ANNEX I

(WT/DS160/5 of 16 April 1999)

UNITED STATES – SECTION 110(5) OF US COPYRIGHT ACT

Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities
and their Member States

The following communication, dated 15 April 1999, from the Permanent Delegation of the European Commission to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, is circulated pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU.

My authorities have asked me to submit the following request on behalf of the European Communities and their Members States for consideration at the next meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body.

Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act, as amended by the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act" enacted on 27 October 1998, exempts, under certain conditions, the communication or transmission embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes (sub-paragraph A) and, also under certain conditions, communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a performance or display of a non dramatic musical work intended to be received by the general public (subparagraph B) from obtaining an authorisation to do so by the respective right holder. In practice this means that Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act permits under certain circumstances, the playing of radio and television music in public places (such as bars, shops, restaurants etc.) without the payment of a royalty fee.

However, Article (9)1 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights contained in Annex 1C to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereafter the "TRIPS Agreement") obliges WTO Members to comply with Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (hereafter the "Berne Convention").

Article 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention, as revised by the Paris Act of 1971 grants the authors of literary and artistic works, including musical works, the exclusive right of authorising not only the broadcasting and other wireless communication of their works, but also the public communication of a broadcast of their works by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument. Article 11(1) of the same Convention grants the authors of musical works the exclusive right of authorising the public performance of their works, including such public performance by any means or process, and any communication to the public of the performance of their works.

As a consequence of the above, Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act appears to be inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, including, but not limited to, Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.

In a communication dated 26 January 1999 (WT/DS160/1-IP/D/16) the European Communities and their Member States requested consultations with the United States of America pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes contained in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement (hereafter "the DSU"). Such consultations, which were held on 2 March 1999 in Geneva, have allowed a better understanding of the respective positions, but have not led to a satisfactory resolution of the dispute.

Accordingly, the European Communities and their Member States request the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU and Article 64:1 of the TRIPS Agreement to examine the matter in the light of the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and to find that the United States of America fails to conform to the obligations contained in the TRIPS Agreement, including, but not limited to, Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, and thereby nullifies or impairs the benefits accruing directly or indirectly to the European Communities and their Member States under the TRIPS Agreement.

The European Communities and their Member States request that the panel be established with the standard terms of reference as provided for in Article 7 of the DSU.
ANNEX II

(WT/DS160/6 of 6 August 1999)

UNITED STATES – SECTION 110(5) OF THE US COPYRIGHT ACT

Constitution of the Panel Established
at the Request of the European Communities

Note by the Secretariat

1. At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the DSB established a panel pursuant to the request by the European Communities (WT/DS160/5), in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU (WT/DSB/M/62).

2. At that meeting, the parties to the dispute agreed that the Panel should have standard terms of reference. The terms of reference are the following:

"To examine, in light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the European Communities in document WT/DS160/5, the matter referred to the DSB by the European Communities in that document and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements."

3. On 27 July 1999, the European Communities made a request, with reference to paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU, to the Director-in-charge to determine of the composition of the Panel. Paragraph 7 of Article 8 provides:

"If there is no agreement on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the establishment of a panel, at the request of either party, the Director-General, in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Chairman of the relevant Council or Committee, shall determine the composition of the panel by appointing the panelists whom the Director-General considers most appropriate in accordance with any relevant special or additional rules or procedures of the covered agreement or covered agreements which are at issue in the dispute, after consulting with the parties to the dispute. The Chairman of the DSB shall inform the Members of the composition of the panel thus formed no later than 10 days after the date the Chairman receives such a request."

4. On 6 August 1999, the Director-in-charge composed the Panel as follows:

Chairperson: Carmen Luz Guarda

Members: Arumugamangalam V. Ganesan
          Ian F. Sheppard

5. Brazil, Australia, Canada, Japan and Switzerland reserved their rights as third parties to the dispute.
ATTACHMENT 1.1

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
AND THEIR MEMBER STATES

(5 October 1999)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The European Communities and their member States (hereinafter EC/MS) bring this complaint against the United States of America (US) because they consider that certain aspects of the US legislation relating to the protection of copyrighted works are incompatible with the US’ obligations stemming from the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

2. While Section 106 Copyright Act gives the right holder of a copyrighted work the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies of the work and to perform the copyrighted work publicly, Section 110(5) Copyright Act provides for two exemptions from copyright protection, which in simple terms can be summarised as follows:

- Under Subsection A, anybody is allowed to perform in his business premises for the enjoyment of customers under certain conditions, without the consent of the copyright holder, copyrighted works other than nondramatic compositions such as plays, operas or musicals from radio or television (TV) transmissions;

- Under Subsection B, anybody is allowed to perform in his business premises for the enjoyment of customers, "nondramatic music" by communicating radio or TV transmissions without the consent of the copyright owner in cases where a certain surface is not exceeded without any practical limitation or above that surface limit by respecting certain conditions as to the number of loudspeakers used.

3. In the view of the EC/MS these US measures are in violation of the US' obligations under the WTO-TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the US measures are incompatible with Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11(1) and 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention and cannot be justified under any express or implied exception or limitation permissible under the Berne Convention or under TRIPS. These measures cause prejudice to the legitimate rights of copyright owners, thus nullifying and impairing the rights of the EC/MS.

4. The EC/MS would also like to mention that several senior US government officials, which have testified before the US Congress during the legislative process which led to the present version of Section 110(5) Copyright Act, have expressed the view that the extension of the scope of this provision would violate the US' obligations under TRIPS and the Berne Convention.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^3\)

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\(^1\) The Register of Copyrights stated on 17 July 1997 in Congress (copy of the entire statement on international aspects attached – Exhibit EC-11) that: "The Copyright Office believes that several of the expanded exemptions, if passed in their current form, would lead to claims by other countries that the United States was in violation of its obligations under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, incorporated into the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") of the Uruguay Round of GATT".

\(^2\) At the same occasions, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks stated that: "Our trading partners are likely to allege that several of the changes to the copyright law proposed in Section 2 of the proposed bill may be inconsistent with our obligations under the Berne Convention and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("the TRIPS Agreement") administered by the World Trade Organisation. If H.R. 789 is enacted, and we undermine the rights of copyright owners of musical works to perform their works in public, in particular at a restaurant or bar as envisioned by Section 2(a) and at the establishments covered by Section 2(c), we are seriously concerned that they will claim that we are in violation of our international commitments under both the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, the latter of which contains a similar right under Article 14(3)" (copy of the entire statement on international aspects attached – Exhibit EC-12).
5. The EC/MS' economic interests in this matter are significant. According to a study to which the EC/MS will refer to under Part IV, approximately 70% of all drinking and eating establishments and 45% of all retail establishments in the US can play without limitation radio or TV music without the consent of the copyright owner. This demonstrates clearly the potential of Section 110(5) Copyright Act to cause very significant losses of licensing income.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

6. The so-called "homestyle exemption", which textually corresponds to the present subsection A of Section 110(5) Copyright Act, was already contained in the Copyright Act of 1976 which entered into force on 1 January 1978. Subsection B was added to the Copyright Act in October 1998 by the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act". The practical result of the latter amendment consists in a significant extension of the scope of the exemption from copyright protection as compared to the previous "homestyle" exemption.

7. The US notified their laws and regulations governing the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) to the TRIPS Council on the basis of Article 63(2) TRIPS and the relevant guidelines adopted by the TRIPS Council. At its meeting of July 1996, the US copyright legislation, together with the copyright legislation of other industrialised WTO Members, was subject to a review carried out in the TRIPS Council in which the EC/MS inter alia asked a number of questions to the US concerning copyright protection in the area of copyrighted works to which the US replied in writing.

8. On the bilateral level the EC/MS raised their concerns by means of several diplomatic demarches at various levels, including the political level. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to make any progress to resolve the issues in this way.

9. By a communication dated 26 January 1999, the EC/MS requested consultations pursuant to Article 4 DSU and Article 64 TRIPS in conjunction with Article XXII GATT 1994.

10. By communications dated 11 and 12 February 1999 Australia and Canada expressed their desire to join the consultations pursuant to Article 4 (11) DSU. By a communication dated 15 February 1999, Switzerland did likewise. All three requests were accepted by the US.

11. Consultations between the EC/MS and the US were held in Geneva on 2 March 1999. Canada participated in these consultations. Prior to the consultations, the EC/MS submitted to the US a number of written questions, to most of which the US replied orally. These consultations did not, however, lead to a satisfactory resolution of the matter.

12. By a communication dated 15 April 1999, the EC/MS requested the establishment of a Panel pursuant to Article 64(1) TRIPS and Articles 4(7) and 6(1) DSU. The US refused the establishment of a Panel at the meeting of the DSB on 28 April 1999. At the DSB meeting held on 26 May 1999, the Panel was established.

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3 For the sake of accuracy, it has to be mentioned that the statements referred to under point 4 have been made on the basis of an earlier proposal (H.R. 789 attached as Exhibit EC-13) which provided for slightly wider exception than the one contained in the present Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

4 WTO Doc. IP/N/1/USA/C/1 and 2.
5 WTO Doc. IP/C/M/7.
6 WTO Doc. IP/Q/USA/1.
7 WTO Doc. WT/DS/160/1.
9 WTO Doc. WT/DS/160/2.
10 WTO Doc. WT/DS/160/3.
11 Note from the Permanent Mission of the United States to the WTO dated 31 March 1999.
12 WTO Doc. WT/DS/160/5.
13. The terms of reference of the Panel are the following:

"To examine in light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the European Communities in document WT/DS 160/5 the matter referred to the DSB by the EC/MS in that document and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements."\(^{13}\)

14. Five WTO Members have notified under Article 10(2) DSU their interest in the matter before the panel. These third parties are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan and Switzerland.\(^{14}\)

### III. PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS AND THE EXCEPTIONS THERETO UNDER THE US COPYRIGHT ACT

1. Historical background: Section 110(5) Copyright Act before the 1998 amendment ("the homestyle exemption")

15. Under Section 106 Copyright Act (1976), the right holder of a work has the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works and distribute copies of the work. Under Section 106(4) of said Act, the owner of copyright has also the exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly".

16. In order fully to understand the exemptions contained in the present version of Section 110(5), it is essential to consider its previous version. Prior to 1999, Section 110(5) only consisted of the current Subsection A (minus the words "except as provided in subparagraph (B)"). Subsection B was added to the statute in October 1998 by the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act". The 1976 version of Section 110(5) was generally referred to as "the homestyle exemption". It reads as follows:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106, the following are not infringements of copyright:

(5) communication or transmission embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless:

(a) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission, or

(b) the transmission thus received is further retransmitted to the public."

17. In broad terms, the homestyle exemption covered the use of a "homestyle" radio or TV in a shop, a bar, a restaurant or any other place frequented by the public. The exemption did not apply to venues playing tapes, CDs or other mechanical music.

18. The ratio legis of the homestyle exemption goes back to the 1975 US Supreme Court case Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken.\(^{15}\) Mr Aiken was the owner of a small fast-food restaurant who operated a radio with outlets to four speakers in the ceiling. This installation received the

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\(^{13}\) WTO Doc. WT/DS/160/6.

\(^{14}\) WTO Doc. WT/DS/160/6.

\(^{15}\) Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (Exhibit EC-1).
transmission of various radio stations which included protected musical works. At that time it was believed that the 1931 *Jewell-Lasalle* Supreme Court ruling\textsuperscript{16} meant that a business establishment had to obtain a licence to pick up a broadcast and in order to legally communicate it to the public. However, Mr Aiken had no licence from the right holders of the copyrighted works that were broadcast through the radio on his premises. The Supreme Court exempted Aiken from liability under the 1909 Copyright Act (which is the predecessor of the 1976 Act), as, according to the Court, what he was doing could not be considered as "performing" within the meaning of said Act.\textsuperscript{17}

19. However, in the Copyright Act (1976), the new definition of "perform" clearly covered what Mr Aiken had been doing. In order to keep the "Aiken" activities permissible without the consent of the right holder, a specific provision has been inserted into the Copyright Act to provide users with an exemption from copyright liability.

20. In order to qualify for the exemption, the transmission must be received on "a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes". The benefit of the exemption is lost if a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission or if the transmission is retransmitted to the public.

21. An important question arises as to what is to be considered "a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes". Technology is under constant evolution and the "household radio" technology of the 70's has been superseded several times, having as a practical effect that the scope of the homestyle exemption has continuously been extended.

22. Although it is clear that, in practice, the homestyle exemption has applied in the past and continues to apply at present primarily to radio and TV broadcasts, and satellite and cable TV, the wording of Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976) appears in view of the EC/MS to be also applicable to a wider range of transmissions, including computer networks and the internet.\textsuperscript{18}

23. The scope of Section 110(5) (in its "homestyle" version) has evolved over the years. At the time of the adoption of the Copyright Act (1976), the intention of the US Congress appeared to be that the scope of the exemption should be narrow and apply only to small commercial establishments "where mom is behind the counter and dad does the cashier".\textsuperscript{19} However, the Congressional intent was rather ambiguous, as indicated by the following passage: that "(i)t applies to performances and displays of all types of works, and its purpose is to exempt from copyright liability anyone who merely turns on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or TV (…)".\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} Under Section 101 US Copyright Act to perform a work means "to recite, render, play, dance or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process", while to transmit a performance or display it is "to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are sent".
\textsuperscript{18} We will come back to this issue when discussing Article 110(5)(B) Copyright Act below.
\textsuperscript{19} Compare also reply by the US administration to questions by Canada and the EC/MS within the TRIPS Council, 30 October 1996, WTO Doc. IP/Q/USA/1 at p. 12 with a reference to H.R. Rep. N°1476, 94\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session 87 (1976) (Exhibit EC-2) "The basic rationale of this clause is that the secondary use of the transmission by turning on an ordinary receiver in public is so remote and minimal that no further liability should be imposed. (…). [T]he Committee considers [the particular fact situation of Aiken] to represent the outer limit of the exemption, and believes that the line should be drawn at this point. Thus the clause would exempt small commercial establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto their premises standard radio or TV equipment and turn it on for their customers' enjoyment, but it would impose liability where the proprietor has a commercial sound system installed or converts a standard home receiving apparatus (…) into the equivalent of a commercial sound system".
\textsuperscript{20} See H.R. Rep. N° 1476, 94\textsuperscript{th} Congress, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Session 86 (1976) (Exhibit EC-3).
24. According to the statements by the US authorities made in connection with this case, US Courts have also interpreted this provision narrowly: if the receiving equipment and loudspeakers were too sophisticated and powerful, the exemption would not apply.\textsuperscript{21} In fact, when looking closely at the vast litigation on Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976), one does not come to the same conclusion. In these 20 years of litigation, two periods can be distinguished.

25. Until the early 90's, the main elements that Courts took into consideration in this respect were:\textsuperscript{22}

- the physical size of the establishment (in terms of square footage, e.g. by comparing with the size of Aiken's\textsuperscript{23} restaurant);
- the economic significance of the establishment;
- the number of speakers;
- whether the speakers were free standing or built into the ceiling;
- whether, depending on its revenue, the establishment was of a type that would normally subscribe to a background music service;
- the noise level of the areas within the establishment where the transmissions were made audible;
- the extent to which the receiving apparatus was to be considered as one commonly used in private homes; and
- the configuration of the installation.

As a result of the ambiguous statutory language of Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976), the selective use of these criteria during a decade of litigation has given rise to a certain degree of inconsistency of the case law.\textsuperscript{24}

26. In recent years, rather than to look at the legislative history of Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976) and the intention of the legislator, Courts started to focus more on the plain text of the homestyle exemption, resulting in a broader interpretation of the exemption. As a result of this, large chain store corporations were found to be exempt from applying for a licence and paying a licence fee. \textit{Edison}\textsuperscript{25} and \textit{Claire's Boutiques}\textsuperscript{26} are illustrative decisions which were taken by two different Federal Appeal Courts one month from each other.

\textsuperscript{21} Reply by the US authorities to questions by Canada and the EU within the TRIPS Council, 30 October 1996, WTO Doc. IP/Q/USA/1 at p. 12.
\textsuperscript{22} A non-exhaustive list of relevant Court cases applying the Section 110(5) exemption is attached as Exhibit EC-4.
\textsuperscript{23} See under footnote 15 above.
\textsuperscript{24} It appears from the analysis of US case law on the homestyle exemption that, although surface was not the only criterion used for the application, no Court has ever favourably applied it to an eating or drinking establishment with more than 1500 square feet of total space (the Aiken restaurant was 1,055 square feet). In the same vein, the homestyle exemption does not appear to have been applied by Courts to establishments using more than 4 speakers.
\textsuperscript{25} BMI v. Edison Bros. Stores Inc., US Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, N° 91-2115, January 13, (Exhibit EC-5). In the early 80's, Edison Brothers, an important chain retail store, reached an understanding with a major US collecting society (BMI) on a "radio policy" designed to exempt its more than 1500 stores from copyright liability. The terms of the arrangement were as follows: (a) only two speakers may
27. The core question in both cases was whether in the case of a large nation-wide company, with annual revenues of several hundred million dollars and with a large number of outlets, each outlet using a single receiver of a kind commonly used in private homes, Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976) was still applicable. In both cases the Courts' answers were in the affirmative. According to the Courts, the only relevant factors in assessing the applicability of the exemption are the quantity and the quality of the receiving apparatus used in a particular premise. The physical size of the establishment qualifying for the exemption, the ownership and/or the corporate structure of the establishment or any other factor considered in previous case law were declared irrelevant with regard to the application of the homestyle exemption.

28. In the early nineties, a coalition of business associations started active lobbying of Congress members in order to secure both a clarification of Section 110(5) and a widening of its scope. The coalition's efforts rapidly bore fruit. As from 1995 several bills were introduced in the US House of Representatives and in the US Senate aimed at significantly extending the scope of the homestyle exemption.

29. On 6 and 7 October 1998, a bill, entitled Fairness in Music Licensing Act, was adopted by, respectively, the US House of Representatives and the US Senate. The bill consisted of adding a new Subsection B to Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, while the wording of the homestyle exemption remains unchanged under Subsection A. It was signed by the President on 27 October 1998, and entered into force on 26 January 1999.

2. Current scope and application of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act

30. Section 110(5) now contains two distinct exemptions: the so-called "homestyle exemption" under Subsection A modified as to the kind of works covered and a new exemption under Subsection B (sometimes referred to as the "business exemption").

(a) Subsection A

31. The exact meaning and scope of the "homestyle" exemption, now under Subsection A of Section 110(5), after the adding of Subsection B to the statute, and preceded by the expression "except as provided for in subparagraph (B)", appears to be as follows.

While Section 110(5) Copyright Act applied to all kinds of copyrighted works before the 1998 amendment, apparently, Section 110(5)(A) Copyright Act is now intended to exclude from its scope "nondramatic musical works" and continues to apply to all other types of works, including e.g. plays, sketches, operas, operettas, musicals, because Section 110(5)(A) Copyright Act refers to "works" in general, while the scope of Subsection B is expressly limited to "nondramatic musical works".

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26 BMI v. Claire's Boutiques Inc., US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, No. 91-1232, December 11, 1991 (Exhibit EC-6). This case also opposed right holders and a chain store corporation, the factual and legal situation was similar to the Edison case.

27 Both in Edison and Claire's Boutiques, each store was fully owned and centrally managed by Edison Inc. and Claire's Boutique Inc. No franchising system was applied. The Claire's Boutique Stores had an individual surface between 861 and 2,000 square feet. Edison stores had an individual surface per outlet between 800 and 1,200 square feet.
32. What has been said on Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976) above continues to apply to subsection A of the current Section 110(5) Copyright Act with the proviso that the scope of this provision has apparently been limited by excluding nondramatic musical works which are now dealt with in Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act. However, given that the limitations on the size of the establishment have been greatly relaxed in subsection B, it is doubtful whether Courts will uphold the limit on the size of the establishment, which they have set in the case law on Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976).  

(b) Subsection B

33. Subsection B of Section 110(5) Copyright Act reads as follows:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 106, the following are not infringements of copyright:

(B) communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a performance or display of a nondramatic musical work intended to be received by the general public, originated by a radio or TV broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal Communications Commission, or, if an audiovisual transmission, by a cable system or satellite carrier, if-

(i) in the case of an establishment other than a food service or drinking establishment, either the establishment in which the communication occurs had less than 2,000 gross square feet of space (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other purpose), or the establishment in which the communication occurs has 2,000 or more gross square feet of space (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other purpose) and-

(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space; or

(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any visual portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than 1 audiovisual device is located in any 1 room, and no such audiovisual device has a diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space;

(ii) in the case of a food service or drinking establishment in which the communication occurs has less than 3,750 gross square feet of space (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other purpose), or the establishment in which the communication occurs has 3,750 gross square feet of space or more (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other purpose) and

28 Compare footnote 22.
(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space; or

(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any visual portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than one audiovisual device is located in any 1 room, and no such audiovisual device has a diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space;

(iii) no direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission or retransmission;

(iv) the transmission or retransmission is not further transmitted beyond the establishment where it is received; and

(v) the transmission or retransmission is licensed by the copyright owner of the work so publicly performed or displayed.”

(ba) Exempted uses

34. The exemption contained in Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act covers transmissions or retransmissions embodying a performance or display of a nondramatic musical work intended to be received by the general public, originated from a radio or TV broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal Communications Commission. This basically covers a situation which appears similar to the one covered by the homestyle exemption, i.e. establishments which are open to the public may play radio or TV on their premises for the enjoyment of their customers without the consent of the right owners.

35. A last difference is that Subsection B does not apply to "works" in general but only to "nondramatic musical works", i.e. songs, and not to operas, operettas, musicals.

36. While the former "homestyle exemption" and the present Subsection A limit the exemption to the use of a single receiving apparatus commonly used in private homes, this condition is completely absent in Subsection B for cases where the establishment does not exceed a certain size. For all larger establishments the "homestyle" requirement has been replaced by much less stringent conditions in relation to the audio or TV equipment which can be used.

37. Moreover, retransmissions which were not expressly exempted under Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976) are now expressly exempted. Under the US Copyright Act, to "transmit" a program means "to communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place where they are sent". Consequently, to "retransmit" a program means to further transmit a transmission, as is for example the case with cable TV operators, who receive TV signals

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29 Under Section 101 Copyright Act to perform a work means to recite, render, play, dance or act, either directly or by means of any device or process.
30 Under Section 110 Copyright Act to display a work means to show a copy of it either directly or indirectly by means of any device.
31 Section 101 Copyright Act.
and retransmit them to their subscribers, or with satellites, which receive the earth-to-satellite signals and retransmit them to the earth.

38. Most TV programmes in the US are transmitted either by over-the-air broadcast or by cable or satellite. Therefore, the express inclusion of this transmission mode makes TV programmes fully subject to the exceptions in all forms of transmission.

39. It is presumed that Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act applies in a case of public communication of musical works involving new technologies such as computer networks (e.g. Internet) in view of the wording of this provision. This transmission mode, the importance of which increases from day to day, is now subject to the exemption from copyright protection.  

(bb) Exempted users

40. For the application of the exemption to the establishments other than food service or drinking establishments, the following conditions apply:

- if the establishment has less than 2,000 gross square feet (= 186 square meters), the exemption applies without any further condition, i.e. any audio equipment also of a professional character and any number of loudspeakers can be used;

- if the establishment has more than 2,000 gross square feet of space, the exemption applies under the following conditions:

  - if the performance is by audio means only, it may be communicated by means of a maximum of 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 may be located in any one room;

  - if the performance or display is by audiovisual means:

    - any visual portion of the performance may be communicated by a maximum of 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than one may be located in any one room. Moreover such devices should not have a diagonal screen size larger than 55 inches;

    - any audio portion of the performance may be communicated by a maximum of 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 may be located in any one room.

41. For food service or drinking establishments, the following even more generous conditions apply:

- if the establishment has less than 3,750 gross square feet (= 348 square meters) of space (excluding parking space) the exemption applies without conditions, i.e. any kind of

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32 The following example is mentioned as an illustration of a situation in which this becomes relevant: an FCC-licensed radio (or TV) broadcaster parallels its over-the-air transmissions on the internet (as an audio back-up to his web-site). These programmes are received by a PC connected with a number of loudspeakers in a bar or other establishment meeting all the conditions set out in Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act.

33 Which are defined in Section 101 Copyright Act amended by Section 205 of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act as: "restaurant, inn, bar, tavern or any other similar place of business in which the public or patrons assemble for the primary purpose of being served food or drink, in which the majority of the gross square feet of space that is non-residential is used for that purpose, and in which nondramatic musical works are performed publicly".
audio(-visual) equipment, including professional equipment and any number of loudspeakers may be used;

- if the establishment has more than 3,750 gross square feet of space, the exemption applies under the following conditions:
  - if the performance is by audio means only, it may be communicated by means of a maximum of 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 may be located in any one room;
  - if the performance or display is by audiovisual means:
    - any visual portion of the performance may be communicated by a maximum of 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than one may be located in any one room. Moreover such devices should not have a diagonal screen size larger than 55 inches;
    - any audio portion of the performance may be communicated by a maximum of 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 may be located in any one room.

42. The exemption applies to "establishments" which are now defined by Section 101 of the US Copyright Act (upon amendment by Section 205 of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act) as "a store, shop or any similar place of business open to the general public for the primary purpose of selling goods or services in which the majority of the gross square feet of space that is non-residential is used for that purpose and in which nondramatic musical works are performed publicly". This definition also reconfirms the findings of the two Circuit Courts referred to above in relation to Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976) that in order to meet the copyright exception each individual store, shop or place of business has to be looked at individually, it being irrelevant if a company operates several thousand such places of business all over the US.

(bc) General conditions

43. No direct charge must be made to the public to see or hear the transmission or retransmission. This condition also applies to the homestyle exemption. However, this condition has no potential whatsoever to limit the exception, because the operator of the establishment remains completely free to amortise the acquisition and operating costs of the audio(-visual) equipment by charging his customers for the goods and services sold accordingly.

44. The transmission or retransmission may not be further transmitted beyond the establishment where it is received. Further transmission or retransmission would of course imply that a new audience is reached, and would thus be a further communication to the public. Thus also this condition has in practice no potential to limit the exception in any meaningful manner.

45. The transmission or retransmission must be licensed by the copyright owner of the work performed. This means that the original broadcaster must be properly licensed by the right holder. Given that virtually all radio or TV stations in the Unites States are licensed by performing rights organisations, this condition is also unlikely to have any practical effect to limit the scope of the exemption.

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34 Compare footnotes 25 and 26.
Summary

46. The exemptions from copyright protection contained in Article 110(5) Copyright Act can be summarised as follows:

As far as copyrighted works excluding nondramatic musical works are concerned, anybody in the US can play such works from radio or TV on his business premises for the enjoyment of his customers without the consent of the copyright owner. The only condition in the law which has the potential to somewhat reduce the benefit of the exception from applying to all business premises in the US, consists in requiring that a single apparatus of a kind commonly found in private homes be used, without defining in the law what is meant by this. The other conditions are unlikely to have any limiting effect in practice.

47. As to nondramatic musical works, anybody can play such works originating from radio or TV in his establishment for the enjoyment of his customers without the consent of the copyright holder. In case the establishment being below a certain size (3,750 square feet for restaurants and bars and 2,000 square feet for all other establishments), no further conditions apply with a potential to limit the number of exempted establishments. In case the premises exceed these size limits, there exist some rather generous limitations in relation mainly to the number of loudspeakers which can be used. In any event, the use of professional equipment is perfectly permissible.

IV. QUANTITATIVE EFFECTS ON COPYRIGHT OWNERS

48. In order to illustrate the scope of the exception, as far as the establishments referred to under Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act are concerned, and on which no limitations as to the audio(-visual) equipment used exist, the following figures are instructive.

49. On the basis of a 1998 Dun & Bradstreet's "Dun's Market Identifiers Market Profile"\(^{35,36}\), which is a data base containing information, *inter alia* on square footage, of more than 6,5 million US businesses, the following can be said:

In 1998, the following number of establishments were contained in the D&B database (this was also the approach by the CRS in 1995), while the total figures as estimated by D&B are given in brackets:

- 7,819 (49,061) drinking establishments of a square footage below 3,750 square feet (= 73 % (85 %) of all US drinking establishments filed in the D&B database);
- 51,385 (192,692) eating establishments of a square footage below 3,750 square feet (= 70 % (68 %)of all US eating establishments filed in the D&B database);
- 65,589 (281,406) retail establishments of a square footage below 2,000 square feet (=45 % (42 %) of all US retail establishments filed in the D&B database).

50. These figures comprise bars, restaurants, tea-rooms, snackbars, etc. and retail stores. However, other sectors in which a number of establishments are likely to be exempted as well were not taken into account (for example: hotels, financial service outlets, estate property brokers, other types of service providers).

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\(^{35}\) Further explanations and the data provided by Dun & Bradstreet are contained in Dun's Market Identifiers Market Profiles (Exhibit EC-7).

\(^{36}\) The 1995 figures of this data base were used by the US Congress Research Service to establish in 1996 the number of establishments in certain size categories to be covered by the new law.
51. To put the results of these data otherwise approximately 70% of all drinking and eating establishments in the US and 45% of all retail establishments in the US are entitled under Section 110(5) Copyright Act, without any limitation, to play music from the radio and TV on their business premises for the enjoyment of their customers without the consent of the copyright owners thus depriving the latter of a significant source of licensing income.

52. All other - larger - establishments are of course benefiting from the exception under Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act, if they meet the very lenient conditions as to the number of permissible loudspeakers.

V. INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE US LEGISLATION WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

1. Short Negotiating History of the TRIPS Agreement

53. At the Ministerial Conference which launched the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations at Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986, TRIPS was included into the negotiation agenda as one of the so-called new topics. Multilateral rulemaking in the IPR area had been so far dominated by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) which administers or co-administers practically all important conventions in this area. There existed at the outset different views between industrialised countries, who wished to achieve a comprehensive coverage of all intellectual property rights and developing countries (LDCs) who wanted to limit work to a Code against trade in counterfeit goods.

54. During the negotiating process the view of those who pursued a comprehensive approach prevailed. This had as a consequence that practically all existing IPRs were included in TRIPS. To start with the principles of national treatment and most favoured nation treatment (the latter being a novelty in the area of IPRs) were stipulated. The most important WIPO conventions (the Paris Convention covering industrial property rights and the Berne Convention covering copyright as well as the Washington Treaty for the protection of semiconductor topographies) were included by reference, also to make these conventions subject to an efficient dispute settlement system. Furthermore extensive rules for the enforcement of the substantive IPR standards were provided, which constituted an absolute novelty for international IPR rulemaking.

55. The so-called Dunkel text on TRIPS of December 1991 became almost verbatim part of the Final Act adopted at the Marrakech Ministerial Conference in April 1994 which successfully concluded the Uruguay Round Negotiations. The provisions of TRIPS became fully applicable to non-developing country Members of the WTO from 1 January 1996 (Article 65(1) TRIPS).

2. Copyright protection under TRIPS

56. The substantive provisions for the protection of copyright (including related rights) are contained in Section 1 of Part II, i.e. Articles 9-14 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 9 stipulates the principle that WTO Members have to comply with the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention (its Articles 1 to 21) and reiterates the basic principle of copyright protection, i.e. protection extends only to expressions and not to ideas, methods of operation or mathematical concepts.

57. Article 12 of the Agreement provides minimum standards for the term of protection of copyrighted works. The term of protection for many works is the life of the author plus 50 years.

58. Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention bans the imposition of limitations on, or exceptions to, the reproduction right except in special cases when such limits or exceptions do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. Article 13 TRIPS, which has also to be read together with Article 20 Berne Convention, makes this provision also applicable to all other exclusive rights in copyright and related rights, thus narrowly circumscribing the limitations and exceptions that WTO member countries may impose.

3. Section 110(5) Copyright Act in the light of Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Article 11bis (1) and 11(1) Berne Convention

59. For ease of presentation, both Subsections of Section 110(5) Copyright Act will be dealt with together for the legal analysis.

(a) Article 9(1) TRIPS

60. This provision reads:

"Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention and the Appendix thereto…"

This provision has as a consequence that the obligations contained in Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention have become part of the obligations under TRIPS and are fully subject to the WTO dispute settlement system.

(b) Article 11bis (1) Berne Convention

61. The provision which is of particular relevance for the case at hand is Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention which reads:

"(I) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorising:

(i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the public by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images;

(ii) any communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work, when this communication is made by an organization other that the original one;

(iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of the work."

62. Article 11bis was introduced into the Berne Convention at the occasion of the Rome Revision (1928), and further elaborated by the Brussels Revision (1948) in a period where public communication by loudspeakers, radio etc. had become a very important means of communication.

38 Compare Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement, Drafting History and Analysis, 1998, at p. 72.
39 See also Message from the President of the Unites States transmitting the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, texts of Agreements Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and Required Supporting Statements, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, House Document 103-316, Vol. 1, p. 981, September 1994 (Exhibit EC-8).
Such a means of communication was clearly similar to the public performance of a work, except that it increased the potential audience.

63. Each of the uses described in Article 11bis(1)(i) to (iii) Berne Convention is to be considered as a separate use, which requires a separate authorisation for each such use by the owner of the copyright. It is Article 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention which is the relevant provision for the case of hand.

64. There can be no doubt that communications to the public not only emanating from radio broadcasts but also from TV are covered by Article 11bis Berne Convention. There can also be no doubt that under Article 2 Berne Convention that musical works, dramatic, dramatic-musical or other musical works qualify as literary and artistic works. Thus it can be concluded that the works for which Section 110(5) Copyright Act (in both alternatives) denies protection, are protected works under Articles 11bis and 2 Berne Convention.

65. While the term public communication has not been defined in the Berne Convention, the Programme for the Brussels Revision provides some guidance as to what is meant by public communication:

"...above all where people meet in the cinema, in restaurants, in tea rooms..."

66. While Subsection A of Section 110(5) Copyright Act refers expressly to "...performance or display of a work by the public reception...", also the communication of a musical work in an establishment to its customers as described in Subsection B of Section 110(5) Copyright Act constitutes a public communication in the sense of Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention.

40 The underlying reasoning for this is explained in WIPO, Guide to the Berne Convention, 1978, at pp 68-69: “The question is whether the licence given by the author to the broadcasting station covers, in addition, all the use made of the broadcast, which may or may not be for commercial ends.

11bis.12. The Convention’s answer is ‘no’. Just as, in the case of a relay of a broadcast by wire, an additional audience is created (paragraph (1)(ii)), so, in this case too, the work is made perceptible to listeners (and perhaps viewers) other than those contemplated by the author when his permission was given. Although, by definition, the number of people receiving a broadcast cannot be ascertained with any certainty, the author thinking his license to broadcast as covering only the direct audience receiving the signal within the family circle. Once this reception is done in order to entertain a wider circle, often for profit, an additional section of the public is enabled to enjoy the work and it ceases to be merely a matter of broadcasting. The author is given control over this new public performance of his work.

11bis.13. Music has already been used as an example, but the right clearly covers all other works as well-plays, operettas, lectures and other oral works. Nor is it confined to entertainment: instruction is no less important. What matters is whether the work which has been broadcast is then publicly communicated by loudspeaker or by some analogous instrument e.g., a television screen.

11bis.14. Note that the three parts of this right are not mutually exclusive but cumulative, and come into play in all the cases foreseen by the Convention.”


43 The term “communication to the public” is synonymous.

44 Comments in Programme for the Brussels Conference: Documents 1948, at pp 266 et seq.

45 Both acts are also clearly covered by the definition given by US domestic law under Section 101 Copyright Act, which defines public performance or display of a work as: "(…)To perform or display a work publicly means: (1) to perform or display at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
67. Under Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention, the public communication has to be "by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument". In this context, it is irrelevant whether the loudspeakers are incorporated in the radio or TV set or other apparatus (including for example a computer) or if they are separate. It is obvious that the communication to the public envisaged in Section 110(5) Copyright Act covers the case that the musical works are played over loudspeakers to the customers of the businesses. In any event, music transmitted over radio or TV can only be made audible by means of some sort of loudspeaker.

68. By denying copyright protection to musical works (in Subsection A to copyrighted works other than nondramatic musical works) when they are received via radio or TV by hertzian waves and subsequently played on business premises for the enjoyment of customers, the US is not granting the protection which it is obliged to grant under Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Article 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention.

(c) Article 11(1) Berne Convention

69. This provision reads:

"(1) Authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing:

(i) ... 

(ii) any communication to the public of the performance of their works."

70. While Article 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention necessitates that the musical work has been transmitted by hertzian waves at some point during its way to the reception apparatus, Article 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention covers the case when the entire transmission was by wire.\(^{46}\)

71. The considerations put forward above under Article 11bis Berne Convention as to works and communication to the public apply mutatis mutandis to Article 11(1) Berne Convention.

72. It can, therefore, be said that the playing of music or other copyrighted works from radio and TV on the business premises for the enjoyment of customers as described in Section 110(5) Copyright Act constitutes acts which are protected by Article 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention if the entire radio or TV transmission is by wire. By denying such protection, the US is violating its obligations under Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Article 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention.

4. Permissible exceptions to copyright protection

73. While the US have at some point in time disputed that a "homestyle radio" is a "loudspeaker or other analogous instrument" in the sense of Article 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention, they have subsequently exclusively relied on assertions that Section 110(5) Copyright Act would be permissible under exception clauses contained in the Berne Convention and TRIPS. The US have in particular referred to so-called "minor exceptions" under the Berne Convention, to Articles 9(2) and 11bis(2) Berne Convention and Article 13 TRIPS.

\(^{46}\)See the unequivocal language in WIPO, Guide to the Berne Convention, 1978, at p. 65 which reads: "the communication to the public of a performance of the work. It covers all public communication except broadcasting which is dealt with in Article 11bis. For example, a broadcasting organisation broadcasts a chamber concert. Article 11bis applies. But if it or some other body diffuses the music by landline to subscribers, this is a matter for Article 11".
74. The EC/MS would like to observe that the burden to invoke and prove the applicability of an exception fall on the party invoking the exception. This standard is in accord with the Appellate Body reports in United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline\(^{47}\) and United States - Measures Affecting Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India.\(^{48}\)

75. In this situation, the EC/MS would like to say that in their view, none of the exceptions to copyright protection contained in the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention can excuse - totally or in part - the exceptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act. The EC/MS will comment in more detail on this issue in light of arguments which the US might wish to submit in this context to the Panel.

5. **Nullification and impairment**

76. Under Article 64(1)TRIPS, Article XXIII GATT and Article 3(8)DSU, the violation of the US' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement are considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment.

VI. **CONCLUSION**

77. The EC/MS therefore respectfully request the Panel to find that the US has violated its obligations under Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention and should bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.

\(^{48}\) WT/DS33/AB/R, p. 16 (adopted on 23 May 1997).
ATTACHMENT 1.2

ORAL STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES AT THE FIRST MEETING WITH THE PANEL

(8 and 9 November 1999)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The European Community (EC) and its Member States (MS) first of all would like to thank you Ms Chairperson and Members of the Panel for taking on this case in anticipation of the time and effort which you will devote to it. These thanks are extended also to the Members of the Secretariat who assist this Panel in its task.

2. This is the fourth panel on TRIPS and the first one on copyright issues. The findings of this Panel are likely to be of significant importance for the implementation by Members of issues namely in relation to the section on copyright of the TRIPS Agreement and the interrelationship between TRIPS and the Berne Convention.

3. We set out our understanding of the facts of this case and our arguments in the first written submission dated 5 October 1999 in which it is explained why we consider that certain aspects of the US' legislation relating to the protection of copyrighted works are incompatible with the US' obligations stemming from the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). We will refrain today from repeating all facts and arguments made in the written submission, but will rather concentrate on what we consider to be the pivotal facts and arguments. We will also comment provisionally on the First Written Submission of US of 26 October 1999 and Third Party submissions. The EC/MS will of course reply in full to the US and Third Party Submissions in our rebuttal submission.

4. To put it in telegraphic style, the particular situation under US copyright law, which is the object of the EC/MS' complaint, presents itself as follows:

While Section 106 Copyright Act gives the right holder of a copyrighted work the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies of the work and to perform the copyrighted work publicly, Section 110(5) Copyright Act provides for two exemptions from copyright protection, which in simple terms can be summarised as follows:

- under Subsection B, anybody is allowed to perform in his business premises for the enjoyment of customers "nondramatic music" by communicating radio or television (TV) transmissions without the consent of the copyright owner in cases where a certain surface is not exceeded without any practical limitation or above that surface limit by respecting certain conditions as to the number of loudspeakers used;

- under Subsection A, anybody is allowed to perform in his business premises for the enjoyment of customers without the consent of the copyright holder, any other copyrighted works such as plays, operas or musicals from radio or TV transmissions under the condition, in particular, that the equipment used can be considered "homestyle".

5. In the view of the EC/MS these US' measures are in violation of the US' obligations under the WTO-TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the US' measures are incompatible with Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11(1) and 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention and cannot be justified under any express or implied exception or limitation permissible under the Berne Convention or under TRIPS. These measures cause prejudice to the legitimate rights of European copyright owners, thus nullifying and impairing the rights of the EC/MS.
6. The EC/MS' economic interests in this matter are significant. According to a study to which the EC/MS will refer to in more detail, approximately 70% of all drinking and eating establishments and 45% of all retail establishments in the US can play without limitation radio or TV music without the consent of the copyright owner. This demonstrates clearly the potential of Section 110(5) Copyright Act to cause very significant losses of licensing income.

II. PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS AND THE EXCEPTIONS THERETO UNDER THE US COPYRIGHT ACT

1. Historical background: Section 110(5) Copyright Act before the 1998 amendment ("the homestyle exemption")

7. Under Section 106 Copyright Act (1976), the right holder of a work has the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works and distribute copies of the work. Under Section 106(4) of said Act, the owner of copyright has also the exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly".

8. In order fully to understand the exemptions contained in the present version of Section 110(5), it is helpful to consider its previous version. Prior to 1999 Section 110(5) only consisted of the current Subsection A. Subsection B was added to the statute in October 1998 by the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act". The 1976 version of Section 110(5) was generally referred to as "the homestyle exemption". In broad terms, the homestyle exemption covered the use of a "homestyle" radio or TV in a shop, a bar, a restaurant or any other place frequented by the public. The exemption did not apply to the playing of tapes, CD's or other mechanical music.

9. The ratio legis of the homestyle exemption goes back to the 1975 US Supreme Court case Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (full text in Exhibit EC-1). Mr Aiken was the owner of a small fast-food restaurant who operated a radio. This installation received the transmission of various radio stations which included protected musical works. At that time it was believed that a business establishment had to obtain a licence to pick up a broadcast and in order to legally communicate it to the public, but Mr Aiken had no licence from the right holders of the copyrighted works that were broadcast through the radio on his premises. The Supreme Court exempted Aiken from liability under the 1909 Copyright Act (which is the predecessor of the 1976 Act), as, according to the Court, what he was doing could not be considered as "performing" within the meaning of said Act.

10. However, in the Copyright Act (1976), the new definition of "perform" clearly covered what Mr Aiken had been doing. In order to keep the "Aiken" activities permissible without the consent of the right holder, a specific provision has been inserted into the Copyright Act to provide users with an exemption from copyright liability.

11. The scope of Section 110(5) (in its "homestyle" version) has evolved over the years. At the time of the adoption of the Copyright Act (1976), the intention of the US Congress appeared to be that the scope of the exemption should be narrow and apply only to small commercial establishments "where mom is behind the counter and dad does the cashier". However, the Congressional intent was not altogether clear (a good example of the ambiguity of the legislator's intent can be seen in the Congressional record which we have submitted as Exhibit EC-3).

12. While the US claim repeatedly that US Courts have interpreted this provision narrowly, in fact, when looking closely at the vast litigation on Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976), one does not come to the same conclusion. In these 20 years of litigation, two periods can be distinguished.

13. Until the early 90's, the main elements that Courts took into consideration in this respect were:
- the physical size of the establishment;
- the economic significance of the establishment;
- the number of speakers;
- whether the speakers were free standing or built into the ceiling;
- the extent to which the receiving apparatus was to be considered as one commonly used in private homes.

As a result of the ambiguous statutory language of Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976), Courts selectively focused on various criteria or different sets of criteria, what has lead to a certain degree of inconsistency of the case law.

14. In recent years, rather than to look at the legislative history of Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976), Courts started to focus more on the plain text of the homestyle exemption, resulting in a broader interpretation of the exemption. As a result of this, large chain store corporations were found to be exempt from applying for a licence and paying a licence fee. *Edison* and *Claire's Boutiques* are illustrative decisions which were taken by two different Federal Appeal Courts one month from each other.

15. The core question in both cases was whether in the case of a large nation-wide company, with annual revenues of several hundred million dollars and with a large number of outlets, each outlet using a single receiver of a kind commonly used in private homes, Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976) was still applicable. In both cases the Courts’ answers were in the affirmative. According to the Courts, the only relevant factors in assessing the applicability of the exemption are the quantity and the quality of the receiving apparatus used in a particular premise. The physical size of the establishment qualifying for the exemption, the ownership and/or the corporate structure of the establishment or any other factor considered in previous case law were declared irrelevant with regard to the application of the homestyle exemption.

16. The EC/MS do not see a contradiction between these two appellate decisions and the two appellate decisions cited by the US in its first written submission under point 7, because the relevant business surfaces in the two cases cited by the US were significantly larger than in the Edison and Claire's Boutiques cases (in the Sailor Music case, the average surface was 3,500 square feet, while in Edison and Claire's Boutiques, the surfaces were 800 - 1,200 square feet and 900 - 2,000 square feet respectively).

17. In the early nineties, a coalition of business associations started active lobbying of Congress members in order to secure a widening of the scope of Section 110(5). The coalition's efforts rapidly bore fruit. As from 1995 several bills were introduced in the US House of Representatives and in the US Senate aimed at significantly extending the scope of the homestyle exemption.

18. In October 1998, a bill, entitled Fairness in Music Licensing Act, was adopted by the Congress, signed by the President and entered into force on 26 January 1999.

2. Current scope and application of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act

19. Section 110(5) now contains two distinct exemptions: the so-called "homestyle exemption" under Subsection A modified as to the kind of works covered and a new exemption under Subsection B (sometimes referred to as the "business exemption").
20. The exact meaning and scope of the "homestyle" exemption, now under Subsection A of Section 110(5), after the adding of Subsection B to the statute, and preceded by the expression "except as provided for in subparagraph (B)", appears to be as follows.

While Section 110(5) Copyright Act applied to all kinds of copyrighted works before the 1998 amendment, apparently, Section 110(5)(A) Copyright Act is now intended to exclude from its scope "nondramatic musical works" and continues to apply to all other types of works, including e.g. plays, sketches, operas, operettas, musicals, because Section 110(5)(A) Copyright Act refers to "works" in general, while the scope of Subsection B is expressly limited to "nondramatic musical works".

While the EC/MS are pleased to learn that this interpretation is shared by the US (point 9 first written submission), we would nevertheless remark that this interpretation may not be the one necessarily followed by all US Courts. There might be Courts which do not draw the a contrario conclusion and apply the exemption contained in Section 110(5)(A) Copyright Act to any sort of literary and artistic work.

Exempted uses

21. The exemption contained in Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act covers transmissions or retransmissions embodying a performance or display of a nondramatic musical work intended to be received by the general public, originated from a radio or TV broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal Communications Commission. This basically covers a situation which appears similar to the one covered by the homestyle exemption, i.e. establishments which are open to the public may play radio or TV on their premises for the enjoyment of their customers without the consent of the right owners.

22. A last difference is that Subsection B does not apply to "works" in general but only to "nondramatic musical works", i.e. popular music, and not to operas, operettas, musicals.

23. While the former "homestyle exemption" and the present Subsection A limit the exemption to the use of a single receiving apparatus commonly used in private homes, this condition is completely absent in Subsection B for cases where the establishment does not exceed a certain size. For all larger establishments the "homestyle" requirement has been replaced by much less stringent conditions in relation to the audio or TV equipment which can be used; in practical terms, it limits the number of loudspeakers to six. Moreover, communications to the public from retransmissions which were not expressly exempted under Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976) are now expressly exempted.

24. Most TV programmes in the US are transmitted either by over-the-air broadcast or by cable or satellite. Therefore, the express inclusion of this transmission mode makes TV programmes fully subject to the exceptions in all forms of transmission.

25. It is presumed that Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act applies in a case of public communication of musical works involving new technologies such as computer networks (e.g. Internet) in view of the wording of this provision. This transmission mode, the importance of which increases from day to day, is now subject to the exemption from copyright protection. The following example is mentioned as an illustration of a situation in which this becomes relevant: an FCC-licensed radio (or TV) broadcaster parallels its over-the–air transmissions on the internet (as an audio back-up to his web-site). These programmes are received by a PC connected with a number of loudspeakers in a bar or other establishment meeting all the conditions set out in Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act. While the EC/MS appreciate that communications over a digital network also involve the reproduction right and distribution right, we are not concerned with these rights in this case.
In this case, we are exclusively concerned with the communication to the public right and nothing in the US first written submission supports in our view the US’ assertion (point 16 first written submission) that communications to the public of works where a computer serves as the receiving and amplifying apparatus would not be covered by the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

**Exempted users**

26. The legislator has made a distinction between food service and drinking establishments on the one hand and other establishments on the other. For the application of the exemption to the establishments other than food service or drinking establishments, the following conditions apply:

- if the establishment has less than 2,000 gross square feet (= 186 square meters), the exemption applies without any further condition, i.e. any audio equipment also of a professional character and any number of loudspeakers can be used;

- if the establishment has more than 2,000 gross square feet of space, the exemption applies under the following conditions:

  - if the performance is by audio means only, it may be communicated by means of a maximum of 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 may be located in any one room;

  - if the performance or display is by audiovisual means:

    - any visual portion of the performance may be communicated by a maximum of 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than one may be located in any one room. Moreover such devices should not have a diagonal screen size larger than 55 inches;

    - any audio portion of the performance may be communicated by a maximum of 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 may be located in any one room.

27. For food service or drinking establishments, the following even more generous conditions apply:

- if the establishment has less than 3,750 gross square feet (= 348 square meters) of space the exemption applies without conditions, i.e. any kind of audio(-visual) equipment, including professional equipment and any number of loudspeakers may be used;

- if the establishment has more than 3,750 gross square feet of space, the exemption applies under the following conditions:

  - if the performance is by audio means only, it may be communicated by means of a maximum of 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 may be located in any one room;

  - if the performance or display is by audiovisual means:

    - any visual portion of the performance may be communicated by a maximum of 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than one may be located in any one room. Moreover such devices should not have a diagonal screen size larger than 55 inches;
any audio portion of the performance may be communicated by a maximum of 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 may be located in any one room.

28. The exemption applies to "establishments" which are now defined by Section 101 of the US Copyright Act (upon amendment by Section 205 of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act) as "a store, shop or any similar place of business open to the general public for the primary purpose of selling goods or services in which the majority of the gross square feet of space that is non-residential is used for that purpose and in which nondramatic musical works are performed publicly".

Summary

29. The exemptions from copyright protection contained in Article 110(5) Copyright Act can be summarised as follows: As far as copyrighted works excluding nondramatic musical works are concerned (this is Subsection A of Section 110(5) Copyright Act), anybody in the US can play such works from radio or TV on his business premises for the enjoyment of his customers without the consent of the copyright owner. The only condition in the law which has the potential to somewhat reduce the benefit of the exception from applying to all business premises in the US, consists in requiring that a single apparatus of a kind commonly found in private homes be used, without defining in the law what is meant by this. The other conditions are unlikely to have any limiting effect in practice.

