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> Reply to open letter by NGOs on Services
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> Pascal
Lamy's speeches
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Dear Mr. Lamy,
The undersigned trade unions and Civil society organizations from around the
world, are appalled by the high ly undemocratic and deceptive process used
to manufacture the draft services ministerial statement, which essentially
brushes aside the concerns of the majority. This process also completely
redefines the “consensus” mode of decision making: rather than having a
consensus before an item is included in a negotiating text, it now appears
that, at least in the case of the Council for Trade in Services, the Chair
can include items from demandeurs that he deems appropriate, even if there
is no agreement amongst the membership, and these can only be removed if
there is complete consensus amongst 148 Member states.
On 13 October, the Chair of the Council for Trade in Services (CTS), Mexican
Ambassador Fernando de Mateo circulated a first “Note by the Chairman” on
“Possible Elements for a Draft Ministerial Text on Services” (JOB(05)/234.
Under “Objectives” to the negotiations, Ambassador Mateo included:
and under “Approaches”
Plurilateral approaches, sectoral — and/or mode-specific
Multilateral approaches (e.g. measure specific)
Numerical targets and indicators.
These elements however do not have the support of the whole membership. In
particular, benchmarks, modal specific approaches or numerical targets to
speed up the GATS negotiations have been intensely rejected by a large
number of developing countries including LDCs. The many statements made by
countries and coalitions in the various CTS meetings prove this. In the CTS,
many delegations therefore requested that these issues be removed or
bracketed, given the lack of consensus. They also pointed out the double
standard: that the section on “Rules”, referring to the emergency safeguard
mechanism (ESM) negotiations, was placed in brackets even though it was
agreed to be negotiated. It was also repeatedly stated that a new paragraph
on Principles should reinforce the current architecture of the GATS.
Despite these objections, the new proposals regarding new approaches again
reappeared — unbracketed — in Ambassador Mateo's second draft elements dated
20 October (JOB(05)/234/Rev.1), and have been further elaborated upon in the
draft Ministerial Text on Services released on 26 October (JOB(05)/262). A
second draft of the text will be released by 3 rd November — the text the
Chair aims to bring to Hong Kong . Whilst the Chair is putting into the text
elements that clearly do not have consensus, elements to be taken out,
according to him, require the complete consensus of members! At the same
time, what has already been agreed upon for negotiations, the ESM, a promise
made since the Uruguay Round as reflected in Article X.1 of the GATS, but
where the developed countries have been dragging their feet — was not
elaborated upon by the Chair in the draft Ministerial text. The draft
Ministerial text also failed to reinforce the current architecture of the
GATS.
There are two issues here that are particularly worrying:
First, having multilateral approaches such as numerical targets and
indicators — essentially compelling countries to open up a specified number
of sectors — will contravene the built-in flexibilities of the GATS and put
developing countries' development objectives and policy space in jeopardy.
Even plurilateral approaches are problematic since these negotiations will
be driven by those with the biggest export capacity. Those who are party to
the negotiations will determine critical issues such as “classification
issues” within the sector, as well as be the players drawing together the
regulatory standards for what is acceptable within such plurilateral
agreements. These standards will be those in harmony with the interests of
the major corporations. Based on past experience with the financial services
and telecoms agreements, there is no guarantee that Members will not be
intensely pressured to join in these plurilateral agreements. