EUROPEAN UNION – MEASURES AFFECTING TARIFF CONCESSIONS ON CERTAIN POULTRY MEAT PRODUCTS

REPORT OF THE PANEL
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 15  
1.1 Complaint by China............................................................................................. 15  
1.2 Panel establishment and composition ................................................................ 15  
1.3 Panel proceedings .............................................................................................. 15  
1.3.1 General ............................................................................................................ 15  
1.3.2 Requests for enhanced third-party rights......................................................... 16  
1.3.3 Requests for preliminary rulings......................................................................... 16  
2 FACTUAL ASPECTS................................................................................................. 16  
3 PARTIES’ REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................... 19  
4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES ............................................................................ 22  
5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES ................................................................... 22  
6 INTERIM REVIEW ................................................................................................ 22  
6.1 Factual aspects and General overview of China’s claims and horizontal arguments ........ 22  
6.2 The tariff rate quotas and the SPS measures ..................................................... 23  
6.3 Terms of reference issues .................................................................................... 23  
6.4 Claims under Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994........................................... 25  
6.5 Claims under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding on Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 .................................................. 28  
6.6 Claims under Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994 .............................................. 29  
6.7 Claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994 ......................... 30  
6.8 Claims under Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 .................................................. 31  
6.9 Claims under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994....................................................... 32  
6.10 Claims under Article XIII:4 of the GATT 1994 ................................................. 32  
6.11 Claims under Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 .................................................... 33  
7 FINDINGS ............................................................................................................ 34  
7.1 General .............................................................................................................. 34  
7.1.1 General overview of China’s claims and horizontal arguments ...................... 34  
7.1.2 Order of analysis ............................................................................................ 36  
7.1.3 Function of the Panel ...................................................................................... 36  
7.1.4 Interpretation of the GATT 1994 ..................................................................... 37  
7.1.5 Burden of proof ............................................................................................. 39  
7.1.6 Request for enhanced third-party rights ......................................................... 40  
7.2 The tariff rate quotas and the SPS measures ..................................................... 44  
7.2.1 The First Modification Package ....................................................................... 44  
7.2.2 The Second Modification Package ................................................................... 47  
7.2.3 The SPS measures applicable to poultry products from China ....................... 53  
7.2.4 Import statistics ............................................................................................. 56  
7.3 Terms of reference issues .................................................................................. 61
7.3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 61
7.3.2 The scope of China's claims under Article XIII of the GATT 1994 .......................... 62
  7.3.2.1 China's contention that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 because it did not set the shares of the TRQs allocated to the "all others" category at sufficient levels .......................................................................................................................... 62
  7.3.2.2 China's contention that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 because it failed to disclose the trade data it used to determine the TRQs ........................................................................................................ 64
  7.3.2.3 China's contention that the European Union violated Article XIII:1 and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by failing to annually review and reallocate the TRQ shares .......................................................................................................................... 67
7.3.3 The scope of China's claims relating to certification ..................................................... 70
  7.3.3.1 China's contentions that the European Union did not respect paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules .......................................................................................................................... 70
  7.3.3.2 China's contention of a possible violation of Article II:1 in the period 2007-2009 arising from the European Union applying new rates prior to notifying all Members of the completion of the negotiations .......................................................................................................................... 75
7.4 Claims under Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994 ............................................................ 76
  7.4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 76
  7.4.2 Relevant provisions ................................................................................................ 76
  7.4.3 Analysis by the Panel ............................................................................................. 81
    7.4.3.1 Whether the SPS measures at issue constitute "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" ........................................................................................................................................................................ 81
      7.4.3.1.1 Main arguments of the parties ............................................................................ 81
      7.4.3.1.2 Findings of the Panel ......................................................................................... 83
    7.4.3.2 Whether the European Union was obliged to re-determine which Members held a supplying interest to reflect changes in import shares that took place following the initiation of the negotiations ........................................................................................................................................................................ 87
    7.4.3.3 Whether the European Union's decision not to recognize China as a Member holding a supplying interest was justified by the timing of China's claim .......................................................................................................................... 94
  7.4.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 95
7.5 Claims under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding on Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 .......................................................................................................................... 95
  7.5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 95
  7.5.2 Relevant legal provisions ........................................................................................ 96
  7.5.3 Analysis by the Panel ............................................................................................. 98
    7.5.3.1 Whether different reference periods can be used for the determinations under Article XXVIII:1 and Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding ........................................................................................................................................................................ 98
    7.5.3.2 Whether the total amount of the TRQs is consistent with paragraph 6 of the Understanding ........................................................................................................................................................................ 99
      7.5.3.2.1 Whether the European Union was obliged to calculate the total amount of the TRQs on the basis of an estimate of what import levels would have been in the absence of the SPS measures ........................................................................................................................................................................ 100
      7.5.3.2.2 Whether the European Union was obliged to calculate the total amount of the TRQs on the basis of import levels over the three years preceding the conclusion of the Article XXVIII negotiations ........................................................................................................................................................................ 102
7.5.3.2.3 Whether the European Union was required to account for poultry imports into Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia in the years before they acceded to the European Union ........... 104

7.5.3.3 Whether the allocation of the TRQs is inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding ............................................................. 106

7.5.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 109

7.6 Claims under Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994 ......................................................... 109

7.6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 109

7.6.2 Relevant provisions .............................................................................................. 110

7.6.3 Analysis by the Panel ........................................................................................... 112

7.6.3.1 Separate analysis of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 ................................................................................................................. 112

7.6.3.2 Relevance of "special factors" to the determination of which Members hold a "substantial interest" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d) .............................................. 113

7.6.3.3 Whether different reference periods can be used for the determinations under Article XXVIII:1, Article XXVIII:2, and Article XIII:2(d) ......................................................... 114

7.6.3.4 Whether the European Union was obliged to determine which Members were substantial suppliers based on an estimate of what their import shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures ................................................................................. 115

7.6.3.5 Whether the European Union was obliged to determine which Members were substantial suppliers taking into account changes in import shares following the initiation of the negotiations on TRQ allocation ................................................................................ 118

7.7 Claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994 ........................................ 127

7.7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 127

7.7.2 Relevant provisions .............................................................................................. 128

7.7.3 Analysis by the Panel ........................................................................................... 129

7.7.3.1 Separate analysis of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 ................................................................................................................. 129

7.7.3.2 Relevance of "special factors" in the determination of whether the allocation of TRQ shares to "all others" complies with the general rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 ......... 130

7.7.3.3 Whether the European Union was obliged to allocate a greater TRQ share to "all others" based on an estimate of what their import shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures ................................................................................. 131

7.7.3.4 Whether the European Union was obliged to allocate a greater TRQ share to "all others" taking into account changes in import shares following the initiation of the negotiations on TRQ share allocations ............................................................................... 132

7.7.3.5 Whether the European Union was under an obligation to allocate an "all others" share of at least 10% for each of the TRQs under the First and Second Modification Packages ................................................................................. 134

7.8 Claims under Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 .......................................................... 137

7.8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 137

7.8.2 Relevant legal provisions ...................................................................................... 138

7.8.3 Analysis by the Panel ........................................................................................... 138

7.8.4 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 141

7.9 Claims under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 ............................................................... 141

7.9.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 141

7.9.2 Relevant legal provisions ...................................................................................... 142
7.9.3 Analysis by the Panel ................................................................. 142
7.9.4 Conclusion ............................................................................. 144
7.10 Claims under Article XIII:4 of the GATT 1994............................... 145
  7.10.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 145
  7.10.2 Relevant legal provisions .................................................. 145
  7.10.3 Analysis by the Panel .......................................................... 146
    7.10.3.1 Whether Article XIII:4 applies in cases where TRQ shares are allocated among
            supplying countries by agreement with substantial suppliers pursuant to Article XIII:2(d)
            first sentence ......................................................................................... 146
    7.10.3.2 Whether China had a substantial interest in supplying the products concerned
            at the time of its request under Article XIII:4 ........................................... 148
    7.10.3.3 Whether Article XIII:4 imposes an obligation to reallocate TRQ shares upon
            request from a Member with a substantial interest in supplying the product ................. 150
    7.10.3.4 Whether the European Union refused to consider the need for an adjustment of
            the TRQ shares or the reference period or reappraisal of special factors ...................... 153
  7.10.4 Conclusion ........................................................................... 156
7.11 Claims under Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 ................................. 156
  7.11.1 Introduction ........................................................................ 156
  7.11.2 Factual background ............................................................ 157
  7.11.3 Paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and
            paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII ......................... 158
  7.11.4 Analysis by the Panel ............................................................ 159
  7.11.5 Conclusion ........................................................................... 171

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION ...................................... 171
# LIST OF ANNEXES

## ANNEX A

### WORKING PROCEDURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex A-2 Amended Working Procedures of the Panel</td>
<td>A-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ANNEX B

### ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-1 First executive summary of the arguments of China</td>
<td>B-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-2 Second executive summary of the arguments of China</td>
<td>B-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-3 First executive summary of the arguments of the European Union</td>
<td>B-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B-4 Second executive summary of the arguments of the European Union</td>
<td>B-23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ANNEX C

### ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-1 Executive summary of the arguments of Argentina</td>
<td>C-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-2 Executive summary of the arguments of Brazil</td>
<td>C-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-3 Executive summary of the arguments of Canada</td>
<td>C-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-4 Executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>C-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-5 Executive summary of the arguments of Thailand</td>
<td>C-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C-6 Executive summary of the arguments of United States</td>
<td>C-22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## WTO CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short title</th>
<th>Full case title and citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short title</td>
<td>Full case title and citation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short title</td>
<td>Full case title and citation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US – Tuna II (Mexico) (Article 21.5 – Mexico)</td>
<td>Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Mexico, WT/DS381/AB/RW and Add.1, adopted 3 December 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### GATT CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short title</th>
<th>Full case title and citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**GATT CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short title</th>
<th>Full case title and citation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada – Lead and Zinc</strong></td>
<td>GATT Panel Report, Canada – Withdrawal of Tariff Concessions (Lead and Zinc), L/4636, adopted 17 May 1978, BISD 25S/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EEC – Apples (Chile I)</strong></td>
<td>GATT Panel Report, EEC Restrictions on Imports of Apples from Chile, L/5047, adopted 10 November 1980, BISD 27S/98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Abbreviations Used in this Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Avian Influenza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>Combined Nomenclature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>Dispute Settlement Body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSU</td>
<td>Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Schedule</td>
<td>Schedule CXL - European Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Modification Package</td>
<td>Modifications to the European Union's tariff concessions notified on 29 May 2009 (G/SECRET/25 ADD.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT 1994</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFN</td>
<td>Most-Favoured-Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Principal supplying interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Modification Package</td>
<td>Modifications to the European Union's tariff concessions notified on 17 December 2012 (G/SECRET/32/ADD 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS Agreement</td>
<td>Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Substantial supplying interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRQ</td>
<td>Tariff rate quota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Convention</td>
<td>Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 International Legal Materials 679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO Agreement</td>
<td>Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## EXHIBITS CITED IN THIS REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHN-15</td>
<td>Article XXVIII:5 negotiations schedule CXL — European Communities, G/SECRET/25 (15 June 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-16</td>
<td>Note Verbale from China to the EU (6 September 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-17</td>
<td>Letter from Amb. Carlo Trojan to Amb. Sun (18 October 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-19</td>
<td>Letter from Vice Minister Yi to DG O’Sullivan (19 April 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-25</td>
<td>Article XXVIII:5 notifications, G/SECRET/32 dated 11 June 2009 and circulated on 16 June 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-27</td>
<td>Council Decision 2012/231/EU of 23 April 2012 on the signing on behalf of the EU of the Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and Brazil pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 relating to the modification of concessions with respect to processed poultry meat provided for in the EU Schedule annexed to GATT 1994, and of the Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and Thailand pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 relating to the modification of concessions with respect to processed poultry meat provided for in the EU Schedule annexed to GATT 1994 (O.J. L 117, 1 May 2012, p. 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-28 / EU-35</td>
<td>Regulation (EU) No 1218/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 concerning the implementation of the Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and Brazil pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions with respect to processed poultry meat provided for in the EU Schedule annexed to GATT 1994, and of the Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit Number</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-29</td>
<td>Letter from China to the EU requesting to enter into negotiations under Article XXVIII (9 May 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-30</td>
<td>Letter from China to the EU (2 October 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-31</td>
<td>Letter from the EU to China responding to China's request for negotiation (1 June 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-32</td>
<td>Letter from the EU to China (12 October 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-36</td>
<td>O.J. L 352, 21 December 2012, p. 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-37</td>
<td>O.J. L 90, 28 March 2013, p. 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-38</td>
<td>O.J. L 56, 28 February 2013, p. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-40</td>
<td>Response letter from the EU to China dated 21 February 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-47</td>
<td>Summary of EU's SPS measures with heat treatment requirements applicable to tariff lines at issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-48</td>
<td>China’s claims of supplying interests for the poultry meat products concerned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-49</td>
<td>The all other share of the tariff rate quotas are below the share obtained based on paragraph 6 of the Understanding even for the reference periods selected by the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-50</td>
<td>Letter from China to the European Union requesting to enter into negotiations under Article XXVIII (9 May 2012), i.e. Ex CHN 29 but with trade data attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN-54</td>
<td>Detailed timeline for the EU's SPS measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-1</td>
<td>Letter from the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations in Geneva to Ambassador Trojan, Permanent Representative of the European Communities to the WTO, dated 24 July 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-2</td>
<td>Letter from the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the WTO to Ambassador Trojan, Permanent Representative of the European Communities to the WTO, dated 11 August 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-3</td>
<td>Agreed Minutes initialled in Geneva by J.L Demarty (Commission of the EC) and Roberto C. De Azevedo (Delegation of Brazil), 26 October 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-4</td>
<td>Agreed Minutes initialled in Bangkok by F. Coturni (Commission of the EC) and B. Chutima (Delegation of Thailand), 23 November 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-5</td>
<td>Agreed Minutes initialled in Geneva by J.L Demarty (Commission of the EC) and Roberto C. De Azevedo (Delegation of Brazil), 6 December 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-6</td>
<td>G/SECRET/25/Add.1, 29 May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-7</td>
<td>Letter from the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of the European Communities to the WTO, 18 August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-8</td>
<td>Letter from the Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the WTO to the Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of the European Communities to the WTO, 8 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-9</td>
<td>G/SECRET/32/ADD 1, 20 December 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-16</td>
<td>Commission Decision 2002/994/EC, of 20 December 2002, concerning certain protective measures with regard to products of animal origin imported from China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit Number</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-28</td>
<td>Letter from David O’Sullivan (Director General of DG TRADE) to Mr Yi, Vice-Minister of MOFCOM (Chinese Ministry of Commerce), 8 May 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-30</td>
<td>Import statistics for the products concerned into the EU, 1995-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-39</td>
<td>Table summarising the various sanitary measures applied to imports from China from 1995 until 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-41</td>
<td>WTO documents circulating the communications of the European Union reserving its rights under Article XXVIII:5 for the periods 2009-2011 and 2012-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-44 (corr.)</td>
<td>Import data for tariff lines 16023940 and 16023980 during the period 1999-2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Complaint by China

1.1. On 8 April 2015, China requested consultations with the European Union pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and Article XXIII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) with respect to the measures and claims set out below.1

1.2. Consultations were held on 26 May 2015.

1.2 Panel establishment and composition

1.3. On 8 June 2015, China requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Articles 4.7 and 6 of the DSU and Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 with standard terms of reference.2 At its meeting on 20 July 2015, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to the request of China, in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU.3

1.4. The Panel's terms of reference are the following:

To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by China in documents WT/DS492/2 and WT/DS492/2/Corr.1 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.4

1.5. On 23 November 2015, China requested the Director-General to determine the composition of the panel, pursuant to Article 8.7 of the DSU. On 3 December 2015, the Director-General composed the Panel as follows:

   Chairperson: Mr Hugo Cayrús
   Members: Mr Masanori Hayashi
             Ms Penelope Ridings

1.6. Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, the Russian Federation, Thailand and the United States notified their interest to participate as third parties in the Panel proceedings.

1.3 Panel proceedings

1.3.1 General

1.7. After consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted the Working Procedures5 and the timetable for these proceedings on 16 December 2015. The Panel adopted Amended Working Procedures6 on 3 February 2016 to reflect the Panel's decision to grant enhanced third-party rights.

1.8. The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties on 22-23 March 2016. The third-party session took place on 23 March 2016. The Panel held a second substantive meeting with the parties on 5-6 July 2016. On 12 August 2016, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 21 October 2016. The Panel issued its Final Report to the parties on 2 December 2016.

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1 See China's request for consultations, WT/DS492/1. The European Union replaced and succeeded the European Communities as of 1 December 2009. In their submissions in these proceedings, the parties have generally referred to the "European Union" when describing events that took place prior to 2009. This Report follows the same approach.
2 WT/DS492/2 and WT/DS492/2/Corr.1.
3 See WT/DSB/M/365.
4 WT/DS492/3.
1.3.2 Requests for enhanced third-party rights

1.9. On 17 December 2015, Brazil, Canada and Thailand each requested enhanced third-party rights in these proceedings. The Panel considered the requests and consulted the parties on this matter. On 3 February 2016, the Panel informed the parties and third parties that for reasons to be elaborated in its Report, it had decided to grant the following enhanced rights to all third parties in these proceedings:

a. the right to be present and observe the entirety of the first and second substantive meetings with the parties; and,

b. the right to receive the parties' first and second written submissions, written responses to questions and comments thereupon, and related exhibits.

1.10. The reasoning for the Panel's decision is elaborated in section 7 of this Report.

1.3.3 Requests for preliminary rulings

1.11. In its first written submission of 9 February 2016, the European Union requested the Panel to make preliminary rulings that two issues raised by China in its first written submission were outside the scope of the Panel's terms of reference. At the invitation of the Panel, China submitted its response to the European Union's requests on 26 February 2016. The third parties were also invited to comment on the European Union's requests in their third-party written submissions. On 7 March 2016, the Panel informed the parties that it had decided not to make a ruling on the European Union's requests prior to the first substantive meeting with the parties. At the first substantive meeting held on 22-23 March 2016, the Panel sought further clarification from the parties on several issues relating to the European Union's requests. In a communication dated 15 April 2016, the Panel ruled on one of the issues raised by the European Union, and reserved judgment until the Panel Report on the other issue. The Panel's rulings and reasoning regarding the European Union's requests for preliminary rulings are set forth in section 7 of this Report.

2 FACTUAL ASPECTS

2.1. This section of the Report aims to provide a brief description of the measures at issue in this dispute. The facts relating to the measures at issue are elaborated in the context of our Findings in section 7 of this Report.

2.2. The claims brought by China concern the modification by the European Union of tariff concessions on certain poultry products pursuant to negotiations held under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. The European Union modified its concessions on the poultry products relevant to this dispute through two distinct negotiation exercises. The first negotiation exercise was initiated in 2006 and covered the modification of the tariff concessions on poultry products falling under tariff items 0210 99 39, 1602 31 and 1602 32 19 (the "First Modification Package"). The second negotiation exercise was initiated in 2009 and covered the modification of the tariff concessions on poultry products falling under tariff items 1602 20 107, 1602 32 11, 1602 32 30, 1602 32 90, 1602 39 21, 1602 39 29, 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 808 (the "Second Modification Package").

2.3. In both negotiation exercises, the European Union notified its intention to modify its tariff concessions under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. It subsequently entered into negotiations with Brazil and Thailand, which the European Union considered to have the requisite legal interest to participate in the negotiations. Pursuant to agreements reached with Brazil and Thailand, the European Union replaced its previous tariff concessions on the poultry products concerned with tariff rate quotas (TRQs). The TRQs and their allocation among supplying countries are as follows:

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7 As noted in China's panel request, "no change was made to the existing tariff rate for tariff subheading 1602 20 10" (China's request for the establishment of a panel, footnote 3, p. 2).
8 As noted in China's panel request, "[t]ariff subheadings 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 80 were combined in 2012 to create a new tariff subheading 1602 39 85" (China's request for the establishment of a panel, footnote 2, p. 2).
With respect to the First Modification Package:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tariff item number</th>
<th>Description of product</th>
<th>Prior tariff rate</th>
<th>New in-quota tariff rate</th>
<th>New out-of-quota tariff rate</th>
<th>TRQ volume (metric tons)</th>
<th>Allocation (metric tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0210 9939</td>
<td>Salted poultry meat</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>1,300 EUR/MT</td>
<td>264,245</td>
<td>Brazil: 170,807 Thailand: 92,610 Others: 828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 31</td>
<td>Prepared turkey meat</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>1,024 EUR/MT</td>
<td>103,896</td>
<td>Brazil: 92,300 Others: 11,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 19</td>
<td>Cooked chicken meat</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>1,024 EUR/MT</td>
<td>250,953</td>
<td>Brazil: 79,477 Thailand: 160,033 Others: 11,443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect to the Second Modification Package:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tariff item number</th>
<th>Description of the product</th>
<th>Prior tariff rate</th>
<th>New in-quota tariff rate</th>
<th>New out-of-quota tariff rate</th>
<th>TRQ volume (metric tons)</th>
<th>Allocation (metric tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 11</td>
<td>Processed chicken meat, uncooked, containing 57% or more by weight of poultry meat or offal</td>
<td>867 EUR/MT</td>
<td>630 EUR/MT</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>16,140</td>
<td>Brazil: 15,800 Others: 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 30</td>
<td>Processed chicken meat, containing 25% or more but less than 57% by weight of poultry meat or offal</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>79,705</td>
<td>Brazil: 62,905 Thailand: 14,000 Others: 2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 90</td>
<td>Processed chicken meat, containing less than 25% by weight of poultry meat or offal</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>2,865</td>
<td>Brazil: 295 Thailand: 2,100 Others: 470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 21</td>
<td>Processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, uncooked, containing 57% or more by weight of poultry meat or offal</td>
<td>867 EUR/MT</td>
<td>630 EUR/MT</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Thailand: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 29</td>
<td>Processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, cooked, containing 57% or more by weight of poultry meat or offal</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>13,720</td>
<td>Thailand: 13,500 Others: 220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 40</td>
<td>Processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, containing 25% or more but less than 57% by weight of poultry meat or offal</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>Thailand: 600 Others: 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 80</td>
<td>Processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, containing less than 25% by weight of poultry meat or offal</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>Thailand: 600 Others: 125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4. According to China’s panel request, the measures at issue are “the modifications of the EU’s tariff concessions and the institution of the TRQs as part of the modification packages”, and “the following instruments and decision” that implement the modifications and the TRQs:

“A. For The 2007 Modification Package [10]:


B. For The 2012 Modification Package [11]:


Whilst this Commission Regulation entered into force on 31 March 2013, a notice published on 28 February 2013 indicated that the agreements between the EU and Brazil on the one hand, and the EU and Thailand on the other hand, entered into force on 1 March 2013.

(iv) Refusal by the European Union in consultations held on 19 May 2014 under Article XIII of GATT 1994 to adjust the TRQs on the basis of recent import statistics establishing China’s substantial supplying interests as had been requested by letter of Ambassador Yu of 19 December 2013.

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9 China’s request for the establishment of a panel, p. 2.
10 China’s reference to the 2007 Modification Package is a reference to the First Modification Package.
11 China’s reference to the 2012 Modification Package is a reference to the Second Modification Package.
In addition to the measures cited in the above paragraphs, this request also covers any amendments, supplements, extensions, replacement measures, renewal measures, related measures, or implementing measures.\textsuperscript{12}

3 PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1. In its panel request, China claims that "the above measures appear to be inconsistent with the EU's obligations under Articles I, II, XIII and XXVIII of the GATT 1994", as follows:

"A. Claims With Respect To The 2007 Modification Package:

(i) The modification negotiation initiated by the EU in 2006 is inconsistent with Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994, read in conjunction with Ad Article XXVIII and with the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII, as the EU failed to negotiate or consult with all the WTO Members having a principal supplying interest or a substantial interest, or that could have had such an interest in the absence of a discriminatory quantitative restriction.

(ii) The tariff rates and the TRQs negotiated and then implemented by the EU in the measures identified above are inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2, read in conjunction with the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII and in particular Paragraph 6 thereof, because they failed to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favorable to trade than that existing prior to the modification.

(iii) The country-specific TRQs allocated by the EU to two of the WTO Members and then implemented by the EU in the measures identified above violate GATT 1994 Article XIII by diminishing for the other WTO Members the market access commitments that the EU undertook to maintain on a non-discriminatory basis.

(iv) The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members implemented by the EU in the measures identified above, is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:1 because the importation of the like product from the WTO Members is not similarly prohibited or restricted as a result.

(v) The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented by the EU in the measures identified above is inconsistent with the chapeau of GATT 1994 Article XIII:2 read in conjunction with the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII and in particular Paragraph 6 thereof, which requires the allocation of a TRQ to approach as closely as possible the shares that the WTO Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQs.

(vi) The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented by the EU in the measures identified above is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:2(d) because the EU failed to seek agreement with all WTO Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned, nor did it allot to such Members shares based upon the proportions supplied by them during a previous representative period, due account being taken of any special factors which affected the trade in the product.

(vii) The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented by the EU in the measures identified above is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:2, including its chapeau, read in conjunction with Article XIII:4, which confirms that the base period must be selected and special factors must be taken into account such as to allot to Members a TRQ that approaches as closely as possible the shares that they might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQs.

(viii) The EU violated GATT 1994 Article II:1 by adopting tariff rates that exceeded the bound tariff rates in its Schedule for the three tariff subheadings at issue, as the tariff

\textsuperscript{12} China's request for the establishment of a panel, pp. 2-3. (footnotes omitted)
rates and the TRQs which the EU negotiated and then implemented under Article XXVIII in 2007 are inconsistent with GATT 1994 Articles XIII and XXVIII:2, and are, therefore, ineffectual to replace the bound rates in its Schedules preceding its implementation of the 2007 Modification Package.

(ix) In the absence of notification for certification, notification of the date on which the changes to the goods schedule come into force to the WTO Secretariat, and notification of the draft modification to its Schedule, the EU acted inconsistently with the procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and Tariff Concessions. The absence of a notification for certification of the modified schedule and of the certification following notification and the other violations mentioned herein, results in the EU having acted inconsistently with GATT 1994 Articles II:1 and II:2 by affording imports of poultry meat from China less favorable treatment than that provided for in its Schedule.

(x) The tariff rates and the TRQs negotiated and then implemented by the EU in the measures identified above are inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article I:1 which requires that any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any WTO Member to any product originating in any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in the territories of all other WTO Members.

B. Claims With Respect to the 2012 Modification Package:

(i) The modification negotiation initiated by the EU in 2009 is inconsistent with Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994, read in conjunction with Ad Article XXVIII, and with the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII, as the EU failed to negotiate or consult with all the WTO Members having a principal supplying interest or a substantial interest or that could have had such an interest in the absence of a discriminatory quantitative restriction.[13]

(ii) The tariff rates and the TRQs negotiated and then implemented by the EU in the measures identified above are inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2, read in conjunction with the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII and in particular Paragraph 6 thereof, because they fail to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favorable to trade than that existing prior to the modification.

(iii) The country-specific TRQs allocated by the EU to two of the WTO Members as implemented in the measures and decision mentioned above[14] violate GATT 1994 Article XIII by diminishing for the other WTO Members the market access commitments that the EU undertook to maintain on a non-discriminatory basis.

(iv) The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented in the measures and decision mentioned above[15] is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:1 as the importation of the like product of all the WTO Members is not similarly prohibited or restricted as a result.

13 In a footnote to this item, China states that "[i]the EU refused to change the TRQs and its allocation mentioned in (ii) above so as to reflect China's recent shares of importation into the EU. In letters dated 1 June 2012 and 12 October 2012 addressed by EU Ambassador Pangratis to Ambassador Yi of China in response to letters from Ambassador Yi dated 9 May 2012 and 2 October 2012, respectively, the EU refused China's request to enter into consultations under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 on the grounds that China had become the biggest supplier in a certain number of poultry products based on EU statistical data for the period from 2009 – 2011" (China's request for the establishment of a panel, footnote 12).

14 In a footnote to this item of its panel request, China states: "See Section I.B(iv) for the referred decision" (China's request for the establishment of a panel, footnote 13). Section I.B(iv) of China's panel request refers to "[i]the refusal by the EU in consultations held on 19 May 2014 under Article XIII of GATT 1994 to adjust the TRQs on the basis of recent import statistics establishing China's substantial supplying interests", as had been requested by China.

15 Ibid.
(v) The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented in the measures and decision mentioned above[16] is inconsistent with the chapeau of GATT 1994 Article XIII:2 read in conjunction with the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII and in particular Paragraph 6 thereof, because the allocation of the TRQs do not approach as closely as possible the shares that the WTO Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQs.

(vi) The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented by the EU in the measures and decisions identified above is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:2(d) because the EU failed to seek agreement with all WTO Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned, nor did it allot to such Members shares based upon the proportions supplied by them during a previous representative period, due account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product.

(vii) The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented by the EU in the measures identified above is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:2, including its chapeau, read in conjunction with Article XIII:4, which confirms that the base period for the determination of the TRQs must be selected and special factors must be taken into account so as to allot to Members a TRQ that approaches as closely as possible the shares that they might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQs.

(viii) The EU’s refusal in consultations with China on 19 May 2014 to consider an adjustment of the allocation of the TRQs based on a change in the base period or a reappraisal of the special factors involved is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:4.

(ix) The EU violated GATT 1994 Article II:1 by adopting tariff rates that exceeded the bound tariff rates in its Schedule for the tariff subheadings at issue, as the tariff rates and the TRQs which the EU negotiated and then implemented under Article XXVIII in 2013 are inconsistent with GATT 1994 Articles XIII and XXVIII:2, and are, therefore, ineffectual to replace the EU’s bound rates in its Schedules preceding its implementation of the 2012 Modification Package.

(x) In the absence of notification for certification, notification of the date on which the changes to the goods schedule come into force to the WTO Secretariat, and notification of the draft modification to its Schedule, the EU acted inconsistently with the procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and Tariff Concessions. The absence of a notification for certification of the modified schedule and of the certification following notification and the other violations mentioned herein, results in the EU having acted inconsistently with GATT 1994 Articles II:1 and II:2 by affording imports of poultry meat from China less favorable treatment than that provided for in its Schedule.

(xi) The tariff rates and the TRQs negotiated and then implemented by the EU in the measures identified above are inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article I:1 which requires that any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any WTO Member to any product originating in any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in the territories of all other WTO Members.

The EU’s measures and decision also nullify or impair the benefits accruing to China directly or indirectly under the cited agreements[17].

3.2. The European Union requests the Panel to reject all of China’s claims.

[16] Ibid.
[17] China’s request for the establishment of a panel, pp. 3-6.
4 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

4.1. The arguments of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the Panel in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Amended Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4).

5 ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

5.1. The arguments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, the Russian Federation, Thailand and the United States are reflected in their executive summaries, provided in accordance with paragraph 21 of the Amended Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5 and C-6). India did not submit written or oral arguments to the Panel.

6 INTERIM REVIEW


6.2. In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this section of the Report sets out our response to the parties' requests for review of precise aspects of the Report made at the interim review stage. We discuss the parties' requests for substantive modifications below, in sequence according to the sections and paragraphs to which the requests pertain. In addition to the substantive requests that are discussed below, various editorial and drafting improvements were made to the Report.

6.3. The numbering of some of the footnotes in the Final Report has changed from the numbering in the Interim Report. The discussion below refers to the numbering in the Interim Report and, where it differs, includes the corresponding numbering in the Final Report.

6.4. Before proceeding on a section-by-section basis, we note that the European Union raised a cross-cutting issue with reference to paragraphs 7.380, 7.386, 7.399, 7.402, and 7.406 and 8.1(e). The European Union observes that the Panel uses different expressions to indicate apparently the same thing, including "the size of the 'all others' share" (para. 7.380), "amount of the 'all others' share" (para. 7.380), or "the amount of the 'all others' shares" (para. 7.402) and "the size of the TRQ shares to be allocated to countries that were not recognized as substantial suppliers" (para. 7.406). For the sake of clarity, the European Union proposes that the panel replace those expressions with the simpler and clearer expression "the TRQ(s) share(s) allocated to 'all others'" or "the TRQ(s) share(s) to be allocated to 'all others'" as appropriate. China considers that the most accurate expression would be "the size of the TRQ(s) share(s) allocated to 'all others'" or "the size of the TRQ(s) share(s) to be allocated to 'all others'". We note that these different expressions were used to indicate the same thing. In the interest of consistent expression, we have harmonized the expressions used in these paragraphs.

6.1 Factual aspects and General overview of China's claims and horizontal arguments

6.5. China requests the Panel to revise the first sentence of paragraph 2.2 and the first sentence of paragraph 7.2 to reflect that the claims brought by China in this dispute are not only about the modification by the European Union of its tariff concessions on certain poultry products, "but also about the administration, allocation in particular, by the European Union through its legislations and other domestic measures of the tariff rate quotas opened as a result of the modification". The European Union does not comment on China's request. We note that these sentences are not intended to provide a thorough description of the scope of China's claims in this dispute. Furthermore, we consider that the terminology proposed by China in its request to revise these sentences, in particular the reference to the "administration" of the tariff rate quotas, does not correspond to the panel request and could potentially prejudge some of the disputed issues in this case. Accordingly, we have not adjusted the wording of these sentences.

6.6. China requests the Panel to revise paragraph 7.3 by adding the words "by the European Union" after the words "during the reference periods selected", for greater clarity. The European
23

Union does not comment on China's request. We have adjusted the wording of paragraph 7.3, as requested by China.

6.7. With respect to paragraph 7.6, the European Union suggests the following drafting change: "Following a relaxation of the SPS measures by the European Union in July 2008, imports of heat treated poultry products from China into the European Union were allowed increased significantly under some of the tariff lines at issue." China considers that these words should not be deleted, because the fact that imports of heat treated products increased significantly under some of the tariff lines is factually correct. Moreover, China considers that the statement supports the analysis of the Panel that China held a substantial supplying interest as regards these tariff lines. We consider that the change requested by the European Union would introduce imprecision into this sentence and potentially alter its meaning, and have therefore left it unchanged.

6.2 The tariff rate quotas and the SPS measures

6.8. The European Union suggests five drafting changes to the description of the SPS measures: (i) with respect to paragraph 7.85, first sentence, specifying that the requirements referenced therein are "sanitary" requirements; (ii) adding the words "due to animal health reasons" at the end of the third sentence of paragraph 7.86; (iii) clarifying that the decision referred to in paragraph 7.88 provides for the importation of poultry products subject to a declaration "amongst other sanitary requirements (i.e. heat treatment)"; (iv) revising paragraph 7.89, third sentence, to clarify that the importation of the products referred to therein are still subject to heat treatment "B", "amongst other sanitary requirements"; and (v) revising paragraph 7.92 by replacing the words "at the time of" with the word "until" in the second sentence, and revising the formulation of the condition relating to heat treatment "B" in the last sentence by adding the words "... and fulfil the other applicable sanitary requirements". China does not comment on any of the foregoing drafting suggestions. We have made drafting changes along the lines proposed by the European Union.

6.9. With respect to paragraph 7.91, fourth sentence, the European Union suggests deleting the words "under the heat treatment measure". China considers that the words should not be deleted because they are necessary to ensure clarity and completeness, and notes that the European Union has not provided reasons for deleting these words. We consider that the change requested by the European Union would introduce imprecision into this sentence and potentially alter its meaning, and we have therefore left it unchanged.

6.10. China requests the Panel to modify the discussion in paragraph 7.97 concerning the discrepancies between the 2000-2006 import statistics submitted by the parties for tariff line 1602 39 80. China notes that the Panel generally uses the import statistics provided by China for the reasons set out there, but that for tariff line 1602 39 80, the Panel decides to use the statistics provided by the European Union for 2005 and 2006 based on the following two considerations: (i) China's statistics appear implausibly large (17.6% and 30.5% of the total EU imports), given the SPS measures in place at the time; and (ii) the final statistics that China submitted in Exhibit CHN-52 are inconsistent with the statistics it submitted previously in Exhibit CHN-43. As regards the second consideration, China notes that in both Exhibits CHN-52 and CHN-43, China consistently reported Chinese imports of 101.4 metric tonnes and 201.5 metric tonnes for 2005 and 2006, respectively, and there is thus no discrepancy between the statistics reported in these two Exhibits. China also notes that it obtained the statistics directly from Eurostat, which China understood to be the source of the European Union's statistics as well. China submits that it retrieved trade statistics multiple times from Eurostat during the course of this dispute settlement proceeding, and the data it retrieved are consistent. The European Union recalls that, as explained by the European Union (second written submission, para. 85), the discrepancy is due to the fact that China's statistics include imports into Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia made before those countries became Member States of the European Union, whereas the EU statistics do not include those imports. We have revised paragraph 7.97, along with a consequential change to footnote 207, in the light of the parties' comments.

6.3 Terms of reference issues

6.11. Regarding paragraph 7.106, the European Union invites the Panel to amend this paragraph by adding some additional text summarizing an additional argument that had been
presented by the European Union on this issue. China does not object to the addition, but offers several drafting suggestions for the new text proposed by the European Union. We have added text along the lines requested by the European Union.

6.12. Beginning with the title of Section 7.3.2.3, China requests that it be changed from "China's contention that the European Union violated Article XIII:1 and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by failing to annually review and reallocate the TRQ shares" to "China's contention that the European Union violated Article XIII with respect to the allocation of the TRQs in the subsequent years" to more accurately describe China's complaint. The European Union "firmly opposes China's attempt to reframe one of the claims that it has formulated during the litigation, and notably in its second written submission, as clearly demonstrated in paragraph 7.128 of the interim report". The European Union submits that it "is clear from paragraphs 7.128 and 7.130 that the Panel has made an objective reading of China's submission and now China tries to move the focus of its claim to what it now pretends to be the essence of China's complaint". The European Union submits that "[i]n reality, what China is doing is to perpetuate its litigation tactics of formulating its claims in an ambiguous and constantly evolving manner in order to take advantage from this situation, in an attempt to avoid its claims being dismissed". We consider that the title of section 7.3.2.3 precisely reflects our understanding of China's claim. Our understanding of China's claim is based on our analysis of the argumentation presented by China in its submissions in the course of these proceedings. Accordingly, we decline to make the change requested by China.

6.13. China notes the Panel's statement in paragraph 7.133 that "having carefully reviewed Section I of the panel request, we do not see any reference to the European Union's failure to annually review and reallocate the TRQs from quota year to quota year to take account of trade developments as one of the challenged measures at issue", and the Panel's statement in paragraph 7.135 that "Section I.B(iv) does not identify, as a measure at issue in this dispute, the failure by the European Union to annually review and reallocate the TRQs from year to year, on its own initiative". China submits that it "appears that the Panel has considered that, in order for China's claim to fall within its terms of reference, China should have explicitly mentioned in Section I of the panel request the European Union's "failure to annually review and reallocate the TRQs from quota year to quota year to take account of trade developments" as a separate and distinct measure at issue." In China's view, however, "[s]uch a standard goes significantly beyond the requirement under Article 6.2 of the DSU, which does not require the complainant to set out the arguments in support of a particular claim in the panel request". In the European Union's view, the comments made by China concerning these paragraphs do not require the Panel to amend its interim report "as they constitute a mere attempt to reargue the case by trying to convince the Panel once again" that the claim discussed in the relevant part of the interim report was within the Panel's terms of reference. Our view is indeed that in order for China's claim that the European Union violated the provisions of Article XIII by failing to annually review and reallocate the TRQs from quota year to quota year to take account of trade developments, the corresponding omission should have been identified, in China's words, as "a separate and distinct measure at issue" in Section I.B(iv) of the panel request. We do not agree with China's view that such a standard goes beyond the requirement under Article 6.2 of the DSU because we do not agree with China that this is properly characterized as an "argument[] in support of a particular claim in the panel request".

6.14. China requests the deletion of paragraphs 7.136 and 7.137, in which the Panel suggests that China's arguments in respect of the subsequent allocation by the European Union of the TRQs were "apparently only in response to" the European Union's submission about some kind of "time limit" on the validity of the allocation or a "periodic review mechanism". According to China, this suggestion "has no basis". China states that in its panel request, China claimed that "the allocation of TRQs by the EU, which naturally includes both initial allocation and subsequent allocation, was inconsistent with Article XIII". China submits that although "it might be true that China reinforced arguments to support its challenge against the subsequent allocation when it noticed that the EU overlooked the ongoing nature of the Article XIII obligations", it "does not follow that China did not properly make such a claim in its panel request and that such arguments of China were "apparently only in response to" the EU's submission merely because of sequence of these two events". The European Union submits that paragraph 7.136 "makes an objective description of the evolution of China's claims during the litigation", and that "China does not argue that this description is incorrect". The European Union submits that in paragraph 7.137, the Panel makes clear what understanding it draws from such evolution and concludes that such an understanding reinforces the conclusion, derived from the text of the Panel request, that these are new claims.
The European Union submits that China's observation that the Panel's understanding "has no basis" is therefore unwarranted and "constitutes an attempt to reargue the case". We decline China's request to delete these paragraphs. They set forth an objective description of the evolution of China's claims and argumentation during these proceedings. The basis for that description is our analysis of the panel request and the subsequent argumentation presented by China in the course of these proceedings. To avoid any misunderstanding, we wish to clarify that it was not "merely because of the sequence of these two events" that we reached the conclusion that China did not properly make the relevant claim in its panel request, and that such arguments were made only in response to the European Union's submissions.

6.4 Claims under Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994

6.15. China requests the Panel to revise its statement in paragraph 7.178 that "China does not claim that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by applying a 10% import share benchmark to determine which Members held a 'substantial interest'". The Panel's understanding "has no basis" is therefore unwarranted and "constitutes an attempt to reargue the case". We decline China's request to delete these paragraphs. They set forth an objective description of the evolution of China's claims and argumentation during these proceedings. The basis for that description is our analysis of the panel request and the subsequent argumentation presented by China in the course of these proceedings. To avoid any misunderstanding, we wish to clarify that it was not "merely because of the sequence of these two events" that we reached the conclusion that China did not properly make the relevant claim in its panel request, and that such arguments were made only in response to the European Union's submissions.

6.16. China submits that there is an inconsistency between the statements made by the Panel in paragraphs 7.195 and 7.201. China notes that paragraph 7.195 states that the cited passage from Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports "supports the proposition that the term 'discrimination' may be interpreted relatively narrowly, so as to cover only unjustifiable distinctions, or relatively broadly, so as to also cover distinctions that are legitimate and justifiable. To that extent, we agree that the word 'discrimination' may be given different meanings depending on the context in which that word appears, and depending on the context, may have a broad meaning that covers legitimate and justifiable distinctions". China submits that this is inconsistent with the Panel's statement in paragraph 7.201 that "when the term 'discrimination' is accompanied by the qualifying terms 'arbitrary or unjustifiable' (or comparable terms) and 'where the same conditions prevail' (or comparable terms) in certain provisions, these additional terms serve the purpose of bringing greater precision to how the general concept and legal standard of 'discrimination' is to be applied in a given provision or context. These qualifying terms do not, in our view, serve the purpose of narrowing the ordinary meaning of the term 'discrimination' in the manner suggested by China." China submits that there is an inconsistency between these statements because "language that brings greater precision of necessity eliminates certain possible interpretations that a more general term may allow and is therefore necessarily narrowing". In addition, China finds an inconsistency "between the Panel stating that the sole word 'discrimination' may have a broad meaning and then to say that the absence of qualifying terms may mean that it does not have a broad meaning". The European Union does not comment on China's observation. We do not apprehend the alleged inconsistency between the propositions presented in paragraph 7.195 (read together with paragraph 7.196) and paragraph 7.201. Among
other things, we do not equate the notion of "bringing greater precision to how the general concept and legal standard of 'discrimination' is to be applied in a given provision or context" to the notion of "narrowing the ordinary meaning of the term 'discrimination'". Accordingly, we have made no change to these paragraphs.

6.17. China requests the Panel to add a new sentence at the beginning of paragraph 7.202 to more accurately summarize its argument, stating that "[i]n addressing the European Union's argument that China and a third country that was not subject to similar import prohibitions/restrictions are not similarly situated, China submits that in determining if two countries are similarly situated, only the conditions that are relevant for the purpose of the provision concerned should be considered." China submits that this would more accurately summarize the arguments presented at paragraphs 29-31 of its oral statement at the first meeting. The European Union believes that the Panel has summarized correctly China's position. In any event, the European Union disagrees with the phrasing of the additional sentence proposed by China. The European Union reiterates that all third countries are subject to the same sanitary regulatory requirements; if all third countries are not "similarly situated", it is because their sanitary situation is different and not because they are "not subject to similar import restrictions/prohibitions". We have not added the additional text requested by China. The focus of this paragraph, and the one that follows, is not on China's argument about the meaning and application of the "similarly situated" standard; rather, the focus of these paragraphs is on China's argument that the term "discriminatory" must be interpreted in the context of Article XXVIII:1 and paragraphs 4 and 7 of its accompanying Ad Note, which in no way prohibit or require the elimination of any measure characterized as a "discriminatory quantitative restriction" within the meaning of those provisions. However, in the light of China's comment, we have added a reference to paragraph 31 of China's opening statement at the first meeting, and also revised paragraph 7.203, to clarify the focus of these paragraphs. Furthermore, we have added a reference to paragraphs 29-31 of China's opening statement at the first meeting in paragraph 7.204, which is where we address China's argument regarding the meaning of "similarly situated".

6.18. Regarding the statement in paragraphs 7.205 and 7.206 that "China has not attempted to argue that imports from any other similarly situated country were not subject to the same restrictions", China reiterates that it "is of the view that the sanitary situation is not the condition that is relevant for the purpose of the provisions concerned in this dispute, i.e. Article XXVIII:1 and paragraphs 4 and 7 of its accompanying Ad Note, which in no way prohibit or require the elimination of any measure characterized as a "discriminatory quantitative restriction" within the meaning of those provisions. However, in the light of China's comment, we have added a reference to paragraph 31 of China's opening statement at the first meeting, and also revised paragraph 7.203, to clarify the focus of these paragraphs. Furthermore, we have added a reference to paragraphs 29-31 of China's opening statement at the first meeting in paragraph 7.204, which is where we address China's argument regarding the meaning of "similarly situated".

6.19. Regarding paragraph 7.206, China requests the Panel not to exercise judicial economy with respect to the parties' disagreement as to: (i) whether the scope of the terms "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" in the context of paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 covers only unjustifiable distinctions, or is broad enough to also cover justifiable distinctions; (ii) whether the SPS measures at issue constitute "quantitative restrictions"; and (iii) what share of imports into the European Union market China could reasonably be expected to have had, in the
absence of the SPS import prohibitions, over period 2002-2008. China requests the Panel "to engage [in] analysis in these respects even on an arguendo basis". The European Union does not comment on China's request. We note that it is well established that a panel has "the discretion to address only those arguments it deems necessary to resolve a particular claim" (Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, para. 135). We consider that a panel "may be guided by a range of different considerations when deciding whether to address arguments beyond those strictly necessary to resolve the matter, and the manner in which a panel may do so, including the scope and nature of any such other alternative findings, may also vary depending on the issues before the panel" (Panel Report, India – Solar Cells, para. 7.76). We are not convinced that addressing the above issues on an arguendo basis will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Accordingly, we decline China's request.

6.20. China considers that, contrary to the Panel's assessment in paragraph 7.219, there is no lack of clarity in China's argumentation regarding "the scope and nature of an obligation of re-appraisement". With reference to its response to Panel question No. 23 and paragraph 40 of its opening statement at the second meeting, China states that its view "has consistently been that if the negotiations / consultations last beyond six months, the Member withdrawing the concession should assess whether a re-appraisement should be made", and that a "re-appraisement need not necessarily be made after each period of six months, but must occur when material trade developments have occurred that influence the supplying interest status of the WTO Members". The European Union does not comment on China's request. We have adjusted paragraph 7.219 and its accompanying footnotes in the light of China's comment.

6.21. With regard to paragraphs 7.224-7.227, China states that the Panel gives a cursory conclusion in the first sentence of paragraph 7.227 by stating that "[i]t appears to us that, if anything, prior practice does not support China's contention that there is a legal obligation of re-appraisement". China observes that the Panel "fails to determine on which basis this conclusion was taken". In addition, China states that the Panel "fails to consider and respond to China's full argumentation and in particular to that set forth in its response to the Panel's question 106". The European Union does not comment on China's request. We have revised paragraph 7.227 to clarify the basis for this assessment.

6.22. China makes several interrelated requests relating to the Panel's discussion, in section 7.4.3.3, of whether the European Union's refusal to recognize China as a Member holding a supplying interest was justified by the timing of China's claim. First, China requests that the Panel rule on whether the European Union's decision not to recognize China as a Member holding a principal or substantial supplying interest was justified in the absence of a claim of supplying interest by China within the 90-day period. China states that this "is particularly because China considers that the Panel should revise its analysis on the existence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions and on the re-appraisement of the interest based on the latest import data for the reasons mentioned above". The European Union does not comment on China's request. We recall that it is well established that a panel has the discretion to address only those arguments it deems necessary to resolve a particular claim. We are not convinced that addressing the above issues on an arguendo basis will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Accordingly, we decline China's request.

6.23. With regard to paragraph 7.233 in particular, China requests that the Panel clarify that paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII are not couched in mandatory terms. China submits that the current paragraph is phrased as if this 90-day is mandatory, which in China's view it is not. The European Union does not comment on China's request. We do not see the basis for China's comment in the text of paragraph 7.233, as this paragraph refers to the 90-day "guideline". Accordingly, we have not amended this paragraph.

6.24. China requests that paragraph 7.234 be revised to state in clear terms that China's claim of a substantial supplying interest for the First Modification Package was filed within the 90-day period. The European Union does not comment on China's request. We have made the change requested by China.
6.5 Claims under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding on Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994

6.25. Regarding paragraph 7.261, China states that "[f]irst of all, in making its analysis, the Panel has omitted to take into account and should do so that the global TRQs for several tariff lines do not reflect the future trade prospects of the WTO Members". In this regard, China refers to paragraph 106 of its second written submission and to paragraph 50 of the China's opening statement at the second substantive meeting. China submits that it "has therefore shown that the total amount of imported poultry products into the European Union from all sources would have been greater had a representative period been chosen", and "requests the Panel to take this data into account". The European Union observes that the calculations cited by China purport to show that the amount of compensation provided by the European Union was below the compensation that would have resulted from the application of the formulae of paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the basis of a different reference period, but that those calculations "do not prove that the total trade during the reference period used by the European Union would have been larger in the absence of the SPS measures applied to China". We have revised paragraph 7.261 to more clearly draw out the premise that, assuming that the amount of imports supplied from China would have been greater in the absence of the SPS measures, there may well have been a corresponding decrease in the amount of imports supplied from other sources in the absence of any change in overall demand.

6.26. With respect to paragraph 7.272, China requests the Panel to identify the legal ground on which it concludes that "it cannot be the case that the Members engaged in the negotiations would be legally obliged to change the benchmark defined in that provision from year to year until the negotiations have been concluded". China states that "[i]f, as the Panel admits, the benchmark must not necessarily be fixed in advance of the negotiations, then, there is no legal ground on which to claim that it must be a three-year period or year preceding the negotiations". China further states that the wording of paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII "is what it is" and requires the use of "the most recent" three-year period or year "and that, as mentioned above, is the period preceding the replacement of the tariff concession by the tariff quota". China adds that "to adjust the benchmark year-to-year is not as complicated as the Panel seems to believe", and this "is the result of a simple mathematical formula applied to import statistics". The European Union does not comment on China's request. We have revised paragraph 7.272 to more clearly draw out the problem that we see with requiring the Members engaged in the negotiations to change the benchmark defined in that provision from year to year until the negotiations have been concluded.

6.27. China additionally requests that the Panel clarify the basis on which it drew the conclusion, in the accompanying footnote to this paragraph (footnote 412 of the Interim Report, footnote 426 of the Final Report), that the fact that the European Union agreed not to base the calculation of the compensation on calendar year 2005, but rather to base it on a more recent twelve-month period of July 2005 to June 2006, does not lend support to the conclusion that the most recent period can be the most recent period preceding the conclusion of the negotiations. The European Union does not comment on China's request. We have rephrased footnote 412 of the Interim Report (footnote 426 of the Final Report) in the light of China's request.

6.28. Regarding paragraph 7.275, China states that the Panel appears to support "without analysis and without reference to the data and analysis submitted by China the assertion of the EU that the amount of trade covered by each of the TRQs in the Second Modification Package exceeds largely the greatest of the amounts that would result from each of the three formulae of paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII". China requests the Panel to provide an analysis on why it supports this assertion by the European Union, and to consider and take into account China's data showing that the global TRQs for several tariff lines do not reflect the future trade prospects of the WTO Members. Reference is made to paragraph 106 of China's Second Written Submission, to paragraph 50 of the China's opening statement at the second substantive meeting, and to China's response to Panel question No. 71. The European Union recalls that it has rebutted China's arguments in its second written submission (at paras. 77-85). We note that the purpose of the statement that is the subject of China's comment was not to make a finding on the question of whether the amount of trade covered by each of the TRQs in the Second Modification Package "exceeds largely the greatest of the amounts" that would result from each of the three formulae of paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII. The point was simply to illustrate, with actual examples, that paragraph 6 of the
Understanding establishes the basis for determining the \textit{minimum} amount of compensation that must be provided, and that it is always open for the Members involved in negotiations under Article XXVIII to agree on compensation that exceeds the minimum amount required. We have deleted this sentence in the light of China's comment.

6.29. With reference to \textit{paragraphs 7.291 and 7.293}, China submits that the arguments developed by the Panel do not respond to China's argument that "it would not make any sense to fix a global TRQ taking into account overall future prospects without taking into account future trade prospects at the level of the separate TRQs in which the global TRQ is broken down", and that to do otherwise "would result in over-compensation for some and under-compensation for others, thereby creating discrimination" (China's first written submission, para. 138; China's second written submission, para. 110). The European Union does not comment on China's request. We have added a reference to this argument in paragraph 7.291. We have added additional language in paragraph 7.299 to more explicitly address this argument.

6.30. China offers several observations on \textit{paragraph 7.301}. First, China states that "[i]n response to the Panel's question in paragraph 7.301, China refers to paragraph 43 of its Opening Statement at the Second Substantive Meeting. China submits that the Panel has not responded to the example given in that case which addresses the issue raised by the Panel in paragraph 7.301." Second, China takes issue with the statement that "China has not explained why it would be the case that, in a situation where a Member replaces an unlimited tariff concession with a TRQ that is not allocated among supplying countries, it could be presumed that the value of that compensation for each single Member would be equivalent to the value, for that Member, of the concession prior to its modification or withdrawal" (emphasis added). The European Union does not comment on China's request. We do not see how paragraph 43 of China's opening statement at the second meeting is relevant to the focus of paragraph 7.301. However, we have rephrased paragraph 7.301 in the light of the second point made by China.

6.31. Regarding \textit{paragraph 7.302}, China requests the Panel "to complete its analysis on an \textit{arguendo} basis that Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding apply to the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries". China disagrees with the Panel's statement that "China's claims of violation relating to the allocation of the TRQs are for the most part based on the same grounds as its claims relating to the total amount of the TRQs. Having rejected China's claims of violation relating to the total amount of the TRQs, the same conclusions would apply \textit{mutatis mutandis} to these additional claims insofar as they are the same". Specifically, China states that it does not consider that "the same conclusions would apply \textit{mutatis mutandis} to these additional claims insofar as they are the same". China gives two examples of reasoning by the Panel that "applies solely with regard to the total amount of the TRQs" and not to the share of TRQs assigned to China or "all others". The European Union does not comment on China's request. We recall that it is well established that a panel has the discretion to address only those arguments it deems necessary to resolve a particular claim. We are not convinced that addressing the above issues on an \textit{arguendo} basis will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Accordingly, we decline China's request. However, in the light of China's comment, we have rephrased this paragraph and we have deleted the statement referred to above.

6.6 \textbf{Claims under Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994}

6.32. With respect to \textit{paragraph 7.320}, China requests the Panel to indicate the factual basis for the statement that negotiations on the total amount of the TRQs under Article XXVIII "frequently occur simultaneously" with negotiations on the allocation of the TRQs under Article XIII:2(d). The European Union does not comment on China's request. The basis for our statement is cited in the accompanying footnote, namely Canada's observation in its third-party submission that "[i]f Article XXVIII is being used, it is very likely that allocation under Article XIII will occur coincident with the establishment of a TRQ under Article XXVIII." However, in the light of China's comment, we have rephrased the wording of this sentence to clarify that the Panel is not making any factual finding on the frequency with which negotiations under Article XXVIII and XIII:2(d) occur simultaneously.

6.33. With reference to \textit{paragraphs 7.332 and 7.333}, China requests the Panel to clarify why the fact that the import restrictions may have included WTO-inconsistent measures in EEC – \textit{Apples (Chile I)} or the fact that import restrictions in the form of WTO-consistent SPS measures
"has any link with the assessment of whether a representative period was selected". China notes that, as mentioned by the Panel, Article XIII:2(d) does not have a qualification of "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" and hence, whether or not the import restrictions are discriminatory or not or whether they are WTO-consistent or not, has no relevance in the view of China. The European Union does not comment on China's request. We consider that although the WTO-consistency of any import restrictions in place during a period selected is not a decisive factor for the purpose of determining whether that period is "representative", it is a relevant consideration. Therefore, we have clarified this point in paragraph 7.333.

6.34. China also requests that the Panel clarify its analysis in paragraph 7.337, as China does not see the link that the Panel attempts to establish between the fact that the objective of the EU measures was to make sure that domestic and foreign suppliers respect the same sanitary requirements, and the issue of whether these SPS measures are "special factors" or not. The European Union considers that "unless a measure is WTO inconsistent or it can be said to be out of the ordinary, unusual, exceptional for some other reasons, than it cannot be characterised as a special factor". The European Union recalls the dictionary definition of "special": "Of an abstract concept, immaterial thing, etc.: out of the ordinary, unusual; exceptional in quality or degree" or "Of a material thing, event, etc.: out of the ordinary; excelling in some (usu. positive) quality". We have clarified this point in paragraph 7.337 in the light of China's comment.

6.35. China requests clarification of the Panel's suggestion in paragraph 7.350 that the consideration of "special factors" would be redundant if a TRQ allocation must as a rule always be based on a representative period immediately preceding the opening of the TRQ. In this regard, China submits that the determination of "a previous representative period" and of "special factors" are separate determinations and it must be determined whether a previous representative period was affected by special factors. In China's view, there is "no automatism between a period preceding the allocation of the TRQ and the existence of special factors". The European Union does not comment on China's request. We did not intend to suggest that consideration of "special factors" would be redundant if a TRQ allocation must as a rule always be based on a representative period immediately preceding the opening of the TRQ. In order to clarify that our interpretation of the terms "special factors" in Article XIII:2 does not rest on that premise, we have modified this paragraph in the light of China's comment.

6.36. The European Union observes that paragraphs 7.313, 7.379, and 7.388 all convey the idea that the Panel's findings in relation to China's claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 are made in the alternative to the findings that the panel reached (in the first place) on China's claims under Article XIII:2(d). However, the European Union considers that when one reads the finding of the Panel in paragraph 7.406 and the conclusion in paragraph 8.1(e), that idea is not clearly conveyed. For the sake of clarity, the European Union suggests that the Panel recall in paragraph 7.406 and again in the conclusion in paragraph 8.1(e) that those findings and conclusion are made in the alternative to the findings concerning China's claims under Article XIII:2(d), i.e. they are relevant to the extent that the conclusion reached by the panel in paragraph 7.378 and recalled in paragraph 8.1(d) would be incorrect. The European Union submits in this regard that if the Panel is right in concluding that the European Union violated Article XIII:2(d) by not recognising China as a Member holding a substantial interest in supplying the products under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 and by failing to seek agreement with China, then the European Union cannot be faulted at the same time for not having allocated a greater "all others" share under the same tariff lines. China sees no reason to make the amendments requested by the European Union, "precisely because the Panel's findings and conclusions are clear". We consider that our findings and conclusions are sufficiently clear, and we therefore see no need to amend these paragraphs as suggested by the European Union.

6.37. The European Union notes that paragraph 7.409 states that "... establishing an 'all others' share in a TRQ without regard to the actual import shares held over a previous representative period would, unless agreed by all substantial suppliers, be at odds with the general rule that TRQ shares should be allocated in a way that approaches 'as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions'." The European Union observes, however, that in the Panel's view the general rule of the chapeau of Article XIII:2 applies also when allocation of the TRQ is agreed with all substantial suppliers. Accordingly, the European Union suggests that the Panel qualify the phrase "unless agreed by all substantial
suppliers” or delete it altogether. The European Union notes that this applies *mutatis mutandis* to **paragraph 7.418**. China does not comment on the European Union's suggestion. We have deleted the reference to "unless agreed by all substantial suppliers" in paragraphs 7.409 and 7.418.

6.38. With respect to **paragraph 7.418**, China notes the Panel's assessment that nowhere in the statements invoked by China from *EC – Bananas III* did the Panel or the Appellate Body mention or imply the obligation to reserve a share in the TRQ to "all other" suppliers of any specific magnitude. However, China states that "the issue that China brought up is not about the specific magnitude of the share" reserved for "all others", but rather "the fact that there should not be a permanent allocation of tariff rate quotas". The European Union comments that China "again tries to alter the claim it presented during the Panel proceedings, by arguing that it did not bring up the issue of a minimum size of the TRQ share to be allocated to "all others". However, this was precisely one of China's claims (see para. 7.407 which contains a reference to China's submissions and it is not contested by China) which was discussed at length during the Panel's meetings with the parties." Moreover, the European Union considers that the Panel has also adequately addressed China's argument that without a minimum "all others" share the TRQs allocation would be frozen (see paragraph 7.419). Therefore, the European Union considers that whilst objectively speaking there is no need to amend this point of the panel interim report, it does not oppose any clarification that the Panel may consider appropriate in this respect. We have rephrased paragraph 7.418 in the light of China's comment.

6.39. China asks the Panel to revise **paragraph 7.419**, which states in relevant part: "As the European Union observes, the objective of preventing a long-term freeze of the allocation cannot necessarily be prevented by reserving a given share to 'all others' in the TRQ, but may instead require other means, such as setting a time limit to the validity of the allocation (or a periodic review thereof). As we explained elsewhere in our Report, China's response to this argument was to claim that the European Union violated Article XIII:1 and XIII:2 by failing to annually review and reallocate the TRQ shares based on the most recent trade developments." Specifically, China requests the deletion of the final sentence. China submits that, as noted above in the comments made with regard to paragraphs 7.136 and 7.137, China's arguments in respect of the subsequent allocation by the European Union of the TRQs "were not in response to the EU's relevant argument". The European Union states that it does not understand the purpose of China's request to the Panel to examine the two abstract examples it formulated in its response to Panel question No. 64(b). Moreover, the European Union states that those two examples have nothing to do with the facts of the present case, so it is really hard to grasp their relevance for solving the present dispute. The European Union observes that "China itself, also in its comments on the interim report, is unable to explain the relevance of those examples for the present dispute and it does not suggest how any possible position that the Panel might take in reply to them would impact on its findings". In these circumstances, the European Union believes that the Panel's thorough analysis contained in this section is complete as it addresses all the arguments raised by the parties "that are objectively relevant to respond to the claim raised by China". We

### 6.8 Claims under Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994

6.40. Regarding the discussion of China's claim under Article XIII:1 (**paragraphs 7.422-7.437**), China submits that the Panel's analysis on Article XIII:1 is incomplete "inasmuch as it does not address the arguments that China advanced in its response to the Panel's question 64(b) and in particular to the section on Article XIII:1 therein". China recalls that it "raised therein the arguments and examples of an allocation of shares in a TRQ that would meet the requirements of Article XIII:2(d) but still violate Article XIII:1". China requests the Panel to also "complete its analysis" on this point. The European Union states that it does not understand the purpose of China's request to the Panel to examine the two abstract examples it formulated in its response to Panel question No. 64(b). Moreover, the European Union states that those two examples have nothing to do with the facts of the present case, so it is really hard to grasp their relevance for solving the present dispute. The European Union observes that "China itself, also in its comments on the interim report, is unable to explain the relevance of those examples for the present dispute and it does not suggest how any possible position that the Panel might take in reply to them would impact on its findings". In these circumstances, the European Union believes that the Panel's thorough analysis contained in this section is complete as it addresses all the arguments raised by the parties "that are objectively relevant to respond to the claim raised by China". We
note that our findings summarize the parties' arguments to the extent necessary to facilitate understanding of our own assessment and reasoning, and do not aim to fully reproduce the parties' arguments as set forth in their submissions. We consider that paragraph 7.435 provides an adequate exposition of China's argumentation on the relationship between Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2.