30. As to nondramatic musical works (this is Subsection B of Section 110(5) Copyright Act), anybody can play such works originating from radio or TV in his establishment for the enjoyment of his customers without the consent of the copyright holder. In case the establishment being below a certain size (3,750 square feet for restaurants and bars and 2,000 square feet for all other establishments), no further conditions apply with a potential to limit the number of exempted establishments. In case the premises exceeding these size limits, there exist only limitations as to the number of loudspeakers which can be used. In any event, the use of professional equipment is perfectly permissible.

III. QUANTITATIVE EFFECTS ON COPYRIGHT OWNERS

31. In order to illustrate the scope of the exception, as far as the establishments referred to under Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act are concerned, and on which no limitations as to the audio(-visual) equipment used exist, the following figures are instructive.

32. In 1999, the Dun & Bradstreet Corp. has prepared a quantitative analysis in order to find out how many businesses in the US fall below the surface thresholds established by Section 110(5) Copyright Act, thus escaping copyright liability. The methodology used by Dun & Bradstreet was identical to the methodology used in an analysis it had prepared in 1995 for the US Congressional Research Service during the legislative process of what eventually became the Fairness in Music Licensing Act.

33. The analysis is based on 1998 figures using Dun & Bradstreet's database comprising more than 6.5 million businesses all over the US.

The result of the analysis is that:

- 73% of all US drinking establishments have a surface of below 3,750 square feet;
- 70% of all US eating establishments have a surface below 3,750 square feet; and
- 45% of all US retail establishments have a surface below 2,000 square feet.
34. These figures comprise bars, restaurants, tearooms, snackbars, etc. and retail stores. However, other sectors in which a number of establishments are likely to be unconditionally exempted as well were not taken into account (for example: hotels, financial service outlets, estate property brokers, other types of service providers).

35. To put the results of these data otherwise, approximately 70 % of all drinking and eating establishments in the US and 45 % of all retail establishments in the US are entitled under Section 110(5) Copyright Act, without any limitation, to play music from radio and TV on their business premises for the enjoyment of their customers without the consent of the copyright owners thus depriving the latter of any potential source of licensing income for this use of his work. **All other - larger - establishments** are of course benefiting from the exception under Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act, if they meet the very lenient conditions as to the number of permissible loudspeakers.

36. Dun & Bradstreet had prepared alternative figures based on its own estimations rather than on actual answers received to its questionnaires to which we have also referred in our First Written Submission. Given that the results of both analyses are very similar, we do not intend to repeat the figures here.

37. For comparison purposes the figures which have been prepared by Dun & Bradstreet in 1995 on behalf of the US Congress, the results were as follows:

- the first scenario used the assumption that premises being unconditionally exempted from copyright liability not exceed the surface of the Aiken establishment which was 1,055 square feet:
  - 16 % of all US eating establishments,
  - 13.5 % of all US drinking establishments, and
  - 18 % of all US retail establishments.

These figures fall below this surface threshold, thus benefiting from the unconditional exemption.

- the second scenario was based on the alternative assumption that the unconditional copyright exemption would apply to eating and drinking establishments with a surface below 3,500 square feet and retail establishments below 1,500 square feet:
  - 65 % of all US eating establishments,
  - 72 % of all US drinking establishments, and
  - 27 % of all US retail establishments.

These figures fall below this alternative surface threshold, thus benefiting from the unconditional exemption.

38. These figures do not only corroborate the figures of the 1999 Dun & Bradstreet analysis but also demonstrate very clearly the very significant increase of the scope of the exemption under the 1976 Copyright Act in comparison to today’s exception. The scope for eating establishment has seen an increase by 437 %, for drinking establishments by 540 % and for retail establishments by 250 %. We will come back to these figures and explain why they are of relevance to this case later on.
IV. INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE US LEGISLATION WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

1. Section 110(5) Copyright Act in the light of Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11bis(1) and 11(1) Berne Convention

39. Given that the distinction between both Subsections of Section 110(5) Copyright Act may not be entirely clear, these Subsections will be taken together for the legal analysis.

   Article 9(1) TRIPS

40. This provision reads:

   "Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention and the Appendix thereto…"

This provision has as a consequence that the obligations contained in Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention have become part of the obligations under TRIPS and violations of these provisions are fully subject to the WTO dispute settlement system.

   Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention

41. The provision which is of particular relevance for the case at hand is Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention which reads:

   "(I) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorising:

   - (i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the public by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images;

   - (ii) any communication to the public by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work, when this communication is made by an organisation other than the original one;

   - (iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of the work."

42. Article 11bis was introduced into the Berne Convention at the occasion of the Rome Revision (1928), and further elaborated by the Brussels Revision (1948) in a period where public communication by loudspeakers, radio etc. had become a very important means of communication. Such a means of communication was considered to be clearly similar to the public performance of a work, except that it increased the potential audience.

43. Each of the uses described in Article 11bis(1)(i) to (iii) Berne Convention is to be considered as a separate use, which requires a separate authorisation for each such use by the owner of the copyright. It is Article 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention which is the pertinent provision for the case of hand.
Article 11(1) Berne Convention

44. While Article 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention necessitates that the musical work has been transmitted by hertzian waves at some point during its way to the reception apparatus, Article 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention covers the case when the entire transmission was by wire.

2. Compatibility of Section 110(5) Copyright Act with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention

45. Given that the US appear to concede that Section 110(5) Copyright Act is at variance with Articles 11bis(1) and 11(1) Berne Convention (point 17 first written submission), we will limit our presentation of the analysis today to the following remarks and refer to the systematic presentation of the legal analysis on Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention to our first written submission. By denying copyright protection to works when they are received via radio or TV by hertzian waves and subsequently played on business premises for the enjoyment of customers, the US are not granting the protection which it is obliged to grant under Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Article 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention.

46. The considerations put forward under Article 11bis Berne Convention apply mutatis mutandis to Article 11(1) Berne Convention. It can, therefore, be said that the playing of music or other copyrighted works from radio or TV on the business premises for the enjoyment of customers as described in Section 110(5) Copyright Act constitutes acts which are protected by Article 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention if the entire radio or TV transmission is by wire. By denying such protection, the US are violating its obligations under Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Article 11bis(1)(ii) Berne Convention.

3. Permissible exceptions to copyright protection

47. The EC/MS would like to observe that the burden to invoke and prove the applicability of an exception falls on the party invoking the exception. This standard is in accord with the Appellate Body reports in United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline and United States - Measures Affecting Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India.

4. The exceptions to copyright protection under TRIPS and the Berne Convention

48. The US point out in point 18 of their first written submission that:

"The Berne Convention permits members to make "minor reservations" to the exclusive rights guaranteed by Berne, including limitations to the public performances right in Article 11 and 11bis TRIPS. Article 13 articulates the standard by which the permissibility of these limitations to exclusive rights must be judged."

The EC/MS would disagree with this statement.

49. The Berne Convention allows certain exceptions to the specific exclusive rights conferred. Article 9(2) Berne Convention allows exceptions to the reproduction right and Articles 10 and 10bis Berne Convention define precisely certain possible free uses of otherwise protected works.

50. As to the public performance and communication to the public right contained in Article 11 Berne Convention, no exceptions or limitations are foreseen in the Berne Convention.

51. As to the exclusive rights covered by Article 11bis Berne Convention, a certain "fine tuning" facility is provided in paragraph two which reads:
"It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions under which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority."

While "countries of the Union" are given the freedom to determine conditions for the exercise of the rights, this freedom is limited by the minimum requirement that a copyright owner obtains as a minimum equitable remuneration. Section 110(5) Copyright Act fails to provide such equitable remuneration.

52. It is true that some discussion in WIPO on so-called "minor reservations" have taken place during the Brussels and Stockholm Conferences, but the precise scope of Berne rights, subject to such minor reservations, has never been fully clarified. In any event, such minor reservations would be limited to public performances of works for religious ceremonies, military bands and the needs of the child and adult education. All these uses are characterised by their non-commercial character and it is obvious that the uses contemplated in Section 110(5) Copyright Act do not meet this requirement.

53. As an intermediate result, it can be said that the Berne Convention does not contain an express or implied provision which would justify the exceptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

54. While the US would appear to agree up to this point, it expresses the view that Article 13 TRIPS provides an exception clause which, if its threefold conditions are met, can permit exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by Articles 11 and 11bis of the Berne Convention. The EC/MS disagree with this interpretation of Article 13 TRIPS.

55. First of all, Article 20 Berne Convention clearly speaks against the US' interpretation of Article 13 TRIPS because it only allows "countries of the (Berne) Union to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the (Berne) Convention". In other words, the Berne Convention countries cannot agree in another treaty to reduce the Berne Convention level of protection. The US interpretation of Article 13 TRIPS would exactly have the effect to reduce the Berne Convention level of protection.

56. Article 20 Berne Convention is mirrored in the TRIPS Agreement by Article 2(2), which stipulates that:

"Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each other under the ..., the Berne Convention".

57. Furthermore, the US' interpretation of Article 13 TRIPS would lead to the absurd result that TRIPS would diminish the level of protection contained in the pre-existing Berne Convention. The opposite is true; both the EC/MS and the US fought vigorously and in the end successfully to increase the pre-existing levels of protection through TRIPS.

58. Even if Article 13 TRIPS were considered to be applicable to Articles 11 or 11bis Berne Convention, as far as the latter is concerned any permissible exception or limitation would at least have to give the author an equitable remuneration (Article 11bis(2) last sentence Berne Convention) what Section 110(5) Copyright Act fails to do. This view appears to be fully shared by Australia (see points 2.10 and 5.2 of its Third Party Submission).
59. In any event, the three criteria set out in Article 13 TRIPS are not met by Article 110(5) Copyright Act, neither as far as Subsection A nor Subsection B is concerned.

60. Before analysing the three conditions contained in Article 13 TRIPS, a few more systemic remarks on the US argumentation on this issue appears to be necessary.

61. The US give at several places in their first written submission (e.g. points 28, 29) the impression that the exclusive rights contained in the Berne Convention and TRIPS would form a hierarchical order with "important" rights and "unimportant" rights, and refers to the public performance rights contained in Articles 11(1)(ii) and 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention as "secondary" rights. The EC/MS disagree with this view. Each and every exclusive right stipulated in the Berne Convention and TRIPS are equally important separate rights, which have to be looked at on the basis of theirs respective merits. The relative importance to an individual copyright owner will vary according to the kind of work involved and the way in which he manages his works.

62. From this, it follows that contrary to what the US appear to suggest under points 28 and 29 of their first written submission, it is not possible to argue under Article 13 TRIPS that by increasing the level of protection in relation to one specific exclusive right, it can be justified to reduce the protection of another exclusive right below minimum standard. In other words, one cannot justify a below standard protection for the public performance rights by an above standard protection of the reproduction right. Also Australia underlines in its Third Party Submission (see, for example, point 3.8) that the different exclusive rights granted to a copyright owner have to be looked at separately.

63. Furthermore the US also refer at several instances to agreements between private operators or their associations and associations representing copyright owners (e.g. point 12 first written submission) and claim that these private agreements were similar to what was finally codified by Section 110(5) Copyright Act. While the US have not made available the agreement to which reference has been made, the appreciation of the two leading US collecting societies has been expressed in unambiguous terms in a joint press release by BMI and ASCAP on the day following the passage of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act by Congress of which I will cite only a few passages (the text of the entire press release will be submitted as Exhibit EC-8).

"With this music licensing legislation, which seizes the private property of copyright owners, the United States Government has severely penalised American songwriters, composers and publishers... The earnings of songwriters, composers and publishers have been reduced by tens of millions of dollars annually."

More importantly, the US' argument to refer to private agreements in order to justify provisions of a statute is of a circular nature. It is the task of the law to set the legal framework and to grant certain rights. It is only after the legislator has established this legal framework that the private economic operators can start to act within this framework. Only if the law stipulates a public performance right can the parties usefully agree on a licensing contract. For uses which are free such as the ones contemplated in Section 110(5) Copyright Act there is no object for a licensing contract because there is no right to be licensed in the first place. In its Third Party Submission, Australia points rightly out that the right to obtain remuneration has to be distinguished from a situation in which the right owner elects not to pursue his entitlement (see points 3.12 and 3.13).

64. The US are also making reference to the inherent administrative difficulties to license a great number of small establishments. Logically speaking, questions of enforcement of a right cannot be used to excuse its very existence. One can only enforce a right if it is recognised by the law. European collecting societies are successfully licensing great numbers of also small businesses and do apparently not encounter insurmountable obstacles. In the US, it would appear that if indeed the collecting societies were to encounter administrative difficulties, this is because collection societies
in the US have never developed the necessary administrative structure to licence small establishments due to a lack of legal protection for extended periods of time in the US. The US' argument is further flawed by the fact that Section 110(5) denies protection to copyrighted works emanating from the radio and TV. The playing of copyrighted works from CDs and tapes is not covered by the exceptions. In other words the operators of establishments have to obtain licences to play music from CDs or tapes, but they can play music from the radio or TV without a license. This differentiation is difficult to justify. Either the licensing of a great number of establishments meets insurmountable difficulties, then it should meet these difficulties independently of the medium used or it does not.

65. Let's now look more specifically at the three conditions to make limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights under Article 13 TRIPS permissible:

- They have to be confined to certain special cases;
- They may not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work; and
- They may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.

These three conditions have to be met cumulatively.

66. When the US claim that Section 110(5) Copyright Act confines the exclusion from copyright protection to "certain special cases" (pages 13-14 first written submission) 49, this would appear to the EC/MS rather to be a claim that the exceptions are well defined in the sense of legal certainty. However, nothing is said about what makes the playing of music from the radio and TV for the enjoyment of customers "special" as compared to other cases. One of the questions coming immediately to one's mind is why is the playing of music from the radio or TV "special" as compared to music played from CDs or cassettes. The remark by Australia in its Third Party Submission (see point 5.5) that "… Section 110(5) Copyright Act appears to provide a blanket exemption for such establishments rather than dealing with special cases" comes to the same conclusion.

67. Furthermore, the fact that very significant numbers of establishments are covered by the exception demonstrates that the exemption rather constitutes the rule than the exception in a situation in which one half to more than two thirds of all US establishments are covered by the exception.

68. As to Section 110(5)(A) Copyright Act, the reference to "homestyle receiving apparatus" is in itself so imprecise that it does not even create any legal certainty leave alone precisely defining a "special case" in the sense of Article 13 TRIPS.

The notion of homestyle receiving apparatus is a moving target that is subject to the developments of technology. Today's audio sets which are purchased by ordinary private customers to be played in their homes may have several hundred Watts of output capable of servicing many times the surface involved in the historic Aiken case.

69. The limitations or exceptions may not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work. As pointed out above, this analysis has to be carried out on the basis of each exclusive right individually.

70. Articles 11(1)(ii) and 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention create an exclusive right for a copyright owner to grant permission for the public performance of his work. While it is difficult to establish with precision what kind of performance to the public would not form part of the normal exploitation of the exclusive public performance rights, it appears in the view of the EC/MS safe to say that at least all uses which create an economic benefit to the users of the works are comprised in the normal

49 See paragraphs 24-26.
exploitation. The ample case law and the legislative history of Section 110(5) Copyright Act make it utterly clear that playing music on the commercial establishment is not an event which happens incidentally, but is a deliberate commercial act to attract customers and to make their stay on the premises of the establishment more enjoyable with the ultimate objective to enhance turnover and profit. This latter aspect is expressly recognised by the NLBA in a News release referred to by the US in their Exhibit US-7. In view of the EC/MS, there can be no doubt that the normal exploitation of the exclusive right concerned includes these commercial activities. This view is also shared by Australia in its Third Party Submission (points 5.6 and 5.7).

71. These arguments apply to both Subsections of Section 110(5) Copyright Act. The author of dramatic musical works, like the author of popular music both expect that their exclusive rights not be disregarded at least for such activities which are carried out by others for commercial gain. The US is offering no evidence whatsoever to support its assertion that owners of dramatic musical works do not expect any benefit from the rights curtailed by Section 110(5) Copyright Act (point 31 first written submission). Also the argument that "Congress intended that this exception would merely codify the licensing practice already in effect..." has to be refuted as circular. Only if there is a right, there can be a licence.

72. The exception may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. The legitimate interest of the right holder consists in being able to prevent all instances of a certain use of his work protected by a specific exclusive right done by a third party without his consent. Clearly, these legitimate interests include as a minimum all the commercial uses by a third party of his exclusive rights. By creating exceptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act, these legitimate interests are diminished, thus prejudiced. This view is shared by Australia in its Third Party Submission point 5.10.

73. While it is difficult to draw the precise line between reasonable and unreasonable prejudice, in view of the EC/MS both exceptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act cause unreasonable prejudice to the owner of the exclusive right concerned.

74. While the US claim that the economic effect of Section 110(5) Copyright Act was minimal, even before the passage of the 1998 Amendment, no evidence whatsoever is offered to support this assertion. To the contrary, the vast body of case law on the pre-1998 homestyle exemptions makes it clear that very significant economic interests were at stake. This is further corroborated by the long and acrimonious legislative debate on the 1998 Amendment. Already under the Aiken scenario the 1995 CRS study showed that 13.5%, 16 and 18% of all US drinking, eating and retail establishments were covered by the exemption. Given that the Aiken surface had been doubled by the Courts before the 1998 Amendment and given that the Courts might after the 1998 Amendment use in Subsection A, the surface categories set out in Subsection B, the coverage of Subsection A is likely to be similar or even identical to the coverage of Subsection B. In practical terms, this means that at least one half of all US service establishments are likely to be covered by the Subsection A exemption. While it is irrelevant for the question of unreasonable prejudice to look at the degree of aggressiveness of licensing activities by the collecting societies, the US' assertion that the establishments exempted under Subsection A … are the least likely to be aggressively licensed by the PRos… (point 34 first written submission) is in contradiction with the US' statement (point 10 first written submission) that the PRos have used harassment and abusive tactics in the licensing practice.

75. As to Section 110(5)(B) Copyright Act, the unreasonableness of the prejudice flowing to the rightholder becomes fully apparent when 73% of all drinking establishments, 70% of all eating establishments and 45% of all retail establishments are unconditionally covered by the exception and the rest of establishments may additionally be exempted under lenient conditions. In this situation, the denial of protection has been elevated to being the rule and protection of the right has become the exception.
76. In relation to the analyses prepared by Dun & Bradstreet one branch of the US government may consider them "meaningless by themselves" the fact of the matter is that the 1995 analysis has been commissioned by the US Congress, because some meaningful insight into the effects of the size of an exemption was expected. The 1998 analysis is but a re-run of the 1995 analyses based on 1998 figures. In view of the EC/MS, it is irrelevant to quantify the actual financial losses suffered by the rightholders concerned. It is sufficient to demonstrate the potential of the prejudice suffered.

77. As to the criticism by the US that the EC has made no attempt to address the effects of these exceptions on its rightholders, it is sufficient to say that at least 25% of all music played in the US belong to EC copyright owners.

78. To sum-up our legal argumentation, Ms Chairperson, Members of the Panel, let me point out the following:

In the view of the EC/MS, which is apparently shared by the US, Section 110(5) Copyright Act is at variance with Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11(1)(ii) and 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention.

79. The EC/MS do not agree with the US defence that the exception stipulated in Section 110(5) Copyright Act can be justified under Article 13 TRIPS. In view of the EC/MS Article 13 TRIPS is not applicable to Articles 11 and 11bis Berne Convention because both Article 20 Berne Convention and Article 2(2) TRIPS do not allow that TRIPS extends the scope of exceptions allowable under Berne. In any event, no exception to Article 11bis Berne Convention could ignore the requirement stipulated in Article 11bis(2) last sentence Berne Convention which requires as the bottom line that the rightholder receive equitable remuneration. Such equitable remuneration is not foreseen in Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

80. Finally, even if Article 13 TRIPS would be applicable to Articles 11 or 11bis Berne Convention none of its three conditions, which have to be met cumulatively, would be met by either alternative contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act. Of course, based on WTO precedents, the US bear the full burden of proof to establish that Article 13 TRIPS would be applicable and all its conditions be met.

5. Nullification and impairment

81. Under Article 64(1) TRIPS, Article XXIII GATT and Article 3(8)DSU, the violation of the US' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement are considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment.

V. CONCLUSION

82. The EC/MS therefore respectfully request the Panel to find that the US have violated their obligations under Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention and should bring their domestic legislation into conformity with their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Of course, the EC/MS would be pleased to reply to any question the Panel might have. The written version of this statement will be made available during the course of tomorrow at the latest.
ATTACHMENT 1.3

RESPONSES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES TO
WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL – FIRST MEETING

(19 November 1999)

I. REPLIES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES

Legislation in the EC

Q.1 What types of minor exceptions apply to the public performance of works in the EC law or the laws of the EC member States, and in particular whether any limitations apply to food service and drinking establishments and establishments other than food service and drinking establishments (below referred to as "other establishments").

See reply under question 2.

Q.2 Is the communication to the public of music contained in broadcasts or played from sound recordings or live performances subject to exclusive rights or right of remuneration in the EC law or the laws of the EC member States, and are the rights in respect of such uses of music exercised by the right holders or by their collective management organizations?

While the Panel uses here and in other instances the term "minor exception", the EC/MS would like to note that this term is not a term of art neither under the Berne Convention nor under TRIPS. We will refer to "exceptions" where referring to Article 13 TRIPS or express exceptions under the Berne Convention and to "minor reservations" where referring to the concept which has been addressed at the Brussels and Stockholm Diplomatic Conferences of the Berne Union.

There exists no EC law, which addresses directly the question of exceptions to public performance of works; this matter is exclusively dealt with in the domestic laws of Member States. Given the very short time available to prepare these replies, it was not possible to collect this information.

Questions on exceptions to exclusive rights have been asked to the EC/MS in the context of the review of the implementation by WTO Members and replies have been provided to the TRIPS Council in 1996. These replies have been reproduced in documents IP/Q/name of WTO Member/1.

According to the information of which we dispose, it appears safe to say that none of the Member States of the EC has an exception to copyright protection identical or similar to Section 110(5) US Copyright Act. Upon express request, the Irish Music Rights Organisation (Imro), whose complaint to the EC is historically at the origin of this dispute settlement case, has confirmed that it and other Collecting Societies in the MS of the EC are actively and systematically enforcing the rights stipulated by Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention, and that this activity generates significant amounts of income (1.2 million IR£ for 1998 for Ireland alone; of this amount 0.86 million IR£ accrues to bars, night-clubs, guesthouses, hair & beauty salons, hotels, restaurants, retail shops and stores), which is distributed to the right holders.
**Impact on the market**

**Q.3** Please provide information on the estimated losses to the EC right holders resulting from the exemptions contained in Section 110(5), if possible divided between Subsections (A) and (B) of that paragraph.

It is very difficult to establish precise figures for losses suffered by EC right holders from the operation of Section 110(5) Copyright Act. But in view of the EC/MS, it is not our task to demonstrate such precise figures.

However, in view of having an order of magnitude of losses which European owners of copyrighted works are likely to suffer, the EC/MS would like to refer the Panel to the order of losses for all right holders, which the two major US Collecting Societies have estimated, when the old coverage of the "homestyle exemption" was enlarged by the Fairness in Music Licensing Act in 1998, to represent an amount of "tens of millions of dollars" per year (see Exhibit produced during first substantive meeting and now reproduced as Exhibit EC-14).

The losses to be allocated to EC right holders are the part of these "tens of millions of dollars" proportionate to the EC authors' market share for which we have given estimates in our reply to question 5 below.

This analysis would suggest that the losses suffered by EC authors are, in any event, in the sphere of millions of dollars per year.

**Q.4** Please provide any available information or estimations on the revenues collected by the EC collecting societies, in particular:

(a) The total revenues from the licensing of public performance of music divided between the major categories of uses, including:

(i) broadcasting and rebroadcasting within the meaning of Article 11bis(1)(i) and (ii) of the Berne Convention,

(ii) public communication within the meaning of Article 11bis(1)(iii), and

(iii) other rights, including those referred to under Article 11(1) of the Berne Convention;

(b) As regards the revenues collected from food serving and drinking establishments and other establishments, what is the breakdown as between royalties for the public performance of broadcast music and the public performance of music from other sources;

(c) Breakdown of these revenues between various sources of revenue, in particular the percentage of the revenues collected from small business establishments (e.g. of the type covered by Section 110(5)).

Information or estimations of the revenues collected by all Collecting Societies in the EU in relation to the licensing of the public performance of music under the categories mentioned in this question are not available to EC/MS.

It should be noted by the Panel that the Collecting Societies in the EU do not necessarily categorise the revenues they collect in respect of the licensing of the public performance of music by reference to the Articles, paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of the Berne Convention or by reference to the categories mentioned in subsections (b) and (c) of this question.
However, the EC/MS have been able to obtain illustrative information in respect of one EU Member State from the Irish Music Rights Organisation (Imro). Imro is a Collecting Society, which licenses and collects revenue in respect of the public performance of music in Ireland. If one were to extrapolate the quantitative data for Ireland to the level of the EC, Ireland representing roughly one hundredth of the EC's population (3.6 million for Ireland; 370 million for the EC), the Irish figures would have to be multiplied with a factor of 100.

(a)  
(i)  In its financial year, which ended on 31 December 1998, Imro collected revenues in respect of broadcasting and rebroadcasting of music (approximating to the rights provided for in Article 11bis(1)(i) and (ii) Berne Convention amounting to IR£ 3,634,594 (€ 4,614,982).

(ii) In the same financial year, Imro collected revenues from the licensing of the public performance of music by means of radio and TV (approximating to the right provided for in Article 11bis(1)(iii)) in the amount of IR£ 1,242,210 (€ 1,577,281).

(iii) In the same financial year, Imro collected revenue from the licensing of all public performances of music in the amount of IR£ 6,237,676 (€ 7,920,214). This does not include the revenue collected in respect of the licensing of broadcasting and rebroadcasting (approximating to Article 11bis(1)(i) and (ii)) mentioned at subsection (a) above. Excluding the radio and TV public performance revenue, Imro collected IR£ 4,995,466 (€ 6,342,933) in respect of the licensing of all other public performances of music (including those referred to under Article 11(1) Berne Convention).

(b) As indicated above, during its most recent financial year, Imro collected revenues in the amount of IR£ 1,242,210 (€ 1,577,281) in respect of the public performance of broadcast music from food serving and drinking establishments and other establishments. In that same financial year, Imro collected revenues in the amount of IR£ 6,237,676 (€ 7,920,214) in respect of the public performances of music from all sources (including the public performance of broadcast music) in food serving and drinking establishments and other establishments.

(c) Imro estimates that it collected revenue from the licensing of the public performance of music by means of radio and TV in small business establishments amounting to approximately IR£ 861,098 (€ 1,093,369) during its most recent financial year. The categories of establishment mentioned in the Section 110(5) Copyright Act are not the basis used by Imro in identifying revenue from "small business establishments". However, in identifying the revenue from small business establishments, Imro has included the revenue collected from retail shops, bars, nightclubs, guesthouses, hotels, restaurants, hair and beauty salons. The revenue collected from these small business establishments for the licensing of the public performance of music by means of radio and TV represented 13.8 % of the public performance revenue collected by Imro in that year.

Q.5 In view of paragraph 77 of your oral statement at the first substantive meeting that 25 per cent of all music played in the US belongs to EC right holders, please provide information about what amount of revenue is transferred from the US CMOs to the EC CMOs for the last three years for which data are available. What is the proportion of this transferred revenue in relation to the total revenues collected by EC CMOs?

An assessment of the market share of European authors for copyrighted works, which are communicated via radio and TV to the public, is a very difficult task, and the best one can achieve is an estimate. It has to be recalled that a typical musical work has not only a significant number of holders of copyrights and neighbouring rights (song writers, text writers, singers, musicians,
producers, publishers, broadcasters, etc) but also the category of authors typically comprises more than one.

Moreover, statistics on record sales are apparently not organised in function of the origin of the right holder of a given work, but rather in function of the origin of the producer. The Frank Sinatra song "My way", for instance, was written by a French composer. Part of this song's licensing income accrues to an EC right holder. The record with the Frank Sinatra version was however produced in the US. Sales of that record will therefore not be categorised as "sales of a French record".

The figure of 25% used in point 77 of our oral statement is based on estimate provided to the EC by the industry, which used published data which suggested for 1988 a 23% "market share" of United Kingdom performing artists in relation to sales of recorded music in the US. This of course requires two additional assumptions to be relevant for the communication to the public, the first being that the presence of performing artist is proportionate to the presence of authors of texts or music; and secondly, that there exists a proportionality between the sale of recorded music to the incidence of communication to the public via radio or TV.

Another way to estimate European authors' "market share" is by looking at the ratio of distributions received from US Collecting Societies. The figures, which we have received from ASCAP (see Exhibit EC-15) for 1998 indicate that EC right holders receive x% of total distributions.\(^1\)

The EC/MS would point out that both figures suggest that EC authors represent a significant "market share" of the US market for the communication to the public by radio or TV.

**Q.6** Please provide a copy of the full study by Dun & Bradstreet referred to in EC Exhibit 7. Please comment on the US observations contained in paragraph 37 of its submission, especially with regard to deductions to be made from the relevant numbers?

The EC/MS have made available - as part of Exhibit EC-7 - copy of a document prepared by Dun & Bradstreet in which the results of its 1999 analysis on the basis of 1998 data are shown. We attach - as requested by the Panel - our entire documentation concerning the Dun & Bradstreet analysis (see Exhibit EC-16).

The 1999 - as well as the 1995 - analysis of the impact of Section 110(5) address the potential impact of the exceptions. The US in point 37 of their first written submission makes an attempt to transform the data of potential impact to information on actual impact.

In view of EC/MS, it is the potential impact, which is relevant for the analysis of Article 13 TRIPS, and not actual impact, which is extremely difficult if not impossible to establish with a sufficient degree of certainty. It would appear that the US Congress in 1995 also considered it more instructive to ask for data on potential impact than on actual impact.

**Q.7** Please provide any market information concerning other countries that you would consider relevant for the case at hand.

The EC/MS do not dispose of market data concerning other countries.

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\(^1\) This information has been provided to the EC in confidence.
International treaty obligations

Q.8 Please explain which individual exclusive rights under which specific provisions of Articles 11(1) and 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention are affected to what extent by which specific provision of Subsection (A) and/or (B) of Section 110(5)?

As pointed out in points 61-72 of our first written submission, and reconfirmed in points 41-46 of our oral statement at the first meeting with the Panel, it is the view of the EC/MS - which is apparently shared by the US, Australia and Switzerland – that both Subsections of Section 110(5) Copyright Act are at variance with Article 11bis(1)(iii) and Article 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention.

Both provisions of the Berne Convention cover the same exclusive right, i.e. the communication to the public of a protected work. The distinction being drawn between the two provisions relate to the way (i.e. hertzian waves for Article 11bis and through cable for Article 11) in which the works reach the place where they are eventually played to the public (see also the citation from the guide to the Berne Convention cited in footnote 46 of our first written submission). Both Subsections of Section 110(5) allow the playing of music for the enjoyment of customers.

Q.9 Is the potential scope of application rather than the existing actual impact of Section 110(5)(A) and (B) relevant for the examination of its consistency with Article 11bis(1) or Article 11(1) of the Berne Convention, as the case may be, or for assessing whether Section 110(5) meets the requirements of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, in particular its second and third conditions?

In the view of the EC/MS, Section 110(5) is incompatible with Articles 11bis and 11 Berne Convention simply because an exclusive right is denied, which according to both Parties is the case. The dichotomy between potential scope and actual impact is, in the view of the EC/MS, of relevance for the three conditions contained in Article 13 TRIPS. This would of course require that Article 13 TRIPS be applicable as an exception to Articles 11bis and 11 Berne Convention, something that the EC/MS have repeatedly denied (see also reply to question 11 below).

In the view of the EC/MS, it is the potential impact, which is of primary importance to assess the conditions contained in Article 13 TRIPS. Seen from the right owner, his exclusive right is not only menaced by those who actually perform the acts prohibited by the exclusive right but also by all those who are free to decide to do so at any time and without having to inform him or his Collecting Society of their intentions.

It is the potential, which is created which sets the market conditions. This argument can also be illustrated by reference to another field of IPR. In the patent area, long and acrimonious discussions took place in the Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIPS in relation to compulsory licenses, which generated eventually the disciplines contained in Articles 27(1) and 31 TRIPS.

In the review of the TRIPS implementation by WTO Members which was carried out during 1996-1997, it became apparent that very few and in several case no single compulsory licence has been granted over an extended period of time by a great number of countries reviewed, despite the fact that practically all these countries had provisions on their statute books which allowed the grant of compulsory licences. Also here, the impact of compulsory licences cannot be reasonably measured by the mere number of licenses granted in a given period of time, but can only be fully appreciated by the impact of the possibility to grant compulsory licences on the market place as such. In a country in which it is relatively easy to obtain a compulsory licence, a right owner will be more inclined to grant a contractual licence on more disadvantages terms than if the system makes it more difficult to obtain a compulsory licence.

Q.10 Could the EC further explain the legal basis for its interpretation that the exception of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement applies only to those copyrights which were introduced by
the TRIPS Agreement in addition to those protected in Article 1 – 21 of the Berne Convention? Does this conflict with the argument that the three conditions of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement can apply in addition to any requirements under exceptions embodied in the Berne Convention?

The TRIPS Agreement has been negotiated, at least from the perspective of the EC/MS, to improve the level of protection of IPRs as compared to the pre-existing situation. Given that the Berne Convention already contained a system of well-defined exceptions to specific rights, there existed no need to define a general exception for all rights covered by Section 1 Part II of TRIPS. If the latter had been the objective, exceptions would have been created for Berne rights, going beyond those contained in the Berne Convention before TRIPS. Such a result would clearly be incompatible with Article 20 Berne Convention and Article 2(2) TRIPS.

The EC/MS negotiating position is well reflected in MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 (Exhibit EC-17). The proposed text on the draft TRIPS Article on limitations and exceptions (Article 8 of the proposal) allowed Members to provide for limitations, exceptions and reservations in relation to certain related rights as permitted by the Rome Convention. It did not, however, allow to provide for limitations and exceptions to Berne rights. It is interesting to note that the US had apparently the same objective when stating in their submission to the negotiating group (doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14/Rev.1, Exhibit EC-18) that "Any limitation and exceptions to exclusive economic rights shall be permitted only to the extent allowed and in full conformity with the requirements of the Berne Convention (1971)."

The argument that the three conditions of Article 13 TRIPS can apply in addition to any requirement under exceptions embodied in the Berne Convention, is made under the alternative hypotheses that Article 13 TRIPS is applicable to Articles 11bis and 11 Berne Convention.

Q.11 What is the legal basis for the EC view that the "minor reservations" doctrine under the Berne Convention justifies only pre-existing exceptions? Does this "grandfathering" of exceptions relate to exceptions existing prior to the conclusion of the Berne Convention, prior to the revision or amendment of certain articles (e.g., Article 9(2) in 1967 or Article 11bis in 1928/1948), prior the date of entry into force of the Berne Convention for a particular country entering the Union, or prior to the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement?

Discussions in the Berne Union on the issue of "minor reservations" were never conclusive. However, one can conclude from several sources that it was intended to preserve or as the Panel puts it to "grandfather" pre-existing "minor reservations". The WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention under point 11.6 states that:

"It is in relation to this Article that the question of the "minor reservations" arises... At Stockholm (1967), it was agreed that the Convention did not stop member countries from preserving (emphasis added) their law on exceptions which come under this heading of "minor reservations."

Furthermore, the Report of the Stockholm Conference (1967) (as cited in Ricketson, The Berne Convention at p. 535 - attached as Exhibit EC-11) states:

"210. It seems that it was not the intention of the Committee to prevent States from maintaining (emphasis added) in their national legislation provisions based on the declaration contained in the General Report of the Brussels Conference."

The intent not to admit new "minor reservations" is confirmed by the fact that the Brussels Conference decided against the adoption of a general provision because this could "positively incite
those nations which had not, to this time, recognised such exceptions to incorporate them in their laws” (Ricketson, The Berne Convention: 1886-1986, at pp. 533 and 536).

As to the timing aspect, the benefits of the "minor reservations" doctrine should only accrue to those national legislations which have been on the statute books on or before 1967. The EC/MS would argue that countries acceding to the Berne Convention after 1967 are either completely prevented from "grandfathering" under the "minor reservations" doctrine or can only "grandfather" their pre-1967 exceptions (of course if all the other conditions are also met). To argue otherwise would give "newcomers" more rights than to established Members.

This logic has also been followed in a TRIPS grandfather provision Article 24(4) where the relevant timeframe is identical for establishment Members and newcomers. The entry into force of TRIPS would appear to be an irrelevant point in time for the “minor reservations” doctrine.

Q.12 Since under Article 11bis(2) equitable remuneration has to be paid, are there ways to provide such equitable remuneration other than through compulsory licensing ?

It would appear that a country could set minimum or precise levels of royalties to be paid for the different uses protected under Article 11bis Berne Convention. Another way to provide for equitable remuneration could be the introduction of a levy system for the audio/TV equipment purchased by the establishment being allowed to play copyrighted works without authorisations, whereby the proceeds from such a levy system are distributed to the right holders.

II. REPLIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL ADDRESSED TO BOTH PARTIES

Q.1 Please explain the extent to which the case law concerning Section 110(5) cited in your respective submissions is relevant for the purposes of interpreting the present subsection (A) of that paragraph.

The caselaw is first of all relevant to appreciate the development of the exceptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act (1976) to the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (1998). As far as Section 110(5)(A) is concerned, the caselaw would appear to remain relevant for all the elements of the exception which have remained unchanged under the new law.

Categories of works

Q.2 The Panel understands that the text of the original Section 110(5) is identical to that of the present subsection (A) minus the words "except as provided in subparagraph (B)". The preparatory work reproduced in exhibits EC-3 and US-1 (H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976)) explains that the provision "applies to performances and displays of all types of works". Paragraph 31 of the EC submission and paragraph 9 of the US submission (and certain other paragraphs) contain an interpretation according to which this text, as contained in subsection (A), is intended to exclude from its scope "nondramatic musical works". Please clarify your interpretation of the text of this provision, on the one hand, as part of the original paragraph, and, on the other hand, as part of subsection A, and, to the extent that, in your view, the text should be understood differently in these two contexts. Explain why.

While we consider that Section 110(5) has to be looked at as an entity, we have pointed out our understanding of a possible dividing line between Section 110(5)(A) and (B) as far as the respective coverage of copyrighted works is concerned, both in our first written submission (see points 31 and 32) and in our oral statement (see point 20). In the latter, we have also referred to the possibility of diverging interpretations by US Courts.
Q.3 What is the definition of the term "nondramatic musical work" in the context of Section 110(5)? What types of musical works are either included in or excluded from the application of the provisions of that Section, and which types of copyright holders are affected by the provisions of Subsections (A) and (B)? Does it also cover communication to the public of live music performances? For example, would the performance of, e.g., one song from a musical, constitute a performance of a "dramatic" or of a "nondramatic" musical work? Is it still a "dramatic" work if a song from a musical is performed separately and by another artist? To what extent the notion of "nondramatic musical work" corresponds or is intended to correspond with the notion of "small musical rights" applied in the practice of CMOs?

Given that neither the Berne Convention nor TRIPS provide for such a distinction, we would expect that the US points out this distinction existing in its statute, while we reserve our right to comment on such explanations.

**Licensing practice**

Q.4 Paragraph 4 of the US oral statement at the first substantive meeting states that Section 110(5) is limited to only certain secondary uses of broadcasts of public performances, for which the right holder has already been compensated for the primary performance. In which way, if any, do licensing arrangements between collective management organisations (CMOs) and broadcasting organisations in the US or the EC take into account the potential additional audience created by means of further communication by loudspeaker etc. of broadcasts to the public within the meaning of Article 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention?

The EC/MS would like to reiterate that in their view, each exclusive right has to be looked at separately. Therefore, for each use, an express authorisation of the right holder has to be granted. While it would - from a purely legal point of view - be possible that the broadcaster also obtains - and pays for - a license for "downstream" users of his broadcast (third party beneficiary licence), the EC/MS are not aware of the existence of such a practice in the US for the uses concerned in this case.

**Interpretation of treaty obligations**

Q.5 What is the legal nature of materials including "General Reports" of Diplomatic Conferences of the Berne Convention countries in light of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)? Are they "subsequent agreements on the interpretation or application" in the meaning of Article 31(3)(a), "subsequent practice" in the meaning of Article 31(3)(b), "rules of international law applicable between the parties" in the meaning of Article 31(3)(c), or a "special meaning … given to a term if its established that the parties so intended"?

Materials such as the "General Reports" of Diplomatic Conferences of the Berne Convention would appear to be in the nature of negotiating history. They therefore could constitute "preparatory works" of the Convention within the meaning of Article 32 VCLT. Since, the EC/MS do not consider that an interpretation of the "ordinary meaning" of the relevant provisions of Articles 11 and 11bis Berne Convention as incorporated into TRIPS according to Article 31(1) VCLT leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, they do not consider that there is any scope for relying on the General Reports as "preparatory works" for the purpose of determining the meaning of these provisions of the Berne Convention.

The relevant parts of the General Reports may constitute or be evidence of an agreement or instrument on the interpretation or application of the Berne Convention of the kinds described in Article 31(3) VCLT. The obvious difficulty with this suggestion is that there is no language whatsoever in Articles 11 and 11bis Berne Convention capable to be interpreted as allowing "minor reservations" or as having a special meaning to the same effect.
A further possibility, which may be easier to reconcile with the text of the Berne Convention, is to consider that the "agreement" between the parties in 1967 was to modify the Berne Convention so as to allow what has been referred to in the diplomatic conferences as "minor reservations". This option however encounters difficulties because the Berne Convention contains specific provisions and procedures for amendment in its Article 27. This makes it difficult to argue that an amendment was effected in a General Report of the diplomatic conference.

Another possibility, which the EC would mention is that the statements about minor reservations in the General Reports could constitute genuine "reservations" to the treaty, expressed by certain parties and accepted by the other parties through their approval of the General Reports. This approach suffers from a similar difficulty to the "amending agreement" theory since the Berne Convention provides for reservations in its Article 28 and requires them to be expressed in the instrument of ratification (see also Articles 19-21 VCLT).

The question of whether they constitute customary international law is discussed under reply to question 8 below. However, the EC/MS consider that for the present case it is not necessary to resolve the issue of the legal nature of the "minor reservations" doctrine. The content of the "minor reservations" is such that they cannot excuse the US measures subject of this dispute, whatever their legal nature.

The origin of the "minor reservations" is considered to be the General Report of the Brussels Conference (1948) in which it is stated that:

"Your Rapporteur-General has been entrusted with making an express mention of the possibility available to national legislation to make what are commonly called minor reservations. The Delegates of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, the Delegate of Switzerland and the Delegate of Hungary, have all mentioned these limited exceptions allowed for religious ceremonies, military bands and the needs of the child and adult education. These exceptional measures apply to Articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14. You will understand that these references are just lightly pencilled in here, in order to avoid damaging the principles of the right."^2

Its existence is considered to be confirmed by General Report of the Stockholm Conference (1967):

"In the General Report of the Brussels Conference, the Rapporteur was instructed to refer explicitly, in connection with Article 11, to the possibility of what it had been agreed to call 'the minor reservations' of national legislation. Some delegates had referred to the exceptions permitted in respect of religious ceremonies, performances by military bands, and the requirements of education and popularisation. The exceptions also apply to articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14. The Rapporteur ended by saying that these allusions were given lightly without invalidating the principle in the right.

It seems that it was not the intention of the Committee to prevent States from maintaining in their national legislation provisions

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based on the declaration contained in the General Report of the Brussels Conference.\textsuperscript{3}

Whatever the legal nature of the principle set out in these texts, the EC/MS consider that there was a clear intention to limit the "minor reservations" to:

- non-commercial uses described in the General Reports: religious ceremonies, performances by military bands, and the requirements of child and adult education;

- such exceptions existing in the legislation of the MS of the Berne Union at the time the conferences took place (1967 at the latest), i.e. to grandfather pre-existing practices. This appears expressly from the use of the terms "maintain" and "preserve" and the clear intention not to undermine (or "invalidate the principle of") the right by allowing the creation of new exceptions expressed in the Brussels General Report (\textit{supra}).

Since both the US "homestyle" and "business" exemptions are clearly far removed from "religious ceremonies", "military bonds" and "the requirements of child or adult education" but are of an obvious commercial nature and cover a wide proportion of business establishments and because the "homestyle exemption" in original formulation was only introduced in 1976/78 (and the "business exemption" in the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act" has only been introduced in 1998) it would appear that they cannot in any event benefit from the "minor reservations" doctrine.

Q.6 In your view, what is the relationship between Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 11\textit{bis}(2) of the Berne Convention? Does Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement prevail over the exception in Article 11\textit{bis}(2) with respect to the exclusive rights conferred by Article 11\textit{bis}(1)(i-iii) of the Berne Convention in the sense that when the three conditions of Article 13 are met, no requirement to pay equitable remuneration arises? Do the requirements of Article 11\textit{bis}(2) of the Berne Convention prevail as a \textit{lex specialis} over the requirements of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, in the sense that if equitable remuneration is paid, there is no need to comply with the three-conditions test under Article 13? Do the requirements of Article 13 and Article 11\textit{bis}(2) apply on a cumulative basis in the sense that, on the one hand, even if the three-condition test of Article 13 is fulfilled, there is an additional, fourth requirement to pay equitable remuneration, and on the other hand, even if equitable remuneration is paid consistently with Article 11\textit{bis}(2), is it necessary to comply in addition with the three conditions of Article 13? Please explain.

As pointed out in our presentation at the oral hearing, the EC/MS are of the view that Article 13 TRIPS is not applicable as an exception to exclusive rights contained in the Berne Convention (see points 54-58; please compare also reply given to question 10 by the Panel to the EC/MS). If one were to apply Article 13 TRIPS to the Berne rights the relationship between Article 13 TRIPS and Article 11\textit{bis}(2) Berne Convention becomes relevant. In view of the EC/MS, it would appear that in any event the equitable remuneration requirement constitutes a condition \textit{sine qua non} for the grant of exceptions to the rights stipulated by Article 11\textit{bis}(1) Berne Convention.

Q.7 In your view, to what extent has the Berne Convention become part of customary international law, and if so, in particular which part of the Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention?

In view of the EC/MS, the Berne Convention is not part of customary international law. Customary international law is "constant and uniform usage, accepted as law".\textsuperscript{4} It cannot be lightly


\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Asylum Case: Columbia v Peru} (1950) ICJ Rep p266.
inferred that a treaty provision has become customary international law.\textsuperscript{5} The Berne Convention is not universally accepted and those countries that have accepted it have accepted different versions. The EC/MS do not therefore believe that it is possible to speak of a "constant and uniform usage". They also do not see how the principles set out in it can be considered as having been "accepted as law" independently of its provisions.

**Q.8** Has the "minor exceptions" doctrine under the Berne Convention, and especially in the context of Articles 11\textsuperscript{bis}(1) and 11(1) of the Berne Convention, acquired the status of customary international law? What is the legal significance of the "minor exceptions" doctrine under the Berne Convention in the light of subparagraph (3)(a-c) or paragraph (4) of Article 31 of the VCLT or in the light of Article 32 of the VCLT? Has the "minor exceptions" doctrine or any other implied exceptions been incorporated, by virtue of Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, together with Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention into the TRIPS Agreement? Please explain.

As explained in the reply given to question 5, the EC/MS do not consider the Berne Convention to be part of customary international law. For the EC/MS it follows that the "minor reservations" doctrine is unlikely to form part of customary international law. One particular difficulty arises out of their exceptional character, which would prevent them becoming "constant and uniform usage, accepted as law".

The EC/MS would not exclude that the "minor reservations" doctrine has, by virtue of Article 9(1) TRIPS, whatever its legal significance may be, become part to the TRIPS Agreement. The EC/MS do not understand what the Panel intends by reference to "other implied exceptions".

With regard to Article 31(4) VCLT, the EC/MS do not see what term in Articles 11 and 11\textsuperscript{bis} Berne Convention the "minor reservations" doctrine could give a special meaning to.

**Q.9** What else other than religious ceremonies, performances by military bands, charitable concerts or requirements of education does the "minor reservations" doctrine cover? Does it only cover non-commercial uses? Was this doctrine be conceived of only with respect to Article 11 of the Berne Convention, or was it also extended to Article 11\textsuperscript{bis}(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention, given that these articles concern different types of rights? What such instances of implied exceptions could be relevant for this dispute?

The General Report of the Brussels Conference (1948), which refers to the "minor reservations" doctrine in relation to Article 11 Berne Convention, mentions an exhaustive list of circumstances where the doctrine may apply. These circumstances were limited to religious ceremonies, military bands and child/adult education.

From these circumstances, it can - in view of the EC/MS - be concluded that "minor reservations" cannot apply to commercial activities. This view is also supported by a reference to the minutes of the Brussels Conference where it is made clear that "these limitations should have a restricted character and that, in particular, it did not suffice that the performance, representation or recitation was 'without the aim or profit' for it to escape the exclusive right of the author" (see Ricketson, The Berne Convention : 1886-1986, at p. 536).

**Q.10** In order to meet the first condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement ("certain special cases"), is it enough if the limitation or exception is defined in great precision?

The criterion "certain special cases" requires that these cases have to be singled out for their particularities from the totality of cases covered by an individual right.

\textsuperscript{5} North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) ICJ Rep p3.
"Special" means "out of the ordinary". Therefore this notion has a qualitative element. Special cases have to be distinguished from the non-special, i.e. normal cases. In other words, a rule-exception distinction has to be drawn.

There is also a quantitative element involved, whereby the ratio between "certain special cases" and the normal cases can under no circumstances exceed a de minimis threshold.

Q.11 Under the second condition of Article 13, in which respect, if at all, is a normal exploitation of the "work" the same as a normal exploitation of "exclusive rights" relating to that work?

In the view of the EC/MS, the analysis has to be done in relation to a specific exclusive right. Thus the normal exploitation of the work under Article 13 TRIPS is the normal exploitation of this very exclusive right in relation to a given work.

By arguing otherwise, entire exclusive rights could be done away with under Article 13 TRIPS if only the "core" rights would be maintained.

This latter approach would be clearly at variance with the very foundation of the Berne Convention, which establishes a sophisticated system of different exclusive rights with different fine tuning mechanisms.

Q.12 To what extent is it appropriate in evaluating the compliance of a law with the conditions of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement based on looking at the current market situation in a given country?

The EC/MS do not fully understand what is meant by "current market situation in a given country".

It would appear clear to us that the three conditions contained in Article 13 TRIPS have to be analysed for the territory of a given country, here the US, given that the protection of intellectual property rights is based on the principle of territoriality.

Q.13 To what extent subsequent technological and market developments (e.g., new means of transmission of or increased use of background music or television) are relevant for the interpretation of the conditions under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement?

It would also appear that this analysis has to be based on the socio-economic environment existing in the country concerned. We have however repeatedly pointed out that in our view, the economic effects of an exception have to be assessed as to its potential effect. See also our reply to question 9 to the EC/MS above.

Q.14 Is it justified to define the three conditions exclusively by reference to a particular market, or is a comparative analysis of licensing practices in other Members with similar economic conditions warranted?

While it would appear, also in the light of the reply to question 12 above, that the three conditions referred to in Article 13 TRIPS have to be analysed by reference to the situation in the WTO Member concerned, data from other Members at a similar level of socio-economic development can be useful to corroborate or contradict original data in the country concerned or to provide data which is for practical reasons unavailable in the Member concerned.

Q.15 Under the third condition of Article 13, should the concepts of "unreasonable prejudice" and "legitimate interests" be defined based on existing, legally guaranteed entitlements, or do these concepts also connote an aspect of normative concern of right
holders? In the latter case, what could be the normative concern at issue? In addition to an empirical analysis of prejudice to legitimate interests, how could such a normative element be taken into account in defining the threshold of the third condition of Article 13?

It is not quite clear to the EC/MS what is meant by "normative concern". As also pointed out in the reply to question 18 below, the EC/MS consider that both normative and empirical elements have to be taken into consideration under Article 13 TRIPS and that empirical elements can have an impact on normative questions. We would also refer to the example given in the reply to question 18 below.

Q.16 What is the extent of "reasonable" prejudice to the legitimate interests of rights holders that is permissible under the third condition of Article 13?

All three conditions referred to in Article 13 TRIPS are intended to make sure that the exception-rule situation not be reversed. The reasonable prejudice has to be compared within the unreasonable prejudice. While, as we have pointed out earlier (see points 73 et seq. of our oral statement), it may be difficult to draw an exact line between reasonable / unreasonable prejudice, there can be no doubt in view of the EC/MS that the prejudice caused by an exception which covers 45 to more than 70% of establishments can under no circumstance be considered reasonable because it reverses the rule-exception situation.

Q.17 With a view to giving distinct meaning to the second and the third condition of Article 13, in which respect does an extent, degree or form of interference with exclusive rights below the threshold of "conflict with normal exploitation" differ from an extent, degree or form of interference with exclusive rights that exceeds the threshold of a reasonable prejudice to the interests of the right holder? In other words, how does a permissible degree of prejudice under the third condition relate to "normal exploitation" under the second condition of Article 13?

The EC/MS agree that the second and third conditions of Article 13 TRIPS are distinct conditions, which must be applied cumulatively.

First, the requirement that an exception or limitation does not conflict with normal exploitation of the work would appear to call for a more normative or qualitative approach than the third requirement. This appears from the comparison of the word "conflict" (in the sense of "interfere with" or "not be consistent with") with the term "unreasonably prejudice".

Second, "normal exploitation of the work" requirement differs from the "legitimate interests of the right holder" in a number of ways. Exploitation, which is not "normal", may still be a "legitimate interest" of the right holder. Also, "exploitation" refers to the ways in which an author may obtain a reward from an exclusive right in his work, whereas his "interests" may cover other matters than financial interests in the exploitation of the particular right in question, such as his interest in an acknowledgement of his work or information about its use.

As a result of the excessive coverage of situations by Section 110(5) (see also the results of the Dun & Bradstreet analysis to which we have referred repeatedly), there can be no doubt in view of the EC/MS that neither of the latter two conditions of Article 13 TRIPS are met.

Q.18 Should quantitative empirical or normative approaches be used in defining the three conditions of Article 13?

In view of the EC/MS, both quantitative and normative elements have to be used for the interpretation. There are also instances in which quantitative data can influence a normative assessment like in the situation where it is established from quantitative data that the exception
covers more than one half of all situations, thus reversing the rule-exception principle which underlies Article 13 TRIPS.
ATTACHMENT 1.4

RESPONSES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES – FIRST MEETING

(19 November 1999)

Q.1 Does the EC have any factual support for its assertion that European music represents 25% of all music played in the US?

Please see reply to question 5 asked by the Panel to the EC/MS.

Q.2 On what facts does the EC base its assertion that establishments in the US have "adapted their music installation" or have cancelled contracts for commercial music services in the wake of the Claire's Boutiques and Edison Bros. decisions?

It clearly appears from the complaint for Declaratory Judgement and the Motion of Plaintiff for summary judgement in the case Edison Brothers Stores Inc. v. Broadcast Music Inc. (Edison case) (see Exhibits EC-19 and EC-20) that Edison adapted the music equipment in its stores in order to benefit from the homestyle exemption. This is referred to as the "Edison radio policy" which was initially agreed with BMI until it revoked its agreement (which gave rise to the Edison proceedings).

In its amicus curiae brief submitted to the Court of Appeals in the Claire's Boutiques proceedings (see Exhibit EC-21), ASCAP declared that it believed that "this decision (i.e. the District Court's decision), if not reversed, will result in a very substantial reduction in license fees from owners of establishments who use music by means of radios and loudspeaker systems and from background music licensees, many of whose subscribers will cancel their subscriptions and substitute radio music".

Q.3 Does the EC contend that no exceptions to the public performance are permissible to Berne Article 11 rights?

As pointed out in the reply to question 11 by the Panel to the EC/MS, the discussions in WIPO on the "minor reservations" doctrine have concentrated on Article 11 Berne Convention. In view of the EC/MS, Section 110(5) under no circumstances would qualify as a "minor reservation" as addressed in WIPO even if the "doctrine" were applicable to Article 11 Berne Convention.

Q.4 Does the EC contend that the "minor reservations" doctrine does not permit any exceptions other than those that existed in Member countries at the time of accession to the Berne Convention?

Please see reply to question 11 by the Panel to the EC/MS.

Q.5 Please list and describe any exemptions in copyright laws or neighbouring rights laws of EC/MS to the public performance right, and provide the dates of enactment of such exemptions.

The US are referred to the replies given by the EC/MS in the context of the TRIPS review on copyright and related rights which has been carried out during the first semester of 1996 in the TRIPS Council, for which the WTO Secretariat has established an extensive documentation. Furthermore, we would like to draw the attention of the US to the fact that all laws and regulations relevant for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement have been notified to the TRIPS Council in the manner provided therein.
Q.6 Out of the 70% of all eating and drinking establishments and 45% of all retail establishments that the EC alleges are impacted by the 1998 Amendment, does the EC have any factual data regarding:

- how many of these establishments play music at all?
- how many of these establishments play radio music as opposed to recorded music?

All percentage figures given in the Dun & Bradstreet analyses, including of course the basis of 100%, are potential users. The exempted potential users are free to benefit from the possibility offered by Section 110(5) at will at any point in time and without any notification to the right holders or their collecting societies. Therefore, the EC/MS would consider that the question of "how many establishments actually play music from the radio or recorded at a given point in time?" is of secondary importance and factually difficult to establish.

Q.7 On what facts does the EC base its assertion that EC right holders have lost or will lose revenue as a result of Section 110(5)(B). What is the estimated amount of the losses or projected losses?

As appears from the joint press release by BMI and ASCAP on the day after the adoption by Congress of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (see Exhibit EC-14), the total losses from these measures to right holders amount to "tens of millions of dollars per year". The losses suffered by EC right holders will be an amount proportionate to their share in the US market for which we have submitted an estimate in reply to question 5 of the Panel to the EC/MS.

Q.8 Have EC right holders ever received any revenue from secondary performances in US establishments of works other than nondramatic musical works? If so, please provide factual support. If the EC alleges that its right holders have lost or will lose revenue as a result of Section 110(5)(A), please provide supporting data and the estimated amount of such losses.

The EC assumes that the US means by the phrase "secondary performances" (a term unknown in the Berne Convention and TRIPS) the performances over which authors enjoy exclusive rights under Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention.

In the time available, it has not been possible for the EC/MS to consult with all the Collecting Societies in the EU on this question. However, the EC/MS have received information relating to this question from the Irish Music Rights Organisation (Imro), the Collecting Society which administers the public performance right in music for most of the music right holders resident in Ireland. Imro has confirmed that, on behalf of its Members, who are right holders in the public performance right in dramatic musical works, it entrusts the collection of revenue in the US in respect of public performance in those works to the US Collecting Societies, subject only to the exclusion of the performance of those works on stage or in similar circumstances. Imro specifically confirms that it entrusts to the US Collecting Societies the collection of revenues deriving from the broadcasting and rebroadcasting of those dramatic musical works in the US (approximating to the right provided for in Article 11bis(1)(i) and (ii) Berne Convention) and from the public performance of broadcasts of those dramatic musical works in the US (approximating to the right provided for in Article 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention).

Q.9 Given that the EC's assertion that exceptions to exclusive rights under Berne Article 11bis must be assessed in the light of Article 11bis(2), how would the EC evaluate the permissibility of Section 110(5), which implicates two separate exclusive rights, only one of which is subject to a right of equitable remuneration?
If an exception from copyright liability is provided for in a national law of a WTO Member, which concerns several exclusive rights for which different conditions apply, these different conditions have to be met cumulatively.

**Q.10 Does the EC contend that under no circumstances may an exemption for any commercial purpose be permissible to the Berne Article 11 and 11\textit{bis} rights?**

The EC/MS are of the view that the "minor reservations" doctrine does not allow exceptions for a commercial use of the right. See also reply to question 9 from the Panel to both Parties. We would, however, not exclude that an exception for commercial purposes could, if properly formulated, meet the requirements set out in Article 11\textit{bis}(2) Berne Convention.
ATTACHMENT 1.5
SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
AND THEIR MEMBER STATES
(24 November 1999)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the light of the extensive number of questions, to which the Parties and Third Parties have replied recently, and because of the often quite detailed discussions held at the first substantive meeting with the Panel on 8-9 November 1999, the EC/MS will take this opportunity to present their case in a systematic way and highlight the remaining conflictual issues.

II. FACTUAL ELEMENTS

2. A large number of factual elements have been clarified in the process up to now. In view of the EC/MS, there remain certain important factual elements, which require further clarification.

1. Economic significance for the author of musical works of the communication to the public rights as compared to the other exclusive rights enjoyed by the author

3. The principal aim of copyright is to compensate authors for their creative efforts and investment. Thus, through appropriate licensing arrangements authors are able to control and to be adequately remunerated for each protected use of their intellectual property.

4. Yet, in the last decades, certain uses have become more important in commercial terms than others. In particular, according to some US commentators, "the right of public performance has become the most important legal right, providing the largest single source of income, for most composers, lyricists and music publishers".

5. The magnitude of the commercial value of the right of public performance, or communication to the public, for authors, whether considered on its own or in comparison to reproduction rights, is significant and confirmed by the figures published annually by collecting societies. For instance, in Belgium, where a single collecting society is responsible for the collection of all rights related to musical works (thus making a comparison more immediate), the total revenues distributed to authors in 1998 for performance rights amounted to BEF 867 mio (€ 21 mio), while in the first semester of the same year the amount distributed for mechanical reproduction rights was only BEF 324 mio (€ 8 mio). This means that about 60 % of all authors' income came from the right of communication to the public.

6. This illustrates well the consequent scale, in quantitative terms, of the loss that exemptions similar to those provided under Section 110(5) Copyright Act cause for authors. Following our domestic example, in Europe revenues distributed for TV and radio broadcast in small establishments open to the public represent between 26 % and 10 % of the total public performance revenues. Consequently, exemptions similar to those at issue in the present case would diminish the overall income that authors receive from their work in an order of 15 to 6 %. These figures and proportions make it utterly clear that the exclusive rights stipulated by Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention are not some secondary, ancillary rights worth little or nothing in reality, but constitute very significant exclusive rights not only in absolute terms but also when compared with the other exclusive rights guaranteed by the Berne Convention and TRIPS.
2. **Interplay and separation between Subsections A and B contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act**

7. Both Parties interpret Section 110(5) Copyright Act – by way of an *a contrario* argument from Subsection B – to mean that Subsection A applies to all sorts of literary and artistic works with the exception of nondramatic musical works.

8. While this interpretation has been put forward by both Parties, it is however uncertain that US Courts would invariably share this interpretation. The risk that a US Court might rely textually on Subsection A entails the danger that it would apply the exception contained in Subsection A to all literary and artistic works, including nondramatic musical works.

9. In this context, another element merits clarification. During the first meeting with the Panel on 8-9 November 1999, the US, upon a question from the Panel, made some explanatory remarks on the definition of nondramatic musical works. It explained that a dramatic musical work would be definitively categorised as such at the moment of the creation of the work. This would have the consequence that an aria from an opera or a song from a musical work would continue to be considered as a dramatic musical work, even if played individually.

10. According to the information available to the EC/MS, this does not correctly reflect the situation under US' law and practice. The categorisation of a work as dramatical / nondramatic depends on the circumstances of the performance of the work. This means that a song from a dramatic musical work played on its own, outside the dramatic work, will be considered as a nondramatic work. Furthermore, it is important to note that all the music originating from a dramatic musical work, but being performed as nondramatic works, is part of the repertoire licensed in the US by ASCAP and BMI. This does not mean that right holders of dramatic works do not get any remuneration for the public performance of their works. In the US, the communication to the public of dramatic works is licensed directly by the right holder, without ASCAP and BMI acting as intermediaries.

11. These serious difficulties to clearly separate both Subsections constitute a further argument to treat both Subsections as an entity, where the common objective consists in allowing the widespread use of literary and artistic works in a vast variety of establishments for the enjoyment of customers, if the works have been received by radio or TV.

3. **Internet**

12. While the EC/MS have already in their first written submission drawn the Panel's attention to the fact that Section 110(5) Copyright Act is likely to also apply to cases involving certain communications via the Internet, the US have, in particular by referring to other exclusive rights, which are not the object of this case, tried to exclude or minimise this danger. The EC/MS are pleased to see in the US' reply to question 6 by the Panel to the US that the US do no more exclude this possibility. In any event, there can be no doubt that Section 110(5) Copyright Act fully applies where a computer is used as a receiving device for radio or TV broadcasts.

4. **Third country practices**

13. While the EC/MS were not able in the short time since the US' replies were received, to verify the accuracy of the reply on third country practices given on question 16 by the Panel to the US, it is remarkable, albeit not surprising that not a single country mentioned allows an exception to

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3 See citation in footnote 1 above.
4 See point 39.
5 See point 16.
copyright protection for situations comparable to Section 110(5) Copyright Act. It is also noteworthy that a certain number of countries (Brazil, India, the Philippines and South Africa) do not yet have to comply with the copyright section of Part II of TRIPS because they benefit from additional transitional periods under Article 65(2) TRIPS and their domestic legislation has not yet been subject to TRIPS review.

5. **US practices**

14. It is worth noting that examples of exceptions, which are similar to the third country practices indicated by the US, do exist also in the US copyright law outside Section 110(5) Copyright Act. These are in particular provided in Section 110(1) to (4) Copyright Act and are not under dispute in this case.

III. **LEGAL ELEMENTS**

1. **Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention**

15. While the drafting of the submissions is not identical, the Parties appear to agree that Section 110(5) Copyright Act creates exceptions to the exclusive rights stipulated in the provisions referred to above. The divergence of views relates to the issue of if and to what extent these exceptions can be justified by other provisions of the Berne Convention or TRIPS.

2. **"Minor reservations" doctrine**

16. At the occasion of two diplomatic conferences of the Berne Union, some discussion took place on the issue of "minor reservations", which is reflected in the General Reports of both diplomatic conferences.

(a) **Legal character**

17. As we have pointed out in our reply to question 5 of the Panel to the EC/MS and US, it is unclear what legal standing the "minor reservations" doctrine has. For the reasons pointed out, these General Reports of diplomatic conferences can, in principle, be used under Article 31(3) VCLT to interpret the Berne Convention, however there is no language in Articles 11bis and 11 Berne Convention being susceptible of being interpreted in a "minor reservations" way.

18. The option that the "minor reservations" doctrine constitutes customary international law, by which the text of the Berne Convention has been modified, has been discarded by both Parties.  

19. A further option is that the General Reports constitute evidence of an agreement between the Berne Union Members to modify the Berne Convention accordingly. Not only is the language used in the General Report of the Brussels Conference (1948): "You will understand these references are just lightly pencilled in (emphasis added)", not supportive of such an approach, but also Article 27 Berne Convention would create a serious obstacle to such an interpretation.

20. Finally, the option of considering that the relevant language in the General Reports constitutes genuine reservations, encounters similar obstacles as the "agreement approach" because Article 28 Berne Convention prescribes procedures for invoking reservations which have not been followed in the case before us.

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6 See replies to question 8 by the Panel to both Parties.
7 See citation contained in reply to question 5 by the Panel to both Parties.
(b) Scope and timing

21. Eventually, the EC/MS consider that these difficult legal questions can remain unresolved in the case before us, because the exceptions provided for in Section 110(5) Copyright Act go, in many aspects, significantly beyond what the "minor reservations" doctrine would have allowed.

22. As far as the scope of "minor reservations" is concerned, only three instances for exceptions have been mentioned in the General Reports, which were religious ceremonies, playing of military bands, child and adult education. There can be no doubt and, as it appears, nobody has argued so far that the exceptions created by Section 110(5) Copyright Act fit under any of the three headings or are comparable with any one of them.

23. Furthermore, there exists clear textual evidence that the "minor reservations" doctrine was intended to "grandfather" the practices referred to in the preceding paragraph, existing on or prior to the Diplomatic Conference in 1967. At that time the US did not have any such exception clause, and the US only became a Berne Union Member in 1989.

24. To recapitulate, whatever the legal status of the "minor reservations" doctrine, Section 110(5) Copyright Act would clearly not be covered by its scope nor by its "grandfathering" aspect. In other words, no exception under the Berne Convention excuses Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

3. Article 13 TRIPS

25. While both Parties agree apparently to the principle, which is clearly set out in Article 2(2) TRIPS and Article 20 Berne Convention, that the TRIPS Agreement was intended to increase the level of protection of intellectual property rights, the US argue that Section 110(5) Copyright Act could be justified under Article 13 TRIPS.

26. The application of Article 13 TRIPS to the rights contained in Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention, has also to be seen in relation to Article 11bis(2) Berne Convention, which stipulates a specific exception clause for the rights contained in Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention. This means that any exception would, as a minimum, have to provide for the equitable remuneration to be granted to the right holder. This is not the case under Section 110(5) Copyright Act. The EC/MS are of the view that Article 11bis(2) Berne Convention applies to all exceptions and limitations to Article 11bis(1) Berne Convention. There is no language whatsoever to support the US' view that Article 11bis(2) Berne Convention only applies to compulsory licences. The language in the title of Article 11bis Berne Convention is irrelevant given that it is not based on a negotiated text but on a draft done by the International Bureau of WIPO.8

27. The EC/MS have consistently argued that Article 13 TRIPS, for a multitude of reasons, does not apply to Articles 11bis(1) and 11(1) Berne Convention. Even if one were to give to Article 13 TRIPS a role in the context of exceptions to exclusive rights under Berne Convention, one would have to respect the principle that TRIPS rather than to grant new or extend existing exceptions, has as objective to reduce or eliminate existing exceptions. Also the language of Article 13 TRIPS itself says that:

"Members shall confine (emphasis added) their limitations or exceptions…"

8 See footnote 1 to Article 1 Berne Convention.
This language is in remarkable contrast to the language used in all other TRIPS exception clauses, i.e. Articles 17, 26(2) and 30 TRIPS, which provide that:

"Members may provide (emphasis added) limited exceptions …"

(a) Scope

28. On the assumption that Article 13 TRIPS was intended to contain existing exceptions under the Berne Convention, it would have been necessary for the US to point out precisely the extent of the pre-existing exceptions to Articles 11bis and 11 Berne Convention. The "minor reservations" doctrine as pointed out above, has addressed pre-existing situations of religious ceremonies, playing of music by military bands and child and adult education, and would, under no hypothesis, have covered Section 110(5) Copyright Act, leave alone gone beyond, so that Article 13 TRIPS could serve any "confining" job.

29. The EC/MS do not understand the relevance of the US' arguments in relation to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), which were adopted by a Diplomatic Conference in December 1996. These treaties (signatories 51 WCT, 50 WPPT) have to date only been ratified by a small number of contracting Parties (9 WCT – 7 WPPT; the EC/MS have not yet ratified) and have not reached the threshold of thirty ratifications necessary for entry into force. It is difficult to imagine that such treaties, which are still in a nasciturus state, can add or subtract anything to / from obligations under the TRIPS Agreement which has been in force since 1995 and by which more than 130 WTO Members are bound.

(b) Conditions of Article 13 TRIPS

30. Even if one were to argue that Article 13 TRIPS creates new exceptions also to existing rights under the Berne Convention, a situation which would of course be irreconcilable with the argument that TRIPS is intended to improve the level of IPR protection and thus Article 13 TRIPS to reduce or eliminate existing exceptions, the effects of Section 110(5) Copyright Act are such that none of the three conditions set out in Article 13 TRIPS would be met.

31. As to "certain special cases", the EC/MS have pointed out why we think that Section 110(5) Copyright Act does not meet this requirement. From a plausibility point of view, it appears obvious that an exemption, which covers from 45% to more than 70% of all existing establishments, does not represent "certain special cases" but reverses the rule-exception relationship.

32. In relation to the second and third conditions, the EC/MS have indicated their view in reply to questions 11 and 12 from the Panel to both Parties and in our oral statement of the first meeting with the Panel on 8-9 November 1999. The EC/MS continue to believe that the analysis has to be based on an assessment in relation to the exclusive right concerned, given the sophisticated distinction of individual exclusive rights under the Berne Convention. To argue otherwise would entail the risk that entire exclusive rights can be disregarded as long as the core economic right remains protected; a situation, which also the US would consider as not being contemplated by Article 13 TRIPS.

33. The EC/MS cannot follow the argumentation of the US in reply to question 18 by the Panel, in which they put forward the idea that the analysis has to be based on both aspects, i.e. individual exclusive right and whole work. While one can indeed imagine a cumulative test, the test will be

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9 See reply to question 10 by the Panel to both Parties and points 66 to 68 of our oral statement at the first meeting with the Panel.
10 See points 69 to 71.
11 See US reply to question 18 from the Panel to the US.
failed if only one of its constituent element fails. In other words, if the test is not met on the basis of the individual exclusive right, the entire test is not met and it is irrelevant of how the analysis for the entire work turns out.

34. Finally, the EC/MS would like to reiterate that according to well-established WTO jurisprudence\textsuperscript{12}, it is the task of the US to prove that the exceptions invoked are applicable and their conditions fully met.

IV. CONCLUSION

35. Under Article 64(1) TRIPS, Article XXIII GATT and Article 3(8) DSU, the violation to the US' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement are considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment.

36. The EC/MS therefore respectfully request the Panel to find that the US have violated their obligations under Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11\textit{bis}(1)(ii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention and should bring their domestic legislation into conformity with their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.

\textsuperscript{12} See reference under point 47 of our oral presentation at the first meeting with the Panel.
ATTACHMENT 1.6

ORAL STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES
AT THE SECOND MEETING WITH THE PANEL

(7 & 8 December 1999)

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is the second hearing in this case and thus the last opportunity for the Parties to present their facts and arguments as a whole to you.

The EC/MS will present its case in the light of the facts and arguments made available by the Parties and third Parties. Wherever necessary, we will also comment on the US' replies to questions from the Panel and the EC/MS and on the US' rebuttal statement dated 24 November 1999.

II. FACTUAL ELEMENTS

1. It would appear to the EC/MS that the coverage of Section 110(5) Copyright Act has by now been largely clarified by the Parties with the exception of the question of the interplay and separation between Subsections A and B and the applicability to the IT world and Internet.

2. As to the first issue, the plain text of Subsection A would suggest that all copyright works, which are susceptible to be communicated to the public by loudspeaker, are covered. Subsection B defines its coverage as nondramatic musical works. While it appears possible to draw an a contrario argument from Subsection B with the result that Subsection A does not apply to nondramatic musical works, it is far from certain that US Courts would consistently follow this a contrario argument.

   When the US mention (point 4 of their rebuttal statement) that there exists « ... consistent jurisprudence of US Courts interpreting the homestyle exemption... », the EC/MS would like to remark that there exists not a single US Court decision to date, which interprets the scope of Section 110(5)(A) Copyright Act.

3. Also, the distinction between dramatic and nondramatic musical works remains unresolved. While the US have pointed out at the first meeting upon a question from the Panel that the distinction is made definitively when the work is created, the EC/MS have put forward in their rebuttal statement that, according to US literature, the dividing line is not a permanent one, but depends on the circumstances of the performance. In other words, this would suggest that an individual aria from an opera or a song from a musical played on the radio or TV are to be considered as nondramatic, which in turn has important repercussions for the licensing practice.

4. While the EC/MS appreciate that in the IT world other exclusive rights than the ones covered by Section 110(5) Copyright Act are relevant for communications to the public, no argument has been put forward by the US, that the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act do not apply in the digital context.

III. LEGAL ELEMENTS

5. While the language used by the US differs, it would appear that the US agree in essence with the EC/MS.

   Section 110(5) Copyright Act is inconsistent with Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention unless the US can demonstrate that their measure is covered by an exception provision.

6. The US argue that Article 13 TRIPS allows the exceptions to Articles 11bis(1) and 11(1) Berne Convention, which are contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

   In view of the EC/MS, the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act cannot be justified under any kind of argumentation in relation to Article 13 TRIPS.
7. The EC/MS have pointed out in detail why in their view, Article 13 TRIPS is not applicable to the Berne rights, which have been incorporated into TRIPS by reference. The plain text, the negotiating history and the object and purpose of TRIPS militate for this result.

8. However, even if one were to argue that Article 13 TRIPS may play a role in the context of exceptions to Berne rights, the exceptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act cannot be justified.

9. It would appear that the US agree that one of the major objectives of the TRIPS Agreement consists in increasing the level of IPR protection as compared to the level of protection prevailing under the pre-existing WIPO Conventions. This in turn means for Article 13 TRIPS that – if it were applicable to Articles 11bis(1) and 11(1) Berne Convention – its objective would have to consist in limiting any wider pre-existing Berne exceptions.

10. While the Berne Convention provides for a number of exceptions such as Articles 9(2), 10, 10bis, there exists no exception provision to Article 11 Berne Convention and Article 11bis Berne Convention has a specific exception provision in its paragraph 2, which provides that – as a minimum – the right holder has to be granted equitable remuneration. The US themselves do not claim that Section 110(5) Copyright Act can be justified by Article 11bis(2) Berne Convention.

1. "Minor reservations" doctrine

11. In this situation, the US claim the benefit of the "minor reservations" doctrine, which, in the US view, has been further clarified and articulated by TRIPS Article 13 (see point 2 of the rebuttal statement).

12. Discussions have indeed taken place on so-called minor reservations at the occasion of two diplomatic conferences of the Berne Union in 1948 and 1967. We have considered in detail the possible legal character of the references to "minor reservations" in the General Reports of these diplomatic conferences in our reply to question 5 by the Panel to the EC/MS. We have concluded that the legal significance of the "minor reservations" doctrine under public international law is doubtful.

13. The US claim that the "minor reservations" doctrine constitutes "subsequent practice" in the sense of Article 31(3)(b)VCLT. However, such "subsequent practice" is a tool, among others, to interpret provisions of treaty language, which need interpretation. In the case at hand, it is utterly clear that Article 11 Berne Convention does not contain an exception provision and Article 11bis Berne Convention contains an exception provision whose conditions are not met by Section 110(5) Copyright Act. Thus no need exists to interpret the plain language any further.

(a) Scope of the "minor reservations" doctrine

14. The list of alleged exception provisions, which is contained in Exhibit US-22, merely states figures of Articles without even specifying the statute to which these articles belong, and without any explanation as to their context. This does not contribute anything to establishing "subsequent practice", and even less so to determining the scope of the "minor reservations" doctrine. The US have referred also to the "minor reservations" doctrine in relation to exceptions provided for in 10 countries Members of the Berne Union (the Berne Union is presently composed of more than 130 Members). All these exceptions are characterised by their non-commercial character and mostly reflect the exceptions, which also exist in the US copyright law, notably in Section 110, paragraphs (1) to (4) Copyright Act. These situations are not the ones covered by Section 110, paragraph (5) Copyright Act.

15. All this leads us to the conclusion that it is difficult to give any legal status to the "minor reservations" doctrine. As we have pointed out repeatedly, there is fortunately no need to decide this
thorny issue in the case before the Panel, because the exceptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act do under no circumstance meet the requirements on scope and timing as referred to in the General Reports.

16. The only instances, which were mentioned in the discussions on "minor reservations" at the two diplomatic conferences were military bands, religious services and child and adult education. Obviously, Section 110(5) Copyright Act is not limited to any of these categories. But even if one were to argue that these three instances were only illustrative, their common features consist in being for non-commercial activities and for a well-defined social purpose. Given that Section 110(5) Copyright Act is directly intended to serve commercial interests by the use of the copyright works in commercial establishments for the enjoyment of customers with the objective to enhance turnover and profit neither of these common characteristics can be found in Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

17. The US argument that the underlying policy consideration for Section 110(5) Copyright Act consists in fostering small businesses is spurious at best. First of all, it has to be remembered that copyright owners themselves are in their vast majority "small businesses" and second as is well evidenced in the Claire's Boutique case (see Exhibit EC-6) the homestyle exemption applies to big corporations. Claire's Boutique Inc. had a yearly turnover in the vicinity of 200 million dollars and net earnings in excess of 13 million dollars.

(b) The "minor reservations" doctrine as a grandfathering device

18. As to the aspect of timing for the adoption of minor exceptions, we maintain our view that the citations from the General Reports make it utterly clear that the "minor reservations" doctrine was intended to "grandfather" existing practices and not as an invitation to Berne Union Members to subsequently adopt such "minor reservations".

19. Also as to the application of grandfather provisions to newcomers to a convention, our arguments remain. There is no reason to treat newcomers any better than established Members, by allowing them to reduce the level of obligations at a time when an established Member would no more be allowed to do so. This approach is perfectly neutral as to the level of development of a country Member or candidate to an international convention.

20. The case of the Berne Convention represents indeed a good illustration of the non-discriminatory effects of this approach in a situation in which the vast majority of developing countries were already a Member of the Berne Union at the moment the US joined. Furthermore, TRIPS has taken exactly this approach for its grandfather provisions (see Articles 4(d) and 24(4) TRIPS).

(c) Tunis Model Law on Copyright

21. A further argument to support our view that the "minor reservations" doctrine under no circumstances covers the situations contemplated by Section 110(5) Copyright Act, can be drawn from the "Tunis Model Law on Copyright", which has been adopted in 1976 (i.e. after the last reference to "minor reservations" at the diplomatic conference in 1967). This model law was intended to provide the legislators in developing countries with guidance on how to draft a copyright statute in compliance with the Berne Convention (for more details, see the description contained in WIPO, Background Reading Material on Intellectual Property, 1988 at pp. 255-257, Exhibit EC-24).

This model law "provides for a fairly wide variety of limitations to copyright : both free uses and non-voluntary licenses" but none of these limitations resembles even remotely the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act. The text of the Tunis Model Law referred to is reproduced in our written text.
Free uses according to the Model Law include:

(a) use of a work for one's own personal and private requirement;

(b) quotations compatible with fair practice and to the extent not exceeding that justified by the purpose;

(c) the use of a work for illustration in publications, broadcast or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided that such use is again compatible with fair practice and that the source and the name of the author are mentioned by the user;

(d) the reproduction in the press or communication to the public of articles on current economic, political or religious topics published in newspapers or periodicals and broadcast works of the same character, provided that the source is indicated by the user and such uses were not expressly prohibited when the work was originally made accessible;

(e) the use of a work that can be seen or heard in the course of a current event for reporting on that event;

(f) the reproduction of works of art and architecture in a film or television broadcast, if their use is incidental or if the said work is located in a public place;

(g) the reprographic reproduction of protected work, when it is made by public libraries, non-commercial documentation centres, scientific institutions and educational establishments, provided that the number of copies made is limited to the needs of their activities and the reproduction does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the author;

(h) the reproduction in the press or communication to the public of political speeches, speeches delivered during legal proceedings, or any lecture or sermon delivered in public, etc, provided that the use is exclusively for the purpose of current information and does not mean publishing a collection of such works.

22. Finally, the US rely on the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) in order to suggest that some wide undefined exceptions must exist under the Berne Convention.

23. We have already pointed out in the rebuttal statement that given the nasciturus status of these treaties, which are not even in force and not yet ratified by the EC/MS, whatever they stipulate cannot reduce the level of protection of Berne or TRIPS, or create new exceptions which have not previously existed under Berne or TRIPS.

But also from a substantive point of view nothing in the text of Article 10 WCT suggests that new exceptions would have been contemplated. While Article 10(1) WCT creates limitations and exceptions to new exclusive rights being created by the WCT, Article 10(2) addresses the cases in which the WCT makes Berne rights applicable to the digital network environment, which was not covered under Berne Convention previously.

24. This is in contrast with the case before us, where Section 110(5) Copyright Act is at variance with Articles 11bis and 11 Berne Convention whose scope has not been modified by TRIPS.
25. The arguments put forward in relation to Article 10 WCT apply *mutatis mutandis* to Article 16 WPPT.

26. All in all, it can be said that there exists no exception or limitation provision – express or implied – under the Berne Convention which could justify the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act, leave alone an exception or limitation provision which when "narrowed down" by Article 13 TRIPS could justify Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

2. Article 13 TRIPS

27. In the hypothesis that the Panel should consider that Article 13 TRIPS is of relevance for the assessment of Section 110(5) Copyright Act, we now apply the three steps test provided for in Article 13 TRIPS to Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

(a) Certain special cases

28. We have pointed out repeatedly why we consider that the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act do not constitute "certain special cases". We do not intend to repeat the reasons here, but think it is sufficient to say that exceptions which unconditionally exempt 45 to more than 70% of all retail, drinking and eating establishments from copyright liability for playing of copyright works from the radio or TV and exempting the remainder of such establishment under generous conditions cannot be considered as certain special cases, such exemptions are rather a reversal of the rule-exception principle.

(b) Conflict with the normal exploitation

29. Here again we have pointed out in detail the reasons why we consider that the exemptions created by Section 110(5) Copyright Act (see for example our replies to questions 11 and 12 from the Panel to both Parties) do conflict with the normal exploitation. We would limit ourselves to mention here again the sheer size of the exception, which covers huge proportions of entire business sectors unconditionally and thus, conflict with the normal exploitations of the public performance rights.

(c) Unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holders

30. We do not intend to repeat all the arguments we have made in support of our view that the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act do indeed unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holders, but we would like to concentrate on the new quantitative guestimates made in this context by the US in its rebuttal statement (points 33 et seq.).

31. We agree as pointed out in our reply to question 12 by the Panel to both Parties that the economic prejudice to the right holder has to be assessed primarily on the basis of the economic effects in the country, which provides the exceptions. As we have said earlier, and as the US themselves put forward during the negotiations of the TRIPS exceptions' clause (see US submissions to the negotiating group doc. MTN.GNG/NG 11/W/14/Rev. 1, Exhibit EC-18, and Article 6 in doc. MTN.GNG/NG 11/W/70, Exhibit EC-25), we are of the view that it is more appropriate to look at the potential impact (as opposed to the actual impact) because it can be established with a higher degree of certainty and is less subject to unforeseen changes.

32. We have provided an analysis on the potential economic effects of Section 110(5) Copyright Act, which has never been challenged in a substantiated manner by the US. This analysis demonstrates that 73% of all drinking establishments, 70% of all eating establishments and 45% of all retail establishments in the US are unconditionally exempted by Section 110(5) Copyright Act and all remaining such establishments are exempted if a condition essentially on the number of loudspeakers is met. In our view, these results make it utterly clear that the exemptions stipulated in
Section 110(5) Copyright Act do constitute an unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interest of the right holder.

(i) **US guesstimate of losses**

33. In its rebuttal submission, the US have made an attempt to minimize the prejudice on the basis of guesstimated actual losses based on historic distributions by one single collecting society (ASCAP).

   In view of the EC/MS, this approach is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons:

34. The distributions from collecting societies to right holders are a function of their collections on the market and the collections on the market in turn are a function of the legal protection of the relevant exclusive rights.

   In the US, the rights referred to in Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention were not at all protected until 1976 (see the US Supreme Court Decision in Aiken, Exhibit EC-1). While these exclusive rights were protected in general from 1976, the "homestyle" exemption was introduced at the same time by the previous version of Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

   This exemption already excluded a wide range of commercial uses (see for example the situations in the Claire's Boutique and Edison cases, Exhibits EC-6 and EC-5 respectively), thus seriously reducing the number of businesses subject to a need to obtain a license.

35. Furthermore, the fact that the National Licensed Beverage Association (NLBA) has, according to the US, concluded in 1995 an agreement with the US collecting societies, which excludes all establishments below 3,500 square feet from copyright liability and under certain conditions excludes larger establishments from such liability (see first written submission by the US points 12-14) lead to a situation in which, for the eating and drinking establishments which are members of the NLBA, no licensing fees have been collected since the entry into force of this agreement.

36. Just as a reminder, the figures given in the US Congress sponsored Dun & Bradstreet Analysis (see oral statement by the EC/MS at the first hearing, point 37) show that the unconditional exemption of eating and drinking establishments with less than 3,500 square feet cover 65% and 72% of all such establishments respectively.

37. Also the use of a figure of losses, which is attributable to EC right holders only in the context of establishing the prejudice under Article 13 TRIPS misinterprets Article 13 TRIPS.

   For all conditions referred to in Article 13 TRIPS, the effect on all right holders, US right holders, EC right holders and right holders from other countries, have to be taken together. The specific impact on EC right holders is perfectly irrelevant at this stage. It only becomes relevant in the context of Article 22 DSU.

38. A further shortcoming in the US quantitative guesstimate consists in the fact that, while there exist three collecting societies for the collection of the proceeds for the rights concerned in this case, the US only provide figures for one of them.

(ii) **Alternative bottom-up approach**

39. While we have repeatedly argued that it is the potential impact rather than the actual impact, which should be applied to an analysis under Article 13 TRIPS, the EC/MS consider that the following bottom-up approach gives at least some plausible indications of the order of actual losses suffered by right holders as a consequence of the operation of Section 110(5) Copyright Act.
40. In the database run by Dun & Bradstreet (see Exhibit EC-16), the figures for 1998 show for the entire US:

- 49,061 drinking establishments, and
- 192,692 eating establishments,

with a square footage of below 3,750 square feet and

- 281,406 retail establishments with a square footage of below 2,000 square feet.

These figures are likely to be lower than the actual number of establishments when compared to the figures for eating establishments on the basis of the US Census Bureau data for 1996 (see Exhibit US-18) from which a figure of 240,000 eating establishments below 3,750 square feet resorts.

41. As a second step, we would agree with the US that not all these establishments would actually play music from the radio or TV on their premises for the enjoyment of their customers.

The US offer in their rebuttal submission (see point 39) the hypotheses that 30.5% of all eating and drinking establishments with a surface below 3,750 square feet, actually play music from the radio in their establishments.

While this assumption has not been motivated by the US, we will use this hypothesis for this analysis and apply it equally to retail establishments.

This process demonstrates that:

- 14,700 drinking establishments,
- 57,800 eating establishments, and
- 84,400 retail establishments,

which all fall below the 3,750/2,000 square feet threshold actually play music from the radio on their premises without having to pay for a license. This analysis disregards the playing of music from TV.

42. As a subsequent step, the appropriate licensing fee for playing music from the radio in the relevant establishments, has to be selected from the licensing schedules of ASCAP (an excerpt is provided as Exhibit EC-26) and BMI (an excerpt is provided as Exhibit EC-27).

Given that ASCAP and BMI represent different repertories, licenses have to be sought from both in order to play the radio in the business establishments.

The lowest ASCAP and BMI licensing fees for eating and drinking establishments add up to an amount of 410 US$ per year. This can also be compared to the fee schedule contained in Exhibit US-7, which effectively mentions yearly licensing fees of 455 US$ for establishments smaller than 1,500 square feet, 869 US$ for establishments between 1,500/2,500 square feet and 1,265 US$ for establishments between 2,500/3,500 square feet.

For retail establishments, the lowest fee categories of BMI and ASCAP add up to 283.50 US$ per year.
43. When applying the respective rate to the number of establishments playing music from the radio in their establishments, one arrives at the amount of lost revenue by BMI and ASCAP as a consequence of the operation of Section 110(5) Copyright Act.

For eating and drinking establishments, the lost revenues amount to 29.725 mio US$ and for retail establishments, lost revenues amount to 23.93 mio US$ which adds up to a total of 53.65 mio US$.

44. These are the losses in relation to all right holders, US right holders, EC right holders and right holders from third countries. This analysis also confirms the claim made by BMI and ASCAP in their press release on the day following passage of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (see Exhibit EC-14) when they state that:

"The earnings of song writers, composers and publishers have been reduced by tens of millions of dollars annually"

45. This excursion into the sphere of estimated actual losses suffered by copyright owners from the operation of Section 110(5) Copyright Act confirms the analysis based on potential losses presented earlier and does in the view of the EC/MS clearly indicate that the exceptions provided for in Section 110(5) Copyright Act do unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the copyright owner and thus also the third condition contained in Article 13 TRIPS cannot be met.

IV. CONCLUSION

46. The EC/MS therefore respectfully request the Panel to find that the US have violated their obligations under Article 9(1) TRIPS together with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) Berne Convention and should bring their domestic legislation into conformity with their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.

Of course, the EC/MS would be pleased to reply to any further question the Panel might have. As to the replies provided by WIPO, the EC/MS reserve their right to comment after having had the possibility to carefully look at them.
ATTACHMENT 1.7

COMMENTS FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES ON THE LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF WIPO TO THE CHAIR OF THE PANEL

(12 January 2000)

1. The European Communities and their Member States (EC/MS) would like to express through you their appreciation to the International Bureau of WIPO for its work done to reply to the Panel's three questions.

2. As to the substance of the replies given, we note that no evidence in relation to the existence and scope under the Berne Convention of any exception or limitation including the so-called "minor reservations" doctrine, which would be susceptible of justifying the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) US Copyright Act, is contained in WIPO's replies and annexes.

3. In view of the EC/MS, this confirms our conclusion already expressed in point 26 of our presentation at the second substantive meeting that:

"All in all, it can be said that there exists no exception or limitation provision – express or implied – under the Berne Convention which could justify the exemptions contained in Section 110(5) Copyright Act, leave alone an exception or limitation provision which when "narrowed down" by Article 13 TRIPs could justify Section 110(5) Copyright Act."

4. The EC/MS trust that they will be invited to comment on any substantive remarks that may be made by the US based on the WIPO reply and annexes.

1 This submission by the EC contained also comments on a letter from a law firm representing ASCAP to the USTR that was copied to the Panel. This part of the submission is not reproduced here; neither is the letter in question nor the US comments on it reproduced in the attachments to this report. See section VI.B of the report.
ATTACHMENT 2.1
FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
(26 October 1999)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act of 1976 is fully consistent with the United States' obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the "TRIPS Agreement" or "TRIPS"). The TRIPS Agreement, incorporating the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works (1971) ("Berne Convention"), allows Members to place minor limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners. Article 13 of TRIPS provides a standard by which to judge the appropriateness of such limitations or exceptions. The exemptions embodied in Section 110(5) fall within the Article 13 standard: they are special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and they do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. The United States has one of the strongest systems of intellectual property protection in the world. Under the U.S. copyright system, copyright holders are granted a "bundle" of exclusive rights. Specifically, Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants to right holders the exclusive right to do and authorize:

   (i) the reproduction of a copyrighted work;

   (ii) the preparation of derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;

   (iii) the distribution of copies of the copyrighted work to the public;

   (iv) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;

   (v) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, the right to display the copyrighted work publicly; and

   (vi) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.

3. Section 110 of the Copyright Act provides for several limited exceptions to one of these exclusive rights – the public performance right. The exemptions in Section 110 include exceptions to the performance right for certain educational, charitable and religious uses, as well as the provisions challenged by the EC in this proceeding, Section 110(5)(A) and (B).

A. SECTION 110(5)(A)

4. Section 110(5)(A) constituted the entire Section 110(5) exemption for the 22 years prior to the passage of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998 ("the 1998 Amendment").

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Section 110(5)(A) exempts public performances communicated by means of "homestyle" receiving equipment, subject to certain additional limitations, and provides as follows.\footnote{3} Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not infringements of copyright:

(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes, unless –

(A) direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or

(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public.

5. In establishing the "homestyle" exemption in 1976, Congress intended to exempt from copyright liability small stores and restaurants whose owners merely turned on an ordinary radio or television set while they worked. As explained in the House Report accompanying the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act,

[T]he clause would exempt small commercial establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto their premises standard radio or television equipment and turn it on for their customers' enjoyment, but it would impose liability where the proprietor has a commercial 'sound system' installed or converts a standard home receiving apparatus (by augmenting it with sophisticated or extensive amplification equipment) into the equivalent of a commercial sound system.\footnote{4}

According to the House Report, factors to consider in particular cases would include the size, physical arrangement, and noise level of the areas within the establishment where the transmissions were made, and the extent to which the receiving apparatus was altered or augmented for the purpose of improving the quality of the performance.\footnote{5} The Conference Report elaborates on the rationale for the exemption, noting that it would be justified in situations where the defendant was a small commercial establishment and "not of sufficient size to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background music service".\footnote{6}

\footnote{3}{Section 110(5), both (A) and (B), also exempt the display right. Because that right has little or no economic relevance to copyright owners in musical works, it is not discussed here.}


\footnote{5}{Id. The factors to consider in applying the exemption are largely based on the facts of a case decided by the United States Supreme Court immediately prior to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). In Aiken, the Court held that an owner of a small fast food restaurant was not liable for playing music in a 1,055 square-foot shop that had only four speakers and a radio. The House Report describes the fact situation in Aiken as representing the "outer limit" of the homestyle exemption. Id.; see also exhibit EC-1.}

6. By its nature, the licensing of thousands of individual restaurants and retail establishments is a difficult and resource-intensive process. Naturally, there is a point at which the potential licensing revenue does not justify the administrative burden of the licensing process. The licensing process is especially difficult with respect to smaller establishments that might benefit from the homestyle exception. Congress expected the homestyle exemption to have a limited economic effect because it essentially codified the licensing practices of the performing rights organizations ("PROs") with respect to such establishments. As observed in the House Report on the homestyle exception, "in the vast majority of cases no royalties are collected today, and the exemption should be made explicit in the statute".

7. In the almost two and one-half decades since the homestyle exemption was enacted, U.S. courts have applied the exception narrowly and in a manner consistent with Congress's intent. Of the forty decisions reported under Section 110(5) (now Section 110(5)(A)), only three courts have found that the defendant was entitled to take advantage of the exception. In reaching their conclusions, courts have generally engaged in a highly fact-specific analysis, taking into account the factors cited in the text and legislative history of Section 110(5)(A). For example, in *Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc.*, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that a chain store was not entitled to the homestyle exception because it used four to seven speakers recessed in the ceilings of its stores, and in the court's words, "was of sufficient size to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background music service". Similarly, in *Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp.*, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed *Gap Stores* in denying the applicability of the homestyle exemption to a chain of retail stores. The Court expressly relied on the fact that the size and nature of the Defendant's operation justified the use of a commercial background music system.

8. Two courts have given relatively greater weight to equipment, rather than other factors, in applying the homestyle exception. These two courts did not consider corporate revenues or ownership structure, but rather focused on the fact that the chain stores at issue had extremely limited stereo equipment. In *Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques*, for example, the "receiving apparatus" at issue retailed at $129.95, had just five watts of power, and was able to drive only two speakers, each of which measured 7 inches x 5 inches x 4 inches (approximately 18 x 13 x 10 cm). The Court then went on to conduct a stringent analysis of the stereo system, requiring the Defendant to prove that each of the components of the system was "home-type," and also that the components

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7 See Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments, Hearing before the House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary (July 17, 1997) (hereinafter "Judiciary Committee Hearing") (testimony of Patrick Collins, SESAC, at 109-110). Due to the length of the Judiciary Committee Hearing transcript, we are not annexing this document, however, the transcript is available on the internet at: http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju43667.000/hju43667_0.htm.

8 House Report, at 86 (exhibit US-1).


10 *Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp.*, 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982). See also *Red Cloud Music Co. v. Schneegarten, Inc.*, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (following the *United States Shoe* decision). Other courts across the country have also applied this type of nuanced analysis of equipment and establishment size and revenues in finding that the homestyle exception did not apply. E.g., *Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews*, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990) (restaurant with 1,192 square feet using radio and recessed speaker system did not qualify for section 110(5) exemption); *Little Mole Music v. Mavar's Supermarket*, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1209 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (chain of supermarkets did not qualify for 110(5) exemption based on use of six to ten ceiling speakers and physical size); *Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enters.*, 688 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (chain of restaurants did not qualify for 110(5) because equipment was not homestyle, physical size was 1000 - 1500 sq. feet and annual revenues justified a commercial subscription service).
were configured in a manner commonly found in a home.\textsuperscript{11} Similarly, in \textit{Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Edison Brothers}, the court was persuaded that the exemption applied where it found that the company used only "low grade radio-only" receivers, with no more than two portable speakers placed within 15 feet (4.6m) of the receiver.\textsuperscript{12}

9. Taken as a whole, the substantial body of case law under Section 110(5)(A) demonstrates its limited nature and careful application by the courts. In addition, however, it is important to recognize that the 1998 Amendment dramatically limited the homestyle exception even further. As the EC acknowledges, Section 110(5)(A) no longer covers nondramatic musical works at all. Rather, it covers only other types of works, such as plays and operas. No licensing mechanism currently exists for right holders to collect royalties on a collective basis for secondary performances of these other types of works in establishments. As a practical matter, no royalties are collected for these secondary performances, and thus the statutory exemption for homestyle receiving equipment has no effect on this market.

B. \textbf{SECTION 110(5)(B)}

10. In the mid-1990s, in response to complaints from different sectors of the small business community of various abuses by the PROs,\textsuperscript{13} Congress undertook consideration of a proposed expansion of the homestyle exemption advocated by a coalition of business associations (the "coalition"). The proposal put forward by the coalition was much broader than that which was eventually passed into law, and called for a complete exemption for the performance of nondramatic musical works, regardless of the type of establishment, size of establishment or equipment used to broadcast the work. It also would have permitted further retransmission beyond where the transmission was received. The only limitations were that no admission fee could be charged, and that the transmission must be properly licensed.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Broadcast Music Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques}, 949 F.2d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir. 1991).
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Broadcast Music Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., supra}. The EC makes the unsubstantiated statement in its submission that, as a result of this case, chain stores have adapted their music installation to qualify for the exemption or even canceled their subscription to music services. EC Submission, p. 9 note 25. The EC offers no support or citations whatsoever for these statements, and the U.S. is not aware of any cases in which this scenario actually occurred.
\textsuperscript{13} Specifically, there was widespread complaint from small business owners about harassment and abusive tactics by the PROs in the licensing process. \textit{See generally}, Judiciary Committee Hearing, statement of Bruce A. Lehman, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, at 42, statement of Pete Madland on behalf of the Tavern League of Wisconsin at 220, and testimony of Peter Kilgore on behalf of the National Restaurant Association at 235-236.
\textsuperscript{14} The coalition's proposal was reflected in H.R. 789, the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1997, by Representative James Sensenbrenner, annexed hereto as exhibit US-4. This proposal, not the provisions at issue in this case, were the basis of the testimony by the Register of Copyright, Marybeth Peters, and Bruce Lehman, that is cited by the EC in its submission. EC first submission, para. 4. While the EC cites the portion of Ms. Peters' statements relating to this much broader exemption that was not enacted into law, they neglect to mention her statement on Section 110(5)(A). With respect to Section 110(5)(A), Ms. Peters noted that a joint committee had investigated 110(5) in the context of U.S. accession to the Berne Convention and stated: "I strongly believe that the existing section 110(5) is fine, given what is required by the Berne Convention, and may be similar to exemptions that you see in a few other countries." Judicial Committee Hearing at 46. Furthermore, the EC mischaracterizes the statements by Ms. Peters and Mr. Lehman concerning the TRIPS-compatibility of the coalition proposal. Even a cursory reading of the quoted statements reveals that Ms. Peters and Mr. Lehman actually expressed the belief that the proposed amendments would lead to \textit{claims by other countries} that the United States was in violation of its obligations – an unsurprising view since the EC had already complained about the TRIPS-consistency of the homestyle exemption, and had initiated a formal investigation of the provision at the time the statements were made. \textit{See also} exhibits EC-11 and EC-12.
11. At that time, the PROs also proposed amendments to Section 110(5) that they believed "accurately reflect[ed] uses by small commercial establishments in the marketplace". The PROs' proposal, in addition to suggesting a square footage limit of 1,250 sq. ft. (116.2 sq. m.), also advocated specific equipment limitations of no more than four loudspeakers and two TV screens not greater than 44 inches (1.1m). Notably, the scope of the exemption advocated by the PROs in this initial proposal was broader than the courts' interpretation of the existing homestyle exemption, and thus represented a modest expansion of the exemption.

