products investigated that were subject to the PBS.

7.165 Chile has explained that the CDC's relevant findings and reasoned conclusions are contained in the following section of the Minutes of Session No. 193:

"The Commission notes the significant differences between recent import prices resulting from full application of the band and prices resulting from imposition of a tariff ceiling of 31.5 per cent. This substantiates the forecasts of a greatly accelerated increase in imports that would occur (or has already occurred) unless the full duties specified in the bands are applied. The increase in imports, and the potential for further substantial increases, has occurred at a time when international prices of the products investigated have been subject to sizeable and rapid decreases.

The Commission has also taken into account that the c.i.f. prices of Chilean imports are closely linked to international prices (the behaviour of commodities) and domestic prices similarly shadow trends in import prices. Predicted trends in international prices for these products are also negative; i.e., prices should remain at their present levels or fall even more.

The situation described has left the Commission convinced of the existence of an imminent threat of injury if only the tariff ceiling of 31.5 per cent is applied, which can be summarized as follows:

(i) In the case of wheat, a decrease of 34 per cent in the area under cultivation is expected (from 370 thousand hectares to 244 thousand hectares); a decrease
of 28 per cent in production (less than the reduction in the area cultivated as crop yields continue to improve); 10 per cent fall in prices; a decrease of 35 per cent in direct employment; and a drop of 20 to 90 per cent in net profit margins depending on the level of production. This means that around one third of approximately 90,000 producers will cease this activity. As is the case for sugar beet and rape, the capacity of utilisation indicator has not been estimated because it is not relevant to agricultural crops;

(ii) for sugar (sugar beet), the aforementioned indicators used to assess injury are even more significant, showing a reduction of around 80 per cent in production, area under cultivation and employment, and a 28 per cent decrease in prices, meaning that 90 per cent of producers will cease this activity. Very high losses are expected in the sugar industry, with a 28 per cent reduction in the value of output and related losses amounting to US$10 million;

(iii) in the case of oils (rape), indicators show a drop of 54 per cent in production and a decrease of around 60 per cent in employment (direct and indirect), marginalizing over 63 per cent of producers. Losses in the oil industry are estimated to include an 8 per cent fall in the value of output, a US$3.2 million reduction in production. It should also be noted that a decrease in rape cultivation will have an impact on wheat yields because rape is sold in rotation with wheat (30,000 hectares of rape allow the rotation of around 100,000 hectares of wheat)."724

7.166 Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards reads:

"In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment."725

7.167 We recall that the Appellate Body in US – Lamb stated that,

"(…) an 'objective assessment' of a claim under Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards has, in principle, two elements. First, a panel must review whether competent authorities have evaluated all relevant factors, and, second, a panel must review whether the authorities have provided a reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts support their determination. […] Thus, the panel's objective assessment involves a formal aspect and a substantive aspect. The formal aspect is whether the competent authorities have evaluated 'all relevant factors'. The substantive aspect is whether the competent authorities have given a reasoned and adequate explanation for their determination."725

7.168 As regards the formal aspect, the Appellate Body stated in Argentina – Footwear that:

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724 Emphasis added.
"Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards requires a demonstration that the competent authorities evaluated, *at a minimum*, each of the factors listed in Article 4.2(a) as well as all other factors that are relevant to the situation of the industry concerned."\(^{726}\)

7.169 Chile has conceded that the CDC did not evaluate certain relevant factors, such as changes in the level of sales and capacity utilization with respect to wheat, and productivity and employment with respect to vegetable oils.\(^{727}\) Chile has explained that it did not evaluate all the relevant factors explicitly listed in Article 4.2(a), including productivity and employment in the oils industry, because for those factors "information was unavailable from public sources and could not be found by consulting other sources either".\(^{728}\) At the same time, however, Chile has indicated that the questionnaires which the CDC had sent to the interested parties did not include "the more specific questions that are necessary in other cases, since the data contained in the application covered a large part of the background information from the industry and the data gathered from other sources was considered sufficient".\(^{729}\) We find it difficult to accept lack of information as a justification for failure to evaluate all relevant factors, if the investigating authorities were apparently satisfied that the available information was sufficient and no further investigative steps had to be taken. Accordingly, by failing to evaluate each of the factors listed in Article 4.2(a), we consider that Chile has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 4.2(a).

