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SECOND SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT.

NOTE BY THE CHINESE AND CANADIAN DELEGATIONS ON THE
QUESTION OF VOTING IN THE CONFERENCE CONSIDERED BY
THE COMMITTEE ON VOTING AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXEC-
UTIVE BOARD.

(Reference E/PC/T/143 Part C)

The Chinese and Canadian Delegations believe that it may be helpful if they amplify the suggestions looking towards a compromise solution of the question of voting which they advanced in the course of the Sub-Committee's discussions. For this purpose they have amalgamated their suggestions so as to constitute a single proposal.

1. The proposal is that the system of voting known as "one state, one vote" should be the basic system. In certain designated cases, however, they suggest that this system of voting should be supplemented by requiring also a majority of votes cast in accordance with a system of weighted voting.

2. Before considering the details of this proposal it may be convenient to indicate the main principle on which it is based.

Voting in accordance with the principle of one state, one vote has the advantage of affording protection against measures supported solely by large and economically powerful states. It has been said to have the disadvantage of enabling a group of relatively small states to impose a solution on large states which have a very great stake in world trade.

A system of weighted voting, on the other hand, gives some protection to large and economically important states against measures supported solely by small states. It has been said to have the corresponding disadvantage of enabling the first group, if it is unanimous, to impose a solution on the second.

The system of combined voting suggested by the Chinese and Canadian Delegations for use on certain designated issues combines the

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advantages of the other two systems and eliminates their disadvantages. It secures this result without requiring majorities so large that they might be difficult to obtain on controversial issues.

3. The details which would have to be settled if the system of combined voting is approved concern two questions:

- (a) What system of weighting should be adopted, and
- (b) What issues should be designated as requiring a combined majority?

4. (a) On the first of these questions the Chinese Delegation is in favour of the system proposed in Attachment A to the Report of the Committee on Voting and Membership of the Executive Board. This system is further explained in Document E/PC/T/143 Add.1. The Canadian Delegation would prefer a somewhat "heavier" weighting; for instance, a basic vote of twenty-five might be substituted for the basic vote of one hundred in Attachment A.

(b) The Chinese and Canadian Delegations consider that the use of the system of combined voting should be limited to those cases in which Member States consider that it is necessary for the protection of their interests. If, therefore, the principle of using the system of combined voting in certain designated cases is acceptable to the Commission it is hoped that Delegations will be prepared to indicate the issues, if any, on which they consider that the combined system should be employed. The Commission will then be in a position to ascertain if the proposed list of designated issues is generally acceptable.

5. In this way it is hoped that the Preparatory Commission may be enabled (as the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee have suggested) to reach a solution satisfactory to all.