12. In October of 1995, the National Licensed Beverage Association ("NLBA"), which had been one of the initial proponents of an amendment to Section 110(5) and an important member of the coalition, settled its differences with the PROs and signed a private group licensing agreement. This agreement applied to most of the NLBA's wide membership, and was also available to any eating, drinking or retail establishment licensed to sell alcohol for on-premise consumption. It exempts establishments affiliated with the NLBA from paying licensing fees for the performance of music by radio or television if:

(i) the establishment is smaller than 3,500 sq. ft. [325.28 m. sq.], or,

(ii) the establishment is 3,500 sq. ft. or larger and no more than 6 radio and/or TV speakers are used, with no more than 4 in any one room; and no more than 3 TVs of a screen size smaller than 55 inches [1.4 m.] are used, with no more than 2 TVs in any one room; and

(iii) no direct charge was made to see or hear the transmission and there was no retransmission.

13. The NLBA agreement also provided reduced licensing rates for music performances by other means, such as mechanical music, live performances, establishment-owned jukeboxes and radio and TV performances not qualifying for the exemption. The largest U.S. PRO, the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), praised the agreement, calling it a "fair compromise", and stating that it would benefit small businesses while ensuring that the rights of "songwriters, composers and music publishers will remain protected". Again, it is notable that the scope of the exemption in this voluntarily negotiated agreement is almost identical to the legislation that, three years later, in 1998, became the Fairness in Music Licensing Act. Moreover, at the time that the agreement was concluded with the NLBA, the PROs offered to extend the same proposal to the National Restaurant Association and other members of the business coalition, but, at that time, it was rejected.

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16 Id. at 5-6.
17 Any establishment that is a member of the NLBA can take advantage of the terms of the agreement and establishments which are not members of NLBA can, by joining the NLBA, also avail themselves of the agreement. To be a member of the NLBA, an establishment must sell alcohol on its premises, a condition that applies to all bars and taverns, as well as a very large number of restaurants.
18 NLBA News, April 1997 (annexed hereto as exhibit US-6).
19 Id.; see also Music Licensing Agreement with ASCAP, BMI & SESAC for NLBA Members, 2-3 (attached as exhibit US-7).
20 ASCAP Playback, February 1996 (annexed as exhibit US-8).
21 ASCAP Playback, December 1995 (annexed as exhibit US-9).
22 Judiciary Committee Hearing (testimony of Wayland Holyfield, on behalf of ASCAP at 75). The NRA did not accept the offer, however, because of their view that its standards were more appropriately reflected in legislation, rather than a private commercial agreement.
14. In October 1998, after extended negotiations between the PROs and the coalition, Congress passed legislation amending Section 110(5), with terms very similar to the NLBA agreement. The 1998 amendment revised Section 110(5) to add subsection (B), which applies exclusively to nondramatic musical works. The new subsection (B) exempts secondary performances of nondramatic musical works based on defined criteria of square footage and/or equipment, subject to three additional limitations. It provides in full as follows:

(5)(B) communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a performance or display of a nondramatic musical work intended to be received by the general public originated by radio or television broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal Communications Commission, or, if an audiovisual transmission, by a cable system or satellite carrier, if:

(i) in the case of an establishment other than a food service or drinking establishment, either the establishment in which the communication occurs has less than 2,000 gross square feet of space (185.9 m. sq.) (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other purpose) and:

(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space; or

(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any visual portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than 1 audiovisual device is located in any 1 room, and no such audiovisual device has a diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space;

(ii) in the case of a food service or drinking establishment, either the establishment in which the communication occurs has less than 3,750 gross square feet of space (348.5 m. sq.) (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other purpose), or the establishment in which the communication occurs has 3,750 gross square feet of space or more (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other purpose) and:

(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space; or

(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any visual portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than one audiovisual
device is located in any 1 room, and no such audiovisual device has a diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space;

(iii) no direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission or retransmission;

(iv) the transmission or retransmission is not further transmitted beyond the establishment where it is received; and

(v) the transmission or retransmission is licensed by the copyright owner of the work so publicly performed or displayed.23

15. This legislation was part of a larger bill in which the term of protection for copyright was extended by twenty years, giving copyright owners substantially more protection than that required by international agreements.

16. Contrary to the assertions of the EC, Section 110(5)(B) does not apply to the communication of works over the Internet.24 In fact, neither Section 110(5)(A) or Section 110(5)(B) exempts communications over a digital network. Such communications, by the very nature of the technological process of transmission, involve numerous incidences of reproduction, and could implicate the distribution right as well. When a work is transmitted to a distant location over a computer network, temporary RAM copies are made in the computers through which it passes, by virtue of the technological process of transmission.25 This is an essential function of the way that digital information is transported over a digital network. The Section 110(5) exemptions, both (A) and (B), only apply to the performance right, and do not affect copyright holders’ exclusive reproduction and distribution rights. Therefore, even under Section 110(5) as amended, establishment owners generally must still seek a license for the reproduction and possibly distribution rights implicated by Internet transmissions.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

17. The EC devotes almost its entire legal argument to arguing that Articles 11 and 11bis of the Berne Convention are implicated by the Section 110(5) exemptions. This issue is not in dispute. The relevant issue in this case is not whether Berne rights are implicated, but whether the provisions at issue are permissible exceptions under the standard of TRIPS Article 13. In its submission, the EC does not substantively address this central issue at all.

18. TRIPS Article 9(1) incorporates Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention. The Berne Convention permits members to make “minor reservations” to the exclusive rights guaranteed by Berne, including limitations to the public performance right in Article 11 and 11bis.26 TRIPS

23 P.L. 105-298, Section 202 (annexed as exhibit US-10).
24 EC first submission, para. 39.
25 The US courts have consistently held that RAM copies implicate the copyright holder’s reproduction right. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S.Ct. 671 (1994); Stenograph L.L.C. v. Bossard Assocs., 144 F.3d 96, 101-02 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (these cases are annexed as exhibit US-11). This conclusion was codified in Title III of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act at section 301.
Article 13 articulates the standard by which the permissibility of these limitations to exclusive rights must be judged. This standard is based on the language in Berne Article 9(2), which pertains to exceptions to the reproduction right, and provides: "It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author."

19. Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that "Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder." This provision must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which provides in relevant part that "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."

20. The text of Article 13 plainly establishes cumulative requirements for exceptions to exclusive rights. Any exception must apply only to certain special cases, cannot conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, and, in addition, cannot cause unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holder.

21. The context of Article 13 includes other exceptions in the TRIPS Agreement that provide WTO members a certain amount of flexibility in implementing the relevant provisions of the Agreement. Articles 17, 26 and 30 contain language very similar to Article 13 and apply this exception to trademarks, industrial designs and patents, respectively. Article 1.1 of TRIPS also emphasizes flexibility, and provides that "Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice."

22. The object and purpose of Article 13, as reflected in its text, are to allow certain exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a copyright. The object and purpose should be considered in light of the "Objectives" of the Agreement, set forth in Article 7, which provides that the provisions of the Agreement are designed to result in mutual advantages to producers and users, and contribute to a balance of rights and obligations.

23. Each of the criteria in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement must be interpreted in light of these principles. Under such an analysis, the exceptions in Section 110(5)(A) and (B) satisfy Article 13 because they are confined to special cases which do not conflict with normal exploitation and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of copyright holders.

A. SECTION 110(5) APPLIES TO CERTAIN SPECIAL CASES

24. As a preliminary matter, Section 110(5) is confined to "certain special cases." The TRIPS Agreement does not elaborate on the criteria for a case to be considered "special," and WTO Members have flexibility to determine for themselves whether a particular case represents an appropriate basis for an exception to exclusive rights. The limiting adjectives "certain" and "special" in Article 13 do indicate that exceptions should be "clearly delineated," rather than vague and open ended.

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27 See also Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, §2.72, 90 (1998).
29 Gervais at 90.
25. Section 110(5)(A) is confined to certain special cases – *i.e.*, those involving use of a "homestyle" receiving apparatus. This is a fact-specific standard, but nonetheless one that is well-defined. Courts have considered the various factors articulated in the text and legislative history of the provision in determining whether a given establishment meets the Section 110(5)(A) standard. Although judges may have weighed the various factors differently in making their individual decisions, these cases reflect the reasonable and consistent application of a fact-specific standard in a common-law system.

26. Section 110(5)(B) is also confined to certain special cases, and defines with great precision the establishments that are entitled to benefit from the exception. The size and equipment limitations in the law are unambiguous, and can be applied with ease.

B. **SECTION 110(5) DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH NORMAL EXPLOITATION**

27. There is no normative definition in TRIPS as to what constitutes the "normal exploitation" of a copyrighted work. The normal exploitation of a work, however, can and must necessarily include permissible exceptions to an author's exclusive rights – it is for the purpose of allowing those exceptions that Article 13 was included in the TRIPS Agreement. Limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights by definition deprive a copyright owner of potential compensation for certain uses of his or her work. If every time a copyright owner was deprived of any potential compensation, such deprivation constituted a conflict with normal exploitation, then Article 13 would have no meaning.

28. To determine what constitutes normal exploitation, the Panel must look at all "the ways in which an author might reasonably be expected to exploit his work in the normal course of events". Under U.S. copyright law, the copyright owner of a musical work has a broad range of exclusive rights. Those most important to such right holders include the right to reproduce their work in copies and phonorecords, the right to distribute and sell those copies and phonorecords, and the right to perform their music publicly. Section 110(5) is an exception to only the public performance right.

29. With respect to the public performance right, by far the most significant area of exploitation for the copyright owner is the primary performance of the work. The compensation paid by broadcasters for the right to broadcast the musical work is particularly important. Royalties from broadcasting and live performance are the principal means by which copyright owners in nondramatic musical works receive compensation for the public performance of their works. Section 110(5) does not affect a copyright owner's right to be compensated for these types of exploitation. Rather, it affects only secondary uses of broadcasts. Moreover, it does not exempt all secondary performances, but only those in establishments that use homestyle receiving equipment, or meet the square footage and other criteria in the statute. Finally, even in those establishments exempted by Section 110(5), owners must still pay licensing fees for the use of recorded music, on CD or cassette tapes, and for live performances of music.

30. Furthermore, as noted by Professor Ricketson, a use does not conflict with normal exploitation if the copyright owner would not otherwise expect to collect a fee from that use. It is important to emphasize that the issue in this dispute is the scope of normal exploitation in the United States. Thus, even though a use may technically fall within the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, it may not normally be capable of being exploited within a particular market or jurisdiction.

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31 This includes the right to broadcast their work found in Berne Art. 1 lcibis.

32 Ricketson, at 483 (an example of uses that would not conflict with normal exploitation is "uses for which [the copyright owner] would not ordinarily expect to receive a fee - even though they fall strictly within the scope of his [exclusive] right").
With respect to the homestyle exemption in Section 110(5)(A), even before nondramatic musical works were removed from its scope by the passage of the 1998 Amendment, it was limited to establishments that were not large enough to justify a subscription to a commercial background music service. As noted in the House Report, Congress intended that this exception would merely codify the licensing practices already in effect by the right holders and their licensing organizations. Congress's intent and scope has been followed by the courts, as discussed above. Since 110(5)(A) only affected establishments that were not likely otherwise to enter into a license, or would not have been licensed under the practices at that time, it did not conflict with the expectations of right holders concerning the normal exploitation of their works.

31. Now that Section 110(5)(A) excludes nondramatic musical works e.g., songs commonly played on the radio rather than as part of a larger dramatic performance such as an opera) from its scope, it is even more clear that it does not conflict with the normal exploitation of copyrighted works. For nondramatic musical works, there is, at least, a collective licensing mechanism (the PROs) that generates some revenue from secondary performances. For the remaining works covered by the exemption, such as operas, plays, and musicals, there is no such system for the collective licensing of secondary performances, and little or no direct licensing by right holders to retail, eating or drinking establishments. Owners of copyright in these works do not and have never expected direct revenue from secondary performances in such establishments. In other words, licensing this aspect of the performance right is not a part of how an author "might reasonably [ ] expect[] to exploit his work in the normal course of events."

32. In the case of Section 110(5)(B), a significant portion of the establishments exempted by that section had already been exempted, for almost a quarter of a century, by the homestyle exception. Owners of copyrights in nondramatic musical works had no expectation of receiving a fee from these establishments. Moreover, even if Section 110(5)(B) had not been passed, many of the establishments now eligible for that exemption would have been able to avail themselves of the nearly identical exemption under the NLBA agreement voluntarily concluded by the PROs. Thus, even prior to the passage of the 1998 Amendment, copyright owners would not normally expect a fee from these establishments either. In the final analysis, a small number of establishments may not have been entitled to take advantage of either the homestyle exemption or the NLBA agreement; and thus were newly exempted under Section 110(5)(B). However, when viewed against the panoply of exploitative uses available to a copyright owner under the U.S. Copyright Act, this minor limitation on some secondary uses on broadcasts to the public simply does not rise to the level of a conflict with normal exploitation.

C. SECTION 110(5) DOES NOT UNREASONABLY PREJUDICE THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE RIGHT HOLDER

33. While the "conflict with normal exploitation" standard of TRIPS Article 13 looks to the amount of market displacement caused by a limitation or exception, the "unreasonable prejudice" standard measures how much the right holder is harmed by the effects of the exception. It is important to recognize that the issue in this analysis is not whether the right holder's interests are prejudiced. Given that any exception to exclusive rights may technically result in some degree of prejudice to the right holder, the key question is whether that prejudice is unreasonable.  

33 Conference Report, 75 (exhibit US-2).  
34 House Report, 86 (exhibit US-1).  
35 Ricketson, 483. This language refers to the use of the phrase "normal exploitation" in the context of Berne Art. 9(2).  
36 WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention at 55-56.
1. **Section 110(5)(A)**

34. The economic effect of Section 110(5)(A) was minimal even before the passage of the 1998 Amendment, and thus caused no unreasonable prejudice to any legitimate interests of EC right holders. Returning again to the fundamental intent of the provision, it was to exempt from liability small shop and restaurant owners whose establishments, for a variety of reasons, would not have justified a commercial license. In general, where no such licenses would have been sought or issued in the absence of an exception, there is literally no economic detriment to the right holder from an explicit exception.\(^{37}\) The establishments exempted by Section 110(5)(A), with small square footage and elementary sound equipment, are the least likely to be aggressively licensed by the PROs and licensing fees for these establishments would likely be the lowest in the range.\(^{38}\) Furthermore, given their size and that the playing of music is often incidental to their services, these establishments are among those most likely simply to turn off the radio if pressed to pay licensing fees.

35. With the passage of the 1998 Amendment, and the removal of nondramatic musical works from the scope of Section 110(5)(A), this section has been limited even further and ceased to have any real economic relevance. As described above, there is, for all practical purposes, no substantial licensing market for secondary performances in retail, eating or drinking establishments for works now covered by Section 110(5)(A). In other words, these establishments are not and could not be significant sources of revenue for right holders. Therefore, this exception does not prejudice the legitimate interests of these right holders.

36. Perhaps most probative of this issue, the EC has not made any attempt, in its submission, to address the effect of this exception on its right holders. Nowhere in its submission are there any concrete allegations as to the prejudice the EC believes it suffers as a result of Section 110(5)(A).

2. **Section 110(5)(B)**

37. In the section of its submission entitled "Quantitative effects on copyright owners," the EC provides no information about the quantitative effects on copyright owners of Section 110(5)(B). Instead, the EC provides the Panel with a few statistics – meaningless by themselves – concerning the square footage of certain drinking, eating and retail establishments in the United States. For several reasons, these numbers do not serve as a useful basis for estimating the economic impact of Section 110(5)(B) on right holders. They fail to account for the majority of the relevant factors that determine whether a right holder would be economically prejudiced at all by the exemption in Section 110(5)(B). Even assuming for the sake of argument the accuracy of the figures cited by the EC, in order to obtain a reasonable estimate of the number of establishments from which copyright owners have truly lost revenue as a result of the FMLA, one would have to:

- subtract from those gross totals the sizable number of establishments that do not play music;
- subtract from that number the establishments that rely on music from some source other than radio or TV (such as tapes, CDs, jukeboxes, or live music);
- subtract again for the number that were not licensed prior to the passage of the FMLA and which the PROs would not be able to license anyway regardless of the exemption;
- subtract once more for the establishments that would simply take advantage of the NLBA agreement practically identical to Section 110(5)(B) if the statutory exemption were not available; and,  

\(^{37}\) See *supra* para. 6 (discussion of licensing practice).

\(^{38}\) See Judiciary Committee Hearing, letter from Marilyn Bergman, ASCAP President and Chairman of the Board, at 175-186.
finally, subtract again for the establishments that would prefer to simply turn off the music rather than pay the fees demanded by the PROs.

While these figures are impossible to estimate with scientific precision, there is ample reason to believe that they represent substantial numbers of establishments. Even a realistic figure of the number of establishments from which copyright owners have lost revenue, however, would not present a true figure of economic harm to EC right holders. Whatever revenues could be collected from these smaller establishments would then have to be reduced again by the portion due to right holders in the EC, as opposed to all other right holders.

38. The EC makes no attempt to take these factors into account but rather merely asserts that copyright owners have been deprived of a significant source of income. Without providing any support for this assertion, the EC has not presented a prima facie case that any prejudice suffered by EC right holders is unreasonable within the meaning of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.

39. In light of the history of the 1998 Amendment, and the close similarity between that legislation and the voluntary agreement reached between the PROs and the NLBA in 1995, the EC's claim that copyright holders are suffering unreasonable prejudice is even more tenuous. As previously discussed, the PROs voluntarily concluded the agreement with the NLBA that exempts almost the same establishments. Far from alleging unreasonableess, the PROs hailed this agreement as a "fair" deal that "protected" their members' rights. Marilyn Bergman, President and Chairman of ASCAP, explained in ASCAP's 1996 Annual Report, "We are proud to have reached a resolution with the NLBA and it is a good one for both of our organizations".

40. Finally, the analysis of unreasonable prejudice must also take into account the limited resources of the PROs and the small percentage of the market actually licensed by the PROs. In light of the certainty provided by the precise limitations of the Section 110(5)(B) exemption, the PROs can now efficiently redirect their licensing resources toward those establishments not eligible for the Section 110(5)(B) exemption, and thus compensate for any minor prejudice they might suffer. In fact, the largest PRO has already stated its intent to do exactly this, as well as generate additional income by encouraging live and recorded music, for which there is no exemption. Even before the 1998 Amendment went into effect, ASCAP outlined its plan to "reverse the effects" of the legislation: "A critical element of our plan will be to aggressively license those eligible establishments that have withheld royalty payment and to promote the value of live and mechanical music to a large number of newly targeted establishments."

IV. CONCLUSION

41. For all of these reasons, the Panel should find that both Section 110(5)(A) and Section 110(5)(B) of the U.S. Copyright Act meet the standards of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and the substantive obligations of the Berne Convention. Both provisions are limited to certain special cases, and do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, nor cause unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of EC right holders. Accordingly, this Panel should dismiss the claims of the EC in this dispute.

ATTACHMENT 2.2

ORAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE
FIRST MEETING WITH THE PANEL

(8 November 1999)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Good morning, Madame Chair and members of the Panel. We are pleased to have this opportunity to appear before you to present the arguments of the United States in defense of the Section 110(5) music licensing exemptions. We welcome any questions you may have, and we look forward to responding to them.

2. The United States has one of the strongest systems of intellectual property protection in the world. In fact, the 1998 music licensing amendment was part of a larger bill in which the term of protection for copyright was extended by twenty years, giving copyright owners substantially more protection than that required by international agreements. To help the Panel focus on the real issue in this dispute, we have provided you a chart, exhibit US-14, which outlines the scope of the exemptions in the relevant context.

II. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 110(5) EXEMPTIONS

3. Turning to exhibit US-14, we see that the U.S. copyright system grants a bundle of exclusive rights to right holders. Specifically, right holders are granted the exclusive right to do and authorize: (1) the reproduction of their work in copies and phonorecords, (2) the distribution and sale of those copies and phonorecords, (3) the adaptation, translation, arrangement or other transformation of their work, (4) the public performance of their work, (5) the display of their work, and (6) with respect to sound recordings, the public performance by means of a digital audio transmission. Of these rights, the most important to a right holder in musical works are the reproduction, distribution and public performance rights.

4. Section 110(5) effectively limits only one of these exclusive rights – the public performance right. Moreover, Section 110(5) has no effect on the most significant area of public performance exploitation for a copyright owner – the primary performance of his or her work (for example, broadcasting of works over the television and radio). Rather, the exception is limited to only certain secondary uses of broadcasts of public performances, for which the right holder has already been compensated for the primary performance.

5. The EC grossly exaggerates the scope of Section 110(5). It is important to remember that there are two exceptions contained in Section 110(5): the Section 110(5)(A) homestyle exemption (which has been narrowed), and Section 110(5)(B), which was added by the 1998 amendment. Almost all of the EC's allegations are based on speculation regarding the impact of the 1998 Amendment, which created Section 110(5)(B).

6. With respect to the homestyle exemption, the EC acknowledges that its scope has been limited by the 1998 Amendment's removal of nondramatic musical works from its purview. However, the EC attempts to distort the standing body of caselaw developed by U.S. courts over more than twenty years regarding the scope of the homestyle exemption.

7. As we demonstrated in our first submission, in the almost two and one-half decades since the homestyle exemption was enacted, U.S. courts have applied the exception narrowly and in a manner consistent with the text of the statute and with Congress's stated intent. Of the forty decisions reported under Section 110(5) (the homestyle exemption), only three courts have found that the
defendant was entitled to take advantage of the exception. Of those three cases, only two courts, in Claire's Boutiques and in Edison Bros., found that chain stores qualified for the exemption. In both cases the deciding factor was the limited and unsophisticated homestyle-type equipment used in the stores. For example, in Edison Bros., the stores used only a radio-only receivers with two portable speakers placed within 15 feet of the receiver. These two cases are not "illustrative" as the EC has claimed this morning and in their submission. They are the only cases finding that a chain store qualified for the exemption.

8. The mid-1990s brought a call for relief from small businesses against what they viewed as abusive collecting tactics and harassment by the collecting societies. Over the next several years, a broad expansion of the homestyle exemption was advocated by a diverse coalition of businesses. In response, the collecting societies proposed legislation exempting establishments based on size and equipment. Indeed, the legislation that ultimately became Section 110(5)(B) last year, after intensive negotiations with the business coalition and the collecting societies, was remarkably similar to the agreement the collecting societies voluntarily negotiated with the National Licensed Beverage Association three years earlier. At that time, ASCAP, the largest U.S. collecting society, praised the NLBA agreement, calling it a "fair compromise."

III. SECTION 110(5) MEETS ARTICLE 13'S STANDARD

9. As we noted in our first submission, the relevant issue in this case is not whether Berne Convention rights are implicated, but whether the provisions at issue are permissible exceptions under the TRIPS articulation, in Article 13, of the Berne "minor reservations" standard. TRIPS Article 13 articulates the standard by which the permissibility of limitations (or "minor reservations") to exclusive rights must be judged. Indeed, TRIPS Article 13 is based on the Berne standard for exceptions to the exclusive reproduction right, Berne Article 9(2).

10. In considering the scope of Berne Convention rights such as those at issue in this case, it is important to remember the basic distinction that exists in copyright law between exceptions to exclusive rights and compulsory licenses. Sections 110(5)(A) and (B) are exceptions to an exclusive right. By contrast, with respect to certain rights, Berne permits countries to provide a compulsory license in lieu of an exclusive right. With a compulsory license, an author is deprived of the right to authorize or prohibit use of the work, provided that compensation is provided. Exceptions and compulsory licenses are subject to different standards of review under Berne. Exceptions to exclusive rights are generally subject to the doctrine of "minor reservations." Compulsory licenses are subject to the standard of equitable remuneration, such as articulated in Article 11bis(2). For this reason, Article 11bis(2) is not relevant to the Panel's consideration of Sections 110(5)(A) and (B).

11. The central issue for the Panel then, is to determine whether, in accordance with TRIPS Article 13, Section 110(5) exempts from copyright infringement "special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder".

12. As a preliminary matter, Section 110(5) is confined to "certain special cases". The TRIPS Agreement does not elaborate on the criteria for a case to be considered "special", and WTO Members have flexibility to determine for themselves whether a particular case represents an appropriate basis for an exception to exclusive rights. The limiting adjectives "certain" and "special" in Article 13 do indicate that exceptions should be "clearly delineated", rather than vague and open ended.

13. The homestyle exemption is confined to certain special cases – that is, those involving use of a "homestyle" receiving apparatus in small businesses which would not generally pay for a commercial license. This is a fact-specific standard, but nonetheless one that is well-defined. Courts
have considered the various factors articulated in the text and legislative history of the provision in determining whether a given establishment meets the homestyle exemption standard. Although judges may have weighed the various factors differently in making their individual decisions, these cases reflect the reasonable and consistent application of a fact-specific standard in a common-law system.

14. The 1998 Amendment is also confined to certain special cases, and defines with great precision the establishments that are entitled to benefit from the exception. The size and equipment limitations in the law are unambiguous, and can be applied with ease. The legislative history of the 1998 Amendment demonstrates Congress's view that the straightforward square footage criteria would curtail overreaching and abusive tactics by the collecting societies.

IV. NORMAL EXPLOITATION

15. The two central assessments therefore, are whether Section 110(5) conflicts with normal exploitation and unreasonably prejudices the legitimate interests of the copyright holder. First, limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights by definition deprive a copyright owner of potential compensation for certain uses of his or her work. If every time a copyright owner was deprived of any potential compensation, such deprivation constituted a conflict with normal exploitation, then Article 13 would have no meaning.

16. To determine what constitutes normal exploitation, the Panel must look to the ways in which an author might reasonably be expected to exploit his work in the normal course of events. As outlined in exhibit US-14, under U.S. copyright law, the copyright owner of a musical work has a broad range of exclusive rights. Section 110(5) is an exception to only one of the three most important exclusive rights – the public performance right. Of the uses protected by this public performance right, Section 110(5) affects only certain secondary uses, and does not affect the most significant area of public performance exploitation for the copyright owner, the primary performance of the work. Moreover, even in those establishments exempted by Section 110(5), owners must still pay licensing fees for the use of recorded music, on CD or cassette tapes, and for live performances of music.

17. As we emphasized in our submission, the relevant market to assess the scope of normal exploitation in this dispute is that of the United States. Thus, even though a use may technically fall within the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, it may not normally be capable of being exploited within a particular market or jurisdiction. With respect to the homestyle exemption, even before nondramatic musical works were removed from its scope by the passage of the 1998 Amendment, it was limited to establishments that were not large enough to justify a subscription to a commercial background music service.

18. Indeed, this exception merely codified the licensing practices already in effect by the right holders and their licensing organizations. Since the homestyle exemption only affected establishments that were not likely otherwise to enter into a license, or would not have been licensed under the practices at that time, it did not conflict with the expectations of right holders concerning the normal exploitation of their works.

19. Now that the homestyle exemption excludes nondramatic musical works (e.g., songs commonly played on the radio rather than as part of a larger dramatic performance such as an opera) from its scope, it is even more clear that it does not conflict with the normal exploitation of copyrighted works. For nondramatic musical works (such as pop, jazz or rock songs), there is, at least, a collective licensing mechanism (the collecting societies) that generates some revenue from secondary performances. For the remaining works covered by the homestyle exemption, such as operas, plays, and musicals, there is no such system for the collective licensing of secondary performances, and little or no direct licensing by right holders to retail, eating or drinking
establishments. Owners of copyright in these works do not and have never expected direct revenue from secondary performances in such establishments.

20. In the case of the 1998 Amendment, a significant portion of the establishments exempted by that section had already been exempted, for almost a quarter of a century, by the homestyle exception. Owners of copyrights in nondramatic musical works had no expectation of receiving a fee from these establishments. Moreover, even if the 1998 Amendment had not been passed, many of the establishments now eligible for that exemption would have been able to avail themselves of the nearly identical exemption under the NLBA agreement voluntarily concluded by the collecting societies. We would note that both the NLBA agreement and the 1998 Amendment are based on square footage, as well as equipment. In the NLBA agreement, the square footage requirement is 3,500 square feet, and in the 1998 Agreement it is 3,750 square feet, a difference of only 250 square feet. Thus, even prior to the passage of the 1998 Amendment, copyright owners would not normally have expected a fee from these establishments either.

21. In the final analysis, a small number of establishments may not have been entitled to take advantage of either the homestyle exemption or the NLBA agreement; and thus were newly exempted under the 1998 Amendment. However, given that copyright owners did not expect to receive compensation from most of the uses exempted by the statute, this minor limitation on some secondary uses on broadcasts to the public simply does not rise to the level of a conflict with normal exploitation. Therefore, the Section 110(5) exemptions do not conflict with normal exploitation.

V. UNREASONABLE PREJUDICE

22. The "unreasonable prejudice" standard measures how much the right holder is harmed by the effects of the exception. It is important to recognize that the issue in this analysis is not whether the right holder's interests are prejudiced. Any exception to exclusive rights may technically result in some degree of prejudice to the right holder. The key question is whether that prejudice is unreasonable.

23. The economic effect of the homestyle exemption was minimal even before the passage of the 1998 Amendment, and thus caused no unreasonable prejudice to any legitimate interests of EC right holders. Returning again to the fundamental intent of the provision, it was to exempt from liability small shop and restaurant owners whose establishments did not justify a commercial license. Rather, the homestyle exemption merely codified then existing licensing practices. In general, where no such licenses would have been sought or issued in the absence of an exception, there is literally no economic detriment to the right holder from an explicit exception. As noted by ASCAP, the establishments exempted by the homestyle exemption, with small square footage and elementary sound equipment, are the least likely to be aggressively licensed by the collecting societies and licensing fees for these establishments would likely be the lowest in the range. (ASCAP's letter introduced at the Judiciary Committee Hearings). Furthermore, given their size and that the playing of music is often incidental to their services, these establishments are among those most likely simply to turn off the radio if pressed to pay licensing fees.

24. With the passage of the 1998 Amendment, and the removal of nondramatic musical works from the scope of the homestyle exemption, this section has been limited even further and ceased to have any real economic relevance. As we have demonstrated, there is, for all practical purposes, no substantial licensing market for secondary performances in retail, eating or drinking establishments for the limited category of works now covered by the homestyle exemption (dramatic works such as operas). In other words, these establishments are not and could not be significant sources of revenue for right holders. Therefore, this exception does not prejudice the legitimate interests of these right holders.

25. In the section of its submission entitled "Quantitative effects on copyright owners," and here again today, the EC provides the Panel with a few statistics – meaningless by themselves –
concerning the square footage of certain drinking, eating and retail establishments in the United States, intended to show the dramatic effect of the 1998 Amendment. For several reasons, however, these numbers are not relevant. They certainly do not serve as a useful basis for estimating the economic impact of the 1998 Amendment on right holders. They fail to account for the majority of the relevant factors that determine whether a right holder would be economically prejudiced at all by the exemption in the 1998 Amendment. Even assuming for the sake of argument the accuracy of the figures cited by the EC, in order to obtain a reasonable estimate of the number of establishments from which copyright owners have truly lost revenue as a result of the 1998 Amendment, one would have to:

- subtract from those gross totals the sizable number of establishments that do not play music;
- subtract from that number the establishments that rely on music from some source other than radio or TV (such as tapes, CDs, jukeboxes, or live music);
- subtract again for the number that were not licensed prior to the passage of the 1998 Amendment and which the collecting societies would not be able to license anyway regardless of the exemption;
- subtract once more for the establishments that would simply take advantage of the NLBA agreement practically identical to the 1998 Amendment if the statutory exemption were not available; and,
- finally, subtract again for the establishments that would prefer to simply turn off the music rather than pay the fees demanded by the collecting, societies.

While these figures are impossible to estimate with scientific precision, there is ample reason to believe that they represent substantial numbers of establishments.

26. Even a realistic estimate of the number of establishments from which copyright owners have lost revenue, however, would not present a true picture of economic harm to EC right holders. Whatever revenues could be collected from these smaller establishments would then have to be reduced again by the portion due to right holders in the EC, as opposed to all other right holders.

27. The EC makes no attempt to take these factors into account but rather merely asserts that copyright owners have been deprived of a significant source of income. Without providing any support for this assertion, the EC has not presented prima facie case that any prejudice suffered by EC right holders is unreasonable within the meaning of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.

28. In light of the history of the 1998 Amendment, and the close similarity between that legislation and the voluntary agreement reached between the collecting societies and the NLBA in 1995, the EC's claim that copyright holders are suffering unreasonable prejudice is even more tenuous. As previously discussed, the collecting societies voluntarily concluded the agreement with the NLBA that exempts almost the same establishments. Far from alleging unreasonableness, the collecting societies hailed this agreement as a "fair" deal that "protected" their members' rights.

29. Finally, the analysis of unreasonable prejudice must also take into account the limited resources of the collecting societies and the small percentage of the market they actually license. For example, the revenues generated by ASCAP from general licensing average 14% of overall revenues. This 14% includes significant sources of revenues that are unaffected by Section 110 (5). In addition to radio music played in establishments, it includes use of music at large gatherings such as conventions and in establishments such as circuses, theme parks, shopping malls, sports events and roller and ice rinks. It also includes revenues from certain live performances and from recorded
30. In light of the certainty provided by the precise limitations of the 1998 Amendment, the collecting societies can now efficiently redirect their licensing resources toward those establishments not eligible for the Section 110(5)(B) exemption, and thus compensate for any minor prejudice they might suffer. In fact, ASCAP has already stated its intent to do exactly this, as well as generate additional income by encouraging live and recorded music, for which there is no exemption. As noted in our first submission, even before the 1998 Amendment went into effect, ASCAP outlined its plan to "reverse the effects" of the legislation.

31. We believe that a thorough analysis of all the issues will lead you to conclude that both the homestyle exemption and the 1998 Amendment are fully consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Thank you.
ATTACHMENT 2.3

RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS
FROM THE PANEL – FIRST MEETING

(19 November 1999)

I. REPLIES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL TO THE UNITED STATES

Q.1 Please provide:

(a) a consolidated version of the current text of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act together with the current text of Section 106;

(b) a copy of the study by the US Congressional Research Service on the impact of the proposed legislation referred to in paragraph 5.3 of the Australian submission;

(c) if possible, a copy of the full text of the group licensing agreement between the US collective management organizations (CMOs) and the National Licensed Beverage Association (NLBA) referred to in your submission.

(a) There is no official U.S. Government text consolidating Section 110(5). We are providing the Panel with a copy of a commercial service's consolidated Section 110(5), as well as the current text of Section 106 at exhibit US-15.

(b) It is our understanding that the CRS "study" referred to by Australia involved only the preparation of a couple of estimates, resulting in the one chart attached at exhibit US-16.

(c) We have been advised by the NLBA that its Agreement with the collecting societies contains a strict nondisclosure provision, and cannot be released. However, we have attached an NLBA circular, as well as a letter from the organization, both of which provide an overview of its main terms. (See exhibit US-17.)

Exceptions and limitations

Q.2 In paragraph 17 of its first submission, the US states – with respect to the EC allegations that Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act violates Articles 11 and/or Article 11bis of the Berne Convention in combination with Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement – "this issue is not in dispute" and that the dispute centres around the exceptions and limitations in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement. Could the US clarify whether it accepts that Section 110(5)(A)(B) in its revised form is not consistent with Articles 11 and/or 11bis of the Berne Convention read in combination with Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, but that it claims that Section 110(5) is fully justified by the exceptions and limitations provided in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement?

The U.S. does not dispute that Section 110(5)(A) and (B) implicate Articles 11 and 11bis of the Berne Convention. That is to say, it affects rights that are protected under those Articles. The question of whether Section 110(5) is consistent with those Articles cannot be determined, however, without looking both to the scope of the rights that they afford, and to the exceptions which are permitted to those rights. Only if Section 110(5) does not fall within the exceptions permitted to Articles 11 and 11bis will it be inconsistent with them.

The U.S. does not claim that TRIPS Article 13 permits exceptions or limitations that would not be allowed by the Berne Convention, with respect to Berne rights. The U.S. does claim that
Section 110(5) is justified under the minor reservations doctrine. TRIPS Article 13 is relevant because it provides an explicit test under which a minor reservation must be evaluated. TRIPS Article 13 is a mechanism for evaluating what would, and what would not, be permissible under Berne. (For further discussion of this issue, please see U.S. Response to Panel Question 14.)

Categories of works

Q.3 Section 110(5)(B) applies to "performance or display of a nondramatic musical work". What was the objective of excluding works other than nondramatic musical works from the scope of application of Subsection (B)? When is "display" of a nondramatic musical work relevant? To what extent does Subsection (B) apply to categories other than musical works, in particular to audiovisual works?

Nondramatic works were the focus of Subsection (B) for two related reasons. First, the impetus for the enactment of Subsection (B) was complaints from business owners about the licensing tactics of the PROs. Since PROs do not license dramatic musical works, there were no complaints about the licensing of such works, and thus there was no reason to address these works in the amendment. Furthermore, in as much as the PROs do not license them, there is effectively no licensing of secondary performances of dramatic musical works in establishments affected by the exemption. To our knowledge, individual right holders do not license these types of secondary performances. Without any licensing taking place in this field, there was no need for Section 110(5)(B) to include such works.

A display of a nondramatic musical work is almost never relevant. The only occasion in which it would conceivably arise would be an audiovisual transmission in which sheet music was held up to the camera. It should also be noted that the display right, while present in U.S. law, is not required by the Berne Convention.

Subsection (B) does not apply to any categories of works other than nondramatic musical works. The application of this provision to works other than nondramatic musical works, and in particular audiovisual works, turns on the construction of the word "embodying". Subsection (B) exempts only the performances of nondramatic musical works which occur in the process of an audiovisual transmission. While the establishment owner would not be required to pay a license fee for the performance of music during television programs, he or she would still be required to pay the copyright owners of the other works performed, such as cinematographic works. In practice, however, there is no licensing of the secondary performances of other types of works, including audiovisual works, to bars, restaurants and retail establishments.

Establishments covered

Q.4 Under Subsection 110(5)(B) of the U.S. Copyright Act, if (I) an establishment other than a food service or drinking establishment has less than 2,000 gross square feet of space or (II) a food service or drinking establishment has less than 3,750 gross square feet of space, and if it wants to play nondramatic musical works, can it use any professional equipment or can it use only a homestyle-type equipment described in Subsection 110(5)(A)?

If an establishment falls within the 2,000/3,750 square footage limit, the equipment limitations of Subsection (A) do not apply.

Rights affected

Q.5 What types of transmissions are covered by Section 110(5)(A) and (B), in particular:

(a) Please specify separately in respect of Subsection (A) and (B) whether they cover:
(i) **original broadcasts over the air;**

Both Subsections A and B would cover if the broadcasts originated from a radio or TV station licensed by the FCC.

(ii) **original satellite broadcasting;**

Both Subsections A and B would cover.

(iii) **rebroadcasting by terrestrial means or by satellite;**

Both Subsections A and B would cover.

(iv) **cable retransmission of original broadcast;**

Both Subsections A and B would cover.

(v) **original cable transmission or other transmission by wire.**

Both Subsections A and B would cover.

(b) **In the above-mentioned cases, is there a difference between the treatment of audio and audiovisual transmissions?**

Generally, there is no difference in treatment except in regard to the technical aspects of the receiving devices.

(c) **What are the objectives and implications of the specific reference to audiovisual transmissions by a cable system or satellite carrier in Subsection (B)? What situations are intended to be either included or excluded?**

Because cable systems and satellite carriers are not licensed as "radio or television station licensed as such" by the FCC, they were specifically included in Subsection (B). This makes application of the provision uniform and predictable, applying to most audiovisual transmissions without distinctions between originating source.

(d) **Does Subsection (A) apply to transmissions regardless of whether they are intended to be received by the general public (cf. the wording of Subsection (B))?**

Under Subsection (A), the performance must be by "the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus . . .". If the reception was not public, then Subsection (A) would not apply. For both sections, if transmissions are not received by the public, then they would not implicate the author's exclusive rights under Berne Article 11 and 11bis. For example, if the radio were playing in a person's car, or in the private back office of a restaurant, there would be no exercise of the public performance right.

As the Panel notes, for Subsection (B), there is the added requirement that the transmission must have been *intended* to be received by the general public. Presumably this would exclude from the exemption transmissions intended for a more select audience, such as music subscription or on-demand services. There is no such requirement in Subsection (A). For all practical purposes, however, this limitation is implicit in Subsection (A), since homestyle devices are not likely to be capable of receiving other types of transmissions than those intended for the public.
Q.6(a) Are Internet transmissions covered by Section 110(5)(A) and (B)?

Internet transmissions would generally not be covered by Sections 110(5)(A) or (B) because those sections apply only to the public performance right. See answer to sub-question (b) below. It is unclear whether the performance aspect of an internet transmission would be covered by either Section 110(5)(A) or (B). Under Subsection (A), the courts have not determined whether a computer would be considered a "single receiving apparatus of a type commonly used in homes", although it should be observed that computers differ in many ways from the stereo and radio receivers contemplated by the legislative history of the homestyle exception and the case law of Section 110(5)(A). In the case of Subsection (B), most Internet transmissions will not originate from television or radio stations licensed as such by the FCC, nor will they be AV transmissions by satellite or cable systems. However, if an FCC-licensed broadcaster itself streams its signal on the Internet, the performance aspect of the broadcast might fall within Subsection (B).

(b) Paragraph 16 of the US submission says that "establishment owners generally must still seek a licence for the reproduction and possibly distribution rights implicated by Internet transmission". Please explain to what extent reproductions are created by a person who listens to a radio transmission "streamed" over the Internet and whether an authorization is required for such reproductions, as well as under what circumstances a person who receives radio transmissions "streamed" over the Internet would violate the distribution right. Please clarify whether any small stores or restaurants covered by Section 110(5) have acquired a reproduction or distribution licence for communicating by a loudspeaker music streamed over the Internet, and from whom such licences have been or could be obtained.

Temporary reproductions are created by all transmissions that traverse a computer network. This a technical requirement of sending digital information – the information is sent from one computer, and goes through numerous other computer servers before it reaches its final destination. Each one of the computer servers through which the information passes makes a copy of that information in the process of passing it on. Under U.S. law, these copies implicate an author's reproduction right.

The process of creating temporary reproductions occurs whether or not a transmission is "streaming". The term "streaming" means only that a reproduction of the entire work may not be created on the recipient's computer. Reproductions still occur as the information is transmitted across the network.

The distribution right could be implicated by copies of the work, or parts of the work, being deposited on the recipient's computers. This occurs with many streaming technologies, in which portions of the streamed work are "cached" on the recipient's computer as a backup or buffer to the portion being performed or displayed on-screen.

The United States has no information regarding whether or how business owners have obtained or could obtain licenses for the practices described above. The idea of a business owner performing broadcast works over a computer for the benefit of his or her patrons is still a novel one, with which we have no experience.

Even in the event that such forms of reception become more widely used, it is important to note that the owner of an establishment would receive no greater, or broader, ability to play music than he receives from his radio. In consultations prior to this Panel, the EC voiced concerns that this Subsection would apply to a variety of new music services that could become available over the Internet, such as on-demand music. However, since the Subsection is limited to transmissions "intended to be received by the general public," a
restaurant or small business owner would only have access to the same broadcasts he or she could get over a common radio or TV. Access to those same broadcasts over a computer, and only to those originating from the relatively small number of licensed radio stations, pose no additional threat to copyright owners.

(c) Assuming that a food service or drinking or other establishment would be required to acquire a reproduction and/or distribution licence for the public performance of music transmitted over the Internet, would this affect the scope to which it would be permissible to provide limitations to the public performance right in the law?

Yes, the requirement to obtain a license for the reproduction and/or distribution of music performed over the internet could affect the scope of permissible exceptions to the public performance right. Although it is difficult to answer this question without any licensing experience in this area, it appears that right holders could take into account in their licensing practices for reproduction/distribution any diminished revenues for performances. The exception from the public performance right might then cause right holders no economic prejudice whatsoever. Moreover, right holders could simply withheld authorization of the reproduction or distribution in any instance in which they wished to prevent an unauthorized public performance.

Q.7 What is the purpose for exempting under Section 110(5) communications to the public of music broadcasts but not of music from tapes or CDs or live music? In which respect are administrative difficulties with licensing thousands of small establishments for playing broadcasts more difficult to surmount than those arising in the context of collecting royalties for playing tapes or CDs or live music?

The United States does not argue that administrative difficulties in licensing small establishments are more severe with respect to broadcasts as opposed to CDs or live music. Part of the rationale for this distinction is a historical one. In the Aiken decision, the Supreme Court decided that a radio broadcast was not a public performance. When Congress overruled the rationale, though not the result of Aiken, in the 1976 Copyright Act by declaring that playing the radio was a public performance, it created an exemption to the exclusive right of public performance based on the fact pattern of the Aiken case (ie., a small establishment of approximately 1055 square feet with limited receiving equipment). The equitable consideration that the copyright owner had already been compensated once is reflected in the legislative history of both Sections 110(5)(A) and (B). Congress thus determined to encourage small business by creating the exception, but at the same time limited the scope of that exemption to broadcasts.

**Governmental proceedings to set or adjust royalties**

Q.8 Please clarify the purpose of a new paragraph added to Section 110 concerning the impact of the exemptions provided under paragraph (5) on any administrative, judicial, or other governmental proceedings to set or adjust royalties, in particular whether the intention is that the exemptions can or cannot be reflected in the royalties payable to right holders for broadcasting or other transmissions.

Our understanding is that this paragraph was drafted by the collecting societies to ensure that the exemption in Section 110(5)(B) would not be taken into consideration in any proceeding to determine the amount of royalties each of the right holders should be paid by the collecting societies. One can surmise that the provision was the result of a business decision on the part of the collecting societies that the passage of Section 110(5) should not affect the distribution of their royalty payments to right holders.
Impact on the market

Q.9 Please provide any available information or estimations on the actual or potential beneficiaries of the exemption in Section 110(5), in particular:

(a) Percentage of food service or drinking establishments and establishments other than food service and drinking establishments (below other establishments) that benefitted from the original "homestyle" exemption;

In 1996, the Congressional Research Service estimated that based on the square footage guidelines of the Aiken case (1,055 square feet), approximately 16% of eating establishments and 13.5% of drinking establishments, were eligible for the homestyle exemption. Combined with the estimate from the National Restaurant Association that approximately x% of restaurants use the radio (and x% use the television)

(b) Percentage of food service or drinking establishments and other establishments that fall under the relevant size limits of Subsection (B) (3,750 square feet and 2,000 square feet respectively);

The National Restaurant Association (NRA) estimates that 36% percent of table service restaurants in the United States (those with sit-down waiter service) are less than 3,750 square feet, and approximately 95% of fast-food restaurants are less than 3,750 square feet. Exhibit US-18. In 1996, the Congressional Research Service conducted an analysis of a legislative proposal from ASCAP and BMI that would have exempted restaurants under 3,500 square feet. CRS estimated that 65.2% of restaurants would fall under this size limit and 71.8% of drinking establishments. Exhibit US-16. The United States has not been able to obtain information regarding the number of retail establishments that may fall under 2,000 square feet.

(c) Percentage of such establishments either below or above the limit that are likely to be exempted when other factors, in particular the limits on equipment, are taken into account.

The United States has no access to data regarding the establishments likely to be exempted by Section 110(5)(B) based on equipment usage.

Q.10 Please provide information on the licensing practices of the three US CMOs in regard to public performance of music by food service and drinking establishments and other establishments, in particular:

The United States is pleased to provide the following information in response to the Panel's questions numbered 10, 11 and 12. We would like to note that, as we mentioned at the first meeting with the Panel, in preparation for this case we requested information from the largest U.S. collecting societies (ASCAP and BMI) regarding their licensing practices, but that information was not provided. In response to the Panel's questions, we have renewed and reiterated these requests to the collecting societies. If they are responsive, we may be able to provide the Panel with additional information in the future. See Exhibit US-19.

1 Confidential Exhibit US-18.
(a) The percentage of such establishments in which broadcast music was licensed before the 1976 Copyright Act;

The United States does not have detailed information regarding the pre-1976 period; however, in the House Report cited in the U.S. First Submission, (Exhibit US-1), Congress found that the majority of beneficiaries of the homestyle exemption were not licensed.

(b) The percentage of such establishments in which broadcast music was licensed since the entry into force of the 1976 Copyright Act until the entry into force of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (for the last three years for which data are available);

According to surveys conducted by the National Restaurant Association in 1996-1997, 16% of table service establishments and 5% of fast food establishments in the United States were licensed before the 1998 Amendment. According to Census Bureau Data, in 1996 there were approximately the same number of table service and fast food restaurants in the United States. (Confidential Exhibit US-18, NRA letter reporting estimates based on Census Bureau figures of 183,253 table service restaurants in the United States and 185,891 quick-service restaurants). Thus, averaging 16% and 5%, it appears that approximately 10.5% percent of restaurants were licensed in the United States.

Information from ASCAP, the largest collecting society also indicates the relatively low level of licensing of establishments. In her testimony before Congress in 1997, Marilyn Bergman, the President of ASCAP stated that "the total number of ASCAP restaurant licensees does not exceed 70,000." Exhibit US-20, page 177. The Census Bureau figures cited above indicate that there are approximately 368,044 total restaurants (table and quick-service) in the United States. Thus, it appears that even the largest U.S. collecting society, ASCAP, estimates that it licenses no more than 19% of the restaurants in the United States.

(c) To what extent collecting societies license the use by such establishments of music other than broadcast music (such as live music and music performed by means of sound recordings or jukeboxes) (for the last three years for which data are available).

The United States has no data regarding the extent to which the collecting societies attempt to collect from establishments under 3750 or 2000 square feet for the use of live music, recorded music or jukeboxes.

Q.11 Please provide any available information or estimations on the revenues collected by the US collecting societies (for the last three years for which data are available), in particular:

(a) The total revenues from the licensing of public performance of music divided between the major categories of uses, including (a) broadcasting and retransmission within the meaning of Article 11bis(1)(I) and (ii) of the Berne Convention (b) public communication within the meaning of Article 11bis(1)(iii) and (c) other rights, including those under Article 11(1) of the Berne Convention;

ASCAP's annual reports for 1995-1997, attached as exhibit US-21, indicate that the revenues from broadcasting are by far its most significant source of revenue.