6.41. Regarding paragraph 7.434, China requests the Panel to modify the statement that "[a]ll of China's argumentation under Article XIII:1 relates to the amount of the TRQ shares allocated to 'all others'". In this regard, China recalls that it also claims that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:1 "by allocating country-specific shares only to Brazil and/or Thailand but not to China which was also a substantial supplier". Reference is made to paragraph 127 of China's second written submission, and to the fact that the Panel itself also acknowledges this at paragraph 7.423 of its Interim Report. The European Union does not comment on China's request. We have revised the wording of this paragraph in the light of China's comment.

6.9 Claims under Article I:1 of the GATT 1994

6.42. Regarding paragraph 7.448, China requests the Panel to clarify why it surmises from China's response to the Panel's question 59(c) that whether a TRQ allocation is "disproportionate" under Article I:1 is to be assessed on a basis that is different from the TRQ rules set forth in Article XIII:2. In this respect, China notes that "all China stated was that its claim under Article I:1 does not depend on the outcome of claims under Article XIII or XXVIII". And in support, China referred to paragraph 344 of the Appellate Body's decision in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) in which it is stated that the ACP duty-free quota is not a limitation on a tariff preference that is subject only to Article I:1 but a tariff quota subject also to Article XIII. In addition, China observes that the Panel claims that China has not elaborated its argument that the TRQ allocation to Brazil and Thailand is "disproportionate". China nevertheless refers to its response to Panel question No. 59 and to paragraph 207 of its second written submission and requests the Panel to take this into account. According to the European Union, China's comments "appear to be the result of a hasty reading of the interim report". The European Union notes that the Panel's reasoning is explained in clear terms in this paragraph, and China's arguments (developed in Panel question 59 and in paragraph 207 of its second written submission) are properly summed up in this section of the interim report. Accordingly the European Union does not see the need to amend this paragraph of the interim report. We consider that paragraph 7.448 already sets forth the basis upon which "it might be surmised" that, in China's view, whether a TRQ allocation is "disproportionate" under Article I:1 is to be assessed on a basis that is different from the TRQ allocation rules set forth in Article XIII:2. In addition, having reviewed China's response to Panel question No. 59 and to paragraph 207 of its second written submission, we still do not find any additional substantial elaboration of its argument beyond stating that the TRQ allocation is "disproportionate". Accordingly, we have not revised paragraph 7.448.

6.43. Regarding paragraph 7.449, China requests the Panel to add ", while other substantial suppliers such as China are not" at the end of the first sentence to accurately reflect China's arguments as acknowledged by the Panel at paragraph 7.438 of the Report. The European Union does not comment on China's request. We have adjusted the wording of this paragraph, as requested by China. We have also added an accompanying citation to paragraph 208 of China's second written submission.

6.10 Claims under Article XIII:4 of the GATT 1994

6.44. The European Union considers that given that import figures postdating December 2013 are irrelevant for the present dispute, they should be deleted from the tables contained in the panel report (paragraph 7.466). China objects to such deletion, and observes that these import figures were provided in response to questions from the Panel; they are part of the record and should, as a result, remain in the tables contained in the report to accurately reflect the data supplied by China and the European Union. We note that our findings under Article XIII:2 and XIII:4 are not based on import statistics post-dating December 2013. However, we do not see why it follows that those figures should be deleted from the tables contained in the panel report. Accordingly, we have not deleted the data from the tables.
6.45. Regarding **paragraph 7.491**, China notes the Panel's statement that "China's request to enter into consultations under Article XIII:4 does not contain a reference to the specific tariff lines upon which its request is based." China observes that the request to enter into consultations is contained in Exhibit CHN-39. The Note Verbale refers to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1218/2012, through which a new tariff regime on the tariff items concerned had been adopted. In the Note Verbale, China referred to "the tariff lines" concerned, as the tariff lines that were affected by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1218/2012. China submits that it was therefore abundantly clear to the European Union, on 19 December 2013, that China had requested to enter into consultations on all the tariff lines affected by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1218/2012. China requests the Panel "to clarify whether its analysis took into account the fact that Exhibit CHN-39 contains an explicit reference to the document containing information on the tariff lines that China sought to consult on". Moreover, if the Panel confirms that it took Exhibit CHN-35 into account in its analysis, China requests the Panel "to clarify whether it considers that the request to enter into consultations under Article XIII:4 itself should contain an explicit reference to the relevant tariff lines and whether a reference to the document directly implementing the changes to those tariff lines is insufficient". The European Union states that China "tries once again to amend its arguments and claim at this stage of the proceedings". The European Union observes that "the interim report recalls, in its comments to the EU response to question 123 of the panel, China recognised that its request was addressing tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85". The European Union observes that now China argues instead that the European Union should have understood that its request was addressing all of the tariff lines concerned by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1218/2012, because its Note Verbale contains a cross reference to that Regulation. Hence, the European Union considers that not only is China trying to reargue the case by attempting to amend its claim", but it is also explicitly admitting that its request to enter into consultations with the European Union under Article XIII:4 did not identify "in a clear and unequivocal manner the specific tariff line(s) upon which that request was based, as in order to guess what those tariff lines are one should refer to other documents mentioned in that request". Furthermore, the European Union observes that as recalled by the Panel in paragraph 7.492, in its Note Verbale China claimed to have "a substantial supplying interest in several of the tariff items concerned" by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1218/2012 (emphasis added). Therefore, the European Union submits that "this Note Verbale made clear one thing only i.e. that China did not claim an SSI on all the tariff lines concerned by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1218/2012, but on several of those tariff lines, without specifying which ones". The European Union states that this "contradicts openly" China's new argument to the effect that it was abundantly clear to the European Union, on 19 of December 2013, that China had requested to enter into consultations "on all the tariff lines affected by that Regulation". We have adjusted paragraphs 7.491 and 7.492 in the light of the parties' comments.

6.46. Regarding **paragraph 7.492**, China observes that the Panel continues its analysis by observing that China took an "all inclusive" approach with respect to its claims of interest in supplying the products covered by the First and Second Modification Packages. China requests the Panel to clarify its understanding of an "all inclusive" approach, which the Panel refers to again in the eighth sentence of this paragraph. China also requests the Panel to clarify how a WTO Member can ensure that it meets the Panel's proposed standard of "specificity" regarding which tariff lines and special factors were concerned, other than by referring to the very document that implemented the changes to the tariff regime. We have adjusted paragraph 7.492 to clarify what we mean by an "all inclusive" approach. We have also revised paragraph 7.492 to clarify that there is no general standard of "specificity" that we are reading into Article XIII:4.

6.11 **Claims under Article II:1 of the GATT 1994**

6.47. China observes, in relation to **paragraph 7.527**, that WTO Members and in particular the European Union distinguish between the "entry into force" and the "application" of legal instruments, with the entry into force being capable of preceding the application by several years. China respectfully requests the Panel "to consider this in the context of its analysis in paragraph 7.527 and to determine whether and how this impacts its analysis". The European Union does not comment on China's request. We have considered the distinction referred to by China, but we do not see how it impacts on our analysis in paragraph 7.527 or this section more generally. Accordingly, we have made no change as a consequence of China's comment.
7 FINDINGS

7.1 General

7.1.1 General overview of China's claims and horizontal arguments

7.1. This section aims to provide a general overview of several horizontal arguments that underlie China's claims in this dispute. The measures at issue, and the distinct claims that China advances, are elaborated in greater detail in the subsequent sections of this Report.

7.2. The claims brought by China concern the modification by the European Union of bound duties inscribed in its Schedule of concessions on certain poultry products pursuant to negotiations with Brazil and Thailand held under Article XXVIII:5 of the GATT 1994. A first negotiation exercise (the "First Modification Package"), which was initiated in 2006 and saw the negotiations concluded in 2006, resulted in the European Union replacing its ad-valorem duties with tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on poultry products classified under three tariff items. A second negotiation exercise (the "Second Modification Package"), which was initiated in 2009 and according to the European Union concluded at negotiators' level in late-2011\(^{18}\), resulted in the European Union replacing its ad-valorem duties with TRQs for poultry products classified under seven other tariff items.

7.3. In each negotiation exercise, the European Union determined that Brazil and Thailand were the only WTO Members that held a "principal supplying interest" or "substantial interest", within the meaning of Article XXVIII:1, in any of the tariff concessions at issue and entered into negotiations under Article XXVIII:5 with these Members. The European Union based its determination of which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest on actual import data covering the three-years preceding the initiation of each of the two negotiation exercises (i.e. 2003-2005 for the First Modification Package, and 2006-2008 for the Second Modification Package). It is not in dispute that, during the reference periods selected by the European Union, imports of the poultry products concerned from China into the European Union were negligible.

7.4. Each of the TRQs agreed with Brazil and Thailand provides for an in-quota tariff at a rate that is equal to or lower than the European Union's previously bound rate of duty, together with an out-of-quota tariff rate that is in all cases higher than the European Union's bound rate of duty before the modification. Under all of the TRQs resulting from the First Modification Package, Brazil and/or Thailand are each allocated their own country-specific share, with an "all others" share set aside for all other countries. The situation is similar for all of the TRQs resulting from the Second Modification Package, whereby Brazil and/or Thailand are each allocated their own country-specific share, with an "all others" share set aside for all other countries (except for one tariff line (HS1602 3921) where there is no "all others" share and the entirety of the TRQ is allocated to Thailand). The majority of each TRQ, and in some cases the vast majority (or all) of the TRQ, is allocated to Brazil and/or Thailand (the "all others" TRQ share is below 20% in all cases).

7.5. The total volume of each TRQ and the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries was determined, with some exceptions, on the basis of actual import data for the three-year period preceding the initiation of each of the two negotiation exercises (i.e. 2003-2005 for the First Modification Package\(^{19}\), and 2006-2008 for the Second Modification Package). As noted above, during these reference periods, imports of the poultry products concerned from China into the European Union were negligible.

7.6. As elaborated in greater detail later in our Report, the European Union had applied several SPS measures throughout the period concerned by the two Article XXVIII negotiations, i.e. 2003-2008. Following a relaxation of the SPS measures by the European Union in July 2008, imports of heat treated poultry products from China into the European Union increased significantly under some of the tariff lines at issue. This increase was taking place while the European Union's negotiations with Brazil and Thailand in relation to the Second Modification Package were still ongoing. The European Union did not update the reference period selected for the purpose of determining which Members to negotiate with regarding the modification of its

\(^{18}\) See footnote 128 below.
\(^{19}\) EU's first written submission, para 32, page 9. In the case of the TRQs for tariff lines 0210 9939 and 1602 3219, the European Union agreed, at the request of Brazil and Thailand, to use a different reference period. See paras. 33-35.
concessions, or for the purpose of calculating the total volume of the TRQs or the respective TRQ shares allocated to different countries. With respect to the TRQs under the Second Modification Package, the European Union made no adjustment to the TRQ allocations to reflect more recent data and the increase in China's share of imports.

7.7. Against this background, China claims that the European Union acted inconsistently with various articles of the GATT 1994 by basing the above determinations on actual import levels over the periods 2003-2005 and 2006-2008. China advances distinct claims of violation under Article XXVIII:1, Article XXVIII:2 in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII, Article XIII:1, the chapeau and paragraph (d) of Article XIII:2, Article XIII:4, Article II:1, and Article I:1. In these findings, the Panel will consider China's claims and arguments on a provision-by-provision basis, so as to ensure that due account is taken of the applicable legal standard and subject-matter of each provision. However, there is significant degree of overlap in China's argumentation under these provisions, and many of its claims under these provisions rest on one or more of the same grounds. Therefore, it is helpful to provide an overview of three fundamental arguments that underlie China's claims in this dispute. Each argument relates in one way or another to the European Union's use of data regarding actual import levels over the periods 2003-2005 and 2006-2008.

7.8. First, China argues that the European Union was prohibited from basing its determinations on actual import levels during the periods 2003-2005 and 2006-2008 on the grounds that, throughout both of these periods, there were SPS measures in place that prohibited or significantly restricted the importation of poultry products from China into the European Union. According to China, the European Union was obligated to base its determinations under these provisions on either a different reference period, or on an estimate of the import shares that China would have had in the absence of those SPS measures. China argues that in determining the share that China would have had absent the import ban, the European Union should have taken into account factors such as China's production capacity and investment in the affected products, estimates of export growth, and forecasts of demand in the European Union. China provides information on the level of its poultry exports before, during and after the ban, both to the European Union and other countries, to support its contention that China could reasonably be expected to have had a significant share of the EU market in the absence of the SPS measures that were in place. China claims that by not basing its determinations under these provisions on an estimate of the import shares that China would have had in the absence of those SPS measures, the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1, Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding, Article XIII:1, and the provisions of Article XIII:2.

7.9. Second, China argues that the European Union was required to use the most recent reference period of 2009-2011 as the basis for its determinations in the context of the Second Modification Package. As noted above, the negotiations under the Second Modification Package were initiated in 2009, but did not conclude at the negotiators' level until September 2011, according to the European Union, and the completion of the negotiations was not notified to the WTO until December 2012. During that period, China's share of imports under several tariff lines increased following the relaxation of the SPS measures. China submits that the European Union was under an obligation to base its determinations on the most recent three-year period preceding the conclusion of the negotiations (2009-2011), not the three-year period preceding the initiation of the negotiations (2006-2008). China claims that by not doing so in respect of its initial TRQ allocations, the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1, Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding, and Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2. China further claims that by subsequently making no adjustment to the TRQ allocation following a request for reappraisal by China in 2013, the European Union violated Article XIII:4.

7.10. Third, China argues that the European Union was obligated to set aside an "all others" share of at least 10% when allocating the TRQs among supplying countries, regardless of the actual level of imports and whatever the reference period selected. According to China, the amount set aside for "all others" must be sufficient to allow at least one other Member going forward to achieve a substantial interest as a supplier of the products subject to the TRQs. In this case, the European Union recognised Members as holding a substantial supplying interest if they accounted for 10% share of imports in the tariff line concerned. Accordingly, China claims that by not setting aside an "all others" rate of at least 10% within each TRQ, the European Union violated Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2.
7.11. In addition to these three horizontal arguments, China advances various additional claims and arguments under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding, Article XIII:1, Article II:1, and Article I:1. These are elaborated in the context of analysing China’s claims under those provisions.

7.1.2 Order of analysis

7.12. A panel enjoys a degree of discretion to structure the order of its analysis as it deems appropriate. In exercising that discretion, a panel may decide to follow, but is not bound by, the manner in which the complainant presented its claims.

7.13. We begin by examining China’s claims that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by failing to recognize China as a Member with a principal or substantial supplying interest for purposes of the negotiations under Article XXVIII. We then examine China’s claims that the compensation provided by the European Union, including the total amount of the TRQs and their allocation among supplying countries, is inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII.

7.14. We will then examine China’s claims under Article XIII regarding the European Union’s allocation of TRQs among supplying countries. We first consider China’s claims under the provisions of Article XIII:2, as both parties agree that Article XIII:2 refers specifically to the allocation of TRQs. After addressing China’s claims regarding the initial TRQ allocation under the provisions of Article XIII:2(d) followed by China’s claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2, we will then proceed to address China’s claims regarding the initial TRQ allocation under Article XIII:1 and Article I:1. After we have addressed China’s claims regarding the initial TRQ allocation, we will then turn to China’s claim that, following the entry into force of the TRQs under the Second Modification Package, the European Union violated Article XIII:4 by failing to enter into meaningful consultations with China regarding the need for an adjustment of the TRQ shares allocated among supplying countries.

7.15. Finally, we address China’s claims that the European Union violated Article II:1 by applying the modifications agreed in the Article XXVIII negotiations prior to those changes being incorporated into the text of its Schedule of concessions through the certification process.

7.1.3 Function of the Panel

7.16. According to Article 11 of the DSU, the function of a panel is “to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements.” The same Article provides that a panel is to make an “objective assessment of the matter before it”, including:

[A]n objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.

7.17. Regarding the requirement to conduct an "objective assessment" of the facts, the Appellate Body has stated that it is not for panels to undertake a de novo review, nor to show total deference to the findings of the national authorities. On the specific subject of the assessment of evidence, the Appellate Body has stated that:

[I]n accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, a panel is required to "consider all the evidence presented to it, assess its credibility, determine its weight, and ensure that its factual findings have a proper basis in that evidence". It must further provide in its report "reasoned and adequate explanations and coherent reasoning" to support its findings. Within these parameters, "it is generally within the discretion of the [p]anel

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20 Appellate Body Report, Colombia – Textiles, para. 5.20.
22 See e.g. China’s response to Panel question No. 29(b), para. 147.
to decide which evidence it chooses to utilize in making findings”. Although a panel must consider evidence before it in its totality, and “evaluate the relevance and probative force” of all of the evidence, a panel is not required “to discuss, in its report, each and every piece of evidence” put before it, or to “accord to factual evidence of the parties the same meaning and weight as do the parties”.24 (footnotes omitted)

7.18. A panel’s obligation to make an objective assessment of the matter also refers to the legal assessment, that is, the analysis of the consistency or inconsistency of the challenged measures with the applicable provisions.25 To that end, a panel is free “to use arguments submitted by any of the parties – or to develop its own legal reasoning – to support its own findings and conclusions on the matter under its consideration.”26

7.1.4 Interpretation of the GATT 1994

7.19. Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the WTO dispute settlement system serves to "clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law". The "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" referred to by the DSU include Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention).

7.20. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose".27 It is well established that a treaty interpreter must "read all applicable provisions of a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of them, harmoniously".28

7.21. Under the terms of Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention, the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise the text of the relevant agreement, including its preamble and annexes, along with agreements or instruments made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty. The text of the GATT 1994 includes not only the articles contained therein, but also the Ad Notes contained in Annex I of the GATT. In this connection, we recall that the articles of the GATT and the accompanying Ad Notes “have equivalent treaty status in that both are treaty language which was negotiated and agreed at the same time”, and that they must “be read together in order to give them proper meaning”.29 By virtue of paragraph 1(c)(vi) of the GATT 1994, the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 (the Understanding) is also an integral part of the GATT 1994. Thus, there can be no question that Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, and any related provisions, must be interpreted harmoniously with the relevant Ad Notes and the Understanding.

7.22. In their submissions, the parties have referred to the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII30 and the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules.31 Both of these procedures were adopted in 1980, in the context of the GATT 1947. In these proceedings, diverse views have been presented by the parties and third parties on the proper legal characterization of these procedures. However, it is common ground between the parties and third parties expressing

27 With respect to good faith, the Appellate Body has indicated that “[t]hat means, inter alia, that terms of a treaty are not to be interpreted based on the assumption that one party is seeking to evade its obligations and will exercise its rights so as to cause injury to the other party” (Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 326).
a view on the matter that, at a minimum, both procedures qualify as "decisions", "procedures" or "customary practices" within the meaning of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement.32

7.23. Article XVI:1 instructs that:

Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947.

7.24. The Appellate Body has stated that "Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement ... bring[s] the legal history and experience under the GATT 1947 into the new realm of the WTO in a way that ensures continuity and consistency in a smooth transition from the GATT 1947 system", and "acknowledges the continuing relevance of that experience to the new trading system served by the WTO".33

7.25. We agree with the parties and third parties that both sets of procedures qualify as "decisions", "procedures" or "customary practices" within the meaning of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement. First, we see no basis to question that these procedures qualify either as "decisions", "procedures" or "customary practices" within the meaning of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement. Second, it is clear that both sets of procedures were "followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947" since their adoption in 1980. Third, neither the WTO Agreement nor the GATT 1994 made provision for any new procedures to supersede these procedures. To the contrary, the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII continue to serve as the basis for all negotiations under Article XXVIII.34 These same procedures are expressly referred to, in whole or in part, in several WTO instruments.35 The Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules continue to apply under the WTO as well. This is evidenced, inter alia, by the fact that they have been applied in several prior disputes by WTO panels and the Appellate Body.36

7.26. Article XVI:1 states that "the WTO" shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947. This reference to the WTO would include the Dispute Settlement Body, and we therefore see no reason why the sphere of application of Article XVI:1 would not extend to a dispute settlement panel. Accordingly, we consider that we are under a duty ("shall be guided by") to take account of these procedures in our interpretation of the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994.

7.27. In this case, diverse views have been presented on whether one or both of these procedures might additionally be characterized as "decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947" within the meaning of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the GATT 199437, as a "subsequent agreement

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32 China's response to Panel question No. 10, paras. 62, 70; EU's response to Panel question No. 10, para. 33. In response to Panel question No. 1 to the third parties, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Russia, and Thailand expressed the view that both procedures fall within the scope of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement.
34 EU's first written submission, para. 99.
35 For example, see paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII; paragraph 4 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV; paragraph 6 of the Marrakesh Protocol to the GATT 1994; and the decisions adopted by the General Council for introducing Harmonized System changes into the Schedules (i.e. the Decision of 30 November 2011, WT/L/831, footnote 3; the Decision of 18 July 2001, WT/L/407, footnote 10; the Decision of 15 December 2006, WT/L/673, footnote 4).
37 China considers that the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII do not fall within the scope of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the GATT 1994, whereas the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules do fall within the scope of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the GATT 1994 (China's response to Panel question No. 10, paras. 61, 63-70). The European Union considers that neither of these procedures falls within the scope of paragraph 1(b)(iv) (EU's response to Panel question No. 10, paras. 34-39, and to No. 102(b)). In response to Panel question No. 1 to the third parties, Argentina and the United States expressed the view that both procedures fall within the scope of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the GATT 1994; Canada and Russia expressed the view that the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII do not, whereas the Procedures for Modification
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, or form the basis for "subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. Recalling that there is no disagreement that both procedures fall within the scope of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement, and thus no disagreement that the Panel should take them into account in its examination of China's claims under the GATT 1994, we see no need to decide on whether any of the foregoing may constitute additional legal justifications for taking the two procedures into account. We note that there have been several prior cases in which panels and the Appellate Body referred to these procedures without elaborating on their legal status.

7.28. We recall that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the "preparatory work" of the treaty and "the circumstances of its conclusion", in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. The Appellate Body has stressed that Article 32 does not define exhaustively the supplementary means of interpretation, so that an interpreter has a certain degree of flexibility in considering relevant supplementary means in a given case so as to assist in ascertaining the common intentions of the parties.

7.1.5 Burden of proof

7.29. The DSU does not contain any express provision governing the burden of proof. However, by application of general principles of law the WTO dispute settlement system has recognized that the burden of proof lies with the party asserting a fact, whether that party is the complainant or the responding Member.

7.30. The burden of proving that a challenged measure is inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the covered agreements lies with the complaining party. Once the complaining party has made a prima facie case of such inconsistency, the burden shifts to the defending party, which must then refute the alleged inconsistency. Precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be

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38 China considers that both procedures constitute "subsequent agreements" within the scope of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention (China's response to Panel question No. 10, paras. 63, 71). The European Union considers that it is "debatable whether they can be regarded as a 'subsequent' agreement within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a)" of the Vienna Convention, and that "[g]iven that, in any event, the Procedures fall clearly within the scope of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement, it seems that the Panel need not reach this issue" (EU’s response to Panel question No. 102(c), para. 74). Without reference to Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, the European Union observes in respect of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII that "[a]ll renegotiations under Article XXVIII are now being conducted under those procedures" (EU's first written submission, para. 99).

In response to Panel question No. 1 to the third parties, Argentina and Thailand expressed the view that neither of the procedures falls within the scope of paragraph 1(b)(iv).

39 If a claim of violation of either of these procedures was properly before the Panel, it would then be necessary to resolve whether either of these procedures was part of a "covered agreement" as defined in Appendix 1 to the DSU. To resolve that issue, we would need to arrive at a conclusion as to whether either of these procedures are "decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947" within the meaning of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the GATT 1994. However, for the reasons set out further below in section 7.3.3.1, we do not consider any such claim to be properly before the Panel in this case.

40 See footnote 36.

41 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 282.

42 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 283.


44 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 98.
required for the complaining party to establish its case will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and case to case. In any event, it should be borne in mind that:

A *prima facie* case must be based on "evidence and legal argument" put forward by the complaining party in relation to *each* of the elements of the claim. A complaining party may not simply submit evidence and expect the panel to divine from it a claim of WTO-inconsistency. Nor may a complaining party simply allege facts without relating them to its legal arguments.

7.31. In the matter before us, the burden is on China to persuade the Panel that the measures at issue are inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT 1994 allegedly violated.

7.32. In this dispute, China claims that all ten of the TRQs arising from the First and Second Modification Packages are inconsistent with the GATT 1994 and for that reason, in order to meet its burden of proof, China is required to prove its claims in respect of each of the TRQs at issue. The European Union requests the Panel to make, "in respect of each claim, a separate finding with regard to each of the TRQs at issue". By this, we understand the European Union to mean that "China should not be allowed to make its case in respect of a TRQ on the basis of argument or evidence pertaining to another TRQ". We do not understand the European Union to suggest that our Report should be structured so as to present a separate, individualized analysis of each of the TRQs at issue under each of the different GATT provisions at issue. Leaving aside the degree of repetition that this would involve in a case involving ten different TRQs that share many common features, neither party has structured its own submissions in that way. Of course, where claims or arguments are specific to only one or a few of the TRQs, our analysis will make that clear.

### 7.1.6 Request for enhanced third-party rights

7.33. On 17 December 2015, Brazil, Canada and Thailand each requested the Panel to grant enhanced third-party rights in these proceedings. The scope of the rights requested by these third parties was similar, but not identical. The rights requested were the following: (i) the right to be present for the entirety of all substantive meetings with the parties; (ii) the right to receive all submissions and statements of the parties, including responses to questions from the Panel, throughout the proceedings; (iii) the right to respond to questions from the Panel; and, (iv) the right in the substantive meetings to ask questions, at the invitation of the Panel, to the parties or the other third parties without any obligation to respond on the part of the parties or the other third parties.

7.34. Brazil and Thailand based their requests on the understanding that the measures challenged by China concern the TRQ shares that were allocated to them by the European Union. Furthermore, they note that these TRQs were adopted by the European Union to implement the separate bilateral agreements reached with Brazil and Thailand as a result of negotiations to

46 Appellate Body Report, *US – Gambling*, para. 140. (emphasis original, footnotes omitted)
47 EU's first written submission, para. 2. See also EU's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 9.
48 EU's first written submission, para. 2.
49 Panels may structure their reports in a manner that avoids repetition. This is commonly achieved by grouping together measures or claims that raise the same issues. See e.g. Panel Reports, *Guatemala – Cement II*, para. 7.5; *EU – Footwear*, para. 7.114. Naturally, care must be taken to ensure that such grouping does not lead to important differences being obscured. Appellate Body Report, *Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages*, para. 142.
50 Request by Brazil (Letter from Brazil dated 17 December 2015, p. 2), request by Canada (Letter from Canada dated 17 December 2015, p.2) and request by Thailand (Letter from Thailand, p. 7).
51 Request by Brazil (Letter from Brazil dated 17 December 2015, p. 2), request by Canada (Letter from Canada dated 17 December 2015, p.2) and request by Thailand (Letter from Thailand dated 17 December 2015, p. 7). Thailand also requested the right to receive the exhibits related to all submissions and statements by the parties.
52 Brazil requested the right to respond to questions from the Panel "whenever it finds appropriate" (Letter from Brazil dated 17 December 2015, p. 2). Thailand requested the right to respond to questions from the Panel "during the proceedings, up to immediately prior to the issuance of the interim report" (Letter from Thailand dated 17 December 2015, p. 7).
53 Request by Thailand (Letter from Thailand dated 17 December 2015, p. 7).
modify the European Union's concessions pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994.\textsuperscript{54} Brazil additionally points out that China's panel request specifically referred to these bilateral agreements in the context of identifying the measures at issue.\textsuperscript{55} Brazil and Thailand consider that any possible modification or withdrawal of the TRQs negotiated with the European Union as a result of the Panel's rulings could negatively affect their economic interests, as well as their legal rights pursuant to these bilateral agreements.\textsuperscript{56} In addition, both Brazil and Thailand noted that the negotiations under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 were related to the European Union's implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings in \textit{EC – Chicken Cuts}, a prior dispute brought against the European Union by Thailand and Brazil. Finally, Thailand and Brazil submit that they are significant exporters of poultry products, both globally and to the European Union.\textsuperscript{57} In these circumstances, Brazil argued that it had "a direct and concrete interest in participating appropriately in this dispute"\textsuperscript{58}, and Thailand likewise argued that it "ha[d] a unique economic and legal interest" in these proceedings.\textsuperscript{59}

7.35. Canada requested enhanced third-party rights on the basis that the dispute raises important issues for the modification of tariff commitments and the administration of TRQs. Since Canada administers TRQs in the agriculture sector, it argued that "the outcome of this dispute could have important legal and policy implications for Canada".\textsuperscript{60}

7.36. The European Union did not object to Brazil's, Canada's and Thailand's requests for enhanced third-party rights.\textsuperscript{61} However, China considered that the circumstances of this dispute did not warrant the grant of enhanced third-party rights, as requested by Brazil, Canada or Thailand.\textsuperscript{62} China noted that previous panels have only granted requests for additional third-party rights when the requesting third party could show "specific reasons" that differentiated it from other third parties to the proceedings, all of which may be presumed to have a "substantial interest" in the proceedings before a panel.\textsuperscript{63} According to China, a potential and indirect impact of a panel ruling on the economic interests of the third party making a request for enhanced rights, as in the present case, is not a sufficient reason to grant those rights.\textsuperscript{64}

7.37. The Panel considered the requests of Brazil, Canada and Thailand, and the views of the parties. On 3 February 2016, the Panel informed the parties and third parties that it had decided to grant the following enhanced rights to all third parties in these proceedings:

a. the right to be present and observe the entirety of the first and second substantive meetings with the parties; and

b. the right to receive the parties' first and second written submissions, written responses to questions and comments thereupon, and related exhibits.\textsuperscript{65}

7.38. In its communication, the Panel indicated that it would provide its reasoning on this matter in its Report. Our reasons are as follows.

7.39. The Panel recalls that Articles 10.2 and 10.3 of the DSU and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 of the DSU provide for the rights of third parties in panel proceedings. Pursuant to these provisions, third parties have the right to receive the parties' first written submission to the panel, and to present their views orally to the panel during the first substantive meeting. It is well established

\textsuperscript{54} Letter from Brazil dated 17 December 2015, p.1; Letter from Thailand dated 17 December 2015, paras. 2.2, 2.3 and 4.6.
\textsuperscript{55} See China's request for the establishment of a panel, Section I, items (i) and (ii).
\textsuperscript{56} See letter from Brazil dated 17 December 2015, pp. 1-2; Letter from Thailand dated 17 December 2015, para. 4.6.
\textsuperscript{57} Letter from Brazil dated 17 December 2015, p. 2; Letter from Thailand dated 17 December 2015, para. 4.2.
\textsuperscript{58} Letter from Brazil dated 17 December 2015, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{59} Letter from Thailand dated 17 December 2015, para. 1.1.
\textsuperscript{60} Letter from Canada dated 17 December 2015, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{61} Letter from the European Union dated 12 January 2016.
\textsuperscript{62} Letter from China dated 19 January 2016, para. 1.
\textsuperscript{63} Letter from China dated 19 January 2016, para. 3, citing to Panel Report, \textit{US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint)}, para. 7.16.
\textsuperscript{64} Letter from China dated 19 January 2016, para. 7.
\textsuperscript{65} Letter from the Panel to the parties and third parties dated 3 February 2016.
that a panel may exercise the discretion afforded to it under Article 12.1 of the DSU\textsuperscript{66} to grant enhanced third-party rights in a dispute, provided that the additional rights are consistent with the provisions of the DSU and the principles of due process.\textsuperscript{67} Panels have exercised this discretion where there were special circumstances that justified the grant of enhanced third-party rights. We consider that decisions on whether to grant enhanced third-party rights should be made on a case-by-case basis, and that any such decision should be informed by the factors considered in previous disputes.\textsuperscript{68} We also recall the need to maintain the distinction drawn in the DSU between the rights afforded to parties and those afforded to third parties.\textsuperscript{69}

7.40. One of the special circumstances that have led previous panels to grant enhanced third-party rights was when "third parties enjoyed certain economic benefits that were directly implicated by the measure at issue".\textsuperscript{70} This was the basis for granting enhanced third-party rights in the proceedings in \textit{EC – Bananas III} and \textit{EC – Tariff Preferences}.

7.41. We consider that, for present purposes, there are significant similarities between the measures at issue in \textit{EC – Bananas III} and the measures at issue in the current dispute. In \textit{EC – Bananas III}, the measures at issue included the allocation of a TRQ to certain countries, with ACP countries benefitting from a relatively large share of the lower in-quota rate.\textsuperscript{71} The complainants claimed that the TRQ shares were determined and allocated in a discriminatory manner, and violated the European Union's obligations under Article XIII of the GATT 1994.\textsuperscript{72} The panel agreed to grant a request for enhanced third-party rights made by the countries benefitting from the TRQ allocation on the basis that, among other considerations, "the economic effect of the disputed EC banana regime on certain third parties appeared to be very large", and "the economic benefits to third parties from the EC bananas regime were claimed to derive from an international treaty between them and the European Communities".\textsuperscript{73} The international treaty referred to was the Bananas Framework Agreement signed between the European Communities and certain ACP countries that established a TRQ with respect to the importation of bananas and the country-specific allocation of the TRQ.\textsuperscript{74}

7.42. We consider that, for present purposes, there are also some significant similarities between the measures at issue in \textit{EC – Tariff Preferences} and the measures at issue in the current dispute. In \textit{EC – Tariff Preferences}, certain third parties were beneficiaries of the tariff preference scheme at issue in that case. They requested enhanced third-party rights because, according to them, the tariff preferences in dispute determined the conditions of access of their exports to the European market.\textsuperscript{75} The panel granted those rights considering, among others factors, the economic impact of the tariff preference programmes on third-party developing countries. The panel found it significant that "those third parties that are beneficiaries under the EC's [tariff preferences] and those that are excluded have a significant economic interest in the matter before the Panel."\textsuperscript{76}

7.43. The TRQs at issue in this dispute, as is generally the case for all TRQs, comprise a two-tiered tariff rate in which the in-quota tariff rate is lower than the out-of-quota tariff rate. The TRQs have been allocated by the European Union in varying amounts among supplying countries. More precisely, under most of the TRQs at issue, Brazil and Thailand have each been allocated their own country-specific share of the TRQ, whereas all other Members are able to export at the lower in-quota tariff rate only within the "all others" share that is provided for under the relevant

\textsuperscript{66} Article 12.1 of the DSU provides that "[p]anels shall follow the Working Procedures in Appendix 3 unless the panel decides otherwise after consulting the parties to the dispute."


\textsuperscript{68} See Panel Report, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.7.

\textsuperscript{69} Panel Reports, US – 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.33, and US – 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.33, and EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Australia), para. 2.5.

\textsuperscript{70} Panel Report, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.8. Other circumstances mentioned by that panel are "(ii) the economic and social impact of the measures in third countries; (iii) whether enhanced third-party rights had been granted in previous disputes relating to the measure; (iv) the impact of the dispute on other Members maintaining similar measures; (v) the similarity of the dispute to related disputes; and/or (vi) the imperative of avoiding repetition" (para. 7.8).

\textsuperscript{71} Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 7.64.

\textsuperscript{72} Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, paras. 4.9, 4.10.

\textsuperscript{73} Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 7.8.

\textsuperscript{74} Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 3.30.


TRQs. What this means is that Brazil and Thailand are entitled to export the volumes set out in their country specific shares at the lower, in-quota tariff rate, as compared with other Members. In this case, therefore, Brazil and Thailand enjoy economic benefits that are directly implicated by the measures at issue. China directly challenges the allocation of shares under the TRQs at issue. In this regard, China's panel request claims that the tariff rates and the TRQs that the European Union negotiated with Brazil and Thailand violate several provisions of the GATT 1994, and contains ten different claims of violation of the GATT 1994 arising from "[t]he allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (i.e. Brazil and Thailand).77

7.44. In the Panel's view, the foregoing is sufficient to establish that Thailand and Brazil enjoy certain economic benefits that are directly implicated by the measures at issue. In addition, these benefits are derived from international agreements entered into between these Members and the European Union. We also note that one of the disputing parties indicated that it had no objection to the Panel granting enhanced third-party rights. We consider that the foregoing constitutes a prima facie basis for concluding that there are special circumstances that support the grant of enhanced third-party rights to Brazil and Thailand in these proceedings.

7.45. China sought to distinguish the present case from the circumstances in EC – Bananas III and EC – Tariff Preferences. China noted that in both cases, the measure at issue was "a preferential scheme the withdrawal of which would have a direct and automatic impact on the TRQs afforded by the European Union to other exporting countries".78 China further argued that unlike the claims in EC – Bananas III, China in the current proceedings is not challenging Brazil's and Thailand's "share in the EU TRQ allocation as such". Rather, China states that it "considers that the EU should have negotiated or consulted with China as [a] country with principal or substantial supplying interests and that in the determination of the global TRQ and the attribution of the TRQ to China individually or as part of the all other countries, the impact of the EU's SPS measures on Chinese poultry meat products should have been taken into account".79

7.46. In our view, China has not explained how or why the modification or withdrawal of the TRQs, or their allocation among different supplying countries, would not have a "direct and automatic impact" on the TRQ shares allocated to Brazil and Thailand. Furthermore, although China states that it is not challenging Brazil's and Thailand's "share in the EU TRQ allocation as such", as we have already noted, China's panel request contains a number of claims based on "the allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (Brazil and Thailand). We have no intention, in the context of deciding on the preliminary procedural question of whether to grant enhanced third-party rights, of either prejudging the merits of China's claims, or opining on how the European Union might potentially bring its measures into conformity with the GATT 1994 should China's claims be upheld. However, given the way that China has defined the alleged violations, it stands to reason that compliance would likely entail either a reduction of the share of the TRQs currently allocated to Brazil or Thailand in order to allow for a country-specific share for China or a relatively larger share of the "all others" category to accommodate China's exports, the withdrawal of country-specific shares and the opening of the TRQ on a global basis, or even the complete withdrawal of the TRQs. In any of those scenarios, there would be a "direct and automatic impact" on the TRQ shares allocated to Brazil and Thailand.

7.47. In light of the foregoing, the Panel decided that there were special circumstances that warranted the granting of enhanced third-party rights in these proceedings. In accordance with previous practice and as a matter of due process80, the Panel decided to extend the enhanced rights to all third parties to this dispute. For this reason, combined with the fact that Canada did not request any enhanced third-party rights going beyond those requested by Brazil or Thailand, the Panel did not consider it necessary to separately examine Canada's request for enhanced third-party rights.

77 See China's request for the establishment of a panel, pp. 3-5, items A(iii), A(iv), A(v), A(vi), A(vii), and B(iii), B(iv), B(v), B(vi) and B(vii).
7.48. As noted above, the Panel decided to grant all third parties the right to be present and observe the entirety of the first and second substantive meetings with the parties, and the right to receive the parties' first and second written submissions, written responses to questions and comments thereupon, and related exhibits. The Panel considered that in the circumstances of this case, the granting of these additional rights to third parties would not impose additional burdens on the parties, the Panel or the Secretariat, and would not result in any delays.

7.49. However, the Panel declined to grant third parties the right in the substantive meetings to ask questions to the parties or the other third parties. In the Panel's view, granting such a right to third parties would risk blurring the distinction between third parties and parties established in the DSU. Nor did the Panel consider it necessary to grant third parties the right to respond to written questions from the Panel during the proceedings, up to the issuance of the interim report. In the Panel's view, this would be redundant in light of paragraph 11 of the Working Procedures, which already states that "[t]he Panel may at any time pose questions to the parties and third parties, orally or in writing, including prior to each substantive meeting."81

7.2 The tariff rate quotas and the SPS measures

7.2.1 The First Modification Package

7.50. On 7 June 2006, the European Union notified WTO Members of its intention to modify its concessions on certain poultry products, pursuant to Article XXVIII:5 of the GATT 1994.82 The notification covered the products classified in the following tariff lines: (i) 0210 99 3983 (salted poultry meat); (ii) 1602 31 (prepared turkey meat); and (iii) 1602 32 19 (cooked chicken meat).84 In this notification, the European Union stated that it was "prepared to enter into negotiations and consultations with the appropriate Members under Article XXVIII for the modification of concessions with respect to the above-mentioned tariff lines".85 The European Union's notification indicated that it intended to "replace with tariff rate quotas" the concessions on the above-mentioned tariff lines.86 The notification provided import statistics by country of origin, for the period 2003-2005, for each of the tariff lines covered by the notification. These statistics indicated that Brazil accounted for the largest share of imports into the European Union of products under tariff lines 0210 99 39 and 1602 3187, and that Thailand accounted for the largest share of imports to the European Union of products under tariff line 1602 32 19.88

7.51. On 24 July 2006, Brazil reserved its rights under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 to enter into negotiations or consultations with the European Union for the modifications of these concessions, claiming a principal supplying interest on tariff lines in Harmonized System headings 0210 and 1602.89 On 11 August 2006, Thailand requested to "enter into negotiations on compensatory adjustments" with the European Union, claiming a principal supplying interest in products falling under tariff lines 0210 99 39 and 1602 32 19.90

7.52. The European Union agreed to enter into negotiations with Brazil and Thailand, recognizing that Brazil held a principal supplying interest in tariff lines 0210 99 39 and 1602 31 and a substantial supplying interest in tariff line 1602 32 19, and recognizing that Thailand held a

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81 Panel's Working Procedures, para. 11.
82 Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations, Schedule CXL – European Communities, G/SECRET/25, circulated on 15 June 2006 ("G/SECRET/25") (Exhibit CHN-15). In its legislation, the European Union distinguishes between fresh poultry meat and poultry meat products (EU's first written submission, para. 71). In this Report, we use the term "poultry meat" to cover these two categories.
83 The notification indicated that item 0210 90 20 was "now 0210 99 39".
84 The descriptions of the products are taken from Council Regulation (EC) No 580/2007 of 29 May 2007 concerning the implementation of the Agreements in the form of Agreed Minutes between the European Community and Brazil, and between the European Community and Thailand, pursuant to Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 amending and supplementing Annex I to Regulation (EEC) 265/87, OJ L 138/1 of 30.05.2007 (Exhibit CHN-22).
85 G/SECRET/25, p. 2 (Exhibit CHN-15).
86 G/SECRET/25, p. 2 (Exhibit CHN-15).
87 G/SECRET/25, pp. 3–4 (Exhibit CHN-15).
88 G/SECRET/25, p. 5 (Exhibit CHN-15).
89 Letter from the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations in Geneva to Ambassador Trojan, Permanent Representative of the European Communities to the WTO, dated 24 July 2006 (Exhibit EU-1).
90 Letter from the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the WTO to Ambassador Trojan, Permanent Representative of the European Communities to the WTO, dated 11 August 2006 (Exhibit EU-2).
principal supplying interest in tariff line 1602 32 19 and a substantial supplying interest in tariff lines 0210 99 39 and 1602 31.  

7.53. On 6 September 2006, China requested the European Union to enter into bilateral negotiations on the proposed modifications. China claimed to hold a substantial supplying interest.  

The European Union informed China that it did not recognize its claim of substantial supplying interest, "given that China [did] not have a significant share in the trade affected by these concessions". China subsequently requested the European Union to reconsider its position, arguing that its smaller share in the European poultry market was due to the imposition by the European Union of an import ban on China's poultry products over the last five years. The European Union reiterated its refusal to recognize China's claim of substantial interest, noting that China did not "have a significant share in the trade affected by the modification of the concessions on these products".

7.54. On 26 October 2006, the European Union concluded an agreement with Brazil pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. On 23 November 2006, the European Union concluded an agreement with Thailand, also pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. These agreements were approved by the European Council in Council Decision 2007/360/EC and implemented through several regulations:

i. Council Regulation (EC) No 580/2007, which amends the tariff legislation of the European Union and supplements it with the duties and volumes resulting from the agreements with Brazil and Thailand;

ii. Commission Regulation (EC) No 616/2007, which opens the TRQs for the products covered by the First Modification Package originating in Brazil, Thailand, other third countries, and provides for their administration; and


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92 Note Verbale from China to the EU, 6 September 2006 (Exhibit CHN-16). See also China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 25.

93 Letter from Amb. Trojan to Amb. Sun (18 October 2006) (Exhibit CHN-17).

94 Letter from Amb. Sun to Amb. Trojan (16 November 2006) (Exhibit CHN-18); see also Letter from Vice Minister Yi to David O'Sullivan, Director-General for Trade, European Commission (19 April 2007) (Exhibit CHN-19).

95 Letter from David O'Sullivan to Vice Minister Yi (8 May 2007) (Exhibit EU-28). The EU referred the rules set out in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 and stated that "China is not in the same situation as certain other WTO Members (Brazil, Thailand) who historically have delivered substantial quantities of chicken meat into the European Union and were therefore invited to negotiate compensation in return for lost market access resulting from the tariff increase."

96 Agreed Minutes initialled in Geneva by J.L Demarty (Commission of the EC) and Roberto C. De Azevedo (Delegation of Brazil), 26 October 2006 (Exhibit EU-3); EU's first written submission, para. 21. This agreement was revised on 6 December 2006 (EU's first written submission, para. 21 and Agreed Minutes initialled in Geneva by J.L Demarty (Commission of the EC) and Roberto C. De Azevedo (Delegation of Brazil), 6 December 2006 (Exhibit EU-5).

97 Agreed Minutes initialled in Bangkok by F. Coturni (Commission of the EC) and B. Chutima (Delegation of Thailand), 23 November 2006 (Exhibit EU-4).

98 Exhibits CHN-20 and CHN-21 and Exhibit EU-34.


7.55. These measures opened the TRQs for the importation of products classified under the three tariff lines covered by the First Modification Package, and provided for their administration. These TRQs replaced the tariff rates previously applicable to these products.\textsuperscript{102}

7.56. The total amount of the TRQs and their allocation were determined by the European Union in agreement with Brazil and Thailand in the context of the negotiations held pursuant to Article XXVIII:5 of the GATT 1994. According to the European Union, it sought to calculate the total amounts of the TRQs "on the basis of the guidelines provided in paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, using as a reference period the three-year period immediately preceding the notification of the European Union's intention to modify the concessions, i.e. 2003-2005".\textsuperscript{103}

7.57. With respect to tariff line 0210 99 39, the European Union agreed, at the request of Brazil and Thailand, to calculate the total amount of the TRQ on the basis of the average import volume for the period 2000-2002, increased by the annual average growth rate for the same period. This period was chosen instead of the period 2003-2005, as this was a period during which the imports of products originating from Brazil and Thailand were restricted.\textsuperscript{104} The European Union allocated that TRQ among supplying countries on the basis of the average import shares held by Brazil, Thailand, and other supplying countries during the period 2000-2002.\textsuperscript{105} The total amount of the TRQ applicable to products classified under tariff line 1602 31 was calculated using the reference period 2003-2005, based on the import volume for calendar year 2005 increased by 10%.\textsuperscript{106} The European Union allocated that TRQ among supplying countries on the basis of the import shares for 2005.\textsuperscript{107} The total amount of the TRQ applicable to tariff line 1602 32 19 was calculated "on the basis of the import volume for the last twelve-month period, instead of the last calendar year, preceding the initiation of the negotiations (i.e. July 2005-June 2006) increased by the growth rate of imports during the same period".\textsuperscript{108} According to the European Union, Thailand requested the use of this formula, which led to a TRQ amount that is greater than the amount that would have resulted from the application of the formulas in paragraph 6.\textsuperscript{109} The European Union allocated that TRQ among supplying countries on the basis of the import shares for the same period, July 2005-June 2006.

7.58. The tariff rates, the total volume of the TRQs and their allocation among supplying countries are as follows:\textsuperscript{110}:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tariff line</th>
<th>Prior tariff rate</th>
<th>New in-quota tariff</th>
<th>New out-of-quota tariff</th>
<th>TRQ volume (metric tons)</th>
<th>Allocation (metric tons)</th>
<th>Allocation share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0210 99 39</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>1,300 EUR/MT</td>
<td>264,245</td>
<td>Brazil: 170,807</td>
<td>Brazil: 64.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand: 92,610</td>
<td>Thailand: 35.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 828</td>
<td>Others: 0.031%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 31</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>1,024 EUR/MT</td>
<td>103,896</td>
<td>Brazil: 92,300</td>
<td>Brazil: 88.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand: 11,592</td>
<td>Thailand: 11.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 828</td>
<td>Others: 0.031%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 19</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>1,024 EUR/MT</td>
<td>250,953</td>
<td>Brazil: 79,477</td>
<td>Brazil: 31.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand: 160,033</td>
<td>Thailand: 63.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 11,443</td>
<td>Others: 4.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{102} China's first written submission, para. 136; EU's first written submission, para. 30.
\textsuperscript{103} EU's first written submission, para. 32.
\textsuperscript{104} EU's first written submission, para. 33. The restrictions applicable to these products resulted from the changes to the EU's customs classification, which were the subject of the EC – Chicken Cuts disputes.
\textsuperscript{105} EU's first written submission, para. 33.
\textsuperscript{106} EU's first written submission, para. 34.
\textsuperscript{107} EU's first written submission, para. 34.
\textsuperscript{108} EU's first written submission, para. 35.
\textsuperscript{109} EU's first written submission, paras. 35-36.
\textsuperscript{110} EU's first written submission, Table EU-2: Old and New Tariff Bindings in the First Modification Package (para. 30) and Table EU-3: Agreed TRQs in the First Modification Package (para. 31).
7.59. The TRQs under the First Modification Package entered into force on 4 June 2007. Two years later, on 27 May 2009, the European Union notified the WTO that it had concluded its negotiations for the modification of concessions under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. The notification referred to the bilateral agreements concluded with Brazil and Thailand, indicated the bound rates that were to be modified on the products, and contained the final report of negotiations under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. The notification was circulated to WTO Members on 29 May 2009. The European Union explained that the delay in notifying the completion of the negotiations and the bilateral agreements with Brazil and Thailand, which were concluded in 2006, was "largely due to an administrative oversight".

7.60. In the notification, the European Union stated that it also held consultations with Argentina, China, and the United States. However, the European Union determined that these Members "did not have either Initial Negotiating Rights, principal supplying interest or substantial interest in any of the products that the EC had notified in its proposal for modifying existing bindings", and therefore "there was no need to hold substantive Article XXVIII negotiations" with them. The notification states that "[s]ince no other WTO Member expressed its interest to enter into negotiations, the EC considers its negotiations under Article XXVIII to be completed." At the time of this Report, the draft schedule has not yet been certified.

7.61. On 24 March 2014, the European Union communicated for certification a revised schedule of concessions which contained "consolidations, modifications and rectifications in this Schedule, in relation to the previous certified CXL schedule of the EU" (Schedule CXL – EC15). The draft schedule of the European Union (Schedule CLXIII – EU25) was circulated to the WTO Membership on 25 April 2014, in document G/MA/TAR/RS/357. The European Union confirmed in these proceedings that the modifications resulting from the First Modification Package are included in this draft schedule. At the time of this Report, the draft schedule has not yet been certified.

7.2.2 The Second Modification Package

7.62. On 11 June 2009, the European Union notified WTO Members of its intention to modify its tariff concessions applicable to a number of other poultry products pursuant to Article XXVIII:5 of the GATT 1994. The products covered by the notification were those classified in tariff lines: (i) 1602 20 10 (goose duck or liver); (ii) 1602 32 11 (processed chicken meat, uncooked, containing 57% or more by weight of poultry meat or offal); (iii) 1602 32 30 (processed chicken meat, containing 25% or more but less than 57% by weight of poultry meat or offal); (iv) 1602 32 90 (processed chicken meat, containing less than 25% by weight of poultry meat or offal); (v) 1602 39 21 (processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, uncooked, containing 57% or more by weight of poultry meat or offal); (vi) 1602 39 29 (processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, cooked, containing 57% or more by weight of poultry meat or offal); (vii) 1602 39 40 (processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, containing 25% or more but less than 57% by weight of poultry meat or offal); and (viii) 1602 39 80 (processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, containing less than 25% by weight of poultry meat or offal).

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112 G/SECRET/25/Add.1, 29 May 2009 (Exhibit EU-6).
113 G/SECRET/25/Add.1., 29 May 2009 (Exhibit EU-6).
114 EU's response to Panel question No. 53, para. 156.
115 G/SECRET/25/Add.1, 29 May 2009, page 6 (Exhibit EU-6).
116 G/SECRET/25/Add.1, 29 May 2009, page 6 (Exhibit EU-6).
118 A corrigendum (G/MA/TAR/RS/357/Corr.1) was circulated on 19 February 2015, an addendum (G/MA/TAR/RS/357/Add.1) was circulated on 1 September 2016, and a corrigendum to the addendum was circulated on 19 September 2016.
119 EU's response to Panel question No. 54, para. 158.
120 The European Union confirmed that the certification process of the changes to the draft schedule communicated on 24 March 2014 is ongoing (EU's first written submission, para. 299).
121 Article XXVIII:5 Negotiations, Schedule CXL – European Communities, G/SECRET/32, dated 11 June 2009 and circulated 16 June 2009 ("G/SECRET/32") (Exhibit CHN-25).
122 The product descriptions of tariff lines 1602 32 11, 1602 32 30, 1602 32 90, 1602 39 21 and 1602 39 29 are taken from Exhibits CHN-28 and CHN-35, as well as China's second written submission, para. 6. The product description of tariff line 1602 20 10 is taken from the European Union's Customs Code available at http://ec.europa.eu.
7.63. In the notification, the European Union noted that it was "prepared to enter into negotiations and consultations with the appropriate Members under Article XXVIII for the modification of concessions with respect to the above-mentioned tariff lines". The notification provided import statistics by country of origin, for the period 2006-2008, for each of the products classified under the tariff lines covered by the notification. These statistics indicated that Thailand accounted for the largest share of imports into the European Union of products under tariff lines 1602 32 90, 1602 39 21, 1602 39 29, 1602 39 40, and 1602 39 80, and that Brazil accounted for the largest share of imports into the European Union of products under tariff lines 1602 32 11 and 1602 32 30.

7.64. On 18 August 2009, Thailand requested to enter into negotiations with the European Union, claiming a "principal" supplying interest in products classified under five tariff lines (1602 32 90, 1602 39 21, 1602 39 29, 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 80), and a "substantial interest" in products classified under one tariff line (1602 32 30). On 8 September 2009, Brazil sent a letter to the European Union claiming a principal supplying interest in products classified under two tariff lines (1602 32 11 and 1602 32 30), and a substantial interest in products falling under tariff line 1602 32 90. Brazil reserved its rights to enter into negotiations or consultations with the European Union regarding the modification of these concessions.

7.65. The European Union held bilateral negotiations with Brazil and Thailand. According to the European Union, negotiations were completed "at the negotiators' level" on 23 September 2011. The agreement resulting from the Article XXVIII negotiations with Thailand was initialled on 22 November 2011, and the agreement resulting from the Article XXVIII negotiations with Brazil was initialled on 7 December 2011. The two agreements were authorised for signature by the Council of the European Union on 23 April 2012.

7.66. On 9 May 2012, China requested to enter into negotiations with the European Union under Article XXVIII on the basis that it was a Member with a principal supplying interest "with respect to relevant tariff lines". China also provided statistics on imports into the European Union from China of products classified under four tariff lines (1602 20 10, 1602 39 29, 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 80) for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011.

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123 G/SECRET/32, p. 1 (Exhibit CHN-25).
124 G/SECRET/32, pp. 2-3 (Exhibit CHN-25).
125 G/SECRET/32, p. 2 (Exhibit CHN-25).
126 Letter from the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of the European Communities to the WTO, 18 August 2009 (Exhibit EU-7).
127 Letter from the Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the WTO to the Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of the European Communities to the WTO, 8 September 2009 (Exhibit EU-8).
128 EU's first written submission, para. 40; EU's response to Panel question No. 107(b), para. 85. China does not consider that the negotiations were concluded in September 2011 (China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 7; China's response to Panel question No. 107, paras. 96-98). In this regard, China does not contest the European Union's explanations that negotiations were completed "at the negotiators' level" on 23 September 2011, or that the agreements with Thailand and Brazil were initialled at the time that the European Union claims. Rather, China argues that because the European Union did not complete its internal processes to give legal effect to changes agreed with Thailand and notify other WTO Members of the completion of the negotiations until December 2012, it is legally incorrect to characterize the negotiations as having been concluded prior to that time. Further, China suggests that because China claimed a principal supplying interest in May 2012, and the European Union never entered into negotiations with China under Article XXVIII, the European Union's negotiations under Article XXVIII were never actually completed (China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 7).
129 EU's response to Panel question No. 107, para. 83. See also Council Decision 2012/231/EU of 23 April 2012 on the signing on behalf of the EU of the Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and Brazil pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 relating to the modification of concessions with respect to processed poultry meat provided for in the EU Schedule annexed to GATT 1994, and of the Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and Thailand pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 relating to the modification of concessions with respect to processed poultry meat provided for in the EU Schedule annexed to GATT 1994 (O.J. L 117, 1 May 2012, p. 1) (Exhibit CHN-27).
130 Exhibit CHN-27.
131 Letter from China to the EU requesting to enter into negotiations under Article XXVIII (9 May 2012) (Exhibit CHN-50).
7.67. On 1 June 2012, the European Union informed China that it did not recognize China's claims of a principal supplying interest or substantial interest under Article XXVIII. More specifically, the European Union informed China that:

Following the Understanding on the Interpretation of the Article XXVIII GATT and the Procedures for the Negotiations under Article XXVIII GATT adopted on 10 November 1980 (BISD27S/26-28), a principal supplying interest is recognised only for the WTO Member which had, for a given concession and in the most recent representative period prior to the notification of a WTO Member's intention to modify concessions included in its tariff schedule, the largest share in the market of the WTO Member seeking to modify concessions. Likewise, substantial supplying interest is recognised only for those WTO Members which had in that period a significant share, i.e. at least 10 per cent according to continuous practice of WTO Members, in the market of the WTO Member seeking to modify concessions.

The European Union's notification G/SECRET/32 dated 16 June 2009 included import data for the 2006-2008 period, during which imports from China did not correspond to 10 per cent or more of total imports. Therefore, the European Union is not in a position to recognize China's claims under Article XXVIII GATT.

7.68. The European Union signed the agreement resulting from the negotiations under Article XXVIII with Thailand on 18 June 2012, and it signed the agreement with Brazil on 26 June 2012.

7.69. On 2 October 2012, China reiterated its request to enter into consultations with respect to "relevant tariff lines of poultry products" as notified by the European Union. China contested the European Union's reliance on import statistics covering the period 2006-2008 to determine which Members held the right to participate in consultations and negotiations pursuant to Article XXVIII, stating that:

China believes that 2006-2008 period does not constitute the representative three-year period in this case. Before 2008, the EU prohibited imports from China for SPS reasons, which completely stopped any exports of poultry from China. However, since the release of the SPS measures against China in 2008, China's export of poultry has increased rapidly. According to the EU statistics, from 2009-2011, China has become the biggest supplier in a certain number of poultry products in the EU market, the percentage of which has exceeded 10%, with some products even reaching 86%. All above-mentioned facts and evidences show that 2006-2008 period is inconsistent with the provisions on the most recent representative three-year period as stipulated in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994.