7.170 We now proceed to examine whether Chile has complied with the substantive requirements of the injury analysis. We recall in this respect that, pursuant to Article 4.1(b), a threat of serious injury shall be understood to mean serious injury that is clearly imminent, and that a determination of the existence of a threat of serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. We also recall that the Appellate Body in *US – Lamb* has stated:

"[I] making a 'threat' determination, the competent authorities must find that serious injury is 'clearly imminent'. As we have already concluded, this requires a high degree of likelihood that the anticipated serious injury will materialize in the very near future. Accordingly, we agree with the Panel that a threat determination is 'future-oriented'. However, Article 4.1(b) requires that a 'threat' determination be based on 'facts' and not on 'conjecture'. As facts, by their very nature, pertain to the present and the past, the occurrence of future events can never be definitively proven by facts. There is, therefore, a tension between a future-oriented 'threat' analysis, which, ultimately, calls for a degree of 'conjecture' about the likelihood of a future event, and the need for a fact-based determination. Unavoidably, this tension must be resolved through the use of facts from the present and the past to justify the conclusion about the future, namely that serious injury is 'clearly imminent'. Thus, a fact-based evaluation, under Article 4.2(a) of the *Agreement on Safeguards*, must provide the basis for a projection that there is a high degree of likelihood of serious injury to the domestic industry in the very near future."\(^{730}\)

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\(^{726}\) Appellate Body report on *Argentina – Footwear (EC)*, paras. 135-136. Emphasis added.

\(^{727}\) Chile's response to question 21(a) of the Panel. In addition, Chile has informed the Panel that the injury data in the minutes of CDC session No. 193 regarding production, employment and "marginalization" of producers concern the agricultural production of rape-seed, and not "the oils industry" (Chile's response to question 38 of the Panel). As indicated above, unless rape-seeds are shown to be like or directly competitive with oils, rape-seed growers should not be included in the domestic industry. Absent this demonstration, injury data relating to rape-seed growers would be irrelevant.

\(^{728}\) Chile's response to question 21 of the Panel.

\(^{729}\) Chile's response to question 17(c) of the Panel.

\(^{730}\) [original footnote] We observe that the projections made must relate to the overall state of the domestic industry, and not simply to certain relevant factors.
[...] Whatever methodology is chosen, we believe that data relating to the most recent past will provide competent authorities with an essential, and, usually, the most reliable, basis for a determination of a threat of serious injury. The likely state of the domestic industry in the very near future can best be gauged from data from the most recent past. Thus, we agree with the Panel that, in principle, within the period of investigation as a whole, evidence from the most recent past will provide the strongest indication of the likely future state of the domestic industry.

However, we believe that, although data from the most recent past has special importance, competent authorities should not consider such data in isolation from the data pertaining to the entire period of investigation. The real significance of the short-term trends in the most recent data, evident at the end of the period of investigation, may only emerge when those short-term trends are assessed in the light of the longer-term trends in the data for the whole period of investigation. If the most recent data is evaluated in isolation, the resulting picture of the domestic industry may be quite misleading. [...]n

7.171 The CDC did not provide in the Minutes of Session No. 193 any indication regarding either the data which it had based its injury projections on, or the relevant time-period during which such data would have been examined. The data mentioned in the CDC's report refer to hypothetical growth rates taken with respect to projected values. They do not reveal what the most recent historical values were. Consequently, the CDC does not appear to have based its injury determination on data relating to the most recent past, and did not assess such data in the context of the data for the entire investigative period. We therefore find that, also in this respect, Chile has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 4.2(a).