Revenues from the licensing of public performances of music by television broadcast amounted to 32%-33% of ASCAP's annual revenues in 1995, 1996 and 1997. Revenues from radio broadcasts amounted to 25%-26% of ASCAP annual revenues in each of those same years. The actual revenue figures are as follows (in millions):
Precise figures on the amount of revenues from public communication by loudspeaker are not available. The only available statistics are ASCAP's receipts for so-called "general and background licensing", which include all licensing revenues from food, drinking and retail establishments, as well as from licensees such as conventions, circuses, theme parks and sports events. It must be remembered that these general figures include all licensing revenues from such establishments, including revenues from the playing of recorded music and live bands. For this reason, these figures do not represent the potential loss of revenue from the Section 110(5)(A) or (B) exemptions, but most certainly represent an upper bound on those losses. For each of the years 1995, 1996 and 1997, general licensing revenue amounted to approximately 14% of ASCAP's total revenue.

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(b) As regards the revenues collected from food service and drinking establishments and other establishments, what is the breakdown as between royalties for the public performance of broadcast music and the public performance of music from other sources;

As described above, in ASCAP's case, total revenues from food service, drinking and other establishments is less than 14% of total revenues for the years 1995-97. The United States does not have access to data itemizing ASCAP's general licensing revenues by broadcast music and music from other sources.

Surveys conducted by the NLBA, however, indicate that the use of recorded music from CDs and tapes (26% in member establishments) or background music services (18%) is very significant in its members establishments, and approximately as prevalent as the use of radio music (28%). The same survey showed that the public performance of live music (37%) was even more prevalent than the use of radio music. See Letter from NLBA (November 18, 1999) Exhibit US-17. Given that many establishments play music from several different sources, these percentage figures do not represent the percentage of total royalties collected for the use of music from each of these sources. For example, the percentage of royalties collected for the use of radio music is almost certainly less than 28% because many establishments that play radio music also play music from other sources.

The United States estimates that approximately 74% of all restaurants play some kind of music. From this data, as well as confidential NRA estimates, it can safely be assumed that no more than 44% of licensing fees from restaurants can be attributed to radio music.

(c) Breakdown of these revenues between various sources of revenue, in particular the percentage of the revenues collected from food serving and drinking establishments and other establishments; to the extent possible, please break down these figures between
food service and drinking establishment and other establishments that fall below and above the respective size limits provided for in Subsection (B);

To the extent that this information is available, it has been provided in the answer to question 10 and sub-questions (a) and (b), above.

(d) What is the likely impact of the amended Section 110(5) on the revenues collected earlier from such establishments.

The effect of the amended Section 110(5) on the revenues of the collecting societies is likely to be minimal. ASCAP collects just 14% of its total revenues from general licensees, including eating, drinking and retail establishments. Much of this revenue is for the public performance of live or recorded music, rather than broadcast music. Based on the data provided by the NLBA and other sources, it can be conservatively estimated that radio music accounts for a maximum of 28% to 44% of revenues from eating and drinking establishments. 28%-44% of 14% is equivalent to 3.9% - 6.2% of total revenues. In addition, this figure must be reduced further, since all restaurants and bars are not eligible for the Section 110(5) exemptions. Even using the EC's figure that 70% of all U.S. restaurants would be exempt under Section 110(5)(B), it appears that the exception for radio music will have a maximum effect on revenues of 2.7% - 4.3%.

Q.12 Can the US confirm the EC statement in paragraph 77 of its oral statement at the first substantive meeting that at least 25 per cent of all music played in the US belongs to EC copyright owners? If not, could the US give alternative estimates?

The United States does not agree with the EC statement. In particular, we cannot agree with the EC's implication that 25% of royalties collected in the United States are due to EC right holders. In fact, the United States is surprised by the EC's statement, given that a 1998 internal EC analysis of the economic effect of the homestyle exception on EC right holders estimated that just 6.2% of ASCAP revenues were distributed to all foreign collecting societies, and that just 5.6% of BMI revenues were due to all foreign collecting societies. Obviously, the percentage payable to EC collecting societies would be significantly less than these figures for total payments to all foreign collecting societies. European Commission, Examination Procedure Regarding the Licensing of Music Works in the United States of America (23 Feb. 1998).

Q.13 Please provide any market information concerning other countries that you would consider relevant to the case at hand.

Market conditions in the United States are the most relevant to the case at hand and thus the United States does not believe that market information concerning other countries is necessary to the resolution of this case. Right holders' legitimate expectations regarding the exploitation of their work in a particular market must be guided by the conditions in that market.

International treaty obligations

Q.14 Could the US explain how, absent express wording to that effect in the TRIPS Agreement, Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement "constitutes the articulation" of the "minor reservation" doctrine under the Berne Convention? Does the US claim that Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement can be invoked on its own or only through the "minor reservation" doctrine under the Berne Convention?

During the negotiation of Article 13 in TRIPS, the question posed by the Panel was discussed at length, and there were differing views regarding the need for Article 13. Eventually, the position that prevailed recognized that practically every country had small exceptions to exclusive rights
under Berne, either through statutory law, case law or practice, and that the inclusion of Article 13 was an effective way to measure the appropriateness of such exceptions.

In the draft of the TRIPS text from July 23, 1990 (W/76), this statement is made regarding Article 13: "In respect of the rights provided for at point 3, the limitations and exemptions, including compulsory licensing, recognized under the Berne Convention(1971) shall also apply *mutatis mutandis*". Furthermore, a prominent scholar, and author of a book on the negotiating history of TRIPS comments:

The interpretation of [Article 13] is possible only in the light of Article 2(2) and 9(1) of the Agreement and, by incorporation, Article 20 of the Berne Convention. Hence, Article 13 does not create new exceptions, even though when read separately from these other provisions, one would be tempted to say that it allows countries to create new compulsory licenses. . . . Yet this line of argument must fail. Introducing *new* compulsory licenses would in almost all cases violate the Berne Convention. Article 13 allows a dispute settlement panel to review exceptions, including the so called "small exceptions", to ensure that they pass the test. . . . [Quotes report from the Brussels Conference mentioning minor reservations applicable to Article 11, 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14.] When these exceptions are invoked, they may from now on be submitted to the general test of Article 13. . . (emphasis added).

*D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 89-80 (1998).*

Importantly, this interpretation is also confirmed by the language and history of subsequent treaty affirming Berne rights. The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) were adopted by the WIPO Diplomatic Conference on December 20, 1996, at Geneva. The WCT requires compliance with the substantive rights of Berne (WCT, Article 1(4)), and includes language very similar to Article 13 of TRIPS. Furthermore, the WCT specifically provides that it is a "special agreement within the meaning of Article 20 of the Berne Convention". WCT, Article 1(1). With respect to both the WCT (in Article 10) and the WPPT (in Article 16), it was believed important to incorporate the same standard for judging limitations and exceptions as already applied in the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention.

The WCT explicitly clarifies the application of the standard set forth in TRIPS Article 13 to existing provisions of the Berne Convention as well as the rights established in the new Treaty. Article 10(1) of the WCT provides that:

(1) Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.

Article 10(2) clarifies that this standard also applies in respect of the implementation of any limitations on or exceptions to any rights under the Berne Convention:

(2) Contracting Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention, confine any limitations of or exceptions to rights provided for therein to certain special cases that do not conflict with
a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice
the legitimate interests of the author.

The Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 of the WCT further buttresses this view:

It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting
Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital
environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which
have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention.
Similarly these provisions should be understood to permit
Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are
appropriate in the digital network environment.

It is also understood that Article 10 neither reduces nor extends the
scope of applicability of the limitations and exceptions permitted by
the Berne Convention.

If no minor exceptions or limitations were permitted under Berne, there would be no reason
for Article 10(2) of the WCT or the cited provision of the Agreed Statement.

Article 10 of the WCT reflects the same text included as Article 12 in the Basic Proposal for
the 1996 Diplomatic Conference (CRNR/DC/4). The commentary on the Basic Proposal is
enlightening. After observing that the TRIPS Agreement already enunciated this standard for
permissible limitations and exceptions to rights, it states that "[n]o limitations, not even those that
belong in the category of minor reservations, may exceed the limits set by the three step test".

The EC and the U.S. are signatories of both the WCT and the WPPT.

Q.15 In the light of Article 2.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 20 of the Berne
Convention, can Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement derogate from the requirement under
Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention to provide "equitable remuneration"?

Article 13, as explained above, in no way derogates from the protection afforded under the
Berne Convention and consequently is entirely consistent with TRIPS Article 2.2 and Berne
Article 20. In fact, Article 13 strengthens the protection under the Berne Convention, by providing
explicit criteria to judge exceptions where none existed before.

In particular as applied to Article 11bis(2), Article 13 does not derogate from the right to
equitable remuneration. Minor exceptions apply in respect of many of the rights under Berne,
explicitly including Article 11 and 11bis. Should a party choose to implement a compulsory
licensing regime under Article 11bis(2), as opposed to having a small exception to that right, such a
system must provide for equitable remuneration. The U.S. compulsory licensing regime, for
example, as it applies to secondary retransmissions of broadcast signals by cable systems clearly falls
within, and complies with, this provision. (For further discussion of this issue, please see US
Response to Panel Question 6 to US and EC.).

Q.16 Are there exceptions similar to the US Section 110(5)(A) or (B), or examples of "minor
reservation" exceptions in the copyright laws of other countries?

There are numerous exceptions similar to U.S. Section 110(5)(A) and (B), and examples of
minor reservation exceptions, in the copyright laws of other countries. Although the United States
has not been able, in the time provided, to review the copyright laws of all other WTO or Berne
Members, even a limited review of the copyright laws of a handful of WTO members reveals a
number of exceptions to the public performance right, including a number in EC Member States.
For example, the Australian copyright law provides a number of exceptions to the public performance right. Section 46 provides an exemption for public performances by wireless apparatus or by a record "at premises where persons reside or sleep, as part of the amenities provided exclusively for residents or inmates of the premises or for those residents or inmates and their guests". Copyright Act 1968 (amended 1994), Section 46. The commercial nature of this exemption is notable, as it applies to hotels and guest houses. Parliament of Australia, Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, "Don't Stop the Music!: a report on the inquiry into copyright, music and small business", 29 (May 1998) (available at www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/laca/reports/copyrigh/index.htm). Australia also exempts public performances for educational purposes. Id., Section 28.

Under the Belgian copyright law, Section 22, an author "may not prohibit . . . communication to the public of a work shown in a place accessible to the public where the aim of the [] communication to the public is not the work itself". Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights 1994 (amended 1995), Art. 22(1). Belgium also has an exception for the "free performance of a work during a public examination where the purpose of the performance is not the work itself, but assessment of the performer . . ." Id.

Under the Copyright Law of Finland, "A published work may also be publicly performed in events where the performance of such works is not the main feature, provided that no admission fee is charged and the event is not arranged for profit". Copyright Act (amended 1997) Law 446/ 1995, Art. 21. The same law also contains an exemption for public performances "in connection with religious services and education". Id. Denmark also provides an exception for public performances of non-dramatic works on radio or television "on occasions when the performance of such works is not the main feature of the event, provided that no admission fee is charged and the event is not for profit". Act on Copyright 1995, Sec. 21.

New Zealand exempts public performances of musical works at educational establishments. Copyright Act 1994, Section 47. The Philippines excepts public performances for educational and charitable purposes. Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, Sec. 184 (1997). India, in addition to educational exemptions, also exempts "the performance of a literary, dramatic or musical work by an amateur club or society, if the performance is given to a non-paying audience . . ." India Copyright Act 1957 (amended 1994), Sections 52(l), 52(I).

Canada provides a number of exceptions to the public performance right. Copyright Act 1994 (amended 1997). It provides several exceptions for educational purposes, see Sections 29.4 & 29.5, and for performances "at any agricultural or agricultural-industrial exhibition or fair," Section 32.2(2), as well as a blanket exception for any public performance of a musical work – whether live or by "communication signal" – by a religious organization or institution, education institution, charitable or fraternal organization in furtherance of a religious educational or charitable object. Section 32.2.(3). The later section specifically provides that under such circumstances, no such organization "shall be held liable to pay any compensation". (Emphasis added.)

South African law provides that "the copyright in a literary or musical work shall not be infringed by the use thereof in a bona fide demonstration of radio or television receivers or any type of recording equipment or playback equipment to a client by a dealer in such equipment. Copyright Act of 1978 (amended May 1995).

Finally, the United States references Brazil's letter to the Panel of 17 November 1999, in which Ambassador Amorim noted that Brazilian copyright law contains exceptions in the sense of the minor reservations doctrine.

Q.17 Precisely how do you justify the submission that the provisions of Section 110(5)(A) and (B) constitute a special case within the meaning of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement?
Article 13 requires that exceptions be limited to certain special cases. The Oxford Dictionary defines "certain" as "determined; fixed" and "definite". The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary (ed. Lesley Brown), 364 (1993). The word "special" is defined as "exceptional", "distinguished from others of the kind by a particular quality or feature; distinctive in some way", "appointed or employed for a particular purpose or occasion", "having an individual or limited application or purpose", and "containing details, precise, specific". Id. at 2971. These definitions contain a significant degree of overlap, and the key criterion that emerges from the requirement that exceptions be limited to "certain, special" cases is that the exception be both well-defined and of limited application. One report of the TRIPS negotiating history explains as follows: "When these exceptions are invoked, they may from now on be submitted to the general test of Article 13, which should be interpreted on the basis of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. The two tests contained in that Article are cumulative. In addition, any exception must be clearly delineated so as to apply only to "certain special cases". Gervais, at 90.

The negotiating history of Berne Article 9(2) reinforces this view. The original text proposed for Article 9(2) listed three areas of permissible exceptions, the third of which was "certain particular cases, provided (I) that reproduction is not contrary to the legitimate interests of the author, and (ii) that it does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work". The Conference decided, however, that a more general formula for exceptions was preferable, and instead of the three areas of exceptions, adopted a proposal of the United Kingdom to modify the text to allow exceptions "in certain special cases" that met the two conditions. WIPO, Records of the Stockholm Conference, 1144-46, paras. 78, 81, & 86 (1967). The WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention also supports the idea that the phrase "certain special cases" in Article 9(2) is not intended as a separate threshold requirement for exceptions, and does not discuss the imposition of any limitation on the purposes for which an exception can be made. WIPO – Guide to the Berne Convention, 55, para. 9.6 (focusing exclusively on the "two" conditions that limit the power to make exceptions: conflict with normal exploitation and unreasonable prejudice).

Thus, the concept of "special" need not include the concept of the purpose of the exception. To the extent that the purpose of an exception is relevant under TRIPS Article 13, it is only necessary that the exception have a particular purpose. By itself, the term "special" does not convey any priority of purpose, or preference for one purpose over another.

Moreover, in considering whether an exception constitutes a "special case," it is critical that a WTO Panel not judge the desirability of a country's public policy rationale for an exception. In an organization as diverse as the WTO, a Panel should not determine the acceptability of a Member's public policy objectives. There is no support in the TRIPS Agreement for a Panel to determine acceptable policy rationales for exceptions under Article 13 of TRIPS. The purpose for which countries may make exceptions to exclusive rights is not the central focus of Article 13; rather, it is tangentially relevant, if at all. It is the scope of the exception and its effect on right holders that is key.

As discussed in the U.S. first submission, paragraphs 24-26, the exceptions in Sections 110(5)(A) and (B) of the U.S. Copyright Law are well-defined and limited to particular circumstances. Section 110(5)(A) is limited to cases involving use of a homestyle receiving apparatus, and Section 110(5)(B) is confined to cases involving establishments meeting its clear size and equipment requirements.

Moreover, important public policy concerns underlie both Sections 110(5)(A) and (B). With respect to 110(5)(A), the record is clear that Congress was concerned with small "mom and pop" businesses. Small businesses play a particularly important role in the American social fabric. They foster local values and innovation and experimentation in the economy. Small businesses also create a disproportionately greater number of economic opportunities for women, minorities, immigrants,

Important public policy concerns also support the exception in Section 110(5)(B). With respect to many of the businesses exempted, the same concerns relating to the social importance of small businesses apply. *E.g.*, Congressional Record (Oct. 7, 1998); Letter from Representative James Sensenbrenner, Jr. to Members of Congress, "Key small business vote next week" (Mar. 20, 1998). In addition, the legislative history of this provision is replete with concern over abuses of the PROs. By exempting small businesses, many of whom the collecting societies had already agreed to exempt in the context of the NLBA Agreement, Congress believed that it was resolving the issue of abusive licensing practices without causing any unreasonable prejudice to right holders.

Q.18 Does Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement permit the balancing of revenues generated or likely to accrue under individual exclusive rights, *inter alia*, for purposes of determining "normal exploitation" of works, and/or "unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests of rights holders", or is it necessary to consider each individual exclusive right separately?

This question, like question 19, appears to assume that the Panel must *either* consider each right separately *or* consider all rights together. On the contrary, both paradigms are relevant. Exceptions should be considered in the context of all the exclusive rights granted to the right holder, as well as the context of the particular right to which the exception applies.

Exceptions can take many forms. Some exceptions might represent a great intrusion on one particular exclusive right, and no intrusion on any other exclusive right. Other exceptions might represent a lesser degree of intrusion on several exclusive rights. Both kinds of exceptions might violate the TRIPS Agreement, and the analytical framework of Article 13 must take both situations into account.

Thus, a Panel considering an exception should consider the scope of the exception *vis-à-vis* the scope of all the right holders’ exclusive rights, as well as the scope of the exception *vis-à-vis* the exclusive right to which it applies. Whether an exception applies to one exclusive right or several is relevant in the analysis of conflict with normal exploitation and unreasonable prejudice. Similarly, the degree to which an exception affects a particular exclusive right is also relevant to that analysis. Whether any particular exception is determined to conflict with normal exploitation or cause unreasonable prejudice is ultimately a highly fact-specific inquiry that will turn on the precise circumstances of the exception and the market at issue.

The text of Article 13 supports this broad analysis. Article 13 requires that exceptions be limited to cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the "work", not a normal exploitation of the particular right affected. If the drafters had meant to limit the analysis to the exclusive right to which an exception applied, the provision could easily have referenced the "normal exploitation of such exclusive rights". It is also significant that Article 13 also references unreasonable prejudice to the "legitimate interests of the right holder" without any limiting language regarding their legitimate interests in a particular right.

The fact that an exception must be evaluated in the overall context of the rights granted by a country does not imply that a country could completely eliminate an exclusive right if that right were economically unimportant. *TRIPS* established minimum standards. The exclusive rights set forth in Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention (minus *6bis*) and in Part I, Section 1 of *TRIPS* must be provided. Moreover, Article 13 references "limitations or exceptions" to exclusive rights. The abolition of an exclusive right is not equivalent to a limitation to such right. So long as the exclusive
right is provided, however, the relative economic importance of that exclusive right would be a relevant factor in the Article 13 analysis.

Actual revenues from exclusive rights are also important in the Article 13 analysis. Marketplace realities guide the expectations of benefit of copyright owners. In determining the scope of normal exploitation, and unreasonable prejudice it is highly appropriate to look at marketplace realities. The concepts of normal exploitation and unreasonable prejudice cannot be determined in the abstract.

Q.19 In considering criteria for determining "normal exploitation" and/or "unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests of rights holders" under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, is it necessary to consider each individual exclusive right separately?

See answer to Question 18, above.

Q.20 Could the US further explain how the provision of Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention could amount to a greater degree of derogation from substantive copyright law than an exception under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement?

This question could also be phrased: "How could a right of remuneration under Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention amount to a greater degree of derogation from exclusive rights than an exception under the minor reservations doctrine applicable to Article 11bis?" As discussed above, Article 13 does not "provide" exceptions that are not already provided for by Berne, it merely furnishes a standard under which they can be judged.

Generally speaking, a compulsory license may be much broader, and may abrogate more rights, than an exception. The minor reservation doctrine, applied to Article 11bis, would only allow narrow and reasonable exceptions to a right holder's rights. Should a country choose to substitute a right of remuneration for the exclusive right under Article 11bis, rather than creating a narrow exception targeted to address a particular problem, it could result in a far greater diminution of revenues. A compulsory license under 11bis(2) potentially could abrogate all of a right holder's rights under Article 11bis – including his right to license his work to radio stations, television stations, and cable systems. Especially in the context of certain audiovisual works, which receive virtually all their revenue through this mechanism, it can be seen how broad this abrogation would be. Furthermore, although the right holder would still be entitled to some compensation for use of the work, he cannot set the price of that compensation himself. It will most likely be set by an administrative or quasi-governmental entity, which could determine that the work is worth far less than the right holder himself believes, or could get in a free market.

In contrast, under the minor reservations doctrine, outright exceptions to the Berne rights must be narrow, and cannot conflict with normal exploitation or prejudice a right holder's legitimate interests in the work. Exceptions which pass this test will likely be narrower and have less impact on the right holder than the licenses authorized by Article 11bis(2).

In sum, under Article 11bis(2), a country can put any condition on a right holder's rights, provided that he is not deprived of equitable remuneration, which he does not even have the authority to determine himself. In contrast, under the minor reservations doctrine, as judged through TRIPS Article 13, countries can only create narrow exceptions which have a reasonable effect.

Q.21 Does the US protect broadcasting rights through the performance rights protected in Section 106 of the US Copyright Act?

Assuming that by "broadcasting rights" the Panel is referring to the right of broadcasting of the copyright owner under Article 11bis (as opposed to broadcasters' rights in the programming that they produce), the simple answer is yes.
Broadcasting is only one means by which a work may be publicly performed. The copyright owner generally has the exclusive right under U.S. copyright law to authorize or prohibit that broadcast. The right of public performance in Section 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act includes the broadcasting right in Berne Article 11bis as well as other types of public performances.

II. REPLIES OF THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL Addressed to Both Parties

Q.1 Please explain the extent to which the case law concerning Section 110(5) cited in your respective submissions is relevant for the purposes of interpreting the present subsection (A) of that paragraph.

The United States believes that the case law is relevant because Section 110(5) was TRIPS consistent even before non-dramatic musical works were excluded from its scope. Moreover, the case law also provides guidance as to the bounds of the exception with respect to works other than non-dramatic musical works.

Categories of works

Q.2 The Panel understands that the text of the original Section 110(5) is identical to that of the present subsection (A) minus the words "except as provided for in subparagraph (B)"). The preparatory work reproduced in exhibits EC-3 and US-1 (H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976)) explains that the provision "applies to performances and displays of all types of works". Paragraph 31 of the EC submission and paragraph 9 of the US submission (and certain other paragraphs) contain an interpretation according to which this text, as contained in subsection (A), is intended to exclude from its scope "nondramatic musical works". Please clarify your interpretation of the text of this provision, on the one hand, as part of the original paragraph, and, on the other hand, as part of subsection A, and, to the extent that, in your view, the text should be understood differently in these two contexts. Explain why.

With respect to the original (homestyle) exemption, the precursor to subsection A, as noted, the intent was to exempt the public performance of all types of work, within the other limitations of the exemption. The 1998 Amendment narrowed the scope of the homestyle exemption. Subsection B refers to "nondramatic musical works" and the scope of subsection A is specifically limited to whatever is not detailed in subsection B. See also U.S. Response to Panel Question 3 to the U.S. Thus, given that nondramatic musical works are covered under Subsection B, they are not included within Subsection A. The United States observes that on this particular question of fact – the scope of Section 110(5) – there is no dispute between the parties to the case.

Q.3 What is the definition of the term "nondramatic musical work" in the context of Section 110(5)? What types of musical works are either included in or excluded from the application of the provisions of that Section, and which types of copyright holders are affected by the provisions of Subsections (A) and (B)? Does it also cover communication to the public of live music performances? For example, would the performance of, e.g., one song from a musical, constitute a performance of a "dramatic" or of a "nondramatic" musical work? Is it still a "dramatic" work if a song from a musical is performed separately and by another artist? To what extent the notion of "nondramatic musical work" corresponds or is intended to correspond with the notion of "small musical rights" applied in the practice of CMOs?

The term "nondramatic musical work" is not defined in Section 110(5). However, as we have discussed, nondramatic musical works are typically those not accompanied by a dramatic performance, such as a play or opera. Nondramatic music represents most of the music played in the United States since it encompasses pop, rock, jazz, and ethnic music. The United States wishes to clarify our preliminary answer at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, and note our understanding that the PROs do license nondramatic renditions of dramatic musical works.
Licensing practice

Q.4 Paragraph 4 of the US oral statement at the first substantive meeting states that Section 110(5) is limited to only certain secondary uses of broadcasts of public performances, for which the right holder has already been compensated for the primary performance. In which way, if any, do licensing arrangements between collective management organisations (CMOs) and broadcasting organizations in the US or the EC take into account the potential additional audience created by means of further communication by loudspeaker etc. of broadcasts to the public within the meaning of Article 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention?

The United States does not assert that licensing arrangements between broadcast organizations and the collecting societies include royalties for secondary performances by the receiving public. In assessing the economic impact of Section 110(5), however, and specifically the extent of prejudice to a copyright owner, the Panel should take note that the copyright owner has already been compensated once for the broadcast or radio transmission of a particular public performance.

Interpretation of treaty obligations

Q.5 What is the legal nature of materials including "General Reports" of Diplomatic Conferences of the Berne Convention countries in light of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)? Are they " subsequent agreements on the interpretation or application" in the meaning of Article 31(3)(a), "subsequent practice" in the meaning of Article 31(3)(b), "rules of international law applicable between the parties" in the meaning of Article 31(3)(c), or a "special meaning … given to a term if its established that the parties so intended"?

The General Reports of Diplomatic Conferences of the Berne Convention countries may, depending on the context, be considered to be preparatory work for revisions to the Berne Convention, or evidence of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the text of the revisions to the Berne Convention; thus they would be analyzed under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. They are not "agreements on the interpretation or application" of the Berne Convention, they do not represent a widespread "subsequent practice" of the parties to the Convention, and they do not as such constitute "rules of international law applicable between the parties.” Thus they do not fall within any of the categories listed as Article 31(3)(a), (b) or (c).

Q.6 In your view, what is the relationship between Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention? Does Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement prevail over the exception in Article 11bis(2) with respect to the exclusive rights conferred by Article 11bis(1)(I-iii) of the Berne Convention in the sense that when the three conditions of Article 13 are met, no requirement to pay equitable remuneration arises? Do the requirements of Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention prevail as a lex specialis over the requirements of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, in the sense that if equitable remuneration is paid, there is no need to comply with the three-conditions test under Article 13? Do the requirements of Article 13 and Article 11bis(2) apply on a cumulative basis in the sense that, on the one hand, even if the three-condition test of Article 13 is fulfilled, there is an additional, fourth requirement to pay equitable remuneration, and on the other hand, even if equitable remuneration is paid consistently with Article 11bis(2), is it necessary to comply in addition with the three conditions of Article 13? Please explain.

As a fundamental matter, it must be clarified that the "equitable remuneration" language of Article 11bis(2) only applies to, and indeed is a shorthand for, compulsory licenses. Article 11bis(2) allows a country to put any conditions on a right holder's broadcasting rights, provided that they do not deprive the right holder of equitable remuneration. This is a compulsory license. Compulsory
licenses may be much broader than an exception, and are a different mechanism for limiting rights than the minor reservations doctrine.

Article 11bis(2) is consistently described as a provision authorizing compulsory licenses:

- "Long discussions – in the subcommittee as in the General Committee – was caused by para. 2 [of Article 11bis] which enables Union countries to introduce obligatory licenses in favor of the radio." (Report on The Brussels Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention, Dr. Alfred Baum, Zurich, 1948.)

- "This provision [Article 11bis(2)] allows member countries to substitute, for the author's exclusive right, a system of compulsory licenses." (WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention, 70.)

- "The reference to "conditions" in article 11bis(2) is usually taken to refer to the imposition of compulsory licenses, but the form of these licenses is left to national legislation to determine."


Notably, the minor reservations doctrine, discussed at length in the negotiating history of Berne and in subsequent treatises, is never linked in any way to compulsory licenses or to Article 11bis(2). In the General Report at the Brussels Conference (1948), Marcel Plaisant explicitly discusses the applicability of minor reservations to Article 11bis: "These exceptional measures apply to Articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14". (Quoted in Ricketson, p. 534.) The right to remuneration provision in Article 11bis(2) was already in the Convention at that time. If the drafting committee had intended that minor reservations should be subject to some additional requirement with respect only to Article 11bis, it surely would have mentioned that fact in the Report. Likewise, in the WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention, Article 11bis(2) is discussed on page 70 under the heading "Compulsory Licenses". The minor reservation doctrine, is discussed on page 65: "It is in relation to Article 11 that the question of the 'minor reservations' arises. . . . It was agreed at Brussels that these exceptions (which apply also to Articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14) were valid". No mention is made of Article 11bis(2), and there is no indication that it relates to the minor reservations doctrine.

Q.7 In your view, to what extent has the Berne Convention become part of customary international law, and if so, in particular which part of the Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention?

The United States is continuing to consult internally regarding the issues raised by this question, as well as the following one. For this reason, the following views must be considered preliminary, and we may elaborate further in our Second Submission to the Panel.

The United States does not consider that the Berne Convention has become part of customary international law. In the view of the United States, there is not the required degree of consistency and uniformity of practice, nor do non-signatories States view the obligations of the Berne Convention as sufficiently obligatory, to consider it part of customary international law. First negotiated in 1886, the Berne Convention has been revised five times with two additions since that time. The current text is that of the Paris revision of 1971. Many countries are not party to the Berne Convention, do not comply with its provisions, or have not accepted some of the latter revisions of the Convention. The United States acceded to the Berne Convention only in 1989 when it passed domestic legislation to conform its law to Berne requirements. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
Q.8 Has the "minor exceptions" doctrine under the Berne Convention, and especially in the context of Articles 11bis(1) and 11(1) of the Berne Convention, acquired the status of customary international law? What is the legal significance of the "minor exceptions" doctrine under the Berne Convention in the light of subparagraphs (3)(a-c) or paragraph (4) of Article 31 of the VCLT or in the light of Article 32 of the VCLT? Has the "minor exceptions" doctrine or any other implied exceptions been incorporated, by virtue of Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, together with Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention into the TRIPS Agreement? Please explain.

The "minor exceptions" doctrine under the Berne Convention has not acquired the status of customary international law. The doctrine under the Berne Convention constitutes subsequent practice of Berne Members under Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(b). See U.S. Response to Panel Question 16 to the U.S. regarding minor exceptions in the laws of other Berne members. The minor exceptions doctrine is also explicitly referenced in the preparatory work of the Berne Convention, which constitutes a supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. See U.S. response to Panel Question 14 to the U.S.

The "minor exceptions" doctrine has been incorporated into TRIPS by the specific articulation in Article 13 of the standard by which to judge such minor exceptions. See U.S. response to Panel Questions 14 and 15 to the U.S. The 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty also confirms that Berne countries intended to allow minor exceptions to Berne rights. See U.S. response to Panel Question 14 to the U.S.

Q.9 What else other than religious ceremonies, performances by military bands, charitable concerts or requirements of education does the "minor reservations" doctrine cover? Does it only cover non-commercial uses? Was this doctrine be conceived of only with respect to Article 11 of the Berne Convention, or was it also extended to Article 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention, given that these Articles concern different types of rights? What such instances of implied exceptions could be relevant for this dispute?

Minor reservations cover exceptions that meet the standard now articulated in TRIPS Article 13. The doctrine is not limited to the specific examples cited by some countries in the negotiating history, and subsequent practice of many countries demonstrates the applicability of the doctrine to a wide variety of types of exceptions. As set forth in the negotiating history, the doctrine was intended to extend to Article 11bis.

Q.10 In order to meet the first condition of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement ("certain special cases"), is it enough if the limitation or exception is defined in great precision?

See our response to Question 17 of the Panel's questions to the United States.

Q.11 Under the second condition of Article 13, in which respect, if at all, is a normal exploitation of the "work" the same as a normal exploitation of "exclusive rights" relating to that work?

See our response to Question 18 of the Panel's questions to the United States.

Q.12 To what extent is it appropriate in evaluating the compliance of a law with the conditions of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement based on looking at the current market situation in a given country?

The current situation in a given country is extremely important in that it determines the bounds of normalcy in that market and sheds light on the reasonableness of any prejudice suffered by right holders. A contrary approach – evaluating the TRIPS Article 13 criteria by reference to hypothetical future or potential market situations – would be unworkable, and finds no support in the
TRIPS Agreement. That is not to say that the evolution of market conditions is irrelevant. It is possible that exceptions justifiable under Article 13 at one point in time may become unacceptably broad with the passage of time and changes in the market. It is also possible that an exception that fails to meet the Article 13 criteria at a certain time may in fact meet those criteria as market conditions evolve.

It seems highly speculative to attempt to determine whether the conditions of Article 13 are met with respect to any potential market situation. One could also hypothesize changes in the market that would affect the degree of prejudice caused by an exception to exclusive rights. The WTO dispute settlement system is not based on such speculation. To look at anything other than the current market situation would be tantamount to reading into TRIPS a requirement that exceptions avoid any potential conflict with normal exploitation of a work and avoid even the possibility of unreasonable prejudice to the right holder. The plain text of Article 13, however, provides that exceptions must be evaluated by the extent to which they "do" not conflict with a normal exploitation and "do" not cause unreasonable prejudice.

Q.13 To what extent subsequent technological and market developments (e.g. new means of transmission of or increased use of background music or television) are relevant for the interpretation of the conditions under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement?

Technological and market developments are relevant to the interpretation of the conditions under Article 13 of TRIPS to the extent that they relate to a particular case at a particular time. The Article 13 analysis should be based on the current state of technology and market development, as opposed to speculation about future possibilities. See U.S. Response to Question 10, above.

Q.14 Is it justified to define the three conditions exclusively by reference to a particular market, or is a comparative analysis of licensing practices in other Members with similar economic conditions warranted?

TRIPS Article 1.1 provides guidance on this question, and provides that WTO Members are "free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice". This provision would mean little if the reasonableness of a country's exceptions were determined in part by foreign right holders' licensing practices in other Members. Similarly, Article 5(2) of Berne provides that "apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed." The spirit of this provision is that, except where Berne specifically provides otherwise, countries are free to determine the content of their own national laws regarding the extent of copyright protection.

A Member's national market is the most important determinant of normalcy and reasonableness with regard to that Member. It cannot be assumed that right holders have identical interests in various WTO Members, even where similar economic conditions prevail. There is no support in the TRIPS Agreement for requiring that any exception to exclusive rights be justified not only by reference to the prejudice it might cause to right holders' in the market that it would affect, but also by reference to the prejudice it would cause in theory if it were imposed in a completely separate market.

A comparative analysis of other WTO Members is particularly inappropriate with respect to the issue of "certain, special cases." Local history and tradition may play a major role in determining whether a particular country considers a case sufficiently special to warrant an exception to an exclusive right. TRIPS certainly does not require that other Members share the same social values.

Q.15 Under the third condition of Article 13, should the concepts of "unreasonable prejudice" and "legitimate interests" be defined based on existing, legally guaranteed entitlements, or do these concepts also connote an aspect of normative concern of right
holders? In the latter case, what could be the normative concern at issue? In addition to an empirical analysis of prejudice to legitimate interests, how could such a normative element be taken into account in defining the threshold of the third condition of Article 13?

Existing, legally guaranteed entitlements to an exclusive right are one factor in defining the concepts of unreasonable prejudice and legitimate interests. Existing entitlements determine the benefits that a right holder might legally expect from his work, and thus provide helpful guidance in evaluating prejudice to the right holder's interests. In addition, the concepts of unreasonable prejudice and legitimate interests do also connote an aspect of normative concern to right holders.

Q.16 What is the extent of "reasonable" prejudice to the legitimate interests of rights holders that is permissible under the third condition of Article 13?

The extent of prejudice that may be deemed reasonable under TRIPS Article 13 must be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case, and cannot be established in the abstract due to the myriad potential factors that may influence the inquiry in any particular instance. To determine whether prejudice is unreasonable, the Panel should undertake a fact-intensive inquiry into the extent of the prejudice suffered by right holders subject to an exception, and then must ultimately balance these facts to reach a conclusion based on reason, rather than on a per se notion of the permissible degree of prejudice.

Q.17 With a view to giving distinct meaning to the second and the third condition of Article 13, in which respect does an extent, degree or form of interference with exclusive rights below the threshold of "conflict with normal exploitation" differ from an extent, degree or form of interference with exclusive rights that exceeds the threshold of a reasonable prejudice to the interests of the right holder? In other words, how does a permissible degree of prejudice under the third condition relate to "normal exploitation" under the second condition of Article 13?

The normal exploitation element of Article 13 looks to the amount of market displacement caused by the exception or limitation at issue. In other words, are there areas of the market in which the copyright owners would expect to exploit his or her work which are not now available to be exploited because of this exemption? Note that it is only the normal exploitation that is at issue – uses from which an owner would not expect to receive compensation are not part of normal exploitation. In contrast, the legitimate interest element of Article 13 looks at the amount of harm that is caused to the owner, economic or otherwise, by whatever provision is in dispute. Although these two elements may overlap, they are not coextensive. One could imagine a situation in which a large part of the market was displaced, but, because it was not a particularly profitable market and the right holder lost very little money, there was not unreasonable prejudice of the owners' interests. Likewise, one could imagine a situation in which relatively little of the market was displaced, but, because those few uses were so lucrative, the owner's legitimate interests would be unreasonably prejudiced.

Q.18 Should quantitative empirical or normative approaches be used in defining the three conditions of Article 13?

A quantitative empirical approach is the most appropriate approach to the Article 13 conditions. The grant of an exclusive right compensates the author for his initiative and creativity and for his investment and risk in producing the work. Exceptions should neither unreasonably prejudice the right holders’ economic rewards, nor should not undermine the incentive to create. Without an empirical analysis of the actual effect of an exception on the market, it is not possible to determine the extent to which a right holder is actually prejudiced and the reasonableness of that prejudice. For example, the fact that a right holder has not collected royalties from a particular market for decades is at least a relevant factor bearing on the reasonableness of an exception applicable to that particular market.
The context, object and purpose of Article 13 are also relevant to this discussion. The TRIPS Agreement is a trade agreement, and its purpose was to "reduce distortions and impediments to international trade". TRIPS, preamble. The Agreement was negotiated against the backdrop of a wide variety of national systems, and was intended to contribute to "the mutual advantage of producers and users" and "a balance of rights and obligations". As mentioned above, the drafters also intended that Members would have flexibility in implementing the Agreement within the context of "their own legal system and practice". These guiding principles support the position that the analysis of the conditions of Article 13 must be grounded in local market realities, and in the actual practice and experience of right holders and users in the country concerned.
ATTACHMENT 2.4

RESPONSES OF THE UNITED STATES TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES – FIRST MEETING

(19 November 1999)

Q.1 Does the US agree that Section 110(5) US Copyright Act would be inconsistent with Article 11bis(1)(iii) Berne Convention if it were not for the minor reservations doctrine? If not why not?

The US agrees that any exception to the exclusive right under Article 11bis(1)(iii) would be inconsistent with the Berne Convention if it were not for the minor reservations doctrine. If there were no minor reservations doctrine, then no exceptions would be permitted to the exclusive rights under either Berne Article 11 or Berne Article 11bis. This would mean that exceptions for marching bands, religious services or school activities, found in many European Union member states' laws as well as those of other WTO Members, would all be inconsistent with the Berne Convention. For further discussion of this and related issues, see US response to Panel Questions to the United States and the European Communities, numbers 8 and 9.

Q.2 Would the US in particular confirm that it does not consider that Section 110(5) can be justified under Article 11bis(2) Berne Convention?

The U.S. confirms that it does not consider that any exception to an exclusive right can be justified under Berne Article 11bis(2). That provision does not speak to whether exceptions to an exclusive right are permissible, but merely authorizes a country to substitute a compulsory license for that exclusive right. Only compulsory licenses can be evaluated under Article 11bis(2). For further discussion of this and related issues, see US response to Panel Question 6 to the United States and the European Communities.

Q.3 The US seems to concede that TRIPS does not diminish any rights available under the Berne Convention. Would the US not therefore agree that Article 13 TRIPS, rather than being considered as an exemption in its own right, can only be considered as a further limitation of any possibility to maintain limitations, reservations or exceptions that may be contained in the Berne Convention?

No. Article 13 is not a further limitation on the possibility of providing exceptions to exclusive rights under Berne; rather, it articulates the standard by which implied exceptions to Berne should be evaluated.

Q.4 Does the US agree that the purpose of minor reservations under the Berne Convention is to allow Parties to maintain existing minor exceptions when acceding to the Berne Convention?

No. The U.S. does not agree with this statement. Although the negotiating history of Berne may contain some references to countries' desire not to encourage exceptions (and thus the minor reservations doctrine was kept implicit, rather than specified in the text of the Convention), a general desire to minimize exceptions is not equivalent to an intent to prohibit them.

Q.5 Where in the negotiating history of TRIPS does the US find a basis for its contention that Article 13 TRIPS was designed to "articulate" the minor reservations under the Berne Convention? Does the US consider that the possibility of "minor reservations" can apply to all rights guaranteed under the Berne Convention?

See U.S. response to Question 14 from the Panel to the United States.
Q.6 In paragraph 32 of its First Written Submission the US seeks to justify the "business exemption" by saying that it adds only a "small number of establishments" to those benefiting from the pre-existing homestyle exemption. Would the US please provide an estimate of this additional "small number of establishments"? If the US Congress were to further increase the thresholds, would the US then seek to justify the new version under Article 13 TRIPS by arguing that most of the establishments covered by the newly-formulated exemption were exempted under the pre-existing version?

See U.S. Response to Panel Questions 9-10 to the United States for the data available to the United States. The United States will not speculate concerning the hypothetical sub-question posed in the above question.

Q.7 What percentage of establishments would have to be excluded from protection under Article 110(5) US Copyright Act before it ceased to qualify for exemption under Article 13 TRIPS according to the US?

See U.S. Response to Question 16 from the Panel to the United States and the European Communities.

Q.8 Could the US please explain why the playing of copyrighted works originating from radio or TV broadcasts may be excluded from protection and not the playing of copyrighted works directly from tapes or cassettes?

See U.S. Response to Question 7 from the Panel to the United States.

Q.9 Could the US please provide a copy of the NLBA licence which it claims at paragraph 13 of its First Written Submission is based on similar criteria to those used in Section 110(5)?

See U.S. response to Panel Question 1 to the United States and exhibit US-16.

Q.10 In paragraph 4 of its Oral Statement, the US states that the Article 110(5) "exception is limited to only certain secondary uses of broadcasts of public performances, for which the right holder has already been compensated for the primary performance." Does the US really consider that payment of a royalty for the "primary performance" may be considered to also compensate for "secondary uses"?

See U.S. response to Panel Question 4 to the United States and the European Communities.

Q.11 Please explain why you consider the other exception provisions of TRIPS (Articles 17, 26(2) and 30) to be relevant context for the interpretation of Article 13 and what consequences you draw? What is the relative importance of these other provisions of TRIPS and the exceptions, reservations or limitations allowed under the Berne Convention as context for the interpretation of Article 13?

Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, other provisions of a treaty are part of the context for the purpose of interpreting a particular provision. In considering the interpretation of Article 13 of TRIPS, it would be inappropriate not to consider three other similarly worded provisions governing exceptions in the Agreement. Generally under TRIPS, the permissibility of exceptions is determined by similar (though not identical) standards in relation to copyrights, patents, industrial designs as well as trademarks. These exceptions reinforce the principle that the TRIPS Agreement was intended to balance the interests of producers and users of intellectual property. There is no basis in the negotiating history of TRIPS to assume that WTO Members used similar wording, but nevertheless intended to permit exceptions of radically differing scope, with respect to different types of intellectual property rights.
Moreover, Articles 30 and 31 reinforce the point made in U.S. Response to Panel Question 6 to the United States, in that they reflect the clear distinction in intellectual property between exceptions (for which equitable remuneration is not required) and compulsory licenses (for which equitable remuneration is required).
ATTACHMENT 2.5
SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES
(24 November 1999)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. In this case, the Panel is faced with two important questions under the TRIPS Agreement. First, the Panel must decide on the proper standard to evaluate an exception to an exclusive right under the Berne Convention that has been challenged under the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Second, the Panel must apply that standard to the case at hand to determine whether the exception is permissible under Berne and TRIPS. The proper determination to both of these questions leads to the conclusion that Section 110(5)(A) and (B) of the U.S. Copyright Law are permissible under the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement.

2. The minor reservations doctrine is well-founded in the history and practice of the Berne Convention, and should be applied to exceptions to the Berne rights at issue here — Article 11 and 11bis rights. That doctrine, however, has been clarified and further articulated by TRIPS Article 13, which is the standard by which such exceptions are to be judged. The Article 13 test should be used by the Panel as the means to judge the permissibility of Section 110(5) under Berne. The exemptions in Section 110(5) fall within the Article 13 standard: they are special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and they do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.

II. FACTUAL ISSUES

3. As an initial matter, several factual issues relating to Section 110(5)(A) require clarification. First, the United States emphasizes that there is no factual dispute before the Panel regarding the works covered under the current Section 110(5)(A), and the text of the provision itself is unambiguous. Both parties agree that the homestyle exemption was substantially narrowed by the removal of nondramatic musical works from its spectrum, and that the exemption now applies only to works other than nondramatic musical works.1

4. Although it has failed to provide any evidence of prejudice to EC right holders as a result of Section 110(5)(A), the EC has nevertheless made unsupported factual assertions regarding the scope of this provision. The scope of Section 110(5) is a question of fact to be established before this Panel, as it is an accepted principle of international law that municipal law is a fact to be proven before an international tribunal.2 Despite the plain language of Section 110(5)(A) regarding the requirement of homestyle receiving equipment, the EC asks the Panel to consider that at some point in the future, U.S. courts might expand that exemption by applying the square footage and size requirements of Section 110(5)(B) to subsection (A).3 The Panel should give no weight to the EC's speculative and unsupported assertion that U.S. courts might begin to ignore the text of Section 110(5)(A) in the future. The consistent jurisprudence of U.S. courts interpreting the homestyle exemption is dispositive evidence of the scope of this law.4

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1 EC Oral Statement, para. 20.
3 EC first submission, para. 32.
4 See Judge Lauterpacht, Case Concerning the Guardianship of an Infant [1958], ICJ Rep., Sep. Op., at 91 (It is settled practice among States that international judicial bodies should accept, and treat as binding, questions of municipal law and practice decided by competent municipal courts); Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France [1929], PCIJ Rep., Series A, No. 20, at 46; Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia [1926], PCIJ Rep., Series A, No. 7, at 19; Case Concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France [1929], PCIJ Rep., Series A, No. 21, at 124-25 (The PCIJ attached controlling weight to the manner in which French courts had interpreted French legislation). See also India - Mailbox, para. 65.
5. The EC also argues that two particular cases, Edison Bros. and Claire's Boutiques, are "illustrative" of a judicial trend toward broadening the homestyle exemption.\(^\text{5}\) Far than being illustrative, however, these two cases are the only decisions allowing chain stores to take advantage of the homestyle exception. Furthermore, as explained in the U.S. first submission, these cases are consistent with the body of U.S. case law under Section 110(5), in that they involved the use of extremely limited receiving equipment.

6. With respect to Section 110(5)(B), the EC again wrongly asserts that the prohibitions against charging admission fees and retransmission "have no potential whatsoever to limit the exception."\(^\text{6}\) As a factual matter, the prohibitions do limit the scope of both subsections. There is a market for paid events at restaurants in the United States – for example, sporting events. If restaurants charged a fee for entrance, it would change the nature of a customer's visit to a restaurant, signifying that the main reason for the visit was to attend an event, not necessarily to eat. This requirement thus limits the impact of the exemption.

III. TRIPS ARTICLE 13 IS THE APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR EVALUATING EXCEPTIONS

7. Given that this case was initiated under the WTO TRIPS Agreement, the text of that Agreement should be the starting-point for the Panel's legal analysis regarding the exceptions in Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Law. In this case, the plain language of Article 13 indicates that it is the appropriate standard by which to judge exceptions to exclusive rights such as Section 110(5). This interpretation of Article 13 is confirmed by the recently-concluded WIPO Copyright Treaty ("WCT"), as well as the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement.

8. The EC argues that TRIPS Article 13 should not apply to this case because Article 13 would then represent a derogation from the protection afforded by the Berne Convention, in violation of TRIPS Article 2.2 and Berne Article 20. On the contrary, however, this result does not derogate from Berne because TRIPS Article 13 articulates the standard applicable to minor reservations under Berne. According to the EC, Berne either does not permit exceptions to Articles 11 and 11bis at all, or, if it does permit such exceptions, then Section 110(5) does not fall within those permitted exceptions because it is commercial in nature and enacted after 1967. These arguments fail, however, because neither of these factors is determinative in deciding whether an exception falls within the minor reservations doctrine under the Berne Convention.

A. PLAIN LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 13

9. The text of Article 13 is straight-forward and applies to "limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights". In light of this plain language, the Panel should be particularly reluctant to adopt an interpretation of Article 13 that makes it somehow inapplicable to a "limitation or exception" to an exclusive right. The EC's position conflicts with the text of Article 13, in that the EC argues that Article 13 is not applicable to limitations and exceptions to the particular exclusive rights in TRIPS that have been incorporated from the Berne Convention.

10. The general rule of treaty interpretation in the WTO is that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose".\(^\text{7}\) A corollary to the general rule of interpretation is that the interpretation must give meaning and effect to all terms of a treaty, and not adopt a reading

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\(^6\) EC first submission, paras. 43-44.
that would reduce or nullify a provision. These rules govern a Panel's interpretation of TRIPS. As we discussed extensively in the U.S. first submission and Statement at the first meeting of the Panel with the Parties, Article 13 articulates the standard for exceptions within the context of the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Convention as incorporated into TRIPS.

B. WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY

11. The WCT represents further evidence of the applicability of the standard articulated in Article 13 to exclusive rights provided under the Berne Convention. As articulated in the U.S. Response to Panel Question 14 to the United States, the WCT was adopted by consensus in 1996 by the WIPO Diplomatic Conference. The overwhelming majority of Berne members (99 out of 119) and WTO members (94 out of 128) participated in the Diplomatic Conference. Like TRIPS, the WCT is an Agreement explicitly designed to provide a higher level of protection than that provided under Berne. Article 1 of the WCT provides that it is a "Special Agreement" within the meaning of Berne Article 20, provides that it does not derogate from existing obligations under Berne, and also explicitly requires compliance with Articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Berne Convention.

12. The preamble of the WCT states that the Parties recognized "the need to introduce new international rules and clarify the interpretation of certain existing rules". Article 10(2) of the WCT is an example of a clarifying interpretation of Berne, and provides: "Contracting Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention, confine any limitations or exceptions to rights provided for therein to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author." (Emphasis added.) Thus, under the WCT, exceptions permissible under Berne are those that meet the same standard set out in TRIPS Article 13. On the other hand, under the EC's interpretation of TRIPS Article 13 – that it cannot represent the standard governing exceptions to Berne rights because TRIPS would then represent a derogation of rights provided under Berne – the WCT must represent a derogation of rights provided under Berne, a conclusion flatly at odds with Article 1 of the WCT.

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8 United States - Reformulated Gas; India - Mailbox, para. 46.
9 See India - Mailbox, paras. 43, 46.
11 For a complete listing of states participating in the Geneva conference, see List of Participants, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/INF.2 at www.wipo.org/eng/dipconf.
12 Article 1 of the WCT is entitled "Relation to the Berne Convention", and provides as follows:
(1) This Treaty is a special agreement within the meaning of Article 20 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as regard Contracting Parties that are countries of the Union established by that Convention. This Treaty shall not have any connection with treaties other than the Berne Convention, nor shall it prejudice any rights and obligations under any other treaties.
(2) Nothing in this Treaty shall derogate from existing obligations that Contracting Parties have to each other under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
(4) Contracting Parties shall comply with Article 1 to 21 and the Appendix of the Berne Convention.
13 WCT, preamble.
C. NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

13. The negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement further supports our conclusion that Article 13 applies to Berne rights. As explained by one commentator: "Article 13 allows a dispute settlement panel to review exceptions, including the so called 'small exceptions', to ensure that they pass the test. . . . When these exceptions are invoked, they may from now on be submitted to the general test of Article 13". The United States has already elaborated on the negotiating history of TRIPS in its Response to the Panel Question 14 to the United States and in its first submission.

14. In its Response to Question 10 from the Panel, the EC has cited its opening position in the TRIPS negotiations as evidence of the non-applicability of Article 13 to Berne rights. During the TRIPS negotiations, the EC had taken the position that the exceptions article in TRIPS should not apply to Berne rights, but rather should apply only to so-called "Berne-plus" rights set forth in particular provisions of TRIPS. The contrast between the EC negotiating position and the final text of Article 13, the application of which is not limited to specified exclusive rights, demonstrates that if WTO Members had intended Article 13 to apply only to certain exclusive rights under TRIPS, they would have specified that result. Rather, Article 13 was phrased generally, does not indicate any sort of limited application, and was intended to apply to all exclusive rights.

D. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BERNE CONVENTION

15. The U.S. view that Article 13 sets forth the standard governing all exceptions or limitations to exclusive rights is consistent with the context of Article 13, including TRIPS Article 2.2. It does not imply that TRIPS reduced the level of protection below the level permissible under Berne. Even though not explicitly stated, the Berne Convention permits minor exceptions to the exclusive rights provided therein. As acknowledged by the EC in its response to Panel Question 11 to the EC, and Panel Question 5 to the US and EC, the minor reservation doctrine is well-established under Berne.

16. Minor exceptions to the public performance right appear in the copyright laws of very many, if not virtually all, Berne members. Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, subsequent practice is to be "taken into account, together with the context" in interpreting treaty text. Subsequent practice is important, according to the International Law Commission, because it "constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the treaty." According to the Appellate Body, subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(b) includes practice that is "concordant, common, and consistent". Although the United States has not been able to review the copyright laws of all Berne members, a large number of exceptions were cited in our response to Panel Question 16 to the United States. Additional countries that permit exceptions to the public performance right are cited in Exhibit US-22. This widespread practice of allowing minor exceptions to this particular Berne right illustrates its common acceptance among Berne members.

17. Relevant negotiating history of the Berne Convention has already been reviewed in this proceeding, and also clearly establishes the permissibility of minor reservations under Berne. Under

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15 Exhibit EC-17 ("Contracting parties may, in relation to the rights conferred by a Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 provide for limitations, exceptions and reservations as permitted by the Rome Convention . . .").
16 The responses of the EC now assert that the existence of the minor reservations doctrine "is considered to be confirmed" by the General Report of the Stockholm Conference (1967) and that the EC "would not exclude that the 'minor reservations' doctrine has, by virtue of the Article 9(1) TRIPS, whatever its legal significance may be, become part to [sic] the TRIPS Agreement." EC Response to Panel Question 5 and 8 to the US and EC.
17 Vienna Convention, Article 31(3).
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, preparatory work of a treaty may be used to confirm the meaning of the text and context or to clarify ambiguities. The negotiating history regarding minor exceptions confirms that Berne members intended that exceptions be allowed to the exclusive rights provided in Articles 11 and 11bis.

18. Contrary to the EC's assertions, minor reservations under Berne are not limited to either: (a) the specific noncommercial uses listed in the General Reports – "religious ceremonies, performances by military bands and the requirements of child and adult education"; or (b) exceptions existing in the legislation of the member states of the Berne Union in 1967, at the latest.

19. First, there is no requirement that exempt uses be noncommercial. Although, as a general rule, noncommercial uses may be less prejudicial to right holders than commercial ones, this is not an absolute rule. Even the uses discussed in the General Reports are not necessarily noncommercial; for example, there are many educational institutions or training programs that are run for profit. Several of the public performance exceptions in EC member state laws exempt educational activities without specifying that the educational institution must be nonprofit. Exemptions in the laws of certain third parties to this dispute are also applicable to commercial uses. These include the Australian law that exempts secondary performances in hotels and guest houses, and the Canadian law that exempts performances at agricultural fairs and exhibitions. These exceptions demonstrate that the commercial nature of a use cannot be dispositive.

20. Furthermore, the discussion of the minor reservations doctrine in the General Reports precludes the notion that the doctrine was limited to the exceptions specifically mentioned in those Reports. The General Reports only list several traditional exceptions to the public performance right of Article 11, such as military bands and religious ceremonies. However, the Reports also make certain to note that the minor reservation doctrine is also applicable to Article 11bis, 13 and 14, but do not provide any examples of permissible exceptions to those rights. It must have been intended that the doctrine apply to exceptions not specifically listed in the Reports, otherwise that language would have no meaning.

21. Second, the EC's argument that the exceptions allowable under the minor reservations doctrine must be frozen in 1967 fails for a number of reasons. Notably, it is explicitly contradicted by the language in the Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 of the WCT, which states "It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention." If the exceptions permissible under Berne were frozen in 1967, then this language would effectively contradict Article 1 of the WCT, which states that nothing in the Treaty shall derogate from the protection afforded under Berne.

22. Construing the minor reservation doctrine to apply only to exceptions in existence in 1967 also creates unfair results in regard to developing countries, and renders the Berne Convention less applicable in the modern world. Many developing countries that are now members of Berne had no copyright law at all, or only a rudimentary one, in 1967. If the EC's argument that countries can only "grandfather their pre-1967 exceptions" when acceding to Berne is accepted, then most developing countries will not be allowed to have any exceptions at all. In addition, the flexibility of the principles of copyright protection represented in Berne would be drastically undermined were they not allowed to respond to changes and developments in technology as well as practice. As provided in the WCT, countries must be able to appropriately extend and adapt exceptions to fit the realities of

20 See U.S. response to Panel Question 16 to the Panel.
a changing world. The EC’s interpretation of Berne, freezing it in 1967, would deprive it of much relevance in today’s intellectual property environment.

E. SIGNIFICANCE OF BERNE ARTICLE 11BIS(2)

23. We note that there has also been some discussion, in third party submissions and in the questions from the Panel, about the relevance of Article 11bis(2) to the permissibility of Section 110(5). We reiterate our position, more fully articulated in the U.S. Response to Panel Question 6 to the US and EC, that Article 11bis(2) has no bearing on Section 110(5). Article 11bis(2) merely authorizes a country to substitute a compulsory license, or its equivalent, for an exclusive right under Article 11bis. Neither the negotiating history of Berne, nor the subsequent writings of commentators support the view that 11bis(2) authorizes outright exceptions to Article 11bis, or represents a standard against which to judge such exceptions.22 Simply put, Article 11bis(2) is not related to the minor reservations doctrine, and does not bear upon the scope of exceptions permissible under that doctrine.23

24. Indeed, interpreting Article 11bis(2) to apply to exceptions as well as compulsory licenses leads to illogical and impractical results. For example, where an exception implicates several rights, such as Section 110(5), only one of which is subject to a right of equitable remuneration, it would be practically impossible to divide the exception into the different rights affected and then apply different standards to each right.

F. CONCLUSION

25. In conclusion, as the plain meaning of the provision suggests, Article 13 articulates the standard by which to determine the permissibility of "exceptions or limitations" to exclusive rights. By contrast, the EC interpretation of Article 13 is at odds with the text of that provision, as well as its negotiating history, and is not consistent with the WCT. Furthermore, minor exceptions to exclusive rights under Articles 11 and 11bis have always been permitted under the Berne Convention, and have not been limited to any particular purpose or date of enactment. TRIPS Article 13 articulates the standard governing such minor reservations, and thus is the appropriate focal point of the legal analysis in the case.

IV. SECTION 110(5) MEETS ARTICLE 13 CRITERIA

26. Sections 110(5)(A) and (B) are consistent with the principles of the minor reservations doctrine, and satisfy the TRIPS Article 13 standard. Section 110(5) applies to certain special cases, does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.

A. INTERPRETING THE ARTICLE 13 CRITERIA

27. Interpretation of the TRIPS Article 13 criteria requires a fact-intensive analysis by the Panel that takes into account all the circumstances of an individual case. Article 13 is intended to be a

22 The negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement also supports the distinction between compulsory licenses and outright exceptions. Of interest is a late version of Article 13 which included a separate provision on rights of equitable remuneration, providing: "Any compulsory license (or any restriction of exclusive rights to a right of remuneration) shall provide mechanisms to ensure prompt payment and remittance of royalties." Status of Work in the Negotiating Group: Prepared by the chairman, No. 2341 (1 October 1990).
23 The EC implicitly acknowledges the lack of a relationship between 11bis(2) and the minor reservations doctrine in its response to Question 12 of the Panel to the EC, in which the Panel asks the EC to provide examples of ways to provide "equitable remuneration" under 11bis(2) other than compulsory licensing. In response, the EC posits several mechanisms, such as royalty schemes and levy systems, that are the functional equivalent of compulsory licenses.
flexible mechanism to evaluate numerous different exceptions in many different contexts and legal systems. It does not impose any "per-se" rules with respect to any of the criteria in the Article. Rather, the permissibility of exceptions under TRIPS Article 13 must necessarily be determined on a case-by-case basis.

28. In such an analysis, the market of the country imposing the exception is the most relevant. The United States and the EC are apparently in agreement regarding this issue. Moreover, while both actual market conditions as well as potential market may be relevant to the analysis under Article 13, actual conditions are of primary importance. An analysis based on assumptions about a potential market is necessarily less reliable and subject to speculation. The EC, for example, argues that the Panel should consider the alleged 70% of exempt restaurants as the potential market for its right holders – even though there is no possibility that all such restaurants actually play radio music and would be licensed by ASCAP or BMI. The only way to avoid the danger of arbitrariness is to accord the greatest weight to actual existing market conditions.

B. SECTION 110(5)(A) AND (B) APPLY TO CERTAIN, SPECIAL CASES

29. As discussed in the U.S. Response to Panel Question 17 to the U.S., both Section 110(5)(A) and (B) represent exceptions that apply in certain special cases. The essence of this requirement is that exceptions be well-defined and of limited application. Both Sections 110(5)(A) and (B) are sufficiently definite. Section 110(5)(A) is defined by the equipment limitations, and the subsequent case law which has consistently enforced square footage limitations. Section 110(5)(B) is clearly defined in the statute by square footage and equipment limitations. Furthermore, to the extent that the purpose of the exception is relevant, it is only required that the exception have a specific policy objective. TRIPS does not impose any requirements on the policy objectives that a particular country might consider special in light of its own history and national priorities. In this case, both exceptions rest upon sound public policy objectives related to the social benefits of fostering small businesses and preventing abusive tactics by the collecting societies.

C. NEITHER SECTION 110(5)(A) OR (B) CONFLICTS WITH NORMAL EXPLOITATION

30. Neither Section 110(5)(A) nor Section 110(5)(B) conflict with the normal exploitation of a work. Section 110(5)(A), almost by definition, cannot conflict with normal exploitation, as it was intended precisely to exempt those establishments which would not have otherwise justified a commercial license.

31. In evaluating normal exploitation, the Panel must look at the scope of the exception with respect to the panoply of exclusive rights, as well as with respect to the specific right which it exempts. As more fully explained in US Response to Panel Question 18 to the U.S., both perspectives are relevant. While the impact on the particular right affected is relevant, the proportion of that right to the rest of the exclusive rights is equally so. Notably, the TRIPS Article 13 test does not say "conflict with the normal exploitation of an exclusive right", but refers to the exploitation of the "work" as a whole.

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24 EC Response to Panel Question 8 to both parties.
25 The EC appears to find a contradiction in the fact that the PROs did not generally license small business establishments, and that there were many complaints about their licensing practices being abusive with regard to such establishments. No such contradiction exists. The PROs did not attempt to license the vast majority of small businesses. Nevertheless, there were complaints that when the PROs did attempt to obtain licenses from any business, they often did so in an arbitrary and abusive manner, without regard for existing law or good faith business practices. Small business, generally being the least sophisticated and having the fewest resources, are the least able to respond to such tactics or defend their rights.
D. **NEITHER SECTION 110(5)(A) OR (B) CAUSES UNREASONABLE PREJUDICE**

32. Section 110(5)(A) and (B) do not cause right holders unreasonable prejudice, as the economic impact of the exceptions is minimal. The discussion below focuses primarily on Section 110(5)(B), since the EC aims most of its criticism, and the minimal empirical analysis it has conducted, at this subsection. It can be assumed, however, that the impact of subsection (A), the homestyle exemption, is a mere fraction of the numbers discussed below, as it affects fewer and smaller establishments than subsection (B). The United States also observes that, despite the more than 20 year history of the homestyle exemption, the EC has not provided any facts or data showing any prejudice to EC right holders as a result of the old homestyle exemption or amended Section 110(5)(A).

1. **Section 110(5)(B) does not cause unreasonable prejudice because any actual harm to EC right holders is minimal**

33. The amount of prejudice resulting from Section 110(5)(B) is not unreasonable. In our first submission, the United States noted the irrelevance of the figures provided by the EC, and discussed the factors by which those figures must be reduced to yield a reasonable approximation of losses to EC right holders. The following empirical analysis supplements that already provided by the United States, and is based on additional information recently received. It is designed to rebut the EC's assertions, particularly those made in its responses to the Panel's questions, that Section 110(5) is likely to cost EC right holders "millions" of dollars. The analysis demonstrates that the maximum loss to EC right holders of distributions from the largest U.S. collecting society, ASCAP, as a result of the Section 110(5) exemption is in the range of $294,113 to $586,332 – far less than the "millions" of dollars claimed by the EC. Especially in light of the size of the U.S. and EC markets, this figure is truly a minimal one, and does not establish any unreasonable degree of prejudice.

(a) Starting-point in the analysis: total royalties paid to EC right holders: $19.6 million - $39 million

34. To determine the degree of prejudice to EC right holders from the exemption, the logical starting-point is the total amount paid to EC right holders by the collecting societies. The EC has recently provided figures from ASCAP purporting to show that EC right holders received an average of $39,045,833 from ASCAP for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998. According to the EC data, this figure of 39 million dollars represents an average of 13.7% of ASCAP's total distributions of domestic income for those three years. It must be noted here that in an earlier analysis conducted by the EC to determine the harm to EC right holders from Section 110(5) before it was amended in 1998, the EC used a figure of "less than 5%" for 1996, and noted that ASCAP's distributions to all foreign collecting societies were just 6.2%. The EC estimate of "less than 5%" appears to be based on the figure "total domestic distributions for EU societies" (19,586,000) as a percentage of total ASCAP distributions for 1996 (397,379,000). Given the inconsistency in the EC methodology, the United States' analysis below will proceed based on a range for ASCAP's total payments to EC right holders of 19.6 million to 39 million.

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26 See EC Response to Question 3 asked by the Panel.
27 The data provided in the following analysis reflects that provided in the U.S. Responses to the Panel's Questions 9-11 to the United States. The empirical calculations above, however, replace those estimates provided in the U.S. Response to Panel Questions 11.b and 11.d.
28 Exhibit EC-15 (average of three figures in line 4).
30 Exhibit EC-15 (line 2 for 1996).
(b) After reducing for amount attributable to general licensing – losses to EC right holders: $3.7 - $7.4 million

35. To determine the potential impact of Section 110(5) on total payments to EC right holders, the figure for such total payments must be reduced to account for the fact that a relatively small proportion of licensing revenue collected in the United States is attributable to music played in restaurants, bars and retail establishments. As discussed in the U.S. responses to the Panel's questions, ASCAP's annual reports demonstrate that the majority – approximately 58% - of collecting society revenue comes from radio and TV broadcasters. Another quarter of ASCAP's revenue comes from foreign collecting societies (25-26%). Interest, member dues and revenues from symphonies and concerts account for approximately 2%. All other licensing revenues account for only 14% of ASCAP total revenues from domestic and foreign sources. This 14% figure includes fees from commercial background music services, and a wide variety of licensees, including conventions and sports arenas, as well as all restaurants, bars and retail establishments. It represents average collections of $65,581,000 from general licensees for 1995-97. The average amount collected from such general licensees ($65,581,000) in turn represents 18.9% of ASCAP's average total domestic receipts for 1995-97 ($346,981,000).

36. Thus, the first step in determining the losses to EC right holders is to reduce the total payments to EC right holders to 18.9% of that total. This accounts for the fact that at least 81.1% of EC income from ASCAP is unaffected by Section 110(5). This analysis yields a potential range of loss to EC right holders from Section 110(5) of only 3,701,754 (18.9% of 19,586,000) to 7,379,662 (18.9% of $39,045,833).

(c) After reducing to account for licensing revenue from general licensees that do not meet the statutory definition of an "establishment" – losses to EC right holders: $1.85 - $3.69 million

37. These estimates of losses to EC right holders must also be reduced to account for the fact that many general licensees are not eligible to take advantage of Section 110(5), regardless of whether they meet the square footage and equipment criteria or not. Section 110(5)(B) applies to "establishments", which are defined in the same statute as "a store, shop or any similar place of business open to the general public for the primary purpose of selling goods or services in which the majority of the gross square feet of space that is nonresidential is used for that purpose". Many types of general licensees, for example, background music services, sporting events and conventions would seem not to fit this definition, and thus the royalties paid by these licensees must be excluded from the analysis of losses resulting from Section 110(5).

38. No data are available to the United States regarding the percentage of general licensees that might qualify as "establishments" under Section 110(5). It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the percentage of revenue from such "non-establishment" licensees is significant given their prevalence and size. For that reason, the United States will assume that 50% of general licensing revenue is attributable to such licensees. After reducing the potential losses to EC right holders to 50%, the resulting range of potential loss is: 1,850,877 (50% of 3,701,754) to 3,689,831 (50% of $7,379,662).

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33 Id. (average of figures for 1995, $63,227,000, 1996, $66,192,000, and 1997, $67,324,000).
34 Id. (average of figures for 1995, $326,482,000, 1996, $356,035,000, and 1997, $358,428,000).
35 This analysis assumes that distributions paid to EC right holders are attributable to the same sources of revenue in the same proportion as overall revenues. It is entirely possible, however, that distributions to EC right holders might by attributable to television and radio broadcasters or symphonies to a greater extent than general licensing.
(d) After reducing to account for licensing revenue from general licensees that do not play the radio – losses to EC right holders: $.56 million - $1.13 million

39. In addition, it is obviously important to take into account the fact that much of the revenue from general licensees that qualify as establishments is not attributable to the playing of radio or TV music, but rather to public performances of music from media other than radio or TV broadcasts, such as tapes/CDs, live bands, and jukeboxes. According to the National Restaurant Association, approximately x% of all restaurants play the radio, but not necessarily exclusively (they may also sometimes use live bands or CDs, etc.). According to the National Licensed Beverage Association, 28% of its members play the radio, but again not necessarily exclusively. Taking an average of these two roughly comparable estimates, the United States assumes that 30.5% of establishments play radio music.

40. It is important to note that, given that establishments often play music from more than one source, this estimate – 30.5% of establishments that play the radio – does not correspond with the percentage of licensing revenue attributable to the playing of radio music, and indeed would significantly overstate such revenue. Nevertheless, for the purpose of deriving a conservative estimate and in light of the limited data available, the United States assumes for the sake of only this analysis that 30.5% of licensing revenue is attributable to the playing of radio music. Correspondingly, the losses to EC right holders from the Section 110(5) exemption for radio music must be reduced to this amount, and would range from $564,517 (30.5% of 1,850,877) to $1,125,398 (30.5% of 3,689,831).

(e) After reducing to account for licensing revenue from general licensee establishments that play the radio and meet size limitations of Section 110(5): losses to EC right holders: $294,113 to $586,332

41. Certainly the calculation of losses to EC right holders must also take into account that many eating, drinking and retail establishments that play radio music do not meet the square footage limits of Section 110(5)(B). Based on figures provided by the National Restaurant Association, 65.5% of restaurants meet the square footage criteria of the statute. The United States has no data regarding the percentage of retail establishments that would meet the square footage criteria; however, the EC has presented a Dun & Bradstreet study commissioned by ASCAP purporting to demonstrate that 45% of retail establishments are exempt under Section 110(5)(B).

42. According to the EC’s own exhibit EC-16, Dun & Bradstreet estimated that there were 683,783 retail establishments in the United States, and 364,404 eating and drinking establishments.

43. Applying 45% to the total number of retail establishments (683,783) results in a total of 307,702 retail establishments that meet the square footage criteria of Section 110(5). Applying 65.5% to the total number of eating and drinking establishments (364,404) results in a total of 238,685 such establishments that meet the square footage criteria of Section 110(5). The total number of establishments (both retail and eating and drinking) meeting the square footage criteria of the statute is thus 546,387, which is 52.1% of all establishments. The loss to EC right holders is further reduced to $294,113 (52.1% of $564,517) to $586,332 (52.1% of $1,125,398).

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36 Confidential Exhibit US-18.
37 The EC has presented a different figure, and estimates that 70% of eating and drinking establishments fall within the square footage limitations of the statute.
38 EC first submission, para. 51; Exhibit EC-16.
(f) The U.S. Methodology is Conservative

44. The above figure is a conservative one, based on available information. For a number of reasons, the true amount of economic prejudice to EC right holders is likely to be even less than $294,113 to $586,332. For example, the United States has assumed that where 30.5% of establishments play the radio, 30.5% of licensing revenue is attributable to radio-playing. This figure is obviously too high, given the large proportion of establishments that play music from more than one type of media. In addition, the United States assumed that the 65.5% of restaurants (and 45% of retail establishments) that fit within the square footage limits of the exception accounted for a 65.5% (and 45%) loss of revenue. In fact, the exempt restaurants and retail establishments are necessarily smaller establishments, and almost certainly represent a smaller proportion of licensing revenue.

45. In addition, the above analysis does not take into account steps that ASCAP and BMI might take to minimize any impact of Section 110(5), for example by focusing licensing resources exclusively on larger stores that generally pay larger fees, or by charging more for the playing of music from CDs and tapes. Similarly, the analysis does not take into account the establishments that could take advantage of the private agreement concluded by the PROs with the NLBA. Given the significant membership of the NLBA, and the fact that membership is open to any establishment that is licensed to serve alcoholic beverages, the NLBA Agreement should result in another significant reduction in any estimate of potential losses to EC right holders resulting from Section 110(5). Because the United States currently has no precise data on this factor, and is trying to keep estimates as conservative as possible, this element has not been figured into the loss calculation above.

46. The United States recognizes that the above estimates are losses from ASCAP distributions only. Little data has been available to the United States regarding revenues or distributions of the smaller of the two major U.S. collecting societies, BMI. While the total loss to EC right holders would obviously have to take into account the BMI figures, these figures will certainly be even less than those calculated for ASCAP. As indicated above in Section IV.1.B, average domestic revenue for ASCAP for the years 1995-97 was approximately $347 million. BMI's average domestic revenue in 1995 and 1996 was $260.5 million. 39 Thus, including the BMI figures will not dramatically increase the any loss to EC right holders.

47. The United States also recognizes that the analysis also does not take into account music played from the television. Given that few establishments rely exclusively on television for music, and that the proportion of restaurants using television sets is even lower than the proportion playing the radio, 40 these figures appear unlikely to significantly increase the loss to EC right holders. Finally, the United States notes that Section 110(5)(B) exempts establishments above the square footage limits if they meet certain equipment limits. No information, however, is currently available on this factor.

48. The United States has endeavored here to present the Panel with the best estimates possible from the limited data available. The resulting figures are well-founded in fact and logic, and indicate the insignificant amount of prejudice that EC right holders might actually suffer as a result of Section 110(5). The EC has not to date offered any concrete facts which rebut any of the assumptions made above. The only data offered thus far to support the EC's claim that its right holders have suffered unreasonable prejudice comes from a self-serving press release by the U.S. PROs asserting that their right holders will lose "tens of millions" of dollars. On the basis of this press release, the EC asks the Panel to conclude that EC right holders will suffer losses "in the sphere of millions of dollars". 41 The more rigorous analysis presented by the United States refutes this exaggerated and speculative claim, and establishes the minimal prejudice actually likely to occur.

39 Exhibit US-23.
40 Exhibit US-18.
41 EC Response to Panel Question 4 to the EC.
2. Right holders themselves have viewed size limits comparable to Section 110(5)(B) as reasonable and voluntarily supported them

49. In considering whether the passage of Section 110(5)(B) has caused right holders any unreasonable prejudice, the private agreement between the PROs and the NLBA is also highly relevant. Notably, the PROs voluntarily agreed to a blanket exemption of 3500 square foot in the context of their private agreement with the NLBA. The fact that they were willing, voluntarily, to forego the collection of any revenue from such establishments must indicate that the administrative costs of doing so did not justify the likely returns, and that it was preferable from the right holders' perspective to seek a higher degree of compliance from non-exempt restaurants.

50. Indeed, throughout the legislative debate regarding Section 110(5)(B), the PROs were willing to conclude a private agreement with the National Restaurant Association that, like the NLBA deal, would exempt all restaurants under 3500 square feet from paying royalties for radio music. In addition, during legislative consideration of Section 110(5)(B), the "ASCAP and BMI proposal" revolved around an exemption for establishments smaller than 3500 square feet.

V. CONCLUSION

51. In conclusion, the applicable standard for determining the TRIPS consistency of Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act is TRIPS Article 13. Section 110(5) is a permissible exception to the public performance right based on the criteria articulated in Article 13. Therefore, the United States respectfully requests that the Panel find that both Section 110(5)(A) and (B) are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.
ATTACHMENT 2.6

ORAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE SECOND MEETING WITH THE PANEL

(7 December 1999)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The exceptions permissible to exclusive rights, and the standard by which they will be governed are issues of tremendous importance under TRIPS. Article 13 of TRIPS is a key provision that limits WTO Members' ability to restrict exclusive rights, but also provides them with vital flexibility in implementing their TRIPS obligations. The proper application of this standard to Section 110(5)(A) and (B) of the U.S. Copyright Law results in a conclusion that these provisions are fully consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.

II. FACTUAL ISSUES

2. In our second submission, the United States addressed several factual inaccuracies put forward by the EC. We won't repeat those explanations here, except to note that where the parties are in agreement as to the facts, the Panel should not engage in speculation regarding alternative factual scenarios that do not in fact exist. The parties agree that Section 110(5)(A) does not apply to nondramatic musical works. The parties agree that the square footage limitations of Section 110(5)(B) do not apply to Section 110(5)(A). This is the plain language of the statutes; no U.S. court has ruled otherwise, and these are the only facts before the Panel.

III. TRIPS ARTICLE 13 IS THE APPLICABLE STANDARD FOR EVALUATING EXCEPTIONS

3. We start with Article 13. The plain language of Article 13 indicates that it is the appropriate standard by which to judge exceptions to exclusive rights such as Section 110(5). This interpretation of Article 13 is confirmed by the recently-concluded WIPO Copyright Treaty ("WCT"), as well as the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement.

4. The text of Article 13 is straightforward and applies to "limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights". Not some limitations, not limitations to some exclusive rights. Just limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights. In light of the clear direction from the Appellate Body regarding the importance of the plain language of the text in the interpretation of WTO agreements, the EC should face a high hurdle to convince this Panel to disregard it.

5. The WCT represents further evidence of the applicability of the Article 13 standard to exclusive rights provided under Berne. The EC's submission indicates that the EC "does not understand" the relevance of this agreement. We submit, however, that where 99 Berne Members get together and adopt by consensus a document stating that the same standard of TRIPS Article 13 applies to Berne rights, it is highly relevant and extremely important. Under the Vienna Convention, subsequent agreements and subsequent practice are important tools in treaty interpretation. In the Japan taxes case, the WTO Appellate Body emphasized that subsequent practice can be established...
by concordant pronouncements that establish a pattern implying the agreement of the parties regarding a treaty's interpretation.¹

6. Like TRIPS, the WCT is an agreement explicitly designed to provide a higher level of protection than Berne. It says explicitly that it is a "Special Agreement" within the meaning of Berne Article 20, that it does not derogate from existing obligations under Berne, and it specifically requires compliance with Articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Berne Convention.

7. Article 10(2) of the WCT specifically states "when applying the Berne Convention" Contracting Parties shall confine limitations to those that meet the same test set out in TRIPS Article 13. The preparatory materials of the WCT are also enlightening, as the Basic Proposal for the '96 Diplomatic Conference specifically discusses the application of the 3-step TRIPS test to minor reservations under Berne.

8. The U.S. view that Article 13 provides the standard governing all exceptions or limitations to exclusive rights is consistent with the context of Article 13, including TRIPS Article 2.2. It does not imply that TRIPS reduced the level of protection below the level permissible under Berne. The Berne Convention permits minor exceptions to exclusive rights.

9. As described at some length in the U.S. Answers to the Panel's Questions and the U.S. rebuttal submission, the subsequent practice of Berne members indicates widespread acceptance of the notion that exceptions to Article 11 and 11bis rights are permissible. Furthermore, the negotiating history of Berne, in particular from the Brussels and Stockholm conferences, confirms that Berne members intended that exceptions be allowed to the exclusive rights provided in Articles 11 and 11bis.

10. Commercial uses are not excluded per se from the scope of the minor reservations doctrine. The uses discussed in the General Reports may themselves be commercial in certain circumstances. The specific examples of minor reservations given were never intended to be an exhaustive list. To quote Ricketson: "The examples of uses given in the records of the Brussels and Stockholm Conferences are in no way an exhaustive list or determinative or which particular exceptions will be justified." (p. 536) The discussion of the minor reservations doctrine in the General Reports actually precludes the notion that the doctrine was limited to the exceptions specifically cited. The General Reports only list several traditional exceptions to the public performance right of Article 11. However, the Reports also make certain to note that the minor reservation doctrine is also applicable to Article 11bis, 13 and 14. It must have been intended that the doctrine apply to exceptions not specifically listed in the Reports, otherwise that language would have no meaning.

11. Nor is the applicability of the minor reservations doctrine frozen in 1967. Again, the WCT provides useful guidance on this issue. The Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 of the WCT states that Contracting Parties can "carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws" that have been considered acceptable under Berne. We note that the EC was a signatory of both the WCT and the Agreed Statement.

12. Construing the minor reservation doctrine to apply only to exceptions in existence in 1967 also creates inequitable results, and renders Berne less relevant to the modern world. Many developing countries that are now members of Berne had no copyright law, or only a rudimentary one, in 1967. If the EC's argument is accepted, then most developing countries will not be allowed to have any exceptions. In addition, the flexibility of the principles of copyright protection represented in Berne would be drastically undermined were they not allowed to respond to changes and developments in technology as well as practice.

13. For the sake of completeness, I'll now briefly address Article 11bis(2). This is a compulsory licensing provision. Compulsory licenses are characterized by the requirement of equitable remuneration. It is not a wholly separate standard governing exceptions. It does not apply in lieu of TRIPS Article 13 and it doesn't affect the applicability of TRIPS Article 13 to this case. Article 11bis(2) can, and should, be read consistently with TRIPS Article 13.

14. Article 11bis(2) applies to "conditions" on 11bis rights. Ricketson writes that "the reference to 'conditions' in article 11bis(2) is usually taken to refer to the imposition of compulsory licenses". (p.525). The WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention (p. 70), the WIPO Glossary of Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighboring Rights (pp. 50, 248), and even the title of 11bis(2) assigned by WIPO also refer to that provision as a compulsory licensing provision. It is highly significant that the World Intellectual Property Organization – the entity that administers the Berne Convention – has expressed this clear and consistent view.

15. Article 11bis(2) simply has no bearing on Section 110(5). Neither the negotiating history of Berne, nor the subsequent writings of commentators support the view that 11bis(2) represents a standard against which to judge exceptions to exclusive rights. If Article 11bis(2) had permitted and governed exceptions, there would have been no need for the negotiators at the Brussels and Stockholm conferences to reference Article 11bis in discussions about the minor reservations doctrine at all. Article 11bis(2) is not related to the minor reservations doctrine, and does not bear upon the scope of exceptions permissible under that doctrine.

IV. SECTION 110(5) MEETS THE ARTICLE 13 CRITERIA

16. I'll turn now to the applicability of Article 13 to Sections 110(5)(A) and (B). These sections apply to different works and have a different scope. Thus, they must be examined separately. Both provisions apply to certain special cases, do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.

A. INTERPRETING THE ARTICLE 13 CRITERIA

17. Interpretation of the TRIPS Article 13 criteria requires a fact-intensive analysis by the Panel. Article 13 is intended to be a flexible mechanism to evaluate numerous different exceptions in many different contexts and legal systems. It demands a 'rule of reason' approach. The permissibility of exceptions under TRIPS Article 13 must necessarily be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the circumstances of an individual case.

18. In such an analysis, the market of the country imposing the exception is the most relevant. The United States and the EC agree on this issue. Moreover, while both actual losses and potential losses may be relevant to the analysis under Article 13, the key is a realistic appraisal of the conditions that prevail in the market. An analysis based on unrealistic and counter-factual assumptions is not reliable, is speculative, and basically unfair. The only way to avoid the danger of arbitrariness is to base the analysis on realistic market conditions.

B. SECTION 110(5)(A) AND (B) APPLY TO CERTAIN, SPECIAL CASES

19. Both Section 110(5)(A) and (B) represent exceptions that apply in certain special cases. The essence of this requirement is that exceptions be well-defined and of limited application. Both sub-sections (A) and (B) are sufficiently definite. Section 110(5)(A) is defined by the equipment limitations, and the subsequent case law. Section 110(5)(B) is clearly defined in the statute by square footage and equipment limitations.

20. Furthermore, to the extent that the purpose of the exception is relevant, it is only required that the exception have a specific policy objective. TRIPS does not impose any limitations on the policy objectives that a particular country might consider special in light of its own history and
national priorities, and a Panel should be loathe to imply them. In this case, both U.S. exceptions rest upon sound public policy objectives related to the social benefits of fostering small businesses and preventing abusive tactics by the collecting societies.

C. **NEITHER SECTION 110(5)(A) OR (B) CONFLICTS WITH NORMAL EXPLOITATION**

21. Neither Section 110(5)(A) nor Section 110(5)(B) conflict with the normal exploitation of a work. The Panel's analysis of the issue of normal exploitation should be a broad one. There is no textual support in TRIPS for confining the analysis concerning normal exploitation to one exclusive right. The effect of an exception on a particular exclusive right is relevant, but no more relevant than the effect of the exception on the exploitation of the work as a whole. When considered in context, neither Section 110(5)(A) nor Section 110(5)(B) conflict with the normal exploitation of the works that they cover.

22. Section 110(5)(A) does not conflict with normal exploitation, as it was intended precisely to exempt those establishments which would not have otherwise justified a commercial license. More generally, the market to which Section 110(5) applies was never significantly exploited by the PROs. During Congressional consideration of Section 110(5)(B), ASCAP and BMI themselves advocated an exemption for establishments under 3500 square feet. (*Exhibit US – 16, CRS study comparing Aiken standard to "ASCAP/BMI proposal"). In addition, they voluntarily signed a private agreement with the NLBA with the same square footage limitations. And they offered the same deal to the NRA. These actions by the PROs constitute important evidence that Section 110(5)(B) does not conflict with a normal exploitation of a work in the United States market.

D. **NEITHER SECTION 110(5)(A) OR (B) CAUSES UNREASONABLE PREJUDICE**

23. Finally, we turn to the last prong of the TRIPS Article 13 standard: unreasonable prejudice. The economic effects of Section 110(5)(A) and (B) are minimal. Neither of these provisions cause EC right holders unreasonable prejudice. In fact, the EC has yet to provide a shred of evidence that Section 110(5)(A) causes its right holders any prejudice whatsoever. Given this situation, our empirical analysis will focus, as has the EC, on Section 110(5)(B).

24. In our first submission, the United States noted the irrelevance of the figures provided by the EC, and discussed the factors by which those figures must be reduced to yield a reasonable approximation of possible losses to EC right holders. The EC responded by asserting generally that the exception was costing its right holders millions of dollars. Thus, in our second submission, the United States has provided rebuttal evidence that Section 110(5)(B) is not costing EC right holders millions, but rather an amount that is insignificant. The analysis demonstrated that the maximum loss to EC right holders of distributions from the largest U.S. collecting society, ASCAP, as a result of the Section 110(5) exemption is in the range of 294 to 586 thousand dollars. This is in the range of 1%.

25. The United States has presented the Panel with the most precise estimates possible regarding the economic prejudice caused by Section 110(5). We've used data from ASCAP, from the NRA, from the NLBA, and even from the EC. Our analysis is based on the best information available, and has a firm factual and logical basis.

26. The EC has not to date offered any facts that rebut in any meaningful way any of the assumptions on which the U.S. analysis is based. The only "data" on losses offered by the EC thus far is a statement from a self-serving press release issued by ASCAP and BMI. In its answers to the Panel's questions, the EC makes some assertions regarding the music licensing market in Ireland. We do not believe that Ireland is a comparable market to the United States. And even if it was, actual data from the United States is certainly more relevant to the issue at hand.
27. The Panel's job is to weigh the facts presented. It must weigh the detailed evidence presented by the United States, which indicates prejudice in the range of a few hundred thousand dollars, against the assertions of the EC about Ireland. We respectfully submit that the U.S. analysis is the more credible one, and that it demonstrates that the amount of prejudice suffered by the EC is not unreasonable – in fact, it is barely measurable.

28. Our analysis is laid out in our Second Submission in significant detail. With the aid of US-exhibit 24, I will review it here briefly. Exhibit 24 has two pages – one for ASCAP and one for BMI. We've prepared these exhibits as an aid to this oral presentation, and you'll note that most of the numbers are rounded off. The precise figures are cited in the U.S. Second Submission. To simplify the presentation, I'll focus on the ASCAP analysis. As we noted in our brief, however, the numbers for BMI are even smaller. BMI collects less in annual revenues and collects for a lower percentage of EC right holders.

1. **Starting-point: royalties paid to EC right holders: $19.6 million - $39 million**

29. The logical starting-point is the total amount paid to EC right holders by the collecting societies. In conducting an internal analysis of the effect of Section 110(5) on EC right holders in 1998, the EC based its calculations on distributions from the U.S. PROs to EC collecting societies. In 1996, such distributions were a bit under 19.6 million dollars.²

30. In its response to the Panel's questions, however, the EC argues that the relevant number is far higher, and cites figures from ASCAP purporting to show that EC right holders received an average of $39 million from ASCAP for the years 1996 – 98. Given the inconsistency in the EC methodology, the United States' analysis proceeds based on a range of 19.6 million to 39 million. (line 1 of Exhibit US-24).

31. Now these total figures – 19.6 – 39 million – represent payments from all licensees, including those that are not affected at all by Section 110(5)(B). So obviously it does not represent a realistic number for the potential loss to EC right holders. The only loss could come from establishments that meet the size and equipment limitations and play the radio. So we will take it step by step to reduce that total figure to exclude revenues that are unaffected by Section 110(5).

2. **Reduce to amount attributable to general licensing - $3.7 - $7.4 million**

32. Step One – You've got to exclude revenues from TV and radio broadcasting. Nothing in Section 110(5)(B) touches these revenues. And in fact license fees paid by TV and radio broadcasters are by far the largest portion of ASCAP's revenues. Licensing fees from establishments covered by Section110(5)(B) are considered general licensing fees. We know from ASCAP's Annual Reports that general licensing fees make up only 14% of ASCAP's total revenues. That's 18.9% of ASCAP's domestic revenues. So as you can see under Line 1 of the exhibit, right away you have to reduce the total amount paid to EC right holders to just 18.9% of that total, or 3.7 – 7.4 million dollars.

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² The starting figure for BMI was taken from the EC's 1998 Trade Barriers Regulation Investigation Report, which indicated that of BMI's total distributions to rightholders of 217.3 million in 1996, 5.6% went to foreign collecting societies. We've made the realistic assumption that two-thirds of these foreign distributions are paid to EC right holders (217.3 * .056 * .67 = 8.15), and then followed the same calculations as described for ASCAP.
3. Reduce to account for licensing revenue from general licensees that do not meet the statutory definition of an "establishment" – losses to EC right holders: $1.85 - $3.69 million

33. Step Two – Section 110(5)(B) does not apply to all general licensing. General licensing is a very broad category. It essentially applies to anyone that is not a radio or television station. ASCAP’s A-Z list of general licensees is Exhibit US-25. As you can see, this category includes everything from background music services, colleges and universities, conventions, football teams, music-on-hold, private clubs, theme parks, trade shows, training seminars and tractor pulls. Restaurants are certainly included on the list, but so are many other types of licensees. The royalties paid by these licensees must be excluded from the analysis of losses resulting from Section 110(5)(B).

34. In accounting for this factor, the United States has made an assumption that 50% of general licensing revenue is attributable to such licensees. Given the variety of exclusive licensees and significance of some of the excluded ones, this figure is a conservative one. In Step Two on the exhibit, you can see that after reducing the potential losses to EC right holders to 50%, the resulting range of potential loss is about 1.8 million to 3.7 million.

4. Reduce to account for licensing revenue from general licensees that do not play the radio – losses to EC right holders: $.56 million - $1.13 million

35. Now we go to step three. Obviously many restaurants, bars and retail stores do not play radio music. For most establishments, radio programming – with all of its advertisements, talk and interruptions – is an unattractive option. Who wants their customers to hear advertisements for their competitors? Much of the revenue from general licensees that qualify as establishments is not attributable to the playing of radio or TV music, but rather to public performances of music from media such as tapes/CDs, live bands, and jukeboxes.

36. The National Restaurant Association and the National Licensed Beverage Association estimate that approximately 33% and 28% of their members, respectively, play the radio. Such radio use is often not exclusive. Many establishments that play the radio will often play music from other sources as well. Taking an average of these two roughly comparable estimates, we have assumed that 30.5% of establishments play radio music.

37. It is important to note that, given that establishments often play music from more than one source, this estimate – 30.5% of establishments that play the radio – does not correspond with the percentage of licensing revenue attributable to the playing of radio music. Revenue from radio music is going to be much less. Nevertheless, we are being very conservative in these calculations, and have assumed for the sake of this analysis that 30.5% of licensing revenue is attributable to the playing of radio music. Correspondingly, the losses to EC right holders from the Section 110(5) exemption for radio music must be reduced to this amount. In line 3, you can see that this would range from about half a million to 1.1 million dollars.

5. Reduce to account for licensing revenue from general licensee establishments that play the radio and meet size limitations of Section 110(5): losses to EC right holders: $294,113 to $586,332

38. In Step Four, we take a final reduction to take into account the fact that many eating, drinking and retail establishments that play radio music do not meet the square footage limits of Section 110(5)(B). According to figures provided by the National Restaurant Association, 65.5% of restaurants meet the square footage criteria of the statute. According to the EC, there are 364,404 eating and drinking establishments in the United States. That means that about 239 thousand meet the square footage requirements of the statute.
39. On the retail side, the EC has presented a study commissioned by ASCAP purporting to demonstrate that about 45% of retail stores meet the square footage limits of the statute. The EC also alleges that there are 683,783 retail establishments in the United States. 45% of 684 thousand is about 307 thousand.

40. So, even using EC figures for the sake of today's analysis, we have about 239 thousand exempt restaurants and 307 thousand exempt retail stores. That's a total of 546 thousand exempt establishments, which is 52.1% of all establishments. In line 4, we've reduced the possible losses to EC right holders to 52.1%, which is about 294 – 586 thousand dollars.

41. If you follow the same four-step analysis for BMI, the result is a paltry 122 thousand dollars.

6. The U.S. Methodology is Conservative

42. As explained in the U.S. submission, these calculations are conservative and – if anything – overstate the true amount of economic prejudice to EC right holders. Some of the reasons these figures are conservative include:

- The United States has assumed that where 30.5% of establishments play the radio, 30.5% of licensing revenue is attributable to radio-playing. This figure is obviously too high, given the large proportion of establishments that play music from more than one type of media.

- Similarly, the United States assumed that the 65.5% of restaurants (and 45% of retail establishments) that fit within the square footage limits of the exception accounted for a 65.5% (and 45%) loss of revenue. In fact, the exempt restaurants and retail establishments are necessarily smaller establishments, and almost certainly represent a smaller proportion of licensing revenue.

- The analysis also does not take into account steps that ASCAP and BMI might take to minimize any impact of Section 110(5).

- Similarly, the analysis does not take into account the establishments that could take advantage of the private agreement concluded by the PROs with the NLBA.

7. Any minimal prejudice from Section 110(5)(B) is reasonable in light of ASCAP and BMI's advocacy of an exemption of almost identical scope

43. Finally, in considering whether the passage of Section 110(5)(B) has caused right holders any unreasonable prejudice, the private agreement between the PROs and the NLBA is again relevant. The PROs voluntarily agreed to a blanket exemption of 3500 square feet. They offered the same deal to the NRA. Perhaps most significantly, during Congress' consideration of Section 110(5)(B), the "ASCAP and BMI proposal" also revolved around an exemption for establishments smaller than 3500 square feet. Presumably, ASCAP and BMI would not have proposed an exemption of 3500 square feet if they felt that such an exemption would cause their members any real prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

44. To sum up, the applicable standard for determining the TRIPS consistency of Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act is TRIPS Article 13. Section 110(5) is a permissible exception to the public performance right based on the criteria articulated in Article 13. Therefore, the United States respectfully requests that the Panel find that both Section 110(5)(A) and (B) are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.
45. Furthermore, the United States requests that the Panel clearly delineate its findings regarding sub-section (A) and sub-section(B) of Section 110(5), in order to provide maximum guidance to WTO members regarding the interpretation of the TRIPS provisions at issue.
1. The United States appreciates this opportunity to comment on the material provided to the Panel by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The United States further appreciates the Panel’s communication of January 10, 2000, regarding the deadline for submitting comments on these materials.

2. In the view of the United States, the extensive material provided by WIPO does not raise issues not already addressed by the Parties and discussed in the two Panel meetings in this case. The material further confirms the importance that Berne negotiators attached to the permissibility of exceptions under Articles 11 and 11bis, and the existence of the minor reservations doctrine. See, e.g., Annexes X, XII and XIII. For this reason, the United States considers that these documents support the U.S. position in this case.
3.1 AUSTRALIA

3.1.1 WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF AUSTRALIA

(1 November 1999)

SYNOPSIS

- Exceptions or limitations to the right of authorising public communication of broadcast copyright works under the TRIPS Agreement must conform with:
  - the general conditions set by TRIPS Article 13, and
  - the specific conditions set by Article 11bis of the Berne Convention as incorporated in TRIPS,

consistent with the general objectives and principles of TRIPS, in particular Article 7.

- It would be valuable to clarify the relationship between TRIPS and Berne as they apply to this specific right:
  - there is no hierarchy of authority between TRIPS Article 13 and Berne Article 11bis(2), but the latter provision provides more direct guidance as to the present case;
  - any exception or limitation would still need to conform with each of the two provisions;
  - this right is to be considered differently from other rights – such as the general reproduction right – in the light of the specific guidance provided by Berne 11bis(2);
  - 11bis2 specifies that conditions on this right shall in no circumstances be prejudicial to the author's entitlement to equitable remuneration.

- The diplomatic history of the Berne Convention provides further guidance as to how the "conditions" allowable under Berne 11bis(2) should be interpreted:
  - the right of equitable remuneration was strongly emphasised;
  - the only apparent exceptions considered were "minor reservations" relating to use of the work in a private setting or associated with public interest objectives, such as in educational or religious contexts.

- Consistent application of these two provisions to the right of public communication of broadcast works would entail giving due weight to Berne 11bis(2):
  - hence, the test established under TRIPS Article 13, applied to this right, should be coloured by the specific requirement for equitable remuneration;
  - by setting conditions on the exercise of this right, and establishing a minimum standard involving equitable remuneration, 11bis(2) prescribes how rights and obligations are balanced, and exceptions and limitations are
set, that is a specific instance of the general balance of interests that is required in TRIPS Article 7 and also expressed in Article 13;

- Article 9(2) of Berne, by contrast, has only limited and indirect relevance to the determination of the scope of allowable exceptions and limitations to this right.

- Equitable remuneration in relation to the right of public communication of broadcast works should entail recognition of any specific commercial benefits that are intended to result from public communication made for commercial objectives:

  - the confinement of this right to an entitlement to equitable remuneration represents a significant constraint on the exercise of the right, allowing exclusion of the right to prohibit public communication and to seek inordinate remuneration, and allowing for it to be implemented through compulsory licensing;

  - equitable remuneration in this context maintains the balance of rights and objectives called for in TRIPS Article 7;

  - it also clarifies the nature of "unreasonable prejudice" in the application of TRIPS Article 13 to the right of public communication of broadcast works.
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I. POLICY BACKGROUND

1.1 Historically, at a national level, copyright and related rights have been developed, enforced, and subject to limitations and exceptions with the overall goal of serving the broader public interest through the provision of effective and appropriate private rights. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") articulates this balance, already present in the established copyright norms of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne"),\(^1\) sets it explicitly into an international trade context, and obliges WTO Members to observe it in a number of specific contexts in their implementation of intellectual property law. TRIPS is founded on the understanding that distortions and impediments to trade, and other forms of detriment to legitimate interests, are the consequence of disturbances to this balance.

1.2 Hence TRIPS affirms that a "balance of rights and obligations" is a key objective of the "protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights" (Article 7), and it provides for exceptions and limitations to be imposed on intellectual property rights, including copyright and related rights (Article 13). Any exceptions to the basic framework established by TRIPS should be aimed at sustaining this mutually beneficial balance, and should also be consistent with the specific provisions of TRIPS (including those provisions of other instruments incorporated within TRIPS by reference).

1.3 The present case concerns an exemption from the requirement to pay royalties to music composers and songwriters for the playing of radio and television broadcasts of their compositions in certain public places – exceptions to the right of communication to the public of broadcast copyright works, a right which has, in the Berne Convention, been clearly distinguished from the broadcast right itself. On the basis of the two first submissions, there appears to be no issue as to the initial scope of the rights, and the present case is more concerned with the legitimate scope of certain statutory exceptions to that right: hence it has less to do with the underlying nature of the right than with the degree to which that right can be limited or qualified, with reference to the questions of normal exploitation of a copyright work, unreasonable prejudice to the right holder's interests, and the right holder's entitlement to equitable remuneration.

1.4 The case therefore raises questions about the interaction of private intellectual property rights (IPR) and broader public policy goals, the way in which the broad objectives of TRIPS are to be reflected in national intellectual property systems, and how certain key provisions are to be implemented in individual jurisdictions. Since the case relates to key provisions of Berne, it also raises the question of how the diplomatic and interpretative history of relevant provisions of that Convention should be taken into account when interpreting obligations under TRIPS.