7.70. On 12 October 2012, the European Union responded that it had already provided explanations of why China's claims could not be recognized, in writing as well as in bilateral meetings. The European Union also noted that it had not received a claim of interest from China within ninety days following the June 2009 notification of its intention to modify its concessions, contrary to the time-period provided in paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII. The European Union further stated that:

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132 Letter from the EU to China responding to China's request for negotiation (1 June 2012) (Exhibit CHN-31).
133 Letter from the EU to China responding to China's request for negotiation (1 June 2012) (Exhibit CHN-31).
134 EU's response to Panel question No. 107, para. 83. See also Council Decision 2012/792/EU of 6 December 2012 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and Brazil pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions with respect to processed poultry meat provided for in the EU Schedule annexed to GATT 1994, and of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the EU and Thailand pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to the modification of concessions with respect to processed poultry meat provided for in the EU Schedule annexed to GATT 1994, OJ L 351/44 of 20.12.2012 (Exhibit CHN-34).
135 Letter from China to the EU (2 October 2012) (Exhibit CHN-30). See also China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 37.
136 Exhibit CHN-30. See also China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 37.
The statistics contained in communication G/Secret/32 have been defined in accordance with paragraph 4 of the procedures for the negotiations under Article XXVIII which provides that "the notification or request should be accompanied by statistics of imports of the products involved, by country of origin, for the last three years for which statistics are available". In this case, the "last three years" preceding the notification dated 16 June 2009 are 2006, 2007, 2008. The argument developed by China in its letter of 2 October 2012 according to which the "2006-2008 period does not constitute the representative three year period" is therefore in contradiction with the procedures for the negotiations under Article XXVIII. The statistics of the period 2009-2011 -posterior to the notification- cannot be taken into consideration. Using a different period for China would not only be in breach of Article XXVIII but would also result in a discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis the other WTO Members.\(^{137}\)

7.71. The European Union Council approved the agreements with Brazil and Thailand on 6 December 2012.\(^{138}\) The agreements were implemented through several regulations:

i. Council Regulation (EU) 1218/2012\(^{139}\), which amends the tariff legislation of the European Union to add the new duties applicable to the poultry products and amends and supplements the TRQ legislation of the European Union\(^{140}\) with the duties and volumes resulting from the agreements with Brazil and Thailand;

ii. Commission Regulation (EU) 1246/2012\(^{141}\), which amends Commission Regulation (EC) No 616/2007, and opens the TRQs for the products covered by the Second Modification Package originating from Brazil, Thailand and other third countries, and provides for the administration of the TRQs;

iii. Notice of entry into force of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and Brazil, and between the European Union and Thailand pursuant to Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, which provides that the agreements signed with Thailand and Brazil will enter into force on 1 March 2013\(^{142}\); and,


7.72. These measures opened the TRQs on the importation of the products classified under the tariff lines covered by the Second Modification Package, and provided for their administration. The TRQs replaced the tariff rates previously applicable to these products.\(^{144}\)

7.73. The total amounts of the TRQs and their allocation were determined by the European Union in agreement with Brazil and Thailand, using import data for the period 2006-2008. The European Union allocated the TRQs based on the average import shares for the same period.\(^{145}\)

7.74. The tariff rates, the volume of the TRQs and their allocation among supplying countries are as follows\(^{146}\):

\(^{137}\) Letter from the EU to China (12 October 2012) (Exhibit CHN-32).
\(^{138}\) Exhibit CHN-34 and EU's response to Panel question No. 107, para. B3.
\(^{139}\) Exhibit CHN-28 and Exhibit CHN-35.
\(^{141}\) O.J. L 352, 21 December 2012, p. 16 (Exhibit CHN-36).
\(^{142}\) O.J. L 56, 28 February 2013, p. 2. (Exhibit CHN-38).
\(^{143}\) O.J. L 90, 28 March 2013, p. 86 (Exhibit CHN-37).
\(^{144}\) China's first written submission, para. 136; EU's first written submission, para. 56.
\(^{145}\) EU's first written submission, paras. 59-60.
\(^{146}\) EU's first written submission, Table EU-6: Old and New Tariff Bindings in the Second Modification Package (para. 56) Table EU-7: Agreed TRQs in the Second Modification Package (para. 57).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tariff line</th>
<th>Prior tariff rate</th>
<th>New in-quota tariff rate</th>
<th>New out-of-quota tariff rate</th>
<th>TRQ volume (metric tons)</th>
<th>Allocation (metric tons)</th>
<th>Allocation share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 11</td>
<td>867 EUR/MT</td>
<td>630 EUR/MT</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>16,140</td>
<td>Brazil: 15,800</td>
<td>Brazil: 97.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 340</td>
<td>Others: 2.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 30</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>79,705</td>
<td>Brazil: 62,905</td>
<td>Brazil: 78.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand: 14,000</td>
<td>Thailand: 17.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 2,800</td>
<td>Others: 3.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 90</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>2,865</td>
<td>Brazil: 295</td>
<td>Brazil: 10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand: 2,100</td>
<td>Thailand: 73.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 470</td>
<td>Others: 16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 21</td>
<td>867 EUR/MT</td>
<td>630 EUR/MT</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Thailand: 10</td>
<td>Thailand: 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 29</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>13,720</td>
<td>Thailand: 13,500</td>
<td>Thailand: 98.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 220</td>
<td>Others: 1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 40</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>Thailand: 600</td>
<td>Thailand: 80.21%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 148</td>
<td>Others: 19.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 80</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>Thailand: 600</td>
<td>Thailand: 82.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Others: 125</td>
<td>Others: 17.24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.75. Tariff line 1602 20 10 was included in the European Union’s notification to modify the concessions under the Second Modification Package, but this tariff line was not the subject of subsequent negotiations with Brazil and Thailand.\(^{147}\) China confirmed that it is not challenging any measure related to this tariff line.\(^{148}\) Two of the tariff lines included in the Second Modification Package, 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 80, were merged into a single tariff line, 1602 39 85 (processed duck, goose, guinea fowl meat, containing less than 57% by weight of poultry meat or offal) effective on 1 January 2012.\(^{149}\) Although these two tariff lines were merged, the European Union has explained that it opened and continues to apply two separate TRQs for the products previously covered by tariff lines 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 80.\(^{150}\)

7.76. On 17 December 2012, the European Union notified the WTO that it had concluded its negotiations pursuant to Article XXVIII:5.\(^{151}\) The notification referred to the bilateral agreements concluded with Brazil and Thailand, indicated the bound rates that were to be modified on the products, and included the final report of negotiations under Article XXVIII. It was circulated to WTO Members on 20 December 2012.\(^{152}\) The notification states that Argentina contacted the European Union to enter into consultations. The European Union, however, "did not hold consultations with Argentina as Argentina did not have Initial Negotiating Rights, a principal supplying interest or a substantial interest in any of the products" covered by the Second Modification Package.\(^{153}\) The notification also states that:

\(^{147}\) EU’s first written submission, footnote 25. The European Union noted that “there were no imports under that subheading during the reference period” (2006-2008).
\(^{148}\) China’s response to Panel question No. 4, para. 12.
\(^{149}\) EU’s response to Panel question No. 63 (c), para. 4.
\(^{150}\) EU’s response to Panel question No. 63 (c), para. 6.
\(^{151}\) G/SECRET/32/Add.1, circulated 20 December 2012 (Exhibit EU-9).
\(^{152}\) G/SECRET/32/Add.1 (Exhibit EU-9).
\(^{153}\) G/SECRET/32/Add.1, p. 7 (Exhibit EU-9).
No other WTO Member expressed its interest to enter into negotiations in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVIII GATT 1994 within the 90 day period referred to in paragraph 4 of the Guidelines on Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII (documents C/113 and Corr.1 of 10 November 1980); therefore, the EU considers its negotiations under Article XVIII to be completed.154

7.77. At the time of this Report, the European Union has not yet submitted for certification the changes to its schedule of concessions resulting from the Article XXVIII:5 negotiations relating to the Second Modification Package. The European Union explained that as the Second Modification Package was concluded in 2012, after the enlargement of the European Union to 27 member States, it was considered "more appropriate to submit for certification the changes included in that package as part of the draft schedule EU27" which will be submitted "as soon as the draft EU25 schedule is certified".155

7.78. The TRQs negotiated under the Second Modification Package entered into force on 1 March 2013.156

7.79. On 19 December 2013, China requested to enter into consultations with the European Union pursuant to Article XIII:4 of the GATT 1994.157 In its request, China noted that the European Union had "adopted a new tariff regime [...] whereby the duties rates are increased significantly while a tariff rate quota is open for each item" and allocated the "majority and even all shares of the tariff quotas to Brazil and/or Thailand" and "very limited shares to other Members, including China."158 China recalled that it had previously raised concerns with regard to these modifications, and had requested the European Union to enter into negotiations or consultations with China, under Article XXVIII, on 9 May 2012 and 2 October 2012. In its letter, China stated:

China has a substantial supplying interest in several of the tariff items concerned, as evidenced by the statistics of imports of the European Union from China in the most recent years prior to the adopting of the new tariff regime ...

As required by Article XIII:4 of GATT 1994, a Member applying a tariff quota shall, upon the request of any other Member having a substantial supplying interest, consult promptly with the other Member regarding, inter alia, the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved. Without prejudice to China's rights under other provisions of GATT 1994 as well as other covered agreements, China hereby requests the European Union to enter into consultations with China in accordance with Article XIII:4.159

7.80. On 21 February 2014, the European Union responded that:

[T]he European Union has recently completed a tariff re-binding exercise, in accordance with Article XXVIII of the GATT. Representatives of the European Union have discussed trade in processed poultry meat with representatives of China on a number of occasions, at technical and senior official level as well as in the Committee on Agriculture. Some of these discussions included representatives of the Chinese industry. There has also been extensive correspondence on this matter. We conclude that China did not meet the conditions for participation in the relevant negotiations.160

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154 G/SECRET/32/Add.1, 20 December 2012 p. 7 (Exhibit EU-9).
155 EU's response to Panel question No. 54(c), para 160.
156 O.J. L 56, 28 February 2013, p. 2. (Exhibit CHN-38). In its response to Panel question No. 107(b), the European Union notes that: "[i]nitially, the implementing EU domestic legislation provided that the TRQs would enter into force on 1 January 2013. But, due to a delay in the completion of the internal procedures in Brazil, the entry into force was post-poned until 1 March 2013" (para. 86).
160 Response letter from the EU to China dated 21 February 2014 (Exhibit CHN-40).
7.81. The European Union informed China that it was willing to continue the discussions with China in a spirit of cooperation and good faith, "without prejudice to the position of the European Union as regards the interpretation or application of Articles XIII or XXVIII of the GATT". On 19 May 2014, a meeting was held between China and the European Union. In its panel request, China claims that during the meeting the European Union refused to adjust to TRQs, as had been previously requested by China.

7.2.3 The SPS measures applicable to poultry products from China

7.82. China's claims in this dispute are related to a number of SPS measures adopted by the European Union which have restricted or prohibited the importation of certain poultry products from China. The SPS measures applied to a number of products, including those poultry products included in the First and Second Modification Packages.

7.83. At the outset, the Panel notes that China is not challenging the consistency of the SPS measures with any provision of the covered agreements. The panel request does not include any claims of violation relating to the SPS measures, and China stated in these proceedings that "it is not China's intention nor the focus of this dispute to examine the SPS measures taken by the EU in relation to imports of poultry meat products". The SPS measures are relevant to this dispute because China argues that the European Union should have taken these SPS measures into account when making its determinations of: which Members held a principal or substantial interest in supplying in the products covered by the First and Second Modification Packages; the amount of compensation under Article XXVIII:2; and the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries. Essentially, China claims that the European Union should not have relied on import statistics based on time periods during which the SPS measures were in effect, as they had a negative impact on the importation of poultry products from China. According to China, the two reference periods used by the European Union in its notifications of modification of concessions under Article XXVIII:5 (2003-2005 for the First Modification Package and 2006-2008 for the Second Modification Package) were not representative, since these periods were "tainted" by the existence of the SPS measures affecting the importation of poultry products from China.

7.84. In this section, we will briefly describe the SPS measures that were applicable, and which in some instances are still applicable, to the poultry products at issue in this dispute. We focus on three SPS measures that were in place during the periods at issue and which, according to China, should have been taken into account by the European Union. As elaborated below, these measures are the "heat treatment measure", the "residues measure" and the "avian influenza measure". We describe these SPS measures to the extent that they are relevant to our assessment of the arguments of the parties in this case.

7.85. According to the European Union, in order to ensure that imported poultry products "comply with the same or equivalent sanitary requirements as domestic products", the imported products must originate from a country included in a list of approved countries and must satisfy sanitary requirements, including a heat treatment measure. The heat treatment measure that applies to the products originating from the listed countries differs in terms of the severity of requirements. In the case of China, the importation of poultry products into the European Union was authorised on the condition that the products undergo the most severe heat treatment known as "treatment B". According to the European Union, the requirement that poultry products from China undergo

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161 China's first written submission, para. 48; EU's first written submission, para. 54.
162 China's request for the establishment of a panel, Section II.B.(viii), p. 5.
163 Throughout these proceedings, various terms have been used by the parties to refer to these measures. Both parties agree that it is appropriate in this Report to refer to them as "SPS measures" (China's response to Panel question No. 81, para. 44; EU's response to Panel question No. 81, para. 40).
164 China's first written submission, para. 31. See also China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 5; China's second written submission, paras. 46; China's response to Panel question No. 6, para. 23; China's response to Panel question No. 81, para. 43).
165 China's first written submission, paras. 78, 80, 194, and 246.
166 EU's first written submission, para. 69. See also paras. 70-71.
167 Part 4 of Annex II of Commission Decision 2007/777/EC distinguishes 6 categories of heat treatment: one non-specific treatment (called treatment "A" under which any specific heat treatment is not required) and five specific treatments, from "B" to "F", in descending order of severity. Treatment "B", which is the most severe heat treatment measure, is defined as "treatment in a hermetically sealed container to an Fo value of three or more" (Exhibit CHN-8 and Exhibit EU-13) and China's first written submission, footnote 24.
"treatment B" had been in force since 1997.\textsuperscript{168} The heat treatment measure applicable to the importation of meat products into the European Union is currently provided in Commission Decision 2007/777/EC (as amended).\textsuperscript{169} In addition to the heat treatment measure, "if there is evidence that imported products from a listed country no longer comply with the same or equivalent sanitary requirements as those prescribed for the EU products, the European Commission may adopt protective measures restricting those imports"\textsuperscript{170}, including the two types of SPS measures as described below.

7.86. On 30 January 2002, the European Union suspended the importation of all products of animal origin from China, including poultry products.\textsuperscript{171} The measure applied to animal products intended for human consumption or animal feed use, and was adopted to protect against the risks posed by deficiencies in the regulation of veterinary medicine and the control of residues in China.\textsuperscript{172} This prohibition initially provided for a derogation for certain animal products, but these products did not include the poultry products at issue in this dispute, due to animal health reasons. All products classified under the tariff lines included in the First and Second Modification Packages originating from China were prohibited under this measure.\textsuperscript{173} We refer to this measure, which was specific to China, as the "residues measure".

7.87. On 6 February 2004, the European Union suspended the importation of fresh poultry meat, meat preparations and meat products consisting of or containing any parts of poultry originating from China and several other Asian countries.\textsuperscript{174} This measure was adopted in response to an outbreak of avian influenza in the region.\textsuperscript{175} This prohibition applied in addition to the above-noted prohibition imposed due to residue concerns, and it also covered all products falling under the tariff lines included in the First and Second Modification Packages. A derogation applied to the products of China and several other Asian countries.\textsuperscript{176} We refer to this measure, which was specific to China, as the "avian influenza measure".

\textsuperscript{168} EU's first written submission, footnote 65; Commission Decision 97/222/EEC, of 28 February 1997, laying down the list of third countries from which the Member States authorize the importation of meat products, OJ L 89/39 of 4.4.1997 (Exhibit EU-25); Commission Decision 2005/432/EC, of 5 June 2005, laying down the animal and public health conditions and model certificates for imports of meat products for human consumption from third countries and repealing Decisions 97/41/EC, 97/221/EC and 97/222/EC, OJ L 151/3 of 14.6.2005 (Exhibit EU-24). During the same period, treatment A applied to the products of Thailand. The heat treatment measure applicable to the products of China was amended in 2008, as described in paragraph 7.89.


\textsuperscript{170} EU's first written submission, para. 72.

\textsuperscript{171} Commission Decision 2002/69/EC of 30 January 2002 concerning certain protective measures with regard to the products of animal origin imported from China (O.J. L 30, 31 January 2012, p. 50) (Exhibit CHN-5 and Exhibit EU-15), replaced by Commission Decision 2002/994/EC, of 20 December 2002, concerning certain protective measures with regard to products of animal origin imported from China (Exhibit EU-16). This decision was amended several times. See also China's first written submission, para. 23 and footnote 18; China's second written submission, footnotes 13 and 66; Exhibits CHN-47 and CHN-54; EU's first written submission, paras.74-75; EU's response to Panel question No. 6, para. 7; Exhibit EU-39.

\textsuperscript{172} EU's first written submission, para. 73; Exhibit CHN-5 and EU-15, 5th and 6th recitals.

\textsuperscript{173} At that time, poultry products from Thailand were authorised, subject to chemical testing and heat treatment "D". See China's second written submission, para. 21; EU's response to Panel question No. 6, paras. 8 et seq.


\textsuperscript{175} China's first written submission, para. 24; EU's first written submission, para. 77.

\textsuperscript{176} China pointed out that Thailand also suffered from the outbreak of avian influenza but its products were not subject to the same heat treatment measure (China's first written submission, para. 31). The European Union explained that the imports from Thailand that had undergone treatment "D" were authorised for importation because that treatment was effective against avian influenza (EU's first written submission, paras. 82-83; EU's response to Panel question No. 8, para. 18, Commission Decision 2004/84/EC, of 23 January 2004, concerning protection measures relating to avian influenza in Thailand, OJ L 17/57 of 24.1.2004 (Exhibit EU-20)).
7.88. On 30 July 2008, the European Union “relaxed” the above SPS measures that applied to the importation of poultry products from China. The European Union amended the residues measure which addressed the risks posed by residues in animal products, because an “appropriate residue monitoring plan” had been provided by China and the result of verification was favourable. The amended decision allows for the importation of poultry products from China, provided that the products are accompanied by a declaration of the Chinese competent authority that each consignment has been subjected to a chemical test, among other sanitary requirements (including the heat treatment measure).

7.89. The European Union also modified the heat treatment measure applicable to Chinese poultry products. The specific heat requirement was modified from treatment "B" to the less severe treatment "D" for poultry products originating from the province of Shandong, on the basis that the competent authority of the province of Shandong complied with the specific animal health requirement. The importation of poultry products originating from the rest of the Chinese territory is still subject to heat treatment "B", among other sanitary requirements. The European Union additionally modified the avian influenza measure and authorized the importation of poultry products from China, subject to the same specific heat treatment measure noted above, on the basis that “such heat treatment is sufficient to inactivate the avian influenza virus”.

7.90. The European Union has indicated that “[t]he scope of application of the EU sanitary measures is not defined by reference to CN or HS codes.” In order to evaluate the effects of the above-noted SPS measures on the importation of Chinese poultry products, we use the product categories “uncooked” and “cooked”, upon which both parties agree.

7.91. The category of "uncooked poultry products" covers tariff item 0210 99 39 (salted poultry meat), 1602 32 11 (processed chicken meat, uncooked, containing 57% or more by weight of poultry meat or offal) and 1602 39 21 (processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, uncooked, containing 57% or more by weight of poultry meat or offal). According to China, these “uncooked” poultry products by definition cannot be subjected to a heat treatment measure, and therefore remain subject to an import ban. The European Union has confirmed that these three tariff lines cover uncooked products. The Panel understands from the parties' submissions in this regard that the importation into the European Union of products classified under tariff lines 0210 99 39, 1602 32 11 and 1602 39 21 and originating from China were prohibited under the heat treatment measure at the time of the application of the residue measure in January 2002. The imports of these products from China in the European Union remain prohibited until the present since they were not affected by the lifting of the prohibition under the residue measure, the avian influenza measure and the modification of the heat treatment measure on 30 July 2008.

7.92. The poultry products falling under tariff lines 1602 32 19 (cooked chicken meat) and 1602 39 29 (processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, cooked, containing 57% or more by weight of

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177 China’s first written submission, para. 93.
182 EU’s response to Panel question No. 77(b), para. 35.
183 China’s second written submission, para. 16; EU’s response to Panel question No. 77(b), para. 35.
184 China’s response to Panel question No. 5, paras. 17-19 and question No. 8, paras. 37-38; China’s second written submission, para. 15.
185 China’s second written submission, paras. 13-15. See also China’s response to Panel question No. 8, para. 35; China’s opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 50.
186 EU’s response to Panel question No. 77(b), para. 35.
187 China’s second written submission, para. 19. See also China’s opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 50; China’s response to Panel question No. 5, paras. 17-19 and question No. 8, paras. 37-38; China’s comments on the EU’s responses to the Panel’ question No. 77(b), para. 22. The Panel also notes the EU’s response to Panel question No. 79, at para. 36 that “[i]mports of fresh poultry meat from China are currently not authorised."
poultry meat or offal) are "cooked poultry products." We understand that these products were authorized for importation into the European Union if they had undergone treatment "B", until the application of the residue measure in 2002. Since 30 July 2008, these products are authorized for importation into the European Union if they are accompanied by the required veterinary certification and declaration of chemical testing, and have undergone heat treatment "D" (if the products are from the province of Shandong), or treatment "B" (if the products originate from other parts of China and fulfill the other applicable sanitary requirements).

7.93. The remaining four tariff lines comprise both cooked and uncooked poultry products: these include tariff lines 1602 31 (prepared turkey meat); 1602 32 30 (processed chicken meat, containing 25% or more but less than 57% by weight of poultry meat or offal); 1602 32 90 (processed chicken meat, containing less than 25% by weight of poultry meat or offal) and 1602 39 85 (processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, containing less than 57% by weight of poultry meat or offal). We understand that the importation into the European Union of poultry products originating from China that is classified in these tariff lines were and are subject to the SPS measures described above, depending on which category they fall (cooked or uncooked).

7.94. As noted above, it is not in dispute that these measures are SPS measures. China agrees that:

[T]he EU's SPS measures discussed in this dispute are "sanitary measures" within the meaning of Annex A:1 of the SPS Agreement, and that it would be appropriate to refer to them as "SPS measures" in the Panel Report. Without conducting a detailed examination of the EU's SPS measures given that the measures are not the subject of this dispute, China would like to briefly note that the EU's measures are applied (1) "to protect human life or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs", as described in Annex A:1(b), and (2) in the form of regulations, as provided in the second paragraph of Annex A:1.

7.2.4 Import statistics

7.95. The parties have each provided the Panel with information on the import shares held by Brazil, China, Thailand, and other countries over the period 1996-2015. China has provided the percentages in Exhibit CHN-52, and the European Union has provided these percentages in Exhibit EU-43. The European Union also separately provided, in Exhibit EU-44, the volumes of imports from different countries under tariff lines 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 80 up until the merger of these two tariff lines into tariff line 1602 39 85, effective 1 January 2012. This exhibit does not however present data expressed in percentages of shares.

7.96. We note the existence of multiple discrepancies between the import shares submitted in Exhibit CHN-52 and Exhibit EU-43, and also with the information in Exhibit EU-44. For the most part, it appears that these discrepancies are not material to our analysis of China's claims in this dispute. We further note that the data on import percentages provided to the Panel by both parties (in Exhibits CHN-52 and EU-43) appear to be derived from data covering EU28 imports, which includes "the imports into Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia made into those countries before they joined the European Union." However, as discussed later in our Report, we understand from the parties that the use of EU28 data may be expected to have a negligible impact on the overall import shares.

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188 China's second written submission, para. 17.
189 Tariff line 1602 39 85 results from the merger of tariff line 1602 39 40 (processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, containing 25% or more but less than 57% by weight of poultry meat or offal) and tariff line 1602 39 80 (processed duck, geese, guinea fowl meat, containing less than 25% by weight of poultry meat or offal) effective 1 January 2012.
190 See above, footnote 163.
191 China's response to Panel question No. 81, para. 44.
192 We note that Exhibit EU-43 is mistakenly identified, on its cover page, as EU-44.
193 We note that Exhibit EU-44 is mistakenly identified, on its cover page, as EU-45.
194 EU's second written submission, para. 81.
195 See section 7.5.3.2.3.
7.97. In relation to tariff line 1602 39 80, there is a significant discrepancy between the information provided in Exhibit CHN-52 and the information contained in Exhibit EU-44 regarding the import shares held by different countries over the years 2000-2006. Among other things, the information in Exhibit CHN-52 indicates that in the years 2005 and 2006, China accounted for 17.6% and 30.5% of imports into the European Union under tariff line 1602 39 80. We recall that during this period, the SPS measures generally prohibited importation of poultry products into the European Union from China, and at no point in these proceedings has China indicated that it would have been able to or did export products under 1602 32 80 in significant quantities during that period. We understand that the discrepancy is due to the fact that China's statistics in Exhibit CHN-52 (and Exhibit CHN-43) include imports into Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia made before those countries became Member States of the European Union, whereas the EU statistics do not include those imports. For the foregoing reasons, the figures in the table below for 1602 39 80 for the years 2000-2006 are based on the data provided in Exhibit EU-44.

7.98. The shares of imports into the European Union of Brazil, China and Thailand of the products classified under the tariff lines covered by the First and Second Modification Packages for years 2000-2015 are reproduced below. The year 2000 was the earliest year included by the European Union in one of the reference periods (for tariff line 0210 99 39). Throughout these proceedings, the parties have made reference to the percentage of import shares based on the quantity of imports, as well as the value of imports. Both parties have subsequently confirmed that for the purposes of determining which Member holds a substantial supplying interest, it is more appropriate to examine import shares based on quantity, rather than value. The import shares in the table that follows are based on quantity. The figures in the table below are rounded to the nearest decimal point.

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196 EU’s first written submission, para. 33.
197 EU’s response to Panel question No. 61(a), para. 1; China’s response to Panel question No. 61(a), para. 4.
First Modification Package: Shares of imports into the EU of Brazil, China, Thailand and other countries, 2000-2015 (in quantity)

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198 These figures are based on Exhibit CHN-52. However, Exhibit CHN-52 appears to be missing data for the years 2000-2001 for tariff line 0210 99 39. The information presented in this table for these years is based on the information presented in Exhibit EU-43 for tariff line 0210 99 39.

Second Modification Package: Shares of imports into the EU of Brazil, China, Thailand and other countries, 2000-2015 (in quantity)

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199 These figures are based on Exhibit CHN-52. However, Exhibit CHN-52 appears to be missing data for the year 2000 for tariff line 1602 31. The information presented in this table for this year is based on the information presented in Exhibit EU-43 for tariff line “1602 31 11”.

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200 These figures are based on Exhibit CHN-52.

201 These figures are based on Exhibit CHN-52.

202 These figures are based on Exhibit CHN-52.
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### Tariff line 1602 39 45 (merged with 1602 39 80 into tariff line 1602 39 85 effective 1 January 2012)

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203 These figures are based on Exhibit CHN-52.
204 These figures reflect the information contained in Exhibit CHN-52 read in conjunction with the information contained in Exhibit EU-30 for the years 2000 and 2001. According to Exhibit EU-30, there were imports from unspecified Members in 2000 and 2001. We note that according to Exhibit EU-30, there was 1 tonne of imports under 1602 39 21 in the year 2009. According to Exhibit CHN-43, there was 1.2 tonnes of imports from Brazil for that same year. Exhibit CHN-52 also suggests that these imports originated in Brazil. Exhibit EU-43 only indicates the percentage of imports into the European Union held by Thailand for this product.
205 These figures are based on Exhibit CHN-52.
206 These figures are based on Exhibit CHN-52.
### Tariff Item 1602 39 80 (merged with 1602 39 40 into tariff line 1602 39 85 effective 1 January 2012)

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207 These figures are based on Exhibit EU-44 for the years 2000-2006, and on Exhibit CHN-52 for the years 2007-2011. We note that the figures provided by the parties generally align for the years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. As already noted, however, there are significant discrepancies between the information provided in Exhibit CHN-52 and Exhibit EU-44 regarding the share of imports into the European Union under tariff line 1602 39 80 in the years 2000-2006. More specifically: (i) Exhibit CHN-52 indicates that Thailand accounted for 37.9% of imports into the European Union in 2000; however, according to Exhibit EU-44, in 2000, Thailand accounted for 6 of the 12 tonnes imported (i.e. 50%); (ii) Exhibit CHN-52 indicates that Thailand and Brazil respectively accounted for 17.9% and 0.5% of imports into the EU in 2001; however, according to Exhibit EU-44, in 2001, Thailand accounted for 23 of the 24 tonnes imported (i.e. 95.8%) and Brazil accounted for the remaining 4.2%; (iii) according to Exhibit CHN-52, Thailand accounted for 21.1% of imports into the European Union in 2002; however, according to Exhibit EU-44, in 2002, Thailand accounted for 74 of the 128 tonnes imported into the EU (i.e. 57.8%); (iv) Exhibit CHN-52 indicates that Thailand accounted for 37.6% of imports into the European Union in 2003; however, according to Exhibit EU-44, in 2003, Thailand accounted for 134 of the 141 tonnes imported (i.e. 95.0%); (v) Exhibit CHN-52 indicates that Thailand accounted for 38.1% of imports into the European Union in 2004; however, according to Exhibit EU-44, in 2004, Thailand accounted for 162 of the 199 tonnes imported (i.e. 81.4%); (vi) Exhibit CHN-52 indicates that Thailand and China respectively accounted for 46.2% and 17.6% of imports into the European Union in 2005; however, according to Exhibit EU-44, in 2005, Thailand accounted for 266 of the 267 tonnes imported in 2005 (99.6%), and China exported no poultry products under tariff line 1602 32 80 (i.e. 0.0%); and (vii) Exhibit CHN-52 indicates that Thailand and China respectively accounted for 31.5% and 30.5% of imports into the European Union in 2006; however, according to Exhibit EU-44, in 2006, Thailand accounted for 209 of the 275 tonnes imported (76.0%), and China exported no poultry products under tariff line 1602 32 80 (i.e. 0.0%). We understand that the discrepancy may be due to the fact that China's statistics in Exhibits CHN-52 and Exhibit CHN-43 include imports into Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia made before those countries became Member States of the European Union, whereas the EU statistics do not include those imports.

208 These figures are based on Exhibit CHN-52. This average is based on Exhibit EU-43, which provides merged statistics for tariff line 1602 39 85 including for years prior to the merger of tariff lines 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 80 (effective 1 January 2012). Exhibit CHN-52 does not provide merged statistics for the tariff lines 1602 3940 and 1602 39 80 prior to their merger effective 1 January 2012.
7.3 Terms of reference issues

7.3.1 Introduction

7.99. According to the European Union, China has advanced certain claims of violation in the course of the proceedings that are not identified in the panel request, and which therefore fall outside of the Panel's terms of reference.

7.100. In its first written submission, the European Union requested that the Panel make a preliminary ruling that the following claims advanced by China in its first written submission fall outside of the scope of the Panel's terms of reference:

a. China's claim that European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by allocating small TRQ shares to "all others", at levels that do not allow these countries going forward to achieve substantial supplying interest status; and

b. China's claim that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2, and Article XIII:4, by not explicitly identifying the data that it took into account to determine the TRQs.

7.101. During the second meeting of the Panel, and in its responses and associated comments to the second set of questions, the European Union argued that two other issues fall outside of the Panel's terms of reference:

c. China's claims, developed in its second written submission, that the European Union violated Article XIII:1 and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by failing to annually review and adjust the TRQ allocations on an ongoing basis to reflect recent trade developments; and,

d. any claim by China that the European Union violated paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII or paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules.

7.102. We recall that Article 6.2 of the DSU establishes the requirements that apply to a panel request. Article 6.2 provides that a panel request "shall be made in writing", "shall indicate whether consultations were held", "identify the specific measures at issue" and "provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly".

7.103. With respect to each of the issues identified above, the European Union has indicated that China's panel request fails to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. However, we understand the European Union to be arguing that the issues raised by China are "new claims" that fall outside of the scope of the panel request, and not that there is any defect in the panel request itself. Thus, the terms of reference issues before us are not about the adequacy of one or more items of the panel request judged against the requirements of Article 6.2, but rather about whether the complaining party has broadened the scope of the measures or claims in the dispute by advancing new claims as compared with those identified in the panel request.

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209 EU's first written submission, para. 7. See also paras. 239-249.
210 EU's first written submission, para. 8. See also paras. 269-270.
211 EU's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 33-35. See also the EU's comments on China's response to Panel question No. 121, paras. 58-67.
212 EU's response to Panel question No. 100, paras. 61-64.
213 EU's first written submission, paras. 239, 270; EU's response to Panel question No. 100, para. 63; EU's comments on China's response to Panel question No. 121(b), para. 67.
214 At the first meeting, the Panel asked the European Union to clarify whether it was arguing that one or more items of the panel request itself failed to meet the requirements of Article 6.2 (and if so, to specify which items of the panel request fail to meet which requirement of Article 6.2), or instead that the panel request itself may meet the requirements of Article 6.2, but that China's first written submission challenged new measures or claims that fall outside of the scope of the panel request (Question 1(a) of the set of questions sent to the parties in advance of the first meeting). The European Union responded that China's first written submission developed legal claims that were not mentioned in the panel's request, and therefore constitute "new claims" falling outside of the Panel's terms of reference.
7.104. China considers that some of the issues that the European Union characterizes as new "claims" are arguments in support of claims identified in the panel request. We recall that Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that the claims, but not the arguments in support of those claims, must be identified in the panel request in order to allow the defending party and any third parties to know the legal basis of the complaint. In this regard, the Appellate Body has consistently distinguished between claims of violation and the arguments presented in support of those claims.

7.3.2 The scope of China's claims under Article XIII of the GATT 1994

7.3.2.1 China's contention that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 because it did not set the shares of the TRQs allocated to the "all others" category at sufficient levels

7.105. In its first written submission, China contends that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 because the shares of the TRQs allocated to the "all others" category are not sufficient to allow other WTO Members to obtain a substantial supplying interest going forward in the products covered by the TRQs. According to China, the chapeau of Article XIII:2 requires that the determination of the TRQs be a "dynamic process based on market developments" and not be "cast in stone", as evidenced by the possibility to request adjustments to the base period and reappraisal of special factors under Article XIII:4. For that reason, China argues, the shares of TRQs afforded to the "all others" category must be large enough to ensure that countries which did not receive a country-specific share are able to use their comparative advantages to achieve a substantial supplying interest in the future. China claims that by not allocating an "all others" share of at least 10% for all of the TRQs, the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2.

7.106. The European Union submits that this is a new claim that falls outside the Panel's terms of reference because it was not identified in China's panel request. The European Union submits that China's panel request only claims a violation of the chapeau of Article XIII:2 in connection with other provisions or paragraphs of Article XIII, including Article XIII:4, by using the expressions "including the chapeau" and "read in conjunction with". According to the European Union, there is no "stand-alone", independent claim of violation of the chapeau of Article XIII:2 in China's panel request based on the purported obligation of a country establishing a TRQ to set aside a share for "all others" at levels sufficient to allow these countries going forward to obtain a substantial supplying interest. The European Union submits that there is nothing in the panel request hinting at that obligation, or at how or why the measure at issue might be considered by China to violate such an obligation, nor is there mention of such a dynamic interpretation of the chapeau. In this regard, the European Union notes that the chapeau "does not impose a clear cut obligation whose contours are easily understandable from its wording", and that China's itself "reads in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 several distinct obligations with a very different content". Moreover, the European Union considers that item (vii) of China's panel request alleges that the chapeau of Article XIII:2, together with Article XIII:4, have been violated because the European

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217 China's first written submission, paras. 208 et seq, section IV.3.c., entitled "the EU violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 because it did not establish the level of the TRQs for all other countries at levels that allow these countries going forward to achieve a substantial interest as suppliers of the products subject to the TRQs." See also China's first written submission, para. 280(8).
218 China's first written submission, para. 209.
219 China claims that this also violates Article XIII:1. The European Union has not argued that the claim under Article XIII:1 falls outside of the scope of the Panel's terms of reference.
220 EU's first written submission, paras. 238-248 and EU's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, para. 27.
221 See China's request for the establishment of a panel, items (v) (vii) of Sections II.A. and II.B. See EU's first written submission, paras. 246-247 and EU's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, paras. 38 et seq.
222 EU's first written submission, para. 247; EU's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, para. 43.
223 EU's first written submission, para. 248, EU's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, para. 45.
224 EU's opening statement at the first substantive meeting, paras. 32-33.
Union has not ensured that the base period is selected and special factors are taken into account such as to allot to Members a TRQ that approaches as close as possible the shares that they might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQs. Hence, the references to Article XIII:4, to the base period and to special factors are not described in the panel request as mere examples, but constitute defining features of the obligation described in item (vii) of China's panel request, which, according to China, the European Union has violated. China's claim that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 because the shares of the TRQs allocated to the "all others" category are not sufficient to allow other WTO Members to obtain a substantial supplying interest going forward in the products covered by the TRQs is completely independent from the need to make adjustments to the base period selected and reappraise special factors in accordance with Article XIII:4.

7.107. According to China, its contention that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by failing to allocate an adequate "all others" share sufficient to allow other WTO Members to obtain a substantial supplying interest going forward is an argument in support of the claim presented in item (vii) of Section II.A and item (vii) of Section II.B of its panel request. Item (vii) sets forth the claim that "the allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" is inconsistent with "Article XIII:2, including its chapeau, read in conjunction with Article XIII:4". According to China, the panel request thus makes clear that the consistency of the TRQs with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 is challenged, even if the words "including the chapeau" are used. China also considers that the chapeau of Article XIII:2 contains a single, distinct obligation that requires Members to "aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions." While China recognizes that it has alleged several different violations of the chapeau of Article XIII:2, it explains that this is not because the provision of the chapeau contains several distinct obligations, but because the sole requirement that it contains was violated in several different ways by the European Union.

7.108. The main issue before the Panel is whether China's contention that the European Union violated the obligation in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by failing to allocate the "all others" shares at a levels sufficient to allow other Members to obtain a substantial supplying interest is properly characterized as a new claim, in which case it would fall outside the Panel's terms of reference, or rather as an argument in support of the claim included in item (vii) of China's panel request.

7.109. We note that China's panel request is divided into two sections. Section I identifies the measures at issue, and Section II identifies the legal basis for the complaint. Section II.A presents the claims of violation in respect of the First Modification Package, and Section II.B presents the claims of violation in respect of the Second Modification Package. Items II.A(vii) and II.B(vii) set forth the following claim:

The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented by the EU in the measures identified above is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:2, including its chapeau, read in conjunction with Article XIII:4, which confirms that the base period must be selected and special factors must be taken into account such as to allot to Members a TRQ that approaches as closely as possible the shares that they might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQs. (emphasis added)

7.110. First, we observe that item (vii) specifies that the violation arises from "the allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members", i.e. to Brazil and Thailand. While the European Union argues that there is nothing in the panel request to suggest a claim that the chapeau of Article XIII:2 contains an obligation to allocate a share of the TRQ to an "all others" category so as to allow other countries going forward to achieve a substantial interest, we consider that item (vii) of China's panel request clearly alleges a violation on the basis of the "allocation of all or vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members". The contention that the European

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225 EU's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, paras. 39-42.
226 EU's opening statement at the first substantive meeting of the Panel, paras. 43 and 45.
227 China's response to the EU's request for preliminary rulings, para. 4.
228 China's response to the EU's request for preliminary rulings, para. 6.
229 China's response to the EU's request for preliminary rulings, para. 11.
230 China's response to the EU's request for preliminary rulings, para. 13.
Union did not "allocate a share for 'all other' countries at levels sufficient to allow these countries going forward to achieve a substantial interest" is closely related to the contention that the European Union failed to allocate a sufficiently large amount of the TRQ shares to the "all others" category, and instead allocated "all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members". In our view, it is an elaboration of why China considers that "the allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two Members" violates the chapeau of Article XIII:2.

7.111. Second, we observe that item (vii) states that the allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two Members "is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:2, including its chapeau". We consider that the claim of violation of "GATT Article XIII:2, including its chapeau", read in conjunction with Article XIII:4 is not a model of clarity in drafting. However, we do not consider that the phrase "read in conjunction with Article XIII:4" negates the express claim based on the chapeau of Article XIII:2. In this regard, we note that item (vii) of the panel request not only references "Article XIII:2, including its chapeau", but also reproduces the actual wording of the obligation that is provided for in the chapeau, namely to "allow to Members a TRQ that approaches as closely as possible the shares that they might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQs".

7.112. Third, to the extent that the European Union's objection is grounded on the premise that the chapeau of Article XIII:2 contains multiple, distinct obligations, we disagree. In our view, Article XIII is an example of a provision that contains multiple, distinct obligations as set forth in Article XIII:1, the chapeau of Article XIII:2, the subparagraphs of Article XIII:2, the subparagraphs of Article XIII:3, and Article XIII:4. However, we read the chapeau of Article XIII:2 as containing a single obligation, namely, that in applying import restrictions to any product, Members "shall aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions".

7.113. The Panel considers that, based on the wording of item (vii) of the panel request, China's contention that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by failing to set aside TRQ shares for "all others" at levels that allow other WTO Members to achieve a substantial supplying interest status going forward falls within the scope of the panel's terms of reference.

7.3.2.2 China's contention that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 because it failed to disclose the trade data it used to determine the TRQs

7.114. In its first written submission, China contends that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 by not disclosing the data that it took into account to determine the TRQs. More precisely, China submits that none of the instruments, regulations or decisions adopted by the European Union with respect to the First and Second Modification Packages "describe with any degree of precision the historical trade data" relied upon by the European Union to determine the TRQs allocated to specific countries and the TRQs allocated to all other countries. China contends that there is no indication of how the European Union calculated the amount of the TRQs under paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII, and that this violates the chapeau of Article XIII:2. China also contends that the European Union violated Article XIII:4 by failing to disclose the representative period taken into account to determine the TRQS, and whether "special factors" were considered.

7.115. The European Union submits that these are new claims that fall outside the scope of the Panel's terms of reference. The European Union argues that nothing in China's panel request, including in the claims listed in items (v) and (vii) of Section II.A regarding the First Modification Package, and the corresponding claims in items (v) and (vii) of Section II.B regarding the Second Modification Package, indicate that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 or Article XIII:4 by failing to disclose the data that it took into account to determine the shares in the TRQs. The European Union submits that the text of the chapeau of Article XIII:2, of Article XIII:4 and of paragraph 6 of the Understanding do not refer to any obligation to disclose

\[231\] China's first written submission, para. 217.
\[232\] China's first written submission, para. 218.
\[233\] China's first written submission, para. 222.
\[234\] EU's first written submission, para. 268.
the trade data upon which the allocation of the TRQ is made. The European Union argues that "a simple reference to those provisions did not allow the European Union to anticipate that China intended to refer to the violation of the alleged disclosure obligation".235

7.116. China responds that these are not new claims, but rather an argument in support of China's claims in items (v) and (vii) of Section II.A and Section II.B of its panel request. In these items of China's panel request, China claims that "the allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two Members" violates "Article XIII:2 read in conjunction with the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII and in particular Paragraph 6 thereof" (item (v) of the panel request), and "Article XIII:2, including its chapeau, read in conjunction with Article XIII:4" (item (vii) of the panel request).236 China submits that compliance with these obligations "requires disclosure of the basis and data taken into account for the determination of the TRQs".237 Thus, China considers that its contention that the European Union violated these provisions by failing to disclose the data used to determine the TRQs are properly characterized as arguments in support of its claims under these provisions.

7.117. According to China, its contention that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 because it failed to disclose the data used to determine the TRQs is an argument in support of the claim set forth items II.A(v) and (vii) and II.B(v) and (vii) of the panel request. The main issue before the Panel is whether China's contention that the European Union violated the obligation in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 by failing to disclose the data used to determine the TRQs is properly characterized as a new claim that is outside the Panel's terms of reference, or rather as an argument in support of the claims included in items (v) and (vii) of China's panel request.

7.118. We have already examined item (vii) of the panel request above, in the context of examining the first terms of reference issue raised by the European Union. We recall that item (vii) of the panel request reads as follows:

> The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented by the EU in the measures identified above is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:2, including its chapeau, read in conjunction with Article XIII:4, which confirms that the base period must be selected and special factors must be taken into account such as to allot to Members a TRQ that approaches as closely as possible the shares that they might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQs. (emphasis added)

7.119. Item (v) of the panel request also concerns the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two Members". It reads as follows:

> The allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members as implemented by the EU in the measures identified above is inconsistent with the chapeau of GATT 1994 Article XIII:2 read in conjunction with the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII and in particular Paragraph 6 thereof, which requires the allocation of a TRQ to approach as closely as possible the shares that the WTO Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQs. (emphasis added)

7.120. First, we observe that items (v) and (vii) of the panel request make no reference to the disclosure of data, or to any alleged failure by the European Union to disclose historical trade data, or to disclose any other type of information. Rather, items (v) and (vii) both specify that the violation of the cited provisions arises from "the allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members", i.e. to Brazil and Thailand. In addition, none of the provisions of the GATT 1994 cited in these items of the panel request make reference to the disclosure of data. Furthermore, the manner in which the panel request summarizes the obligations in the chapeau of Article XIII:2, Article XIII:4 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding makes no reference to any obligation in these provisions, express or implied, to disclose information.

235 EU's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 55.
236 China's response to the EU's request for preliminary rulings, para. 22; China's response to Panel question No. 91, para. 61.
237 China's response to the EU's request for preliminary rulings, para. 26.
7.121. In addition, we note that the alleged omission at issue – the failure by the European Union to disclose certain data – is not identified as one of the challenged measures listed in Section I of China's panel request. As noted above, China's panel request is separated into two sections. Section I identifies the measures at issue, and Section II identifies the legal basis for the complaint. The scope of China's claims must be discerned by reading the relevant items in Sections II.A and II.B of the panel request, together with the identification of the measures at issue in Section I of the panel request. We do not see in the measures listed in Section I of China's panel request any reference to the European Union's failure to disclose the historical trade data, the selection of a base period and how special factors were appraised.

7.122. Throughout its submissions in these proceedings, China has presented the alleged failure to disclose data as the action or omission that constitutes the violation of the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4, and not as an explanation of why some other action or omission is inconsistent with these provisions. In this regard, we observe that the section of China's first written submission developing this claim is entitled "The EU violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 by not explicitly identifying the data that it took into account to determine the TRQs". In its first written submission, China requests a finding that "By not explicitly identifying the data that it took into account to determine the TRQs, the EU violate[d] the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4". The corresponding section of its second written submission is entitled, "The chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 Were Violated By Not Explicitly Identifying The Data That The European Union Took Into Account To Determine The Tariff Rate Quotas". The requirement of disclosure, as advanced by China throughout its submissions, is presented as a constitutive element of its claim of violation under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4.

7.123. Based on the foregoing, the Panel considers that China's contentions that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 by failing to proactively disclose the historical trade data, the reference period selected and how special factors were appraised are new claims that fall outside the Panel's terms of reference.

7.124. In any event, the Panel considers that there is no textual basis to conclude that either the chapeau of Article XIII:2 or the provisions of Article XIII:4 impose an obligation on a Member adopting a TRQ to proactively disclose the historical trade data which was relied upon to determine the TRQ allocation, the representative period selected or the special factors considered.

7.125. No such obligation is identified in the text of either provision. Beginning with the obligation in the chapeau Article XIII:2, we note that the text of this provision does not explicitly or implicitly refer to the disclosure of any information. It refers to the obligation applicable to a Member imposing a TRQ "to aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions". The Panel cannot read these words to suggest an obligation to proactively disclose the import data used by a Member to determine and allocate TRQs. Article XIII:4 provides for the possibility for a Member holding a substantial interest in supplying a product that is subject to an import restriction to request consultations "regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved". There is nothing in the wording of Article XIII:4 that suggests in any way that the Member imposing a TRQ must "explicitly identify", or proactively disclose, any information. Article XIII:4 rather empowers a Member holding a substantial interest to undertake a certain action, which is to request consultations with the Member imposing the TRQ. It also obliges the Member imposing the TRQ to "consult promptly" upon request. A requirement to proactively disclose certain information relating to the historical trade data, the reference period and the consideration of special factors, if any, is not mentioned in the text of Article XIII:4.

7.126. Turning to the context of these provisions, the Panel notes that other provisions of the GATT 1994 contain express disclosure and publication obligations which are applicable to TRQs. Notably, Article XIII:3(b) states that Members "applying restrictions shall give public notice of the total quantity or value of the product or products which will be permitted to be imported during a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or value". Article XIII:3(c) requires that 

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238 China's first written submission, section IV.B.3.d.
239 China's first written submission, para. 280(9).
240 China's second written submission, section IV.D.
Members allocating TRQs among supplying countries "shall promptly inform all other Members having an interest in supplying the product concerned of the shares in the quota currently allocated, by quantity or value, to the various supplying countries and shall give public notice thereof". These provisions, which apply to a Member imposing a TRQ, do not refer to any requirement to proactively disclose the historical trade data upon which the TRQ was determined, or of the selection of the base period or consideration of special factors. More generally, Article X:1 obliges Members to ensure that trade regulations pertaining to rates of duty and restrictions on imports "be published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments or traders to become acquainted with them". The existence of these other provisions of the GATT 1994 that expressly require the disclosure or publication of information precludes us from reading disclosure obligations into the chapeau of Article XIII:2 or Article XIII:4, especially insofar as such proactive disclosure obligations would be of a more far-reaching scope than those expressly provided for in Article XIII:3(b) and (c), and Article X:1 of the GATT 1994.

7.127. Based on the foregoing, even if the Panel were to find that the panel request covers these claims, the Panel would be compelled to reject China's claims that the European Union violated the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 by failing to proactively disclose the data that it took into account to determine the TRQs in the instruments, regulations or decisions adopted by the European Union with respect to the First and Second Modification Packages.

7.3.2.3 China's contention that the European Union violated Article XIII:1 and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by failing to annually review and reallocate the TRQ shares

7.128. In its second written submission, China claimed that the failure by the European Union to update and reallocate the TRQ shares annually was inconsistent with Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2(d). More precisely, China stated that TRQ shares had to be reviewed and adjusted "from time to time"; "before a new quota year starts"; "preceding each allocation"; "when trade developments occur and the allocated shares are no longer representative of the import of a WTO Member in the absence of the TRQs"; and "over time". China explained that in this dispute, it advances two categories of claims regarding the allocation of shares in the TRQs:

- China makes claims under Article XIII challenging the initial allocation of shares in the TRQs in the First and the Second Modification Packages but also challenges the ongoing application thereof from quota year to quota year without adjustment in light of trade developments such that the allocated shares in the TRQs no longer reflect the shares WTO Members would have had in the absence of the TRQs. China submits that (i) the allocated shares in the TRQs as applied by the European Union since 2007 and 2012 respectively and going forward during their period of validity must be updated from time to time to reflect the share that each WTO Member could have had without the TRQs and (ii) such updating must be based on trade flows during a representative period preceding the continued application of the allocated shares.

7.129. At the second meeting with the Panel, the European Union indicated that China's challenge to the ongoing application of the TRQs from quota year to quota year, without adjustment in light of trade developments, is a new claim which "has not been made before, either in China's Panel request, or in its first written submission, or elsewhere. It is therefore manifestly outside the Panel's terms of reference."

7.130. In its responses to the second set of questions, China indicated that these claims are covered by items (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) of Section II.B of the panel request, regarding the Second Modification Package, read together with the footnotes accompanying some of these items. China recalled that "[t]he allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO
Members as implemented in the measures and decision mentioned above" is the aspect of the measures being challenged. China observed that the allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members has remained in place in the years 2013-2015, and that this TRQ share allocation was implemented in the measures and decisions mentioned in Section I.B of the panel request. China notes that the measures identified in that section, e.g. Commission Regulation (EU) No 1246/2012 of 19 December 2012, were in effect in the years 2013-2015 and are still effective now.

7.131. In its comments on China's response250, the European Union responded, *inter alia*, that the panel request shows that what is challenged is only the initial allocation of the TRQ shares by the European Union at the moment of opening those TRQs, and that the panel request makes no reference to any obligation to periodically review and adjust the allocation.

7.132. Beginning with the text of China's panel request, we note that the claims under Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2 as set forth in section II.B of the panel request all refer to the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two Members".251 We consider that the reference to the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two Members", if taken alone, is broad enough to embrace a claim of violation not only in respect the initial allocation of shares in the TRQs in the First and the Second Modification Packages, but also a claim of violation in respect of a failure to annually review and reallocate the TRQs from quota year to quota year to take account of trade developments. The items referring to the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two Members" are not temporally limited in a way that would confine the scope of the claims only to the initial TRQ allocation.

7.133. However, we consider that the scope of China's claims must be discerned by reading the relevant items in Section II.B of the panel request together with the identification of the measures at issue in Section I of the panel request. And, having carefully reviewed Section I of the panel request, we do not see any reference to the European Union's failure to annually review and reallocate the TRQs from quota year to quota year to take account of trade developments as one of the challenged measures at issue. These claims pertain to a measure in the form of an omission, namely, the failure by the European Union to update and reallocate the TRQ shares set forth in the measures identified in Section I of the panel request. This omission is not identified as one of the measures at issue in Section I of the panel request. In our view, the identification of the regulations as the measures at issue does not, by implication, encompass claims relating to the European Union's subsequent failure to modify the TRQ allocations provided for in those instruments.

7.134. China points out that the items in Section II.B advancing claims under Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2 refer to the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two Members", and are accompanied by a cross-reference back to the following "decision" that is identified in Section I.B(iv) of the panel request:

Refusal by the EU in consultations held on 19 May 2014 under Article XIII of GATT 1994 to adjust the TRQs on the basis of recent import statistics establishing China's substantial supplying interests as had been requested by letter of Ambassador Yu of 19 December 2013.

7.135. We agree that, by virtue of its inclusion in Section I.B(iv) of the panel request, this alleged refusal to adjust the TRQs in consultations held on 19 May 2014 is a measure at issue in this dispute. We further note that items (iv), (v), and (vi) of Section II.B of the panel request each explicitly refers back to this decision, either in the body text of the item or in an accompanying footnote. However, we do not consider that this supports China's argument that the ongoing application of the TRQs from quota year to quota year, without adjustment, is a claim identified in

250 EU's comments on China's response to Panel question No. 121(b).

251 See items (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) of Section II.A of the panel request, and items (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) of Section II.B of the panel request. Item (iii) of the panel request states that "[t]he country-specific TRQs allocated by the EU to two of the WTO Members as implemented in the measures and decision mentioned above violate GATT 1994 Article XIII by diminishing for the other WTO Members the market access commitments that the EU undertook to maintain on a non-discriminatory basis". This item contains no reference to any subparagraph of Article XIII, and it is not clear which of the various paragraphs and obligations of Article XIII would be linked to "diminishing for the other WTO Members the market access commitments that the EU undertook to maintain on a non-discriminatory basis".
7.136. Furthermore, we consider that the evolution of China's claims in its submissions reinforces the conclusion that these are new claims that were developed in the course of the proceedings. In its first written submission, China argued that in order to avoid a long-term freeze in the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries, Article XIII:1 and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 should be interpreted as requiring a Member to reserve at least a 10% share of the TRQ allocation to an "all others" category. In its first written submission, China did not refer to any obligation in Article XIII:1 or XIII:2 to annually review and reallocate the TRQs, and did not refer to any violation of those provisions arising from the European Union's failure to do so in this case. In the context of responding to the argument that China made in its first written submission, the European Union pointed out that allocating a minimum 10% TRQ share to "all others" would not necessarily prevent a permanent freeze in the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries, because one or more countries might proceed to capture the entirety of that "all others" share. The European Union explained that the way to avoid a permanent freeze would not therefore be to always allocate an "all others" share at a certain minimum level, as proposed by China, but rather by having some kind of "time-limit" on the validity of the allocation, or a "periodic review mechanism"; the European Union emphasized, however, that there is no such obligation in Article XIII.254. In its second written submission, China then explained that it is also challenging the absence of any annual review and adjustment of the TRQs at issue by the European Union. China subsequently explained that it "considered it unnecessary to explicitly draw a distinction between its challenges to the initial TRQ allocations and those against the continuous application of these allocations without change in the subsequent periods, until it noticed that the EU overlooked the ongoing nature of the obligations in Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2".255

7.137. We understand that a claim or defence being raised for the first time in a party's second written submission is not, in and of itself, grounds for a panel declining to rule on such claim or defence.256 However, in this case China did not articulate any claims of violation based on the "ongoing" obligations in Article XIII:1 or the chapeau of Article XIII:2 prior to its second written submission, and then did so apparently only in response to the European Union's argument that the only way to avoid a permanent freeze in the allocation of TRQs would be through by having some kind of "time-limit" on the validity of the allocation, or a "periodic review mechanism". The manner in which China's claim regarding an alleged ongoing obligation under Article XIII:1 and XIII:2 to annually reallocate TRQ shares reinforces the conclusion, derived from the text of the panel request, that these are new claims.

7.138. Based on the foregoing, and in particular our analysis of the text of the panel request, we conclude that China's claims that the European Union violated Article XIII:1 and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by failing to annually update the initial TRQ allocations constitute new claims that are not identified in the panel request, and which therefore fall outside of the panel's terms of reference.

7.139. We note that in the present case, China has advanced several claims under Article XIII in connection with the absence of any adjustment to the initial TRQ allocation following the opening of the TRQs. These claims include, in addition to those under consideration here, China's claim that the European Union violated Article XIII:4 by refusing to enter into "meaningful consultations" with
China concerning the need for an adjustment of the TRQ shares, the reference period selected, or the appraisal of special factors.

7.140. It is not in dispute that China’s claim under Article XIII:4, regarding the European Union’s alleged refusal to enter into “meaningful consultations”, falls within the scope of our terms of reference. Accordingly, we address the merits of that claim in our Report. In the course of addressing the merits of that claim, we are confronted with the same fundamental legal issue that we would be confronted with in the event that we were to reach the merits of the claims under consideration here. That issue is whether, in cases where a TRQ has been allocated among supplying countries on the basis of historical market shares in accordance with Article XIII:2(d), there is a legal obligation on the importing Member to reallocate TRQ shares among supplying countries to reflect an updated reference period or a reappraisal of special factors, and if so, whether there is a requirement that such reallocation occur within any particular time-frame.

7.141. In the course of addressing China’s claim under Article XIII:4 regarding the absence of “meaningful consultations”, we conclude that in cases where a TRQ has been allocated among supplying countries on the basis of historical market shares, there is no legal obligation on the importing Member to reallocate TRQ shares among supplying countries to reflect an updated reference period or a reappraisal of special factors, or at least not within any particular time-frame or with any particular frequency. Therefore, even if we were to find that the panel request includes China’s claims that the European Union violated Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2 by failing to annually update the initial TRQ allocations, we would be compelled to reject those claims on the merits.

7.3.3 The scope of China’s claims relating to certification

7.142. China claims that the European Union’s application of the higher out-of-quota tariff rates arising from the First and Second Modification Packages are in violation of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 because they exceed the bound rates currently inscribed in the European Union’s schedule of concessions. This is so, China argues, because the changes agreed with Brazil and Thailand in the Article XXVIII negotiations have not yet been incorporated into the text of the European Union’s schedule through the certification procedure, and therefore are legally ineffective to replace the existing bound duties. In China’s view, the absence of certification means that the bound rates that existed in the Schedule prior to the completion of the Article XXVIII negotiations remain unchanged, from which it follows that the European Union’s application of the higher out-of-quota tariff rates violates Article II:1.

7.143. It is not in dispute that the above claim falls within the scope of our terms of reference, and we address the merits of that claim elsewhere in our Report. In the course of presenting its arguments in support of that claim, however, China has made statements that might be construed as advancing additional claims of violation relating to the European Union’s alleged failure to respect certain requirements contained in the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, and in the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules. In this section of our Report, we will consider whether any additional claims of violation stemming from the European Union’s alleged failure to respect these requirements are properly before the Panel.

7.3.3.1 China’s contentions that the European Union did not respect paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules

7.144. In its panel request and in the course of these proceedings, China has made several statements relating to the European Union not respecting the requirements of paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, and paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules.

7.145. Paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII provides that:

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257 See section 7.10 below.
258 See section 7.11 below.
Contracting parties will be free to give effect to the changes agreed upon in the negotiations as from the first day of the period referred to in Article XXVIII:1, or in the case of negotiations under paragraph 4 or 5 of Article XXVIII, as from the date on which the conclusion of all the negotiations have been notified as set out in paragraph 6 above. A notification shall be submitted to the secretariat, for circulation to contracting parties, of the date on which these changes will come into force. (emphasis added)

7.146. Paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules provides that:

Changes in the authentic texts of Schedules annexed to the General Agreement which reflect modifications resulting from action under Article II, Article XVIII, Article XXIV, Article XXVII or Article XXVIII shall be certified by means of Certifications. A draft of such change shall be communicated to the Director-General within three months after the action has been completed. (emphasis added)

7.147. In its panel request, China suggests that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article II as a result of the European Union having acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules. The panel request states in relevant part:

In the absence of notification for certification, notification of the date on which the changes to the goods schedule come into force to the WTO Secretariat, and notification of the draft modification to its Schedule, the EU acted inconsistently with the procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and Tariff Concessions. The absence of a notification for certification of the modified schedule and of the certification following notification and the other violations mentioned herein, results in the EU having acted inconsistently with GATT 1994 Articles II:1 and II:2 by affording imports of poultry meat from China less favorable treatment than that provided for in its Schedule. (emphasis added)

7.148. In its subsequent submissions in these proceedings, however, China did not request any findings of violation under paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII or paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules. Instead, China argued that the European Union violated Article II because the changes agreed to in the Article XXVIII negotiations had not been formally incorporated into the European Union’s Schedule of concessions through certification, and were therefore legally ineffective to replace its existing bound duties. In the concluding section of its first written submission, there is no reference to paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII or paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, and China requested the Panel to make the following findings in relation to the claims under Article II:

By applying the tariffs and TRQs that have not been certified, have not been given formal effect and are thus ineffectual to replace the EU's obligations under the unmodified schedule, the EU acts in violation of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994;

By applying tariffs in excess of the bound level, the EU acts in violation of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994.

259 China's request for the establishment of a panel, item (ix) of Section II.A and item (x) of Section II.B.
260 China's request for the establishment of a panel, item (ix) of Section II.A and item (x) of Section II.B.
261 China's arguments in relation to this claim were set forth in Section IV.C of its first written submission, under the heading "The EU's Tariffs And TRQs Implemented Under Article XXVIII Of The GATT 1994 Are Inconsistent With Article II Of GATT 1994 Because They Exceed The EU's Current Schedule Of Concessions". Section V of China's second written submission, entitled "The EU's Tariffs And TRQs Implemented Under Article XXVIII Of The GATT 1994 Are Inconsistent With Article II Of GATT 1994 Because They Exceed The EU's Current Schedule Of Concessions".
262 China's first written submission, para. 280, subparagraphs (14) and (15).
7.149. In its first written submission, China did refer to paragraph 8 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and to paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, observing that the European Union had not communicated the draft of the changes to its Schedule to the Director-General and that the European Union failed to obtain certification of its modified concessions. China did not, however, explicitly request that the Panel make any finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with any of these provisions under the respective Procedures; nor did it argue that the alleged inconsistency with Article II arose by virtue of any such inconsistency with the Procedures. Rather, the reference to the procedures appeared to be in the nature of factual observations and explanations as to why the changes had not yet been certified.

7.150. In its second written submission, China reiterated that the requirement in the second sentence of paragraph 1 "has in fact not been respected by the European Union either for the First or for the Second Modification Package". However, here again, China did not argue explicitly that this gave rise to the inconsistency with Article II:1; rather, this statement was made in the context of the section of its submission with the heading, "The EU's Tariffs and TRQs Implemented Under Article XXVIII Of The GATT 1994 Are Inconsistent With Article II Of GATT 1994 Because They Exceed The EU's Current Schedule Of Concessions". This statement apparently served to reiterate why the changes resulting from the First and Second Modification Packages have not yet been certified.

7.151. At the second meeting with the Panel, the Panel sought to resolve any ambiguity as to the existence of any claims of violation relating to paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII or paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, by asking China to clarify whether it was requesting the Panel to find a violation of these provisions. China indicated that it would respond in its written responses to the panel's second set of questions. This prompted the European Union to comment that it was operating on the understanding that no such claims of violation were being made by China in these proceedings, and that depending on China's forthcoming written response to this question, it may have to raise issues relating to the Panel's terms of reference and due process.

7.152. The second set of questions from the Panel to the parties included several questions pertaining to the requirements in paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, and the question of whether any claims of violation were being requested under these procedures. In response to a question from the Panel regarding the second sentence of paragraph 7, the European Union indicated that although it had informed all of the Members with a principal or substantial supplying interest of the date of entry into force of the changes arising from the Article XXVIII negotiations, "[t]he date [of] entry into force of those changes has not been notified under paragraph 7 of the Procedures". In its subsequent comments on the EU response, China observed that "[t]he notification to the secretariat is intended to allow the secretariat to notify the date to all WTO Members and not only to the Members holding a PSI or a SSI", and that "[o]ther Members not holding a PSI or SSI were accordingly not informed of the date notwithstanding their immediate interest in the matter". However, China did not request any finding of inconsistency with this provision.

7.153. To the contrary, in its written response to Panel question No. 99, China clarified that:

For the purpose of finding whether the EU acted inconsistently with Article II, the Panel needs to ascertain whether paragraph 1, read together with paragraph 8, provides certification as a mandatory precondition for the modified concessions come

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263 China's first written submission, paras. 264, 270.
264 For example, in its response to the first set of questions, China stated that it had previously "noted" that "the three month period set forth in paragraph 1 has in fact not been respected by the EU" (China's response to question No. 50, para. 194).
265 China's second written submission, para. 199.
266 EU's response to Panel question No. 97.
267 China's comments on the 'EU's response to Panel question No. 97.
into effect. The Panel is not required nor requested to make a finding that the EU acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 and paragraph 1.\textsuperscript{268} (emphasis added)

7.154. In a response to a question from the Panel, the European Union elaborated on its understanding that China was not making any claims of violation under paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII or paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules. The European Union set forth its understanding that the panel request "did not raise separate claims of violation of either of those two provisions", and that China had not asked the Panel to rule on any such claims in its previous submissions, but rather that China "relied on those provisions in support of its claim under Article II:1". According to the European Union, the fact "[t]hat the Panel considered it necessary to raise this question at this very late stage of the proceedings confirms the lack of clarity of the Panel request on this point", and reiterated that "making those claims for the first time in response to a Panel question after the second hearing would raise issues of due process".\textsuperscript{269}

7.155. In its comments on the EU response, China reproduced the text of the items in its panel request referring to paragraphs 7 and 1 of the above-mentioned Procedures, and stated:

The EU is thus wrong in its response to the above question stating that China made no claims based on the two Procedures. To the contrary, two of China's claims are directly based on these two Procedures, as well as other provisions of the GATT 1994.

China further refers to its response to the Panel's question 99.

Considering that China and the EU hold different views on whether the Modification Procedures qualify as "decisions" within the meaning of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the GATT 1994, an issue decides directly the legal status of the Modification Procedures where China's claims are hinged upon, China sees no reason for the Panel not to rule on this issue.\textsuperscript{270}

7.156. We recall that it was in its response to Panel question No. 99 that China had clarified that the Panel "is not required nor requested to make a finding that the EU acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 and paragraph 1".\textsuperscript{271}

7.157. We consider that while the identification of a claim in a panel request is a necessary condition for a Panel to rule on that claim, it is not always a sufficient condition for a Panel to rule on that claim. In some circumstances, a panel may be precluded from ruling on a claim, even where it is included in the panel request, if the complainant does not articulate the claim in a clear and timely manner in its subsequent submissions.

7.158. In EU – Fasteners (China) the Appellate Body found that a claim under Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement was identified in the panel request, and thus within the Panel's terms of reference. However, the Appellate Body found that the panel erred in ruling on this claim. After reviewing the manner in which the particular claim was pursued, the Appellate Body explained that:

[T]he Panel record shows that China asserted its claim ... only in response to questions from the Panel, and articulated this claim only after the parties had provided the Panel with written submissions and had attended a substantive meeting. We do not find that assertions made so late in the proceedings, and only in response to questioning by the Panel, can comply with either Rule 4 of the Panel's Working Procedures, or the requirements of due process of law. The late assertion of a claim ..., and the absence of proper argumentation and of the provision of relevant evidence in support of this assertion, demonstrates that the European Union was not called upon to respond to China's claim under Article 6.5.\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{268} China's response to Panel question No. 99. See also China's response to Panel question No. 100.
\textsuperscript{269} EU's response to Panel question No. 100, paras. 61-63.
\textsuperscript{270} China's comments on the EU response to Panel question No. 102(a).
\textsuperscript{271} China's response to Panel question Nos. 99 and 100.
\textsuperscript{272} Appellate Body Report, EC – Fasteners (China), para. 574.
7.159. In India – Additional Import Duties, the panel found that a claim under Article III:2 of the GATT 1994 was identified in the panel request, and therefore fell within the scope of its terms of reference. The panel noted that in its submissions to the panel, the complainant had referred to this provision, and even to the alleged inconsistency of the measures with this provision. However, the panel was unable to discern from the complainant’s submissions any arguments in support of a separate and independent claim under Article III:2. In addition, the panel noted that the complainant did not request any findings under this provision in the concluding section of its first or second written submissions. The panel noted that the statements alleging a lack of consistency with this provision were embedded in a discussion of a different claim and argument, and that it "would be improper for the Panel proprio motu to take these statements out of their specific context and rely on them to rule on an alternative claim" under Article III:2, especially where the complainant "has not requested any findings in relation to a claim" under this provision. In these circumstances, the panel found that the claim under Article III:2 was not properly before it, and made no findings on the merits of any such claim.

7.160. In US – Steel Plate, the panel request identified a claim under Article 6.6, Article 6.8 and Annex II(7) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement regarding the failure to exercise special circumspection in using information supplied in the petition. The complainant explicitly abandoned these claims in its first written submission. It subsequently stated its intention, prior to the first meeting with the panel, to pursue one of those claims. Despite the lack of a specific objection by the responding party, the panel found that the complainant could not "resurrect" this claim. The panel considered that "[w]hile it is true that the claim in question was set out in the request for establishment, and is therefore within our terms of reference, we are not persuaded that fact alone requires us to rule on it". The panel found that in the absence of any extenuating circumstances to justify the reversal of its abandonment of this claim, the complainant should not be allowed to resurrect it.

7.161. In the present case, the items of China’s panel request alleging a violation of Article II include the statement that "the EU acted inconsistently with the procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII and paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and Tariff Concessions". However, in its subsequent submissions, China never requested a finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with either of these provisions, nor did it ever argue that the alleged inconsistency with Article II arose as a result of any inconsistency with paragraph 1 or paragraph 7 of the above-mentioned procedures. To the contrary, we understand that China’s claim under Article II is not dependant on the premise that the European Union acted inconsistently with paragraph 7. Furthermore, as noted above, in response to a question posed by the panel at the second meeting, China clarified that the Panel "is not required nor requested to make a finding that the EU acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 and paragraph 1".

7.162. Based on the foregoing, we do not understand China to be requesting a finding that the European Union acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII or paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedule. Insofar as China is making any such claims, then we conclude that such claim has not been made in a sufficiently clear and timely manner, and is therefore not properly before the Panel.

273 Panel Report, India – Additional Import Duties, para. 7.412.
274 Panel Report, India – Additional Import Duties, paras. 7.402-7.418.
276 At paragraph 73 of its response to Panel question No. 99, China explained that "China takes the view that in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and Tariff Concessions, read together with paragraph 8 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, modifications of a schedule of concessions are subject to certification, without which the new modified concessions are not yet given legal effect and the original concessions remain in force. Based on this legal interpretation as well as the fact that the EU's modified concessions have not been certified, China claims that the EU violated Article II of the GATT 1994 by applying customs duties in excess of the current bound rates that are still in effect".
277 China’s response to Panel question Nos. 99 and 100, paras. 74 and 75.
7.3.3.2 China's contention of a possible violation of Article II:1 in the period 2007-2009 arising from the European Union applying new rates prior to notifying all Members of the completion of the negotiations

7.163. Paragraph 6 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII provides that:

Upon completion of all its negotiations the contracting party referred to in paragraph 1 above should send to the secretariat, for distribution in a secret document, a final report on the lines of the model in Annex C attached hereto.

7.164. As noted earlier, the first sentence of paragraph 7 of those procedures states that in the case of negotiations under Article XXVIII:5, Members "will be free to give effect to the changes agreed upon in the negotiations ... as from the date on which the conclusion of all the negotiations have been notified" in accordance with paragraph 6 of those procedures.

7.165. As elaborated later in our Report in the context of addressing the merits of China's claim under Article II:1, China's position is that changes agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations cannot be implemented, insofar as they exceed the bound rates inscribed in a Member's Schedule, until such time as those changes are formally incorporated into its Schedule through certification. The European Union disagrees, and argues that the first sentence of paragraph 7 reflects the right of Members to apply tariff rates in excess of those set forth in the text of the Schedule prior to the changes being formally incorporated through certification. In its second written submission, China notes, in the context of responding to that argument, that the European Union implemented the higher out-of-quota rates over the period 2007-2009, prior to notifying other Members of the conclusion of the negotiations on 27 May 2009. Thus, China submits that even if the European Union's position regarding paragraph 7 were correct, which in China's view it is not, then there was still a violation of Article II:1, in respect of the First Modification Package, over that 2007-2009 period.

7.166. We recall that the European Union notified the WTO of the conclusion of the negotiations relating to the First Modification Package on 27 May 2009, and of the conclusion of the negotiations relating to the Second Modification Package on 17 December 2012. We note that it is not in dispute that the European Union implemented the higher out-of-quota rates established by the First Modification Package nearly two years before it notified the WTO Membership of the conclusion of the negotiations on 27 May 2009. In response to a question from the Panel, the European Union explained that this was "largely due to an administrative oversight" on its part.

7.167. We observe that China's panel request does not appear to articulate any claim that the European Union violated Article II:1 on the grounds that it gave effect to the results of the First Modification Package prior to notifying Members of the completion of the negotiations. The relevant item of the panel request, already reproduced further above, refers to the absence of "notification for certification", "notification of the date on which the changes to the goods schedule come into force", and "notification of the draft modification to its Schedule".

7.168. In any event, even if the panel request could be read as including such a claim, we consider that any violation of Article II:1 arising from the European Union's implementation of the results of the Article XXVIII negotiations prior to notifying Members would have ceased to exist on 29 May 2009, which was more than six years prior to the panel request in these proceedings. In EC – Chicken Cuts, the Appellate Body confirmed that "[t]he term 'specific measures at issue' in Article 6.2 suggests that, as a general rule, the measures included in a panel's terms of reference must be measures that are in existence at the time of the establishment of the panel." We

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278 China's first written submission, paras. 260-264, para. 268.
279 EU's first written submission, para. 300.
280 China's second written submission, para. 200.
281 See, respectively, G/SECRET/25/Add.1, circulated on 29 May 2009 (Exhibit EU-6) and G/SECRET/32/Add.1., circulated on 20 December 2012 (Exhibit EU-9).
282 G/SECRET/25/Add.1, 29 May 2009 (Exhibit EU-6).
283 EU's response to question 53, para. 156.
284 China's request for the establishment of a panel, item (x) of Section II.A and item (x) of Section II.B.
285 Appellate Body Report, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 156. For a review of WTO jurisprudence dealing with measures that were withdrawn, repealed, or expired prior to the request for the establishment of a panel, see Panel Report, China – Electronic Payment Services, paras. 7.224-7.229.
recognize that there may well be particular circumstances in which a panel would be justified in making findings in respect of a measure that ceased to exist prior to its establishment. However, in this case, China has not advanced any argument as to why the Panel should rule on whether the European Union violated Article II:1 by implementing the higher out-of-quota rates over the period 2007-2009.\footnote{In response to Panel question No. 53, the European Union acknowledged the delayed notification, but then stated that “the notification to the WTO was made well before the establishment of the present Panel” (para. 157). China did not subsequently advance any counterargument, or raise the issue concerning the 2007-2009 period again.}

Based on the foregoing, we do not understand China to be requesting a finding that the European Union violated Article II:1 by implementing the higher out-of-quota rates over the period 2007-2009, prior to the point in time when it notified other Members of the conclusion of the negotiations (on 29 May 2009). Insofar as China's statement to that effect\footnote{China's second written submission, para. 64.} is to be construed as making such a claim, then for the reasons above we conclude that it is not properly before us.

### 7.4 Claims under Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994

#### 7.4.1 Introduction

China claims that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994 by refusing to recognize China's "principal supplying interest" and "substantial interest" in the concessions at issue in the First and Second Modification Packages.\footnote{China's first written submission, paras. 49-117; China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 11-55; China's responses to Panel question Nos. 13-20, 22-23; China's second written submission, paras. 31-95; China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 3-40; China's responses, or comments on EU's responses, to Panel question Nos. 68-70, 72-75, 82-84, 106-110.} In China's view, the reference periods used by the European Union to determine which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest were inconsistent with Article XXVIII:1 for two different reasons. First, we understand China to claim that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by not determining which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest on the basis of an estimate of what Members' shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China. Second, we understand China to claim that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by not re-determining which Members held a relevant supplying interest on the basis of the increase in imports from China over the period 2009-2011.

The European Union responds that its determinations of which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest were entirely consistent with the requirements of Article XXVIII:1.\footnote{EU's first written submission, paras. 86-153; EU's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 10-17; EU's responses to Panel question Nos. 14-16, 18, 21-22, 24; EU's second written submission, paras. 2-59; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 3-40; EU's responses, or comments on China responses, to Panel question Nos. 68-70, 72-75, 82-84, 106-110.} The European Union submits that it was under no obligation to determine which Members held a supplying interest on the basis of an estimate of what Members' shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China, or to re-determine which Members held a supplying interest on the basis of the increase in imports from China over the period 2009-2011. In addition, the European Union submits that it was entitled not to take into account China's claims of supplying interest insofar as China did not claim any principal supplying interest in the First Modification Package, and failed to make a timely claim of either principal or substantial supplying interest in respect of the Second Modification Package.

#### 7.4.2 Relevant provisions

Article XXVIII is entitled "Modification of Schedules". China's claim of violation is based on Article XXVIII:1, which reads as follows:

> On the first day of each three-year period, the first period beginning on 1 January 1958 (or on the first day of any other period* that may be specified by [the CONTRACTING PARTIES] by two-thirds of the votes cast) a Member (hereafter in this Article referred to as the "applicant Member") may, by negotiation and agreement with any Member with which such concession was initially negotiated and with any
other Member determined by [the CONTRACTING PARTIES] to have a principal supplying interest* (which two preceding categories of Members, together with the applicant Member, are in this Article hereinafter referred to as the "Members primarily concerned"), and subject to consultation with any other Member determined by [the CONTRACTING PARTIES] to have a substantial interest* in such concession, modify or withdraw a concession* included in the appropriate schedule annexed to this Agreement. (emphasis added)

7.173. Thus Article XXVIII:1 establishes certain conditions as to when modifications of concessions contained in a Schedule can be made, as well as when concessions can be withdrawn. It also indicates which Members are entitled to participate in negotiations or consultations regarding the proposed modification or withdrawal. This includes any Member with which the concession was initially negotiated, any Member determined to have a "principal supplying interest", and any other Member determined to have a "substantial interest" in the concession subject to renegotiation. In this case, the European Union stated that China did not possess initial negotiating rights in any of the concessions at issue under the First or Second Modification Packages. China's claim in relation to the First Modification Package was to be recognized as a Member with a substantial supplying interest in the three tariff lines at issue.290 With regard to the Second Modification Package, China has claimed a principal supplying interest with regard to all the relevant tariff lines and provided import statistics with respect to four tariff lines.291 As noted earlier, the European Union did not recognize China as a Member holding a principal or substantial supplying interest in any of the concessions at issue.

7.174. The Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 provides additional information on which Members should be determined to hold a principal supplying interest and a substantial supplying interest. With regard to the concept of a principal supplying interest, paragraph 4 of the Ad Note sets forth the following objectives:

The object of providing for the participation in the negotiation of any Member with a principal supplying interest, in addition to any Member with which the concession was originally negotiated, is to ensure that a Member with a larger share in the trade affected by the concession than a Member with which the concession was originally negotiated shall have an effective opportunity to protect the contractual right which it enjoys under this Agreement. On the other hand, it is not intended that the scope of the negotiations should be such as to make negotiations and agreement under Article XXVIII unduly difficult nor to create complications in the application of this Article in the future to concessions which result from negotiations thereunder... (emphasis added)

Paragraph 4 then sets out the criteria to define the principal supplying interest:

.... Accordingly, [the CONTRACTING PARTIES] should only determine that a Member has a principal supplying interest if that Member has had, over a reasonable period of time prior to the negotiations, a larger share in the market of the applicant Member than a Member with which the concession was initially negotiated or would, in the judgement of [the CONTRACTING PARTIES], have had such a share in the absence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions maintained by the applicant Member. It would therefore not be appropriate for [the CONTRACTING PARTIES] to determine that more than one Member, or in those exceptional cases where there is near equality more than two Members, had a principal supplying interest. (emphasis added)

7.175. Paragraph 4 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 clarifies several important points. The first is that a Member with a principal supplying interest must "have an effective opportunity to protect the contractual right which it enjoys" under the GATT, but at the same time, the scope of the negotiations should not be such as to make "negotiations and agreement under Article XXVIII unduly difficult nor to create complications in the application of this Article in the future to concessions which result from negotiations thereunder... (emphasis added)

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290 China's response to Panel question No. 17, para. 101 and Exhibit CHN-16.
291 China's response to Panel question No. 17, para. 102 and Exhibits CHN-29 and CHN-50. In Exhibit CHN-48, China identified the type of supplying interest that it claimed with respect to the ten tariff lines at issue under both of the modification packages.
supplying interest based on its share of the market "over a reasonable period of time prior to the negotiations" or based on the market share it would be expected to have in the absence of "discriminatory quantitative restrictions".

7.176. Regarding the meaning of the term "substantial interest", paragraph 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 states that:

> The expression "substantial interest" is not capable of a precise definition and accordingly may present difficulties for [the CONTRACTING PARTIES]. It is, however, intended to be construed to cover only those Members which have, or in the absence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions affecting their exports could reasonably be expected to have, a significant share in the market of the Member seeking to modify or withdraw the concession. (emphasis added)

7.177. Thus, as a general rule, a Member should be determined to have a substantial supplying interest only where it has, or would expect to have in the absence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions affecting its exports, a significant share of the market. The notion of a significant share of the market is not further clarified in the text of paragraph 7.

7.178. The ordinary meaning of the word significant is "[i]mportant, notable; consequential". Thus, the general standard seems to be whether a Member has, or in the absence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions could reasonably be expected to have, an important share in the market of the importing Member. In the context of Article XXVIII:1, a 10% import share benchmark has been applied for the purpose of determining which Members hold a substantial supplying interest. In this case, China argues that the 10% import share benchmark cannot be invoked to exclude a Member whose import share is below the 10% benchmark, insofar as that Member demonstrates a substantial supplying interest taking into account the existence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions in the context of Article XXVIII, and taking into account any "special factors" in the context of determining which Members hold a substantial supplying interest under Article XIII:2. However, subject to this understanding, China states that it "does not consider that it is an ipso facto violation of Articles XXVIII and XIII for a member to use the 10 percent threshold to determine SSI status." Thus, based on its submissions in these proceedings that the use of the 10% import share threshold is not an ipso facto violation of Article XXVIII or Article XIII, our understanding is that China does not claim that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by applying a 10% import share benchmark to determine which Members held a "substantial interest". For its part, the European Union does not argue that the 10% import

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292 The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII provides further guidance on the interpretation of the terms "principal supplying interest" and "substantial interest" with regard to the specific issues. Paragraph 1 of the Understanding, elaborating on paragraph 5 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, broadens the definition of "principal supplying interest" to also include the Member which has the highest ratio of its exports affected by the concession. Paragraph 3 clarifies the conditions under which trade in the affected product that did not take place on an MFN basis should be taken into account when determining which Members hold a "principal supplying interest". Finally, paragraph 4 clarifies how "principal" and "substantial" supplying interest is to be determined in respect of a "new product" for which three years' trade statistics are not available.


294 See e.g. Negotiating Rights under Article XXVIII of the GATT, Note by the Secretariat, 2 July 1987, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG7/W/9, pp. 2-3 ("In actual practice, contracting parties which have invoked Article XXVIII, have in their bilateral negotiations interpreted the term 'significant share in the market' to be at least 10 per cent, although nothing would prevent a country from recognizing substantial interest for a lower percentage."); A. Hoda, Tariff Negotiations under the GATT and the WTO, Procedures and Practices, Cambridge UP 2001, p. 14 ("[i]n practice, contracting parties (Members) having 10 per cent or more of the trade shares have been recognized as having a substantial interest."); Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, paragraphs 7.83-7.85 and footnote 369 (finding that the EC's determinations of which Members held a substantial supplying interest, on the basis of the 10% market share benchmark, was not unreasonable).

295 China's response to Panel question No. 68(a) and 68(b).

296 In the course of the proceedings, China stated that what is "a significant share" varies "depending on the market", and that if the Member concerned uses a particular threshold, e.g. 10%, that is higher than the appropriate threshold which reflects "a significant share" in the particular market, e.g. 9%, the Member may violate Articles XXVIII and XIII (China's response to Panel question No. 68(a), para. 17). That might be understood to mean that, in China's view, the use of a 10% import share benchmark for determining which Members hold a "substantial interest" would indeed constitute an ipso facto violation of Article XXVIII and Article XIII.. However, China's clarification that it "does not consider that it is an ipso facto violation of
share benchmark can be applied without taking account of discriminatory quantitative restrictions or special factors. Accordingly, there is no issue regarding the 10% benchmark per se that we are called upon to resolve in the present dispute. 297

7.179. The parties agree on the meaning of the term "consultation" in the context of Article XXVIII:1. The text of this provision specifies that the applicant Member may modify or withdraw a concession "by negotiation and agreement" with any Member with which the concession was initially negotiated and with any Member determined to have a principal supplying interest, and "subject to consultation" with any other Member determined to have a substantial interest in the concession. In this case, the parties agree that the obligation to consult with Members holding a substantial interest is not the same as an obligation to negotiate with Members holding a principal supplying interest (or initial negotiating rights). 299 However, the European Union has not suggested that the exchanges that occurred between the European Union and China amounted to consultation (or, a fortiori, negotiation) within the meaning of Article XXVIII:1. 300

7.180. Both parties also agree that the failure to negotiate or consult with a Member that has a duly justified claim of a principal or substantial supplying interest is cognizable under the DSU. In this regard, the European Union does not question that Article XXVIII:1 imposes, on the Member seeking the modification of a concession, an obligation to recognize any duly justified claim of principal or substantial supplying interest and to negotiate or consult with the parties holding such claims.

Articles XXVIII and XIII for a member to use the 10 percent threshold to determine SSI status" leads us to conclude that China does not claim that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by applying a 10% import share benchmark to determine which Members held a "substantial interest". We note that insofar as any such claim has been made by China, as the party alleging a violation it would have the burden of proof in connection with any such claim. That means that it would be for China to, at a minimum, clearly articulate what alternative percentage import share (e.g. 9%) or other alternative criteria or benchmark should have been used in the market(s) at issue, if not the 10% import share benchmark that was used by the European Union. The fact that China has not done so reinforces our understanding that it is not advancing any such claim, and in any event would mean that China has not discharged its burden of proof in relation to any such claim.

Accordingly, we consider it unnecessary to rule on whether the 10% benchmark constitutes "subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, or a "customary practice" within the meaning of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement. The European Union, Brazil, Canada, and Thailand all consider that there is subsequent practice establishing the agreement of Members, within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, that an importing Member may rely on a 10% import share benchmark to determine which Members have a "substantial interest" under Article XXVIII. The European Union and these third parties, and also Russia, further consider that this qualifies as a "customary practice" within the meaning of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement. China and Argentina disagree with both conclusions. See China's first written submission, paras. 56, 214-215; China's response to Panel question Nos. 10-11; China's second written submission, paras. 74-78; EU's first written submission, paras. 91, 191, 282; EU's response to Panel question No. 10; responses of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Russia, Thailand, and the United States to Panel question No. 1 to third parties.

297 If agreement cannot be reached, paragraph 3(a) of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 provides that the Member can still modify or withdraw its concession. However, if it does, the Members primarily concerned (i.e. the Members with initial negotiating rights or a principal supplying interest) can withdraw substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the Member modifying the concession. It must be noted that, even if Members with initial negotiating rights or a principal supplying interest have the right to negotiate, whereas Members with substantial supplying interest have the right be consulted, the latter category of Members is also entitled to withdraw equivalent concessions if they are not satisfied with the proposed modification. See Article XXVIII:3(b).

299 At paragraph 229 of its first written submission, China contrasts the obligation to negotiate with the obligation to consult, in the context of contrasting Article XXVIII and Article XIII:2(d). See also EU's first written submission, para. 109.

300 In its response to Panel question No. 18(a), the European Union confirms that "[t]he European Union consulted with China on the justification of its claims of interest. Since the European Union did not recognize those claims, it did not consult with China on the compensation to be provided for the intended modification of concessions." In its response to the same question, China states that "the exchange on whether or not China is a WTO Member with a substantial supplying interest is not the same as consultations on the withdrawal of the concession itself and the maintenance of the balance of concessions."
7.181. Although there is no disagreement between the parties, the United States raised the question of whether that is so because the original text of Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1947 as incorporated by reference into the GATT 1994 establishes an obligation to negotiate or consult only with those Members "determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES" to have a principal or substantial supplying interest (and paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 7 of the original Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 also contain language to the same effect). Moreover, in the present case, there was no determination by the Council for Trade in Goods or the General Council that China had a principal or substantial supplying interest in the concessions at issue because China never referred the matter to the Council. In the United States' view, the foregoing casts doubt on whether a Member's refusal to recognize such a claim is justiciable before a dispute settlement panel.

7.182. In response to the question raised by the United States, China responds that the "determination by the CONTRACTING PARTIES" could take place through dispute settlement and points out the consequences that would arise from finding that only the Council on Trade in Goods or General Council could make such a determination. The European Union considers that the text of Article XXVIII:1 must be interpreted in the light of paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, which provides that where a claim of interest is recognized by the Member seeking the withdrawal or modification of a concession, such recognition "will constitute a determination by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in the sense of Article XXVIII:1".

7.183. We are obliged to consider the issue of our jurisdiction on our own initiative. However, we do not consider it necessary to address this issue in any great detail in the absence of any disagreement between the disputing parties. We note that while the original text of Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1947 (and its related Ad Note) as incorporated by reference into the GATT 1994 refers to a determination by the CONTRACTING PARTIES as to which Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest, the text of paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII blurs the distinction between determinations by the CONTRACTING PARTIES and determinations by the applicant Member. We further note that the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII, negotiated in the Uruguay Round, makes no reference to determinations of a principal or substantial supplying interest being made by the CONTRACTING PARTIES (today, the General Council or the Council for Trade in Goods). In the absence of any disagreement between the disputing parties on this issue, we proceed on the premise that we have jurisdiction to review China's claims that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by refusing to recognize its claims of principal or substantial supplying interest.

7.184. The parties also agree that the applicable provisions that regulate the determination of which Members hold a supplying interest in the context of Article XXVIII negotiations apply both to negotiations under Article XXVIII:1 and "reserved" negotiations under Article XXVIII:5. The tariff renegotiations under the First and the Second Modification Packages were reserved negotiations.

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301 We note that Article XXVIII is part of the original GATT 1947, but the text was extensively revised in the 1954-1955 Review Session. See Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th edition (1995), pp. 963-964.

302 Paragraph 2(b) of the Explanatory Note to the GATT 1994 provides that certain functions assigned to the CONTRACTING PARTIES under the GATT 1947, including this one, shall be allocated by the Ministerial Conference. The Panel understands that this function under Article XXVIII:1 would be carried out either by the Council for Trade in Goods or the General Council. In response to Panel question No 14(b), China confirms that it did not refer the European Union's refusal to grant a supplying interest status to China to the General Council or the Council on Trade in Goods. China notes that paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, which provides that where a claim of interest is recognized by the Member seeking the withdrawal or modification of a concession, such recognition "will constitute a determination by the CONTRACTING PARTIES in the sense of Article XXVIII:1".

303 United States' third-party statement, paras. 5-12.

304 China's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 87.

305 China's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 88. In China's view, these consequences would include the fact that an importing Member's failure to take "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" into account could never be reviewed in proceedings initiated under the DSU.

306 EU's response to Panel question No. 14, para. 48. See also China's response to Panel question No. 14 and also parties' responses to Panel question No. 14.

307 As the Appellate Body has observed, "it is a widely accepted rule that an international tribunal is entitled to consider the issue of its own jurisdiction on its own initiative, and to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case that comes before it" (Appellate Body Report, US – COOL (Article 22.6 – United States), paras. 2.6-2.7.).
conducted pursuant to Article XXVIII:5, not Article XXVIII:1. The text of Article XXVIII:5 provides that reserved negotiations conducted pursuant to that provision are to be conducted "in accordance with the procedures of paragraph 1 to 3" of Article XXVIII. The parties agree that the initial determination of which Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest in the context of reserved negotiations conducted pursuant to Article XXVIII:5 is governed by the same provisions that apply in the case of negotiations under Article XXVIII:1. These provisions include, as indicated above, paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1.

7.4.3 Analysis by the Panel

7.185. Turning to the issues in dispute, China's claims under Article XXVIII:1 and the arguments of the parties present three main issues. The first issue is whether the SPS measures that restricted Chinese poultry imports over the reference periods used by the European Union in both the First and Second Modification Packages constitute "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" within the meaning of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1. The second issue is whether the European Union additionally violated Article XXVIII:1 in the Second Modification Package by not re-determining, prior to the conclusion of the negotiations, which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest on the basis of the increase in imports from China over the period 2009-2011. The third issue is whether the European Union was entitled to disregard China’s claims of a principal and substantial supplying interest on the grounds that they were not presented in a timely manner.

7.4.3.1 Whether the SPS measures at issue constitute "discriminatory quantitative restrictions"

7.4.3.1.1 Main arguments of the parties

7.186. China claims that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by determining which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest on the basis of the import statistics over the three years preceding the notification of its intention to modify its concessions (2003-2005 for the First Modification and 2006-2008 for the Second Modification Package) when imports from China were subject to the European Union's SPS measures. China submits that the European Union was under a legal obligation to estimate what Members' shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China. The reason, according to China, is that the European Union's SPS measures on Chinese poultry imports were "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" within the meaning of paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 and, as such, they should have been taken into account by the European Union when determining which Members had a supplying interest in the concessions subject to renegotiations.

7.187. China interprets the term "discriminatory" so as to include situations where imports from a WTO Member are "treated differently from imports from other WTO Members, irrespective of the ground of such disparate treatment and, in particular, whether such difference in treatment was justified or not". In arguing that the SPS measures are discriminatory, China considers that it is legally irrelevant whether those measures are unjustified, or WTO-inconsistent. In China's view, "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" in the context of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 "covers not only those discriminatory restrictions that are prohibited by the covered agreements, but also others that are justifiable under relevant provisions of the covered agreements".

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309 Paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII reiterates that the procedures of Article XXVIII:1 are also applicable to negotiations under paragraph 5.

310 China’s first written submission, para. 65.

311 China’s first written submission, para. 64.
The European Union submits that it was entitled to determine which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest on the basis of actual import levels over the three years preceding the notification of its intention to modify its concessions (2003-2005 and 2006-2008). It was under no legal obligation to estimate what Members' shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China. The reason, according to the European Union, is that the SPS measures at issue are not "discriminatory quantitative restrictions", and therefore the European Union was not required to estimate what Members' imports shares would have been in the absence of those measures. According to the European Union, whether imports from a given country are restricted "will depend on the sanitary situation in each country of origin". The European Union considers that a restriction on imports based on SPS grounds is discriminatory within the meaning of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 "if, and only if, imports from two countries posing similar sanitary risks are not similarly treated". According to the European Union, it follows that if a quantitative restriction on imports is applied consistently with all the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement (including in particular provisions such as Article XX of the GATT 1994, Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement or Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement) it would not be "discriminatory" according to the discrimination test described above.

Regarding the second element of the term "discriminatory quantitative restrictions", China argues that, as import prohibitions, the SPS measures are clearly "quantitative restrictions" within the meaning of Article XI of the GATT 1994. China submits that even if the SPS requirements are compliant with Article III, it would not follow that the import bans do not fall under the scope of Article XI:1. China submits that various panels and the Appellate Body have found that measures that affected both imported and domestic products, but resulted in an import ban, may fall within the scope of "[import] prohibitions or restrictions, other than duties, taxes or other charges" in violation of Article XI:1.

In response, the European Union argues that the SPS measures at issue are not quantitative restrictions. The European Union agrees with China that the term "quantitative restrictions", as used in the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, must be interpreted in the light of Article XI:1. However, the European Union argues that Article XI:1 must in turn be interpreted in the light of the introductory paragraph to the Ad Note to Article III, which provides that a measure that is applied to an imported product and to the like domestic product, and which is enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of importation, "is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other internal charge subject to Article III". In the present case, the European Union submits that its SPS regime for animal products (including poultry products) "is based on the fundamental principle that imported products must comply with the same or equivalent sanitary requirements as the EU domestic products". The European Union reasons that, in accordance with the Ad Note to Article III, such measures are not "quantitative restrictions" within the meaning of either Article XI:1 or, consequently, of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1.

Proceeding on the premise that the European Union was required to estimate the import share that China could reasonably be expected to have in the absence of the SPS measures, China observes that the Ad Note to Article XXVIII does not clarify how such a determination is to be made. Arguing by analogy on the basis of paragraph 4 of the Understanding, concerning "new products" for which trade statistics from the prior three years are not available, China argues that, to determine the share that China could reasonably be expected to have had absent the SPS import bans, the European Union should have taken into account factors such as production capacity, investment in the product, estimates of export growth, and forecasts of demand in the European Union. China provides information on the level of its poultry exports before, during and

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312 EU's first written submission, para. 118. The European Union adds that "[w]here the sanitary situation in any two countries is the same or equivalent the European Union will treat imports from those two countries in the same manner".
313 EU's response to Panel question No. 21, para. 63.
314 EU's response to Panel question No. 21, para. 64.
315 China's first written submission, para. 60.
316 China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 8-12, 14-18; China's second written submission, para. 34.
317 EU's first written submission, paras. 59-60.
318 EU's first written submission, para. 117.
after the prohibition – both to the European Union and globally – to support its contention that China could reasonably be expected “to at least have had an SSI in the EU market”.  

7.192. The European Union disagrees with China on this point as well. The European Union submits that even if the import data relied upon by the European Union had been "tainted" by the application of those SPS measures, the other evidence available at the time when the European Union notified its intention to negotiate the modification of the concessions would not have warranted recognizing that China held either a principal or substantial supplying interest in any of the concessions at issue under both renegotiations. According to the European Union, the existence of a principal or substantial supplying interest cannot be determined on the basis of evidence that was not provided to the European Union at the relevant time in support of China’s claims of interest pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, or on the basis of evidence post-dating the opening of the negotiations. Thus, the European Union submits that the import data concerning the period immediately preceding the entry into force of the SPS measure in 2002 is both the most pertinent and the most reliable source of evidence in order to estimate the import share that China would have had in the absence of the SPS measures for both Modification Packages. The European Union submits that during the years preceding 2002, China’s import shares in the European Union for all the tariff lines concerned were negligible. 

7.4.3.1.2 Findings of the Panel

7.193. The threshold legal issue raised by China’s claim is whether the SPS measures that restricted Chinese poultry imports over the reference periods used by the European Union in both the First and Second Modification Packages constitute "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" within the meaning of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1. The relevant facts are not in dispute, and the parties’ disagreement turns on their opposing interpretations of the terms "discriminatory quantitative restrictions". We will begin our analysis by interpreting the term "discriminatory" in the context of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, taking into account the ordinary meaning of the term "discriminatory", the immediate and wider context in which it appears, and the object and purpose of Article XXVIII.

7.194. In its first written submission, China referred to a passage from the Appellate Body Report in Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports to support its contention that the "ordinary meaning" of the concept of "discrimination" may, depending on the context of the provision, be interpreted broadly. The Appellate Body stated:

> When viewed in the abstract, the concept of discrimination may encompass both the making of distinctions between similar situations, as well as treating dissimilar situations in a formally identical manner. The Appellate Body has previously dealt with the concept of discrimination and the meaning of the term "non-discriminatory", and acknowledged that, at least insofar as the making of distinctions between similar situations is concerned, the ordinary meaning of discrimination can accommodate both drawing distinctions per se, and drawing distinctions on an improper basis. Only a full and proper interpretation of a provision containing a prohibition on discrimination will reveal which type of differential treatment is prohibited. (emphasis added)

7.195. China cites this passage as support for the proposition that “[t]he concept of ‘discriminatory’ quantitative restrictions covers not only those discriminatory restrictions that are prohibited by the covered agreements, but also others that are justifiable under relevant

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319 China’s first written submission, para. 109.
320 EU’s first written submission, paras. 134-140.
321 See section 7.2.3 above.
322 (footnote original) See the reasoning of the Appellate Body with respect to Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 in its Report in Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 136, referring to the GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337. As this case does not include any claim based on discrimination arising from formally identical treatment, we do not address this type of discrimination in our discussion.
323 (footnote original) Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, paras. 142–173. In that case, the Appellate Body examined the meaning of the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 to paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause.
provisions of the covered agreements”. In our view, the above passage supports the proposition that the term "discrimination" may be interpreted relatively narrowly, so as to cover only unjustifiable distinctions, or relatively broadly, so as to also cover distinctions that are legitimate and justifiable. To that extent, we agree that the word "discrimination" may be given different meanings depending on the context in which that word appears, and depending on the context, may have a broad meaning that covers legitimate and justifiable distinctions.

7.196. However, the passage above and prior Appellate Body jurisprudence establishes that, under both the relatively narrow meaning of "discrimination" and this relatively broad meaning of "discrimination", the outer limit of the ordinary meaning of the term "discrimination" only extends to situations in which differential treatment, whether justified or not, is accorded to entities that are similarly situated. In other words, we read the Appellate Body to say that even where the term "discrimination" is to be interpreted relatively broadly, in a way that would cover "both drawing distinctions per se, and drawing distinctions on an improper basis", this would still only be "insofar as the making of distinctions between similar situations is concerned”.

7.197. In addition to what the Appellate Body stated in the above passage from Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports in the context of interpreting the term "discriminatory" in Article XVII:1(a) of the GATT 1994, this was the essence of the prior finding in the Appellate Body Report that was being summarized in Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports. In EC – Tariff Preferences, the Appellate Body addressed the meaning of the term "discrimination" in the context of footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause. The Appellate Body recognized that the ordinary meaning of the term may include a relatively broad and "neutral" meaning "of making a distinction", or a relatively narrow and "negative" meaning "carrying the connotation of a distinction that is unjust or prejudicial". However, the Appellate Body clarified that under both the broad and the narrow meaning of the term "discrimination", the sine qua non is that the different treatment must be accorded to "similarly-situated" entities. This is apparent from the following passage of its Report in EC – Tariff Preferences:

[W]e are able to discern some of the content of the "non-discrimination" obligation based on the ordinary meanings of that term. Whether the drawing of distinctions is per se discriminatory, or whether it is discriminatory only if done on an improper basis, the ordinary meanings of "discriminate" converge in one important respect: they both suggest that distinguishing among similarly-situated beneficiaries is discriminatory. For example, India suggests that all beneficiaries of a particular Member's GSP scheme are similarly-situated, implicitly arguing that any differential treatment of such beneficiaries constitutes discrimination. The European Communities, however, appears to regard GSP beneficiaries as similarly-situated when they have "similar development needs". Although the European Communities acknowledges that differentiating between similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries would be inconsistent with footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause, it submits that there is no inconsistency in differentiating between GSP beneficiaries with "different development needs". Thus, based on the ordinary meanings of "discriminate", India and the European Communities effectively appear to agree that, pursuant to the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3, similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries should not be treated differently. The participants disagree only as to the basis for determining whether beneficiaries are similarly-situated.

7.198. The Appellate Body explained that "the convergence of those definitions on the fact that similarly-situated entities should not be treated differently" finds reflection in the use of the term "discrimination" in general international law. As examples, the Appellate Body quoted from R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed. (Longman, 1992), Vol. 1, p. 378 ("Mere differences of treatment do not necessarily constitute discrimination ... discrimination may in general be said to arise where those who are in all material respects the same are treated differently, or where those who are in material respects different are treated in the same way"); and from E.W. Vierdag, The Concept of Discrimination in International Law, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 61 ("Discrimination occurs when in a legal system an inequality is introduced in the enjoyment of a certain right,
the term "discrimination", concluded that "preference-granting countries are required, by virtue of the term "non-discriminatory", to ensure that identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries". 330

7.199. Based on the foregoing, we consider that the ordinary meaning of the term "discriminatory" is somewhat elastic and may be interpreted narrowly or broadly, depending on the context. However, even if this concept is stretched to include the broader meaning of discrimination, the ordinary meaning of the term "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" would still only cover, in the context of paragraphs 4 and 7 of Note Ad Article XXVIII:1, quantitative restrictions that draw distinctions between imports from different countries that are similarly-situated.

7.200. Turning to the context of paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, the concept of "discrimination" appears in numerous provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other covered agreements. The term "discrimination" is used in some WTO provisions accompanied by the associated terms "arbitrary or unjustifiable" (or comparable terms) and "where the same conditions prevail" (or comparable terms). 331 In the context of certain provisions, the term discrimination is accompanied by one of those associated terms, but not the other. 332 In the context of some other provisions, such as paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, the term "discriminatory" or "discrimination" is not accompanied by the qualifying terms "arbitrary or unjustifiable", or by the terms "between countries where the same conditions prevail". China argues that the phrase "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" should therefore be interpreted to cover "both arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, as well as non-arbitrary or justifiable discrimination -- regardless of the application to countries where the same conditions prevail". 333

7.201. We agree with the premise that when the same term is accompanied by qualifying terms that narrow or broaden the ordinary meaning of that term in the context of some provisions, but that same term is used in the context of other provisions unaccompanied by any such qualifying language, then the omission of the qualifying language must be given meaning and, all else being equal, it must be interpreted in accordance with its unqualified ordinary meaning. However, the function of qualifying terms is not always to narrow or broaden the ordinary meaning of the term. To the contrary, qualifying language may serve the purpose of bringing greater precision to how a general concept or legal standard is to be applied in a given provision or context, when the ordinary meaning of that term is general enough to accommodate an interpretative range with different shades of meaning. The foregoing consideration is particularly relevant in the context of interpreting a general concept such as "discrimination". 334 It appears to us that when the term "discrimination" is accompanied by the qualifying terms "arbitrary or unjustifiable" (or comparable terms) and "where the same conditions prevail" (or comparable terms) in certain provisions, these additional terms serve the purpose of bringing greater precision to how the general concept and legal standard of "discrimination" is to be applied in a given provision or context. These qualifying terms do not, in our view, serve the purpose of narrowing the ordinary meaning of the term "discrimination" in the manner suggested by China.

330 Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 173. (emphasis added) The Appellate Body's interpretation of the ordinary meaning of term "discrimination" in the above cases is consistent with the meaning given to the term in other contexts. For example, as regards the term "discrimination" in the context of Article XX, the Appellate Body has explained that "discrimination results not only when countries in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but also when the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries" (Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 165).

331 For example, the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 refers to "arbitrary or unjustifiable" discrimination between countries "where the same conditions prevail", and the sixth recital of the preamble to the TBT Agreement uses identical terminology, as does the first recital to the SPS Agreement; the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS refers to "arbitrary or unjustifiable" discrimination between countries "where like conditions prevail"; Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement refers to "arbitrary or unjustifiable" discrimination between countries "where identical or similar conditions prevail".

332 For example, Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement refers to certain "arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions", insofar as such distinctions "result in discrimination".

333 China's response to Panel question No. 82, para. 46.

334 Panel Report, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, paras. 7.94 and 7.98.
7.202. China argues that the provisions of relevance in this case are Article XXVIII:1 and paragraphs 4 and 7 of its accompanying Ad Note, and points out that these provisions in no way prohibit or require the elimination of any measure characterized as a "discriminatory quantitative restriction" within the meaning of those provisions. China emphasizes that these provisions are simply about the impact that restrictions have had on the imports from supplying WTO Members, and therefore any import restriction that has affected the shares of imports should be taken into account and allowance should be made for such restriction. In its view, "for the purpose of Article XXVIII:1, the similarity or dissimilarity in sanitary situations is not relevant. What is relevant is the existence of import restrictions on some products and not on others whilst all products whichever their origin, are like products".  

7.203. The term "discriminatory" must be interpreted in the particular context of Article XXVIII:1 and paragraphs 4 and 7 of its accompanying Ad Note. In our view, characterizing a measure as discriminatory in the context of the Ad Note triggers significant legal consequences. Specifically, when a quantitative restriction is characterized as a "discriminatory quantitative restriction" for the purpose of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, the legal consequence is that actual import shares that Members held over a reference period cannot be used as the basis to determine which Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest. Rather, such determination must be made either on the basis of a different reference period, or on the basis of a counterfactual estimate of what import shares Members would reasonably be expected to have in the absence of the quantitative restriction. Thus, the broader the interpretation of the term "discriminatory", the wider the universe of measures that would fall into that category of discriminatory quantitative restrictions, and the more complex the ensuing counterfactual analysis. We agree with China that such complexity cannot be regarded as insignificant, especially taking into account that one of the objectives of Article XXVIII:1 is to ensure that negotiations and agreement under Article XXVIII are not "unduly difficult" and that "complications in the application of this Article" are avoided.

7.204. Having examined the ordinary meaning of the term "discriminatory", and having further examined the context and object and purpose of paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, we conclude that the terms "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" only cover situations in which differential treatment is accorded to imports from Members that are similarly situated. Applying this general concept of discrimination to the SPS measures, we consider that restrictions applied to imports based on sanitary grounds are "discriminatory", within the meaning of paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, only if imports from different countries that are similarly situated in terms of the sanitary situation or sanitary risks are not similarly restricted. Thus, we do not agree with China's view that China and other countries are "similarly

335 China's oral statement at the first meeting, para. 31.
336 This is illustrated by China's arguments in the present case. China argues that all of the import bans applying to Chinese poultry imports constitute discriminatory quantitative restrictions. In response to questions from the Panel, China has confirmed that the heat treatment measure, including the limitation on the production areas (see paragraphs 7.85 and 7.91-93), also falls within its definition of "discriminatory quantitative restriction" (China's response to Panel question Nos. 9(b), 19, and 76). If this definition of "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" is accepted, this would mean that all of the tariff lines at issue were subject to "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" even before the import prohibition in 2002, and also after the relaxation of the SPS measures in 2008. The European Union submits that under China's definition of discriminatory quantitative restriction, the European Union would have been obligated to take into account not only the specific SPS measures applied to China which are of concern to China, "but also for the SPS measures applied to many other WTO Members and, more generally, for the entire sanitary regime applied to imports of poultry products" (EU's first written submission, para. 132). The European Union submits that estimating what poultry imports would be without any of the SPS measures "would be an extremely complex task involving the use of highly speculative estimates" (EU's first written submission, para. 131; EU's second written submission, para. 29; EU's response to Panel question No. 74).
337 China's response to Panel question No. 74(a), para. 15.
338 In this regard, Annex A:1 of the SPS Agreement explicitly defines SPS measures in relation to the "risks" they seek to prevent. We also note that in the context of the chapeau of Article XX, the Appellate Body has clarified that the assessment of whether or not a measure is applied in a manner that gives rise to discrimination "between countries where the same conditions prevail" may focus on the extent to which the same risks are posed. See e.g. Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Art. 21.5 – Mexico), para. 7.308 (finding that "the prevailing conditions between countries are the risks of adverse effects on dolphins arising from tuna fishing practices").
7.205. In this case, in response to the European Union’s argument that its import restrictions depend on the sanitary situation or sanitary risks of different countries, China has not attempted to argue that imports from any other similarly situated country were not subject to the same restrictions. Accordingly, we find, on the basis of our interpretation of the term "discriminatory", that China has not demonstrated that the SPS measures at issue are "discriminatory quantitative restrictions". Therefore, we reject China's claim that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by determining which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest on the basis of actual import levels over the three years preceding the notification of its intention to modify its concessions (2003-2005 and 2006-2008), rather than on the basis of an estimate of what Members' shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China.

7.206. Our interpretation of the terms "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" and the resulting conclusions that we have reached renders it unnecessary to rule on several disputed issues raised by the parties. First, we have concluded that the sine qua non of characterizing a measure as a "discriminatory quantitative restriction" is the existence of differential treatment between countries that are similarly situated, and that in this case China has not attempted to argue that imports from any other similarly situated country (in the sense referred to above) were not subject to the same restrictions. Accordingly, it is not necessary for us to resolve the parties' disagreement as to whether the scope of the terms "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" in the context of paragraphs 4 and 7 covers only unjustifiable distinctions in treatment accorded to countries that are similarly situated, or is broad enough to also cover justifiable distinctions in treatment accorded to countries that are similarly situated. Second, given that China has not demonstrated that the SPS measures are discriminatory, it is not necessary to rule on the disputed issue of whether these measures constitute "quantitative restrictions". Finally, having found that the SPS measures do not constitute "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" within the meaning of paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, it is not necessary to resolve the parties' disagreement as to what share of imports into the European Union market China could reasonably be expected to have had, in the absence of the SPS import prohibitions, over period 2002-2008.

7.4.3.2 Whether the European Union was obliged to re-determine which Members held a supplying interest to reflect changes in import shares that took place following the initiation of the negotiations

7.207. We now turn to the second ground for China's claim that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1.

7.208. China argues that in light of the lapsing of substantial time between the notification of its intention to modify its concessions in 2009 and the conclusion of the negotiations three years later in the case of the Second Modification Package, it was necessary for the European Union to engage in a re-determination of which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest, based on actual imports from the most recent three-year reference period, which in China's view is 2009-2011. According to China, where negotiations and consultations under Article XXVIII extend beyond the six-month period provided for in paragraph 3 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, the determination of which WTO Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest must be updated to reflect changes in import shares. China submits that because the Article XXVIII negotiations were not concluded until 2012, the European Union should

339 China's oral statement at the first meeting, paras. 29-31.
340 In this regard, the basis for our conclusion is similar to the basis for the conclusion reached by the Appellate Body in EC – Tariff Preferences. In deciding to rule on the issues relating to the interpretation of the term "discriminatory" that are necessary to resolve the question before us, our approach is also similar to that followed by the panel in Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents. In the context of examining the term "discrimination", that panel observed that "[g]iven the very broad range of issues that might be involved in defining the word", it would "be better to defer attempting to define that term at the outset, but instead to determine which issues were raised by the record before the Panel, and to define the concept of discrimination to the extent necessary to resolve those issues"(Panel Report, Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents, para. 7.98).
341 China's first written submission, para. 88.
342 China's first written submission, para. 79; China's response to Panel question No. 22.
have re-determined which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest based on import levels over the most recent period of 2009-2011.

7.209. The European Union submits that it was not required to re-determine which Members had a principal or substantial supplying interest on the basis of import data for a period subsequent to the initial determination. According to the European Union, China's claim has no basis in any provision of Article XXVIII or the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, or on past practice, and would undermine the objective pursued by Article XXVIII:1.

7.210. The fundamental legal issue raised by China's claim is whether, in the context of negotiations under Article XXVIII:5, the importing Member is under a legal obligation to reappraise which WTO Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest to reflect changes in import shares that have taken place following the initiation of the negotiations.343 The parties have presented a series of arguments in support of their respective positions. The starting point of our analysis is the ordinary meaning of the applicable provisions that regulate the determination of which Members hold a supplying interest in the context of Article XXVIII negotiations. We will then examine these provisions in the light of the parties' arguments concerning the context of those provisions, their object and purpose, and their prior application.

7.211. The text of Article XXVIII:1 itself does not go into detail on the modalities of negotiations to modify concessions, and is silent on the question of when and how determinations of principal and supplying interest are to be made. This is elaborated in its Ad Note. Specifically, paragraph 4 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 provides that a Member should only be determined to have a principal supplying interest if it "has had, over a reasonable period of time prior to the negotiations", the requisite market share (or would have had such a share in the absence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions).344 Although this applies only to the determination of which Members hold a principal supplying interest, we see no reason why a different approach to the reference period should be followed for the purpose of determining which Members hold a substantial supplying interest.345

7.212. The Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII set forth guidelines for determining which Members hold a principal or supplying interest. They specify when such a determination is to be made, and on what basis. Paragraph 1 of these Procedures provides that the Member intending to negotiate the modification or withdrawal of concessions should transmit a notification to that effect to all Members. Paragraph 2 provides that the notification should be accompanied "by statistics of imports of the products involved, by country of origin, for the last three years for which statistics are available".346 Furthermore, paragraph 4 of these Procedures provides that any Member which considers that it has a principal or substantial supplying interest in the concessions that have been identified in the notification should communicate its claim in writing to the applicant Member, and that the claim should be made "within ninety days following the circulation of the import statistics referred to in paragraph 2". The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII provides that the guidelines provided in paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII are equally applicable when determining the existence of a principal or substantial supplying interest in the particular situations identified in paragraph 1 (highest ratio of exports) and paragraph 4 (new products) of the Understanding.347

7.213. What emerges from the foregoing is that the determination of which Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest in the concessions subject to renegotiations is to be made on the basis of the data preceding the initiation of the negotiations, and more specifically, the data for the last three years accompanying the notification which the importing Member circulates to initiate the process. These provisions do not directly speak to the separate issue of whether, having made this initial determination, a Member may then be required to subsequently reappraise that determination, at a later stage, to reflect any changes in import shares that have

343 We recall that the negotiations were conducted under Article XXVIII:5. See footnote 308 above.
344 Emphasis added.
345 We note that the paragraph 4 of the Ad Note regarding determinations of which Members hold a principal supplying interest is considerably more detailed than paragraph 7, which concerns substantial supplying interest. Thus, the omission of this particular element from paragraph 7 would not suggest that the drafters intended for a different approach to apply under paragraph 7.
346 Emphasis added.
347 See paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Understanding.
taken place following the initiation of the negotiations. The absence of any guidance on that issue is notable for the following reasons.

7.214. First, the identification of the Members having a supplying interest would seem to be a necessary pre-condition for the opening of negotiations. Therefore, such a determination must obviously be made before the initiation of the negotiations. It is also relatively straightforward that such a determination must, given this timing, be made on the basis of a reference period covering a period of time prior to the negotiations. Notwithstanding, the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII contain the above-mentioned provisions elaborating on the length of that reference period and related trade statistics and on the modalities and time-frame for making a claim of interest. We consider that if Members were under a far less-obvious legal obligation to reappraise and re-determine which other Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest, one would expect the Ad Note, the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, or the Understanding to also provide at least some form of guidance on when and on what basis such a reappraisal is to be made. They do not. This serves as an indication that no such requirement exists.

7.215. Second, this indication is reinforced by the existence of other provisions of the covered agreements that expressly indicate when there may be a requirement to review and reappraise the reference period used to determine the existence of a supplying interest. Notably, Article XIII:4 of the GATT 1994\textsuperscript{348} expressly provides for such a mechanism in the context of allocating TRQs, and quantitative restrictions more generally, among supplying countries. This provision indicates what may be reappraised (the reference period selected, special factors, and other points); what procedure is to be followed (a request, followed by consultations); and which Members are to be involved (those with a substantial supplying interest). The absence of any provision akin to Article XIII:4 in the context of Article XXVIII is not dispositive. However, it reinforces the impression that emerges from the text of the applicable provisions relating to the determination of supplying interests.

7.216. Turning to the object and purpose of Article XXVIII, which must inform our analysis, we are of the view that the rules applicable to the determination of which Members hold a supplying interest under Article XXVIII should be interpreted in a way that strikes a balance between the several competing objectives that find expression in the text of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1. On the one hand, it is important to ensure that negotiations and agreement under Article XXVIII are not "unduly difficult", that "complications in the application of this Article" are avoided, and that the negotiations should "come to an end as quickly as possible".\textsuperscript{349} On the other hand, it is equally important to ensure that any Member that holds a principal supplying interest "shall have an effective opportunity to protect the contractual right which it enjoys under this Agreement"\textsuperscript{350}, and we recognize that Article XXVIII "is not only about an expeditious conclusion of modification negotiations."\textsuperscript{351}

7.217. We consider that there would be circumstances in which it would not be "unduly difficult" or complicated to reappraise which Members hold a substantial supplying interest. For example, it could be the case that for some reason, and shortly after the start of the negotiations, a Member that had previously been determined to hold a principal supplying interest is rendered unable to supply that product at all in the long term.\textsuperscript{352} On the other hand, we consider that there would be other circumstances in which the balance between these competing objectives would tilt the other

\textsuperscript{348} Article XIII:4 provides that:
With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with [Article XIII:2(d)] or under [Article XI:2(c)] the selection of a representative period for any product and the appraisal of any special factors affecting the trade in the product shall be made initially by the Member applying the restriction; \textit{Provided} that such Member shall, upon the request of any other Member having a substantial interest in supplying that product or upon the request of the [CONTRACTING PARTIES], consult promptly with the other Member or the [CONTRACTING PARTIES] regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions, formalities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization.

\textsuperscript{349} Paragraph 4 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1. EU’s first written submission, para. 153; China’s response to Panel question No. 22(c), paras. 126-127.

\textsuperscript{350} Paragraph 4 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1.

\textsuperscript{351} China’s second written submission, para. 45.

\textsuperscript{352} Canada’s response to Panel question No. 4(b) to third parties.
way, and mitigate against re-determining which WTO Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest in the midst of ongoing negotiations. For example, it could be the case that long after the initiation of negotiations, a relatively minor change in the import shares leads to one Member temporarily overtaking another as the supplier with a principal interest, such that a re-determination would lead to negotiations that have reached an advanced stage having to be restarted again, with a different Member. 353

7.218. The issue before the Panel is not, however, whether, in the circumstances of this case, the European Union should have re-determined which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest. In this regard, both parties agree that this particular issue should not be resolved on the basis of a "reasonableness" standard. 354 Rather, the issue is whether or not there is a legal rule that applies to all cases, putting a Member under a legal obligation, in all cases, to reappraise which WTO Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest to reflect changes in import shares that have taken place following the initiation of the negotiations. We have already noted the absence of any guidance in the text of the Ad Note and the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII on when and how a Member might reappraise which WTO Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest following the initiation of the negotiations. When this silence is read in the light of the need to strike a delicate balance between the different objectives of Article XXVIII, it leads us to the conclusion that we cannot, as treaty interpreters, formulate a general rule on this matter.

7.219. In this regard, we note that there is a lack of clarity in China's own argumentation regarding the scope and nature of such an obligation. China states that whether the three-year period prior to the notification seeking to modify or withdraw a concession is representative, or another representative period must be used, "will depend on the circumstances and the facts of each case". 355 China also suggests that the obligation to re-determine which Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest following the initiation of negotiations would be triggered where the negotiations were protracted and substantial time lapsed between the notification of the intention to withdraw or amend a concession and the conclusion of negotiations and/or consultations. 356 With reference to paragraph 3 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, China has argued that if the negotiations under Article XXVIII:5 continue past six months, "the assessment on the WTO Members holding principal or substantial supplying interests and the relevant reference period must be re-assessed", and that the "re-determination should occur after the expiry of the six-month deadline". 357 China then added that, "[a]t the very least", the "re-assessment should occur as soon as there is evidence of the "developments materially affecting" the determination of who holds a principal or substantial supplying interests or affecting the determination of the future trade prospects. 358 We are not faulting China's argumentation. Rather, we believe that China's argumentation on this issue illustrates the difficulty in fashioning an

353 In the present case, the European Union points out that "[i]n the case at hand the negotiations were difficult and long because of the demanding requests put forward by Brazil and Thailand for the benefit of all Members. Negotiations would have been even longer if the European Union had been required to discard the results of two years of negotiations with those two Members and to start over again the negotiations on the basis of the claim of a principal supplying interest submitted by China in May 2012, nearly three years after the initiation of the negotiations" (EU's second written submission, para. 153). In its third-party written submission, Brazil states that "it was only after long negotiations with the European Union that it was possible to agree on the shared administration of quotas", and that "[b]oth negotiations proved highly complex and time-consuming, in particular the second process, which took three years to be completed" (Brazil's third-party written submission, paras. 9, 23).

354 Parties' responses to Panel question No. 106(a).
355 China's first written submission, para. 82.
356 China's first written submission, para. 82.
357 China's response to Panel question Nos. 22 and 23, paras. 125, 128.
358 China's response to Panel question No. 23, para. 129. In its opening statement at the second meeting, China subsequently stated that "[c]ontrary to the EU's groundless assertion that China believes the determination of Members with a principal or substantial supplying interest would have to occur every six months", China's view is rather that "such re-determination must occur at such periods of time when material trade developments have occurred" that influence the supplying interest status of the WTO Members" (China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 40). In its comments on the Interim Report, China stated that its position is that "if the negotiations / consultations last beyond six months, the Member withdrawing the concession should assess whether a re-appraisal should be made", but that a "re-appraisal need not necessarily be made after each period of six months, but must occur when material trade developments" have occurred that influence the supplying interest status of the WTO Members (China's comments on the Interim Report, para. 29) (emphasis original).
unwritten rule on this matter, in the absence of any textual guidance and in the light of the competing objectives of Article XXVIII.

7.220. China has argued that even if the negotiations under the Second Modification Package were conducted under Article XXVIII:5, the six-month time-limit for negotiations envisaged in paragraph 3 of the Ad Note, which applies to negotiations under Article XXVIII:1, is nonetheless directly applicable.\(^{359}\) We observe that the text of Article XXVIII specifies that the modification or withdrawal of concessions can be done at three different points in time.\(^{360}\) The main difference between the three different kinds of Article XXVIII negotiations relates to the time limits for concluding such negotiations. Paragraph 3 of the Ad Note is explicitly linked to the time limits in Article XXVIII:1 negotiations. In the case of negotiations under Article XXVIII:1, the parties must aim to reach an agreement before the end of the triennial period, and the Member wishing to modify a concession should notify other Members "not earlier than six months, nor later than three months prior to ... the termination date of any subsequent period" of its intention to do so.\(^{361}\) In this context, there is a six-month time-limit. However, in the case of reserved negotiations pursuant to Article XXVIII:5, there are no time-limits specified regarding when such negotiations are to be concluded. Indeed, this is the defining feature of reserved negotiations under Article XXVIII:5.\(^{362}\) Accordingly, insofar as China is arguing that negotiations under Article XXVIII:5 are subject to the same time-limit that applies in the case of Article XXVIII:1 negotiations, we consider, based on the above explanation, that there is no time-limit specified for reserved negotiations under Article XXVIII:5.

7.221. China further argues that an adjustment of the reference period to take account of changes in import shares following the initiation of the negotiations is "all the more necessary" where the three-year period preceding the notification of the intention to withdraw or amend a concession was tainted by the existence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions, and where data for a more recent period have become available before the end of the negotiations and consultations showing developments for a period that reflects the consequences of the partial lifting of the discriminatory restrictions.\(^{363}\) We agree that an adjustment of some kind to the 2006-2008 reference period, used in the Second Modification Package, would have been necessary if, as argued by China, import data from this period was tainted by the existence of discriminatory quantitative restrictions. However, we recall that we have already found that China has failed to demonstrate that the SPS measures at issue constitute discriminatory quantitative restrictions within the meaning of paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1.

7.222. China advances an additional argument based on paragraph 3 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII. This provision states that in the determination of which Members have a principal supplying interest or substantial interest, only trade in the affected product which has taken place on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis shall be taken into consideration. It adds that trade in the affected product which has taken place under non-contractual preferences "shall also be taken into account if the trade in question has ceased to benefit from such preferential treatment, thus becoming MFN trade, at the time of the negotiation for the modification or

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\(^{359}\) China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 52; China's response to Panel question No. 22(a), paras 121-123, China's statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 39. China's position is not clear. The Panel asked China to clarify the difference between reserved negotiations under Article XXVIII:5 and Article XXVIII:1 if both are subject to the same time-limit. China responded that "[t]he difference is one of timing. If they reserve their rights to rebinding, WTO Members are not limited to the timing set forth for modifications under Article XXVIII:1. The explicit reference in Article XXVIII:5 to the applicability of the procedures of paragraphs 1 to 3 makes it clear that the negotiations of the modifications under Article XXVIII:1 or Article XXVIII:5 are the same in other respects" (China's response to Panel question No. 109).

\(^{360}\) These are: (i) on the first day of each three-year period, the first of which began on 1 January 1958 (so-called "open season" negotiations, provided for in Article XXVIII:1); (ii) at any time in special circumstances with the authorization of the CONTRACTING PARTIES (so called "special circumstances" negotiations, provided for in Article XXVIII:4); or (iii) during the three-year period referred to above if the Member concerned has, before the beginning of the period, elected to reserve the right to renegotiate (so-called "reserved" negotiations, provided for in Article XXVIII:5).