7.172 Moreover, we note that, according to Chile, a threat of serious injury exists because imports would increase unless the full duties specified in the Chilean PBS are applied. We consider this reasoning insufficient to support the CDC's conclusion. As we have stated earlier, at the time of the adoption of the safeguard measures, the Chilean PBS was already operating without restriction, and PBS duties were being imposed in excess of the 31.5 per cent bound rate. Chile argues that there would be a threat of serious injury if the Chilean PBS were not to be applied without restriction, and that, therefore, safeguard measures equal to the portion of the PBS duties exceeding the 31.5 per cent bound rate should be adopted. Put another way, Chile based its determination of a threat of serious injury on a counterfactual analysis: if they were to restrict the operation of the Chilean PBS to the 31.5 per cent bound rate, injury may occur. Thus, in their threat of injury analysis, for "projecting" the future condition of the domestic industry, the investigative authorities did not rely on an extrapolation of existing trends, but on the results from a counterfactual exercise, simulating what that condition would be if the safeguard measure were to be removed. Such counterfactual analysis cannot justify the imposition of definitive safeguard measures.

7.173 In reply to the Panel's questions, Chile has argued that "the determination of whether or not serious injury would occur if a safeguard measure were withdrawn is possible", because the Agreement on Safeguards "envisages that such an analysis will be made by the competent authorities in that it assumes that a safeguard measure will be maintained only for the time necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury." We do not disagree with Chile that this type of analysis is indeed

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732 We note that the CDC's threat of injury analysis is also flawed since its report does not provide historical data on the "relevant factors" (other than data on import growth), and thus it is impossible to assess the significance of the projected drops against the background of the data for the most recent past. This approach is inconsistent with Article 4.2(a), as interpreted by the Appellate Body in its report on US – Lamb, para. 138.
733 Chile's response to question 7(b) of the Panel. Emphasis added.
envisaged by Article 7.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards for the *extension* of the period of application of the safeguard measure. Obviously, however, it cannot apply to the *adoption* of the safeguard measure, where a projection should be made on the basis that a new safeguard measure would not be adopted, and not on the basis that an existing safeguard measure (or its equivalent) were to be withdrawn.

7.174 In conclusion, we find that the CDC did not demonstrate the existence of a threat of serious injury, as required by Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

### 9. Causal link (Articles 2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards)

7.175 Argentina argues that Chile did not comply with its obligations under Articles 4.2(b) and 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards inasmuch as it did not establish any causal link between the alleged increase in imports and the alleged threat of injury to the domestic industry. Argentina also considers that Chile failed to comply with its obligations under Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards inasmuch as it did not evaluate factors other than the increase in imports which at the same time were causing injury to the domestic industry. According to Chile, the CDC established the causal link between increased imports and threat of serious injury when it stated that "the c.i.f. prices of Chilean imports are closely linked to international prices (the behaviour of commodities) and domestic prices similarly shadow trends in import prices."

7.176 We have found above that the CDC failed to appropriately establish the existence of both increased imports and threat of serious injury. No causal link can exist if the existence of either of the two substantive requirements has not been established.

7.177 In any event, we recall that, pursuant to Articles 2 and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and serious injury or threat thereof must be demonstrated, and that, when factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports. In this case, Chile's analysis of causality was strictly limited to its statement that international prices, import prices and domestic prices are linked. Further, the CDC's report at no point reflects any consideration as to the possible effects on the domestic industries concerned of factors other than increased imports. We consider that such a cursory one-sentence analysis is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a causal link between increased imports and threat of serious injury. Moreover, injury must be caused or threatened by increased imports, not decreasing international prices. Declining international prices may be a factor in a causal analysis but mere consideration of such declining international prices cannot be substituted for such a causal analysis, which, of course, was not done here. We therefore find that the CDC failed to properly establish a causal link, as required by Articles 2.1 and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.178 Finally, we recall the Appellate Body's statement in *US – Wheat Gluten*:

"Article 4.2(b) presupposes [...] as a first step in the competent authorities' examination of causation, that the injurious effects caused to the domestic industry by increased imports are *distinguished from* the injurious effects caused by other factors. The competent authorities can then, as a second step in their examination, attribute to increased imports, on the one hand, and, by implication, to other relevant factors, on

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734 Minutes of CDC session No. 193.
735 Appellate Body report on *Argentina – Footwear (EC)*, para. 145.
736 See the Panel report on *Canada – Countervailing Duties on Grain Corn from the United States*, BISD 39/411, at 433-435 (paras. 5.2.6 and 5.2.9-5.2.10).
the other hand, 'injury' caused by all of these different factors, including increased imports. Through this two stage process, the competent authorities comply with Article 4.2(b) by ensuring that any injury to the domestic industry that was actually caused by factors other than increased imports is not 'attributed' to increased imports and is, therefore, not treated as if it were injury caused by increased imports, when it is not. In this way, the competent authorities determine, as a final step, whether 'the causal link' exists between increased imports and serious injury, and whether this causal link involves a genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect between these two elements, as required by the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.179 We recall that Argentina has argued that the increase in imports of wheat during 1999 was due to extreme drought in Chile, severely affecting domestic output that year. We note that this issue was raised, at least in passing, by Argentine exporters, and a Report of a Chilean government agency submitted by Argentina confirms that Chilean wheat production was adversely affected by drought in the 1998/99 season. The minutes of session No 193 – in which adoption of the definitive measure is recommended by the CDC – however, do not contain any analysis as regards injury caused by other factors, such as drought in the case of wheat. Thus, the CDC did not distinguish the injurious effects caused to the domestic industry by increased imports from the injurious effects caused by other factors. We therefore consider that, also in this respect, the CDC did not perform an adequate causation analysis, as required by Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.180 In conclusion, we find that the CDC did not demonstrate the existence of a causal link, as required by Articles 2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.

10. Measures necessary to remedy injury and facilitate adjustment (Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 3.1 and 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards)

7.181 Argentina submits that Chile's safeguard measure violates Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards because it was not limited to the extent necessary to remedy injury and to facilitate adjustment. Argentina contends that the CDC did not consider whether or not the measure was "necessary" to prevent injury and facilitate readjustment and that no substantive analysis was undertaken. Argentina argues that Chile based its safeguard measure on the difference between the bound tariff and the combination of the PBS duty and applied rate, and this is in no way related to a threat of injury from imports. Chile submits that, in accordance with its obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards, it instituted a measure that protected its domestic producers from serious injury, but which provided no further amount of protection. Chile explains that, having found the requisite conditions justifying a safeguard action, the action recommended by the CDC and taken by the Government involved the least possible trade disruption consistent with preventing serious injury: an increase in duties to enable the PBS to apply without regard to the bound level of duties.

7.182 Pursuant to Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, "[a] Member shall apply safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment". According to the Appellate Body in Korea – Dairy:

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739 Oficina de Estudios y Políticas Agrarias, Ministerio de Agricultura, Temporada Agrícola, No. 13, primer semestre de 1999 (Exhibit ARG-30). Although we do not know with certainty that this publication was in the record of the investigation, Chile indicated to the Panel that it used the publication "Temporada Agrícola (semestral)" as a basis for its investigation (Chile's reply to question 17(b) by the Panel).
740 (new footnote) We note, on the other hand, that table 13 annexed to the minutes of session No 224 shows a drop of 28% in crop, 19.8% in output of wheat, and 10.2% in the sown surface during 1999.
"(…) the wording of this provision leaves no room for doubt that it imposes an obligation on a Member applying a safeguard measure to ensure that the measure applied is commensurate with the goals of preventing or remediating serious injury and of facilitating adjustment."\(^{741}\) (emphasis added)

7.183 Thus, according to this report, in order to comply with the requirement of Article 5.1, the Member imposing the safeguard measure must ensure that the measure is only applied to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. We consider that a Member can only ensure that the safeguard measure is calibrated if there is, at a minimum, a rational connection between the measure and the objective of preventing or remediating serious injury and facilitating adjustment. In the absence of such a rational connection, a Member cannot possibly ensure that the measure is applied only to the extent necessary.

