# GENERAL AGREEMENT ON 

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## REPORT ON THE TURKTSH STNSP DUTY <br> SUBMITHE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IECISION <br> O. THE COIVIRACTJNG PAPTHES <br> 17 APRIL 1978

The most important characteristic of Turkey which should be taken into consideration in the context of its stamp cuty application is the fact that it is a developing country which has, in the process of development, been tecking three fundamental problems:

- to enerate a sufficient level of savines to meet the investment yequirements for development;
- to mintsin internal price stability so that the process of steady growth is not endangered by infletionary pressures;
- to maintain close surveillance orer its belance of poyments in view of the inimited volune of available foreign exchange enrnincs.

In $\because \therefore=\mathrm{i}$, the stamp duty legislation in Turkey should be vicwed as an instrument which has been introduced and is preserved as an integral part of these policj considerations.

In this context, the stamp duty scheme,

- nolns focilitate the implementotion anc increase the effectiveness of a selictive import régime;
- Fuvicies the Government with some flexibility in the implonentation of Ets wilcics in cose it cannot easily and quickly revise and restructure its forciçn trade récime as anc. when cyolicel chances occur in its balance-of-paments situation;
- :s a fiscal measure to menerate budgetary revenues.
riherefore, the Turkish Stemp Duty should not necessarily be considered as an ristzale to increasing access by contracting parties to Iurkey's domestic mariets, but rather as an instrument for balonced eoonomic dovelopment.

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In conformity with the world economic conditions Turkey continued facing a serious slowdown in its economic activity and a deterioretion in its belance-of-payments situntion. A major problem has been to sccure the neeessary means to finance imports needad mostly for its development purposes. Exports could cover only pert of the imports set forth in the annuel proframes under the five-year cevelopment plons.

Althouth the masures which had been taken have had some positive effects on external trade, 1978 was $\Omega$ year when price incresses were hirher then in previous years and belence-of-peymonts difficulties exceedingly serious.

The totsl value of imports which was precramed as $\$ 20.3$ billion for the Third Five-Year Development Plan period (1973-1977) recched the level of $\$ 22.5$ billicn. The eversee annual increase durine the said period was aproximately 30 per cent. The tariet set forth for axports of $\$ 10$ billion in the Third Five-Year Plon could not be realized and the total value of exports of $\$ 8.5$ billion attsined during this five-year period was 14.6 per cent benind the progrmmed figures. is or result, the freicn deficit reached the level of $\$ 14$ billion at the end the aforementioned jeriod.

The new exchonse rote orjustment in the berinnine of 1978 has contributed to reduce foreicn trede deficit. Therefore, the baince-ofpayments deficit which had grown substantially durins the previous years, narrowed somewhet in 1970.

In 1973, priority was continued to be given to the imports of raw materiols anc sinere perts needed to keep the existinc industries operntinc as close to full cenacity as zossible. The nocessary measures were alss taken to meat.inport requirements for capital goods. beoring in mind the investment iriorities of the development flons.

Both the absolute onount of Iberolized imports on their shore in total imperts heve also been increasine over the years in Turkey. The total value of liberolized imports was 70 per cont of total imports in 1977. (Table III:) In vicw of the rrevailinc difficulties in the balance-ofjeyments situntion, further steps to liberalize the imort récime con only be expected aftor the existing iniolance is reduced.

As records the budgetary policy, the Government of Turkey has been endeavourine to meet its financiol requirements with revenue renerated throuch non-inflntionary resources in order to maintain price stability ond to brinie the value and volume of imports into conformity with the development stratery. During the recent years, however, budeetary revenue hes tended to lac behine expenditure. Thererere, the stamp duty which contributes sukstantially to the Turkish budeet could not ensily be abandoned unless some other fiscal mensures were introducer as a substitute. Revenue from
the stamp duty is expected to amount to LT 14.300 million and
LT 16.260 million respectively in the fiscel years 1978 and 1979. This accounts for about 6 per cent of totel tax revenue, which corresponds to $a$ significont amount in view of the Government's effort to reduce the public sector deficit. However, the Turkish Government is aware of the fact that the stamp duty is justiried only on a tempornry besis and believes that this measure should be substituted by alternative and more arporiate measures. The Government does presently eim at replecing the stamj duty as a fiscal measure by - system of velue-added tax. The draft lesislation for the value-added tex is practically ready and is likely to be submitted to Parlianent in 1979. Nevertheless, until the draft legislation of the volueadded tax is enected into lew and technical preparations for its implementation are finalized, the revenue raised through the existinf stam duty scheme is also needed for budgetary purposes.

It is also worth mentioning thet:

- Turkey has been crantine non-reciprocel tex exemptions and recuctions to contractine parties, the imact of which is hirher than the yielc of the stami duty.
- The stamp duty acos not, mactically, enuse any increase in prices of injorted coods, but rather has the effect of reducing the hich profit margins of importers.

These very facts clearly show that Turkey's main rurpese in mantaining the stamp duty is by no means to curb imports; it should rather be regrded as one of the instruments of balanced economic irowth and part of a comprehensive fiscal effort directed towards achievinf, on overnll stebility in the economy.