\(^{361}\) In the case of negotiations authorized under Article XXVIII:4, an agreement must be reached within "60 days or any longer period" depending on the number of items to renegotiate (Article XXVIII:4(c) and Ad Article XXVIII:4).

\(^{362}\) A. Hoda, *Tariff negotiations and renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO. Procedures and Practices*, Cambridge University Press, 2001, at p. 11 (stating that, in the case of reserved negotiations, "there are no time limits at all regarding when they are to be begun or concluded").

\(^{363}\) China's first written submission, para. 80.
withdrawal of the concession, or will do so by the conclusion of that negotiation".\textsuperscript{364} China observes that although this provision applies in the case of the transition of preferential trade to non-preferential trade, it demonstrates that trade levels at the time of the negotiations or by the conclusion of negotiations will be taken into account in the determination of which Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest.\textsuperscript{365}

7.223. From a grammatical perspective, we consider that the wording of paragraph 3 could accommodate China's reading of this provision. However, we also agree with the European Union that, from a grammatical perspective, paragraph 3 can be read to mean that a determination of whether trade in the affected product "has ceased" to benefit from preferences or "will do so" by the conclusion of the negotiations is to be made when the negotiations are opened; and that, if that is the case, the trade to be taken into account is the trade "which has taken place" under the preferences prior to the initiation of the negotiations, rather than the subsequent non-preferential trade.\textsuperscript{366} We note that paragraph 3 applies to "the determination of which Members have a principal supplying interest (whether under paragraph 1 above or in paragraph 1 of Article XXVIII)\textsuperscript{362}, and determinations of a principal supplying interest under those provisions are to be made in accordance with the guideline in paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII. As we emphasized earlier, paragraph 4 provides that a claim of interest is to be made "within ninety days following the circulation of the import statistics referred to in paragraph 2". Those import statistics, as stated in paragraph 2 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, are statistics of imports for the last three years for which statistics are available as from the time that the Member notifies its intention to modify its concessions. Insofar as paragraph 3 is open to two different readings, we must adopt the reading that is harmonious with these elements of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII. In addition, we note that paragraph 3 refers, in the singular, to "the determination" of which Members have a principal or substantial supplying interest.

7.224. In support of its contention that an importing Member is under a legal obligation to reappraise which WTO Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest to reflect changes in import shares that have taken place following the initiation of the negotiations, China relies on the following statement by the GATT panel in Canada – Lead and Zinc:

\begin{quote}
The Panel does not consider that full statistics for the applicable base period must be available at the very beginning of the negotiations, provided that these data become available later in the negotiations, China relies on the following statement by the GATT panel in Canada – Lead and Zinc:

\end{quote}

7.225. The European Union counters that the panel report in Canada – Lead and Zinc confirms that it is a long-standing practice to determine the value of tariff concessions on the basis of the three-year period prior to the initiation of the negotiations pursuant to Article XXVIII.\textsuperscript{368} The European Union notes that in that case, the GATT panel had agreed with the parties that the entire calendar year of 1974 was part of the three-year base period preceding the initiation of the negotiations, even if the notification of the intention to withdraw the concessions had been circulated only on 23 December 1974, since negotiations had not effectively started until 1975.\textsuperscript{369} The European Union notes that, on this premise, the GATT panel went on to find that the EEC should have taken into account the statistics for the first 10 or 11 months of 1974 when they became available in the course of 1975.\textsuperscript{370} Thus, the European Union submits that, contrary to what China alleges, "nothing in these findings suggests that the EEC should have taken into account import data for the period after the effective initiation of the negotiations (i.e. 1975 and onwards)\textsuperscript{371}. On the contrary, the European Union notes that "the whole report is based on the uncontested assumption that only data pre-dating the effective opening of the negotiations

\textsuperscript{364} Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{365} China's first written submission, para. 84; China's opening statement at the first meeting with the Panel, para. 37.
\textsuperscript{366} EU's second written submission, para. 47.
\textsuperscript{367} GATT Panel Report, Canada – Lead and Zinc, para. 17.
\textsuperscript{368} At paragraph 15 of its Report, the panel "noted that as a general principle, Article XXVIII negotiations had in the past been based on the most recent three-year period for which trade statistics were available, for the purpose of determining principal or substantial supplier rights".
\textsuperscript{369} GATT Panel Report, Canada – Lead and Zinc, para. 16.
\textsuperscript{370} GATT Panel Report, Canada – Lead and Zinc, para. 17.
\textsuperscript{371} EU's first written submission, para. 181. (emphasis added)
in 1975 was relevant for the determination of the value of the concession.\footnote{372} In addition, Thailand has drawn the Panel's attention to the fact that, in that case, the panel report also reflects that the EEC was of the view that "there was no precedent in Article XXVIII negotiations for bringing forward the base period to incorporate statistical data becoming available after negotiations had begun", and that the EEC had voluntarily agreed "in a desire to adopt a reasonable approach, to take account of the trends in trade and in prices in 1974" instead of using only the reference period of 1971-1973.\footnote{373}

7.226. China also notes that the GATT panel in US/EEC – Poultry lends further support to its position, as that panel had stated that "[i]n its choice of a reference period, the Panel was guided by the practice normally followed by contracting parties in tariff negotiations, namely to lay particular emphasis on the period for which the latest data were available".\footnote{374} The European Union responds that in US/EEC – Poultry, the GATT panel was requested by the parties to issue an advisory opinion on the question of the value of a tariff concession, as of 1 September 1960, in the context of negotiations under Article XXIV:6 of the GATT. The European Union notes that the panel decided to use, as a reference period, the 12-month period from 1 July 1959 to 30 June 1960. The European Union notes that the reason why the parties requested the panel to determine the value of the concession as of 1 September 1960, rather than as of the date when the establishment of the panel was requested in 1963, is not explained in the report. As a result, the European Union states that "this advisory opinion provides little guidance in relation to the issue raised in this claim."\footnote{375}

7.227. We observe that in practice, most negotiations under Article XXVIII have been conducted as reserved negotiations under Article XXVIII:5.\footnote{376} The European Union has indicated that it is unaware that, in practice, any such re-determination of the Members having a principal or substantial supplying interest has ever been made, either under the GATT 1947 or under the GATT 1994. We recognize, as Argentina has pointed out\footnote{377}, that Members participating in a procedure under Article XXVIII should conduct the negotiations and consultations "with the greatest possible secrecy"\footnote{378}, and that given this secrecy, there is some difficulty in accessing information concerning instances where the Member seeking to modify a concession has, during the course of the negotiations, proceeded to re-determine the Members having a principal or substantial supplying interest on the basis of more recent import data. For that reason, in the course of these proceedings we sought information on this point from China and the third parties. China states that it "has no information to discern whether an updating of data is done" in prior cases where the negotiations took several years.\footnote{379} Furthermore, no third party indicated that it was aware that, in practice, any re-determination of the Members having a principal or substantial supplying interest has ever been made, either under the GATT 1947 or under the GATT 1994.\footnote{380} Based on all of the foregoing, it appears to us that, if anything, prior GATT/WTO practice does not support China's contention that there is a legal obligation to reappraise which WTO Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest to reflect changes in import shares that have taken place following the initiation of the negotiations.

\footnote{372} EU's first written submission, para. 181.

\footnote{373} GATT Panel Report, Canada – Lead and Zinc, para. 8. See Thailand's response to Panel question No. 4(a) to third parties.


\footnote{375} EU's first written submission, para. 181.


\footnote{377} Argentina's response to Panel question No. 4(a) to third parties.

\footnote{378} The chapeau of Ad Article XXVIII states that parties "should arrange to conduct the negotiations and consultations with the greatest possible secrecy in order to avoid premature disclosure of details of prospective tariff changes". It adds that "[t]he [CONTRACTING PARTIES] shall be informed immediately of all changes in national tariffs resulting from recourse to this Article".

\footnote{379} A. Hoda, **Tariff negotiations and renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO, Procedures and Practices**, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 92 (with regard to the Article XXVIII:5 negotiations held between 1958 and 1994, that "in some cases the process was concluded within a few months while in others it took up to six years or more"); see also Committee on Market Access, Factual report on the status of renegotiations under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 – Report by the Secretariat, WTO Doc. G/MA/W/123, dated 12 May 2016.

\footnote{380} See responses by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Thailand to Panel question No. 4(a) to third parties.
Based on all of the foregoing, we are unable to agree with China that an importing Member is under a legal obligation to reappraise which WTO Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest to reflect changes in import shares that have taken place following the initiation of the negotiations. Therefore, we reject China claims that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 by not re-determining which Members held a relevant supplying interest on the basis of the increase in imports from China over the period 2009-2011.

7.4.3.3 Whether the European Union's decision not to recognize China as a Member holding a supplying interest was justified by the timing of China's claim

The European Union submits that it was "not required to take into account" China's claims of a principal supplying interest in respect of the concessions included in the First Modification Package, which China has raised for the first time in this dispute. The European Union submits that it was also not required to take into account China's claims of a principal or substantial supplying interest in respect of the concessions included in the Second Modification Package, which China did not raise until May 2012, i.e. nearly three years after the expiry of the 90-day time limit mentioned in Paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII.

The European Union submits that, by the time China made its claims of interest in respect of the Second Modification Package, "the negotiations had already been concluded with both Thailand and Brazil and the EU Council had already approved the signature of the agreements reached with those two Members". The European Union submits that while the term "should" used in paragraph 4 of the Procedures may suggest that the 90-day time limit is a guideline, from which it may be possible to depart with "due cause", there are no circumstances in this case that would justify such a departure. The European Union observes that China has not invoked any circumstances to justify its failure to submit its claims of a "principal" supplying interest within the 90-day time-limit in the context of the First Modification Package, and that the circumstances invoked by China in respect of the Second Modification Package do not justify the delay in submitting its claims of "principal" and "substantial" supplying interest.

China does not dispute that Paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII provides for the filing of a claim of interest as a WTO Member holding a principal or substantial supplying interest. However, China submits that the 90-day period for making a claim of interest is not couched in mandatory terms and, as a result, does not set an absolute deadline. China notes that the European Union does not deny that China's claim of a "substantial" supplying interest for the First Modification Package was introduced within the 90-day period.

As regards the Second Modification Package, China argues that several circumstances justify the fact that it did not submit any claim of a principal or substantial supplying interest within the 90-day period, including: (i) the European Union's refusal to recognise China's claims of a substantial supplying interest in respect of the First Modification Package; (ii) at the time where the European Union notified its intention to modify concessions on 16 June 2009, "the favourable effects of the relaxation of the import bans on 30 July 2008 were barely felt"; and (iii) following the notification of the European Union's intention to modify the concessions, "no information transpired", so that China did not become aware that negotiations were "carried out" until the publication of the agreements with Brazil and Thailand.

We note that Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 does not explicitly identify the time-period during which a claim of principal or supplying interest must be made. However, as already discussed, paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII sets out a 90-day guideline, running from the date that the Member seeking to modify its concession circulates

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381 EU's second written submission, para. 2.
382 EU's second written submission, para. 2.
383 EU's second written submission, para. 6.
384 EU's second written submission, paras. 8-12.
385 China's second written submission, para. 86.
386 China's second written submission, para. 87.
387 China's response to Panel Question No 16, para. 97; China's second written submission, para. 88.
388 China's response to Panel Question No 16, para. 97; China's second written submission, para. 88.
389 China's response to Panel Question No 16, para. 97; China's second written submission, para. 88.
import statistics for the last three years for which statistics are available. The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII clarifies that the same 90-day guideline is applicable in the special cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Understanding.

7.234. In this case, China's claim of a substantial supplying interest for the First Modification Package was filed within the 90-day period. China's claims of a "principal" supplying interest in respect of the concessions at issue in the First Modification Package were raised for the first time in this dispute, notwithstanding that the European Union had notified WTO Members of its intention to modify those tariff concessions in June 2006. China's claims of a supplying interest (whether "principal" or "substantial") in respect of the concessions at issue in the Second Modification Package were not made until May 2012, notwithstanding that the European Union had notified its intention to modify its concessions and circulated the accompanying import statistics in June 2009.

7.235. We have already found that the SPS measures in place over the reference periods selected by the European Union did not constitute "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" within the meaning of paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1. We have also found that, for the purpose of the Article XXVIII negotiations, the European Union was under no legal obligation to re-determine which Members held a principal or substantial supplying interest based on the latest available import data for 2009-2011. In the light of these findings on the two grounds upon which China alleges a violation of Article XXVIII:1, it is unnecessary, for the purpose of assessing whether the European Union acted consistently with Article XXVIII:1, to additionally rule on whether the European Union's decision not to recognize China as a Member holding a principal or substantial supplying interest was justified by the absence of a timely claim of supplying interest by China.

7.4.4 Conclusion

7.236. Based on the foregoing, the Panel finds that China has failed to demonstrate that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994 by not recognizing that China held a principal or substantial supplying interest in the concessions at issue in the First and Second Modification Packages.

7.5 Claims under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding on Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994

7.5.1 Introduction

7.237. China claims that the TRQs negotiated in the First and Second Modification Packages are inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2, read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII ("the Understanding"). According to China, the TRQs do not maintain "a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable..."
to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations" within the meaning of Article XXVIII:2. That is because, China argues, the TRQs do not reflect "future trade prospects" calculated in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Understanding. We understand China’s claims under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 to rest on multiple grounds, relating both to the total amount of the TRQs and the allocation of the TRQs among supplying countries.

7.238. The European Union responds that there is no violation of Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding.\(^{395}\) The European Union submits that the total amount of the TRQs equals or exceeds the greatest of the amounts that would result from applying each of the three formulae set out in paragraph 6 of the Understanding based on the relevant reference periods and import data. The European Union submits that the allocation of TRQs among supplying countries is not governed by Article XXVIII:2 or paragraph 6 of the Understanding.

7.5.2 Relevant legal provisions

7.239. Article XXVIII:2 of the GATT 1994 reads:

2. In such negotiations and agreement, which may include provision for compensatory adjustment with respect to other products, the Members concerned shall endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations. (emphasis added)

7.240. Paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 refers to the amount of compensation to be provided when, as in the First and Second Modification Packages, an unlimited tariff concession is replaced by a TRQ. Paragraph 6 of the Understanding requires that compensation be provided insofar as the "level of the quota", i.e. the total volume of imports subject to the lower in-quota tariff rates, is less than the amount of "future trade prospects". Paragraph 6 reads as follows:

6. When an unlimited tariff concession is replaced by a tariff rate quota, the amount of compensation provided should exceed the amount of the trade actually affected by the modification of the concession. The basis for the calculation of compensation should be the amount by which future trade prospects exceed the level of the quota. It is understood that the calculation of future trade prospects should be based on the greater of:

(a) the average annual trade in the most recent representative three-year period, increased by the average annual growth rate of imports in that same period, or by 10 per cent, whichever is the greater; or

(b) trade in the most recent year increased by 10 per cent.

In no case shall a Member’s liability for compensation exceed that which would be entailed by complete withdrawal of the concession. (emphasis added)

7.241. For the purpose of determining the amount of compensation to be provided, subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 6 sets out three different formulae for calculating the amount of future trade prospects against which the level of the quota must be compared. These formulae provide that future trade prospects are to be calculated on the basis of historical trade levels, in either "the most recent representative three-year period", or the "most recent year". The resulting amount is to be increased either by the average annual growth rate of imports in the same period (in case a three-year period is selected), or by 10%. Whichever formula yields the greatest amount in the circumstances is to be used.

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\(^{395}\) EU's first written submission, paras. 154-182; EU's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 18-19; EU's responses to Panel question Nos. 25-28, 30; EU's second written submission, paras. 60-85; EU's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 21-31; parties' responses, and comments on one another's responses, to Panel question Nos. 64, 66-67, 85, 111.
7.242. Article XXVIII:2 provides that Members "shall endeavour to maintain" a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations. The European Union refers to Article XXVIII:2 as a "best efforts" obligation and considers that in assessing the level of compensation the "negotiating Members must be accorded a wide margin of discretion". 396 China responds that Members are not accorded "a wide margin of discretion" in determining the appropriate level of compensation, and notes that the word "endeavour" used in Article XXVIII:2 is accompanied by the verb "shall", meaning that Members are compelled to work towards the maintenance of the general level of reciprocal concessions. 397 However, it does not appear to us that the parties' disagreement on how best to characterize Article XXVIII:2, to the extent that there is such a difference, raises any issue for the Panel to resolve. 398 For its part, the European Union has not argued that China's claims of violation under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding should be dismissed on the basis that Article XXVIII:2 reflects a "best efforts" obligation. In addition, China appears to accept that the meaning of Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding is that "it may be difficult to have a compensation that is mathematically the exact counterfactual of the concession being withdrawn", and that what is required is that Members "do all in their power to reach that goal". 399

7.243. Furthermore, the European Union does not contest that Article XXVIII:2 "establishes a mandatory obligation which is cognizable under the DSU". 400 The European Union also agrees with China that, regardless of which Members are involved in the negotiations under Article XXVIII, any WTO Member has the right to challenge the compensation agreed pursuant to Article XXVIII under the DSU, if they consider that it is not adequate in view of Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding. 401 In sum, whatever the differences between the parties' respective positions on certain aspects relating to the contours of this obligation, there is no disagreement that Article XXVIII:2 establishes a legally enforceable obligation.

7.244. The parties agree that if compensation is calculated in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Understanding, it would normally be presumed to be compliant with Article XXVIII:2. 402 We see no reason to disagree. Article XXVIII:2 is a generally worded provision. Article XXVIII:2 does not include any specific rules in order to determine the amount of compensation to be accorded by the Member seeking the modification of a concession, and in practice assessments of the "level of concessions" may be a very complex and difficult task, which can be approached by the negotiating Members in very different ways. 403 The Understanding is an integral part of the GATT 1994, the purpose of which is to set forth an agreed interpretation among Members on the meaning to be given to certain aspects of Article XXVIII, including Article XXVIII:2. Moreover, paragraph 6 specifically addresses the question of the level of compensation to be provided when, as in the present case, an unlimited tariff concession is replaced with a TRQ. As China notes, "[t]he EU's unlimited tariff concessions with regard to the poultry products at issue were replaced by TRQs in the 2007 and 2012 Modification Packages. As such, paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 is clearly applicable." 404

7.245. Consistent with this understanding of the relationship between Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding, China's claims of violation in this case are based on Article XXVIII:2, "read in conjunction" with the Understanding "and in particular paragraph 6

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396 EU's response to Panel question No. 25, para. 78.
397 China's second written submission, paras. 96-101.
398 In our view, China's claims in this case under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding could be characterized in terms of the European Union not endeavouring to achieve the result set forth in Article XXVIII:2, and would thus fall within the scope of the obligation in that provision insofar as it is characterized as a "best efforts" obligation. Thus, in the circumstances of this case, whether Article XXVIII:2 is properly characterized as a "best efforts" obligation is not an issue we need to resolve.
399 China's second written submission, para. 101.
400 EU's response to Panel question No. 25, para. 78.
401 See EU's response to Panel question No. 12, para. 42.
402 China considers that "where paragraph 6 of the Understanding is strictly adhered to, the resulting tariff rate quota should normally be in compliance with Article XXVIII:2" (China's response to Panel question No. 26(b), para. 132). The European Union also considers that "if compensation is consistent with paragraph 6 of the Understanding it must be deemed compliant with Article XXVIII:2" (EU's response to Panel question No. 26, para. 83). See also EU's second written submission, para. 60.
404 China's first written submission, para. 136.
thereof. China has claimed that the total amount of the TRQs and their allocation among supplying countries is inconsistent with these provisions in a number of different respects. China has clarified that each of those claims rests on the same legal basis, namely Article XXVIII:2 taken together with paragraph 6 of the Understanding, as opposed to some claims being based on the obligation in Article XXVIII:2, and others being based on the terms of paragraph 6 of the Understanding.

7.246. Finally, in accordance with the findings of the panel and the Appellate Body in EC – Poultry, the parties agree that compensation negotiated within the framework of Article XXVIII is not "exempt from compliance with the non-discrimination principle inscribed in Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994", and if "preferential treatment of a particular trading partner not elsewhere justified is permitted under the pretext of 'compensatory adjustment' under Article XXVIII:2, it would create a serious loophole in the multilateral trading system". The European Union agrees with China that, in accordance with EC – Poultry, the "compensation provided pursuant to an agreement under Article XXVIII is not meant to compensate exclusively the Member which has negotiated the compensation and must be made available to all Members on a MFN basis".

7.5.3 Analysis by the Panel

7.247. Turning to the issues that are in dispute, our understanding is that China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding rest on several different grounds, relating both to the total amount of the TRQs and to the allocation of the TRQs among supplying countries.

7.248. The precise scope and nature of China's claims of violation under Article XXVIII:2 have been clarified in the course of the proceedings. Initially, the European Union understood that China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding did "not relate to the overall size of the TRQs at issue, but instead to the allocation of each of those TRQs among different supplying Members". In the course of the proceedings, it has become apparent that China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding relate not only to the allocation of the TRQs among supplying countries, but also to the total amount of the TRQs.

7.249. The parties agree that the obligation in Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding applies to the calculation of the total amount of the TRQs. We further note that China's claims of violation relating to the allocation of the TRQs among supplying countries are for the most part based on the same grounds as its claims relating to the total amount of the TRQs. Accordingly, we consider it logical to first examine the claims that China advances regarding the total amount of the TRQs, and thereafter, in the light of the findings that we have reached, proceed to examine China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding relating to the allocation of the TRQs among supplying countries.

7.250. Before turning to the analysis of China's claims relating to the total amount of the TRQs and their allocation among supplying countries, however, we briefly recall our findings under Article XXVIII:1, and the implications that these findings have on our assessment of China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding.

7.5.3.1 Whether different reference periods can be used for the determinations under Article XXVIII:1 and Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding

7.251. China's principal claims under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding, both at the level of the total amount of the TRQs and at the level of their allocation among supplying countries.

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405 China's request for the establishment of a panel, items (ii) of section II.A and (ii) of section II.B.
406 China’s response to the Panel’s Question 26, para.131. The European Union shares this understanding as well. See EU's response to Panel question No. 26, para. 81; EU's second written submission, para. 60.
408 China's first written submission, paras. 120-129; EU's response to Panel question No. 30, para. 87 (citing Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, paras. 96-102).
409 EU's first written submission, para. 163. In its response to Panel question No. 26, the European Union still understood that "the allegations made by China in both section IV.A.2(a) and section IV.A.2(b) do not relate to the amount of compensation provided by the European Union, but instead to the allocation of such compensation among supplying countries" (EU’s response to Panel question No. 26, para. 82).
countries, include the same two horizontal arguments that we have already considered in the context of examining China's claims under Article XXVIII:1. First, we understand China to argue that for both the First and Second Modification Packages, the European Union was under a legal obligation to estimate what the import levels would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China. Second, we understand China to argue that the European Union was required to base its determinations, of the total amount and allocation of the TRQs for the Second Modification Package, on actual imports from the most recent three-year reference period preceding the conclusion of the negotiations. China considers that the Article XXVIII negotiations concluded in December 2012, and therefore the three preceding years are 2009-2011.

7.252. China has claimed that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 on essentially the same two grounds. We have already rejected China's claims under Article XXVIII:1, and instead found that the European Union was free to determine which Members held a principal and substantial supplying interest in the concessions at issue in the First and Second Modification Packages on the basis of actual imports into the European Union over the three-year period preceding the European Union notification of its intention to modify concessions under Article XXVIII. Given that finding, we consider it is necessary to explain our understanding of the implications that this finding has on our assessment of China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding, given the significant degree of overlap in China's argumentation under these provisions.

7.253. We do not consider that the conclusions that we have reached in relation to China's claims under Article XXVIII:1 necessarily dispose of China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding. The reason is that each provision contains its own applicable legal standard, which applies to a different subject-matter. We are well aware that the subject matter of Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding is distinct from the subject matter of Article XXVIII:1.

7.254. Accordingly, having found that the European Union was free to base its determinations of which Members held a relevant supplying interest on actual imports over the reference periods that it selected for that purpose (2003-2005 and 2006-2008), we do not a priori exclude the possibility that the European Union might have been obligated to calculate the compensation required under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the basis of a different period.  

7.5.3.2 Whether the total amount of the TRQs is consistent with paragraph 6 of the Understanding

7.255. China submits that the total amount of the TRQs is less than the minimum levels calculated in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Understanding. China presents a series of arguments in this regard. First, we understand China to argue that the total amounts of the TRQs are not based on a "representative" period within the meaning of paragraph 6 because they were calculated on the basis of reference periods during which Chinese poultry products were subject to SPS import bans. Second, China submits that the total amounts of the TRQs for four of the TRQs under the Second Modification Package (tariff lines 1602 32 11, 1602 32 30, 1602 32 90 and 1602 39 29) fall below the minimum amount required by paragraph 6 when applied to imports into the European Union over the 2009-2011 period, which in China's view is "the most recent three-year period" within the meaning of paragraph 6 of the Understanding. Third, China argues that even if the 2006-2008 period is used, the total amounts of the TRQs should have been calculated on the

410 China's views on this matter appear to have evolved in the course of these proceedings. In its first written submission, China stated that "the determination of the existence of a PSI or SSI in one period and the calculation of compensation on a different period would seem illogical", and that "[d]iscussions with WTO Members that may have PSI or SSI rights during one reference period, whilst agreeing on compensation based on data for another reference period, would create an imbalance that is neither logical nor reasonable" (China's first written submission, para. 86). At the first substantive meeting of the Panel, China stated that "the base period to be taken into account for the calculation of the compensation ... may then be a period that is different from the period used to determine the WTO members with principal or substantial supplying interests" (China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 70). Along the same lines, at the second meeting of the Panel, China stated that "[i]legally speaking, the reference period used to determine Members with a PSI or SSI is different from that used to calculate compensation" (China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 48).
basis of imports into all EU28 countries over the 2006-2008 period, and that the total amount of one of the TRQs in the First Modification Package (tariff line 1602 31) falls below the minimum amount required by paragraph 6 of the Understanding when EU28 data is used.

7.256. The European Union rejects China's arguments. First, the European Union submits that there is no evidentiary basis for China's contention that, in the absence of the SPS measures applied to imports from China, the total amount of the TRQs determined on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Understanding would have been larger than the total amount of the TRQs agreed by the European Union. Second, the European Union submits that "the most recent representative three-year period" in paragraph 6 of the Understanding refers to the most recent years preceding the initiation of the negotiations under Article XXVIII, and not the three-year period preceding the conclusion of the negotiations as maintained by China. Accordingly, the European Union submits that it was under no obligation to calculate the total amounts of the TRQs for the Second Modification Package on the basis of import levels over the 2009-2011 period. Third, the European Union rejects China's contention that it was required to account for poultry imports into Romania, Bulgaria, or Croatia in the years prior to these countries becoming Members of the European Union.

7.257. In the light of the foregoing, we understand China to claim that the total amount of the TRQs is inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding on three separate grounds. To resolve these claims, the Panel must resolve the following issues. First, whether the European Union was obliged to calculate the total amount of the TRQs for the First and Second Modification Packages on the basis of an estimate of what import levels would have been in the absence of the SPS measures prohibiting or restricting certain poultry imports from China. Second, whether the European Union was obliged to calculate the total amount of the TRQs for the Second Modification Package on the basis of import levels over the 2009-2011 period. Third, whether the European Union was required, in the context of the Second Modification Package, to account for poultry imports into Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia in the years before they acceded to the European Union. We will proceed to examine these issues in turn.

7.5.3.2.1 Whether the European Union was obliged to calculate the total amount of the TRQs on the basis of an estimate of what import levels would have been in the absence of the SPS measures

7.258. China claims that whereas in this case SPS import bans are imposed, the period of application of these import bans cannot be used as a representative basis for determining the amount of compensation under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6. Otherwise "it is impossible to provide compensation that [is] based on the future trade prospects of China".411 Rather, China considers that the period selected "must be representative of China's future trade prospects which must be trade prospects free from import bans".412 China submits that this applies both to the determination of "the global TRQs" (i.e. the total amount of each TRQ, as distinguished from the shares of the TRQ) and also the TRQ allocations among supplying countries.413 In other words, China contends that, "pursuant to Article XXVIII:2, for the global TRQ volume to restore the general balance of concessions, the future trade prospects of China's future trade prospects which must be trade prospects free from import bans".414

7.259. We recall that paragraph 6 of the Understanding requires that when an unlimited tariff concession is replaced by a TRQ, the amount of compensation provided should be based on a calculation of the amount by which "future trade prospects" exceed the level of the quota. Paragraph 6 specifies how "future trade prospects" are to be calculated, based on the formulae in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). Paragraph 6(a) provides that if "future trade prospects" are calculated based on average annual trade over a three-year period, that period must be a "representative" three-year period.

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411 China's first written submission, para. 143.
412 China's first written submission, para. 143.
413 China's first written submission, para. 145.
414 China's second written submission, para. 102.
We consider that, for the purpose of calculating the total amount of the TRQs under paragraph 6 of the Understanding, a three-year period would be "representative" if the total amount of the average annual trade during that period is typical of, and serves to represent, the total amount of annual trade in the product which has occurred in the past or could be expected to occur in the future. Conversely, for the purpose of calculating the total amount of the TRQs under paragraph 6 of the Understanding, a three-year period may not be "representative" if the total amount of the average annual trade during that period is not typical of, and could not serve to represent, the total amount of annual trade in the product which has occurred in the past or could be expected to occur in the future.

Accordingly, we consider that in order to find that the reference periods selected by the European Union were not "representative" for the purpose of calculating the total amount of the TRQs because of the SPS measures that were in place during this time, it would be necessary to establish that these SPS import restrictions significantly altered the total amount of annual trade in the poultry products concerned from all sources, and not merely that the amount from China would have been greater. However, China has not asserted that in the absence of the SPS measures applied to imports from China, the total amount of imported poultry products into the European Union from all sources would have been any greater. We cannot assume that this would have been so, because imports from China compete directly with imports from other sources, which were not subject to those measures. Assuming that the amount of poultry imports supplied from China into the European Union would have been greater in the absence of the SPS measures at issue, one might expect to find a corresponding decrease in the amount of imports of the like products supplied from other sources into the European Union in the absence of any change in overall demand for those products in the European Union. In the absence of any assertion or demonstration by China that the total amount of imports into the European Union from all sources of the poultry products concerned would have been any different in the absence of the SPS measures, China has not provided any calculation of whether the total amount of the TRQs determined on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Understanding would have been larger than the total amount of the TRQs agreed by the European Union for any of the tariff lines at issue in the First or Second Modification Packages.

While our analysis of this claim could stop at this point, we recall our prior finding that China has failed to demonstrate that the SPS measures at issue are "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" within the meaning of paragraphs 4 or 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1. The same legal standard is not directly referenced in the text of Article XXVIII:2 or paragraph 6 of the Understanding. However, paragraph 6 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, which relates to the amount of compensation that is negotiated, links back to the concept of "discriminatory quantitative restrictions". Paragraph 6 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1 states:

"It is not intended that provision for participation in the negotiations of any Member with a principal supplying interest, and for consultation with any Member having substantial interest in the concession which the applicant is seeking to modify or withdraw, should have the effect that it should have to pay compensation or suffer retaliation greater than the withdrawal or modification sought, judged in the light of the conditions of trade at the time of the proposed withdrawal or modification, making allowance for any discriminatory quantitative restriction maintained by the applicant Member." (emphasis added)

The Ad Note suggests that, when calculating the amount of the compensation for the purpose of Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding, there is no requirement to make allowance for each and every measure that may have had the effect of restricting the importation of the products concerned under that concession, but only for those measures that constitute "discriminatory quantitative restrictions".

Based on the foregoing, we reject China's claims that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding by calculating "future trade prospects" and the total amount of the TRQs, on the basis of actual imports of the products concerned into the European Union over the periods selected by the European Union.

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415 EU's comments on China's response to Panel question No. 71(a), para. 14.
416 EU's first written submission, para. 160.
European Union, rather than on an estimate of what those import levels would have been in the absence of the SPS measures.

7.5.3.2.2 Whether the European Union was obliged to calculate the total amount of the TRQs on the basis of import levels over the three years preceding the conclusion of the Article XXVIII negotiations

7.265. We now turn to the second ground of China's claim that the total amount of the TRQs is inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding.

7.266. China claims that based on the more recent representative period 2009–2011 for the Second Modification Package, the total amount of the TRQs determined by the European Union falls short of the total amount that China calculated, pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Understanding, compensation should be based on trade data for the "most recent representative three-year period" or for the "most recent year". China stresses that, according to paragraph 6 of the Understanding, compensation should be based on trade data for the "most recent representative three-year period" or for the "most recent year".

7.267. It is not in dispute that under paragraph 6 of the Understanding, the compensation should be based on trade data for the "most recent" representative three-year period or for the "most recent" year. The legal issue raised by China's claim is whether these terms should be interpreted to mean the most recent period or year preceding the conclusion of the negotiations, as China contends, or rather the most recent period or year preceding the initiation of the negotiations, as the European Union contends.

7.268. Before commencing with our analysis of this issue, we recall that we have already found, in the context of our examination of China's claims under Article XXVIII:1, that the European Union was free to determine which Members held a principal and substantial supplying interest on the basis of actual imports into the European Union over the three-year period preceding the European Union's notification of its intention to modify concessions under Article XXVIII. The European Union was under no obligation to re-determine that issue to take into account changes in import shares over the period 2009-2011. In the course of analysing that issue, we addressed a number of arguments that are specific to the legal standards that apply to the determination of which Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest under Article XXVIII:1. However, some of the arguments that we addressed have been reiterated by the parties in their argumentation under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding. To avoid addressing the same arguments multiple times, our analysis of China's parallel claim under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding will focus on those arguments and interpretative elements that are specific to paragraph 6 of the Understanding and Article XXVIII:2, and that we have not already addressed in the context of our findings under Article XXVIII:1.421

7.269. Paragraph 6 of the Understanding states that the amount of the compensation and future trade prospects must be based on the "most recent" three-year period or year, but is silent on whether this refers to the most recent period or year preceding the initiation of negotiations under Article XXVIII, the most recent period or year preceding the conclusion of negotiations under Article XXVIII, or the most recent period or year preceding some other point in time. Thus, we

417 China's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 144-145; China's second written submission, para. 106.
418 China's second written submission, para. 106.
419 China's first written submission, paras. 86 and 111; China's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 149; China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 48; China's response to Panel question No. 107(a), para. 96.
420 See section 7.4.3.2 above.
421 We see nothing to be gained, and a potential for confusion, from reproducing the same analysis multiple times through the Report in respect of overlapping arguments.
422 Paragraph 6 of the Understanding does not contain comparable language to, for example, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Annex IV of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which refers to "the most recent 12-month period … preceding the period in which the subsidy is granted".
consider that, as a textual matter, the ordinary meaning of the terms "the most recent" three-year period or year is inconclusive with regard to the question before us. 423

7.270. Turning to the context of paragraph 6 of the Understanding, both parties submit that their opposing interpretations are supported by paragraph 6 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1. Paragraph 6 of the Ad Note reads as follows:

It is not intended that provision for participation in the negotiations of any Member with a principal supplying interest, and for consultation with any Member having substantial interest in the concession which the applicant is seeking to modify or withdraw should have the effect that it should have to pay compensation or suffer retaliation greater than the withdrawal or modification sought, judged in the light of the conditions at the time of the proposed withdrawal or modification, making allowance for any discriminatory quantitative restriction maintained by the applicant Member. (emphasis added)

7.271. According to the European Union, this paragraph "makes it clear that the adequacy of compensation must be judged in the light of the conditions prevailing at the moment where the modification of the schedule is proposed, rather than at the time where the modification is eventually agreed", and submits that this is confirmed by the wording of the French and Spanish versions of paragraph 6. 424 China disagrees with the European Union's reading of paragraph 6 of the Ad Note, and instead considers that the moment of the "proposed withdrawal or modification" is not the moment of the notification of the mere intention to withdraw or modify concessions, but rather the moment at which the details of the withdrawal or modification are agreed immediately preceding their implementation. 425 In our view, the parties' arguments show that the ordinary meaning of the wording of paragraph 6 of the Ad Note is capable of accommodating both of those interpretations. Accordingly, while we agree that this provision is relevant context, we consider that it is of limited assistance in resolving the interpretative issue before us.

7.272. However, we do not consider that China's interpretation of paragraph 6 of the Understanding can be reconciled with the object and purpose of this provision and Article XXVIII:2. In particular, paragraph 6 of the Understanding seeks to facilitate the negotiations under Article XXVIII:2 by providing a benchmark that the negotiating Members can use as a basis for the calculation of compensation in the case of TRQs. We do not agree with the European Union that the benchmark must necessarily be "known in advance of the negotiations" and "fixed", insofar as this would suggest that the Members concerned could not agree, as part of their negotiations, to use a different period. 426 However, we consider that, in order to achieve the purpose of facilitating the negotiations under Article XXVIII:2 by providing a benchmark that the negotiating Members can use as a basis for the calculation of compensation, it cannot be the case that the Members engaged in the negotiations would be legally obliged to change the benchmark defined in that provision from year to year until the negotiations have been concluded. We note that to adjust the benchmark year-to-year would not be complicated as such, insofar as it would be the result of a simple mathematical formula applied to import statistics. The difficulty that would arise is that the

423 We note that the immediate context of these terms is also inconclusive, insofar as the content of the three formulae set forth in paragraph 6(a) and (b) are neutral as to whether the calculation called for is to be based on the most recent period or year preceding the initiation of negotiations under Article XXVIII, or the most recent period or year preceding the conclusion of negotiations under Article XXVIII.

424 EU's first written submission, paras. 159, 177. The French and Spanish versions refer, respectively, to "les conditions du commerce au moment où sont projetés le retrait ou la modification" and "las condiciones del comercio en el momento en que se proyecte dicho retiro o modificación".

425 China's opening statement at the first meeting, para. 69; China's second written submission, para. 104.

426 EU's first written submission, para. 179. As China observes, in the First Modification Package (tariff line 0210 99 39), the European Union modified the reference period that covered initially 2003-2005 to the period of 2000-2002 due to changes to the European Union customs classification regulations adopted in 2002, and that for another line of the First Modification Package (tariff line 1602 32 19), the European Union admitted that it agreed, "upon the insistence of Thailand", not to base the calculation of the compensation on the most recent calendar year preceding the initiation of the negotiations, i.e. 2005, but to base it on a more recent twelve-month period preceding the initiation of negotiations, i.e. July 2005 to June 2006. This does not, in our view, lend support to the conclusion that "the most recent" period or year can be interpreted to mean "the most recent" period or year preceding the conclusion of the negotiations. However, it does show that the period or year used to calculate the compensation need not necessarily "be known in advance of the negotiations" and "fixed".
benchmark is meant to serve as the basis for negotiations and the calculation of compensation. To require the negotiating Members to use a continually moving benchmark as the basis for negotiations could perpetuate negotiations indefinitely.

7.273. We consider that Article XXVIII:2 is relevant context for the interpretation of paragraph 6 of the Understanding, given the close relationship between these two provisions. Therefore, we have also considered whether a requirement to base the calculation of the total amount of a TRQ on the most recent three-year period preceding the conclusion of the negotiations would serve the objective, reflected in Article XXVIII:2, of the Members concerned to "endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade" than that provided for prior to the modification. For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded that it would necessary serve this objective.

7.274. First, as the European Union has pointed out, there is no reason why the import volumes following the initiation of negotiations should necessarily be higher than the pre-initiation import volumes. For example, according to China's data and calculations, the amount of the TRQs for two of the tariff items included in the Second Modification Package (1602 39 21 and 1602 39 80) is lower if the formulae of paragraph 6 of the Understanding are applied on the basis of import data for the period 2009-2011, instead of import data for the reference period 2006-2008.427 Furthermore, we consider that a "moving" benchmark would have the potential to create an incentive for the parties to delay the conclusion of negations while waiting for more favourable trade data to emerge.428

7.275. Second, we note that the benchmark in paragraph 6 of the Understanding establishes the basis for calculating the minimum amount of compensation that must be provided. In this regard, paragraph 6 states that the calculation of future trade prospects must be "based on the greater" of the three formulae contained in subparagraphs (a) and (b). Because paragraph 6 establishes the formulae for defining the minimum amount of the TRQ, we consider that it is not necessary to interpret the terms the "most recent" three-year period in paragraph 6 of the Understanding to mean the most recent period preceding the conclusion of the negotiations in order to provide for the possibility that the amount of the TRQs is adjusted to reflect any increase in imports that may take place in the course of the negotiations. It is always open for the Members involved in negotiations under Article XXVIII to agree on compensation that exceeds the minimum amount required.

7.276. Finally, with regard to prior practice, the Panel has asked the parties whether, in prior cases where the negotiations under Article XXVIII took several years, it is possible to discern whether the Members concerned determined the level of compensation under Article XXVIII:2 on the basis of import data that became available during the negotiations. China responds that it "has no information to discern whether an updating of data [was] done".429

7.277. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the European Union was not obliged to calculate the total amount of the TRQs on the basis of import levels over the three years preceding the conclusion of the Article XXVIII negotiations. Accordingly, we reject China's claims that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding by calculating "future trade prospects" and the total amount of the TRQs on the basis of imports of the products concerned into the European Union over the period 2006-2008 in the context of the Second Modification Package, and not on the basis of imports over the 2009-2011 period.

7.5.3.2.3 Whether the European Union was required to account for poultry imports into Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia in the years before they acceded to the European Union

7.278. China submits that even using the reference periods selected by the European Union, i.e. 2006-2008, the total amount of one of the TRQs in the First Modification Package (tariff line 1602

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427 EU's second written submission, para. 76.
428 EU's first written submission, para. 180.
429 China's response to Panel question No. 111, para. 104.
31) falls below the minimum amount required by paragraph 6 of the Understanding when EU28 data is used.\textsuperscript{430}

7.279. We recall that the total amount of the TRQ for tariff line 1602 31 was determined in the context of the First Modification Package. The negotiations in the First Modification Package took place in 2006. Romania and Bulgaria did not accede to the European Union until 1 January 2007. Croatia acceded to the European Union on 1 January 2013. The European Union confirms that it did not account for imports into these countries when determining the total amount of the TRQs.

7.280. China argues that the European Union was required to do so. Firstly, as regards Romania and Bulgaria, China submits that when the First Modification Package was negotiated in 2006, the European Union knew that the two countries would be joining the European Union in 2007.\textsuperscript{431} Secondly, as regards Croatia, China agrees that, “technically the EU was not required to take into account Croatia's imports when the First Modification Package was negotiated and reached in 2006, as there was uncertainty as to whether and when Croatia would become a member”; however, China nonetheless submits “for the purpose of this dispute settlement, the Panel should use the import data that includes those of Croatia, as the EU is obliged to increase the Union concession level when Croatia became a member, in exchange for Croatia's withdrawal of its own concession”.\textsuperscript{432}

7.281. China observes, however, that "whether or not to include import data for these three countries will have a negligible impact on the present dispute".\textsuperscript{433} In this regard, China explains that throughout the period 2000-2012, Croatia imported only 6.8 tonnes under tariff line 1602 31, and all of these imports took place in 2012. By way of comparison, China notes that the corresponding EU28 imports under 1602 31 in 2012 alone were 77,659 tonnes. For Romania and Bulgaria, China explains that for tariff line 1602 31, total imports of 25.4 metric tonnes were recorded for Romania in 2003 and 8.3 metric tonnes for Bulgaria in 2005. By way of comparison, China notes that the corresponding EU28 imports under tariff line 1602 31 were 63,883 tonnes in 2003, and 94,500 tonnes in 2005.\textsuperscript{434}

7.282. The European Union submits that it was under no obligation to account for imports into these countries in the years preceding their accession to the European Union, and that to the extent that the accession of those countries to the European Union resulted in an increase of the applicable duty rates, the European Union would have been required to provide compensation in accordance with Article XXIV:6 of the GATT 1994.\textsuperscript{435} In addition, the European Union notes that the difference arising from using import data including imports into these three countries only leads to a minimal difference. Specifically, the European Union observes that the total amount of the TRQ agreed by the European Union for tariff line 1602 31 covers 103,896 tonnes. According to China's alternative calculation in Exhibit CHN-49, the compensation required pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Understanding including imports into these countries would amount to 103,953 tonnes, i.e. a difference of just 57 tonnes per year.\textsuperscript{436}

7.283. We are not persuaded that the European Union was obliged to account for imports into Romania, Bulgaria, or Croatia when determining in the total amount of the TRQ for tariff line 1602 31 in the context of the First Modification Package. As noted above, Romania and Bulgaria did not accede to the European Union until 2007, and Croatia did not accede until 2013. However, the initiation and conclusion of the Article XXVIII negotiations under the First Modification Package occurred in 2006.\textsuperscript{437} Furthermore, the total amount of the TRQ for tariff line 1602 31 was determined on the basis of imports over the period 2003-2005.\textsuperscript{438}

7.284. In addition, China acknowledges that including the import data for these three countries would have a negligible impact on the total amount of the TRQ. We note that insofar as the

\textsuperscript{430} China's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 144-145; China's second written submission, para. 106.

\textsuperscript{431} China's response to Panel question No. 71(b), para. 24.

\textsuperscript{432} China's response to Panel question No. 71(b), para. 25.

\textsuperscript{433} China's response to Panel question No. 71(b), para. 25.

\textsuperscript{434} China's response to Panel question No. 71(b), para. 26.

\textsuperscript{435} EU's second written submission, paras. 81-82.

\textsuperscript{436} EU's second written submission, para. 80.

\textsuperscript{437} See paragraphs 7.50 to 7.54.

\textsuperscript{438} See paragraph 7.57.
information contained in Exhibit CHN-49 is accurate\textsuperscript{439}, it would follow that the total amount of the TRQ for 1602 31 is 0.05\% less than required by Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding. However, we understand China to accept that the meaning of Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding is that "it may be difficult to have a compensation that is mathematically the exact counterfactual of the concession being withdrawn", and that what is required is that Members "do all in their power to reach that goal"\textsuperscript{440}.

7.285. In addition, we note the argument by the European Union that to the extent that the accession of those countries to the European Union resulted in an increase of the applicable duty rates, the European Union would have been required to provide compensation in accordance with Article XXIV:6 of the GATT 1994.

7.286. Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding by calculating "future trade prospects" and the total amount of the TRQs on the basis of import statistics that exclude imports into Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia which took place in the years before they acceded to the European Union.

**7.5.3.3 Whether the allocation of the TRQs is inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding**

7.287. Having addressed China's claims regarding the total amount of the TRQs, we now turn to China's claims that the allocation of the TRQs among supplying countries is inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding.

7.288. China argues that if a TRQ resulting from Article XXVIII negotiations is allocated among supplying countries, the provisions of Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding apply at the level of the individual shares allocated. China submits that the allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to Brazil and Thailand, with a relatively small "all others" share and no country-specific share allocated to China, does not reflect China's future trade prospects. In this connection, China argues that there are several different violations of paragraph 6. First, China submits that by using reference periods during which Chinese poultry products were subject to SPS measures, the TRQ allocation is not based on a "representative" period within the meaning of paragraph 6. Second, China submits that by basing the TRQ allocation for the Second Modification Package on the 2006-2008 period, the TRQ allocations are not based on "the most recent three-year period" within the meaning of paragraph 6. Third, China argues that the "all others" share for one of the TRQs (tariff line 1602 30 80) is less than that required if EU28 data is used.\textsuperscript{441} Fourth, China contends that the absence of any "all others" share for one of the TRQs (tariff line 1602 39 21) violates paragraph 6.\textsuperscript{442}

7.289. The European Union submits that Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 regulate the overall value for all Members of the compensation provided, and apply only at the level of the total amount of each TRQ. The European Union submits that Article XXVIII and paragraph 6 of the Understanding do not address or apply to the allocation of TRQs among supplying countries, which is specifically and exhaustively addressed by Article XIII of the GATT. Without prejudice to this position, the European Union submits that China has in any event failed to demonstrate that any of the TRQ allocations are inconsistent with the requirements of paragraph 6.

7.290. The threshold legal issue raised by China's claims is whether Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding apply to the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries, as China contends, or merely apply to the total amount of the TRQs, as the European Union contends.

\textsuperscript{439} It is not entirely clear how these figures relate to the figures that China presents in its response to Panel question No. 71(b), para. 26.
\textsuperscript{440} China's second written submission, para. 101.
\textsuperscript{441} China's response to Panel question No. 29(a), paras. 144-145.
\textsuperscript{442} China's response to Panel question No. 29(a), paras. 144-145. China accepts that there were no imports from countries falling under the category of "all others", and that a "technical application of the formulas of Paragraph 6 of the Understanding thus results in zeros, as indicated in Exhibit CHN-49". However, China explains that "even when there were actually no imports during the reference period, the EU is required to create a TRQ that is larger than the trade actually affected, namely larger than zero imports". China's response to Panel question No. 71(c), paras. 27-28.
7.291. Beginning with the text of paragraph 6 of the Understanding, we note that it contains no reference to the shares of a TRQ allocated to certain supplying countries or group of countries. Rather, paragraph 6 refers in the singular to "a tariff rate quota" in its first sentence, and to "the quota" in its second sentence. When read as a whole, paragraph 6 establishes the basis for calculating the total amount of the TRQ. However, China submits that where "a global TRQ" is broken down into what China terms "country-specific TRQs" and what China terms "an 'all others' TRQ", it follows that the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Understanding must be applied "at the level of each TRQ", as well as at the level of "the global TRQ". Thus, China refers to each of the shares of a TRQ as a "TRQ" on its own, and refers to each of the TRQs as a "global TRQ". Proceeding on the basis of this terminology, China argues that the use of the singular in relation "a tariff rate quota" and "the quota" actually signifies that the calculations provided for in paragraph 6 should be applied for each of the TRQ shares allocated among supplying countries. In China's view, "it would not make any sense to fix a global TRQ taking into account overall future prospects without taking into account future trade prospects at the level of the separate TRQs in which the global TRQ is broken down", and that to do otherwise "would result in over-compensation for some and under-compensation for others, thereby creating discrimination".

7.292. We are not persuaded by China's interpretation of paragraph 6 of the Understanding. Beginning with the ordinary meaning of the terms used, it is evident that the term "tariff quota" is not the same as a "share" of an allocated tariff quota. China rightly notes that paragraph 6 does not refer to the "total amount of compensation". However, in our view this does not have the implications drawn by China. As discussed above, paragraph 6 refers to "a tariff rate quota" and "the quota", but not to the shares of TRQ allocated among supplying countries. In the absence of any juxtaposition of these different terms in the text of paragraph 6, there would be no need, in the text of paragraph 6, to include such qualifiers as the "global" or the "total" quota, or level of compensation.

7.293. Turning to the context of paragraph 6 of the Understanding, we consider that paragraph 6 can be presumed to use the term "tariff quota" with the same meaning as that term is elsewhere used in the GATT 1994. That includes Article XIII:5 of the GATT 1994, which states that the provisions of Article XIII apply "to any tariff rate quota" instituted or maintained by a Member. We consider that the term "tariff rate quota" cannot, in the context of Article XIII, be used interchangeably with the concept of a "share" of an allocated tariff quota. Article XIII:2(d) distinguishes "a quota" which is allocated among supplying countries from the "shares in the quota" that has been allocated. We note that interpreting the two terms interchangeably in the context of Article XIII:2(d) would lead to the absurd result that any share of a TRQ allocated to one country would then have to be allocated among different supplying countries.

7.294. We consider that Article XXVIII:2 is relevant context for the interpretation of paragraph 6 of the Understanding, given the close relationship between these two provisions. Therefore, we next consider whether the text of Article XXVIII:2 supports the conclusion that if a withdrawing Member allocates a tariff rate quota during Article XXVIII negotiations, "compliance with Article XXVIII:2 requires a comparison at the level of the WTO Members to which the quota was allocated rather than at the global level only". For the reasons that follow, we do not consider that Article XXVIII:2 supports that conclusion.

7.295. Article XXVIII:2 states that the Member concerned must endeavour to maintain a "general level" of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for prior to the modification. In calling for an examination of whether the "general level" of concessions has been maintained, the text of Article XXVIII:2 suggests that the overall value of the compensation for all Members should be equivalent to the overall value for all Members of the modified concession. This is reinforced by the focus being on whether the compensation maintains a "general level" of concessions not less favourable to "trade", without any further precision.

7.296. China recognizes that the use of the word "general" implies that "what must be done is to aggregate the level of concessions of each WTO Member". However, China points out that the

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443 China's first written submission, para. 137.
444 China's first written submission, para. 138; China's second written submission, para. 110.
445 China's response to Panel's question No 29, para. 141.
446 China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 64.
447 China's comments on the EU's response to Panel question No. 67, para. 7.
text of Article XXVIII:2 does not simply state that the Member concerned should endeavour to maintain the "general level" of tariff concessions, but refers rather to a general level of "reciprocal and mutually advantageous" concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations.

7.297. We consider that China’s argument seeks to read too much into the term "reciprocal" in Article XXVIII:2. The ordinary meaning of the term "reciprocal" is "[o]f the nature of a return made for something; given, felt, shown, etc., in return", and ":[e]xisting on both sides; mutual; (of two or more things) done, made, etc., in exchange". Other provisions of the GATT 1994 refer to "reciprocal and mutually advantageous" concessions and arrangements. Notably, the preamble to both the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement recognize the objective of entering into "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements" directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. It seems to us that they basically convey the notion of balanced concessions and arrangements. As the Panel in EC – Chicken Cuts observed:

Taken together, the relevant aspects of the WTO Agreement and the GATT 1994 indicate that concessions made by WTO Members should be interpreted so as to further the general objective of the expansion of trade in goods and the substantial reduction of tariffs. It is also clear that such an interpretation is limited by the condition that arrangements entered into by Members be reciprocal and mutually advantageous. In other words, the terms of a concession should not be interpreted in such a way that would disrupt the balance of concessions negotiated by the parties.

7.298. In the context of Article XXVIII:2, the use of the term "reciprocal" does not shed any light on whether: (i) the value of the compensation resulting from the negotiations, for each single Member, must be equivalent to the value, for that Member, of the concession prior to its modification or withdrawal, or rather (ii) the value of the overall compensation resulting from the negotiations, for all other Members, must be equivalent to the overall value, for all other Members, of the concession as it existed prior to its modification or withdrawal. The term "reciprocal" can be just as easily understood as referring to the relationship between the Member modifying the concession, on the one side, and all other Members, on the other side, rather than to each of the multiple relationships between the Member modifying the concession and every other Member.

7.299. Continuing with our textual analysis, both parties agree that Article XIII:2 refers specifically to the allocation of TRQs. In our view, Article XIII:2 is therefore also relevant context for the purpose of the interpretation of Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding. Specifically, if the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries is not regulated by Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding, it does not follow that the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries is unregulated, or "would result in over-compensation for some and under-compensation for others, thereby creating discrimination." Rather, it would mean that the allocation of TRQs shares among supplying countries is regulated only by the relevant obligations in Article XIII. Interpreting Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding as also regulating the allocation of TRQs among supplying countries would thus mean that there are two sets of requirements in the GATT 1994 regulating the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries. To the extent that the requirements of paragraph 6 of the Understanding would be interpreted differently from the TRQ allocation requirements found in Article XIII:2, this would mean that there are different and potentially conflicting requirements regulating the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries.

7.300. According to China, paragraph 6 of the Understanding applies "at the level of the share allocation of each tariff rate quota as well as at the level of the global tariff rate quota." However, we recall that paragraph 6 contains three different formulae for calculating future trade

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448 China’s opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 64.
450 We also note that Article XVII:3 of the GATT 1994 and Article XXVIII:2bis both refer to negotiations on a "reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis" to reduce obstacles to trade.
451 See Panel Reports, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 7.320.
452 See e.g. China’s response to Panel question No. 29(b), para. 147.
453 China’s first written submission, para. 138; China’s second written submission, para. 110.
454 China’s response to Panel question No. 29, para. 143.
prospects, and the importing Member is required to select the formula that yields the greatest amount. Therefore, if paragraph 6 of the Understanding applies at the level of the share allocation, the importing Member would have to apply different formulae to different Members insofar as that would yield a greater amount in any case. Based on the text of paragraph 6 of the Understanding, we consider that the application of the formulae set forth in paragraph 6(a) and 6(b) at the level of TRQ allocation would not only lead to results that conflict with the allocation rules set forth in Article XIII:2, but which would also be unworkable.

7.301. Before concluding, we recall that China stresses that "[t]o be clear, China is not suggesting that a Member is required to allocate among supplying countries the compensation provided in the form of TRQs under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding". Rather, China clarifies that "in cases where the Member chooses to allocate or break down the total compensation among supplying countries and records the shares of the compensation of various supplying countries as part of its modification of the concessions, the compensation is provided not only at the global level, but also at the level of each supplying country or group of countries". However, we do not understand the basis for the distinction that China draws between how Article XXVIII:2 would apply to assessing the adequacy of the value of compensation in the form of a TRQ that is not allocated among supplying countries, and how Article XXVIII:2 would apply to assessing the adequacy of the value of compensation in the form of a TRQ allocated among supplying countries. If Article XXVIII:2 is interpreted to require that the value of the compensation resulting from the negotiations for each single Member be equivalent to the value for that Member of the concession prior to its modification or withdrawal, then that general principle would apply irrespective of the form of the compensation. A global TRQ that is not allocated among supplying countries would therefore be subject to that same principle. In this regard, we do not consider that, in a situation where a Member replaces an unlimited tariff concession with a TRQ that is not allocated among supplying countries, the value of that compensation for each single Member would necessarily be equivalent to the value, for that Member, of the concession prior to its modification or withdrawal.

7.302. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding do not apply to the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries. Therefore it is not necessary to consider China's claims relating to the allocation of TRQ shares further. In any event, we note that China's claims of violation relating to the allocation of the TRQs are to some extent based on the same grounds as its claims relating to the total amount of the TRQs. Accordingly, we reject China's claims that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XXVIII:2 read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding by allocating the TRQs among supplying countries in a manner that does not reflect China's "future trade prospects".

7.5.4 Conclusion

7.303. The Panel finds that China has failed to demonstrate that the tariff rates and the TRQs negotiated and implemented by the European Union are inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2, read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, by failing to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that existing prior to the modification.

7.6 Claims under Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994

7.6.1 Introduction

7.304. China claims that by allocating "all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (i.e. Brazil and Thailand), the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994. According to China, it had a "substantial interest in supplying the product concerned", and the European Union therefore violated Article XIII:2(d) because it failed to seek agreement with all WTO Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned, and did not allocate to all such Members shares based upon the proportions supplied

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455 China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 42.
456 China's first written submission, paras. 223-252; China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 109-112; China's responses to Panel question Nos. 41-42; China's second written submission, paras. 172-175; China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 76-81; parties' responses, and comments on one another's responses, to Panel question Nos. 69, 72-74, 106-109, 111-120.
by them during a previous representative period, due account being taken of any special factors which affected the trade in the product.

7.305. China argues that all of the determinations under Article XIII:2 must be based on a "previous representative period", taking due account of "special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product", including not only the allocation of TRQs shares vis-à-vis substantial suppliers under Article XIII:2(d) in accordance with the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d), but also the initial, threshold determination of which Members have a "substantial interest" in supplying the products concerned under Article XIII:2(d). In this case, China argues that the reference periods upon which the European Union made those determinations were not "representative", and that China's reduced ability to export as a result of import bans due to SPS measures, as well as its increased ability to export after the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008, were "special factors" that had to be taken into account. With respect to both the First and Second Modification Packages, China claims that the European Union should have determined that China was a substantial supplier and sought an agreement with China on the TRQ share allocations based on an estimate of the share of imports that China would have had in the absence of the SPS measures that restricted Chinese poultry imports over the reference periods used. With respect to the Second Modification Package, China additionally claims that the European Union was obligated to seek an agreement with China on the TRQ share allocations taking into account the increase in poultry imports from China over the 2009-2011 period, which China considers to be the most recent three-year period preceding the determination of the TRQs.

7.306. The European Union responds that China's claims rest on an incorrect interpretation of Article XIII:2(d). Regarding the determination of which Members are substantial suppliers for the purpose of Article XIII:2(d), the European Union submits that there is no reason for interpreting the term "substantial interest" differently in the context of Article XXVIII:1 and Article XIII:2, especially in cases where the negotiations on the total amount of the TRQs pursuant to Article XXVIII take place concurrently with the negotiations on the allocation of those same TRQs pursuant to Article XIII:2(d). In addition to questioning whether consideration of "special factors" is required when determining which Members are substantial suppliers under Article XIII:2(d), the European Union considers that the SPS measures mentioned by China are not "special factors" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d), and that the European Union was therefore under no obligation to determine which Members held a substantial supplying interest on the basis of an estimate of what China's share of imports into the European Union would have been in the absence of the SPS measures. The European Union also rejects China's claim that, in respect of the Second Modification Package, it was required to determine which Members held a substantial supplying interest based on more recent data regarding imports over the period 2009-2011.

7.6.2 Relevant provisions

7.307. China advances separate claims of violation under the chapeau of Article XIII:2, and under Article XIII:2(d). The chapeau of Article XIII:2 provides that:

In applying import restrictions to any product, Members shall aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this end shall observe the following provisions...

7.308. The provisions that follow include paragraphs (a) through (d) of Article XIII:2. Of relevance to the present case is paragraph (d), which clarifies how the chapeau of Article XIII:2 is to be complied with as regards WTO Members that hold a "substantial interest" in supplying the product concerned. Article XIII:2(d) states:

In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries the Member applying the restrictions may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product

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457 EU's first written submission, paras. 278-287; EU's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 20-25; EU's responses to Panel question Nos. 39, 42; EU's second written submission, paras. 163-176; EU's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 97-99; parties' responses, and comments on one another's responses, to Panel question Nos. 69, 72-74, 106-109, 111-120.
concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the Member concerned shall allot to Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any Member from utilizing fully the share of any such total quantity or value which has been allotted to it, subject to importation being made within any prescribed period to which the quota may relate. (emphasis added)

7.309. In EC – Bananas III (Art. 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Art. 21.5 – US), the Appellate Body clarified that Article XIII:2(d) is a permissive "safe harbour" insofar as substantial suppliers are concerned. However, the Appellate Body explained that even where a TRQ is allocated among supplying countries in accordance with Article XIII:2(d), that allocation must also respect the requirement in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 vis-à-vis non-substantial suppliers (i.e. countries not recognized as having a "substantial interest" in supplying the product concerned). The Appellate Body stated:

The provisions of Article XIII:2(a)-(d) are specific instances of authorized forms of allocation when a Member chooses to allocate shares of the tariff quota. Article XIII:2(d) allows for the case where a quota is allocated among supplying countries, either by way of agreement or, where this is not reasonably practicable, by allotment to Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned, and in accordance with the proportions supplied by those Members during a previous representative period, taking due account of "special factors". In other words, Article XIII:2(d) is a permissive "safe harbour"; compliance with the requirements of Article XIII:2(d) is presumed to lead to a distribution of trade as foreseen in the chapeau of Article XIII:2, as far as substantial suppliers are concerned.408

408 If a Member allocates quota shares to Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product, in accordance with Article XIII:2(d), it must also respect the requirement in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 — that distribution of trade approach as closely as possible the shares that Members may be expected to obtain in the absence of the restriction. This is usually done by allocating a share to a general "others" category for all suppliers other than Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product.458 (emphasis added)

7.310. The second sentence of Article XIII:2(d) refers to "special factors".459 An Ad Note that applies to both Article XI and XIII of the GATT 1994 states that the term "includes changes in relative productive efficiency as between domestic and foreign producers, or as between different foreign producers, but not changes artificially brought about by means not permitted under the Agreement".460 Another Ad Note that is specific to Article XIII:2(d) clarifies that no mention was made of "commercial considerations" as a rule for the allocation of quotas because "it was considered that its application by governmental authorities might not always be practicable", and because "in cases where it is practicable, a Member could apply these considerations in the

459 The term is also found in several other provisions of the covered agreements, including Article XI:2(c) of the GATT 1994 (providing that "the Member shall pay due regard to the proportion prevailing during a previous representative period and to any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product concerned"); Article XII:2(a) and Article XVIII:9 of the GATT 1994 (both providing that "[d]ue regard shall be paid in either case to any special factors which may be affecting the reserves of such Member"); Article XVI:3 of the GATT 1994 (referring to "account being taken of the shares of the Members in such trade in the product during a previous representative period, and any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting such trade in the product"). Article 5.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards refers, reiterates the relevant portion of the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d), including the reference to "special factors".
460 The Ad Note applies to the term "special factors" in Article XI:2, but applies to Article XIII:2(d) and Article XIII:4 by virtue of an Ad Note to Article XIII:4 that cross-references the Ad Note to Article XI:2.
process of seeking agreement, consistently with the general rule laid down in the opening sentence of paragraph 2”.