7.184 We recall that the safeguard measures at issue consist of a duty in the amount of the difference between, on the one hand, the sum of the 8 per cent applied rate and the ad valorem equivalent of the PBS duty, and, on the other hand, the 31.5 per cent bound rate. According to Chile, such a duty is "most appropriate" to remedy injury and facilitate adjustment.\(^{742}\) This argument appears to be based on the premise that the lower PBS threshold (to which level import prices are raised through the safeguard measure) can be regarded as indicative of a state below which the domestic industry will experience (a threat of) serious injury. In our view, this premise is unfounded because the lower PBS threshold is calculated on the basis of the international prices observed in the recent past, and therefore does not reflect in any way the condition of the domestic industry. In our view, therefore, it is clear that the lower PBS threshold has no rational connection to a state of the domestic industry below which (a threat of) serious injury will be experienced. We find accordingly that Chile did not ensure that the safeguards measures are applied to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and facilitate adjustment, as required by Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.185 Moreover, we note the following statement by the Appellate Body regarding the obligation of Article 5.1 in its report on US – Line Pipe:\(^{743}\)

"For all these reasons, we conclude that the phrase 'only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment' in Article 5.1, first sentence, must be read as requiring that safeguard measures may be applied only to the extent that they address serious injury attributed to increased imports.\(^{744}\)

Having reached this conclusion, we must consider now whether the Panel erred in concluding that Korea did not make a prima facie case that the United States had not fulfilled this substantive obligation in Article 5.1, first sentence. On this, we conclude that, by establishing that the United States violated Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, Korea has made a prima facie case that the application of the line pipe measure was not limited to the extent permissible under Article 5.1. In the absence of a rebuttal by the United States of this prima facie case by Korea, we find that the United States applied the line pipe measure beyond the "extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment".\(^{745}\)


\(^{742}\) Chile’s reply to Panel question 29.


\(^{744}\) Ibid., para. 260.

\(^{745}\) Ibid., para. 261.
We note that, had the Panel found differently, the United States might have attempted to rebut the presumption raised by Korea in successfully establishing a violation of Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, that the United States had also violated Article 5.1. [..] The United States did not rebut Korea's *prima facie* case by showing that this was so. We offer this observation only to emphasize that we are not stating that a violation of the last sentence of Article 4.2(b) implies an *automatic* violation of the first sentence of Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.\(^{746}\)

7.186 The Appellate Body report on *US – Line Pipe* cited above supports our finding that Chile's measures are inconsistent with Article 5.1, first sentence. Chile failed to either assess the serious injury arising from 'other factors' in the context of its Article 4.2(b) causation analysis\(^ {747}\) or otherwise establish that the Chilean measures address the serious injury arising from imports alone in the context of Article 5.1.

7.187 We note that Argentina has also based its claim on Article 3.1, which requires the investigating authorities, *inter alia*, to set forth their findings and reasoned conclusions on all pertinent issues of fact and law, thus raising the question of whether Chile was under an obligation to justify, in its report, the application of the measures.\(^ {748}\)

7.188 As we have already found that Chile has acted inconsistently with Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, we do not find it necessary for the settlement of this dispute to address Argentina's claim regarding the justification of the application of the measure to the extent that it has been based on Article 3.1. We accordingly decide to exercise judicial economy to that extent.

11. **Appropriate investigation (Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards)**

7.189 Argentina claims that Chile breached its obligation under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 to conduct a "appropriate investigation" because Argentina did not have a full opportunity to participate in the investigation. Specifically, Argentina asserts that it did not have access to any public summary of the confidential information on which the Chilean authorities may have based their determination. Chile responds that Argentina participated in two hearings before the CDC and had access to the file containing submissions of other interested parties. It further contends that there were no non-confidential summaries of confidential information because there was no confidential information to discuss; the information regarding these products was completely public.

7.190 We note that, pursuant to Article 3.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, parties submitting confidential information may be requested to furnish non-confidential summaries or, if such information cannot be summarized, the reasons why such summaries cannot be provided. Argentina has not however established in this case that the record contained any confidential information\(^ {749}\).

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\(^{746}\) *Ibid*, para. 262.

\(^{747}\) See para. 7.179 above.

\(^{748}\) We recall in this respect that, according to the Appellate Body, no formal requirement for an explanation in the decision of the investigating authorities flows from the provision of Article 5.1 for a safeguard measure other than a quantitative restriction which reduces the quantity of imports below the average of imports in the last three representative years. (See Appellate Body report, *Korea – Dairy*, paras. 98-99, and Appellate Body report, *US – Line Pipe*, paras. 230-235) Since the safeguard measures at issue are not in the form of a quantitative restriction reducing the quantity of imports below the average of imports in the last three representative years, Chile was under no obligation pursuant to Article 5.1 to give a justification for those measures at the time of the CDC's decision.

\(^{749}\) We recall in this respect that, for each stage of the investigation, the CDC receives a "technical report" from its Secretariat. Chile has explained that this technical report is an internal working document which
thus, we do not see the factual basis for a claim based on the absence of non-confidential summaries. We therefore conclude that Argentina has failed to establish that Chile has acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards by reason of an alleged failure to provide Argentina with access to non-confidential summaries of confidential information.

7.191 Argentina further contends that the failure of the minutes of the relevant sessions of the CDC to take into account or analyse information provided by the Argentine exporters in respect to the evaluation of imports and the condition of the domestic industry is evidence in support of its claim that Chile failed to conduct an appropriate investigation.\textsuperscript{750} In this Report, we have already found, \textit{inter alia}, that Chile acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards in respect of its consideration of the increased imports requirement and with Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement by failing to consider all relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the industry. In these circumstances, we do not consider it necessary to examine Argentina's further claim under Article 3.1 that Chile failed take into account information provided by Argentine exporters on these issues. Accordingly, we exercise judicial economy with respect to this claim.

12. Findings and reasoned conclusions (Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards)

7.192 Argentina submits that the national investigating authorities must explain in their report how they arrived at their conclusions, based on the information, and that the findings of the competent authorities must be contained in the decision itself. According to Argentina, the CDC has not done so, and has therefore acted in a manner inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.193 Above, we have already found that the CDC failed to set forth findings and reasoned conclusions in its report regarding unforeseen developments and the application of the measures.\textsuperscript{751} In addition, we have also found that Chile has not demonstrated that the CDC complied with the substantive requirements of Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards. In the light of these findings, we do not consider it necessary to make any additional findings under Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, and, accordingly, will exercise judicial economy in this respect.

13. Provisional measures (Article XIX:2 of GATT 1994 and Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards)

7.194 Argentina claims that the CDC did not comply with Article XIX:2 of GATT 1994 and Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which lay down the requirements for the application of provisional measures. Chile submits that the Minutes of Session No. 185 set out the critical circumstances and assessments required in order to determine the need for the recommended provisional measures, as required by Article XIX:2 of GATT 1994 and Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