1.5 The General Report of the Rome Conference, in discussing the introduction of the new right of communication to the public through broadcasting (the "most important result" of that Conference\(^2\)), notes that the text adopted by the Conference "had the characteristic of a compromise between two opposing tendencies": that of "entirely assimilating the broadcasting right into the other exclusive rights of the author", and that of considering the right "as the subject for intervention by the public authorities to protect the cultural and social interests linked to this new and special form of popular dissemination of intellectual works, especially musical works".\(^3\) This is a clear instance of the broader "balance of interests" noted in TRIPS 7, with specific bearing on the particular right at issue in the present case. The Report of the Sub-committee on Broadcasting at Rome notes that this provision reconciles "the general public interest of the State with the interests of authors",\(^4\) the public

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\(^1\) For convenience and brevity, this submission generally cites provisions of TRIPS in the format "TRIPS 13", for "Article 13 of TRIPS", and "Berne 11bis(2)", for "paragraph 11bis(2) of Berne".
\(^3\) loc. cit.
\(^4\) op. cit. p.184.
interests under consideration being the potential use of the new medium of broadcasting for the dissemination of cultural works.

1.6 Australia's involvement as a third party in this case reflects:

- an immediate trade interest in ensuring that Australian composers and songwriters can obtain equitable remuneration in relation to the public communication of broadcasts of their musical works in the important US market; and

- the need to preserve the integrity of the rules relating to trade-related IPRs: that is, ensuring that TRIPS (and, in this case, specifically the Berne provisions it incorporates) is interpreted and applied in national law in a manner that ensures that the common standards are fully respected, while maintaining a legitimate scope for public policy exceptions to IPRs, in a way that preserves the balance of interests enshrined in TRIPS and promotes its objectives.

Australia's approach is accordingly governed by the concern that there should be no unreasonable diminution of the legitimate interests of copyright owners, including the right to equitable remuneration where this is explicitly provided for; and that governments should have sufficient latitude to maintain the underlying balance of rights and obligations while giving full effect to specific TRIPS obligations.

1.7 In June 1998, the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs tabled a report on the public performance and broadcast rights in relation to small business. A key issue considered by the Committee was the international legal obligations concerning public performance and broadcast rights set out in TRIPS and Berne. As elements of this Committee's work may be of use in the present Panel's deliberations, a synopsis of this report is attached (Annex A). Australia continues to place strong emphasis on the continuing consistency of its own domestic intellectual property system with international obligations, and welcomes the opportunity that the present case provides to clarify and confirm those obligations as they apply to the right of public communication of broadcast works.

II. LEGAL ISSUES

2.1 The question before the Panel is whether the recently amended S.110(5) of the US Copyright Act ("S.110(5)") is in breach of TRIPS 9(1), which requires WTO Members to comply with Berne Articles 1 through 21 (save for 6bis), and the Berne Appendix. This obligation is potentially affected by TRIPS Article 13 which sets bounds within which any limitations and exceptions to copyright and related rights under TRIPS must be confined. This submission sets out an approach to dealing with the legal issues of this case in a manner that should preserve both the legitimate interests of copyright holders and the public interest, as well as maintaining the integrity of the composite TRIPS-Berne system. Given that this is the first case before the WTO DSB to consider substantive TRIPS provisions on copyright, and in particular the linkages between specific Berne provisions and broader TRIPS provisions, this submission offers some considerations on interpretative questions.

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5 According to one industry estimate, the potential annual loss from the introduction of S.110(5) of the US Copyright Act would exceed AUD 1 million, a sum likely to rise given current market trends.

The scope and objective of Berne Article 11bis: the right of public communication of broadcast works, and conditions on that right

2.2 S.110(5) provides that certain forms of public communication of broadcast works shall not infringe copyright. This creates a clear exception to the right established in accordance with Berne 11bis(1) which provides to authors of literary and artistic works (including musical works) the exclusive right of authorizing inter alia "the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of the work". This is subject to the provision (Article 11bis(2)) that it "shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the [Berne] Union to determine the conditions under which [this right] may be exercised… [These conditions] shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority". This last provision bears the facilitative heading "Compulsory Licences". The context of the 11bis(2) suggests that it is intended in particular to ensure that arrangements for compulsory licensing of broadcast works do not deprive the right holder of equitable remuneration. This particular focus was confirmed at the Stockholm Conference. In addition, the scope of Berne 11bis is potentially affected by the so-called "minor reservations", discussed below (from 3.4), that form part of its negotiating history.

The scope and objective of TRIPS Article 13: general limitations and exceptions on copyright

2.3 TRIPS 13 covers limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights pertaining to copyright works in general. Its immediate objective is to "confine" such limitations or exceptions. It has some important differences from parallel provisions in relation to trade marks (Article 17), designs (Article 26.2) and patents (Article 30) - these only cover exceptions, and not limitations, to exclusive rights. The need to confine limitations in TRIPS 13 as well as exceptions may be a consequence of the different nature of copyright compared with industrial property rights, entailing the broader range of legitimate non-commercial usages of copyright material, and the widespread use of compulsory and mechanical licensing in the exploitation of copyright works. Such measures limit the operation of the right rather than necessarily create exceptions. TRIPS 13 recognises the need to govern the way in which legislative restrictions on such rights operate, so as to maintain an appropriate balance of interests.

2.4 The notion of "limitation", in contrast to an "exception", accords with the operation of Berne 11bis(2), which sets bounds on the "conditions" which national legislation may set for the exercise of the specific rights provided in Berne 11bis(1).

Berne Convention obligations in a TRIPS context

2.5 How, and to what extent, do the history and accumulated interpretative material concerning the Berne Convention apply to Berne provisions within TRIPS when considered under the WTO DSU? This is not raised specifically as an issue by either party, but is implicit in the use made of background material about Berne in both first submissions. In interpreting the provisions at issue, the EC submission has drawn on the diplomatic history of Berne; the US submission (para 22) refers to the objective of TRIPS (Article 7), draws on scholarly commentary on Berne 9(2) in its detailed elucidation of TRIPS 13, and invokes the Berne doctrine of "minor reservations" that is not a specific Berne provision but was established in diplomatic conferences on Berne (para 18).

2.6 On the face of it, the Berne provisions at issue should be assessed as obligations arising through the effect of TRIPS, and not as Berne obligations in their own right. TRIPS binds WTO Members to certain provisions of a distinct international instrument, the Berne Convention.

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7 Berne 11 is also relevant, in that it covers any public communication of the work, but Berne 11bis provides more specific guidance on the context at issue in this case.
TRIPS 2.2 provides that TRIPS does not derogate from existing obligations under Berne: this suggests that any rights or exceptions permitted under TRIPS should be consistent with Berne in its own right. TRIPS was negotiated with a background understanding of the scope of the provisions of Berne, and, while there is not necessarily a direct linkage with the interpretative history of Berne, it is unquestionable that the Berne negotiations form part of customary international law in this area. Moreover, the inclusion of Berne provisions in TRIPS indicates that the object and purpose of TRIPS extend to the promotion of the full and effective implementation of those provisions.

2.7 It is submitted that both the interpretative history of Berne and the specific objectives of TRIPS are relevant to the application of overlapping TRIPS and Berne provisions, in the absence of any contradiction between the two. There are in fact certain instances where the background of Berne helps elucidate the way interests are balanced in TRIPS. In dealing with the complex issues at stake in this case, it would be useful to articulate more clearly how this linkage should operate.

**Berne Article 11bis(2) and TRIPS Article 13: reconciling the general and specific provisions**

2.8 There are compelling policy and legal reasons to maintain consistency between Berne 11bis and TRIPS 13 when they are applied to the same right. This question has not been explicitly raised by either party, but is implicit in the interpretations made in their submissions. There is a need for clarity and consistency of application, particularly given that overlapping Berne and TRIPS provisions have not before been considered in a WTO DSU context.

2.9 The first question relates to their respective scope - does TRIPS 13 encompass Berne 11bis(2), or are they co-extensive in relation to broadcast works? A WIPO commentary on the relationship between TRIPS 13 and exceptions and limitations in Berne remarks that:

> None of the limitations and exceptions permitted by the Berne Convention should, if correctly applied, conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and none of them should, if correctly applied, prejudice unreasonably the legitimate interests of the right holder. Thus, generally and normally, there is no conflict between the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement as far as exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights are concerned.\(^8\)

2.10 This suggests that no fundamental conflict need exist, and that all limitations and exceptions already allowed under Berne would also comply with TRIPS 13; but that does not mean that the exceptions or limitations (“conditions”) afforded by one are coextensive with those allowed under the other. Ricketson\(^9\) has suggested that TRIPS 13 is broader in scope than specific exceptions allowable under Berne. However, even if an exception to the right of public communication of broadcast works were found to be consistent with TRIPS 13, then the more specific Berne 11bis(2) would still apply and maintain the requirement for equitable remuneration. In effect, this would either add an additional step to the “three step” test of Article 13 when it is applied to public communication of broadcast works, or would more precisely determine the way that test is applied in this context.

2.11 There is no hierarchy of authority between TRIPS 13 and Berne 11bis(2). In the context of the conclusion of TRIPS, both provisions were adopted at once and have simultaneous effect as TRIPS obligations. However, Berne 11bis(2) has not been addressed so far in the submissions put to the panel, and the focus appears to be on TRIPS 13 only.\(^10\)

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\(^10\) See for instance paragraph 17 of the first submission of the US.
2.12 Further, TRIPS 13, as a general provision, cannot override the more specific Berne 11bis(2): it is more likely that the latter provision indicates how the parties considered the general principle would apply in these circumstances, and there is no evidence to suggest that the general was intended to override the specific in this particular case; hence the specific provision should prevail in the event of any unclarity. This legal principle - *generalia specialibus non derogant* - is well established in common law and can be drawn on in the international context. Further, TRIPS 13 provides that limitations and exceptions are to be confined in a certain way: this does not rule out further, more focussed constraints, based on specific Berne provisions. Since the two provisions are equally binding on WTO Members, and can be interpreted without conflict between them, an exception or limitation to the right of public performance of broadcast works should comply with both TRIPS 13 and Berne 11bis(2).

2.13 The incorporation of Berne 11bis establishes this right under TRIPS; it would follow that any provision allowing limitations to that right (such as 11bis(2)) would also be significant in determining related TRIPS obligations. The General Report of the Brussels Conference states that Berne 11bis(1), "with its three separate items, is inseparable from paragraph 2".

2.14 It is submitted that the preferable approach would be to acknowledge that Berne 11bis(2) influences the application of TRIPS 13 to rights established under Berne 11bis (but not its application to other rights). This would promote consistency of interpretation between the key provisions of TRIPS and of Berne incorporated within TRIPS. Berne 11bis(2) provides the clearest, most authoritative guidance as to how acceptable limitations and exceptions under TRIPS 13 apply to the right of public communication of broadcast works; at the same time, it establishes a direct test for TRIPS-consistency of any exception or limitation on that right.

### III. ANALYSIS OF BERNE ARTICLE 11BIS

#### Scope of the specific limitations in Berne Article 11bis: interpretative background

3.1 The right of public communication of broadcast works was incorporated into the Berne Convention at the Brussels Conference (1948) with no significant opposition, confirming that a distinct right existed over and above the broadcast right itself.

The rationale for this is that the author thinks of his licence to broadcast as covering only the direct audience receiving the signal within the family circle. Once this reception is done in order to entertain a wider circle, often for profit, an additional section of the public is enabled to enjoy the work and it ceases to be merely a matter of broadcasting.

3.2 The Brussels Conference considered the limitations that national legislation may place on this right, leading to the adoption of Article 11bis(2). Three delegations had made drafting proposals seeking to clarify that the right did not apply when the communication to the public was not in a

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11 The authority for relying on the principle of *generalia specialibus non derogant* is Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which is generally regarded as a complete statement of the sources of international law. Article 38(1)(c) indicates that a valid source of international law is "the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations".


14 WIPO Guide, Para. 11bis .12.
commercial context, was made in a family or domestic circle, or was in a scholastic context.\textsuperscript{15} These were withdrawn on the understanding that such reservations could be accommodated within the proposed text of Article 11\textit{bis}(2), but subject to the understanding in the Broadcasting Subcommittee's report that exercise of the prerogative "will in no circumstances be prejudicial to the author’s … right to receive equitable remuneration".

3.3 Inasmuch as this provides guidance as to the nature of the TRIPS (and Berne within TRIPS) obligation, it is clear that no exception was contemplated that would allow public communication of broadcast works in the pursuit of commercial objectives without the possibility of securing equitable remuneration. The Brussels Conference General Report mentioned "free-of-charge exceptions made for religious, patriotic or cultural purposes"\textsuperscript{16} as related to allowable conditions. The Stockholm Conference\textsuperscript{17} clarified that this provision referred to "the compulsory licence which national legislations may impose, subject to just remuneration". The provision does not appear to extend to the effective extinguishment of the right in circumstances when equitable remuneration could be expected. As Ricketson notes, "the power to impose conditions on the exercise of rights set out in Article 11\textit{bis}(1) does not carry with it the power to deny those rights".\textsuperscript{18}

\section*{Minor reservations under Berne Article 11\textit{bis}}

3.4 Since the first submissions by both parties refer to "minor reservations" under Berne,\textsuperscript{19} it may be useful to clarify how such "reservations" would apply in a TRIPS context. It was in relation to Berne 11 - Right of Public Performance - that the issue of minor reservations first arose. During the Brussels Conference (1948) it was proposed that a general provision be inserted into the Berne Convention under which it would be permissible for State Parties to retain minor reservations that already existed in their national laws (e.g. religious ceremonies and performances by military bands at public fetes). The drafters of the Brussels Revision rejected this proposal on the basis that the adoption of such a general provision would encourage those nations which had not recognised such exceptions to incorporate them into their laws.\textsuperscript{20} It was agreed that rather than dealing with this matter in the Convention itself, it would be dealt with in the General Report of the meeting as follows:

Your rapporteur general has been entrusted with making an express mention of the possibility available to national legislation to make what are commonly called minor reservations. The Delegates of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, the Delegate of Switzerland and the Delegate of Hungary, have all mentioned these limited exceptions allowed for religious ceremonies, military bands and the needs of the child and adult education. These exceptional measures apply to articles 11\textit{bis}, 11\textit{ter}, 13 and 14. You will understand that these references are just lightly pencilled in here, in order to avoid damaging the principles of the right.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{15} Records of the Conference Convened in Brussels, BIRPI, Berne, 1951: proposal of the Netherlands on p.279; proposal of Monaco, p.278; proposal of Hungary, p. 278.


\textsuperscript{17} Records of the Stockholm Conference, WIPO, Geneva, 1971, Main Committee I Report, p.1167.

\textsuperscript{18} Ricketson (1987), page 525.

\textsuperscript{19} EU submission, para 73; US submission, para 18.

\textsuperscript{20} Ricketson (1987), page 533.

The last sentence underscores the *de minimis* nature of the types of exceptions that could fall under the minor reservations doctrine in relation to this particular right.

3.5 At the Stockholm Conference (1967) it was again agreed that the Berne Convention did not prevent State Parties from maintaining existing exceptions in their law on the basis that they qualified as minor reservations.\(^22\) The Nordic countries proposed inserting into the General Report a sentence to the effect that the possibility allowed for in the Brussels Conference General Report for the making of minor reservations was still valid. The Record of the Stockholm Conference accordingly reads:

> In the General Report of the Brussels Conference, the Rapporteur was instructed to refer explicitly, in connection with Article 11, to the possibility of what it had been agreed to call 'the minor reservations' of national legislation. Some delegates had referred to the exceptions permitted in respect of religious ceremonies, performances by military bands, and the requirements of education and popularization. The exceptions also apply to articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14. The Rapporteur ended by saying that these allusions were given lightly without invalidating the principle in the right.

> It seems that it was not the intention of the Committee to prevent States from maintaining in their national legislation provisions based on the declaration contained in the General Report of the Brussels Conference.\(^23\)

3.6 Both the Brussels and Stockholm Conferences considered the minor reservation doctrine as applying to Article 11bis among other provisions. The legal status of the minor reservations is not entirely clear: are they strictly "reservations" to the application of the treaty to the countries expressing them, or are they implicit interpretations of the treaty language? Given that TRIPS does not permit formal reservations (Article 72), it is possible that TRIPS 13 was intended to provide the same degree of latitude that these minor reservations permitted under Berne; alternatively, the minor reservations could be seen as casting light on the practical interpretation of Berne 11bis(2). For instance, a "reserved" use could be deemed to be one for which the appropriate remuneration can be deemed equitably to be nil - given their non-commercial nature, and their private setting or their use in relation to a common public interest, it could be deemed inequitable to charge for such communications.

"Equitable remuneration" under Article 11bis(2)

3.7 Article 11bis(2) provides that, whatever conditions are imposed on the exercise of the right of public communication of broadcast works, "in any circumstances" two clear entitlements should be preserved - moral rights (which appear not to apply in the TRIPS context, owing to their exclusion from TRIPS 9(1)), and the right to obtain equitable remuneration. Neither first submission directly addresses the question of equitable remuneration. It merits consideration, firstly because exceptions and limitations to the right of public communication of broadcast works need to be assessed against Article 11bis(2), and secondly because Article 11bis(2) should inform the application of TRIPS 13 to that right.


3.8 The distinct nature of the public communication of a broadcast work creates an expectation of a distinct reward for the creator of the work. This was summarised in a submission to the recent Australian Parliamentary inquiry as follows:

\[\text{[the law gives] recognition that there are two levels of benefit. The radio station is gaining a benefit from broadcasting into people's homes. If someone at the point of reception chooses to gain a second commercial benefit by playing the music through the use of reception, then that is something that should attract some return for the author or composer.}^24\]

Hence the notion of 'equitable remuneration' should be informed by this expectation of a separate reward. The same inquiry report observed:

\[\text{Many composers emphasised the importance of their public performance royalties in allowing them to continue to compose music. … There was a strong feeling that the value of the royalty was not just in its quantum, but in the knowledge that they were receiving some sort of financial reward for their work. In many cases, the principle of reward was considered to be as important as the money.}^25\]

3.9 Given the clear direction of Berne 11bis(2), equitable remuneration, either by agreement or the determination of an appropriate authority, is required for the public communication of broadcasts even in connection with relatively modest commercial objectives. The appropriate fee may also be very modest for individual small businesses seeking to secure commercial benefits from the broadcast works.\(^26\) The level of equitable remuneration may be linked in a general way to the commercial benefits achieved by the business user - for instance, in attracting and retaining additional clientele, in creating a particular ambience, and in drawing on the popular appeal of a musical work. Representing a major group of users of copyright works, the US National Licensed Beverage Association (NBLA) has acknowledged the commercial benefits of music:

\[\text{The use of music in your business establishment is one way you can enhance your business, influence your customers’ eating and drinking habits, and increase your profits.}^27\]

3.10 Equitable remuneration is not simply the level of return that the right holder (or its agent) wants - Berne 11bis(2) notes that a competent authority can adjudicate on this point in the absence of agreement, and the right holder is not in a monopolistic bargaining position. Some objective assessment of the value of the use of the work to the business enterprise may be called for. At the same time, it is well recognised that enforcement of intellectual property rights should not be burdensome. The need for administrative efficiency has accordingly led to the creation of collective or "blanket" licensing arrangements.

3.11 It is inconsistent with the requirement for equitable remuneration to remove any legal possibility for securing appropriate returns for the public communication of broadcast works in

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\(^24\) Submission of APRA, cited in Don’t Stop the Music, pp 67-68.

\(^25\) Don’t Stop the Music, p.68.

\(^26\) The license fee charged by the collecting society ASCAP in the US for the small business exempted by the recent revision to S.110(5) was $30, for instance (see Annex US-7 to the First Submission of the US, 26 October).

contexts which are clearly and substantially commercial in nature, and when commercial benefits arise from use of the music, often as a conscious commercial judgement (such as the contexts noted by the NBLA, 3.9 above). For example, broadcast musical works are communicated to members of the public for their entertainment and for commercial gain, such as through increased patronage (even if no direct or distinct charge is levied for the communication of the broadcast as such), as an alternative to commercial music services or licenses for other forms of commercially-motivated public communication of works.

3.12 It would be consistent with the notion of "equitable remuneration" for the revenue to be scaled, within practical bounds, according to the overall commercial interests engaged. As discussed in para 3.6, equitable remuneration may even be determined to be nil for certain public-interest or de minimis public communications (such as those cited at the Brussels Conference). The matter is less clear in relation to incidental use of broadcast works, and in particular in the context of so-called "homestyle" reception of broadcasts on the premises of small businesses, especially when the public communication is incidental or unintended, and is not specifically directed at clientele in the course of pursuing commercial activities. In certain such limited contexts, "equitable remuneration" may also be effectively nil. Nonetheless, the situation is clearer for significant and unambiguous commercial use of the copyright work. It would be difficult to maintain that, in the present case, the effective elimination of the public communication of broadcast right in a wide range of commercial settings amounts to a determination by the authorities, in the absence of agreement, that nil remuneration is the most equitable outcome in all those commercial settings. There was no consent to the removal of the public communication right or the entitlement to obtain equitable remuneration on the part of the right holders' representatives in the present case:

ASCAP is totally committed to overturning the "Music Licensing Amendment" which allows for-profit restaurants, bars, grills and retailers to avoid paying for music performed over radio and television speakers. Very simply, it is not fair that any of us should be forced to work for free.

3.13 The right in question is "to obtain" remuneration, and does not entail an obligation on the part of the user to pay remuneration when it is not as a matter of fact sought in any way (including through collective mechanisms) by the right holder. The first submission of the US points to situations in which right holders, or the collecting societies representing them, elect not, for practical or other reasons, to pursue their entitlement to equitable remuneration; but that should be distinguished from an outright abrogation of that right through legislation. The practical possibilities for collecting revenues, and the consequent degree to which right holders may choose to seek remuneration, are contingent matters which may change in the light of technological and commercial developments. The fact that it may be inconvenient to exercise a right in a particular commercial context does not in itself justify the removal of that right. Such exceptions need to be justified on public policy grounds in line with established principles.

3.14 In addition, there is a question as to how national treatment is observed in the situation where the right to obtain remuneration is denied in a foreign market, especially given the voluntary nature of collecting societies as a means of exercising the right of public communication of broadcast works.

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28 For instance, the Australian collecting society APRA has agreed to issue complimentary licenses in relation to small businesses when broadcasts are received on standard receivers and are not intended to be heard by the public.

The nature of public communication

3.15 Article 11bis provides no further definition of the nature of "public communication": it is a matter that is still determined according to national legislation and judicial interpretation. Some of the "minor reservations" cited at the Brussels Conference in the context of 11bis (especially those relating to use in the family or domestic circle) may in fact have bearing on the way "public communication" is defined. This matter is apparently not at issue (paragraph 17 of the US submission), but Annex B of this submission sets out some background considerations on this issue should it be considered by the Panel.

IV. TRIPS ARTICLE 13 AND THE PUBLIC COMMUNICATION OF BROADCASTS

4.1 TRIPS 13 applies in general to limitations and exceptions to rights under Section 1 of Part II of TRIPS, and accordingly provides a test for the TRIPS consistency of limitations and exceptions to the right of public performance of broadcast works. When TRIPS 13 was drafted, the terms used closely followed Berne 9(2). Because of this textual linkage, the two provisions are often compared, and, on the face of it, the test established in TRIPS 13 does not appear to differ materially from the three-step test contained in Berne 9(2). For instance, the first submission of the US draws on material relating to Berne Article 9(2) in its interpretation of TRIPS Article 13.

4.2 There are nonetheless clear differences between the two provisions, especially when TRIPS 13 is applied to the right of public performance of broadcast works. In this context, therefore, Berne 9(2) refers to a different right, a different form of exploitation of a work and a different set of interests; it also refers to outright exceptions to the reproduction right, rather than to conditions or limitations on the right. The nature of the normal exploitation of works and of unreasonable prejudice to legitimate interests may significantly differ between the reproduction right and the right of public communication of broadcast works. The matter would be different if the case concerned an exception to the reproduction right.

4.3 Berne 9(2) may nonetheless give general or indirect guidance as to the application of TRIPS 13 to the public communication of broadcasts, especially in any endeavour to interpret the exact terms used. As far as the legal effect of TRIPS 13 and its object and purpose are concerned in relation to the right of public communication of broadcast works, then Berne 11bis(2) provides more direct and authoritative guidance. Berne 11bis(2) governs this specific right directly, and a coherent application of TRIPS would require consistency between TRIPS 13 and Berne 11bis(2).

4.4 In adopting Berne 9(2), the Stockholm Conference commented:

If it is considered that reproduction conflicts with the normal exploitation of the work, reproduction is not permitted at all. If it is considered that reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, the next step would be to consider whether it does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. Only if such is not the case would it be possible in certain special cases to introduce a compulsory license, or to provide for use without payment. A practical example might be photocopying for various purposes. If it consists of producing a very large number of copies, it may not be permitted, as it conflicts with a normal exploitation of the work. If it implies a rather large number of copies for use in industrial undertakings, it may not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, but it may not unreasonably

prejudice the legitimate interests of the author, provided that, according to national legislation, an equitable remuneration is paid. If a small number of copies is made, photocopying may be permitted without payment, particularly for individual or scientific use.\textsuperscript{31}

In relation to the first criterion of a "special case" in the three-step test, Ricketson notes:

\begin{quote}
The words 'in certain special cases' embody a general criterion, and this can be seen as possessing two distinct aspects. First, the use in question must be for a quite specific purpose: a broad kind of exemption would not be justified. Secondly, there must be something special about this purpose, 'special' here meaning that it is justified by some clear reason of public policy or some other exceptional circumstance.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

4.5 The second and third criteria were placed in that order to aid in the application of the rule. In other words, it is first necessary to decide whether there is a "conflict with a normal exploitation of the work". Only if this is answered in the negative is it necessary to consider whether there is "unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the author".\textsuperscript{33}

4.6 Little guidance is provided on the meaning of the expression "normal exploitation of the work", although the Stockholm Conference records cited above in 4.4 indicate that making a very large number of copies may conflict with the "normal exploitation of a work".\textsuperscript{34} In relation to this second criterion, Ricketson makes the following useful comment:

\begin{quote}
Common sense would indicate that the expression normal exploitation refers simply to the ways in which an author might reasonably be expected to exploit his work in the normal course of events. Accordingly, there will be certain kinds of use which do not form part of his normal mode of exploiting his work - that is, uses for which he would not ordinarily expect to receive a fee - even though they fall strictly within the scope of his reproduction rights.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

4.7 Turning to the last criterion of "unreasonable prejudice", the question is not whether there is prejudice or not. It is a question of degree as to whether the use in the particular circumstances, is reasonable or not. The WIPO Guide on the Berne Convention provides the following examples:

\begin{quote}
All copying is damaging in some degree: a single photocopy may mean one copy of the journal remaining unsold and, if the author had a share in the proceeds of publication he lost it. But was this prejudice unreasonable? Here scarcely. It might be otherwise if a monograph, printed in limited numbers, were copied by a large firm and the copies distributed in their thousands to its correspondents throughout the world. Another example is that of a lecturer who, to support his theme, photocopies a short article from a specialist journal and reads it to his audience: clearly this scarcely prejudices the circulation of the review. It would be different if he had run off
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{32} Ricketson (1987), page 482.
\textsuperscript{33} Ricketson (1987), page 483.
large number of copies and handed them out, for this might seriously cut in on its sales.

**Berne Article 11bis(2) as a guide to the application of TRIPS Article 13**

4.8 As discussed above (2.14, 4.3), Berne 11bis(2) has more direct bearing on how TRIPS 13 should be applied in the present case. It stipulates that "conditions" applying to the public communication of broadcast works "shall not be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority". This sheds light on how "normal exploitation", "unreasonable prejudice" and "legitimate interests" should be interpreted in relation to this particular right. For instance, it suggests that compulsory licenses may be consistent with normal exploitation. It lays emphasis on the author's moral rights and right to obtain equitable remuneration as legitimate interests in this context, and it implies that "unreasonable prejudice" would occur if those interests were impaired through the legislative application of any condition on the exercise of an Article 11bis(1) right.

**TRIPS Article 13 in relation to the objectives of TRIPS**

4.9 Ultimately, the interpretation of TRIPS Article 13 must be consistent with the objectives of TRIPS itself, as the first submission of the US notes (para 22). The key provisions in this context are Article 7 ("Objectives") and Article 8 ("Principles"); elements of the preamble may also be relevant. Article 7 focusses particularly on technological innovation, the transfer and dissemination of technology, and the interests of producers and users of technological knowledge, which are not directly at issue in this case. It also points to the need for protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights to be "conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations". Concerns were expressed at the Rome Conference that the development of the then new technology of radiodiffusion as a means of promoting social and cultural welfare should not be impaired by a restrictive application of the new broadcasting right.

4.10 While not in the foreground of the TRIPS negotiations, the history of Berne suggests that the specific balance of interests involved in relation to the public performance of broadcast works appears to be between the right of the author to remuneration,36 and the need for broadcasting media to develop and contribute to social and economic well-being. What factors should be considered in maintaining this balance? Clearly, it was not intended to give the author the right to prohibit the public communication of the broadcast of the work, as this would be an unreasonable constraint on the use of broadcast material. Some *de minimis* or public interest exceptions to the right were also entertained in relation to some jurisdictions at least – use within the family or domestic circle, in religious or educational contexts. The author, also, did not have an unlimited right to obtain remuneration – in effect, the author was not given monopoly bargaining power, and it was acknowledged that an independent authority may establish the level of remuneration that would be equitable.

4.11 Hence the balance struck was for an undiminished right of equitable remuneration in relation to use of works that did not fall within the "minor exception" or *de minimis* category. When, at the Rome Conference, Article 11bis was introduced in its initial form, the Sub-Committee on Broadcasting reported that the Article was intended "to bring the author's rights into harmony with the general public interests of the State, the only ones to which specific interests are subordinate,"37 while it 'emphatically confirms the author's right'.

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36 As well as the author's moral rights, if they are not excluded in this context - however, the reference to moral rights in Berne 11bis(2) is likely caught by the exclusion of "rights derived" from Berne Article 6bis in TRIPS Article 9(2).

4.12 It is submitted that this approach is wholly consistent with the broader objectives of the TRIPS agreement, and is in fact an exemplary application of the "balance" required by Article 7.

V. S.110(5) OF THE US COPYRIGHT ACT IN RELATION TO TRIPS

5.1 General considerations are now offered in relation to the TRIPS consistency of the legislative provision at issue. As suggested earlier, S.110(5) needs to be assessed against Berne 11bis(2) as well as TRIPS 13, and in particular against a reading of TRIPS 13 that gives full weight to the equal authority of Berne 11bis(2). If an exception to the right of public performance of broadcast works is considered inconsistent with Berne 11bis(2), then it would be ineffectual to claim that it was nonetheless consistent with TRIPS 13.

S.110(5) and Berne 11bis(2): the need to maintain equitable remuneration

5.2 The detailed commentary already provided suggests that it would be inconsistent with Berne 11bis(2) effectively to remove the right of authorising public communication of broadcast works when this is for specifically commercial objectives, given that no condition or reservation to this right has been contemplated which would amount to the denial of equitable remuneration in such a context. This may hinge on how "equitable remuneration" is to be determined, but it is difficult to envisage how no entitlement to remuneration for the author can be reconciled with intentional and direct use of copyright works for specifically commercial purposes.

Application of the minor reservations doctrine

5.3 The present case relates to an exception to the Berne 11bis(1)(iii) right which precludes right holders from seeking equitable remuneration in connection with public communication of the broadcast musical work in a wide range of commercial settings – according to the US Congressional Research Service, some 70% of bars and restaurants in the United States. Whatever the precise proportion, this exception clearly covers a substantial portion of the market for communication to the public of broadcast musical works; nor does it relate to communications essentially unrelated to commercial objectives. The "minor reservations" cited in the development of the Berne Convention (discussed from para 3.4) are distinct from this form of commercial usage in a portion of the market which is neither commercially negligible nor legally de minimis.

S.110(5) and the three-step test of TRIPS 13

5.4 If it is considered relevant or necessary to consider consistency with TRIPS 13, the following analysis seeks to apply the above interpretation of that Article to the present case.

Special Case

5.5 S.110(5) provides an outright exemption for a wide range of establishments including food service, drinking and other establishments. There is no indication that the criteria chosen to define this exception were driven by public policy objectives, comparable to use in a research, educational or religious context. Equally, S.110(5) appears to provide a blanket exemption for such establishments rather than dealing with certain special cases: no special quality is conferred upon an establishment, and the nature of the use of a copyright work is not rendered less directly commercial, by the floorspace of the establishment. There does not appear to be any identification of "special use" or "exceptional circumstances" behind the S.110(5) exemption as is called for in the analysis above (4.4). Rather, the threshold applied is justified by contingent considerations about the practicalities of collecting royalties.

Conflict with a normal exploitation of the work

5.6 S. 110(5) allows food service, drinking and other establishments to communicate broadcasts of musical work to the public in the direct pursuit of commercial gain. Broadcasts of musical work are often used by such establishments to attract, entertain and create an ambience for patrons. The right to equitable remuneration from the public communication of broadcasts in such commercial settings is a normal exploitation of musical work, distinct from other forms of exploitation. It is possible that right holders may, for practical reasons, elect not to seek such remuneration in certain commercial circumstances, but it is consistent with normal exploitation for them to have that choice, provided the principle of equitable remuneration is not denied. The US submission (para. 34) suggests that licensing fees for the establishments excluded under s.110(5)(A) "would likely be the lowest in the range"; this is arguably more consistent with equitable remuneration in the context of normal exploitation than there being no right to obtain fees at all. "Equitable remuneration" may be at an appropriately low level, but should also recognise the direct commercial gain made from public communication of broadcast works when this is applicable.

5.7 S.110(5) only conflicts with the rightholder's right to authorise the public communication of a broadcast of musical work and derive equitable remuneration from public communications, and does not interfere with the rightholder's other exclusive rights such as the right to reproduce, publish, broadcast or make an adaptation of the work. In this regard s.110(5) could be said to interfere only in a limited way with the rightholder's overall ability to exploit the work. However, Article 13(2) refers to conflict with a (in the sense of 'any') normal exploitation of the work – rather than to conflict with the overall commercialisation of the work. The right of public communication of a broadcast work has been explicitly recognised in the Berne Convention as a distinct right, giving rise to a distinct right of remuneration which forms one of the normal exploitations of the work.

Unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interest

5.8 We have suggested that in this context, Berne 11bis(2) clearly sets out considerations that apply to determination of unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of right holders. A compulsory licensing system, a denial of monopolistic bargaining power, a de minimis or public interest educational exception are all forms of prejudice to legitimate interests that would be reasonable: Berne 11bis(2) suggests that denial of the right of equitable remuneration and of moral rights would be unreasonable.

5.9 It may be argued that any prejudice to rightholders is only minimal because they would receive royalties from broadcasting stations. S.110(5) allows many food service, drinking and other establishments to obtain commercial benefit through the broadcast of musical works by attracting and entertaining their patrons without any compensation to the right holders from whom they derive this commercial benefit. There is a strong argument that, just as for other inputs into a business, such as electricity and water, establishments should pay for the public communication of broadcasts of musical work when that communication is for commercial purposes, consistent with the principle of equitable remuneration. In this context, a "reasonable prejudice" to the interests of the rightholder would be a denial of the rightholders capacity to prohibit, or charge excessive fees for, public communication of their broadcast works. Given these more limited forms of conditions on this right, and for the reasons cited above, Article 11bis(2) suggests that the denial of equitable remuneration for such public communication is a more serious prejudice to legitimate interests.

5.10 If a provision entitles a wide range of establishments to communicate the broadcast of musical work to the public for immediate commercial objectives without paying any royalties to the authors, then some form of unreasonable prejudice could be established. The "unreasonableness" of s.110(5) may hinge on the magnitude of the directly commercial usage of copyright works to which the US hospitality and retail industry would be able to apply this exemption. Since this provision
provides an absolute exemption for copyright infringement in a wide range of commercial contexts, it rules out any possibility for obtaining the equitable remuneration consistent with reasonable prejudice to their interests.
ANNEX A

"Don't stop the music!"
A report of the inquiry into copyright, music and small business

In June 1998 the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Matters tabled a report on the public performance and broadcast rights in relation to small business. This report was titled "Don't Stop the Music". The Committee's role was to inquire into and report on the collection of copyright royalties for licensing the playing of music in public by small business. Apart from considering the role played by copyright collection societies, the Committee considered the desirability of amending the Australian Copyright Act in relation to public performance and broadcast rights in a small business context. The Committee made a number of recommendations the following of which are of relevance to the matters before this Panel.

The Committee considered a number of submissions on the royalty scheme for the use of background music. The Committee noted that many small businesses felt that they should be exempt from having to pay a fee for the playing of music in their business. While the Committee was sympathetic to some of their arguments, the Committee did not consider that small businesses should be exempt from paying copyright royalty fee for the public performance of music.

The Committee noted that in some circumstances the use of music in a small business was only intended to be heard by one member of staff and there was a strong case in favour of exempting such businesses from paying licence fees. In this regard, the Committee recommended that the relevant collecting society consider granting a complimentary licence when:

- the means of performance is by the use of a radio or television set; and
- the business employs fewer than 20 people; and
- the music is not intended to be heard by customers or the business or by the general public. That is, neither the radio or television set nor any speakers are located in an area that is accessible to customers or the general public and any performance inadvertently heard by customers or the general public is manifestly unintentional.

However, the Committee found that for most small businesses, music is used to attract, entertain and create ambience for customers. Creating a blanket exemption for small businesses would mean that those businesses using music in a manifestly commercial manner would be exempt from paying licence fees. The Committee considered that this would not be an inequitable outcome and recommended against this course of action.
ANNEX B

Definition of "in public"

The rights contained in article 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention refer to the public communication of a broadcast of work. The question arises as to whether the circumstances envisaged by s.110(5) would amount to a public communication of a broadcast of work.

The Berne Convention does not provide a definition as to what is meant by the term public communication. The Brussels Conference (1948) provided some guidance in defining the public for broadcasting and communication rights:

above all, where people meet: in the cinema, in restaurants, in tea rooms, railway carriages....It also appears from the programme that perhaps the most important of these "public places" were those where people worked and conducted their business, such as factories, shops and offices.\(^{39}\)

On this point the WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention notes:

In places where people gather (cafes, restaurants, tea-rooms, hotels, large shops, trains, aircraft etc) the practice is growing of providing broadcast programmes.... The question is whether the licence given by the author to the broadcasting station covers, in addition, all the use made of the broadcast, which may or may not be for commercial ends.

The Convention's answer is "no". Just as in the case of a relay of a broadcast by wire, an additional audience is created (paragraph (10 (ii)) so, in this case too, the work is made perceptible to listeners (and perhaps viewers) other than those contemplated by the author when his permission was given. Although, by definition, the number of people receiving a broadcast cannot be ascertained with any certainty, the author thinks of his licence to broadcast as covering only the direct audience receiving the signal within the family circle. Once this reception is done in order to entertain a wider circle, often for profit, an additional section of the public is enabled to enjoy the work and it ceases to be merely a matter of broadcasting. The author is given control over this new public performance of his work.\(^{40}\)

The Australian Copyright Act, like the Berne Convention, does not provide a definition of the term in public. However, the expression has been considered by the Australian courts over many years.\(^{41}\)

\(^{39}\) Ricketson (1987), page 453.


\(^{41}\) The most recent judicial comment on the meaning of their term 'in public' has been by the High Court in the 1997 case of APRA v Telstra. Justices Dawson and Gaudron in their joint judgement concluded: "Lying behind the concept of the copyright owner's public is recognition of the fact that where a work is performed in a commercial setting, the occasion is unlikely to be private or domestic and the audience is more appropriately to be seen as a section of the public. It is in a commercial setting that an unauthorised performance will ordinarily be to the financial disadvantage of the owner's copyright in a work because it is in such a setting that that owner is entitled to expect payment for the work's authorised performance."
Under existing Australian case law, it is clear that the Australian courts will take into account the following factors in determining whether a performance is in public:

- First, a performance is "public" unless it takes place in a "domestic and private" setting;
- Secondly, where the performance occurs as an adjunct to a commercial activity, it will be in public;
- Thirdly, the audience in question clearly forms part of the copyright owner's public.
3.1.2 ORAL STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIA AT THE THIRD PARTY HEARING

(9 November 1999)

Australia welcomes the opportunity to put its views on this case to the panel and the two parties.

Our submission is motivated by the direct trade interests related to equitable remuneration for public communication of broadcast musical works of Australian composers and songwriters. It is also intended to promote the integrity of the TRIPS Agreement, including the balance of rights and obligations that should serve the interests of producers and users of intellectual property.

Exceptions or limitations to the right of authorising public communication of broadcast works should conform with the general conditions set by TRIPS Article 13, and the specific conditions set by Article 11bis of the Berne Convention. They should also be consistent with the general objectives and principles of TRIPS, in particular Article 7.

We submit that it would be valuable to clarify the relationship between TRIPS and Berne as they apply to this specific right. There is no hierarchy of authority between TRIPS Article 13 and Berne Article 11bis, as the two provisions are on an equal footing as TRIPS obligations and both apply to this case. However, Berne 11bis does provide more direct guidance on the present case, which relates to a right which is defined and regulated distinctly from other rights such as the general reproduction right. 11bis(2) specifies that conditions on this right shall in no circumstances be prejudicial to the author's entitlement to equitable remuneration.

The diplomatic history of the Berne Convention provides further guidance as to how the "conditions" allowable under Berne 11bis(2) should be interpreted. The undiminished right of equitable remuneration has been strongly emphasised, and the only apparent exceptions considered were "minor reservations" relating to use of the work in a private setting or associated with public interest objectives, such as in educational or religious contexts.

The two tests - TRIPS 13 and Berne 11 bis(2) - could be applied in parallel to the right of public communication of broadcast works. However, the most consistent and systemically sound approach would be to give due weight to Berne 11bis(2) in applying TRIPS 13 in this specific context. Accordingly, the TRIPS 13 test, applied to this right, should be subject to the specific requirement for equitable remuneration. Berne 11bis(2) also suggests how the objectives of TRIPS 7 can be maintained in this context.

- By setting conditions on the exercise of this right, and establishing a minimum standard involving equitable remuneration, 11bis(2) prescribes how rights and obligations are balanced, and exceptions and limitations are set. This is a specific instance of the general balance of interests that is required in TRIPS 7 and expressed in TRIPS 13;

- Article 9(2) of Berne, by contrast, has only limited and indirect relevance to the determination of the scope of allowable exceptions and limitations to this right.

Equitable remuneration in relation to the right of public communication of broadcast works should entail recognition of any specific commercial benefits that are intended to result from public communication made for commercial objectives

- equitable remuneration in this context is consistent with the balancing of rights and obligations called for in TRIPS 7;
it also clarifies the nature of "unreasonable prejudice" in the application of TRIPS Article 13 to the right of public communication of broadcast works.
3.1.3 RESPONSES OF AUSTRALIA TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL

(19 November 1999)

Australia welcomes the opportunity to provide further background information on this case in response to the Panel's questions. It notes, however, that the copyright law and practice in Australia and in countries other than the US are not at issue in this case, and submits that TRIPS obligations should not be determined by the approach taken in any one national system, practice or tradition.

Q.1 Please give examples of exceptions in the copyright laws of your country or of other countries based on the "minor reservations" doctrine.

It is not evident in general which exceptions within copyright laws are based expressly on the minor reservations doctrine, as exceptions may be implicit in the definition of the right or may be justified in other ways. The clearest examples of the application of this doctrine can be found in the diplomatic records which acknowledge and confirm the existence of minor reservations, for instance:

The Delegates of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the Delegate of Switzerland and the Delegate of Hungary have all mentioned these limited exemptions allowed for religious ceremonies, military bands and the needs of child and adult education. These exceptional measures apply to Articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14.42

Q.2. Is the communication to the public of music contained in broadcasts or played from sound recordings or live subject to exclusive rights or right of remuneration in your legislation, and are the rights in respect of such uses of music exercised by the right holders or by their collective management organizations?

This response is limited to this question as it relates to the communication to the public of musical works contained in broadcasts (as this is the subject matter of the case directly before the Panel), and does not consider the separate instances of playing music live or from sound recordings (which may be subject to different considerations.)

2(i) Existence of the right

The communication to the public of music contained in broadcasts is subject to exclusive rights in Australia, essentially through the operation of Sections 27 and 31 of the Copyright Act (1968). Section 27 provides, in part:

(1) Subject to this section, a reference in this Act to performance shall:

(a) be read as including a reference to any mode of visual or aural presentation, whether the presentation is by the operation of wireless telegraphy apparatus, by the exhibition of a cinematograph film, by the use of a record or by any other means …

…

(3) Where visual images or sounds are displayed or emitted by any receiving apparatus to which they are conveyed by the transmission of electromagnetic signals (whether over paths provided by a material substance or not), the operation of any apparatus by which the signals are transmitted, directly or indirectly, to the receiving apparatus shall be deemed not to constitute performance or to constitute causing visual images to be seen or sounds to be heard but, in so far as the display or emission of the images or sounds constitutes a performance, or causes the images to be seen or the sounds to be heard, the performance, or the causing of the images to be seen or sounds to be heard, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be effected by the operation of the receiving apparatus.

(4) Without prejudice to the last two preceding subsections, where a work or an adaptation of a work is performed or visual images are caused to be seen or sounds to be heard by the operation of any apparatus referred to in the last preceding subsection or of any apparatus for reproducing sounds by the use of a record, being apparatus provided by or with the consent of the occupier of the premises where the apparatus is situated, the occupier of those premises shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the person giving the performance or causing the images to be seen or the sounds to be heard, whether he or she is the person operating the apparatus or not.

Section 31 of the same Act provides, in part:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, unless the contrary intention appears, copyright, in relation to a work, is the exclusive right:

(a) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, to do all or any of the following acts:

(i) to reproduce the work in a material form;

(ii) to publish the work;

(iii) to perform the work in public;

(iv) to broadcast the work;

(v) to cause the work to be transmitted to subscribers to a diffusion service;

(vi) to make an adaptation of the work;

(vii) to do, in relation to a work that is an adaptation of the first-mentioned work, any of the acts specified in relation to the first-mentioned work in subparagraphs (i) to (v), inclusive; …
2(ii) Exercise of the right

The current domestic arrangement in Australia is that the rights in respect of public performance of broadcast musical works are exercised by a collective management organization. The right to authorise public performance of broadcast musical works is in practice exercised by the Australasian Performing Right Association Limited (APRA). In exercising these rights, APRA provides for licenses for broadcast musical works on a scale linked with the extent of the public performance, as determined by the number of TV or radio sets and additional loudspeakers. To authorise musical performances at the premises by radio or TV sets, including TV sets used to show videos, free to air TV, satellite TV broadcasts and cable TV, for background and listening purposes only, the annual license fee for each radio set is $37.62 (and each additional speaker $0.94); and for each television set $37.62 (and each additional speaker $0.94). A distinct license is available to authorise performances of music in the workplace for the benefit of employees, at the annual rate of 56 cents per full-time employee, with a minimum annual fee of $37.62.

APRA issues a complimentary licence in instances where:

(a) the means of performance is by the use of a radio or television set; and

(b) the business employs fewer than 20 people; and

(c) the music is not intended to be heard by customers of the business or by the general public. That is, neither the radio or television set nor any speakers are located in an area that is accessible to customers or the general public and any performance inadvertently heard by customers or the general public is manifestly unintentional.

The following are illustrative examples of situations in which APRA would grant a complimentary licence in the exercise of this right:

- A family run milk bar or corner store which has a radio or television behind the counter or in the back room of a composite shop/dwelling. The volume is such that customers may hear some music in the public access areas but the intention is to entertain staff during quiet trading periods.
- A chemist employing five staff with a radio located in the secure dispensing area for the benefit of the pharmacist. Some sound may be audible to customers.
- A service station with 12 employees playing the radio in a workshop and/or with a television behind the counter near the cash register. Customers fuelling cars, leaving vehicles for repair or paying for purchases may overhear music.
- A small hairdresser with a radio in the backroom of the salon which may at times be overheard by clients. The location of the radio shows that this is unintentional.
- A real estate agent where the receptionist has a radio on the desk. While the performance is audible to customers, the radio is for the receptionist's own enjoyment.

43 The following information is drawn from the APRA website, www.apra.com.au.
• A café playing a radio in the staff-only food preparation areas. The location of the radio and the volume indicate that, while music may sometimes be overheard by customers, it is not played for their benefit.

• A small hardware store with three employees where a radio is located in the storage/supply area behind the counter for the benefit of employees.

• A laundromat with five staff playing a radio in an open work area behind the counter. There are no additional speakers and the performance is intended for the benefit of employees.

• An owner/operator tailor with a television in the working area behind the counter. Performance is for the benefit of the owner.

• A doctor's surgery. The receptionist plays a radio at low volume. Music is not clearly audible to patients in the waiting room.

Q.3. Please explain which individual exclusive rights under which specific provisions of Articles 11(1) and 11 bis(1) of the Berne Convention are affected to what extent by which specific provision of Subsection (A) and/or (B) or Section 110(5).

Section 110(5) creates exceptions to the right of communication to the public of certain broadcast musical works, by providing that certain use made of the works is not infringement of copyright. It is apparently not in contention that this use is communication to the public.

Communication to the public is covered in general terms under Article 11(1) of Berne, and this would, on the face of it, include the forms of communication excepted under Section 110(5). Broadcasting itself could be viewed as a particular form of public communication of a work.

Article 11bis was introduced at the 1928 Rome Conference to provide international rules governing the broadcasting of literary and artistic works. It is therefore submitted that this is the more directly relevant provision. The WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention (p.65) comments:

The second leg of this right [Article 11(1)] is the communication to the public of a performance of the work. It covers all public communication except broadcasting which is dealt with in Article 11bis. For example, a broadcasting organisation broadcasts a chamber concert. Article 11bis applies. But if it or some other body diffuses the music by landline to subscribers, this is a matter for Article 11.

Subsections A and B relate to the public communication of broadcast musical works, so that Article 11bis applies to both subsections. In particular, while Subsection A relates to potentially more limited forms of public communication, it was explicitly intended to cover intentional and direct communication to the public, and in particular to allow business proprietors to communicate broadcasts "for their customers' enjoyment."45

Q.4. In your view, what is the relationship between Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention?

Please see section 2 of the Australian submission, in particular paras 2.11-2.12.

**Does Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement prevail over the exception in Article 11bis(2) with respect to the exclusive rights conferred by Article 11bis(1)(i-iii) of the Berne Convention in the sense that when the three conditions of Article 13 are met, no requirement to pay equitable remuneration arises?**

No. There is no basis for ascribing greater authority to TRIPS Article 13 and for overruling or nullifying the effect of Berne Article 11bis(2), which was adopted upon the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement in parallel with TRIPS Article 13.

**Do the requirements of Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention prevail as a *lex specialis* over the requirements of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, in the sense that if equitable remuneration is paid, there is no need to comply with the three-conditions test under Article 13?**

This interpretation is possible, given that the two provisions appear to overlap and that Article 11bis(2) applies more specifically to the situation at issue (see paragraph 2.12 of Australia's third party submission). However, such an interpretation would only be necessary if it were concluded that there is conflict or contradiction between the two provisions. It is submitted that the test established by Article 11bis(2) could be viewed as a special application of the broader factors under consideration in the Article 13 test: in effect, the requirement for equitable remuneration (as opposed to unlimited or unconditional exercise of the right) provides a safeguard that limitations on the right are in accordance with the general requirements of Article 13.

**Do the requirements of Article 13 and Article 11bis(2) apply on a cumulative basis in the sense that, on the one hand, even if the three-condition test of Article 13 is fulfilled, there is an additional, fourth requirement to pay equitable remuneration, and on the other hand, even if equitable remuneration is paid consistently with Article 11bis(2), it is necessary to comply in addition with the three conditions of Article 13? Please explain.**

The preferred interpretation of the two provisions operating in conjunction should be that:

- both tests need to be fulfilled, independently if necessary; but that, if at all possible;
- Berne 11bis(2) should be seen as defining, in relation to the rights provided under 11bis(1), those limitations or exceptions that would - in the terms of TRIPS 13 - not be an unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holder in this context; that is, that the denial of equitable remuneration would automatically amount to an unreasonable prejudice to those interests in relation to this form of exploitation of the right to public communication of a broadcast musical work.