7.311. By its own terms, Article XIII:2(d) provides that a Member seeking to allocate a TRQ among supplying countries may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota “with all other Members” having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned. In EC – Poultry, the Appellate Body confirmed that for a TRQ allocation to be in conformity with the first method set forth in Article XIII:2(d), the Member concerned cannot enter into agreements with some substantial suppliers and not others. In that case, the Appellate Body found that:

To conform to Article XIII:2(d), all other Members having a "substantial interest" in supplying the product concerned would have to agree. That is not the case here. As the European Communities did not seek an agreement with Thailand, the other contracting party having a substantial interest in the supply of frozen poultry meat to the European Communities at that time, the Oilseeds Agreement cannot be considered an agreement within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994.461

7.6.3 Analysis by the Panel

7.312. Turning to the issues in dispute, we understand China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) to rest on two different grounds, raising the following issues. First, whether the European Union was obliged to determine which Members held a "substantial interest" on the basis of an estimate of what import shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures. Second, whether the European Union was obliged to determine which Members held a substantial supplying interest taking into account changes in import shares that occurred in the course of the negotiations under the Second Modification Package concurrently addressing the total amount of the TRQs and their allocation among supplying countries.

7.6.3.1 Separate analysis of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2

7.313. In this case, China has advanced one set of claims of violation under Article XIII:2(d), and another set of parallel claims of violation under the chapeau of Article XIII:2. These appear to be claims in the alternative, insofar as China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) are directed at establishing that it was a Member with a substantial supplying interest, whereas its claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 are premised on the assumption that "it was not WTO Member with an SSI".462

7.314. The parties have presented their argumentation in respect of these two sets of claims in separate sections of their first and second written submissions, notwithstanding that there is a substantial degree of overlap between China's claims and the parties' arguments under Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2. China has clarified that its claim that the European Union was under an obligation to allocate an "all others" share of at least 10% within each of the TRQs under the First and Second Modification Packages is relevant only to China's claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2. However, it would appear that China's other claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 rest on the same supporting arguments as its claim that it had a "substantial interest" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d).463 The overlap between China's arguments under these provisions derives from the fact that, in China's view, there is significant overlap between the legal standards that apply under paragraph (d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2. In particular, China considers that the European Union was required to determine which Members had a "substantial interest" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d) based on a previous "representative" period, taking due account of "special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product", and that the same legal standards apply in the context of the chapeau of Article XIII:2 when determining the amount of the TRQ share to be allocated to "all others".

462 China's second written submission, para. 144.
463 The Panel asked China to clarify whether its China's claim under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 rests on the same argument as its claim that it had a "substantial interest" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d). China responded that "[t]he argument in Section IV-B-3-b is the same as that under Article XIII:2(d)" (China's response to Panel question No. 41(b), para. 173).
7.315. Notwithstanding the substantial degree of overlap between China's claims and the parties' arguments under Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2, we shall address these claims separately, in the same manner as the parties have in their submissions.

7.6.3.2 Relevance of "special factors" to the determination of which Members hold a "substantial interest" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d)

7.316. An important interpretative issue that arises in connection with China's claim under Article XIII:2(d) is whether consideration of "special factors" is relevant to the determination of which WTO Members hold a substantial interest under Article XIII:2(d).

7.317. We recognize that the text of the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d) does not explicitly state that "special factors" must be taken into account for that purpose. However, in our view this does not imply that "special factors" can be ignored in the context of determining which Members hold a substantial supplying interest. If that were the case, then following that same logic, the determination of which Members hold a substantial supplying interest would also not need to be based on a "previous representative period", because this legal criterion, like "special factors", is only referred to explicitly in the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d).

7.318. Furthermore, we can see no reason why Article XIII:2(d) would establish a legal obligation to take due account of "special factors" only when unilaterally allocating the shares of a TRQ among WTO Members having a "substantial interest" in supplying a product, but not in the initial, threshold determination of which Members hold a substantial supplying interest under the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d). We consider that the explicit reference to a "previous representative period" and "special factors" in the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d) can be explained by the need to "set the minimum standards for the determination of the TRQs if no negotiations are held", and that Article XIII:2(d) "assumes that, where there are negotiations, the negotiating WTO Members with [substantial supplying interests] will defend their interests and make certain that special factors are taken into account for the determination of the TRQs".464

7.319. In addition, we consider that Article XIII:4 offers some contextual support for the view that consideration of "special factors" is relevant to the determination of which Members hold a "substantial interest" for the purpose of the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d). As elaborated later in our Report in the course of addressing China's claim of inconsistency with Article XIII:4, we conclude that Article XIII:4 applies to both the first and second sentences of Article XIII:2(d).465 The obligation in Article XIII:4 relates to the subsequent "reappraisal" of the "special factors" involved. This implies that consideration of "special factors" cannot be ignored in the initial appraisal of which Members hold a "substantial interest" for the purpose of the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d).

7.320. The European Union argues that that there is no reason to interpret the notion of a "substantial interest" in different ways in Article XXVIII and Article XIII.466 To be clear, we are not suggesting that the meaning of the terms "substantial interest" in the context of Article XIII:2(d) should be interpreted without regard to the parallel determination that must be made in the context of Article XXVIII negotiations. We consider that the need for a harmonious interpretation is particularly important taking into account the existence of situations where, as in the present case, negotiations on the total amount of the TRQs under Article XXVIII occurs simultaneously with negotiations on the allocation of the TRQs under Article XIII:2(d).467 Thus, we consider that these two provisions should be interpreted harmoniously.

464 China's second written submission, para. 174.
465 See paragraph 7.464.
466 EU's first written submission, paras. 279-283. In its response to Panel question No. 118(a), the European Union agrees that although the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d) does not make any reference to "special factors", "a method that disregards special factors affecting any of the suppliers of a given product would not be objective as it would be biased against the suppliers affected by those factors and in favour of the others". In its comments on the EU's response to Panel question No. 118(a), China sets forth its understanding that "it is not disputed between China and the EU that special factors should be taken into account in determining which Members are "substantial suppliers" under the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d)".
467 At paragraph 33 of its third-party written submission, Canada observes that "[i]f Article XXVIII is being used, it is very likely that allocation under Article XIII will occur coincident with the establishment of a TRQ under Article XXVIII."
7.321. More specifically, we consider that a determination of which Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest under Article XXVIII based on trade statistics for the last three-year period preceding the notification of the intention to modify concessions, in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, would generally satisfy the requirement, in Article XIII:2(d), that the determination be based on a "previous representative period". Furthermore, there are the attractions of methodological ease and consistency in using a 10% import share benchmark as the means of determining "substantial interest" in Article XIII as has been done in the context of Article XXVIII. In this regard, China stated that it "does not consider that it is an ipso facto violation of Articles XXVIII and XIII for a member to use the 10% threshold to determine SSI status". In these and other respects, we consider that the determination of which Members hold a "substantial interest" under Article XIII:2(d) may generally rely on the determination that has been made in the context of Article XXVIII.

7.322. However, in the context of Article XIII:2, we consider that the determination of which Members hold a "substantial supplying interest" under Article XIII:2(d) must be supplemented by the cumulative consideration of whether there are "special factors" within the meaning of Article XIII:2. In our view, this reading seeks a harmonious interpretation and application of Article XIII:2 and Article XXVIII, and at the same time gives due regard to the particular legal standards reflected in the text of the provisions concerned.

7.6.3.3 Whether different reference periods can be used for the determinations under Article XXVIII:1, Article XXVIII:2, and Article XIII:2(d)

7.323. China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) are founded on the same two horizontal arguments that we have already considered in the context of examining China's claims under Article XXVIII:1, and also in the context of examining China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding. First, we understand China to argue that, in respect of both the First and Second Modification Packages, the European Union was obligated to estimate what import shares into the European Union would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China. Second, we understand China to argue that, in respect of the Second Modification Package, the European Union was required to base its determinations on actual imports from the most recent three-year reference period prior to the conclusion of the negotiations. China considers that the negotiations concluded when the European Union notified Members of the same in December 2012, and therefore in its view the determinations under Article XIII:2(d) should have used 2009-2011 as the reference period.

7.324. China has claimed that the European Union violated Article XXVIII:1 and Article XXVIII:2 on essentially the same grounds. We have already rejected China's claims under Article XXVIII:1, finding that the European Union was free to determine which Members held a principal and substantial supplying interest in the First and Second Modification Packages on the basis of actual imports into the European Union over the three-year period preceding the European Union notification of its intention to modify concessions under Article XXVIII (i.e. 2003-2005 and 2006-2008). We have also rejected China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding, again finding that the European Union was free to determine the total amount of the TRQs in the First and Second Modification Packages on the basis of actual imports into the European Union over the three-year period preceding the European Union notification of its intention to modify concessions under Article XXVIII (i.e. 2003-2005 and 2006-2008).

7.325. However, we do not consider that the conclusions that we have reached in relation to China's claims under Article XXVIII:1 and Article XXVIII:2 are necessarily dispositive of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d). The reason is that each of these provisions contains its own applicable legal standard, as elaborated in the different terms used in each provision. In addition, each of these provisions applies to a different subject. The subject-matter of China's claims under Article XXVIII:1 is the reference period used to determine which Members hold a principal or substantial supplying interest for the purpose of entering into negotiations or consultations under Article XXVIII. This is distinct from the subject-matter of China's claims under Article XXVIII:2 and

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468 Canada's third-party written submission, para. 35. We note that the panel in EC-Bananas III (Ecuador) found the approach of the European Union in that case (to interpret this language in conformity with Ad Article XXVIII:1 paragraph 7 and the 10% rule developed in that context) to be reasonable(Panell Report EC-Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.83-7.85).

469 China's response to Panel question No. 68(a).
paragraph 6 of the Understanding, which is the reference period used to determine the total amount of the TRQs. Both of the foregoing are distinct from the subject-matter of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d), which is the reference period used to determine which Members held a "substantial interest" in supplying the products at issue for the purpose of determining the allocation of the TRQ shares among supplying countries.

7.326. Accordingly, having found that the European Union was free to base its determinations under Article XXVIII:1 and Article XXVIII:2 on actual imports over the reference periods that it selected for that purpose (2003-2005 and 2006-2008), we cannot a priori exclude the possibility that the European Union might have been obligated to allocate the TRQ shares among supplying countries on the basis of a different reference period taking into account the particular legal standards that apply in the context of Article XIII:2(d). Specifically, we do not exclude a priori that a different reference period could be used for the different determinations, insofar as that conclusion would be warranted on the basis of the legal standard that applies under Article XIII:2(d).

7.327. We are presented with a number of arguments that are specific to the legal standards that apply under Article XIII:2, and in particular the notion of "special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product". Some of the arguments presented by the parties in relation to China's claims under Article XIII:2 reiterate arguments that were also advanced, and that we have already addressed, in the context of addressing China's claims under Article XXVIII:1 and Article XXVIII:2 and paragraph 6 of the Understanding. To avoid addressing the same arguments multiple times, our analysis of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) will focus on those arguments and interpretative elements that are specific to Article XIII:2, and that we have not already addressed in the context of our findings under Article XXVIII:1 and Article XXVIII:2.

7.328. China claims that where SPS import bans are imposed, the period of application of these import bans cannot be used as a previous "representative" period for the purpose of determining which Members have a "substantial interest" in supplying that product. In addition, China argues that "its reduced ability to export as a result of import bans due to SPS measures" was a "special factor that affected trade in the products" concerned, and that had to be taken into account by the European Union. With respect to both the First and Second Modification Packages, we understand China to claim that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) by not determining which Members held a substantial supplying interest on the basis of an estimate of the share of imports that China would have had in the absence of the SPS measures.

7.329. As we understand it, China's contention is that the European Union was obligated to estimate what other Members' poultry import shares into the European Union would be without any of the SPS measures on Chinese poultry imports, at a time when those SPS measures were still in force, and then determine that China held a "substantial interest" on the basis of that counterfactual estimate. We understand this contention to be distinct from China's additional claim, which we address in the next subsection, that the European Union was obligated to determine which Members held a substantial interest taking into account changes in import shares into the European Union in some poultry products after those SPS measures were relaxed in July 2008. We will analyse China's contention first in the light of the notion of a "previous representative period", and then in the light of the concept of "special factors".

7.330. We understand China's view to be that for a period to be "representative" within the meaning of Article XIII:2, the "period cannot be affected by an import ban". We agree with China that the European Union was obligated to base its determinations under Article XIII:2(d) on a "previous representative period". We also consider that the existence of one or more import restrictions during the reference period selected for the purpose of Article XIII:2(d) could, depending on the facts of a case, warrant the conclusion that the reference period selected might not be "representative". The GATT panel report in EEC – Apples 1 (Chile) supports this understanding. When considering the representative period for the imposition of quantitative restrictions, the years 1975, 1977 and 1978 were taken into account by the panel, while 1976 was

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470 China's first written submission, para. 252.
excluded because it was not "representative" as voluntary restraint agreements with the EEC were in effect at that time. In these circumstances, the panel stated:

Due to the existence of restrictions in 1976, the Panel held that that year could not be considered as representative, and that the year immediately preceding 1976 should be used instead. The Panel thus chose the years 1975, 1977 and 1978 as a "representative period".471

7.331. Likewise, we note that the panel in EC – Bananas III (Art. 21.5 – Ecuador) considered that a period during which some EC member States applied "import restrictions or prohibitions" could not serve as a previous representative period.472

7.332. However, we do not read either of these prior reports to say that the existence of any import restrictions during a previous period means that ipso facto, such a period cannot be "representative". Thus, we do not agree with the sweeping conclusion that for a period to be "representative" within the meaning of Article XIII:2, the "period cannot be affected by an import ban".473 Our reasons are as follows.

7.333. Firstly, it appears that the import restrictions in question in both of these previous cases may have included WTO-inconsistent measures. In this regard, we recall that in EEC – Apples (Chile I), the restrictions were described as "voluntary restraint agreements". In the present case, China is not challenging the consistency of the SPS measures with any provision of the covered agreements.474 Moreover, we have found that the SPS measures were not "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" within the meaning of paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1. Accordingly, the present case is one in which the import restrictions that were maintained during the reference periods must be presumed to be WTO-consistent. In our view, there is nothing unusual about Members maintaining measures that may, directly or indirectly, affect the importation of certain products. It follows, for the purpose of calling into question the representativeness of the period selected, that a relevant consideration would be whether those measures are WTO-consistent or not.

7.334. Secondly, if it were the case that the existence of any import restriction during a previous period meant that ipso facto such a period cannot be considered "representative" for the purpose of Article XIII:2, we would expect this limitation to be reflected in some way in the text of Article XIII:2, just as the concept of "discriminatory quantitative restrictions" is explicitly mentioned in the context of Article XXVIII. However, Article XIII:2(d) contains only a reference to a "previous representative period", with no such qualification. While the chapeau of Article XIII:2 refers to "the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions", when applied to a tariff rate quota, this means the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of the tariff rate quota. In other words, the chapeau refers to "such restrictions", and not to import restrictions in general.

7.335. Thirdly, whether the existence of certain import restrictions over a period means that the period is one that is not "representative" depends on the particular factual circumstances of a case. In the present case, it is not in dispute that all tariff items at issue were prohibited or restricted before and after the period 2002-2008, when importation of all Chinese poultry products was prohibited.475 It appears that EU imports from China under all of the tariff lines at issue had been at 0% or negligible levels over the 1999-2002 period, and that EU imports from China under a number of the tariff lines at issue were still prohibited as a consequence of the heat treatment measure, until 2015 at least.476 From this perspective, we are not persuaded by the argument that the existence of the SPS measures in place during the reference periods 2003-2005 and 2006-2008 means that these periods were, in the circumstances of this case, not "representative".

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471 Panel Report, EEC – Apples (Chile), para. 4.8.
473 China's first written submission, para. 252.
474 China's first written submission, para. 31. See also China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 5; China's second written submission, paras. 42, 46; China's response to Panel question No. 6, para. 23; China's response to Panel question No. 81, para. 43).
475 See section 7.2.3 above.
476 See the import statistics in section 7.2.4 above.
7.336. We turn now to the concept of "special factors". China contends that by using a reference period that was tainted by the existence of import prohibitions due to the SPS measures, the European Union did not base its determinations of which Members held a substantial supplying interest, or the TRQ allocation, taking due account of "special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product". According to China, the "special factor" in this regard was "the reduced ability to export as a result of import bans due to SPS measures".477

7.337. In this respect, we find it difficult to characterize the SPS measures as such as "special factors", insofar as they apply equally to imports from all Members in the same situation.478 As already noted, in our view, there is nothing unusual about Members applying WTO-consistent measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect the importation of certain products. It is not in dispute that "the reduced ability to export as a result of import bans due to SPS measures" was the result of the determination that Chinese poultry producers had not complied with the applicable SPS measures maintained by the European Union. We have some difficulty with the notion that a Member setting a TRQ would need to make allowance for import restrictions arising from foreign producers' non-compliance with applicable SPS measures.

7.338. In our view, the Ad Note to Article XIII:2(d) is relevant context to the interpretation of the concept of "special factors" in Article XIII:2. The Ad Note clarifies that:

No mention was made of "commercial considerations" as a rule for the allocation of quotas because it was considered that its application by governmental authorities might not always be practicable. Moreover, in cases where it is practicable, a Member could apply these considerations in the process of seeking agreement, consistently with the general rule laid down in the opening sentence of paragraph 2. (emphasis added)

7.339. The ordinary meaning of the word "practicable" is "[a]ble to be put into practice; able to be effect, accomplished or done; feasible".479 The Ad Note makes clear that in requiring that due account be taken of "special factors", but including no mention of "commercial considerations", the intention was to avoid establishing a rule for the allocation of quotas whose application "might not always be practicable". The Ad Note clarifies that commercial considerations could be applied "where it is practicable" in the process of seeking agreement. Likewise, Article XIII:2(d) provides that a Member seeking to allocate a TRQ among supplying countries may seek agreement with all Members holding a substantial supplying interest, but has the right to unilaterally allocate the TRQ among substantial suppliers in cases where allocation by agreement is not reasonably "practicable".

7.340. We consider that the Ad Note to Article XIII:2(d), and the text of that provision itself, convey that the rules governing the allocation of TRQs among supplying countries should not be interpreted in a manner that would establish requirements that governmental authorities cannot put into practice, or which are otherwise not feasible. This mirrors the objective, expressed in the text of paragraph 4 of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII:1, of ensuring that negotiations and agreement under Article XXVIII are not "unduly difficult" and that "complications in the application of this Article" are avoided.480

7.341. In our view, treating the SPS measures that were in place over the 2003-2005 and 2006-2008 periods as "special factors" would result in a rule for the allocation of the TRQs that is not practicable. The reason is that estimating what poultry imports would be without any of the SPS measures affecting Chinese poultry imports would be an extremely complex task involving the use of highly speculative estimates.481 Under such an approach, the European Union would have been obligated to take into account not only the range of SPS measures that applied to China and which are of concern to China (including the residues measure, the avian influenza measure, and

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477 China's response to Panel question No. 119, para. 108.
478 EU's first written submission, para. 232.
480 See the import statistics in section 7.2.4 above.
481 EU's first written submission, para. 131; EU's second written submission, para. 29
the heat treatment measure), but also the SPS measures applied to many other WTO Members and, more generally, for its entire sanitary regime applied to imports of poultry products.482

7.342. Furthermore, we note that imports of all of the poultry products under the First Modification Package were still prohibited at the time of the allocation of the TRQs among supplying countries, and it appears that imports of a majority of the products under the Second Modification Package remained prohibited at the time of the allocation as well.483 Therefore, accepting China's interpretation of Article XIII:2(d) would lead to the result that the European Union was obliged to recognize China as a substantial supplier of poultry products that China was prohibited from exporting to the European Union, obliging the European Union to seek agreement with China on the TRQ allocation in respect of such products, and ultimately allocating an unusable country-specific share of the TRQs for such products to China, reducing the size of the shares allocated to imports from other sources. Alternatively, the European Union would have been obliged to increase the amount of the "all others" share to reflect the amount that China would be able to export, if and when the import restrictions affecting poultry imports from China under those tariff lines were removed.

7.343. Based on the foregoing, we find that China has not demonstrated that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) by determining which countries had a substantial interest in supplying the products concerned on the basis of their actual share of imports into the European Union, rather than on the basis of an estimate of what import shares into the European Union would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China.

7.6.3.5 Whether the European Union was obliged to determine which Members were substantial suppliers taking into account changes in import shares following the initiation of the negotiations on TRQ allocation

7.344. With respect to the Second Modification Package, we understand China to claim that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) by not recognizing that China was a substantial supplier, and seeking an agreement with China on the TRQ allocation, on the basis of changes in import shares over the period 2009-2011.

7.345. We understand this second claim to rest on two different lines of argument. First, we understand China to argue that, as a general rule, Article XIII:2(d) requires that the determination of which Members hold a "substantial interest" must always be based on a reference period closely preceding the entry into force of the TRQ. Second, we understand China to argue that, in the particular circumstances of this case, China's increased ability to export after the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor" that had to be taken into account by the European Union when making its determination of which Members held a "substantial interest" in supplying the products at issue.

7.346. We consider that China's claims and the arguments of the parties raise several issues, which we will proceed to examine in turn. We will begin by examining whether, as a general rule, Article XIII:2(d) requires that the determination of which Members hold a substantial interest in supplying the products concerned must always be based on a period immediately preceding the entry into force of the TRQ in situations where, as in a case like the present one, there is a period of several years between the initiation of the negotiations with substantial suppliers aimed at allocating the TRQs, and the subsequent entry into force of the TRQ. If we conclude that there is no such rule requiring the use of the most recent three-year period prior to the entry into force of the TRQs, we will then consider whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, China's increased ability to export following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor" within the meaning of Article XIII:2. If we conclude that China's increased ability to export following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor", we will then proceed to examine whether the European Union was obligated to take into account the increased

482 EU's response to Panel question No. 74(a), para. 23. The European Union also stated in its response to Panel question No. 74, para. 29, that "if China's interpretation is followed, that type of estimate will be far more complicated and speculative, because of the very large number of factors that could have to be controlled for: not just for WTO inconsistent measures, but any SPS measure or any other regulatory requirements that may have the effect of restricting imports from certain countries".

483 After the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008, "uncooked" poultry products remained prohibited as a consequence of the heat treatment. See paragraphs 7.85 and 7.91-7.93.
imports of Chinese poultry products over the period 2009-2011 on its own initiative and in the absence of any related request by China until May 2012 and, on the basis of those increased imports, have recognized China as a substantial supplier in respect of any of the TRQs at issue in the Second Modification Package.

7.347. Beginning with the first issue, China submits that the European Union was required to base its determination under Article XIII:2(d) on a reference period preceding the entry into force of the TRQs, and in China's view that reference period was the period 2009-2011 for the Second Modification Package.\textsuperscript{484} China considers that the existence of a general rule requiring the use of the most recent data that becomes available in the course of the negotiations is supported by the chapeau of Article XIII:2, which requires that the allocation of a TRQ must aim at a distribution of trade in such product "approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of" the allocation. In China's view, the trade in the period immediately preceding the TRQ allocation provides an objective basis to measure the shares Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of the TRQ. China finds additional support for its interpretation of Article XIII:2 in the statement by the panel in US – Line Pipe that "trade flows before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for projecting what might have occurred in the absence of that measure."\textsuperscript{485} In addition, China notes that the GATT panel in EEC – Apples (Chile I) considered appropriate to use as a "representative period" a three-year period previous to 1979, "the year in which the EEC measures were in effect".\textsuperscript{486}

7.348. We recall that in the present case, in June 2009 the European Union notified Members of its intention to modify certain tariff concessions under Article XXVIII, accompanied by statistics on imports from other Members for the last three years (2006-2008) in accordance with the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII. Following the EU notification in 2009, Thailand and Brazil each claimed a principal or substantial supplying interest in the concessions at issue in the Second Modification Package. The European Union entered into negotiations with Brazil and Thailand, and following five rounds of negotiations, reached agreement with Thailand and Brazil on both the total amount of the TRQs, and the allocation of the TRQs among supplying countries. According to the European Union, negotiations at negotiators' level were concluded with Brazil and Thailand in September 2011.\textsuperscript{487} The draft agreements with Thailand and Brazil were initialled on 22 November 2011 and 7 December 2011, respectively. This was followed by approval of the bilateral agreements by each party in accordance with its internal procedures. The TRQs ultimately entered into force in March 2013. Thus, there was a period of several years in between the initiation of the negotiations with substantial suppliers in 2009, and the subsequent entry into force of the TRQs.

7.349. Beginning with the text of Article XIII:2(d), we consider that if the drafters intended for a general rule requiring the use of the most recent data that becomes available in the course of the negotiations to apply to the determination of which Members hold a "substantial interest", then a fortiori that same rule would also apply to the allocation of TRQs among substantial suppliers in cases falling under the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d). However, the second sentence of Article refers only to "a previous representative period", and does not specify that such period must precede the opening of the TRQs. In addition, the reference to "a" previous representative period in Article XIII:2(d) implies that there is no general rule that applies in all cases regarding the selection of the reference period.\textsuperscript{488} Furthermore, Article XIII:4 envisages the "the selection of..."
a representative period” being made “initially” by the importing Member, subject to reappraisal. The clear implication is that there is no general rule, applicable to all cases, regarding the reference period that must be used for the purpose of Article XIII:2(d).

7.350. Turning to the wider context of Article XIII, we recall that we have already found that a Member is entitled to base its determinations under Article XXVIII:1 and Article XXVIII:2 on a reference period covering the three years preceding the notification of the intention to modify concessions, and is under no obligation to update those determinations based on changes in import levels and shares that may occur in the course of negotiations. In our view, to read such a general requirement into Article XIII:2, as a general rule applicable in all cases, would be incoherent and impracticable. Furthermore, we consider that reading such a far-reaching rule into Article XIII:2 would potentially render the concept of “special factors” redundant. As we discuss further below, we consider that changes which may have occurred since the representative period may have to be taken into account in re-determining which Members hold a “substantial interest” under Article XIII:2(d), insofar as those changes qualify as “special factors which may have affected or may be affecting trade in the product concerned”.

7.351. In addition, we consider that there are other practical difficulties that would arise from mandating, as a general rule, the use of a reference period immediately preceding the opening of a TRQ for the purpose of re-determining which Members hold a "substantial interest” under Article XIII:2(d). In this regard, the European Union has elaborated on how there is necessarily a time-lag between the conclusion of the negotiations leading to bilateral agreements pursuant to Articles XXVIII and XIII:2(d), and the adoption of domestic legislation implementing those agreements. The European Union has explained how the approval of international agreements pursuant to Articles XXVIII and XIII in the context of EU law involves a rather complex process with different procedural stages, which usually takes more than one year.489 We consider that the determination of which Members are substantial suppliers could not be based on a reference period that is after the conclusion of the negotiations with the Members recognized as substantial suppliers, let alone after the approval of the agreements by those negotiating Members in accordance with their internal procedures.

7.352. Finally, we do not consider that China’s interpretation of Article XIII:2(d) finds support in the statement by the panel in US – Line Pipe that “trade flows before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for projecting what might have occurred in the absence of that measure”490, or with the fact that the GATT panel in EEC – Apples (Chile I) considered it appropriate to use as a "representative period" a three-year period previous to 1979, “the year in which the EEC measures were in effect”.491 In both of those cases, the TRQ was imposed unilaterally by the importing Member. Neither panel was confronted with a situation in which there was a time-lag of several years between the initiation of the negotiations with substantial suppliers aimed at allocating the TRQs, and the subsequent determination and entry into force of a TRQ.

7.353. For these reasons, we conclude that there is no general rule always requiring the use of the most recent three-year period prior to the entry into force of a TRQ to determine which Members hold a substantial supplying interest. We will now consider whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, China’s increased ability to export following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor" within the meaning of Article XIII:2. We will first set out our interpretation of the term "special factors", and then turn to the facts of this case.

7.354. Article XIII:2(d) refers to "special factors which may have affected or which may be affecting the trade in the product". Similar formulations are used in other provisions of the covered agreements.492 We consider that, in certain circumstances, consideration of “special factors” in the context of Article XIII:2(d) could require the Member allocating a TRQ among supplying countries to take into account changes in the import shares held by different Members which may have

489 EU’s response to Panel question No. 107(a).
491 Panel Report, EEC – Apples (Chile I), para. 4.8.
492 See footnote 459.
occurred between the end of the representative period selected and the time of the TRQ being allocated. In other words, while for the reasons set forth above we consider that there is no general requirement in Article XIII:2 to always use more recent data taking into account developments subsequent to the reference period to re-determine which Members hold a substantial interest in supplying the products at issue, we are of the view this may be required in particular circumstances insofar as such changes in import shares are linked to "special factors".

7.355. We consider that our understanding is supported by the ordinary meaning of the terms accompanying "special factors" in the text of Article XIII:2(d). In this connection, we recall that the text of Article XIII:2(d) refers to the proportions supplied by different countries during a "previous" representative period, with due account being taken of any special factors "which may have affected or may be affecting" the trade in the product. We consider that the reference to special factors including not only those which may have affected trade in the previous reference period, but also those which "may be affecting" trade, implies consideration of trade developments which may have occurred between the end of the representative period selected and the time of the TRQ being allocated.

7.356. We consider that this understanding is also consistent with the text of the Ad Note which clarifies that the term "special factors" includes "changes" in relative productive efficiency as between domestic and foreign producers, or as between different foreign producers, but not "changes" artificially brought about by means not permitted under the Agreement. We understand the basic thrust of this clarification to be that changes artificially brought about by certain forms of unfair trade, e.g. dumping or subsidization, should not be taken into account under the rubric of "special factors". In that respect, the Ad Note is not directly relevant to the circumstances in this case. However, the fact that "special factors" is explicitly linked in the Ad Note to "changes brought about" lends support to the view that an analysis of special factors is dynamic, and may entail consideration of developments that have taken place between the end of the reference period selected and the time of the TRQ being allocated.

7.357. This understanding is also consistent with the following Ad Note that accompanied the provisions of the Havana Charter corresponding to Article XIII:2(d):

The term "special factors" as used in [Article XIII:2(d)] includes among other factors the following changes, as between the various foreign producers, which may have occurred since the representative period:

(1) changes in relative productive efficiency;
(2) the existence of new or additional ability to export; and
(3) reduced ability to export.493 (emphasis added)

7.358. In addition to the clarification provided in this Ad Note, the Sub-Committee at the Havana Conference which considered the provisions of the Havana Charter corresponding to Articles XI and XIII of the General Agreement "agreed that it was desirable to make clear that, in cases where separate import quotas were allotted to the various foreign suppliers, a country whose productive efficiency or ability to export had increased relatively to other foreign suppliers since the representative period on which import quotas were based should receive a relatively larger import quota".494

7.359. Although the Ad Note that accompanied the provisions of the Havana Charter corresponding to Article XIII:2(d) was ultimately not included in the General Agreement, several panels have been guided by it when interpreting and applying the concept of "special factors" in Article XIII:2. In two cases, GATT panels found that the existence of a new or additional ability to export may constitute a "special factor" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d). In EEC – Apples (Chile I), the panel found that:

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494 Havana Reports, page 95, para. 52, cited in GATT Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice, at 403. (emphasis added)
Exports from Chile into the EEC had been expanding rapidly. Chile had more than doubled its share among Southern Hemisphere suppliers into the EEC market over a recent period, accounting for 5 per cent in 1974, 10 per cent in 1975, 13 per cent in 1976, 14 per cent in 1977 and 17 per cent in 1978. The Panel believed that Chile's increased export capacity should have been taken into account by the EEC in its allocation of shares among the Southern Hemisphere suppliers. The Panel felt such a consideration was in line with the interpretative note to the term "special factors" as drafted in the Havana Charter, in particular with reference to "the existence of new or additional ability to export" as between foreign producers.495

7.360. In EEC – Dessert Apples, the panel found that "the overall trend towards an increase in Chile's relative productive efficiency and export capacity had not been duly taken into account, nor had the temporary reduction in export capacity caused by the 1985 earthquake", and therefore "the Panel found that the account taken of special factors by the EEC in allocating Chile's quota share did not meet the requirements of Article XIII:2(d)".496

7.361. We consider that our understanding of "special factors" is also consistent with the immediate context, including the general rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2. In our view, taking due account of changes in the relative import shares held by Members which may have occurred between the end of the representative period and the time of the TRQ being allocated is consistent with the requirement in the chapeau of ensuring that TRQ allocations "aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of" the TRQ.

7.362. Finally, we have carefully considered the practical difficulties and complications that could arise from re-determining which Members hold a "substantial interest" for the purpose of Article XIII:2(d) on a different and more recent reference period and set of trade statistics from those used to determine the total amount of the TRQ, in a situation in which these matters are being negotiated concurrently. We do not consider that doing so in exceptional circumstances would be illogical, impossible, or impracticable. In this regard, we recall the Appellate Body's finding in EC – Bananas III (Art. 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Art. 21.5 – US) that, in principle, "the overall tariff quota quantity" and "the allocation of the quota shares among suppliers" are "elements that distinct and severable from one another".497

7.363. Based on the foregoing, we consider that consideration of "special factors which may have affected or which may be affecting the trade in the product" may include, in certain exceptional (i.e. "special") circumstances, changes in the import shares held by different Members that have occurred between the end of the representative period selected and the time of the TRQ being allocated.

7.364. Turning to the facts of the present case, we recall that the European Union determined which Members held a "substantial interest" under the Second Modification on the basis of their imports shares over the period 2006-2008. During that period, China held a 0% or negligible share of imports into the European Union for all of the products concerned.498 Following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008, it appears that imports of poultry products from China did not increase over the remaining half of 2008.499 However, over the period 2009-2011, imports from China increased significantly under several of the tariff lines at issue in the Second Modification Package, including in particular 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 (the latter being merged with 1602 39 40, at the beginning of 2012, into 1602 39 85). For ease of reference, the import statistics are set out below500:

495 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Apples (Chile I), para. 4.17 (citing Havana Charter Interpretative Note ad Article 22, paragraphs 2(d) and 4). (emphasis added)
498 See the import statistics in section 7.2.4 above.
499 See the import statistics in section 7.2.4 above.
500 See the import statistics in section 7.2.4 above.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tariff line</th>
<th>China's share of imports into the EU in 2006-2008</th>
<th>China's share of imports into the EU in 2009</th>
<th>China's share of imports into the EU in 2010</th>
<th>China's share of imports into the EU in 2011</th>
<th>TRQ allocation share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 11</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>Brazil: 97.89% Others: 2.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 30</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>Brazil: 78.92% Thailand: 17.56% Others: 3.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 90</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>Brazil: 10.3% Thailand: 73.3% Others: 16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 21</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>Thailand: 100% Others: 0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 29</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>Thailand: 98.4% Others: 1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 40</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>Thailand: 80.21% Others: 19.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 80</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
<td>Thailand: 82.76% Others: 17.24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.365. The word "special" means "[e]xceptional in quality or degree; unusual; out of the ordinary"\(^{501}\). The word "factor" refers to "[a] circumstance, fact, or influence which tends to produce a result"\(^{502}\). We consider that the increase in imports from China under the tariff lines 1602 32 29 and 1602 39 80 as set forth above is a development that falls within the ordinary meaning of an "unusual", or "out of the ordinary", "circumstance" or "fact".

7.366. The European Union argues that "special factors" alludes to "observable factual circumstances directly affecting the ability of one country to produce a given product and to compete with other suppliers"\(^{503}\). We consider that China's new ability to export after the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 also falls within that definition of a "special factor", as an "observable factual circumstance directly affecting the ability of one country to produce a given product and to compete with other suppliers". It was observable from the dramatic increase in imports into the European Union under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 (the latter merged with 1602 39 40, in 2012, into 1602 39 85) that occurred in the years immediately following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008.

7.367. In this case, we consider that the changes in the import shares held by different Members which occurred between the end of the representative period selected and the time of the TRQ shares being allocated, which were a consequence of China's increased ability to export certain poultry products into the European Union following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008, was a "special factor ... affecting trade in the product". We have agreed with the European Union that the SPS measures are not themselves "special factors", but we must distinguish the SPS measures per se from China's new ability to export after the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008.

7.368. In sum, we have concluded that there is no rule in Article XIII:2 requiring that the determination of which Members hold a substantial supplying interest always be based on a period

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\(^{503}\) See e.g. EU's response to Panel question No 117, para. 110. With respect to Article XIII:2, Canada likewise considers that "the operation of this Article is based on information that can be documented, i.e. it serves to adjust in light of observed developments, not hypothesized ones"(Canada's third-party written submission, para. 38).
immediately preceding the entry into force of the TRQ in situations where, as in a case like the present one, there is a period of several years between the initiation of the negotiations with substantial suppliers aimed at allocating the TRQs, and the subsequent determination of the TRQ allocation and entry into force of the TRQ. However, we have found that, in the particular circumstances of this case, China's increased ability to export poultry products under certain tariff lines following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d). Having concluded that China's increased ability to export following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor", we must now assess whether the foregoing establishes that the European Union was obligated to take into account the increased imports of Chinese poultry products over the period 2009-2011 and, on the basis of those increased imports, recognize China as having a substantial interest in supplying the products concerned in respect of any of the TRQs at issue in the Second Modification Package.

7.369. We have already identified a number of issues with respect to the trade statistics provided by the parties, and we therefore approach them with an appropriate degree of caution.\(^{504}\) However, it is clear that over the period 2009-2011, imports from China had increased significantly under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 (the latter being merged with 1602 39 40, at the beginning of 2012, into 1602 39 85). Imports from China under most of the other tariff lines in the Second Modification Package remained at zero or negligible levels, as some or all of these products were still restricted by the heat treatment measure in force. Accordingly, if the European Union was under an obligation to take into account the changes in import shares that occurred following the 2006-2008 reference period, we see no basis to find any violation of Article XIII:2(d) in respect of the TRQ for tariff lines 1602 32 11, 1602 32 30, 1602 32 90, or 1602 39 21. While imports from China under tariff line 1602 39 40 increased sharply in 2011, the increase only occurred in 2011. In our view, this distinguishes the increase in imports under tariff line 1602 39 40 from the steady and continuous increase in imports under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 over the period 2009-2011. As set out above, China's share of imports into the European Union under these two tariff lines increased steadily in 2009 (27.1% and 8.7%, respectively), 2010 (40.7% and 17.6%, respectively), and 2011 (52.8% and 61.1%, respectively).

7.370. If the European Union was under an obligation to take into account the changes in import shares that occurred following the 2006-2008 reference period on its own initiative and in the absence of any related request by China until May 2012, the issue that we will address below, we consider that the most recent data to be taken into account would have been from the data available to the European Union at the time that the negotiations with Thailand and Brazil were concluded. According to the European Union, negotiations at the negotiators' level were effectively concluded as of September 2011, and the draft agreements with Thailand and Brazil were initialled on 22 November 2011 and 7 December 2011, respectively. As China points out, the European Union did not notify the conclusion of the Article XXVIII negotiations until December 2012, after the bilateral agreements negotiated with Thailand and Brazil had been approved in accordance with each party's respective internal procedures. However, as noted above, the European Union has explained how under EU law the approval of international agreements pursuant to Articles XXVIII and XIII involves a rather complex process with different procedural stages, which usually takes more than one year. China has not contested that the negotiations at the negotiators' level were already concluded in September 2011, or that the draft agreements initialled before the end of 2011.\(^{505}\)

7.371. We understand that in September 2011, the European Union would have had available preliminary import data on imports into the European Union covering approximately the first half of 2011.\(^{506}\) Based on the trade statistics that were available to the European Union at that time, the change in the import trends under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 (the latter being merged with 1602 39 40, at the beginning of 2012, into 1602 39 85) would have already been apparent. While the parties have provided us with annual and not monthly import statistics, China's share of imports into the European Union in the year 2011 was 52.8% for 1602 39 29, and 61.1% for 1602 39 80. The trend over the period 2009-2011 was similar in respect of each of

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\(^{504}\) See the import statistics in section 7.2.4 above.

\(^{505}\) See footnote 128 above.

\(^{506}\) In its response to Panel question No. 107(c), the European Union explains that "preliminary" import data "becomes generally available with a three-month delay". Thus, we understand that as of September 2011, the European Union had preliminary import data on imports into the European Union covering approximately the first half of 2011.
these tariff lines. Based on the foregoing, we consider that had the European Union been obliged to take into account the trend of the increased imports from China as of at least September 2011, that increase in China's share of imports at that time would have required the European Union to recognize China as having a "substantial interest" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d) with respect to tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 (the latter being merged with 1602 39 40, at the beginning of 2012, into 1602 39 85) to reflect the increased imports from China.

7.372. Turning now to the question of whether the European Union was under a legal obligation to take into account the changes in import shares that occurred over the 2009-2011 period, we have already concluded that, in the particular circumstances of this case, China's increased ability to export poultry products under certain tariff lines following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor" within the meaning of Article XIII:2. An additional question that arises, however, is whether the European Union was under an obligation to take this change in import shares into account on its own initiative, in the course of the negotiations with Thailand and Brazil, and in the absence of any related request from China until May 2012.

7.373. We recall that China requested the European Union to enter into Article XXVIII negotiations in May 2012, claiming a principal supplying interest in all of the products at issue in the Second Modification Package. We recall that by May 2012, the two agreements with Thailand and Brazil had already been initialled, and the domestic legal procedure to authorize their implementation was already underway. The European Union has raised the issue of the timeliness of China's claims of a supplying interest in the context of responding to China's claims that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XXVIII:1. We have already concluded that for the purpose of assessing whether the European Union acted consistently with Article XXVIII:1, it is unnecessary for the Panel to rule on whether its decision not to recognize China as a Member holding a principal or substantial supplying interest was justified by the absence of a timely claim of supplying interest by China. However, the European Union has also raised the issue of the timeliness of China's claims of a principal or substantial supplying interest in the context of Article XIII:2. Specifically, the European Union argues that while the 90-day time-limit that applies for making a claim of supplying interest under Article XXVIII does "not apply to negotiations under Article XIII:2", that deadline "is but one expression of a generally applicable due process requirement". The European Union submits that "[o]nce a Member announces its intention to negotiate the opening of a TRQ, the Members claiming a SSI must have made known their claims within a reasonable period of time". The European Union indicates that this is "[a]ll the more so when such claims are not based on import data for a previous period but on other evidence not immediately available to the Member opening the TRQ". The European Union argues that in this case China failed to make its claims known within a reasonable period of time, and that the European Union "was not required to reopen the negotiations under Article XIII:2 (d) already concluded with Brazil and Thailand in order to take into account China's manifestly untimely claim".

7.374. In our view, the issue raised by the foregoing is whether the European Union was under an obligation to take into account the change in import shares that occurred over the 2009-2011 period on its own initiative in the course of its negotiations with Thailand and Brazil, in the absence of any related request from China being made prior to May 2012. We consider that the European Union was under such an obligation for the following reasons.

7.375. First, we are not persuaded by the European Union's suggestion that once a Member announces its intention to negotiate the opening of a TRQ, other Members could be understood as waiving a claim of substantial supplying interest for the purpose of Article XIII if they do not make known "their claims within a reasonable period of time". The European Union itself acknowledges that the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, including the 90-day time-limit mentioned in paragraph 4, do not apply to negotiations under Article XIII:2. There is no comparable provision in Article XIII:2(d) requiring a supplying Member to claim the status of a substantial supplier at all, let alone to make such a claim within any prescribed time-limit.

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507 See section 7.4.3.3 above.
508 EU's response to Panel question No. 69(b), para. 18.
509 EU's response to Panel question No. 69(b), para. 18.
510 EU's response to Panel question No. 69(b), para. 18.
511 EU's response to Panel question No. 69(b), para. 18.
512 EU's response to Panel question No. 69(b), para. 18.
513 EU's response to Panel question No. 69(b), para. 18.
Furthermore, in the circumstances of this case, the European Union's notification for the First Modification had put Members on notice that it intended to "replace with tariff rate quotas" the concessions at issue in the First Modification Package. However, in the notification of its intention to modify the concessions for the poultry products covered by the Second Modification Package, the European Union did not put Members on notice that it intended to "replace with tariff rate quotas" the concessions at issue. Thus, in the case of the Second Modification Package, nothing was disclosed to China as to whether the European Union would replace the concessions with TRQs, nor whether it would allocate TRQs among supplying countries, nor whether negotiations under Article XIII:2(d) would be conducted concomitantly with the negotiations under Article XXVIII. Moreover, given the requirement of secrecy that applies in Article XXVIII negotiations, the Panel does not consider that China was in a position of being aware of what stage of the EU's Article XXVIII negotiations were under way at any point in time prior to the notification of the conclusion of those negotiations in December 2012. Thus, China had no reason to claim substantial supplying interest status for the purpose of Article XIII:2(d) negotiations, nor to request any reappraisal of "special factors" by the European Union in the course of its ongoing negotiations with Thailand and Brazil.

7.376. Secondly, the concept of "special factors which may have affected or which may be affecting the trade in the product concerned" appears to be an inherently dynamic concept, and thus it is not clear why an importing Member's consideration of special factors would not be of an ongoing nature in the course of the negotiations. Furthermore, if the reference period and appraisal of special factors was appraised only at the point in time when the negotiations commenced, and thereafter fixed, there would, in the words of the European Union, "be very little to negotiate and agree about". Where a TRQ is allocated by agreement, the subject-matter of the negotiations leading to that agreement would include negotiations on the selection of a previous representative period, and the extent to which there were any special factors to be taken into account. Thus, it may be presumed that those matters may be subject to ongoing discussion and reappraisal in the course of the negotiations, rather than being settled and fixed from the outset.

7.377. Finally, in the present case, the "special factor" that we have found to exist was China's increased ability to export poultry products under certain tariff lines following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008. We recall that this manifested itself in a rapid and dramatic increase in Chinese poultry imports into the European Union under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 (the latter being merged with 1602 39 40, at the beginning of 2012, into 1602 39 85) as evidenced by the import shares set out further above. According to the European Union, negotiations at the negotiators' level concluded in September 2011; at that time, these developments in the preceding years cannot be regarded as a factual circumstance that the European Union would have been unaware of in the absence of any request for reappraisal by China.

7.378. Based on the foregoing, we find that China has demonstrated that the increase in EU imports from China over the period 2009-2011 following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor" that had to be taken into account by the European Union when determining which countries had a substantial interest in supplying the products concerned, and that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) by not recognizing China as a Member holding a "substantial interest in supplying the products" under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 and by failing to seek agreement with China on the allocation of the TRQs for those particular tariff lines. However, we find that the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) by failing to recognize China as holding a substantial interest in the other products concerned in the Second Modification Package (i.e. tariff lines 1602 32 11, 1602 32 30, 1602 32 90, 1602 39 21, and 1602 39 40).

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514 G/SECRET/25, p. 2 (Exhibit CHN-15).
515 See G/SECRET/32 (Exhibit CHN-25).
516 China's comments on the EU's response to Panel question No. 69(b), para. 12.
517 See paragraph 7.227.
518 China's comments on EU response to Panel question No. 69(b), para. 12.
519 EU's first written submission, para. 226.
520 Merged with tariff line 1602 39 40 into tariff line 1602 39 85, effective 1 January 2012.
521 Merged with tariff line 1602 39 80 into tariff line 1602 39 85, effective 1 January 2012.
7.7 Claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994

7.7.1 Introduction

7.379. China claims that by allocating "all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (i.e. Brazil and Thailand), the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2.522 The basis for China's claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 is that "even assuming that it was not a Member with a substantial supplying interest, the allocation of TRQ shares agreed with Thailand and Brazil does not comply with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIII:2 vis-à-vis other WTO Members, including China, that were not recognized as having a substantial interest in supplying the products concerned.

7.380. China argues that all of the determinations under Article XIII:2 must be based on a "previous representative period", taking due account of "special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product".524 These determinations include not only the allocation of TRQ shares vis-à-vis substantial suppliers under Article XIII:2(d) in accordance with the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d) and the determination of which Members are substantial suppliers under Article XIII:2(d), but also the allocation of TRQ shares vis-à-vis Members not recognized as having a substantial interest.525 In this case, China argues that the reference periods upon which the European Union made those determinations were not "representative"526 and that China's reduced ability to export as a result of import bans due to SPS measures, as well as the increased ability to export after the relaxation of the bans in July 2008, were "special factors" that had to be taken into account.527 With respect to both the First and Second Modification Packages, China claims that the European Union should have determined the TRQ shares allocated to "all others" based on an estimate of the share of imports that China would have had in the absence of the SPS measures that restricted Chinese poultry imports over the reference periods used.528 With respect to the Second Modification Package, China additionally claims that the European Union should have determined the TRQ shares allocated to "all others" taking into account the increase in poultry imports from China over the 2009-2011 period, which China considers to be the most recent three-year period preceding the determination of the TRQs.529 Finally, China claims that the European Union was in any event under an obligation to allocate an "all others" share of at least 10% for each of the TRQs under the First and Second Modification Packages, so as to enable at least one other Member to achieve a substantial interest in supplying the products.530

7.381. The European Union responds that China's claims rest on an incorrect interpretation of the obligations in Article XIII:2.531 We understand the European Union to accept that, although the general rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 does not explicitly require that "special factors" affecting non-substantial suppliers be taken into account, the chapeau of Article XIII:2 may be violated if a TRQ allocation disregards a "special factor" affecting one or more non-substantial suppliers, in a manner that was biased against non-substantial suppliers.532 However, the European Union considers that the SPS measures mentioned by China are not "special factors" within the meaning of Article XIII:2, and that it was therefore under no obligation to allocate a greater "all others" TRQ share on the basis of an estimate of what China's share of imports into

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522 China's first written submission, paras. 169-207; China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 85-103; China's responses to Panel question Nos. 41-43; China's second written submission, paras. 140-171; China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 66-75; parties' responses, and comments on one another’s responses, to Panel question Nos. 69, 72-74, 86-90, 106-109, 111-120.

523 China's second written submission, para. 144.

524 China's second written submission, para. 145.

525 China's first written submission, para. 171; China's second written submission, para. 141.

526 China's second written submission, para. 151.

527 China's first written submission, paras. 193-194. See also China's response to Panel question No. 119, para. 108.

528 China's first written submission, paras. 197, 199, 201; China's second written submission, paras. 147, 159-160.

529 China's first written submission, paras. 198; China's second written submission, para. 160.

530 China's first written submission, paras. 212-226.

531 EU's first written submission, paras. 210-237; EU's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 20-25; EU's responses to Panel question Nos. 39-40, 42, 44; EU's second written submission, paras. 114-152; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 63-96; parties' responses, and comments on one another’s responses, to Panel question Nos. 69, 72-74, 86-90, 106-109, 111-120.

532 EU's response to Panel question No. 118(b), para. 118.
the European Union would have been in the absence of the SPS measures. The European Union also rejects China's claim that in respect of the Second Modification Package, it was required to allocate TRQ shares based on more recent data regarding imports over the period 2009-2011. Finally, the European Union submits that there is no legal obligation in Article XIII:2 to always allocate an "all others" share of a minimum amount, independently from the import data over the reference period.

7.7.2 Relevant provisions

7.382. We recall that the chapeau of Article XIII:2 provides that:

In applying import restrictions to any product, Members shall aim at a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions and to this end shall observe the following provisions...

7.383. The chapeau states that Members "shall aim at a distribution of trade [...] approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions". The wording of the chapeau ("shall") suggests that it contains a binding obligation, and this is reinforced by the fact that the Ad Note to Article XIII:2(d) refers to the chapeau as containing a "general rule". In this case, the parties agree that the chapeau of Article XIII:2 imposes a mandatory legal obligation that must be respected when allocating a TRQ among supplying countries. In that sense, we understand the European Union to agree with China that the chapeau of Article XIII:2 "states a general rule capable of being violated separately from the provisions of Article XIII:2(d)".

7.384. We see no reason to disagree with the parties, taking into account that in several prior cases, panels or the Appellate Body have upheld claims of violation based on the chapeau of Article XIII:2. In US – Line Pipe, the panel found that the measure at issue was "not consistent with the general rule contained in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 because it has been applied without respecting traditional trade patterns". The panel stated that:

In our view, the chapeau of Article XIII:2 contains a general rule, and not merely a statement of principle. This is confirmed by the Note Ad Article XIII:2, which refers to "the general rule laid down in the opening sentence of paragraph 2".

7.385. This understanding is further confirmed by the Appellate Body's finding that Article XIII:2(d) is a permissive "safe harbour" only insofar "as substantial suppliers are concerned", and that a Member allocating shares to substantial suppliers in accordance with Article XIII:2(d) "must also respect the requirement in the chapeau of Article XIII:2". We understand this to mean that the general rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 contains a legal requirement relating to the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries that is capable of being violated separately from the provisions of Article XIII:2(d). We understand the parties to agree on this point as well. Specifically, the European Union agrees with China that, even where the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries has been agreed with the substantial suppliers in accordance with Article XIII:2(d), this does not necessarily mean that the TRQ

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533 EU's first written submission, para. 232; EU's second written submission, paras. 114-132.
534 EU's response to Panel question No. 106(a), para. 77; EU's response to Panel question No. 109(b), para. 90.
535 EU's first written submission, paras. 250-266; EU's second written submission, para. 141.
allocation complies with the general rule in the chapeau in respect of the non-substantial suppliers.541

7.7.3 Analysis by the Panel

7.386. Turning to the issues in dispute, we understand China's claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 to rest on three different grounds, raising the following issues. First, whether the European Union was obliged to determine the TRQ shares allocated to "all others" on the basis of an estimate of what import shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures. Second, whether the European Union was obliged to determine the TRQ shares allocated to "all others" taking into account changes in import shares that occurred in the course of the negotiations regarding the total amount of the TRQs and their allocation among supplying countries. Third, whether the European Union was under an obligation to allocate an "all others" share of at least 10% for each of the TRQs, so as to enable at least one other Member to achieve a substantial supplying interest.

7.387. We will examine these issues in turn. Before doing so, however, we will explain our approach to examining China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2, and then address the interpretative issue of the relevance of "special factors" in the determination of whether the allocation of the TRQ shares to "all others" complies with the general rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2. This interpretative issue relates to China's first and second claims of violation under the chapeau of Article XIII:2.

7.7.3.1 Separate analysis of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2

7.388. In this case, China has advanced one set of claims of violation under Article XIII:2(d), and another set of parallel claims of violation under the chapeau of Article XIII:2. As explained in the context of our evaluation of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d), these appear to be claims in the alternative, insofar as China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) are directed at establishing that it was a Member with a substantial supplying interest, whereas its claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 are "even assuming that it was not".542

7.389. In examining China's claims under Article XIII:2(d), we have already found that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) by refusing to recognize China as a Member holding a “substantial interest in supplying the products” under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 (the latter being merged with 1602 39 40, at the beginning of 2012, into 1602 39 85) and by failing to seek agreement with China on the allocation of the TRQ shares for those particular tariff lines. Given these findings, we recognize that it may not be strictly necessary for the Panel to proceed to assess China's alternative claims of violation under the chapeau of Article XIII:2, insofar as they rest on the same grounds.

7.390. However, it is well established that panels have the discretion to address arguments and make additional findings beyond those strictly necessary to resolve a particular claim or defence.543 These could include, for example, alternative findings that could serve to assist the

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541 EU's response to Panel question No. 39, para. 111; EU's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 68-69.
542 China's second written submission, para. 144.
543 The Appellate Body has confirmed that "[j]ust as a panel has the discretion to address only those claims which must be addressed in order to dispose of the matter at issue in a dispute, so too does a panel have the discretion to address only those arguments it deems necessary to resolve a particular claim" (Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, para. 135). (emphasis original) The logical corollary of this proposition is that a panel has the discretion based on the circumstances of each case to address certain claims and arguments even where it is not strictly necessary to do so to resolve the matter at issue. We observe that Article 11 of the DSU provides that a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, "and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements". While Article 11 does not specify what “such other findings” might include, the Appellate Body has confirmed that panels have the discretion to make alternative findings, including alternative factual findings (Appellate Body Reports, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 118; Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 126; China – Auto Parts, para. 208; US – Carbon Steel (India), para. 4.274; and India – Solar Cells, para. 5.152. See, e.g. Panel Reports, India – Patents (US), paras. 6.11-6.12 and 7.44-7.50; Canada – Dairy, para. 7.119; EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), paras. 6.234-6.246;
Appellate Body in completing the legal analysis should it disagree with legal interpretations
developed by a panel.\textsuperscript{544} A panel may be guided by a range of different considerations when
deciding whether to address arguments beyond those strictly necessary to resolve the matter,\textsuperscript{545}
and the manner in which a panel may do so, including the scope and nature of any such other
alternative findings, may also vary depending on the issues before the panel.\textsuperscript{546}

7.391. In this case, we consider it appropriate to make findings on all of China's claims under the
chapeau of Article XIII:2. In assessing China's claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2, we are
presented with some issues that we have not already addressed in the context of our examination
of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d). This includes, most notably, the relevance of the notion of
"special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product" in the
determination of whether the allocation of TRQ shares to "all others" complies with the general
rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2. However, some of the arguments presented by the parties in
relation to China's claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 reiterate arguments that were also
advanced, and that we have already addressed, in the context of China's claims under
Article XIII:2(d). To avoid addressing the same arguments multiple times, our analysis of China's
claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 will focus on those arguments and interpretative
elements that are specific to the chapeau of Article XIII:2, and that we have not already addressed
in the context of our findings, in the previous section of this Report, under Article XIII:2(d).

7.7.3.2 Relevance of "special factors" in the determination of whether the allocation of
TRQ shares to "all others" complies with the general rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2

7.392. We observe that reference to a "previous representative period" and "special factors" is
made only in the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d), in the context of the unilateral allocation of
TRQ shares among substantial suppliers. These terms are not referred to in the chapeau of
Article XIII:2, which refers in more general terms to an obligation to "aim at a distribution of trade
in such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be
expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions". The chapeau does not specify the criteria
by which one judges what shares the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence
of the TRQ,\textsuperscript{547} but the chapeau also states that "to this end" Members "shall observe the following
provisions" set forth in sub-paragraphs (a) through (d) of Article XIII:2. Thus, these provisions
must inform the interpretation of the chapeau.

7.393. The parties agree that a TRQ allocation agreed among substantial suppliers could
nonetheless be inconsistent with general rule in the chapeau vis-à-vis non-substantial suppliers, at
least insofar as a TRQ allocation was not based on actual import shares held by different countries
during a "previous representative period" and taking due account of "special factors", in such a
way that was biased against one or more non-substantial suppliers.\textsuperscript{548} China considers that these
legal criteria set forth explicitly in Article XIII:2(d) "form context for satisfying the chapeau of
Article XIII:2 as regards WTO Members that hold no substantial supplying interest".\textsuperscript{549} The
European Union considers that "to remain reasonable and fair the method agreed with the
substantial suppliers should also be applied to non-substantial suppliers and should be based on
objective and unbiased criteria", and that "a method that disregards special factors affecting any
of the suppliers of a given product would not be objective as it would be biased against the
suppliers affected by those factors and in favour of the others".\textsuperscript{550} On that basis, the European
Union accepts that although the chapeau of Article XIII:2 "does not require explicitly to take into
consideration special factors affecting non-SSI Members it would appear that if the TRQ is

\textsuperscript{544} See, e.g. Appellate Body Reports, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 118; US – Tuna II
\textsuperscript{545} See, e.g. Panel Reports, Canada – Dairy, para. 7.119, and China – Auto Parts, fn 641 to para. 7.371.
\textsuperscript{546} See, e.g. Panel Reports, US – COOL (Article 21.5 – Canada and Mexico), paras. 7.672.
\textsuperscript{548} China's first written submission, paras. 186-188; China's response to Panel question No. 41(a), para.
\textsuperscript{549} China's response to Panel question No. 41(a), para. 10.
\textsuperscript{550} EU's response to Panel question No. 118(a), paras. 115-116.
allocated on the basis of a method that disregards a special factor affecting one or more non-substantial suppliers, that method would not contribute to attain the objective of the chapeau". 551

7.394. We see no reason to disagree with the parties. Indeed, we consider that this interpretation is supported by the Appellate Body's clarification of the relationship between Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2. When allocating a TRQ among supplying countries, the amount of any "all others" share allocated to non-substantial suppliers will be the amount of the TRQ that has not been allocated among substantial suppliers. The Appellate Body has found that Article XIII:2(d) is a permissive "safe harbour" only insofar "as substantial suppliers are concerned", and that a Member allocating shares to substantial suppliers in accordance with Article XIII:2(d) "must also respect the requirement in the chapeau of Article XIII:2". 552 This supports the understanding that a TRQ allocation agreed among substantial suppliers could be inconsistent with the rights of non-substantial suppliers under the general rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 insofar as the basis for the allocation, as agreed by the substantial suppliers, was not based on a "previous representative period" or did not take due account "special factors", in a manner that was biased against one or more non-substantial suppliers.

7.395. In addition, without making express reference to any "special factors which may have affected or may be affecting trade in the product", we note that the panel in US – Line Pipe suggested that "changed circumstances" may need to be taken into account in the context of evaluating a TRQ allocation under the chapeau of Article XIII:2. The panel was of the view that:

"In our view, Korea is correct to argue that a Member would violate the general rule set forth in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 if it imposes safeguard measures without respecting traditional trade patterns (at least in the absence of any evidence indicating that the shares a Member might be expected to obtain in the future differ, as a result of changed circumstances, from its historical share). Trade flows before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for projecting what might have occurred in the absence of that measure." 553 (emphasis added)

7.396. Based on the foregoing, we consider that to comply with the obligation in the chapeau of Article XIII:2, "special factors which may have affected or may be affecting trade in the product" cannot be disregarded in the determination of the TRQ shares allocated to "all others" in a manner that would be biased against one or more non-substantial suppliers. We consider that this interpretation reflects a harmonious interpretation of the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and paragraph (d), and is in line with the Appellate Body's prior statements regarding their relationship. Under this interpretation, the general rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 serves to protect the rights and interests of Members that are not recognized as having a substantial supplying interest under Article XIII:2(d).

7.7.3.3 Whether the European Union was obliged to allocate a greater TRQ share to "all others" based on an estimate of what their import shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures

7.397. China claims that where SPS import bans are imposed, the period of application of these import bans cannot be used as a previous "representative" period for the purpose of the TRQ allocation. In addition, China argues that "its reduced ability to export as a result of import bans due to SPS measures" was a "special factor that affected trade in the products concerned", and that had to be taken into account by the European Union. With respect to both the First and Second Modification Packages, we understand China to claim that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2(d) by not allocating a greater "all others" share on the basis of an estimate of the share of imports that China would have had in the absence of the SPS measures.

7.398. In the context of examining China's parallel claim under Article XIII:2(d), we found that the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) by basing its determinations of which Members were substantial suppliers on their actual share of imports into the European

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551 EU's response to Panel question No. 118(b), para. 118.
Union, rather than on the basis of an estimate of the share of imports that China would have had in the absence of the SPS measures. We consider that our reasoning and conclusion applies mutatis mutandis to China's alternative claim under the chapeau of Article XIII:2.

7.399. Based on the foregoing, we find that China has not demonstrated that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by determining the TRQ shares allocated to "all others" on the basis of the actual share of imports into the European Union, rather than on the basis of an estimate of what import shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China.

7.7.3.4 Whether the European Union was obliged to allocate a greater TRQ share to "all others" taking into account changes in import shares following the initiation of the negotiations on TRQ share allocations

7.400. With respect to the Second Modification Package, we understand China to claim that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by not allocating a greater share of the TRQs to "all others" to take into account the increase in imports over the period 2009-2011 from countries that were not recognized as having a substantial interest (including, and largely accounted for by, China).

7.401. In the context of examining China's parallel claim under Article XIII:2(d), we found that the changes in the import shares held by different Members which occurred between the end of the representative period selected and the time of the TRQ being allocated, which were a consequence of China's increased ability to export certain poultry products into the European Union following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008, qualified as a "special factor ... affecting trade in the product" within the meaning of Article XIII:2(d). We further found that this special factor had to be taken into account for the purpose of determining which Members held a "substantial interest" for the purpose of the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d). We found that the European Union was obliged to take into account the trend of the increased imports from China, and the resulting change in import shares at the time negotiations with Brazil and Thailand concluded at negotiators level, in September 2011. In our view, those aspects of the Panel's reasoning in the context of Article XIII:2(d) apply mutatis mutandis to China's alternative claim under the chapeau of Article XIII:2, regarding the determination of the size of the "all others" shares for the TRQs.

7.402. The separate issue that arises in the context of examining China's claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 is whether the TRQ shares allocated to "all others" in the Second Modification Package reflects the data showing the trend of the increased imports from China, and the resulting change in import shares, that would have been available to the European Union in September 2011.

7.403. Based on the trade statistics provided by the parties, the actual share of imports into the European Union held by countries that were not allocated a country-specific share in the particular TRQ in question was the following:

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554 See the import statistics in section 7.2.4 above. In the case of tariff line 1602 32 11, "Others" includes all countries other than Brazil (the only country allocated a country-specific share in this TRQ). In the case of tariff lines 1602 32 30 and 1602 32 90, "Others" includes all countries other than Brazil and Thailand (both of which were allocated their own country-specific shares in these two TRQs). In the case of tariff lines 1602 39 21, 1602 39 29, 1602 39 40, and 1602 39 80, "Others" includes all countries other than Thailand (the only country allocated a country-specific share in these four TRQs).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tariff line</th>
<th>Share of imports by countries in the &quot;Others&quot; category into the EU in 2006-2008 (average)</th>
<th>Share of imports by countries in the &quot;Others&quot; category into the EU in 2009</th>
<th>Share of imports by countries in the &quot;Others&quot; category into the EU in 2010</th>
<th>Share of imports by countries in the &quot;Others&quot; category into the EU in 2011</th>
<th>TRQ share allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 11</td>
<td>2.83%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>Brazil: 97.89% Others: 2.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 30</td>
<td>0.76%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>Brazil: 78.92% Thailand: 17.56% Others: 3.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 90</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>Brazil: 10.3% Thailand: 73.3% Others: 16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 21</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>Thailand: 100% Others: 0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 29</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>Thailand: 98.4% Others: 1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 40</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>Thailand: 80.21% Others: 19.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 39 80</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>Thailand: 82.76% Others: 17.24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.404. We have already identified a number of issues with respect to the trade statistics provided by the parties, and we therefore approach them with an appropriate degree of caution. However, it is clear that over the period 2009-2011, imports from countries that were not allocated a country-specific share (including and largely accounted for by China) had increased significantly under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 (the latter being merged with 1602 39 40, at the beginning of 2012, into 1602 39 85). Imports from countries that were not allocated a country-specific share (including China) under most of the other tariff lines in the Second Modification Package remained at zero or negligible levels, as some or all of these products remained prohibited. Accordingly, as in the case of Article XIII:2(d), we see no basis for finding any violation of the chapeau of Article XIII:2 in respect of the TRQ for tariff lines 1602 32 11, 1602 32 30, 1602 32 90, or 1602 39 21. While imports from countries that were not allocated a country-specific share (including and largely accounted for by China) under tariff line 1602 39 40 increased as well, the increase only occurred in 2011. In our view, this distinguishes the increase in imports under tariff line 1602 39 40 from the steady and continuous increase in imports under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 over the period 2009-2011. As set out above, imports from countries that were not allocated a country-specific share (including and largely accounted for by China) into the European Union under these two tariff lines increased steadily in 2009 (27.2% and 11.3%, respectively), 2010 (42.8% and 21.2%, respectively), and 2011 (53.1% and 61.2%, respectively).

7.405. We recall our understanding that in September 2011, the European Union had preliminary import data on imports into the European Union covering approximately the first half of 2011. Based on the trade statistics that were available to the European Union as of that time, the change in the import trends under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 was already apparent. While the parties have provided us with annual and not monthly import statistics, the share of imports by countries in the "all others" category into the European Union in 2011 was 53.1% for 1602 39 29, and 61.2% for 1602 39 80.

7.406. Based on the foregoing, we find that China has demonstrated that the increase in imports from China over the period 2009-2011 following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor" that had to be taken into account by the European Union when determining

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555 See section 7.2.4 above.
the TRQ shares allocated to "all others", and that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by not allocating a greater "all others" share under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 (the latter tariff line was merged with tariff line 1602 39 40 into tariff line 1602 39 85, effective 1 January 2012).

7.7.3.5 Whether the European Union was under an obligation to allocate an "all others" share of at least 10% for each of the TRQs under the First and Second Modification Packages

7.407. We turn now to China's third claim under the chapeau of Article XIII:2, which rests on an additional, alternative line of argumentation from that which we have just considered. China interprets Article XIII:2 as requiring a Member imposing a TRQ to always allocate a share to "all others", independently from the factual situation considered, and without regard to the import data over the reference period.556 According to China, "the all others share should be at a level that allows at least one Member within that group to reach SSI status if its products are sufficiently competitive".557 China argues that because the European Union recognizes a country as a substantial supplier only if it accounts for 10% of imports in the product concerned, the European Union was accordingly required to allocate at least 10% of each TRQ to "all others".558

7.408. China claims that the TRQ for all other countries for several of the tariff headings concerned is below a share of 10%, and this is in violation of the general rule in the chapeau of Article XIII:2.559 We understand China's claims to include, in this regard, the six TRQs under the First and Second Modification Packages for which the "all others" share was less than 10%. These TRQs include 0210 9939 (0.31%), 1602 32 19 (4.56%), 1602 32 11 (2.11%), 1602 32 30 (3.51%), 1602 39 21 (0.0%), and 1602 39 29 (1.6%).

7.409. We begin our analysis with the text of the provision at issue. The chapeau of Article XIII:2 requires that the allocation of TRQ shares approach "as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions". We see nothing in the terms of the chapeau of Article XIII:2 establishing an obligation to allocate a minimum share to an "all others" category in a TRQ. To the contrary, establishing an "all others" share in a TRQ without regard to the actual import shares held over a previous representative period would be at odds with the general rule that TRQ shares should be allocated in a way that approaches "as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions". In this regard, we agree with the panel in US – Line Pipe that:

[A] Member would violate the general rule set forth in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 if it imposes safeguard measures without respecting traditional trade patterns (at least in the absence of any evidence indicating that the shares a Member might be expected to obtain in the future differ, as a result of changed circumstances, from its historical share). Trade flows before the imposition of a safeguard measure provide an objective, factual basis for projecting what might have occurred in the absence of that measure.560 (emphasis added)

7.410. Furthermore, we consider that an obligation to allocate a minimum share to "all others" irrespective of actual historical import levels would conflict with the obligation in the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d). This could have been the case if the European Union had, for example, allocated an "all others" share for tariff line 1602 39 21, in respect of which there have been no imports from any Member other than Thailand since 2001. The text of Article XIII:2(d), second sentence, mandates that when allocating TRQ shares in cases where it is not practicable to reach agreement with all substantial suppliers, the importing Member must allocate "the product shares based on the proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous representative period...".

556 China's second written submission, para. 146.
557 China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 65. See also China's response to Panel question No. 88, and China's response to the EU's question No. 3.
558 China's response to Panel question No. 71(c), para. 30.
559 China's first written submission, para. 216.
7.411. China relies on two statements made by the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US) in support of its contention that a Member allocating a TRQ among supplying countries must always allocate a share to the “all others” category large enough to enable at least one Member to achieve a substantial supplying interest. First, China refers to the Appellate Body’s statement that:

If a Member allocates quota shares to Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product, in accordance with Article XIII:2(d), it must also respect the requirement in the chapeau of Article XIII:2 - that distribution of trade approach as closely as possible the shares that Members may be expected to obtain in the absence of the restriction. This is usually done by allocating a share to a general "others" category for all suppliers other than Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product.561 (emphasis added)

7.412. We do not read the words "[t]his is usually done" in this passage to mean or imply that there is an obligation "to allocate always a share to 'all others' ... independently from the factual situation considered, and notably the import data over the reference period".562 It appears to us that when the Appellate Body stated that "allocating a share to a general 'others' category for all suppliers other than Members with a substantial interest" is what is "usually done", the Appellate Body was merely stating that when Members allocate TRQ shares to non-substantial suppliers, that is "usually done" through an "all others" share, as opposed to being done through individual, country-specific allocations for all other countries.

7.413. The underlying panel report in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) had explained this point as follows:

The general rule laid down in Article XIII:2 of GATT requires Members to "aim at a distribution of trade ... approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various Members might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions". To this end, where the option of allocating a tariff quota among supplying countries is chosen, Article XIII:2(d) provides that allocations of shares (i.e. country-specific allocations for substantial suppliers; and a global allotment in an "other" category for non-substantial suppliers unless country-specific allocations are allotted to each and every non-substantial supplier) should be based upon the proportions supplied during a previous representative period.563 (emphasis added)

7.414. This explanation by the panel in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) followed on from an earlier, and even more detailed explanation of the same point by the original panel in EC – Bananas III. That panel explained why it is more practicable to allocate a share to an "all others" category, rather than giving every country its own country-specific share corresponding to its historical import levels:

[I]f a Member wishes to allocate shares of a tariff quota to some suppliers without a substantial interest, then such shares must be allocated to all such suppliers. Otherwise, imports from Members would not be similarly restricted as required by Article XIII:1. As to the second point, in such a case it would be required to use the same method as was used to allocate the country-specific shares to the Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product, because otherwise the requirements of Article XIII:1 would also not be met.

The allocation of country-specific tariff quota shares to all supplying countries on the basis of the first method (agreement) may in practice be difficult since there will likely be demand for more than 100 per cent of the tariff quota and, furthermore, there would be no possibility to make provision for new suppliers. This would leave the second method as the only practical alternative - a result that, however, runs counter to the provision of Article XIII:2(d) to first seek agreement with all Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned.

562 China’s second written submission, para. 146.
The consequence of the foregoing analysis is that Members may be effectively required to use a general "others" category for all suppliers other than Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product.\footnote{Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador), paras. 7.73-7.75.} \footnote{Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 340.} \footnote{Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.92, cited in Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II); Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 427.}

7.415. In addition, we note that immediately after making the statement as to how the allocation of TRQs shares is "usually done", the Appellate Body proceeded to find a violation of Article XIII:2 in that case on the grounds that the TRQ at issue was not "based on the respective shares of the ACP and non-ACP supplier countries in the European Communities' banana market".\footnote{Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 427.} \footnote{China's first written submission, para. 209.} Thus, the Appellate Body found a violation based on the fact that the TRQ allocation did not reflect actual market shares. China has not identified any prior WTO panel or Appellate Body report that found a violation of Article XIII:2 based on a failure to set aside a minimum "all others" share, irrespective of actual imports shares held during the reference period.

7.416. China relies on a second statement from EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US) in support of its argument. In that case, the Appellate Body interpreted the terms of the EC Schedule and the Bananas Framework Agreement to mean that the TRQ allocation agreed in 1994 was set to expire in 2002, but not the concessions in the EU Schedule establishing the total amount of the TRQ. The Appellate Body observed that this reading of Section I-B of the European Communities' Schedule and, specifically, of paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement, was consistent with Article XIII:2(d) and Article XIII:4. In connection with Article XIII:4, the Appellate Body recalled the statement by the original panel in EC – Bananas III, that:

\begin{quote}
Although the EC reached an agreement with all Members who had a substantial interest in supplying the product at one point in time, under the consultation provisions of Article XIII:4, the EC would have to consider the interests of a new Member who had a substantial interest in supplying the product if that new Member requested it to do so. The provisions on consultations and adjustments in Article XIII:4 mean in any event that the [Bananas Framework Agreement] could not be invoked to justify a permanent allocation of tariff quota shares. \footnote{Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 427.} (emphasis added)
\end{quote}

The Appellate Body then stated that, in its view, paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement reflected the requirements of Article XIII:4.

7.417. China reads this passage from the Appellate Body to mean that Article XIII:4 prohibits a "permanent allocation of tariff quota shares", and therefore a TRQ allocation may not be "cast in stone, but must be a dynamic process based on market developments".\footnote{China's first written submission, para. 210.} China argues that this in turn means "that a country-specific TRQ may not lead to long-term freezing of the shares of imported products and cannot be applied in such a way as to create an artificial hurdle preventing the natural evolution of the import market structure".\footnote{China's first written submission, para. 212.} China argues that it follows from this that "the TRQs for other countries must be fixed at levels to allow a supplying WTO Member within the all other category to compete and increase its share so as to allow it to request consultations to recognize its SSI or PSI and obtain country-specific TRQs", and that in this way, "the TRQs will not lead to a long-term freeze of the import shares, as the shares of the suppliers will evolve in accordance with their comparative advantage".\footnote{Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.92, cited in Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II); Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 427.}

7.418. We consider that China reads too much into the statement that the provisions on consultations and adjustments in Article XIII:4 mean in any event "that the [Bananas Framework Agreement] could not be invoked to justify a permanent allocation of tariff quota shares".\footnote{Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Ecuador), para. 7.92, cited in Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II); Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para. 427.} Nowhere in the statements invoked by China did the panel or the Appellate Body mention or imply any obligation to reserve a share in the TRQ to "all other" suppliers to prevent a long-term freeze of the TRQ allocation. Furthermore, the statement was made in relation to Article XIII:4, and not...
the terms of Article XIII:2 on which China's claim of violation is based. To the extent that the Appellate Body was recognizing that the objective of preventing a long-term freeze of the TRQ allocation finds reflection in Article XIII:4, we do not see how this would justify reading into Article XIII:2 a requirement to allocate a minimum share of a TRQ to the "all others", regardless of actual import levels. As discussed at the outset, doing so would appear to violate the obligation that is expressly contained in the chapeau of Article XIII:2.

7.419. In addition, we do not consider that China has adequately responded to the European Union's point that allocating a 10% share to the "all others" category, so as to enable at least one other Member to achieve a substantial supplying interest, would not actually prevent a freezing of the TRQ allocation, but merely postpone that effect.\(^{571}\) As the European Union observes, the objective of preventing a long-term freeze of the allocation cannot necessarily be achieved by reserving a given share to "all others" in the TRQ, but may instead require other means, such as setting a time limit to the validity of the allocation (or a periodic review thereof).\(^{572}\) As we explained elsewhere in our Report\(^{573}\), China's response to this argument was to claim that the European Union violated Article XIII:1 and XIII:2 by failing to annually review and reallocate the TRQ shares based on the most recent trade developments.\(^{574}\)

7.420. Finally, in these proceedings China has suggested that the Panel should at least find an inconsistency with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 in respect of the one TRQ where there is a 0.0% "all others" share (tariff line 1602 39 21). However, we see no legal basis for drawing this distinction. Based on the trade data provided by the parties, it appears that there have been no imports of the poultry products under tariff line 1602 39 21 from any Member other than Thailand over the period 2006-2008, or from any other Member since 2001. Furthermore, leaving aside that there appears to be no legal basis for requiring a Member to allocate an all others share, it is not clear why a 0.0% share that reflects actual imports during the reference period should be treated differently from a 0.31% share (0210 99 39), or from a 1.6% share (1602 39 29), or from a 2.11% share (1602 32 11) that reflects actual imports during the reference period.

7.421. Based on the foregoing, we find that China has failed to demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by not allocating an "all others" share of at least 10% for all of the TRQs under the First and Second Modification Packages.

7.8 Claims under Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994

7.8.1 Introduction

7.422. China claims that the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (i.e. Brazil and Thailand) violates not only Article XIII:2, but also Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994. According to China, this is so because the importation of the like product from other WTO Members is not "similarly prohibited or restricted" as required by the terms of that provision.\(^{575}\)

7.423. China considers that like products are not "similarly prohibited or restricted" for the following reasons. First, because the TRQ for tariff line 1602 39 21 was allocated entirely to Thailand.\(^{576}\) Second, because for the other TRQs where the European Union has allocated a share to "all others", it did so in volumes and portions "that are so small as to allow no meaningful

\(^{571}\) We agree with the European Union that a non-substantial supplier could at a certain point capture the whole "all others" share, which would then lead to a permanent freeze in the TRQ allocation unless the "all others" share was a moving target and thus also the amount of the TRQ is a moving target (which would transform a TRQ in an open ended tariff concession) (EU's second written submission, para. 146).
\(^{572}\) EU's first written submission, paras. 262-263.
\(^{573}\) See paragraph 7.136. See also China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 102.
\(^{574}\) As explained in section 7.3.3.1 above, these claims are outside the Panel's terms of reference.
\(^{575}\) China's request for the establishment of a Panel, items II.A(iv) and II.B(iv). China's first written submission, paras. 151-168; China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 76-84; China's responses to Panel question Nos. 35-38; China's second written submission, paras. 122-139; China's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 56-65; parties' responses, and comments on one another's responses, to Panel question Nos. 60, 64-65, 87-88.
\(^{576}\) China's first written submission, paras. 158-159; China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 81; China's second written submission, paras. 129, 131-132.
access to or participation in the TRQs", rendering it significantly more difficult or impossible for the WTO Members concerned to obtain SSI status going forward. China submits that this "reinforces" the effect of the very small "all others" share. Third, China argues that like products are not similarly restricted on the basis that the European Union negotiated country-specific TRQ shares with Brazil and Thailand, but not for other WTO Members that were substantial suppliers, including China. Finally, China submits that where the restrictions in the form of TRQs are determined on the basis of a reference period tainted by SPS import bans that applied to only some WTO Members, this means that imports from all third countries are not "similarly restricted." According to China, "[t]he fact that Article XIII:2 regulates allocation of a TRQ does not in any way preclude Article XIII:1 from regulating allocation". In China's view, "the same measure, including those relating to the allocation of TRQs, could violate Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2, simultaneously".

7.424. The European Union responds that China's claims under Article XIII:1 are unfounded because Article XIII:1 generally does not deal with the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries. More precisely, the European Union considers that Article XIII:2 is lex specialis vis-à-vis Article XIII:1, in the sense that Article XIII:1 is applicable only "for aspects of the allocation of TRQs that are not covered by Article XIII:2", and only "to the extent that its application does not lead to results that would conflict with the outcome resulting from the application of Article XIII:2". In the European Union's view, Article XIII:1 requires that a TRQ be "applied on a product-wide basis and no Member is excluded from participation in the TRQ", but this "does not govern the level of access that each Member must have in a TRQ". The European Union observes that the TRQs at issue in this dispute "are defined only by reference to the tariff line, which in turns refers to the intrinsic characteristics of the products, such as percentage of meat contained in the product and whether or not the product is cooked".

7.8.2 Relevant legal provisions

7.425. Article XIII:1 reads as follows:

No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any Member on the importation of any product of the territory of any other Member or on the exportation of any product destined for the territory of any other Member, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted. (emphasis added)

7.8.3 Analysis by the Panel

7.426. China claims that the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (i.e. Brazil and Thailand) violates Article XIII:1 of the GATT 1994 because the...
importation of the like product from other WTO Members is not "similarly prohibited or restricted" as required by the terms of that provision. China's claim and the arguments of the parties raise the issue of the relationship between the obligations found in Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2, and in particular whether the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries is governed by the general non-discrimination obligation in Article XIII:1.

7.427. We note that the terms of Article XIII:1 could be read to mean that no tariff rate quota may be applied by any Member on the importation of any product of the territory of any other Member (e.g. poultry from China), unless the importation of the like product of all third countries (e.g. Brazil and Thailand) is "similarly restricted". However, Article XIII:1 does not provide any specific guidance on how to administer TRQs in a manner that avoids discrimination in the allocation of shares.

7.428. A TRQ will, by definition, comprise a two-tier tariff rate in which the in-quota tariff rate is lower than the out-of-quota tariff rate. In every case in which a TRQ is allocated among supplying countries, some Member(s) will be allocated a share of the TRQ that is larger than the share that is allocated to other Members. Taken together, this means that the Member(s) with the larger TRQ shares will be entitled to export the volumes set out in their country specific shares at the lower, in-quota tariff rate, as compared with other Members. That could be understood to mean that products from different Members are not "similarly restricted". When a TRQ is allocated in varying amounts among supplying countries, then each Member is not, and by definition cannot be, "similarly restricted" vis-à-vis any other Member that is allocated a greater or smaller share (or no share) of the TRQ.

7.429. Of course, it would follow from such an interpretation of Article XIII:1 that Members are legally prohibited, by the terms of Article XIII:1, from ever allocating a TRQ among supplying countries. This is because where a TRQ is allocated among supplying countries, the "similarly restricted" requirement of Article XIII:1 would never be met, insofar as that requirement is applied at the level of the amount of the shares allocated. It is axiomatic that the terms of Article XIII:1 cannot be read in isolation from Article XIII:2, which expressly authorizes a Member to allocate shares in a TRQ, in varying amounts, among different supplying countries.588 Therefore, we cannot interpret Article XIII:1 as prohibiting a Member from allocating shares in a TRQ in varying amounts among different supplying countries insofar as this would conflict with Article XIII:2.

7.430. Prior panel and Appellate Body Reports have, unsurprisingly, interpreted Article XIII:1 so as not to conflict with the obligations in Article XIII:2 relating to the allocation of TRQs. Notably, the panel in EC – Bananas III explained:

While the requirement of Article XIII:2(d) is not expressed as an exception to the requirements of Article XIII:1, it may be regarded, to the extent that its practical application is inconsistent with it, as lex specialis in respect of Members with a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned.589


Applying Article XIII:1 to a tariff quota requires that the word "restriction" be read as a reference to a tariff quota. Article XIII:1 is then rendered thus: no tariff quota shall be applied by a Member on the importation of any product of the territory of any other Member, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries is similarly made subject to the tariff quota. The application of the tariff quota is thus on a

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588 We recall that Article XIII:2(d) provides that the importing Member "may seek agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned"; and provides that, in cases in which this method is not reasonably practicable, the importing Member "shall allot to Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous representative period, of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product".

589 Panel Report, EC-Bananas III, para. 7.75.
The principle of non-discriminatory application captured by Article XIII:1 requires that, if a tariff quota is applied to one Member, it must be applied to all; and, consequently, the term "similarly restricted" means, in the case of tariff quotas, that imports of like products of all third countries must have access to, and be given an opportunity of, participation. If a Member is excluded from access to, and participation in, the tariff quota, then imports of like products from all third countries are not "similarly restricted".\(^{590}\) (emphasis added)

7.432. Thus, the Appellate Body did not read the "similarly restricted" requirement of Article XIII:1 as applying at the level of the amount of the TRQ shares allocated among supplying countries. Rather, the Appellate Body equated the term "restriction" in Article XIII:1 with the TRQ as a whole, rather than at the level of the individual shares allocated among supplying countries. The Appellate Body understood the obligation in Article XIII:1 to be that no tariff quota shall be applied by a Member on the importation of any product from some Members, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries is similarly "made subject to the tariff quota". Under this reading, a violation of Article XIII:1 would be established if the products from one Member are "made subject to the tariff quota", but the products of one or more other Members are not made subject to the tariff quota.

7.433. After clarifying how Article XIII:1 applies to TRQs, the Appellate Body then immediately turned to the subject-matter of Article XIII:2. The Appellate Body stated that:

Article XIII:2 regulates the distribution of the tariff quota among Members. The chapeau of Article XIII:2 requires that the tariff quota be distributed so as to serve the aim of a distribution of trade approaching as closely as possible the shares that various Members may be expected to obtain in the absence of the tariff quota. In this way, all Members producing the like product are afforded access to, and competitive opportunities under, the tariff quota in a manner that mimics their comparative advantage vis-à-vis other Members who would participate under the quota. Thus, while Article XIII:1 establishes a principle of non-discriminatory access to and participation in the overall tariff quota, the chapeau of Article XIII:2 stipulates a principle regarding the distribution of the tariff quota in the least trade-distorting manner. The provisions of Article XIII:2(a)-(d) are specific instances of authorized forms of allocation when a Member chooses to allocate shares of the tariff quota.\(^{591}\) (emphasis added)

7.434. In the present case, China has not alleged that Brazil or Thailand were not "made subject to the tariff quota". Nor has China alleged that the TRQ is applied other than "on a product-wide basis". China has not articulated what are the different elements of the TRQs, or their allocation, that China is challenging under Article XIII:1, separately from that which China has already challenged under Article XIII:2. Rather, China's claims under Article XIII:1 appear to be based on essentially the same elements as its claims regarding the TRQ allocation under the chapeau of Article XIII:2. All of China's argumentation under Article XIII:1 relates to the amount of the TRQ shares allocated to "all others", or to the allocation of country-specific shares only to Brazil and/or Thailand but not to China which claimed it was also a substantial supplier.

7.435. China did not expressly address the relationship between Article XIII:1 and XIII:2 in its first written submission. The Panel solicited China's views of the relationship between Article XIII:1 and XIII:2 with regard to the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries, with a view to understanding the difference between China's claims and arguments under Article XIII:1 and those China has advanced under Article XIII:2. China has stated that it disagrees with the European Union that Article XIII:2 is \textit{lex specialis} with respect to TRQ share allocation.\(^{592}\) However, in setting forth its views on how Article XIII:1 applies to the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries, China advanced an interpretation of Article XIII:1 under which this provision would seem to impose essentially the same rule that is already expressed in Article XIII:2 (including both

\(^{592}\) China's comments on the EU's response to Panel question No. 64(a).
In addition to the requirements that China sees as being common to both Article XIII:1 and Article XIII:2, China states that:

In addition, however, Article XIII:1 has a broader scope of application compared to Article XIII:2 inasmuch as it also provides that no conditions or formalities are established with regard to access to the tariff rate quotas that differentiate between WTO Members such that the importation from all WTO Members is not similarly restricted. Thus, as mentioned in Question 34(a) above that was addressed to the EU, China also believe that Article XIII:1 also requires similar treatment with respect to matters such as the product coverage of the tariff rate quotas, applying the same in-quota tariff rates, applying the same out-of-quota tariff rates or similarity in the procedures and formalities to access the tariff rate quotas.594

7.436. We have already addressed the substance of all of the arguments that China advances under Article XIII:1 in the context of addressing China's arguments regarding the allocation of the TRQs under Article XIII:2. As for the additional elements that China considers would fall within the broader scope of application of Article XIII:1, and which may not be subject to Article XIII:2, China has not alleged that there are any "conditions or formalities ...established with regard to access to the tariff rate quotas that differentiate between WTO Members", or that the TRQs at issue accord any dissimilar treatment "with respect to matters such as the product coverage of the tariff rate quotas, applying the same in-quota tariff rates, applying the same out-of-quota tariff rates or similarity in the procedures and formalities to access the tariff rate quotas".

7.437. Based on the foregoing, we find that China has failed to demonstrate that the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (i.e. Brazil and Thailand) violates the requirement, in Article XIII:1, that no tariff rate quota be applied by any Member on the importation of any product of the territory of any other Member unless the importation of the like product of all third countries is "similarly prohibited or restricted".

7.8.4 Conclusion

7.438. China claims that the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (i.e. Brazil and Thailand) violates not only Article XIII:2, but also the requirement in Article I:1 that any "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" granted to any Member be "accorded immediately and unconditionally" to the like product originating in any other Member.595 According to China, the first "advantage" or "favour" granted to products of Brazil and Thailand that is not "accorded immediately and unconditionally" to the like products from all other Members is the "disproportionate high allocation" of the share in the TRQs to Brazil and Thailand together with "the difference between the in-quota rates and the much higher out-of-quota rates".596 The second "advantage" or "favour" is the granting of "a country-specific volume of the tariff rate quotas" to Brazil and Thailand, whereas "[o]ther WTO Members with substantial supplying interests, such as China, have a volume of imports that cannot be predicted since it is in competition with imports originating in other countries".597 China states that its claims under Article I:1 are "independent legal claims", and "not a consequential claim that depends on the outcome of claims under Articles XIII or XXVIII".598

593 China's response to Panel question No. 35, paras. 155, 157. See also China's second written submission, paras. 127-128.
594 China's response to Panel question No. 35, para. 158.
595 China's first written submission, para. 280(16). The arguments in supports of China's claims under Article I:1 are found in China's first written submission, paras. 271-279; China's responses to Panel question Nos. 58-59; China's second written submission, paras. 202-208; parties' responses, and comments on one another's responses, to Panel question Nos. 60, 64.
596 China's second written submission, para. 207.
597 China's second written submission, para. 208.
598 China's first written submission, para. 275; see also China's response to Panel question No.59(b), and Panel question No. 59(c), para. 207; China's second written submission, para. 205.
7.439. The European Union responds that China’s claims under Article I:1 are unfounded because this provision does not govern the allocation of TRQs among supplying countries. 599 According to the European Union, Article I:1 would only be implicated insofar as a Member imposes differential in-quota duties on imports of like products from different supplier countries. 600 The European Union submits that if China’s claim were upheld, “it would mean that any time a Member allocates a TRQ (regardless of whether it has complied with Article XIII:2 or not) there would be a violation of Article I:1 because it would not grant immediately and unconditionally the same access to the TRQ to all other Members.” 601 The European Union does not consider the relationship between Article XIII:2 and Article I:1 to be one of *lex specialis* vs *lex generalis*, because the European Union considers that even in the absence of Article XIII:2, the terms of Article I:1 do not regulate the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries. 602

7.9.2 Relevant legal provisions

7.440. Article I of the GATT 1994 is entitled "Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment". Article I:1 states:

> With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any Member to any product originating in or destined for the territories of all other Members.

7.9.3 Analysis by the Panel

7.441. China claims that the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (i.e. Brazil and Thailand) violates the terms of Article I:1 because the TRQ allocation results in an "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" being accorded to Brazil and Thailand which is not accorded "immediately and unconditionally" to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other Members. China’s claim and the arguments of the parties raise the issue of the relationship between the obligations found in Article I:1 and Article XIII:2, and in particular whether the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries is governed by the general MFN obligation in Article I:1.

7.442. We note that the terms of Article I:1 require that, with respect to the tariffs applied to poultry products ("customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation"), any "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" granted by the European Union to any poultry product originating in Brazil or Thailand must "be accorded immediately and unconditionally" to the like poultry product originating in or destined for the territories of all other Members. China’s claim and the arguments of the parties raise the issue of the relationship between the obligations found in Article I:1 and Article XIII:2, and in particular whether the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries is governed by the general MFN obligation in Article I:1.

7.443. A TRQ will, by definition, comprise a two-tier tariff rate in which the in-quota tariff rate is lower than the out-of-quota tariff rate. In every case in which a TRQ is allocated among supplying countries, some Member(s) will be allocated a share of the TRQ that is larger than the share that is allocated to other Members. Taken together, this means that the Member(s) with the larger TRQ

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599 EU’s first written submission, paras. 302-308; EU’s opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 6; EU’s second written submission, paras. 189-195; EU’s opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 107; parties’ responses, and comments on one another’s responses, to Nos. 60, 64.

600 EU’s first written submission, para. 306; EU’s second written submission, paras. 190, 194. The European Union submits that Article XIII:1 “does not necessarily require that the same in-quota tariff rates applies to all Members as that matter is already regulated by Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. It would make little sense to hold that two provisions of the same agreement impose the same identical obligation, because that would imply that one of those provisions is redundant” (EU’s response to Panel question No. 32 para. 97).

601 EU’s first written submission para. 308.

602 EU’s response to Panel question No. 64(a), paras. 8-9, 12.

shares will be entitled to export the volumes set out in their country specific shares at the lower,
in-quota tariff rate, as compared with other Members. That could be understood to constitute an
"advantage" or "favour" with respect to "customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation". When a TRQ is allocated in varying amounts among supplying
countries, then such "advantage" or "favour" is not, and by definition cannot, be "accorded
immediately and unconditionally" to any other Member that is allocated a smaller share (or no
share) of the TRQ.

7.444. Of course, it would follow from such an interpretation of Article I:1 that Members are
legally prohibited, by the terms of Article I:1, from ever allocating a TRQ among supplying
countries. This is because where a TRQ is allocated among supplying countries, the advantages
granted to those who receive the largest TRQ shares would not be accorded "immediately and
unconditionally" to all other Members. Likewise, it is axiomatic that the terms of Article I:1 cannot be
read in isolation from Article XIII:2, which expressly authorizes a Member to allocate shares in a
TRQ, in varying amounts, among different supplying countries. Therefore, to interpret Article I:1 as
prohibiting a Member from allocating shares in a TRQ in varying amounts among different
supplying countries would conflict with Article XIII:2.

7.445. Prior panel and Appellate Body Reports have, unsurprisingly, interpreted Article I:1 so as
not to conflict with the obligations in Article XIII:2 specifically relating to the allocation of TRQs.
The panel in EEC – Apples (Chile I) considered it "more appropriate to examine the matter in the
context of Article XIII which deals with the non-discriminatory administration of quantitative
restrictions rather than Article I:1". Likewise, the panel in EEC – Dessert Apples also "considered
it more appropriate to examine the consistency of the EEC measures with the most-favoured-
nation principles of the General Agreement in the context of Article XIII", as "[t]his provision deals
with the non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions and is thus the iex specialis
in this particular case". In EC – Bananas III, the panel found that "it is more appropriate to
consider these issues under Article XIII because that is the more specific provision", and
accordingly made "no finding on the compatibility of the EC’s tariff quota share allocations and BFA
reallocations rules with Article I:1".

7.446. In EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), the
Appellate Body sought to delineate the scope of Article I:1 from the scope of Article XIII, indicating
that they are "distinct" and that the two provisions may apply to "different elements" of a measure
or import regime. The Appellate Body stated:

We consider that the notion of "non-discrimination" in the application of tariffs under
Article I:1 and the notion of non-discriminatory application of a "prohibition or
restriction" under Article XIII are distinct, and that Article XIII ensures that a Member
applying a restriction or prohibition does not discriminate among all other Members.
Article I:1, which applies to tariffs, and Article XIII:1, which applies to quantitative
restrictions and tariff quotas, may apply to different elements of a measure or import
regime. Article XIII adapts the MFN-treatment principle to specific types of measures,
that is, quantitative restrictions, and, by virtue of Article XIII:5, tariff quotas. Tariff

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604 EU's first written submission para. 308.
605 We recall that Article XIII:2(d) provides that the importing Member "may seek agreement with
respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other Members having a substantial interest in
supplying the product concerned"; and provides that, in cases in which this method is not reasonably
practicable, the importing Member "shall allot to Members having a substantial interest in supplying the
product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous representative period,
of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due account being taken of any special factors which
may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product".
606 GATT Panel Report, EEC – Apples (Chile I), para. 4.1.
608 Panel Report, EC – Bananas III (Guatemala / Honduras), paras. 7.129-7.130. In EC – Bananas III,
the Appellate Body stated, in the context of a different issue, that "although Articles I and XIII of the GATT 1994
are both non-discrimination provisions, their relationship is not such" that a waiver from the obligations under
Article I implies a waiver from the obligations under Article XIII (Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para.
183). Apart from indicating that the relationship between these two provisions is such that a waiver of the
obligation under the former does not imply a waiver of the obligations under the latter, the Appellate Body did
not further elaborate on the different scope and subject-matter of these two provisions.
609 Appellate Body Reports, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5
– US), para. 343.
quotas must comply with the requirements of both Article I:1 and Article XIII of the GATT 1994. This, in our view, does not make Article XIII redundant in respect of tariff quotas: if a Member imposes differential in-quota duties on imports of like products from different supplier countries under a tariff quota, Article I:1 would be implicated; if that Member fails to give access to or allocate tariff quota shares on a non-discriminatory basis among supplier countries, the requirements of Articles XIII:1 and XIII:2 would apply. In the absence of Article XIII, Article I would not provide specific guidance on how to administer tariff quotas in a manner that avoids discrimination in the allocation of shares.610 (emphasis added)

7.447. In the present case, China has not alleged that the TRQs impose "differential in-quota duties on imports of like products from different supplier countries under a tariff quota". Nor has China articulated what are the "different elements" of the TRQs or their allocation that is being challenged under Article I:1, as opposed to Article XIII. Rather, China's claim under Article I:1 appears to be based on essentially the same elements as its claims regarding the TRQ allocation under Article XIII:2, simply articulated in a more general way.

7.448. First, China asserts that the TRQ allocation to Brazil and Thailand is "disproportionate". However, China does not articulate the basis upon which this "disproportionate" standard is to be assessed. Given that China argues that its claims under Article I:1 are "independent legal claims" that are "not a consequential claim that depends on the outcome of claims under Articles XIII or XXVIII"611, it might be surmised that in China's view, whether a TRQ allocation is "disproportionate" under Article I:1 is to be assessed on a basis that is different from the TRQ allocation rules set forth in Article XIII:2. However, China has not elaborated its argument beyond stating that the TRQ allocation is "disproportionate". We see no basis in the text of Article I:1 for applying a stand-alone "disproportionate" standard to assess the GATT-consistency of the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries. Moreover, to read such a standard into Article I:1 would mean that there are different and potentially conflicting requirements under Article I:1 and Article XIII governing the allocation of TRQs among supplying countries.

7.449. In the context of its argumentation under Article I:1, China also notes that Brazil and Thailand are granted a country-specific volume of the tariff rate quotas, with a volume that is transparent, predictable, and free from competition from other supplying countries, while other substantial suppliers such as China are not.612 However, as the European Union has observed, these "are inherent features of any share allocated to any substantial supplier pursuant to Article XIII:2(d)".613 Thus, to find a violation of Article I:1 on that basis would again require interpreting Article I:1 to mean that Members are legally prohibited, by the terms of Article I:1, from allocating a TRQ among supplying countries.

7.450. The Appellate Body has clarified that Article I and XIII may apply to "different elements" of a measure or import regime614, and we do not exclude, a priori, that certain elements relating to the allocation of a TRQ among supplying countries could potentially fall within the scope of the general MFN obligation in Article I:1. However, in the present case, China has not identified any elements of the TRQ allocation that fall within the scope of Article I:1.615

7.9.4 Conclusion

7.451. Based on the foregoing, we find that China has failed to demonstrate that the "allocation of all or the vast majority of the TRQs to two of the WTO Members" (i.e. Brazil and Thailand) violates the requirement in Article I:1 that any "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity" granted to any Member be "accorded immediately and unconditionally" to the like product originating in any other Member.

611 China's first written submission, para. 275; see also China's response to Panel question No.59(b), and Panel question No. 59(c), para. 207; China's second written submission, para. 205.
612 China's second written submission, para. 208.
613 EU's second written submission, para. 193.
615 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 140. (emphasis original, footnotes omitted)
7.10 Claims under Article XIII:4 of the GATT 1994

7.10.1 Introduction

7.452. China claims that the European Union violated Article XIII:4 of the GATT 1994 by refusing to enter into "meaningful consultations" with China. We understand China to acknowledge that, following its request for consultations under Article XIII:4, the parties did in fact hold consultations on 19 May 2014. However, China claims that these were not "meaningful consultations", on the grounds that the European Union "stated that Article XIII did not apply and failed to reappraise the quota allocation to account for the SPS measures". China disagrees with the European Union's position that Article XIII:4 only establishes a "procedural obligation" to consult, and argues that "consultations followed by no adjustment when the conditions for an adjustment are met, would mean that the consultations under Article XIII:4 are a dead letter". China considers that it made a duly justified claim of substantial supplying interest pursuant to Article XIII:4, and that Article XIII:4 applies when the allocation among substantial suppliers is based on either the first or second sentences of Article XIII:2(d).

7.453. The European Union responds that there is no violation of Article XIII:4 because it discharged any obligation that it had to consult with China by meeting with China on 19 May 2014. In this regard, the European Union submits that Article XIII:4 only sets out a "procedural obligation" to consult, and that "it is not required to adjust the allocation of the TRQ in response to the requests from a Member having a SSI". The European Union additionally argues that China did not make a duly justified claim of substantial supplying interest when it requested consultations pursuant to Article XIII:4, and that Article XIII:4 only applies when the allocation among substantial suppliers is done unilaterally pursuant to the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d).

7.10.2 Relevant legal provisions

7.454. Article XIII:4 reads as follows:

4. With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of this Article or under paragraph 2 (c) of Article XI, the selection of a representative period for any product and the appraisal of any special factors affecting the trade in the product shall be made initially by the Member applying the restriction; Provided that such Member shall, upon the request of any other Member having a substantial interest in supplying that product or upon the request of [the CONTRACTING PARTIES], consult promptly with the other Member or [the CONTRACTING PARTIES] regarding the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions, formalities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization.

7.455. Article XIII:4 refers explicitly to the request of "any other Member having a substantial interest in supplying that product". The parties agree that a WTO Member may, but is not required, to consult under Article XIII:4 with a Member that does not hold a substantial interest.
7.10.3 Analysis by the Panel

7.456. It is not in dispute that China sent a letter to the European Union on 19 December 2013 requesting to "enter into consultations with the European Union in accordance with Article XIII:4". It is also not in dispute that a meeting was subsequently held between China and the European Union pursuant to that request on 19 May 2014. We understand that the European Union refused to recognize that China had the requisite substantial supplying interest status to invoke Article XIII:4, and the European Union made no adjustment to the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries following this meeting.

7.457. We consider that China's claims under Article XIII:4 raise a number of disputed issues. First, whether the obligation in Article XIII:4 is applicable to cases where the shares of a TRQ are allocated among supplying countries by agreement with substantial suppliers pursuant to the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d). Second, whether China was a Member having a substantial interest in supplying that product, and thus entitled to invoke Article XIII:4, at the time that it requested consultations pursuant to Article XIII:4. Third, whether Article XIII:4 establishes a legal obligation on the importing Member to reallocate TRQ shares among supplying countries to reflect an updated reference period or a reappraisal of special factors, as China contends, or merely a procedural obligation to consult as the European Union argues. Fourth, whether the European Union refused to consult with China in the sense of refusing to meet with China to consider the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved. We will address these issues in turn.

7.10.3.1 Whether Article XIII:4 applies in cases where TRQ shares are allocated among supplying countries by agreement with substantial suppliers pursuant to Article XIII:2(d) first sentence

7.458. We understand the European Union to argue that the obligation to consult provided for in Article XIII:4 only applies when the TRQ shares are allocated unilaterally pursuant to the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d), and that in cases where a Member allocating the shares of a TRQ has reached an agreement with all Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product under the terms of the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d), there is no obligation to enter into consultations pursuant to Article XIII:4.

7.459. The scope of Article XIII:4 is set out in its introductory sentence, which states that it applies "[w]ith regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2(d) of this Article…". Paragraph 2(d) applies "in cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries". The text of Article XIII:4 does not distinguish between allocation by agreement under the first sentence of paragraph 2(d), and unilateral allocation under the second sentence of paragraph 2(d). Rather, it refers generally to restrictions imposed pursuant to paragraph 2(d). We believe that more precise language would have been needed to exclude from the scope of application of Article XIII:4 the situation where a Member allocates the shares of a TRQ based on agreements reached pursuant to Article XIII:2, first sentence.

7.460. The European Union argues that its interpretation of the scope of Article XIII:4 is supported by the phrase "established unilaterally" appearing in the last sentence of Article XIII:4, which, according to the European Union, refers back only to the unilateral allocation of the shares under the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d). We observe that the phrase "established unilaterally" in Article XIII:4 appears in the phrase providing for consultations regarding "the elimination of conditions, formalities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization". We note that this phrase is in part linked to the last sentence of Article XIII:2(d), which provides that:

No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which would prevent any Member from utilizing fully the share of any such total quantity or value which has been allotted to

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625 See paragraph 7.81.
626 EU's response to Panel question No. 124(b)(i), paras. 131-132.
627 See China's comment on the EU's response to Panel question No. 127, para. 82.
it, subject to importation being made within any prescribed period to which the quota may relate.

7.461. The phrase "established unilaterally" in Article XIII:4 is not specifically linked to the allocation of shares among different supplying countries as provided under the first or the second sentence of Article XIII:2. We also note that the word "unilateral" does not appear in the text of the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d). Contrary to what the European Union argues, we do not consider that the phrase "established unilaterally" qualifies all the matters which can be the object of the consultations provided for in Article XIII:4, on the grounds that it is placed at the end of the list of matters that are subject to consultations as specified in Article XIII:4. Rather, we read this language as relating more to the conditions or formalities regarding the utilization of the quota as per the terms of the third sentence of Article XIII:2(d).

7.462. Continuing with our textual analysis of Article XIII:4, we note that it provides for consultations regarding the need for an adjustment to the reference period selected (i.e. the "base period"), or the reappraisal of special factors. The European Union observes that reference to a "representative period" and "special factors" is explicitly made only in the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d). We agree that, if the subject-matter of the consultations provided for in Article XIII:4 were clearly confined to matters that only arise in cases of unilateral allocation of TRQ shares under the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d), then it may follow, by necessary implication, that the scope of the obligation to enter into consultations would not extend to cases where TRQ shares are allocated by agreement. However, the European Union itself acknowledges that consideration of "special factors" is also relevant in the context of allocating the shares of a TRQ by agreement pursuant to the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d). We have found that due account must be taken of a previous representative period and special factors in the context of allocating the shares of a TRQ by agreement with substantial suppliers, and also in determining which Members are substantial suppliers, in the context of the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d). Therefore, we are not persuaded that consideration of the subject-matter of the consultations under Article XIII:4 gives rise to the necessary implication that the scope of the obligation to enter into consultations extends only to cases where shares of a TRQ are allocated unilaterally pursuant to the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d).

7.463. We further note that the narrow interpretation of Article XIII:4 proposed by the European Union has been previously rejected by the panel in EC – Bananas III. In that case, the shares of a TRQ had been allocated by agreement with all the Members which held a substantial interest in supplying the product in question. The panel stated that:

While the provisions of Article XIII:4 on consultations and adjustments seem to be primarily aimed at adjustments to quota shares allocated pursuant to Article XIII:2(d), second sentence, they also apply in the case where agreements were reached pursuant to Article XIII:2(d), first sentence, with Members having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned. In addition, in so far as a new Member has a substantial interest in supplying that product, its share of the "others" category can be viewed, for purposes of Article XIII:4, as a provision established unilaterally relating to the allocation of an adequate quota. (emphasis added)

7.464. This finding supports our understanding that there is nothing in the language of Article XIII:4 to suggest that its scope of application is confined to the allocation of TRQ shares under the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d). For these reasons, we find that the right to request consultations under Article XIII:4 is available to Members holding a substantial supplying interest in cases in which the allocation of TRQ shares among supplying countries is agreed pursuant to the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d), and not only in those cases in which the TRQ shares are allocated unilaterally pursuant to the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d).

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628 EU's response to Panel question No. 124(b)(i), para. 132.
629 EU's response to Panel question No. 124(b)(i), para. 132.
630 See paragraph 7.393.
631 See paragraphs 7.392 to 7.396.
632 See paragraphs 7.316 to 7.322.
7.10.3.2 Whether China had a substantial interest in supplying the products concerned at the time of its request under Article XIII:4

7.465. Article XIII:4 provides that a Member allocating TRQ shares among supplying countries pursuant to Article XIII:2(d) shall consult with any other Member having a substantial interest in supplying the product (or the WTO Members acting jointly) upon request. We recall that China sent a letter to the European Union on 19 December 2013 to request consultations under Article XIII:4. In its letter, China stated that it was a Member with a substantial supplying interest in several of the tariff lines covered by the Second Modification Package, “as evidenced by the statistics of imports of the European Union from China in the most recent years prior to the adoption of the new tariff regime.” On 21 February 2014, the European Union responded by informing China that it did not meet the conditions to participate in the relevant negotiations. The European Union has confirmed in these proceedings that at the time of China's request for consultations under Article XIII:4, China did not have the substantial supplying interest necessary to request consultations under Article XIII:4.

7.466. The parties have provided the Panel with import statistics for the period 1996-2015. We recall that China's shares of imports into the European Union of the poultry products covered by the Second Modification Package for years 2009-2015 were as follows:

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<tr>
<td>1602 32 11</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1602 32 30</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1602 32 90</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1602 39 21</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1602 39 29</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>59.0%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1602 39 40</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1602 39 80</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1602 39 85</td>
<td>(3.9%)</td>
<td>(8.3%)</td>
<td>(52.8%)</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
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7.467. We note from these statistics that when China requested consultations on 19 December 2013, China held significant import shares in tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 (58.4% and 81.7% for the year 2013, respectively). We also note that imports from China into the European Union under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 already accounted for more than 50% of imports of those poultry products by 2011 and continued to account for more than 50% of imports in 2012 (62.0% and 82.5%, respectively). Based on the import data submitted by the parties, China held an average import share of 51.8% in the importation into the European Union of products classified in tariff line 1602 39 29 for the years 2010-2012. China also held an average share of 47.9% of imports into the European Union of products under tariff line 1602 39 85 for the years 2010-2012.

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636 Response letter from the EU to China dated 21 February 2014 (Exhibit CHN-40).
637 EU's first written submission, para. 296; EU's response to Panel question No. 47, para. 147; Response letter from the EU to China dated 21 February 2014 (Exhibit CHN-40). See paragraphs 7.79 to 7.81.
638 See the import statistics in section 7.2.4 above.
639 We note that when China made its request, tariff lines 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 80 had been merged into tariff line 1602 39 85 (effective 1 January 2012). For this reason, in this section we consider it necessary to also examine China's share of imports under the merged tariff line 1602 39 85.
7.468. These numbers indicate that China had a "substantial interest" in supplying the products classified under tariff line 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 when it made its request for consultations in 2013. We understand that the complete definitive import data from the year 2013 was not available to the European Union when China sent its request for consultations on 19 December 2013, or when the parties met to discuss the TRQs on 21 May 2014.\textsuperscript{640} However, even the data for the year 2012 indicates that China had already achieved a substantial supplying interest in tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 by that time. In light of China's significant import shares in these products during the years preceding the request for consultation, the Panel does not consider it necessary to determine the precise import share that is required for a supplying interest of a Member to be considered as "substantial" under Article XIII:4.\textsuperscript{641} When China made its request for consultations under Article XIII:4 on 19 December 2013, China's import shares in the European Union market for the products classified under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 were clearly large enough for China to be considered a Member with a "substantial interest" in supplying these products (58.4% and 81.7%, respectively in 2013).

7.469. The European Union disagrees that China held a substantial supplying interest in these products when it made its request for consultation. It submits that since the processes of opening the TRQs and allocating the TRQ shares both occurred at the same time, "it follows that in 2014, just after the termination of the rebinding exercise by the EU pursuant to Article XXVIII and the implementation of the TRQs at issue, the EU was of the view that China did not hold a SSI necessary to request consultations under Article XIII:4."\textsuperscript{642} In response to a question by the Panel, the European Union indicated that, at least for the years 2012 to 2015, the import shares held by China in tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 were however sufficient to confer upon China the status of substantial interest supplier under both Article XXVIII:1 and Article XIII:2, "provided that imports were made during the relevant reference period."\textsuperscript{643} Based on the above, we understand the European Union to be arguing that, for the purpose of Article XIII:4, the determination of which Members hold a substantial supplying interest may be based on the same reference period selected by the Member when it initially allocated the TRQ shares among supplying countries, in this case 2006-2008, and may disregard changes in import shares which may have occurred subsequent to that time.

7.470. In our view, the determination of which Members have a substantial supplying interest under Article XIII:4 cannot be based solely on import shares held during the reference period initially used to determine which Members held a substantial supplying interest under Article XIII:2, without taking into account changes in market shares that occurred following the initial TRQ share allocation. This is because Article XIII:4 aims in part to provide the opportunity for a Member which has increased its market share in a product subject to a TRQ to request, among other things, a readjustment of the TRQ shares based on more recent market developments. As the panel in \textit{EC – Bananas III} observed, where a Member not having a substantial supplying interest is able to gain market share in the "others" category and possibly achieve a substantial supplying interest, this, in turn, "would provide them the opportunity to receive a country-specific allocation by invoking the provisions of Article XIII:4".\textsuperscript{644} This recognizes that a Member that did not have a substantial supplier interest during the initial allocation of a TRQ can nonetheless become a substantial supplier at a later point in time, such that it can request consultations with the Member that imposed the TRQ to adjust the TRQ shares under Article XIII:4. We note that the European Union itself recognizes that "a Member which was not a substantial supplier at the moment of the opening of the TRQ, and which at a certain point in time acquires an important import share in the product concerned (in or outside the TRQ) could claim a
substantial supplying interest under Article XIII:4.\(^{645}\) There is nothing in the text of Article XIII:4 to suggest that the possibility to request consultations is limited only to Members that held a substantial supplying interest when the TRQ was initially allocated under Article XIII:2(d). It follows that the reference period used to determine which Members held a substantial supplying interest at the moment of the initial TRQ allocation can be different from the reference period relied upon to determine substantial supplying interest under Article XIII:4.

7.471. For these reasons, we conclude, on the basis of the import shares made available to the Panel, that China was a Member having a substantial interest in supplying the products under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 at the time of its request for consultations under Article XIII:4, in December 2013. We disagree with the European Union insofar as it considers that, for the purpose of Article XIII:4, the determination of which Members hold a substantial supplying interest may be based on the reference period initially used to determine the TRQ share allocation, without taking into account changes in market shares that occurred following the initial TRQ share allocation.

7.10.3.3 Whether Article XIII:4 imposes an obligation to reallocate TRQ shares upon request from a Member with a substantial interest in supplying the product

7.472. Having found that China was a Member with a substantial interest in supplying the products under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 at the time of its request for consultations under Article XIII:4 in December 2013, the next question we have to consider is whether Article XIII:4 imposed an obligation on the European Union to reallocate the TRQ shares in respect of these products to reflect China's increased share of imports. As noted above, the European Union submits that Article XIII:4 only sets out a "procedural obligation" to consult, and that the Member maintaining a TRQ "is not required to adjust the allocation of the TRQ in response to the requests from a Member having a SSI.\(^{646}\) China disagrees, and submits that "consultations followed by no adjustment when the conditions for an adjustment are met, would mean that the consultations under Article XIII:4 are a dead letter.\(^{647}\)

7.473. We recall that Article XIII:4 states that a Member imposing a TRQ shall "consult promptly" upon request from a Member holding a substantial supplying interest. On its face, the wording of Article XIII:4 only imposes a mandatory obligation to consult upon the request of a Member holding a substantial supplying interest. The obligation to "consult" contained in Article XIII:4 is, in accordance with its ordinary meaning, an obligation to "confer about", "deliberate upon", or "consider" the matters listed in Article XIII:4.\(^{648}\) There is nothing in the ordinary meaning of this term, or in the text of Article XIII:4, to suggest that the consultations should lead to a specific outcome, in this case the reallocation of the TRQ shares. We note that our reading of Article XIII:4 conforms to a general understanding of the term "consultations" as used elsewhere in the covered agreements.\(^{649}\) Based on the ordinary meaning of the term "consult", we are therefore inclined to agree with the European Union that Article XIII:4 only imposes an obligation to "confer about", "deliberate upon", or "consider" the matters listed in Article XIII:4, and not an obligation to reallocate TRQ shares upon request from a Member with a substantial supplying interest.\(^{650}\)

7.474. In addition, we consider that the context of Article XIII:4 suggests that it only imposes an obligation on the Member receiving a request from a substantial supplier to enter into consultations, but not an obligation to reallocate TRQ shares. In particular, we have already concluded that the obligation to enter into consultations under Article XIII:4 applies in the situation where the Member imposing the TRQ has allocated the shares under the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d) (allocation by agreement), and not only in the situations falling under the second sentence of Article XIII:2(d) (unilateral allocation by the Member imposing the TRQ). It follows from this interpretation that any Members with whom agreements are reached under the first

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\(^{645}\) EU's response to Panel question No. 42, para. 124.

\(^{646}\) EU's first written submission, para. 195; EU's response to Panel question No. 123(a), para. 119.

\(^{647}\) China's response to Panel question No. 49(a), para. 191.


\(^{649}\) Article 4 of the DSU, for example, also imposes a mandatory obligation to consult before requesting the establishment of a panel, but this obligation to consult clearly does not require that a specific outcome emanates from the consultations.

\(^{650}\) See the EU's first written submission, para. 295; EU's second written submission, para. 182; EU's response to Panel question No. 123(a), para. 119.
sentence of Article XIII:2(d) are also substantial suppliers within the meaning of Article XIII:4, and that these Members may also therefore request consultations under that provision. Thus, if Article XIII:4 implied an obligation to reallocate the shares of a TRQ to reflect changes in import shares held by substantial suppliers, the beneficiaries of that obligation would include not only new substantial suppliers, but also any Members that have already entered into allocation agreements pursuant to the first sentence of Article XIII:2(d). Imposing an obligation on the Member allocating the TRQ to readjust the shares allocated could deprive these agreements of any binding effect, and these agreements would no longer constitute a "safe harbour" as far as these same substantial suppliers are concerned, contrary to the findings of the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US I) / (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II).\(^\text{651}\) Thus, the applicability of Article XIII:4 to situations where agreements regarding the TRQ allocation were reached with Members having a substantial supplying interest, potentially following years of negotiations, suggests that the Member imposing and allocating the TRQ must have a degree of discretion as to whether or not it should reallocate the TRQ shares following a request for consultations under Article XIII:4.

7.475. However, we do not consider that this discretion is unfettered, such that a Member maintaining a TRQ is free to ignore significant changes in imports shares held by different countries following the opening of a TRQ. Our view is consistent with the fact that, in the same report, the Appellate Body suggested that Article XIII:4 could require an adjustment of a TRQ allocation, including in situations where the TRQ has been allocated by agreement. When examining the allocation agreement originally entered into between the European Communities and several other Members, as contained in paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement, the Appellate Body stated in passing that:

> In our view, paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement, which set an expiry date for the agreement at 31 December 2002, provided for consultations between the European Communities and "Latin American suppliers that are GATT Members" by 2001, and the review of the functioning of the agreement within three years, reflects the requirements of Article XIII:4, which requires consultation with substantial suppliers, reappraisal of special factors, and an adjustment of the allocation agreement.\(^\text{652}\) (emphasis added)

7.476. Furthermore, we recall that the panel in EC – Bananas III had also previously suggested that if a Member not having a substantial supplying interest is able to gain market share in the "others" category and possibly achieve a substantial supplying interest, this, in turn, "would provide them the opportunity to receive a country-specific allocation by invoking the provisions of Article XIII:4".\(^\text{653}\)

7.477. We observe that Article XIII:4 was not at issue in either of those cases, and both statements were in the nature of obiter dicta made in passing. We further note that the panel in EC – Bananas III only stated that Article XIII:4 would provide such substantial suppliers with the "opportunity to receive" a country-specific allocation, and did not say that the Member applying the TRQ would have been obliged to allocate a specific share to that supplier in all circumstances.\(^\text{654}\) However, these statements by the Appellate Body and the panel are both consistent with our understanding that, although a Member maintaining a TRQ that has been allocated among supplying countries must enjoy a degree of discretion as to whether or not to reallocate the TRQ shares following a request for consultations under Article XIII:4, such discretion is not unfettered.

7.478. Proceeding on the understanding that a Member does not have unfettered discretion to refuse to reallocate the TRQ shares upon the request of a Member holding a substantial supplying interest following a change in import shares, we do not however see any indication in the wording of Article XIII:4 of any time frame as to when or how often such reallocation would have to take place, or based on the occurrence of which events. There is no specific guidance in the text of Article XIII:4 on whether, for example, the reallocation would have to be done yearly or instead at

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\(^\text{653}\) Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 7.76.
\(^\text{654}\) EU’s response to Panel question No. 123(b), para. 127.
some other regular interval, or whether it would have to be done when any Member that did not receive a country-specific share experiences a surge in its import shares of the relevant product, or even when a Member that has already received a country-specific share significantly increases its share of imports beyond that which it has been allocated. We note in that regard that paragraph 9 of the Bananas Framework Agreement, which was at issue in the EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US I) / (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) dispute, provided that the initial allocation of the TRQ shares was set to expire on 31 December 2002. We understand that the Bananas Framework Agreement was agreed in 1994. Paragraph 9 also expressly provided that "full consultations with the Latin American suppliers that are GATT Members should start no later than in year 2001." As noted above, the Appellate Body suggested that the foregoing "reflects the requirements of Article XIII:4." While the Appellate Body did not elaborate, this suggests that an allocation agreement which was set to remain in force for eight years was nonetheless considered to meet the requirements of Article XIII:4, taking into account that it had an expiry date and provided for consultations. Based on the foregoing, we do not see that any purported obligation to reallocate TRQ shares arising under Article XIII:4 is subject to any particular time frame.

7.479. We note that China itself, in these proceedings, has been unable to clearly specify the time frame, frequency and the basis upon which the reallocation of the TRQ allocation would have to be made. In its second written submission, China stated for example that the allocation of TRQ shares is not static, and must "develop and be updated over time". In the context of its claims under Article XIII:1 and XIII:2, China also submitted that the reassessment of the TRQ share allocation had to be reviewed and adjusted "from time to time"; "before a new quota year starts"; "preceding each allocation"; and "when trade developments occur and the allocated shares are no longer representative of the import of a WTO Member in the absence of the TRQs." At the second meeting of the Panel, China stated that since the TRQs in dispute operate on an annual basis, the European Union in this case is required to review the TRQ allocation every year, so as to determine whether the allocation should be updated in light of trade developments. China also submitted that depending on the conditions of the market, a Member imposing a TRQ would also have the obligation under Article XIII to adjust the shares of the TRQ "on an as-needed basis". We recall that we have ruled that China's claims based on an ongoing obligation under Article XIII:1 and XIII:2 to reallocate or reassess the TRQs applicable to the products covered by the First and Second Modification Packages are outside the Panel's terms of reference. Nevertheless, China's inability, in this case, to clearly specify the time frame, frequency and the basis upon which the reallocation of the TRQ allocation should be made, further highlights that insofar as there is an obligation to reallocate under Article XIII:4, there is no indication, in the text of this provision, as to when that reallocation should be made.