7.195 We have stated above that the provisional safeguard measures are within our jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering our findings above regarding the inconsistency of the CDC's investigation and the resulting safeguard measures with the requirements of Article XIX of GATT 1994 and Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Agreement on Safeguards, we do not consider it necessary to examine
Argentina's claim under Article 6, and, accordingly, decide to exercise judicial economy in this respect.\footnote{We note that the panel in \textit{Argentina – Footwear (EC)}, in light of its findings of the inconsistency of the definitive safeguard measure with Articles 2 and 4 SA, did not consider it necessary to make a finding on a claim raised under Article 6 with respect to the provisional safeguard measure (panel report, para. 8.292).}

14. \textbf{Notification and consultation (Article XIX:2 of GATT 1994 and Article 12 of the Agreement on Safeguards)}

7.196 Argentina claims that Chile violated Article XIX:2 of GATT 1994 and Article 12.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards by failing to comply with the notification requirement laid down in Article 12.1(a) and 12.2 and by not holding prior consultations with Members having a substantial interest as exporters of the product concerned, as required by Article 12.3 and 12.4. Chile responds that it did act in conformity with the requirements of each of those provisions.

7.197 Considering our findings above regarding the inconsistency of the CDC's investigation and the resulting safeguard measures with the requirements of Article XIX of GATT 1994 and Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Agreement on Safeguards, we do not consider it necessary to examine Argentina's claim under Article 12, and, accordingly, decide to exercise judicial economy in this respect.

15. \textbf{Extension of the definitive safeguard measures (Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards)}

7.198 Argentina has requested the Panel to make findings regarding the consistency of the extension of the definitive safeguard measures with the requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards. We recall that we have found above that the CDC's investigation and the resulting definitive safeguard measures are inconsistent with the requirements of Article XIX of GATT 1994 and Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Agreement on Safeguards. If the definitive safeguard measures are inconsistent with Chile's obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards, such inconsistency cannot of course be "cured" by a decision to extend their duration. On the contrary, the decision to extend their duration must, by definition, be tainted by inconsistency as well. We recall, however, that Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which sets out the conditions for an extension, is not within our Terms of Reference. We will therefore refrain from making any finding regarding the consistency of the decision to extend the safeguard measures' duration with Article 7 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

VIII. \textbf{CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS}

8.1 In light of the findings above, we conclude that:

(a) the Chilean PBS is inconsistent with Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994;

(b) as regards the Chilean safeguard measures on wheat, wheat flour and edible vegetable oils:

(i) Chile has acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards by not making available the relevant minutes of the sessions of the CDC through an appropriate medium so as to constitute a "published" report;

(ii) Chile has acted inconsistently with Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 because the CDC failed to demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments, and
Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards because the CDC’s report did not set out findings and reasoned conclusions in this respect in its report;

(iii) Chile has acted inconsistently with Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2 and 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards because the CDC failed to demonstrate the likeness or direct competitiveness of the products produced by the domestic industry, and, consequently, failed to identify the domestic industry;

(iv) Chile has acted inconsistently with Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Articles 2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards because the CDC failed to demonstrate the increase in imports of the products subject to the safeguard measures required by those provisions;

(v) Chile has acted inconsistently with Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards because the CDC did not demonstrate the existence of a threat of serious injury;

(vi) Chile has acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards because the CDC did not demonstrate a causal link;

(vii) Chile has acted inconsistently with Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 and Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards because the CDC did not ensure that the measures were limited to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy injury and facilitate adjustment;

(viii) Argentina failed to establish that Chile has acted inconsistently with the requirement of Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards to conduct an "appropriate investigation" because Argentina allegedly did not have a full opportunity to participate in the investigation and did not have access to any public summary of the confidential information on which the Chilean authorities may have based their determination.

8.2 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that to the extent Chile has acted inconsistently with the provisions of the GATT 1994, the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Safeguards, it has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Argentina under those Agreements.

8.3 We recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body request Chile to bring its PBS into conformity with its obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT of 1994. As explained above\(^{753}\), we do not make any recommendation with respect to the safeguard measures challenged by Argentina in these proceedings.

\(^{753}\) See our comments at paras. 7.112-7.113 and para. 7.124.