As a result, the Turkish Government was not able, during the last twolve months, to substitute the existing scheme and the rate of the stani Cuty winch does not exceed 25 per cent of the value of imported goocs by othor apropriato measures and takines into account the prevailine budeatary and balance-of-jayments difficulties it seems unlikely to have any substantial chanfes in the system during 1979.




$\overline{\mathrm{T}} \mathrm{m}$
(In UGF million)

|  |  |  | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 2976 | 1977 | Jan $19788^{\text {at }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| I. | Imports | $\frac{\text { from the free }}{}$ | 1,060.5 | 1,462.3 | 2,000.3 | 3,555.2 | 4,577.3 | 5.037 .4 | 5.731 .4 | $3,125.5$ |
| (a) | Normal | imports | 792.8 | 1,120.6 | 1,627.0 | 3,221.0 | 4:081.7 | 4,462,8 | 5,222.5 | 2,701.3 |
|  | (1) | Liberalized imports | 532.7 | 708.1 | 1,148.8 | 2,524.2 | 2,918.8 | 3,319.8 | $4,852.4$ | 2,188.6 |
|  | (ii) | Global quota imnorts | 260.1 | 412.5 | 478.2 | 695.8 | 18152.9 | 1,143.0 | 1,200. 1 | 512.7 |
| (b) | Selfofi | inarcing imports | 267.7 | 342.7 | 381.3 | 334.2 | 495.6 | 574.6 | 503.9 | 414.2 |
|  | (i) | Hamo infrastructurs | 6.9 | 9.9 | 20.9 | 23.4 | 33.4 | 26.0 | 39.0 | 20.7 |
|  | (i1) | Project credita | 147.5 | 248.8 | 295.3 | 235.9 | 215.7 | 398.4 | 309.7 | 239.9 |
|  | (iii) | ```Foreirn private carital``` | 29.0 | 28.0 | 14.6 | 15.8 | 141.8 | 24.1 | 43.6 | 17.7 |
|  | (iv) | Imports under maiver | 82.6 | 55.7 | 50,1 | 52.3 | 98.1 | 135.5 | 102.4 | 82.6 |
|  | (v) | Other | 1.6 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 6.8 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 14.2 | 3.3 |
| II. | Bilate | ral quota imnorta | 110.3 | 100.3 | 78.0 | 222.3 | 161.3 | 91.2 | 64.9 | 37.4 |
| III. TOTAL |  |  | 1,170.8 | 1,562.6 | 2,006.3 | 3,777.5 | 4.738 .6 | 5.128 .6 | 5,796.3 | 3,152.9 |

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TABEE III
Percentage Rate of Lib

|  |  |  | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 2975 | 3976 | 2977 | 1978 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1. | In total ingorto | (E) (i) | 45.5 | 45.3 | 55.1 | 66.8 | 66.6 | 64.7 | 70.1 | 69.4 |
| 2. | In injorta from the irce-exchine onrea | (1) | 50.2 | 48.4 | 57.2 | 73.0 | 63.8 | 65.9 | 70.9 | 70.2 |
| 3. | In normel juperis | $\frac{(1)}{(a)}$ | 67.2 | 63.2 | 70.6 | 78.4 | 71.5 | 74.4 | 77.8 | 70.2 |

1 Mhis table is derived ircar rable $I$.
TABLETV

| Year¢ | Investment cooda |  | Spare parts and raw materiala |  | Corsumer coode |  | Tot | \% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1971 | 511.2 | 43.7\% | 600.7 | $51.3 \%$ | 58.3 | 5.0\% | 1.171.0 | 100\% |
| 1972 | 782.7 | 50.1\% | 707.2 | 45.3\% | 72.3 | 4.6\% | 1,952.7 | 100\% |
| 2973 | 1,002.6 | 48.0\% | 993.2 | 47.7\% | 90.4 | 4.35 | 2,086.2 | 100\% |
| 1974 | 1,021.8 | $35.0 \%$ | 1,590.9 | 59.5\% | 127.5 | 4.5\% | 2,840.2 | 100\% |
| 2975 | 1.961.1 | 41.4\% | 2,524.3 | $54.3 \%$ | 203.2 | 4.30 | 4,738.6 | 100\% |
| 1976 | 2,239.3 | 43.6\% | 2,732.9 | 53.3\% | 156.4 | 3.1\% | 5.128 .5 | 100\% |
| $\begin{aligned} & 1977 \\ & 1978(\mathrm{Jan} . \mathrm{Sep}) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $2,367.1$ $1,159.4$ | $40.8 \%$ $36.8 \%$ | $3,251.1$ $1,922.1$ | $56.1 \%$ $60.9 \%$ | 170.0 7.5 | $3,1 \%$ $2,3 \%$ | $5,796.3$ $3,153.0$ | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \% \\ & 100 \% \end{aligned}$ |

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(In US $\phi$ million)

| Aotu: 1 Imports Compared with Irserareme Injorte |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | (In U $\ddagger$ giillicn) |  |  |  |
|  | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 |
| Program:se estimates | 1.045 | 1.300 | 1.650 | 2.550 | 4.000 | 5.000 | 5.800 |
| Aotual injporta | 1.171 | 1.563 | 2.086 | 3.778 | 4.738 | 5.129 | 5.796 |
| Balance | +126 | +263 | 4436 | +1.228 | +739 | +129 | - 4 |
| Per cent | (12.0) | (20.2) | (26.4) | (48.1) |  |  |  |

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