7.480. Finally, we note that the prevalence and centrality of historical market shares in TRQ share allocations also suggest that, insofar as there is indeed an obligation to reallocate the shares allocated among supplying countries upon the request of a Member holding a substantial supplying interest under Article XIII:4, there is no obligation to do within any specified time frame, or with any particularly frequency.
7.481. The issue raised in this case is whether Article XIII:4 can be interpreted as establishing a legal obligation on the importing Member to reallocate TRQ shares among supplying countries, to reflect an updated reference period or a reappraisal of special factors, in situations where import shares held by different countries have changed in the years immediately following the initial TRQ allocation agreed among substantial suppliers on the basis of historical market shares. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that insofar as such an obligation arises from Article XIII:4, there is no obligation to reallocate the TRQ shares within any particular time frame, and at least not in the years immediately following the initial TRQ allocation.

7.482. Accordingly, we find that the European Union did not violate Article XIII:4 when it refused to reallocate the TRQ allocations arising from the Second Modification Package in May 2014. Accordingly, we reject China's claim of violation under Article XIII:4, insofar as this claim is based on the fact that the European Union did not reallocate the TRQ allocation among supplying countries in May 2014, following China's request for consultations under Article XIII:4.

7.10.3.4 Whether the European Union refused to consider the need for an adjustment of the TRQ shares or the reference period or reappraisal of special factors

7.483. The remaining issue is whether the European Union failed to discharge its obligation to consult with China in the sense of refusing to consider the need for an adjustment of the TRQ shares determined, for an adjustment of the reference period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved. In approaching this issue, we are guided by several principles that constitute the framework for our review of the facts before us.

7.484. First, we consider that the obligation to consult pursuant to Article XIII:4 should not be interpreted in an overly formalistic manner. In our view, the fact that the European Union apparently did not consider Article XIII:4 to be legally applicable in the circumstances, and agreed to consult with China only on a "without prejudice" basis and without acknowledging that China was entitled to invoke Article XIII:4, does not suffice, in and of itself, to establish a violation of this provision.667 On the other hand, the fact that the European Union held a meeting with China on 19 May 2014 is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish that the European Union discharged its obligation to consider the need for an adjustment of the TRQ shares determined, the reference period selected, or the reappraisal of special factors. Rather than adopting a formalistic approach, we consider that it is necessary to consider the totality of the information provided to the Panel regarding the exchanges that took place between the parties.

7.485. Second, we recall that as the complaining party alleging a violation of Article XIII:4, the burden of proof is on China to demonstrate that the European Union refused to consider the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors. We recognize that this may not be an easy burden to discharge.

667 To find otherwise would mean that the European Union breached its obligation under Article XIII:4 to enter into consultations, not on the grounds that it refused to enter into consultations, but on the grounds that it entered those consultations without acknowledging that it was legally required to do so, and without acknowledging that the consultations were being conducted, legally speaking, pursuant to Article XIII:4.
We note that in assessing whether China has discharged its burden, we are confined to the facts that the parties have provided to us.

7.486. Third, we consider that consultations must be meaningful, and cannot be "mere formalities". As indicated by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, State parties to international negotiations "are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insist upon its own position without contemplating any modification to it". While Article XIII:4 speaks of consultations, rather than negotiations, the principle that discussions between states be meaningful also applies to consultations.

7.487. There is no disagreement between the parties that a meeting was held between them on 19 May 2014, subsequent to China's request for consultations under Article XIII:4 on 19 December 2013. In its panel request and first written submission, China even characterizes this meeting as "consultations held on 19 May 2014". China claims, however, that the European Union refused to enter into "meaningful consultations", because the European Union denied during those consultations that Article XIII:4 applied to the determination of the TRQs on the poultry products at issue in this dispute, and "failed to reappraise the quota allocation to account for the SPS measures." According to China, its "right to consultation under Article XIII:4 was effectively denied".

7.488. The European Union responds however that China did not duly justify its claim of being a Member with a substantial interest when it lodged its request. It submits that China's 19 December 2013 request was "formulated in very general terms," and did not provide any import figures to justify its request nor did it indicate on which yearly period its request was based.

7.489. We recall that China's request for consultations under Article XIII:4 stated that:

China has a substantial supplying interest in several of the tariff lines concerned, as evidenced by the statistics of imports of the European Union from China in the most recent years prior to the adopting of the new tariff regime. However, the new tariff regime, particularly the discriminatory allocation of tariff quotas contained therein, seriously prejudiced China's export interest. Indeed, in the eight months starting from March 1, 2013, imports from China under the tariff lines concerned declined by more than 50% in value, compared with the same period in 2012.

7.490. The letter also referred to China's previous requests to enter into negotiations or consultations under Article XXVIII, dated 9 May 2012 and 2 October 2012, and to the European Union's notification of the conclusion of the Article XXVIII negotiations for the Second Modification Package.

7.491. We note that China's request to enter into consultations under Article XIII:4 does not contain any reference to the specific tariff lines upon which its request is based. The Note Verbale refers to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1218/2012, through which a new tariff regime on the tariff

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670 The panel request includes, as the relevant measure, the "[r]efusal by the European Union in consultations held on 19 May 2014 under Article XIII of the GATT 1994 to adjust the TRQs on the basis of recent import statistics establishing China's substantial supplying interests as had been requested by letter of Ambassador Yu of 19 December 2013" (China's request for the establishment of a panel, Section I.B item(v), p. 3). The claim under Article XIII:4 likewise refers to "The EU's refusal in consultations with China on 19 May 2014 to consider an adjustment of the allocation of the TRQs based on a change in the base period or a reappraisal of the special factors involved is inconsistent with GATT 1994 Article XIII:4" (China's request for the establishment of a panel, Section II.B item (viii)). At paragraph 256 of its first written submission, China states that the European Union "denied during consultations in May 2014 that Article XIII applied".
671 China's first written submission, paras. 253-257.
672 China's second written submission, para. 194.
673 China's first written submission, para. 256.
674 EU's response to Panel question No. 123, para. 121.
675 EU's response to Panel question No. 123, para. 124.
676 Exhibit CHN-39.
items concerned had been adopted, suggesting that the request for consultations may have been in respect of all of the tariff lines concerned by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1218/2012; however, the Note Verbal refers to China's substantial supplying interest in "several of the tariff lines concerned", implying that in others it did not have a substantial supplying interest. It appears from the submissions of the European Union that it was not until the meeting of 19 May 2014 that China indicated that its request was more precisely based on its belief that it held a substantial supplying interest in products classified in tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85. 677 This has been recognized by China in these proceedings. 678 We also note that China's request does not indicate the issues on which China was seeking to consult upon under Article XIII:4. China simply referred to the provisions of Article XIII:4 requiring a Member imposing a TRQ to consult upon request with a Member holding a substantial interest regarding the need for an adjustment of the TRQ shares, the selection of a base period and the consideration of special factors. It did not state on which of these grounds, specifically, it sought to consult with the European Union. Again, it appears from the record that it was not until the 19 May 2014 meeting that China informed the European Union that it was seeking the readjustment of the TRQ shares of tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 on the basis of a different reference period, taken into account the existence of the SPS measures as special factors. 679 Furthermore, China's request for consultations under Article XIII:4 referred to its multiple earlier requests to be recognized as a substantial supplier in the different context of the negotiations under Article XXVIII, and those requests had been based on several different grounds. In response to a question by the Panel, China has indicated that it did provide the European Union with the trade data showing that it had, at least for tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80, a substantial supplying interest. 680

7.492. We are sympathetic to China's argument that there is no specific guidance in Article XIII:4 on how a Member should make its request for consultations under that provision, and we do not consider that there is any particular "specificity" requirement that can be read into Article XIII:4. 681 However, we note that China has consistently taken an "all inclusive" approach with respect to its claims of interest in supplying the products covered by the First and Second Modification Packages, in the sense of alleging a substantial or principal supplying interest in all of the tariff lines at issue, without distinguishing between the different products at issue, and the different levels of importation into the European Union from China in respect of those products. China's reference in its letter dated 19 December 2013 to its requests for negotiations or consultations under Article XXVIII is illustrative in this regard. To recall, on 9 May 2012, China requested to enter into negotiations with the European Union, under Article XXVIII, on the basis that it was a Member with a principal supplying interest "with respect to relevant tariff lines." 682 China also provided statistics on imports into the European Union from China of products classified under four tariff lines (1602 20 10, 1602 39 29, 1602 39 40 and 1602 39 80) for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. On 2 October 2012, China reiterated its request to enter into consultations with respect to "relevant tariff lines of poultry products" as notified by the European Union, and contested the use of the 2006-2008 reference period. 683 In these proceedings, China has confirmed that it claimed a substantial supplying interest under Article XXVIII "for all of the tariff lines covered by the First Modification Package" 684 and it claimed a "principal supplying interest with regard to the relevant tariff lines mentioned in the EU's notification of its intention to withdraw concessions" under the Second Modification Package. 685 With respect to its request for consultations under Article XIII:4, China has confirmed that it was claiming a substantial supplying interest "for all of the tariff lines covered by the Second Modification Package." 686 These statements by China highlight that China has consistently adopted an "all inclusive" approach to its claims of interests in the products covered by both the First and the Second Modification Package. China's general approach to extend its claims of interests to all the products covered by the

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677 EU's first written submission, para 292; EU's response to Panel question No. 47(a), para. 140. See also the EU's response to Panel question No. 123, para. 126.
678 China's comment on the EU's response to Panel question No. 123, para. 74.
679 EU's response to Panel question No. 47(a), para. 140. See also the EU's second written submission, para. 179.
680 China's response to Panel question No. 128, para. 123.
681 China's comment on the EU's response to Panel question No. 123, para. 73.
682 Letter from China to the EU requesting to enter into negotiations under Article XXVIII (9 May 2012) (Exhibit CHN-50).
683 Letter from China to the EU (2 October 2012) (Exhibit CHN-30). See also China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 37.
684 China's response to Panel question No. 17(b), para. 101, referring to Exhibit CHN-16.
685 China's response to Panel question No. 17(b), para. 102, referring to Exhibit CHN-29.
686 China's response to Panel question No. 17 (b), para. 103.
modification packages further confirms that China's request to consult under Article XIII:4, based on its substantial supplying interest in "several of the lines concerned", was lacking in specificity regarding which tariff lines and special factors were concerned, and on which grounds.

7.493. In addition, we note that there is disagreement between the parties as to the events that took place after the 19 May 2014 meeting. The European Union has indicated that it invited China to provide it with more information, including the trade figures upon which it based its claims, but that China did not follow-up.\textsuperscript{687} China has indicated that the European Union did not seek clarification or question China's claim of substantial supplying interest for the purpose of Article XIII:4, "either at or after the meeting".\textsuperscript{688} China has also informed us that it again sought to consult with the European Union regarding the need for a readjustment of the TRQ shares in September 2015, after the beginning of the current proceedings.\textsuperscript{689} The European Union has for its part indicated that the Article XIII:4 consultations between the parties could be considered as still ongoing.\textsuperscript{690} China responds that the European Union agreed to "continue consultation in form, not in substance".\textsuperscript{691}

7.494. We have concluded that China held a substantial supplying interest in tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 85 at the time of its request under Article XIII:4. However, having considered the limited information that has been provided to the Panel regarding the issues touched upon at the May 2014 meeting, and the limited information provided to the Panel regarding further exchanges between the parties following that meeting, we consider that there are insufficient agreed facts concerning the conduct of the consultations to determine whether the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:4. Accordingly, recalling that China has the burden of proof, we conclude that China has failed to discharge its burden of demonstrating that the European Union refused to consider the need for an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for the reappraisal of the special factors involved.

7.10.4 Conclusion

7.495. Based on the foregoing, we find that China has failed to demonstrate that the European Union violated Article XIII:4 by refusing to enter into meaningful consultations with China.

7.11 Claims under Article II:1 of the GATT 1994

7.11.1 Introduction

7.496. China claims that the European Union's application of the higher out-of-quota tariff rates arising from the First and Second Modification Packages is in violation of Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 because those rates exceed the bound rates currently inscribed in the EU Schedule of concessions.\textsuperscript{692} We understand China to argue that because the changes have not yet been incorporated into the EU Schedule through the certification procedure, they have no legal effect to replace the existing bound duties. In China's view, therefore, the absence of certification means that the bound rates that existed in the EU Schedule prior to the completion of the Article XXVIII negotiations remain unchanged, and that the European Union's application of the higher out-of-quota tariff rates violates Article II:1.

7.497. The European Union submits that its application of the higher out-of-quota rates does not violate Article II:1.\textsuperscript{693} We understand the European Union to argue that there is no violation of

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\textsuperscript{687} EU's first written submission, para. 293; EU's second written submission, para. 179; EU's comment on China's response to Panel question No. 128, para. 81.
\textsuperscript{688} China's comment on the EU's response to Panel question No. 125, para. 78.
\textsuperscript{689} China's second written submission, para. 195.
\textsuperscript{690} EU's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 105, EU's comments on China's response to Panel question No. 128, para. 80 and EU's response to Panel question No. 47, para. 139.
\textsuperscript{691} China's response to Panel question No. 128, para. 123.
\textsuperscript{692} China's arguments regarding its claim under Article II and related points are found in China's first written submission, paras. 260-270; China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 113-118; China's responses to Panel question Nos. 50, 55-57; China's second written submission, paras. 197-201; parties' responses, and comments on one another's responses, to Panel question Nos. 94-105.
\textsuperscript{693} The European Union's arguments regarding the claim under Article II and related points are found in EU's first written submission, paras. 298-302; EU's responses to Panel question Nos. 51-54, 56-57; EU's
Article II:1 because, contrary to what China argues, the certification of the changes to its Schedule is not a legal prerequisite for giving effect to the modifications agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations.

7.11.2 Factual background

7.498. The in-quota tariff rate for each of the TRQs at issue in this dispute is the same or lower than the bound rate currently inscribed in the EU Schedule for the tariff line in question. However, it is not in dispute that the out-of-quota rates that the European Union currently applies to the poultry products at issue resulting from its Article XXVIII negotiations are in excess of the bound rates currently inscribed in its Schedule.

7.499. As regards the First and Second Modification Packages, we recall that, at the time of this Report, the bound rates inscribed in its Schedule (the prior tariff rate) and the rates that the European Union currently applies (the new out-of-quota tariff) are as follows:

First Modification Package

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tariff item number</th>
<th>Prior tariff rate</th>
<th>New in-quota tariff rate</th>
<th>New out-of-quota tariff rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>0210 99 39</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>1,300 EUR/MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 31</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>1,024 EUR/MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 19</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>1,024 EUR/MT</td>
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</table>

Second Modification Package

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tariff item number</th>
<th>Prior tariff rate</th>
<th>New in-quota tariff rate</th>
<th>New out-of-quota tariff rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 11</td>
<td>867 EUR/MT</td>
<td>630 EUR/MT</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 30</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602 32 90</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>630 EUR/MT</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
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<td>1602 39 40</td>
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<td>1602 39 80</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2,765 EUR/MT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.500. As regards both the First and Second Modification Packages, the changes that the European Union, Thailand and Brazil agreed upon in the negotiations under Article XXVIII:5 have been notified to all Members, but those changes have not yet been incorporated into the EU Schedule by means of certification.

7.501. The European Union has submitted for certification the changes to its Schedule resulting from the Article XXVIII:5 negotiations relating to the First Modification Package, but at the time of the Report the draft Schedule has not yet been certified. Specifically, on 24 March 2014, the European Union communicated for certification a revised Schedule which contained "consolidations, modifications and rectifications in this Schedule, in relation to the previous certified CXL schedule of the EU" (Schedule CXL – EC15). The draft Schedule of the European Union (Schedule CLXXIII – EU25), was circulated to the WTO Membership on 25 April 2014, in second written submission, paras. 184-188; parties’ responses, and comments on one another’s responses, to Panel question Nos. 94-105.

694 See EU’s response to Panel question No. 51, para. 151, p. 44; China’s second written submission, para. 8.

695 See the import statistics in section 7.2.4 above.

The European Union confirmed in these proceedings that the results of the Article XXVIII negotiations under the First Modification Package are included in this draft Schedule, and that the certification process of the changes to the draft Schedule communicated on 24 March 2014 was still ongoing.

7.502. At the time of this Report, the European Union has not yet submitted for certification the changes to its Schedule resulting from the Article XXVIII:5 negotiations relating to the Second Modification Package. The European Union explained that as the Second Modification Package was concluded in 2012, after the enlargement of the European Union to 27 member States, it was considered “more appropriate to submit for certification the changes included in that package as part of the draft schedule EU27” which will be submitted “as soon as the draft EU25 draft schedule is certified”.

7.503. Furthermore, we recall that although China does not contest that the changes that the European Union, Thailand and Brazil agreed upon in the negotiations under Article XXVIII:5 have been notified to all Members in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, the European Union confirms that it did not notify all Members of the date on which the changes agreed in the negotiations under Article XXVIII:5 entered into force as referred to in the second sentence of paragraph 7 of those same procedures. Specifically, the European Union indicated that although it had informed all of the Members with a principal or substantial supplying interest, “[t]he date [of] entry into force of those changes has not been notified” under paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII.

7.11.3 Paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII

7.504. The Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII set forth a number of requirements that Members are expected to follow when they seek to modify or withdraw concessions pursuant to Article XXVIII. In the light of the importance of the certification procedures and the objective of ensuring that the authentic texts of Schedules annexed to the General Agreement are up to date and properly reflect the legal rights and obligations of Members, it is important to recall at the outset that several issues fall outside of the scope of the Panel’s terms of reference in the present case.

7.505. Paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules confirms that “[c]hanges in the authentic texts of Schedules annexed to the General Agreement which reflect modifications resulting from action under ... Article XXVIII shall be certified by means of Certifications”, and requires that a “draft of such change shall be communicated to the Director-General within three months after the action has been completed”. As regards both the First and Second Modification Packages, the European Union accepts that the “action was completed” no later than the time that it notified Members of the conclusion of the negotiations pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII.

7.506. Paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII provides that Members will be free to give effect to the changes agreed upon in negotiations under Article XXVIII:5 as from the date on which the conclusion of all the negotiations have been notified, but then requires that a "notification shall be submitted ... of the date on which these changes will come into force". This requirement, set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 7, is linked to the requirement,
set forth in the chapeau of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII, that Members "shall be informed immediately of all changes in national tariffs resulting from recourse to this Article". These requirements both support the objectives of transparency, security and predictability.

7.507. We recall that, in this case, China has stated that "[t]he Panel is not required nor requested to make a finding that the EU acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 and paragraph 1". We have found that insofar as China is making any claims of inconsistency with these procedural requirements, such claims have not been made in a sufficiently clear and timely manner, and are therefore not properly before the Panel. Accordingly, our analysis of China's claims under Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 is confined to the issues that fall within the scope of the Panel's terms of reference. This does not mean or imply that the European Union is in any way absolved or exempted from complying with the requirements set forth in the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules and the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII.

7.11.4 Analysis by the Panel

7.508. The issue raised by China's claim is whether the European Union has acted inconsistently with Article II:1 by applying the higher out-of-quota tariff rates agreed with Brazil and Thailand in the Article XXVIII:5 negotiations prior to the changes being incorporated into its Schedule through the applicable certification procedure. To resolve this issue, the Panel must determine whether certification is a legal prerequisite that must be completed before a Member modifying its concessions can proceed to implement the changes agreed upon in Article XXVIII negotiations at the national level, without violating Article II of the GATT 1994.

7.509. China's claims and the arguments of the parties concern the meaning of and relationship between various provisions of the GATT 1994, the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, and the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules. We will begin our analysis by examining the issue raised in the light of the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994, and we will then proceed to consider the provisions found in the two sets of Procedures.

7.510. Article II is entitled "Schedules of Concessions". Article II:7 provides that "[t]he Schedules annexed to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement". Article II:1 sets forth the following obligations:

(a) Each Member shall accord to the commerce of the other Members treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.

(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any Member, which are the products of territories of other Members, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein.

7.511. Article II is one of the key provisions of the GATT 1994, and of the entire WTO legal system. The importance of Schedules of concessions, as sources of predictable and enforceable legal obligations, has been recognized by numerous panels and by the Appellate Body. Among other things, it has been recognized that "a basic object and purpose of the GATT 1994, as reflected in Article II, is to preserve the value of tariff concessions negotiated by a Member with its trading partners, and bound in that Member's Schedule".

7.512. On the other hand, one of the specific objects and purposes of Article XXVIII is to allow Members to make tariff concessions by providing them with flexibility to withdraw or modify those concessions subsequently, if necessary, in accordance with the procedures provided for therein. In this way, the right to modify or withdraw concessions supports the overarching object and purpose, which finds reflection in the preambles of both the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement.

704 Emphasis added.
705 China's response to Panel question No. 99, para. 74.
706 See section 7.3.3.1.
707 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 47.
of Members "entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade".

7.513. Article II of the WTO Agreement stipulates that "[t]he agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as "Multilateral Trade Agreements") are integral parts of this Agreement, binding on all Members." The general rule for amending provisions of the covered agreements is set forth in Article X of the WTO Agreement, entitled "Amendments". Article X:2 provides that amendments to certain provisions shall "take effect only upon acceptance by all Members"; Article X:3 provides that amendments to other provisions "shall take effect for the Members that have accepted them upon acceptance by twothirds of the Members"; and Article X:4 states that amendments "of a nature that would not alter the rights and obligations of Members" shall "take effect for all Members upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members".

7.514. However, in EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), the Appellate Body confirmed that the modification of Schedules "does not require formal amendment" pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement, and is not subject to the "formal acceptance process" provided for in Article X:7 of the WTO Agreement. The Appellate Body set forth its understanding of the relationship between Article X of the WTO Agreement and Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 as follows:

Article X of the WTO Agreement sets out rules and procedures to amend the provisions in the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Article X specifies the process and quorum required to amend particular provisions or covered agreements. Amendments, unlike waivers, are not limited in time and create new or modify existing rights and obligations for WTO Members. Special rules on acceptance and entry into force apply, depending on the provisions that are being amended and on whether the amendment "would alter the rights and obligations of the Members". Amendments to the WTO Agreement and to a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1 enter into force following a formal acceptance process pursuant to Article X:7.

The modification of Schedules of Concessions, which are an integral part of the GATT 1994, does not require a formal amendment pursuant to Article X of the WTO Agreement, but is enacted through a special procedure set out in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994 or through multilateral rounds of tariff negotiations. Pursuant to Article XXVIII, a Member may modify or withdraw a concession annexed to the GATT 1994 by negotiation and agreement with other Members that are "primarily concerned", and in consultation with Members that have a substantial interest in the concession. Article XXVIII:2 provides that, in an agreement on the renegotiation of a concession, which may include compensatory adjustment, WTO Members "shall endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations". If an agreement cannot be reached, the modifying Member is free to modify or withdraw the concession, while other Members that are primarily concerned or have a substantial interest in the concession are free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the modifying Member.708

7.515. Thus, the Appellate Body explained that Article XXVIII is a "special procedure" through which the "modification" of a Schedule "is enacted". China has suggested that "[c]onsistent with the principle set forth in Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, unless the treaty otherwise provides, amendments to a multilateral treaty can only occur with the participation of all contracting States".709 We observe however that Article 40 of the Vienna Convention is, by its own terms, a default rule that applies "[u]nless the treaty otherwise provides".710 In stating that Article XXVIII is a "special procedure" through which the "modification" of a Schedule "is enacted", the Appellate Body has recognized that Article XXVIII is a sui generis procedure.

709 China's response to Panel question No. 50, footnote 70.
710 Article 40(1) of the Vienna Convention states that "[u]nless the treaty otherwise provides, the amendment of multilateral treaties shall be governed by the following paragraphs."
7.516. Article XXVIII is entitled "Modification of Schedules". Paragraph 1 provides that on the first day of every 3-year period a Member may seek to modify or withdraw a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to the Agreement through negotiation with those Members with initial negotiating rights and a principal supplying interest, and in consultation with those Members with a substantial supplying interest. Paragraph 3 of Article XXVIII addresses the situations in which agreement cannot be reached with the Members engaged in the negotiations, or where the agreement reached is not satisfactory to Members with a substantial supplying interest. In the case of reserved negotiations under paragraph 5, a Member may reserve "the right ... to modify the appropriate Schedule" in accordance with the procedures of paragraphs 1 to 3. Paragraph 5 states that if a Member so elects, other Members with initial negotiating rights or the requisite supplying interest "shall have the right", during the same period, "to modify or withdraw", in accordance with the same procedures, concessions initially negotiated with that Member.

7.517. Paragraph 3(a) of Article XXVIII provides that where agreement with the Members concerned cannot be reached, the Member proposing to modify or withdraw the concession "shall, nevertheless, be free to do so". Paragraph 3(a) then stipulates that if such action is taken, the Members concerned shall then be free "not later than six months after such action is taken", to withdraw, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice of such withdrawal is received by the Members, substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the applicant Member. Article XXVIII:3(b) further provides that if agreement with Members concerned is reached, but the agreement reached is not satisfactory to Members having a substantial supplying interest, those Members "shall be free, not later than six months after the action under such agreement is taken, to withdraw, up the expiration of thirty days from the day on which written notice of such withdrawal is received by the Members, substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the applicant Member".

7.518. China considers that the prior incorporation of such changes into the Schedule through certification is a legal prerequisite for giving effect to the changes in the context of Article XXVIII:3. We have difficulty reconciling such an interpretation with the ordinary meaning of this provision. The specification of a timeframe for the modification or withdrawal of concessions, by reference to the point in time when "such action is taken" by the applicant Member or when "action under such agreement is taken", implies that this may be undertaken prior to the changes being introduced into the Schedule through the certification process. Article XXVIII:3 addresses situations in which agreement cannot be reached with the Members engaged in the negotiations, or where the agreement reached is not satisfactory to Members with a substantial supplying interest. Insofar as the terms of Article XXVIII:3 imply that Members concerned are "free" to withdraw or modify concessions prior to certification of the changes to the Schedule in those situations, then we consider that such a right must exist a fortiori where, as in the present case, the modification has been agreed by the Members holding initial negotiating rights, a principal supplying interest, and a substantial supplying interest.

7.519. The Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, which we examine in greater detail below, provide that changes in the authentic texts of Schedules annexed to the General Agreement "which reflect modifications resulting from action under Article II, Article XVIII, Article XXIV, Article XXVII or Article XXVIII" shall be certified by means of certifications. The Articles specified in paragraph 1 of the Procedures all provide for actions that may be taken to modify concessions, which are then submitted for certification under the Procedures. Articles XVIII, XXIV and XXVII each use a similar phrase to that used in paragraph 3 of Article XXVIII, namely that the Member concerned "shall be free to modify or withdraw" the concession, and affected Members that do not agree to the modification of concession "shall be free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions". These provisions specify the conditions, including the

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711 China's response to Panel question No. 103(a).
712 We recall our earlier finding, in the context of examining China's claims under Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994, that China has failed to demonstrate that it held a principal or substantial supplying interest in the concessions at issue in the First and Second Modification Packages.
713 Article XVIII relates to Governmental Assistance to Economic Development. Section A: paragraph 7 provides that countries with a low standard of economic development may, in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry, negotiate with those Members with initial negotiating rights or substantial supply interest. If agreement is reached "they shall be free to modify or withdraw concessions under the appropriate Schedules to this Agreement in order to give effect to such agreement". Even if agreement is not reached, in certain circumstances the Member "shall be free to modify or withdraw the concession" or "shall be free to proceed with such modification or withdrawal". Paragraph 6 of Article XXIV
timeframes, when the Members concerned "shall be free to modify or withdraw" the concession. In our view, the argument that prior incorporation of such changes into the Schedule through certification is a legal prerequisite for giving effect to the changes in the context of Article XXVIII:3 is also difficult to reconcile with the terms of these other provisions of the GATT 1994.

7.520. Continuing with our examination of the text of the GATT 1994, we note that the chapeau of the Ad Note to Article XXVIII states that negotiations to modify or withdraw concessions under Article XXVIII should be conducted "with the greatest possible secrecy in order to avoid premature disclosure of details of prospective changes", and then states that Members "shall be informed immediately of all changes in national tariffs resulting from recourse to this Article".\textsuperscript{714} Thus, the chapeau distinguishes the "prospective changes" that are the subject of negotiations from the subsequent "changes in national tariffs resulting from" those negotiations. By distinguishing the "prospective changes" from the "changes in national tariffs resulting from" Article XXVIII, and requiring that Members be informed immediately of the latter, the wording of the chapeau implies that Members may be informed of those changes in national tariffs after they have already been made.\textsuperscript{715}

7.521. Thus, our review of the foregoing provisions of the GATT 1994 reinforces the Appellate Body's statement that Article XXVIII is a special procedure through which the "modification" of a Schedule "is enacted".\textsuperscript{716} We now turn to the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, which set forth the procedural arrangements to be followed when a Member seeks to modify or withdraw a concession in its Schedule. As explained earlier in our Report, we agree with the parties and third parties expressing a view on the matter that these procedures qualify, at a minimum, as "decisions", "procedures" or "customary practices" within the meaning of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement.\textsuperscript{717}

7.522. These Procedures provide in relevant part as follows:

6. Upon completion of all the negotiations the contracting party referred to in paragraph 1 above should send to the secretariat, for distribution in a secret document, a final report on the lines of the model in Annex C attached hereto.

7. Contracting parties will be free to give effect to the changes agreed upon in the negotiations as from the first day of the period referred to in Article XXVIII:1, or, in the case of negotiations under paragraph 4 or 5 of Article XXVIII, as from the date on which the conclusion of all the negotiations have been notified as set out in paragraph

provides that in the establishment of a customs union or free trade area, where a Member proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article II, "the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply". Paragraph 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 elaborates on the procedures in paragraph 6 of Article XXIV. It includes the following: "[w]here, despite such efforts, agreement in negotiations on compensatory adjustment under Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 cannot be reached within a reasonable period from the initiation of negotiations, the customs union shall, nevertheless, be free to modify or withdraw the concessions; affected Members shall then be free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions in accordance with Article XXVIII". Article XXVII, which deals with countries which do not or cease to become WTO Members provides: "[a]ny Member shall at any time be free to withhold or to withdraw in whole or in part any concession, provided for in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, in respect of which such Member determines that it was initially negotiated with a government which has not become, or has ceased to be, a Member."

\textsuperscript{714} Emphasis added. We note that this Ad Note appears to be the basis for the requirement, in paragraph 6 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, that the Member concerned notify the Secretariat of the completion of negotiations. As discussed further below, the text of paragraph 7 of those Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII provides that the Member shall be free to give effect to the changes agreed from the date that the conclusion of negotiations has been notified pursuant to paragraph 6.

\textsuperscript{715} Furthermore, we note that Paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules provides that the draft of the Schedule containing the changes resulting from Article XXVIII negotiations shall be communicated by the Director-General to all Members. Insofar as the "changes in national tariffs" correspond to the "changes resulting from Article XXVIII negotiations", then those changes in national tariffs would have already been previously communicated to all Members in the course of the certification procedure. Thus, if certification were a legal prerequisite for giving effect to the changes agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations, then it is not clear why the chapeau of the Ad Note would require that all Members be "informed" immediately of "all changes in national tariffs resulting from" recourse to Article XXVIII.


\textsuperscript{717} See paragraphs 7.22 to 7.27.
A notification shall be submitted to the secretariat, for circulation to contracting parties, of the date on which these changes will come into force.

Formal effect will be given to the changes in the schedules by means of Certifications in accordance with the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 26 March 1980.

The current Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII were adopted in 1980. However, paragraphs 7 and 8 of those procedures are based on similar provisions in the arrangements for Article XXVIII negotiations that had been followed since the 1950s. In the 1957 "Arrangements for Negotiations under Article XXVIII in 1957" (L/635), GATT Contracting Parties agreed on the arrangements for the first three-year period referred to in the text of Article XXVIII:1, which would begin 1 January 1958. The arrangements contained in L/635 subsequently served as a guideline for the procedural arrangements for all subsequent negotiations under Article XXVIII for the next twenty years. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the 1980 Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII are based on paragraphs 12 and 14 of L/635, which provided that:

12. Contracting parties will be free to give effect to the changes agreed upon in the negotiations as from 1 January 1958.

13. Contracting parties should notify the Executive Secretary of the date on which they give effect to the agreed schedules, and compensatory concessions should be made effective not later than that date.

14. Formal effect will be given to the changes in the schedules by a protocol of rectifications and modifications.

Paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII states that the Member "will be free to give effect to the changes" agreed in Article XXVIII:5 negotiations "as from the date on which the conclusion of all the negotiations have been notified". We consider that there might well have been reasons for the GATT Contracting Parties to have followed a different approach, and drafted paragraph 7 so as to instead authorize Contracting Parties to be "free to give effect to the changes agreed upon in the negotiations" only as from the date on which the changes have been introduced into the authentic text of the Schedule through certification (or alternatively, only as from the date that the draft of such changes had been communicated to the Director-General for certification in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, or only from the date that the notification of the date when these changes will come into force was made in accordance with the second sentence of paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII). However, had the GATT Contracting Parties intended to make certification of these other actions the legal prerequisite for a Contracting Party being free to give effect to the changes agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations, we would expect paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII to use different words to that effect.

China has not attempted to argue that the phrase "as from the date on which the conclusion of all the negotiations have been notified" is capable of being understood in more than one way. Rather, China focuses on the terms "free to give effect to the changes", and submits that these terms must be interpreted to allow only "the adoption by the WTO Member of the national legal provisions providing for the tariff rate quotas but not the actual implementation of these tariff rate quotas until certification has occurred." China's interpretation of these terms, as we understand it, is that they serve the limited purpose of allowing a Member to begin to put in place domestic legal provisions
or processes to eventually give effect to the changes agreed, but that Member could not actually "give effect to" or "implement" the changes agreed (nor could a Member "give effect to" or "implement" the domestic legal provisions being put in place). In our view, such a reading is at odds with the ordinary meaning of the terms "free to give effect to the changes".

7.527. This reading is also at odds with the wording of paragraph 7 in the French and Spanish versions of the Procedures. These provide, respectively, that "[i]l sera loisible aux parties contractantes de mettre en vigueur les modifications agréées au cours des négociations," and "[l]as partes contratantes podrán poner en vigor las modificaciones acordadas en las negociaciones." Furthermore, we consider that a WTO Member does not need to be 'allowed' by the WTO to begin to put in place domestic legal provisions or processes if they are not actually implemented. Therefore, in addition to being at odds with the ordinary meaning of the terms used in paragraph 7, China's restrictive interpretation of the terms "free to give effect" would appear to render paragraph 7 legally redundant and inutile.

7.528. Of course, we must read all of the relevant provisions of the Procedures in a way that gives meaning to all of them, harmoniously, rather than taking any one provision in isolation. Thus, we must read paragraph 7 in a manner that gives full weight to paragraph 8 of the same Procedures, which provides that "[f]ormal effect will be given to the changes in the schedules by means of Certifications in accordance with the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 26 March 1980," The need for a harmonious interpretation of paragraphs 7 and 8 is compelled by the fact that these provisions appear side-by-side in the same set of Procedures. In addition, the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules referenced in paragraph 8 and the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII were adopted only a few months apart in 1980. It is well established that "in public international law there is a presumption against conflict", and that "this presumption is especially relevant" in respect of instruments that "were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum".

7.529. Paragraph 8 refers to "formal effect" being given to the changes in a Schedule. The ordinary meaning of the term "formal" includes "[o]f or pertaining to the form or constitutive essence of a thing; essential", "[o]f, pertaining to, or in accordance with recognized rules or conventions...", "[m]ade in proper form, complete; veritable, unmistakable", "[h]aving a definite principle; regular, methodical", "[w]ell formed, regular, shapely", and "[v]alid or correctly so called in virtue of its form; explicit and definite, not merely tacit or accepted as equivalent". Thus, the ordinary meaning does not in any way suggest a diminutive reading of the concept of "formal effect", or of paragraph 8, or of certification more generally.

7.530. However, we do not consider that interpreting paragraph 7 in accordance with its ordinary meaning conflicts with the fact, reflected in paragraph 8, that "formal effect" is given to the changes "in the schedules" by means of certification. Rather, it appears to us that, if anything, the interpretation of paragraph 7 arising from the ordinary meaning of its terms is reinforced by the ordinary meaning of the terms of paragraph 8. By its terms, the subject-matter of paragraph 7 is the point in time at which a Member is "free to give effect to the changes agreed upon" (i.e. "as from the date that the conclusion of all the negotiations have been notified"). By its terms, the subject-matter of paragraph 8 is something different, namely, the point in time when "formal effect" will be given to the changes "in the schedules" (i.e. "by means of Certifications"). The terms of paragraphs 7 and 8, and the very fact that these two provisions are juxtaposed side-by-side in the same set of Procedures, makes clear that each provision is addressing a different issue. Thus, when read together, these provisions make clear that the question of when and under what conditions a Member is "free to give effect to the changes agreed" in Article XXVIII negotiations is different from the question of when and under what conditions "formal effect" will be given to the changes "in the schedules". If paragraph 8 served as the answer to both questions, then there would be no need for paragraph 7 (and vice versa). The reference to "formal effect" in paragraph 8 further reinforces that the subject-matter of this provision concerns "changes in the Schedules", and that this is different from the point in time that a Member is "free to give effect to the changes".

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721 Emphasis added.
7.531. We further note that paragraph 10 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII states that "[t]hese procedures are in relevant parts also valid for renegotiations under Article XVIII, paragraph 7, and Article XXIV, paragraph 6". Article XVIII:7 and the Understanding on Article XXIV also provide, in terms similar to Article XXVIII:3, that the relevant Member is "free to modify or withdraw" concessions. Paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations would also therefore be applicable to these negotiations, and is consistent with the language of those provisions. It follows that the language of paragraph 3 of Article XXVIII, which provides that a Member is "free to modify or withdraw" concessions (the same procedures which apply to reserved negotiations under paragraph 5 of Article XXVIII), is consistent with the language in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Procedures for Negotiations. This further suggests that certification is not a legal prerequisite for implementing the results of negotiations under Article XXVIII.

7.532. We note that the wording of paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII is significantly different from the wording used in the context of the procedures that apply to the modification of Schedules annexed to the GATS. Paragraph 6 of the Procedures for the Implementation of Article XXI, adopted by the Council for Trade in Services in 1999, states:

A modifying Member which has reached agreement with all Members that had identified themselves under paragraph 3 above shall, no later than fifteen days after the conclusion of the negotiations, send to the Secretariat a final report on negotiations under Article XXI, which will be distributed to all Members in a secret document. After completing the certification procedure under paragraphs 20 to 22, such a modifying Member will be free to implement the changes agreed upon in the negotiations and specified in the report, and it shall notify the date of implementation to the Secretariat, for circulation to the Members of the WTO. Such changes shall not exceed the modification or withdrawal initially notified and shall include any compensatory adjustment agreed upon in the negotiations.724 (emphasis added)

7.533. There is more than one possible explanation as to why this difference exists in the case of services. It might be that Members considered that the drafting of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII should be changed in the light of the importance of certification in the WTO legal system, and desired not to replicate the same approach, in the services context. It might be that Members considered that a different approach was warranted in the context of services as a consequence of the different subject-matter and the differences between the rules governing the modification of Schedules in Article XXI of the GATS, as compared with those found in Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. Whatever the reason, the wording of paragraph 6 of the Procedures for the Implementation of Article XXI of the GATS stands in stark contrast to the wording used in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII of the GATT. The wording of paragraph 6 is that the Member modifying its concessions "will be free to implement the changes agreed upon" in the negotiations "[a]fter completing the certification procedure", whereas the wording of paragraph 7 is that the Member "will be free to give effect to the changes agreed upon in the negotiations ... as from the date on which the conclusion of all the negotiations have been notified" with paragraph 8 addressing the separate question of when the formal effect is given to the changes "in the schedules".

7.534. China argues that allowing a Member to give effect to changes agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations prior to those changes being introduced in its Schedule through certification would reduce to inutility the certification procedures which, as China emphasizes, are mandatory in nature.725 China states that such an interpretation would entail the consequence that "the process of certification is meaningless and is reduced to no more than paper",726 and "would run contrary to the object and purpose of all the WTO rules regarding certification, which is to allow the entire Membership to acquiesce in modifications to Schedules"727 and to "review and accept the modifications that a WTO member proposes to make".728

725 China's first written submission, paras. 262-263.
726 China's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 116.
727 China's response to Panel question No. 50, para. 198.
728 China's response to Panel question No. 56, para. 200.
7.535. The 1980 Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, which supersede the certification procedures originally adopted in 1968, set forth the procedures through which rectifications and modifications to a Member's Schedule are certified. As noted earlier in our Report, we agree with the parties and third parties expressing a view on the matter that these procedures qualify, at a minimum, as "decisions", "procedures" or "customary practices" within the meaning of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement.729

7.536. In our view, a finding that Members are free to give effect to modifications to their concessions in certain situations prior to those changes being given formal effect in its Schedule, including in the situation where the changes have been agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations and notified to all other Members, would not imply that "the process of certification is meaningless". As we have already noted, the ordinary meaning of the terms "formal effect" does not in any way suggest a diminutive reading of the concept of certification. Furthermore, we do not doubt that there are other situations where the introduction of changes into the text of a Schedule is a legal prerequisite for effecting any change in Members' substantive rights and obligations. For example, a proposed rectification to correct an alleged error in a Schedule would have no legal effect until such time as the text of the Schedule is changed through certification.730 Likewise, an agreement among Members to reduce tariffs may not be legally enforceable in WTO dispute settlement until such time as the change has been introduced into the text of the Schedule through certification.731 In our view, however, the legal consequence of certification varies in different situations, and therefore must be analysed in relation to the particular situation at hand. In the present case, the issue is whether certification is a legal prerequisite that must be completed before a Member modifying its concessions can proceed to give effect to the changes agreed upon in negotiations under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994. With this in mind, we proceed to examine whether the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules shed light on that issue, beginning with the text of the Procedures.

7.537. We note that the preamble to the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules emphasizes "the importance of keeping the authentic texts of Schedules annexed to the General Agreement up to date and of ensuring that they tally with the texts of corresponding items in national customs tariffs". The preamble further states that, as a consequence, "changes in the authentic texts of Schedules which record modifications resulting from action taken under Article XXVIII shall be certified without delay". Paragraph 1 of the Procedures establishes that "[c]hanges in the authentic texts of Schedules annexed to the General Agreement which reflect modifications resulting from action taken under Article XXVIII shall be certified by means of Certifications", and requires that a "draft of such change shall be communicated to the Director-General within three months after the action has been completed". Paragraph 3 of the Procedures establishes that the draft will then be communicated by the Director-General to all Members, and become a Certification "provided that no objection has been raised by a contracting party within three months on the ground that, in the case of changes described in paragraph 1, the draft does not correctly reflect the modifications". Paragraph 4 of the Procedures provides that whenever practicable, certifications "shall record the date of entry into force of each modification".

7.538. Thus, the Procedures generally speak to the question of how changes in the authentic texts of Schedules are to be made. We understand the Procedures to clarify that certification is the legal prerequisite for altering the authentic text of a Schedule annexed to the General Agreement. However, the question before the Panel is not whether certification is a legal prerequisite for introducing changes into the text of a Schedule in the context of Article XXVIII negotiations. Rather, the question before the Panel is whether, a Member is free to give effect to the changes

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729 See paragraphs 7.22 to 7.27.
730 See e.g. Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment, para. 7.54 ("In responses to questions from the Panel, Russia acknowledged that when its proposed rectification was circulated in document G/MA/TAR/RS/406 in accordance with its request, both the European Union and Japan objected to Russia's proposed rectification. No further action was taken with respect to Russia's Schedule. In particular, no certification was circulated by the Director-General. As indicated, Russia is not challenging the European Union's objection in the context of the present proceedings and has not questioned Japan's objection. Thus, for the purposes of our task in this dispute, Russia's Schedule remains unaltered.")
731 See e.g. Panel Report, EC – IT Products, paras. 7.18 ("In accordance with paragraph 2 of the ITA Annex and the Decision of 26 March 1980 on Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions (the "1980 Procedures"), each ITA participant submitted a proposed modification to its own Schedule for review by all WTO Members. Each participant's schedule was certified following a three-month review period for that particular schedule.") (footnotes omitted)
agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations prior to the changes having been introduced into the authentic text of its Schedule. Our examination of the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII supports the conclusion that the two questions are distinct from one another. In our view, and as elaborated below, there are several elements in the text of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, including the preamble and paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 thereof, that also suggest that certification is not a legal prerequisite for implementing the changes resulting from Article XXVIII negotiations.

7.539. The preamble of the Procedures states that the objective of certification is to keep the authentic texts of the Schedules "up to date" and to ensure "that they tally with the texts of corresponding items in national customs tariffs", and that, in consequence, to ensure that changes in the authentic texts of Schedules to "record" modifications are certified without delay. We consider that if a Member were not free to implement tariff changes agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations (or any other specified articles of the GATT 1994, including Article XVIII, Article XXIV, and Article XXVII) prior to introducing the changes into the authentic text of its Schedule through certification, then it would arguably be unnecessary to ensure that the authentic text of the Schedules are "kept up to date" and "tally with" the texts of the corresponding items in national customs tariffs. Insofar as modifications are concerned, the latter could never diverge from the former without violating Article II:1 of the GATT. In other words, if certification were a legal prerequisite before a Member could implement changes resulting from Article XXVIII negotiations at the national level, it would follow that Schedules would always be up to date and tally with the texts of corresponding items in national customs tariffs.

7.540. Furthermore, we note that paragraph 1 of the Procedures refers to "[c]hanges in the authentic texts of Schedules" being certified to "reflect" modifications "resulting from action under" Article XXVIII (and the other articles of the GATT 1994 specified therein). However, if certification were a legal prerequisite for being able to give effect to those modifications, then it would follow that the introduction of the changes to the authentic texts of Schedules through certification would be the action that would "give effect to", and not "reflect", any modifications resulting from action under Article XXVIII. In addition, the wording of paragraph 1 makes clear that certification reflects "modifications resulting from action" that "has been completed" prior to certification, and this is reinforced by the French and Spanish versions of paragraph 1, which respectively state that "[l]es projets de changement seront communiqués au Directeur général dans les trois mois à compter du moment où les mesures auront été mises en place", and "[s]e enviará al Director General un proyecto de dichos cambios dentro de los tres meses siguientes al momento en que hayan quedado adoptadas las medidas". This too seems to presuppose that changes resulting from Article XXVIII negotiations may be implemented prior to certification.

7.541. We also find it significant that paragraph 3 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules provides that, in the case of changes which reflect modifications resulting from action under Article XXVIII (and also modifications resulting from the other specified Articles of the GATT 1994), Members may object to a certification only "on the ground that … the draft does not correctly reflect the modifications". The fact that objections are confined to the ground that "the draft does not correctly reflect the modifications" has at least two important implications. The first, as pointed out by the European Union, is that the certification process does not confer a "veto" right upon those Members which did not participate in the negotiations and who may not be satisfied with the compensation agreed, or upon those Members which did participate in the negotiations but failed to reach an agreement. The second implication is that the absence of an objection on the part of another Member cannot be construed as a Member "acquiescing" or "accepting" that the changes introduced into the authentic text of the Member's Schedule are consistent with the Member's obligations under the GATT. In the light of the foregoing, we are not persuaded by China's argument that the "object and purpose" of the certification procedure is to ensure that all Members have the opportunity to "acquiesce in" and "review and accept the modifications that a WTO member proposes to make" in the context of Article XXVIII negotiations.

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732 Emphasis added.
733 EU's second written submission, para. 186.
734 In response to a question from the Panel, China submits that it agrees that the grounds for raising an objection in the context of certification are limited to the situation where the changes "do not correctly reflect the modifications" agreed under Article XXVIII, but then China adds that "[i]n addition, for WTO
7.542. Continuing with our review of the text of the Procedures, we also find it significant that paragraph 4 provides that "[w]herever practicable Certifications shall record the date of entry into force of each modification and the effective date of each rectification". In our view, the significance of paragraph 4 lies in the fact that it clarifies that the "entry into force" of a modification is distinct from the point in time when the corresponding change in the authentic text of the Schedule is certified. We further note that the French and Spanish versions of paragraph 4 respectively refer to the "la date d'entrée en vigueur" and "la fecha de entrada en vigor", which recall the terms used in the French and Spanish versions of paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII ("de mettre en vigueur" and "poner en vigor").

7.543. In addition to these elements of the text of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification, we consider that the history of those certification procedures sheds light on the issue before us. Shortly after its adoption, the GATT 1947 and the annexed Schedules had been subject to several amendments by the Contracting Parties.\footnote{735} In the early years of the GATT, attempts to amend Schedules of concessions were carried out by means of "Protocols", providing that the rectifications or modifications contained therein would "become an integral part of the General Agreement on the day on which this Protocol has been signed by all the Governments which are on that day contracting parties to the General Agreement."\footnote{736} A series of "Protocols of Rectifications and Modifications" were circulated in the 1950s.\footnote{737} The Protocols were collections of rectifications and modifications, and intended to amend the Schedules of concessions to reflect those rectifications and modifications, including modifications arising from negotiations under Article XXVIII. The preamble to most of the protocols that were circulated stated that their aim was:

> To make certain modifications in the authentic text of certain Schedules to the General Agreement, which reflect modifications of concessions which have already been made effective in accordance with established procedures under the General Agreement.\footnote{738} (emphasis added)

7.544. This means that the GATT Contracting Parties considered that the modifications had "already been made effective" by operation of the relevant provision of the General Agreement, and that the purpose of modifying the text of the Schedule was to reflect those modifications.\footnote{739}
7.545. On 29 August 1968, the Director-General circulated a draft decision establishing new procedures for modifications and rectifications to Schedules (L/3062). The introduction to the new draft procedures set forth the following understanding:

Several provisions of the GATT - contained in Articles II, XVIII, XXIV, XXVII and XXVIII - permit action by contracting parties, in certain circumstances and subject to specified procedures and conditions, to modify concessions in their schedules. The modifications are legally valid upon the completion of the action and the contracting parties are informed of the results of each action. But there remains the formality of making the changes, in appropriate form, in the authentic texts of the schedules. It is proposed that this be done by means of certifications issued by the Director-General after all contracting parties have had an opportunity to examine the text.740 (emphasis added)

7.546. Thus, it was understood that "[t]he modifications are legally valid upon the completion of the action and the contracting parties are informed of the results of each action" with respect to modifications under Article XXVIII (and also under Articles II, XVIII, XXIV, and XXVII). As we noted earlier, Articles XVIII, XXIV and XXVII use a similar phrase to that used in paragraph 3 of Article XXVIII, namely that the Member concerned "shall be free to modify or withdraw" the concession, and affected Members that do not agree to the modification of concession "shall be free to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions". It was understood that certification relates not to the legal validity of the modifications, which occurs "upon completion of the action" and the GATT Contracting Parties being informed thereof, but rather to "the formality of making the changes, in appropriate form, in the authentic texts of the schedules".

7.547. The Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules were adopted by the Council on 19 November 1968.741 Similar to the language used in the earlier Protocols, paragraph 1 of the 1968 Procedures provided that changes in the authentic texts of the Schedules to "reflect modifications which have entered into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of Article II, Article XVIII, Article XXIV, Article XXVII or Article XXVIII, shall be certified by means of Certification."742 As we noted earlier in connection with the Protocols pre-dating the certification procedures, if certification were a legal prerequisite for a Member being free to give effect to changes agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations, then it would not have been possible for those modifications to "have entered into force" prior to certification. Thus, the wording of paragraph 1 of the 1968 Procedures suggests that GATT Contracting Parties adopted those Procedures on the understanding that they could give effect to the agreed changes pursuant to Article XXVIII negotiations prior to their incorporation into the Schedules of concessions through certification.743

7.548. On 26 March 1980, the revised Procedures for Modifications and Rectification of Schedules were approved by the Council.744 The 1980 Procedures are similar to the 1968 Procedures in many respects. However, one difference is that, in paragraph 1, the reference to changes to the Schedules being made to reflect modifications "which have entered into force" in accordance with Article XXVIII (and the other specified articles of the GATT) was replaced with a reference to
changes to Schedules being made to reflect modifications "resulting from action" under the respective provision.\footnote{745} We are not aware of the reason for this change, but we do not see that it signals that the Contracting Parties were seeking to effect a substantive change in the existing procedures, so as to make certification a legal prerequisite for giving effect to changes agreed in Article XXVIII negotiations. Among other things, in the same year the revised Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII were adopted, with no substantive change to the provision expressly authorizing that Contracting Parties "will be free to give effect to changes" agreed upon in Article XXVIII negotiations "as from the first date of the period referred to in Article XXVIII:1" or, in the case of negotiations under Article XXVIII:4 or XXVIII:5, "as from the date on which the conclusion of all the negotiations have been notified" as set out in accordance with paragraph 6.\footnote{746}

7.549. It appears to the Panel that there is no subsequent practice in the application of Article XXVIII establishing the agreement of Members on whether certification is a legal prerequisite that must be completed before a Member modifying its concessions can proceed to apply the changes agreed upon in Article XXVIII negotiations. China submits that "there is no practice among Members whereby certification is not required for a modification reached under Article XXVIII negotiations to enter into force and to take formal legal effect", and notes that "though there are instances where a modification entered into force before a certification was officially issued", "Members do submit requests for a certification prior to the planned implementation date, and leave time for the certification process".\footnote{747} The European Union submits that "[i]f the certification of changes to a Member's schedule is often delayed, sometimes for very long periods of time, due to the unjustified reservations made by some Members", and that "[a]s a result, the changes agreed in accordance with Article XXVIII are sometimes implemented many months, or even years, prior to the certification of such changes".\footnote{748} The parties have provided examples of cases in which certification occurred after the entry into force of changes resulting from Article XXVIII negotiations, and where certification occurred before such changes were made effective.\footnote{749} The absence of agreement among Members on whether certification is a legal prerequisite that must be completed before a Member modifying its concessions can proceed to

\footnote{745} There appear to be three other differences between the 1980 Procedures and the 1968 Procedures: (i) two paragraphs were added on the importance of "keeping the authentic texts of Schedules annexed to the General Agreement up to date" and that "changes in the authentic texts of Schedules shall be certified without delay"; (ii) also in paragraph 1, the time-bound submission of changes, which "shall be communicated to the Director-General within three months after the action has been completed", was added for the first time; and (iii) in paragraph 3, the time-limit for review and objection was changed to three months as compared to sixty days under the 1968 procedures.\footnote{746} A 1978 "Explanatory Note" by the Secretariat explained that the new paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII were not meant to introduce any substantive change to the corresponding provisions in L/635:

7. Paragraph 7 of document L/4651/Rev.1 corresponds to paragraph 12 of document L/635. Since the old text was related to the particular situation in 1957, the new text has been made more general. The essence of the text of paragraph 13 of document L/635 has also been included in this paragraph.

8. Paragraph 8 of document L/4651/Rev.1 takes account of the modifications that have been agreed upon as regards the legal instruments in question but has otherwise the same content as paragraph 14 of document L/635. (Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, Explanatory Note by the Secretariat, 13 September 1978, C/W/306.)

Furthermore, A. Hoda states the following with respect to the 1980 Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules:

An important aspect of the decision on the procedures for certification has to be highlighted here. As in the case of protocols to which the list of modifications and rectifications was attached, the certifications do not have any effect on the entry into force of the proposed modification or rectification. The idea is to formally incorporate in the schedules of Members modifications and rectifications which, in most cases, have already entered into force. In the case of modifications, the procedures to bring about changes in the legal obligations of the Members have already to be followed as a prerequisite for action to bring about changes in the authentic text. Thus, in the case of renegotiations under Article XXVIII, for instance, the procedures for these renegotiations should have already been complied with, before a request for modification of the schedule is made. (A. Hoda, Tariff negotiations and renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO, Procedures and Practices (Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 115-116.)

\footnote{747} China’s response to Panel question No. 96, para. 70.

\footnote{748} EU’s response to Panel question No. 96, para. 55.

\footnote{749} Parties’ responses to Panel question No. 96.
apply the changes agreed upon in Article XXVIII negotiations is also demonstrated by the diverse views presented by the third parties in this case.\footnote{See responses of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Russia, Thailand and the United States to Panel question No. 10 to third parties. Argentina states that “pursuant to Article II of the GATT and similar WTO provisions, the lack of the fulfillment of the certification obligation could put into question the consistency of the change introduced in the national custom tariff with a Member’s Schedule of Concessions and, as a result, with its WTO obligations”. Russia agrees with China that “changes that were agreed upon in Article XXVIII negotiations and include tariff rates in excess of a Member’s bound rates cannot be implemented prior to certification” of the modified schedule. Canada states that “[a]t the point where negotiations are concluded and the relevant period (for negotiations under Article XXVIII:1) or notice (for negotiations conducted under Article XXVIII:4 or Article XXVIII:5) has occurred, then the substantive changes to Schedules have been determined” and “[w]hat remains is to formally incorporate the substantive changes into the Schedules through use of the 1980 Procedures”. Thailand states that certification is “an administrative procedure that allows for the incorporation of the new tariff concessions in the modifying Member’s Schedule”, and “is not a substantive requirement that must be completed before a Member can implement the changes in its modified Schedule”. Brazil states that “[s]ince Schedules are an integral part to the covered Agreements, it is certainly useful that any changes to them be certified accordingly”, but then states that “[i]t seems, however, that GATT/WTO practice indicates that the certification is not indispensable prior to the modification of the Schedule by the Member”. The United States indicates that the Member modifying concessions “may ‘give effect to’ such changes before they are formally certified pursuant to paragraph 8 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions” (emphasis original); however, the United States then states that because “formal effect” will only be given to those changes after the modified schedule is certified, then “so long as the modified schedule remains uncertified, the prior, certified schedule would continue to constitute the formal legal basis for the Member’s rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements”.
\footnote{We recall that paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII provides that a Member will be free to give effect to “the changes agreed upon” in the negotiations.}
\footnote{Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 92. (emphasis original)}
\footnote{Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 92.}}

7.550. We are well aware of the importance of certification in the context of the WTO legal system. However, having carefully considered the existing provisions of the GATT 1994, the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII, and the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, it does not appear to be the case that certification is a legal prerequisite that must be completed before a Member modifying its concessions can proceed to implement the changes agreed upon in Article XXVIII negotiations at the national level.

7.11.5 Conclusion

7.551. In the present case, China has not suggested that the tariff rates applied by the European Union exceed those agreed upon in the Article XXVIII negotiations with Brazil and Thailand.\footnote{We recall that paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII provides that a Member will be free to give effect to “the changes agreed upon” in the negotiations.} Accordingly, having found that certification is not a legal prerequisite that must be completed before a Member modifying its concessions can proceed to implement the changes agreed upon in Article XXVIII negotiations at the national level, we are unable to uphold China's claims that the European Union violated Article II by giving effect to the modifications arising from the Article XXVIII negotiations prior to the changes being reflected in the authentic text of its Schedule through certification.

7.552. In arriving at this conclusion, we wish to stress that pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, the task of panels in the dispute settlement system of the WTO is “to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”\footnote{Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 92. (emphasis original)} As the Appellate Body has previously confirmed, determining what the applicable rules and procedures ought to be is not “the responsibility of panels; it is clearly the responsibility solely of the Members of the WTO”.\footnote{Appellate Body Report, US – Certain EC Products, para. 92.}

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

8.1. For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:

a. In respect of the Panel’s terms of reference,

i. China’s contention that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994 by failing to set aside TRQ shares for “all others” at
levels that allow other WTO Members to achieve a substantial supplying interest going forward falls within the scope of the panel's terms of reference;

ii. China's contentions that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 and Article XIII:4 of the GATT 1994 by failing to proactively disclose the historical trade data, the representative period selected or the special factors appraised are new claims that are outside the Panel's terms of reference;

iii. China's contentions that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:1 and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994 by failing to annually update the initial TRQ allocations constitute new claims that are outside the Panel's terms of reference;

iv. Insofar as China is claiming that the European Union acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 of the Procedures for Negotiations under Article XXVIII or paragraph 1 of the Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules, such claims are not properly before the Panel;

v. Insofar as China is claiming that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article II of the GATT 1994 by implementing the higher out-of-quota rates arising from the First Modification Package over the period 2007-2009, such claim is not properly before the Panel;

b. China has not demonstrated that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XXVIII:1 of the GATT 1994 by not recognizing China as a Member holding a principal or substantial supplying interest in the concessions at issue in the First and Second Modification Packages;

c. China has not demonstrated that the tariff rates and the TRQs negotiated and implemented by the European Union under the First and Second Modification Packages are inconsistent with Article XXVIII:2 of the GATT 1994, read in conjunction with paragraph 6 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994, by failing to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that existing prior to the modification;

d. In respect of China's claims under Article XIII:2(d) of the GATT 1994,

i. China has not demonstrated that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) by determining which countries had a substantial interest in supplying the products concerned on the basis of their actual share of imports into the European Union, rather than on the basis of an estimate of what import shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China;

ii. China has demonstrated that the increase in imports from China over the period 2009-2011 following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor" that had to be taken into account by the European Union when determining which countries had a substantial interest in supplying the products concerned, and the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XIII:2(d) by not recognizing China as a Member holding a substantial interest in supplying the products under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80 and by failing to seek agreement with China on the allocation of the TRQs for those particular tariff lines;

e. In respect of China's claims under the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994,

i. China has not demonstrated that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by determining the TRQ shares allocated to "all others" on the basis of actual share of imports into the European Union, rather than on the

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754 Tariff line 1602 39 80 merged with tariff line 1602 39 40 into tariff line 1602 39 85, effective 1 January 2012.
basis of an estimate of what import shares would have been in the absence of the SPS measures restricting poultry imports from China;

ii. China has demonstrated that the increase in imports from China over the period 2009-2011 following the relaxation of the SPS measures in July 2008 was a "special factor" that had to be taken into account by the European Union when determining the size of the TRQ shares to be allocated to "all others", and that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by not allocating a greater "all others" share under tariff lines 1602 39 29 and 1602 39 80;\textsuperscript{755}

iii. China has failed to demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently with the chapeau of Article XIII:2 by not allocating an "all others" share of at least 10% for all of the TRQs under the First and Second Modification Packages;

f. China has not demonstrated that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XII:1 of the GATT by allocating all or the vast majority of the TRQs to Brazil and Thailand;

g. China has not demonstrated that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 by allocating all or the vast majority of the TRQs to Brazil and Thailand;

h. China has not demonstrated that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article XII:4 of the GATT 1994 by refusing to enter into meaningful consultations with China; and

i. China has not demonstrated that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article II:1 of the GATT 1994 by giving effect to the modifications resulting from the Article XXVIII negotiations prior to the changes being reflected in the authentic text of its Schedule through certification.

8.2. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered \textit{prima facie} to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. We conclude that, to the extent that the measures at issue are inconsistent with Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994, they have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to China under the GATT 1994.

8.3. Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, having found that the European Union has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article XIII:2(d) and the chapeau of Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994, the Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request that the European Union bring its measures at issue into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.

\footnote{755 Tariff line 1602 39 80 merged with tariff line 1602 39 40 into tariff line 1602 39 85, effective 1 January 2012.}