**Q.5. In your view, to what extent has the Berne Convention become part of customary international law, and, if so, in particular which part of the Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention?**

No direct answer to this question is provided in this response. The rights and obligations currently at issue, including the relevant paragraphs of Berne, are direct treaty obligations, namely Article 9 of the TRIPS, and by reference Article 11bis(iii), Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention and Article 13 of TRIPS.

**Q.6. Has the "minor exceptions" doctrine under the Berne Convention, and especially in the context of Article 11bis(1) and 11(1), acquired the status of customary international law? What is the legal significance of the "minor exceptions" doctrine under the Berne Convention in the**
light of subparagraphs (3)(a-c) or paragraph (4) of Article 31 of the VCLT or in the light of Article 32 of the VCLT? Has the "minor exceptions" doctrine or any other implied exception been incorporated, by virtue of Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, together with Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention into the TRIPS Agreement? Please explain.

This response does not venture a conclusion on whether the minor reservations doctrine is part of customary international law. On the facts of this case, S. 110(5) of the US Copyright Act is unlikely to come within the scope of what was intended to be covered by the minor reservations doctrine. A clear sense of the limited scope of the minor reservations principle is provided by the General Report of the Conference in Brussels thus:

Your Rapporteur-General has been entrusted with making an express mention of the possibility available to national legislation to make what are commonly called minor reservations. The Delegates of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the Delegate of Switzerland and the Delegate of Hungary have all mentioned these limited exemptions allowed for religious ceremonies, military bands and the needs of child and adult education. These exceptional measures apply to Articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14. You will understand that these references are just lightly pencilled in here, in order to avoid damaging the principle of the right.46

This was confirmed at the Stockholm Conference in the following terms:

In the General Report of the Brussels Conference, the Rapporteur was instructed to refer explicitly, in connection with Article 11, to the possibility of what it had been agreed to call 'the minor reservations' of national legislation. Some delegates had referred to the exceptions permitted in respect of religious ceremonies, performances by military bands, and the requirements of education and popularization. The exceptions also apply to articles 11bis, 11ter, 13 and 14. The Rapporteur ended by saying that these allusions were given lightly without invalidating the principle in the right.

It seems that it was not the intention of the Committee to prevent States from maintaining in their national legislation provisions based on the declaration contained in the General Report of the Brussels Conference.47

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3.2 BRAZIL

3.2.1 ORAL STATEMENT AT THE THIRD PARTY HEARING

(9 November 1999)

On behalf of the Government of Brazil I thank you for your attention to this matter. Brazil welcomes the opportunity to participate in this Panel as a third party. What motivates Brazil to intervene in this dispute is essentially a systemic interest on the implications to the interpretation on the scope of exceptions contained in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement). At the same time, our participation stems from concrete interests, since the portion of the market in the United States for Brazilian music has increased substantially over the last few years. Brazilian composers have complained that the US "Fairness in Music Licensing Act" is hurting their legitimate interests in that market.

As argued by the European Communities / Member States (EC/MS) in its first submission, the exemptions for commercial establishments provided by Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act are, in Brazil's view, incompatible with multilateral obligations that stem from the TRIPS Agreement, insofar as this Agreement incorporates articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention for the Protection for the Literary and Artistic Works (1971).

By means of Article 9 (1) of TRIPS, these obligations have become an integral part of WTO rules, being fully subject to the dispute settlement mechanism of the Organization. Article 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention states that "authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing (...) the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of the work". Article 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention provides that "Authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of the performance of their works". Finally, Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention establishes that "it shall be a matter of legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions under which the rights mentioned in the preceeding paragraph may be exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority."

The United States claims that the point in question here is that Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act creates a "minor" exception to the exclusive right over public performance. In this context, the US submission attempts to justify that those exceptions would be covered by Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement on limitations and exceptions to copyrights and related rights. Brazil, however, is of the opinion that this panel should consider Section 110(5) in light of the most specific provisions, which are those covered by Articles 11bis(1)(iii), 11(1)(ii) and 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention. The US submission fails to explain how Section 110 (5) could be compatible with its commitments under those specific provisions.

The submissions by the European Communities and Australia provide some valuable contribution for this panel to understand the conflict between the exceptions to copyrights in the US legislation and the existing provisions under TRIPS and the Berne Convention.

Brazil concurs with the European Communities that the situations covered by Section 110 (5) refer (explicitly, in the case of Subsection (A), or implicitly, in the case of Subsection 7(B)) to "public communication" in the sense of Article 11bis(1)(iii) and Article 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention. Consequently, by denying protection under those provisions, the US is violating its commitments related to TRIPS Article 9 (1).
Most importantly, Brazil endorses the legal argumentation provided by the Australian submission that Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention provides more specific guidance to the panel on the application of Section 110(5). Bearing the burden of proof to invoke the exception, the US fails to explain the consistency (if any) between Section 110(5) and that provision.

Section 110(5) is admittedly a circumstance that is prejudicial to the author's right to obtain equitable remuneration. The denial of that right is recognized in paragraph 29 of the US submission. When the US Copyright Act, as amended by the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act", permits the broadcasting of radio and television music in public places without the payment of a royalty fee, it is actually exempting owners from the application of a mandatory rule whose exceptions are not applicable to this case. Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention, however, defines that "in any circumstances" the conditions to the right of public communication should be prejudicial to the author's right to obtain equitable remuneration. In doing so, the US is violating a mandatory rule on clear prerogatives of right holders.

As noted in the Australian submission, the scope of the exception provided by Section 110(5) is much larger than envisaged in the negotiating history of the Berne Convention. The Brussels Conference of 1948 emphasized the limitations of the concept of "minor reservations" as exceptional measures. Such reservations, later confirmed by the Stockholm Conference of 1967, aimed at situations such as, for instance, religious ceremonies, performances by military bands and the requirements of education and popularization - mostly characterized by their non-commercial nature. Such is not the case of Section 110(5), where establishments that benefit from the "homestyle exemption" are essentially commercial. The size of the establishment or the number of loudspeakers in a limited area, as defined by Section 110(5), does not characterize the nature of the use of the broadcasted work as non-commercial. To the contrary, such use is admittedly aimed at attracting customers and consequently improving the profits of the owners of the establishment.

The EC also notes that Since Section 110(5) entitles 70% of all drinking and eating establishments and 45% of all retail establishments in the US to play music from the radio and TV for the enjoyment of their customers without any limitation of any kind, it is more than reasonable to argue that the normal exploitation of the works is at risk and that the legitimate interests of the right holders can be prejudiced. In its submission, the US were unable to produce statistics that prove that the impact on right holder's revenues of the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act" is negligible. Brazil considers, however, that even if such statistics were available, the task of examining Section 110(5) would still be unrelated to quantitative limitations on the size of the area of the establishments or the number of loudspeakers. Brazil considers that the most important task of this panel is to judge the legitimacy of the exception provided by Section 110(5) in light of its essentially commercial nature.

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1 "Section 110(5) does not affect a copyright owner's right to be compensated for these types of exploitation [i.e., primary performance]. Rather, it affects only secondary uses of broadcasts. Moreover, it does not exempt all secondary performance, but only those in establishments that use homestyle receiving equipment, or meet the square footage and other criteria in the statute."
3.2.2 RESPONSES OF BRAZIL TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL

(17 November 1999)

Q.1 Please give examples of exceptions in the copyright laws of your country or of other countries based on the "minor reservations" doctrine.

In the Brazilian legislation there are a few examples of exceptions in the sense of the "minor reservations" doctrine mentioned in this question. Those are cases where there would be no violation of copyright, such as: (a) the reproduction in the daily or periodical press of news or informative articles, from newspapers or magazines, with a mention of the name of the author, if they are signed, and of the publication from which they have been taken; (b) the reproduction in newspapers or magazines of speeches given at public meetings of any kind; (c) the reproduction of literary, artistic or scientific works for the exclusive use of the visually challenged, provided that the reproduction is done without gainful intent, either in braille or by means of other process using a medium designed for such users; (d) the use of literary, artistic or scientific works, phonograms and radio and television broadcasts in commercial establishments for the sole purpose of demonstration to customers, provided that the said establishments market the materials or equipment that make such use possible.

Q.2 Is the communication to the public contained in broadcasts or played from sound recordings or live subject to exclusive rights or right of remuneration in your legislation, and are the rights in respect of such uses of music exercised by the right holders or by their collective management organizations?

According to the new Brazilian Law on Copyrights and Related Rights (Law 9.610, dated 19 February 1999), authors have the exclusive right to use their literary, artistic and scientific works, to derive benefit from them and to dispose of them. Authors and the owners of related rights may form non-profit-making associations for the exercise and defense of their rights. These associations of authors and of the owners of related rights shall jointly maintain a single central office ("Escritório Nacional de Arrecadação de Direitos - ÉCAD") for the collection and distribution of the royalties generated by the public performance of musical works with or without words and phonograms, including performance by broadcasting and transmissions by any means and by the presentation of audiovisual works. This central office shall not have any profit-making purpose and shall be directed and managed by the associations of which it is composed.
3.3 CANADA

3.3.1 WRITTEN SUBMISSION

(1 November 1999)

This dispute raises important issues of copyright protection, including the role of limited exceptions. Canada remains highly interested in these issues and looks forward to the outcome of the panel's deliberations.
3.4 JAPAN

3.4.1 WRITTEN SUBMISSION

(1 November 1999)

1. The European Communities and their member States claim that Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act is not in conformity with the US' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, particularly with its Article 9(1), under which WTO Members must comply with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention.

2. Japan hereby submits its views on compatibility of Subsection (A) of Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act with the US' obligations stemming from Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.

3. In considering the compatibility, it is necessary to examine relevant provisions of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement.

   (i) Articles 11bis and 11 of the Berne Convention

   As is stated in the "Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971)" published by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1978, it has been agreed that the Berne Convention did not stop member countries from preserving their law on exceptions which come under the heading of "minor reservations" with regard to Articles 11bis and 11 of the Convention. However, to examine the relevant provision of the TRIPS Agreement will be helpful to clarify the meaning of "minor reservations".

   (ii) Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement

   Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement (Limitations and Exceptions) stipulates that WTO members can contain in their legislation limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights, provided that these limitations or exceptions are confined to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder (three-step test).

4. Although relationship between "minor reservations" and Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement is not perfectly clear, there is persuasive authority that three-step test can be used in determining whether particular exception is in the boundary of "minor reservations." For example, Chairman Liedes of the Committee of Experts of WIPO once stated to the effect that all limitations and exceptions which were permissible under the Berne Convention would survive if they were in conformity with Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement (Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions on December 10, 1996). Japan, therefore, considers that if Subsection A of Section 110(5) US Copyright Act covers only certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder, the Subsection in question can be regarded as compatible with Article 13, and thus with Article 9(1), of the TRIPS Agreement.

5. In applying three-step test to the Subsection in question, Japan concurs with the United States on the conclusion that it is in conformity with Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.

6. For the reasons stated, Japan is convinced that Subsection (A) of Section 110(5) US Copyright Act is fully consistent with Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.
3.4.2 RESPONSES BY JAPAN TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS FROM THE PANEL

(19 November 1999)

Q.1 Please give examples of exceptions in the copyright laws of your country or of other countries based on the "minor reservations" doctrine.

In general, various conditions are complicatedly combined in provisions for limitations of and exceptions to copyright, and how copyrighted works are used under such provisions considerably differs from nation to nation. This makes it difficult to determine applicability of "minor reservations" doctrine to the related provisions of each domestic law and requires careful consideration thereupon.

Under these circumstances, Japan has so far examined only Subsection A of Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act which is under discussion in this Panel, and has no further adequate examples to present.

Q.2 Is the communication to the public of music contained in broadcasts or played from sound recordings or live subject to exclusive rights or right of remuneration in your legislation, and are the rights in respect of such uses of music exercised by the right holders or by their collective management organizations?

In Copyright Law of Japan, such uses of music are subject to exclusive rights, and such rights are exercised either by the right holders or by their collective management organizations. The latter generally exercise such rights as trustees of the former under trust agreements.
3.5 SWITZERLAND

3.5.1 ORAL STATEMENT AT THE THIRD PARTY HEARING

(9 November 1999)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The complaint brought by the European Communities and their member States against the United States of America is based on the consideration that certain aspects of the US legislation relating to the protection of copyrighted works are incompatible with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). The provision which is the subject matter of contention is Section 110(5) of Title 17 of the US Copyright Act, as amended by the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998". The contended provisions allow for the so-called "homestyle exemption", lately extended to use in wider public places without the authorization of the copyright owner, an exception sometimes also referred to as the "business exemption". Both types of exemptions are summarized in the first submission made by the European Communities and their member States on 5 October 1999 in a very comprehensive manner. Instead of citing the contended provisions, I refer to the summary made by the European Communities and their Member States to avoid repetition. Under the Sections of the US Copyright Act subject matter of this panel procedure, the copyright owner cannot exercise his exclusive right of public communication of broadcast works in the case of establishments which are open to the public and play radio or TV on their premises for the enjoyment of their customers in accordance with certain conditions set out by the Law. In other words, if these conditions are met, the rightholder cannot claim royalty fees.

2. Switzerland has notified under Article 10(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) its interests in the matter before the panel requested by the European Communities and their member States as established on 26 May 1999. Switzerland holds the view that the above-mentioned measures are in violation of US's obligations under Article 9(1) of WTO TRIPS Agreement in conjunction with Articles 11(1) and 11bis of the Berne Convention and cannot be justified under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement. Switzerland takes great interest in this case, not only desiring to safeguard the claims of Swiss rightholders of musical works to obtain equitable remuneration for the communication of their works to the public in the important US market, but also to ensure that the TRIPS provisions, and by reference and incorporation also the relevant provisions of the Berne Convention, are construed and implemented in national laws consistently with the international obligations as agreed in the multilateral framework of WTO.

II. GENERAL REMARKS ON THE CASE BEFORE THE PANEL AND ON THE SUBMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBER STATES

3. Switzerland concurs with the content of the comprehensive submission made by the European Communities and their member States regarding the historical background, case law developments, legal and economic analysis regarding Section 110(5) A and B of the US Copyright Act.

4. The WTO Members agreed in the negotiations of the Uruguay Round to incorporate the Berne Convention (Articles 1 to 21) into the TRIPS Agreement by way of reference. Therefore, protection must be provided in accordance with the Berne Convention, unless the TRIPS Agreement provides explicitly for a different level of protection. The whole TRIPS Agreement has been, and is, commonly referred to as a "major advance" in the field of intellectual property law at the international level. The Berne Convention - compared to other international treaties in the field of copyright - was deemed at that time to be the international treaty which offered a relatively satisfactory level of protection. The only "Berne Minus" provision in the TRIPS Agreement is Article 9.1, sentence 2, which excludes expressis verbis Article 6bis (moral rights) of the Berne
Convention. All other TRIPS provisions on Copyright were introduced in the Agreement for purposes of clarification or improving the corresponding provisions of the Berne Convention, not of diminishing the level of protection.

III. ARTICLE 13 TRIPS; RELATIONSHIP WITH ARTICLES 9(2) AND 11BIS BERNE CONVENTION

5. Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement has to be understood as a Berne-plus element. It contains safe-guard-rails for all kind of limitations and exceptions by extending the three-steps impairment test of Article 9(2) Berne Convention from the reproduction right to all the exclusive rights covered by Section 1 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement. Consequently, Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement limits also the scope of "minor reservations" with regard to Articles 11bis and 11 of the Berne Convention. This is also confirmed by the fact that the WIPO Copyright Treaty explicitly clarifies that the three-step-test applies to all limitations and exceptions of the Berne Convention and those under WCT. Therefore in the case submitted to the panel, exceptions are only permitted:

- in certain special cases,
- if there is no conflict with the normal exploitation, and
- if there is no unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holder.

Referring to the detailed and in-depth analysis of the three-step-test by Australia, the Swiss delegation submits that none of the steps of the impairment test are fulfilled.

6. Furthermore, limitations and exceptions concerning Article 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention have to be consistent with Article 11bis(2) of the Convention. It stipulates that conditions regarding the exercise of the broadcasting and related rights "shall not be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration...". To be consistent with the protection guaranteed by Article 9 (1) TRIPS Agreement containing explicitly only one Berne-minus-element in respect of Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement cannot allow limitations of Article 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention going beyond the limits fixed in Article 11bis(2).

7. In other words, limitations as in the case submitted to the panel are prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the right holders, because they do not respect the authors' right to obtain equitable remuneration.

IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

8. As far as Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement (Objectives) is concerned, it would be useful to remind that this provision is a "lex generalis", Article 13 TRIPS being a "lex specialis". Careful balance is already struck in the latter provision. One should first analyze whether the conditions set out by this Article are fulfilled or not. If they are not, it seems that there would be no need to refer to Article 7 TRIPS.

9. Furthermore, Switzerland wishes to point out that, after ratification of the WTO Agreement (and the TRIPS Agreement), the "homestyle exemption", which had previously posed problems, should not have been further extended in such an unjustifiable way as through Section 110(5) and the so-called "business exemption".
V. CONCLUDING REMARK

10. Switzerland concurs with the position of the European Communities and their member States and supports the pertinent arguments put forward by Australia.
Q.1 Please give examples of exceptions in the copyright laws of your country or of other countries based on the "minor reservations" doctrine.

Art. 22 Par. 1 of the Swiss Copyright Law (CRL\textsuperscript{1}) provides an exception with regard to cable distribution and to communication to the public of broadcast works. These limitations comply with Art. 11\textit{bis}(2) of the Berne Convention (BC) in the sense that they do not abolish or diminish the right of the author to obtain equitable remuneration for the exploitation of his work.

Q.2 Is the communication to the public of music contained in broadcasts or played from sound recordings or live subject to exclusive rights or right of remuneration in your legislation, and are the rights in respect of such uses of music exercised by the right holders or by their collective management organizations?

According to Art. 22 Par. 1 CRL, the right of communication to the public of broadcast works (all categories of works, not only musical works) is an exclusive right, but it is subject to compulsory collective management by collecting societies. It should be underlined that this legal construction is not a legal licence.

The right of communication to the public of music played from sound recordings or live is an exclusive right as well and is also exercised by the collecting societies. For works other than musical works, this right of communication is exercised individually by the author.

The collecting societies collect the copyright remuneration based on tariffs, which have to be approved by the Federal Arbitration Board for the Exploitation of Authors' Rights and Neighbouring Rights.

Q.3 Please explain which individual exclusive rights under which specific provisions of Articles 11(1) and 11\textit{bis}(1) of the Berne Convention are affected to what extent by which specific provision of Subsection (A) and/or (B) of Section 110(5)?

Subsection (A) and (B) of Section 110(5) both affect the exclusive right of public communication of broadcast works as provided by Art. 11\textit{bis}(1)(iii) BC because both provisions do not comply with the conditions under which Art. 11\textit{bis}(2) BC allows exceptions to the exclusive right of public communication of broadcast works.

Q.4 In your view, what is the relationship between Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement and Article 11\textit{bis}(2) of the Berne Convention? Does Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement prevail over the exception in Article 11\textit{bis}(2) with respect to the exclusive rights conferred by Article 11\textit{bis}(1)(i-iii) of the Berne Convention in the sense that when the three conditions of Article 13 are met, no requirement to pay equitable remuneration arises? Do the requirements of

\textsuperscript{1} Text of Art. 22 CRL (Translation by the International Bureau of WIPO):

The right to make broadcast works perceivable simultaneously and unaltered or to rebroadcast them within the framework of the rebroadcast of a transmitted program may only be asserted through the approved collecting societies.

The rebroadcasting of works over technical installations that are intended to serve a small number of receivers, such as installations in houses with more than one occupier or in a private building, shall be permitted.

This Article shall not apply to the rebroadcasting of subscription television programs or of programs that cannot be received in Switzerland.
Article 11bis(2) of the Berne Convention prevail as a *lex specialis* over the requirements of Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, in the sense that if equitable remuneration is paid, there is no need to comply with the three-conditions test under Article 13? Do the requirements of Article 13 and Article 11bis(2) apply on a cumulative basis in the sense that, on the one hand, even if the three-condition test of Article 13 is fulfilled, there is an additional, fourth requirement to pay equitable remuneration, and on the other hand, even if equitable remuneration is paid consistently with Article 11bis(2), is it necessary to comply in addition with the three conditions of Article 13? Please explain.

Switzerland is of the opinion that Art. 13 TRIPS and Art. 11 *bis*(2) BC apply on a cumulative basis in the sense that Art. 13 TRIPS makes the limitations that were acceptable under Art. 11bis(2) BC even narrower. When a remuneration is paid, it can usually be admitted that the third condition of the "3 steps-test" is fulfilled (it does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder). Nevertheless one of the two remaining conditions of the "3 steps-test" could not be fulfilled, in particular the first one providing that the limitations should be confined to "certain special cases".

**Q.5** In your view, to what extent has the Berne Convention become part of customary international law, and if so, in particular which part of the Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention?

We think the question whether the Berne Convention has become customary international law is irrelevant because Art. 1-21 of this Convention have been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement and, as such, make fully part of the Agreement and are applicable between the Parties to the Agreement (Art. 9 Par. 1 TRIPS).

**Q.6** Has the “minor exceptions” doctrine under the Berne Convention, and especially in the context of Articles 11bis(1) and 11(1) of the Berne Convention, acquired the status of customary international law? What is the legal significance of the “minor exceptions” doctrine under the Berne Convention in the light of subparagraphs (3)(a-c) or paragraph (4) of Article 31 of the VCLT or in the light of Article 32 of the VCLT? Has the “minor exceptions” doctrine or any other implied exceptions been incorporated, by virtue of Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, together with Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention into the TRIPS Agreement? Please explain.

Neither the legal status nor the scope of the "minor exceptions doctrine" are very clear. In the past, this doctrine has served - in the context of the successive revisions of the BC - to justify the maintaining of exceptions that already existed in national laws and that might have been problematic with regard to the improvements of the level of protection. Those "minor exceptions" are usually exceptions justified by a public interest and they are limited to very specific cases, reflecting national particularisms. However the "minor exceptions doctrine" cannot be based upon in order to justify the introduction of new exceptions which do not comply with Art. 11 *bis*(2) BC and 13 TRIPS.

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2 Except Art. 6bis BC.
4.1 LETTER FROM THE CHAIR OF THE PANEL TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF WIPO

(15 November 1999)

At its meeting on 26 May 1999, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel pursuant to the request by the European Communities and its member States (please see the attached document WT/DS160/5), in accordance with Article 6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. On 6 August 1999, a Panel was composed to examine this complaint (please see the attached document WT/DS160/6).

The EC complaint relates to Section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act, as amended by the "Fairness in Music Licensing Act" enacted on 27 October 1998, which exempts, under certain conditions, the communication or transmission embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes (subparagraph A) and, also under certain conditions, communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a performance or display of a non-dramatic musical work intended to be received by the general public (subparagraph B) from obtaining an authorization to do so by the respective right holder. The EC claims that Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act appears to be inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, including, but not limited to, Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.

The Parties to the dispute refer to the provisions of the Paris Act 1971 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the substantive provisions of which (with the exception of Article 6 bis on moral rights and the rights derived therefrom) have been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement by Article 9.1. These provisions include, in particular, Articles 11 and 11bis, as well as the limitations applicable thereto. Given that the International Bureau of WIPO is responsible for the administration of that Convention, the Panel would appreciate any factual information available to the International Bureau on the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) relevant to the matter, in particular the negotiating history and subsequent developments and practice concerning those provisions referred to by the Parties to the dispute.

The Parties have also referred to the so-called "minor reservations" doctrine (in particular in relation to Articles 11 and 11bis). The Panel would be interested in any factual information relevant to the status of this doctrine within the Berne Convention as reflected in the materials of Diplomatic Conferences as well as any other documentation relating to the Berne Union or work under the auspices of WIPO on copyright matters, as well as the state practice of the Berne Union members in this regard.

Furthermore, the Parties have referred to Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, which uses much of the language of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971). Even though the latter provision applies to the reproduction right, which is not at issue in this dispute, given the similarity of the language used in the two provisions, the Panel would appreciate any background information on the negotiating history of Article 9(2) and subsequent developments and practice concerning the provision.

It would facilitate the work of the Panel if such factual information could be made available by Wednesday 24 November 1999.
4.2 LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF WIPO  
TO THE CHAIR OF THE PANEL  

(22 December 1999)

I have the honour to refer to your letter of November 15, 1999, relating to an ongoing dispute which is being dealt with by a panel under the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Please find attached a Note and Annexes, prepared by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in response to your questions. As indicated in paragraphs 18, 20 and 23 of the Note, the International Bureau of WIPO is prepared to furnish additional information, at your request.
NOTE

on Certain Questions Regarding the Berne Convention
raised by the World Trade Organization

1. This Note contains the observations of the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in response to a request made by H.E. Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda, Chair, Panel on United States - Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, World Trade Organization (WTO), in a letter of November 15, 1999, addressed to Dr. Kamil Idris, Director General of WIPO.

2. The requested information, related to the dispute in the above-mentioned Panel under the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, is the following:

(1) regarding Articles 11 and 11bis of the Berne Convention, as well as the limitations applicable thereon: "any factual information available to the International Bureau on the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) relevant to the matter, in particular the negotiating history and subsequent developments and practice concerning those provisions referred to by the Parties to the dispute;"

(2) regarding the so-called "minor reservations" doctrine (in particular in relation to Articles 11 and 11bis): "any factual information relevant to the status of this doctrine within the Berne Convention as reflected in the materials of Diplomatic Conferences as well as any other documentation relating to the Berne Union members in this regard;"

(3) regarding Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, given the similarity of the language used in that provision and in Article 13 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement): "any background information on the negotiation history of Article 9(2) and subsequent developments and practice concerning the provision."

Question 1: Articles 11 and 11bis and the limitations applicable thereon

3. The origin of Article 11 of the Berne Convention (1971) is, as regards non-dramatic musical works, Article 9(3) of the Berne Convention (1886) which granted national treatment to authors of such unpublished works—and published works if a prohibition of performance was indicated on the title page. The Draft Convention, adopted at a conference organized by the International Literary Association in Berne in 1883, contained the following provision:

"Article 5: Authors who are nationals of one of the Contracting States shall, in all the other States of the Union, enjoy the exclusive right of translation throughout the duration of the rights in their original works.
"That right shall include the rights of publication or performance."\(^1\)\(^2\)

4. The Program proposed by the Swiss Federal Council for the International Conference for the Protection of Authors' Rights which was held from September 8 to 19, 1884, in Berne, contained in its Article 7 an identical provision, apart from an added alternative proposal regarding the right of translation.\(^3\) Discussions of that proposal have been identified in the minutes of the Third Meeting of the Conference, where the Conference discussed a questionnaire of the German Delegation. An excerpt is attached to this Note as Annex I.\(^4\) The Records of the Conference do not contain minutes or other records of the work of the Committee to which references are made in the text in Annex I, other than the report from that Committee which was presented at the fifth Meeting of the Conference. In the Committee's proposal, the reference to performance in Article 7 of the program had been taken out of the context of translation and placed separately in the draft Article 11. The relevant part of the Minutes of that meeting, dealing with that Article and with draft Article 2, to which reference is made in draft Article 11, are attached to this Note as Annex II.\(^5\) (The reservation made by a Delegate in relation to draft Article 6 is not included, as it relates only to the question of formalities for protection.)

5. At the Second International Conference for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, in Berne, from September 7 to 18, 1885, discussions were based on the draft prepared by the 1884 Conference.\(^6\) The opening discussion at the Conference of Articles 2 and 11 is attached to this Note as Annex III.\(^7\) Excerpts of the Report of the Committee of the Conference as regards these Articles (Article 11 of the 1884 draft was renumbered to become Article 9 in the Committee's proposal) and as regards the Recommended Principles for Subsequent Unification are attached to this Note as Annex IV.\(^8\) The Conference adopted Articles 2 and 9 without discussion, as proposed by the Committee.\(^9\)

6. The Records of the Third International Conference for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, in Berne, from September 6 to 9, 1886, reflect that the Conference discussed a declaration from France regarding, inter alia, Article 9 of the Convention. An excerpt of the minutes of the Conference rendering the declaration and the discussion is attached to this Note as Annex V.\(^10\)

7. The official Records of the Berne Conferences do not contain indexes, and the preceding selection of negotiation history is based on a review of the records. As regards the following Conferences, the selections are partly based on the indexes of the official Records, partly on a review of the Records. As regards the 1967 Stockholm Conference, the selection is solely based on the indexes.

8. The Diplomatic Conference in Paris, from April 15 to May 4, 1896, adopted the Paris Additional Act and Interpretative Declaration, 1896. That Act and Declaration did not amend Article 9 of the Berne Act, but it amended Article 2, to which Article 9 refers, and it discussed certain amendments of Article 9 which were not adopted, and a proposal for a new Article 4bis which would have ruled out non-voluntary licenses for public performances. Annex VI to this Note contains

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\(^1\) The English translations used in the following, except for the Records of the 1967 Stockholm Conference which were published in English, are WIPO translations from: "1886—Berne Convention Centenary—1986," WIPO Publication No. 877 (E), in the following referred to as "Berne Centenary"

\(^2\) Berne Centenary, pp. 83f.

\(^3\) Berne Centenary, p. 85.

\(^4\) Source: Berne Centenary, p. 91.

\(^5\) Source: Berne Centenary, pp. 94f and 100.

\(^6\) Rule 2, Rules of Procedure, Berne Centenary, p. 110.

\(^7\) Source: Berne Centenary, pp. 111, 113 and 116.

\(^8\) Source: Berne Centenary, pp. 118f, 121 and 125.

\(^9\) Berne Centenary, p. 127.

\(^10\) Source: Berne Centenary, p. 132.
excerpts of the Report on the work of the Committee of the Diplomatic Conference, prepared by Mr. Louis Renault, dealing with those Articles and proposal.\textsuperscript{11} Annex VII to this Note contains the following excerpts of the Records of the Conference relevant to the proposed amendments of Article 9 and the proposed new Article 4\textsuperscript{bis}:\textsuperscript{12}

1. proposals made by the French authorities and the International Bureau, regarding Articles 5 and 9;\textsuperscript{13}

2. wishes (vœux) expressed by various congresses and meetings since the adoption of the Convention;\textsuperscript{14}

3. the proposal for a new Article 4\textsuperscript{bis} made by the Delegate of Germany;\textsuperscript{15}

4. summary minutes of the general discussion, regarding Article 9;\textsuperscript{16}

5. analytic table of the proposals, made at the Conference, regarding Article 9;\textsuperscript{17}

6. discussion and adaptation of the wishes of the Conference.\textsuperscript{18}

9. The Berlin Act of the Convention, adopted at a Diplomatic Conference from October 14 to November 14, 1908, included a partial renumbering of the Articles, whereby the previous Article 9 became Article 11, in which paragraphs (1) and (3) related to performance of musical works. Those paragraphs had the following wording:

"(1) The provisions of this Convention shall apply to the public performance of dramatic or dramatico-musical works, and of musical works, whether such works are published or not.

"(3) In order to enjoy the protection of this Article, authors shall not be bound in publishing their works to forbid the public performance thereof."

10. Annex VIII to this Note contains excerpts from the General Report Presented to the Conference on Behalf of its Committee by Mr. Louis Renault dealing with this Article.\textsuperscript{19} Annex IX to this Note contains the following excerpts from the Records of the Conference relevant to Article 11 of the 1908 Berlin Act of the Convention:

1. proposal by the Government of Germany and the International Bureau, with notes\textsuperscript{20} and Annex regarding the "vœux" expressed by the 1896 Paris Conference;\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{11} Source: Berne Centenary, pp. 136ff, 140, and 142.
\textsuperscript{12} Excerpts of the Records regarding the discussions on Article 2 are not included here, but can be provided at request.
\textsuperscript{13} Source: Actes de la conférence réunie à Paris du 15 avril au 4 mai 1896 (in the following referred to as "Actes 1896"), pp. 39f and 42f.
\textsuperscript{14} Source: Actes 1896, pp. 60ff.
\textsuperscript{15} Source: Actes 1896, p. 114.
\textsuperscript{16} Source: Actes 1896, p. 116.
\textsuperscript{17} Source: Actes 1896, p. 124.
\textsuperscript{18} Source: Actes 1896, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{19} Source: Berne Centenary, pp. 154f.
\textsuperscript{20} Source: Actes de la conference réunie à Berlin du 14 octobre au 14 novembre 1908 (in the following referred to as "Actes 1908"), p. 46.
\textsuperscript{21} Source: Actes 1908, p. 53.
(2) wishes (vœux) expressed by various congresses and meetings since the adoption of the 1896 Act of the Convention;\textsuperscript{22}

(3) excerpts of the Minutes of the Conference regarding a presentation of the proposal of the Government of Germany, made by Professor, Dr. Osterrieth;\textsuperscript{23}

(4) excerpts of the Minutes of the Conference regarding an oral proposal by the Delegation of Switzerland;\textsuperscript{24}

(5) excerpts of the Minutes of the Conference containing an observation by the Delegation of Great Britain in connection with the adoption of Article 11, as proposed by the Commission.\textsuperscript{25}

11. The 1914 Additional Protocol to the Convention was signed in Berne without a conference of revision. It did not amend Article 11 of the Convention.

12. The Rome Act of the Convention, adopted at a Diplomatic Conference from May 7 to June 2, 1928, did not amend Article 11, but it added Article 11\textit{bis}, dealing with the right of broadcasting, which had the following wording:

"(1) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the communication of their works to the public by radio-diffusion.

"(2) The legislations of the countries of the Union shall determine the conditions under which the right mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be exercised, but the effect of those conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed. This shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain an equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by the competent authority."

13. Annex X to this Note contains the Report of the Sub-committee on Broadcasting\textsuperscript{26} and excerpts of the General Report of the Drafting Committee (Rapporteur Mr. Edoardo Piola Caselli) relating to Article 11\textit{bis}\textsuperscript{27}. Annex XI to this Note contains the following excerpts from the Records of the Conference relevant to Article 11\textit{bis} of the 1928 Rome Act of the Convention:

(1) excerpts from the Program of the Conference, containing the proposal of the Government of Italy and the International Bureau, regarding Articles 11 (for which no amendment was proposed) and 11\textit{bis};\textsuperscript{28}

(2) observations of the Government of Germany.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{22} Source: Actes 1908, pp. 88f.
\textsuperscript{23} Source: Actes 1908, pp. 162 and 167.
\textsuperscript{24} Source: Actes 1908, p. 180.
\textsuperscript{25} Source: Actes 1908, p. 216.
\textsuperscript{26} Source: Berne Centenary, p. 165.
\textsuperscript{27} Source: Berne Centenary, pp. 173f.
\textsuperscript{28} Source: Actes de la conférence réunie à Rome du 7 mai au 2 juin 1928 (in the following referred to as "Actes 1928"), pp. 75 and 76f.
\textsuperscript{29} Source: Actes 1928, p. 88.
(3) proposed Article 11bis of the Government of Austria; 30

(4) proposal for amendment of Article 11 of the Government of Great Britain; 31

(5) proposed Article 11bis of the Government of France; 32

(6) proposal for amendment of Article 11bis of the Government of Hungary; 33

(7) general observations and observations regarding Articles 11 and 11bis of the Government of the Netherlands; 34

(8) proposal for amendment of Article 11bis of the Government of Norway; 35

(9) observations of the Government of Sweden; 36

(10) excerpts of the summary of the proposals and the discussion, prepared by the Berne Bureau, relating to Articles 11 and 11bis; 37

(11) excerpts of the Minutes of the Conference regarding discussion and adoption of Articles 11 and 11bis. 38

14. The Brussels Act of the Convention, adopted at a Diplomatic Conference from June 5 to 26, 1948, amended Article 11 in which paragraphs (1) and (3) related to performance of musical works. Those paragraphs had the following wording:

"(1) Authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical and musical works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing: (i) the public performance of their works; (ii) any communication to the public of the performance of their works. The application of the provisions of Articles 11bis and 13 is, however, reserved.

"(3) In order to enjoy the protection of this Article, authors shall not be bound, when publishing their works, to forbid the public performance thereof."

The Brussels Act also amended Article 11bis of the Convention. Paragraphs (1) and (2) which relate to the right of broadcasting, were given the following wording:

"(1) Authors of literary and artistic works shall have the exclusive right of authorizing: (i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the public by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images; (ii) any communication to the public, by wire or by rebroadcasting of the broadcast of the work, when this communication is made by an

30 Source: Actes 1928, p. 89.
31 Source: Actes 1928, p. 93.
32 Source: Actes 1928, p. 100.
33 Source: Actes 1928, p. 105.
34 Source: Actes 1928, p. 105.
36 Source: Actes 1928, pp. 111f.
37 Source: Actes 1928, pp. 123f.
38 Source: Actes 1928, pp. 254ff.
organization other than the original one; (iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images, the broadcast of the work.

"(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions under which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority."

15. Annex XII to this Note contains:

(1) excerpts from the General Report on the Work of the Brussels Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention, presented by Mr. Marcel Plaisant, Rapporteur-General, relating to Articles 11 and 11bis, and discussing in this connection also the so-called "minor reserves"; 39

(2) Report by the Sub-Committee on Broadcasting and Mechanical Instruments; 40

(3) Report by the Sub-Committee on Articles 11 and 11ter. 41

Annex XIII to this Note contains the following excerpts from the Records of the Conference relevant to Articles 11 and 11bis of the 1948 Brussels Act of the Convention, including the discussions regarding the so-called "minor reserves":

(1) excerpts from the Minutes of the Conference containing statements made at the adoption of Articles 11 and 11bis; 42

(2) excerpts from the Records of the Conference, containing, under A, the proposals of the Government of Belgium and the Berne Bureau, under B, proposals, counter-proposals and observations made by Governments of countries, member of the Berne Union, and, under C, summary of the discussions and the outcome of the Conference, relating to Articles 11, including the so-called "minor reserves," and Article 11bis of the Convention; 43

(3) wishes (vœux) expressed by various congresses and meetings between 1927 and 1935, relating to the right of public performance and the right of broadcasting; 44

(4) wishes expressed by various congresses and meetings between 1936 and 1948; 45

(5) Memorandum of "l'Organisation internationale de radiodiffusion". 46

39 Source: Berne Centenary, p. 181.
40 Source: Berne Centenary, pp. 185ff.
41 Source: Berne Centenary, p. 191.
42 Source: Documents de la conférence réunie à Bruxelles du 5 au 26 juin 1948 (in the following referred to as "Documents 1948"), p. 82.
43 Source: Documents 1948, pp. 252 to 304.
44 Source: Documents 1948, pp. 448 to 454.
45 Source: Documents 1948, pp. 492f.
46 Source: Documents 1948, pp. 522 to 527.
16. The Stockholm Act of the Convention, adopted at the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 1967, adopted Articles 11 and 11bis in the same wording as that which appears in the Paris Act (1971). Annex XIV to this Note contains the following excerpts from the Records of that Conference (references relating solely to Article 11bis(3) have been omitted):

(1) excerpts from Proposals for Revision of the Substantive Copyright Provisions (Articles 1 to 20), Proposal by the Government of Sweden with the Assistance of BIRPI (the Basic Proposal), relating to Articles 11 and 11bis;\(^\text{47}\)

(2) comments from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning Article 11 of the Basic Proposal;\(^\text{48}\)

(3) comments from the Government of Israel concerning Article 11 and 11bis of the Basic Proposal;\(^\text{49}\)

(4) comments from the Government of Portugal concerning Article 11 of the Basic Proposal;\(^\text{50}\)

(5) comments from the Government of the United Kingdom concerning Article 11bis of the Basic Proposal;\(^\text{51}\)

(6) comments from the Government of Switzerland concerning Article 11ter of the Basic Proposal, containing a reference to Article 11;\(^\text{52}\)

(7) excerpts of summary of observations of governments, prepared by the BIRPI Bureau, as regards Articles 11 and 11bis;\(^\text{53}\)

(8) proposal from the Government of Greece concerning Article 11(1);\(^\text{54}\)

(9) comments from the Government of India concerning Article 11bis of the Basic Proposal;\(^\text{55}\)

(10) proposal regarding the regime of cinematographische works, submitted by the Working Group of Main Committee I to Main Committee I;\(^\text{56}\)

(11) proposals from the Government of Brazil concerning Article 11bis of the Basic Proposal;\(^\text{57}\)

(12) proposals from the Secretariat to the Drafting Committee, concerning Articles 11 and 11bis;\(^\text{58}\)

\(^{47}\) Source: Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 1967 (in the following referred to as "Records 1967"), pp. 120 to 122.

\(^{48}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 618.

\(^{49}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 622.

\(^{50}\) Source: Records 1967, pp. 627f.

\(^{51}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 630.

\(^{52}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 664.

\(^{53}\) Source: Records 1967, pp. 670f.

\(^{54}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 689.

\(^{55}\) Source: Records 1967, pp. 690f.

\(^{56}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 710.

\(^{57}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 715.

\(^{58}\) Source: Records 1967, pp. 721f.
(13) Report of the Drafting Committee to Main Committee I;  

(14) Additional Report of the Drafting Committee to Main Committee I;  

(15) Draft Report of the Rapporteur of Main Committee II to the Committee with addendum, revision and a correction of the revision, relating to preferential rules for developing countries, and Draft Report (final version);  

(16) excerpts from the Report of the Work of Main Committee I (Rapporteur Svante Bergström) relating to Articles 11 and 11bis, including the general Introduction, and excerpts from the Records showing the corrections made in the Draft Report of the Committee;  

(17) excerpts of the Summary Minutes of Main Committee I;  

(18) excerpts of the Summary Minutes of the Plenary of the Berne Union.  

17. The Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention which took place in Paris from July 5 to 24, 1971, did not amend the Articles discussed above, and the Records of that Conference have therefore not been analyzed for this Note. Such an analysis can be provided if requested.  

18. The request made by H.E. Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda regarding Articles 11 and 11bis of the Berne Convention, as well as the limitations applicable thereon, concerns also other "factual information available to the International Bureau," and "subsequent developments and practice concerning those provisions referred to by the Parties to the dispute." This request covers a vast amount of material which is not available in a systematic and detailed indexed form. Any selection of material considered relevant for the dispute will invariably imply risks of interpretations of the material which would be incompatible with the neutral status of WIPO in relation to the dispute. In order to fulfill the request neutrally, it would be necessary to carry through a complete review of major parts of the copyright and related rights activities of WIPO during the period of so-called

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60 Source: Records 1967, p. 735.  
61 Source: Records 1967, pp. 735 to 739 and 760 to 762.  
62 Source: Records 1967, pp. 1131 to 1134, 1146, 1165 to 1168 and 1181f.  
63 Source: Records 1967, pp. 739, 740, 742f and 744.  
64 Source: Records 1967, pp. 851f (in the context of discussions regarding the right of reproduction, reference to Article 11bis(2) is made in paragraph 653.2), 856 (in the context of discussions regarding the right of reproduction, reference to Article 11 is made in paragraph 711.4), 865f (in the context of discussions regarding cinematographic works), 883 to 885 (in the context of discussions regarding the right of reproduction, reference to Article 11(3) is made in paragraph 1069.1 and to Article 11bis in paragraph 1063.1), 893, 902, 902 to 904, 904 to 905 (in the context of discussions regarding the right of public recitation, reference to Article 11 is made in paragraphs 1323.3, 1332, 1335 and 1336), 916 to 917 (in the context of discussions regarding reproduction of lectures, addresses and similar works, references to Article 11bis are made in paragraphs 1498.2, 1499.3 to 1500 and 1501.2), 921f (in the context of discussions on exceptions to translation rights, references to Article 11bis are made in paragraphs 1565.3 to 1567.3), 923 to 924 (in the context of discussions regarding the principle of equivalent protection in regard to the right of translation, reference to Article 11 is made in paragraph 1607), 926f (in the context of discussions regarding exceptions to the exclusive right of translation, references to Article 11bis is made in paragraphs 1652.1 to 1652.2, 1653.2 and 1658.1 to 1658.2), 928, 930 (in the context of the adoption of the Report of the Work of Main Committee I, reference to Article 11 is made in paragraph 1749), 936f (in the context of the adoption of the adoption of the Report of Main Committee I).  
"guided development" from 1967 to 1991 and a general review of the implementation of the treaty provisions in all national laws of Berne Union Member States. Such research would take a long time, and it has therefore not been undertaken. The International Bureau is, however, prepared to furnish any non-confidential material in its possession which is specified in such a way that it can be identified without the need for the International Bureau to make any interpretations of the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention.

Question 2: The so-called "minor reservations" doctrine

19. The discussions regarding the so-called "minor reservations" doctrine apparently all took place in the context of the discussions regarding Article 11 of the Berne Convention. As regards this question reference can therefore be made to the materials referred to under Question 1.

20. The request made by H.E. Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda regarding the "minor reservations" doctrine pertains to "any factual information relevant to the status of this doctrine within the Berne Convention as reflected in the materials of Diplomatic Conferences as well as any other documentation relating to the Berne Union members in this regard." As regards material other than what is referred to in the preceding paragraph, reference is made to the remarks made in paragraph 18, above.

Question 3: Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention

21. Article 9 of the Paris Act of the Berne Convention, granting the right of reproduction and regulating exceptions and limitations to that right was introduced at the Stockholm Conference. Annex XV to this Note contains the following excerpts from the Records of that Conference:

(1) excerpts from Proposals for Revision of the Substantive Copyright Provisions (Articles 1 to 20), Proposal by the Government of Sweden with the Assistance of BIRPI (the Basic Proposal);\(^{67}\)

(2) comments from the Government of Austria to the Basic Proposal;\(^{68}\)

(3) comments from the Government of Belgium to the Basic Proposal;\(^{69}\)

(4) comments from the Government of Czechoslovakia to the Basic Proposal;\(^{70}\)

(5) comments from the Government of Denmark to the Basic Proposal;\(^{71}\)

(6) comments from the Government of France to the Basic Proposal;\(^{72}\)

(7) comments from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Basic Proposal;\(^{73}\)

(8) comments from the Government of Ireland to the Basic Proposal;\(^{74}\)

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\(^{67}\) Source: Records 1967, pp. 111 to 116.

\(^{68}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 611.

\(^{69}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 612.

\(^{70}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 613.

\(^{71}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 615.

\(^{72}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 615.

\(^{73}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 615.

\(^{74}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 618.
(9) comments from the Government of Israel to the Basic Proposal;\textsuperscript{75}

(10) comments from the Government of Italy to the Basic Proposal;\textsuperscript{76}

(11) comments from the Government of Japan to the Basic Proposal;\textsuperscript{77}

(12) comments from the Government of Portugal to the Basic Proposal;\textsuperscript{78}

(13) comments from the Government of South Africa to the Basic Proposal;\textsuperscript{79}

(14) comments from the Government of United Kingdom to the Basic Proposal;\textsuperscript{80}

(15) comments from the Government of Luxembourg to the Basic Proposal;\textsuperscript{81}

(16) excerpts of summary of observations of governments, prepared by the BIRPI Bureau, as regards Article 9;\textsuperscript{82}

(17) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of Austria;\textsuperscript{83}

(18) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of the United Kingdom;\textsuperscript{84}

(19) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland;\textsuperscript{85}

(20) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of Greece;\textsuperscript{86}

(21) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of Monaco;\textsuperscript{87}

(22) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany;\textsuperscript{88}

(23) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of France;\textsuperscript{89}

(24) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Governments of Austria, Italy and Morocco;\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{75} Source: Records 1967, p. 620.
\textsuperscript{76} Source: Records 1967, p. 622.
\textsuperscript{77} Source: Records 1967, p. 623.
\textsuperscript{78} Source: Records 1967, p. 624.
\textsuperscript{79} Source: Records 1967, p. 627.
\textsuperscript{80} Source: Records 1967, p. 629.
\textsuperscript{81} Source: Records 1967, p. 630.
\textsuperscript{82} Source: Records 1967, p. 663.
\textsuperscript{83} Source: Records 1967, pp. 669f.
\textsuperscript{84} Source: Records 1967, p. 683.
\textsuperscript{85} Source: Records 1967, p. 687.
\textsuperscript{86} Source: Records 1967, p. 688.
\textsuperscript{87} Source: Records 1967, p. 689.
\textsuperscript{88} Source: Records 1967, p. 690.
\textsuperscript{89} Source: Records 1967, p. 690.
\textsuperscript{90} Source: Records 1967, p. 690.
(25) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of India;\(^{91}\)
(26) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of Rumania;\(^{92}\)
(27) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of Japan;\(^{93}\)
(28) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of the Netherlands;\(^{94}\)
(29) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Government of India;\(^{95}\)
(30) amendment to the Basic Proposal, proposed by the Working Group of Main Committee I;\(^{96}\)
(31) text given to the Drafting Committee;\(^{97}\)
(32) new text prepared for the Drafting Committee by the Secretariat;\(^{98}\)
(33) Report of the Drafting Committee to Main Committee I;\(^{99}\)
(34) final text submitted by the Drafting Committee to Main Committee I;\(^{100}\)
(35) Additional Report of the Drafting Committee to Main Committee I;\(^{101}\)
(36) additional text proposed by the Secretariat to the Drafting Committee;\(^{102}\)
(37) additional text submitted by the Drafting Committee to Main Committee I;\(^{103}\)
(38) excerpts from the Report of the Work of Main Committee I (Rapporteur Svante Bergström) relating to Article 9, including the general introduction,\(^{104}\) and excerpts from the Records showing the corrections made in the Draft Report of the Committee;\(^{105}\)
(39) excerpts of the Summary Minutes of Main Committee I;\(^{106}\)

\(^{91}\) Source: Records 1967, pp. 690f.
\(^{92}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 691.
\(^{93}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 691.
\(^{94}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 691.
\(^{95}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 692.
\(^{96}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 696.
\(^{97}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 709.
\(^{100}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 734.
\(^{101}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 735.
\(^{102}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 757.
\(^{103}\) Source: Records 1967, p. 758.
\(^{104}\) Source: Records 1967, pp. 739, 740, 740f., 742f.
\(^{105}\) Source: Records 1967, pp. 1131 to 1134, 1142 to 1146, 1147 to 1149, 1164f.
\(^{106}\) Source: Records 1967, pp. 837f., 851 to 855, 856 to 860, 860f. (in the context of discussions regarding lawful quotations, reference is made to Article 9 in paragraph 776), 862, 881f. (in the context of discussions regarding protection of official texts, reference is made to Article 9 in paragraph 1031), 883 to 885, 892 (in the context of discussions regarding reproduction of lectures, sermons, etc., reference is made to Article 9 in paragraphs 1145 and 1152.1), 901f. (in the context of discussions regarding the right of translation, reference is made to Article 9 in paragraph 1275), 905 to 907 (in the context of discussions regarding
22. The Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention which took place in Paris from July 5 to 24, 1971, did not amend Article 9, and the Records of that Conference have therefore not been analyzed for this Note. Such an analysis can be provided if requested.

23. The request made by H.E. Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda regarding Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention pertains to "any background information on the negotiation history of Article 9(2) and subsequent developments and practice concerning the provision." As regards material other than what is referred to in the preceding paragraphs, reference is made to the remarks made in paragraph 18, above.

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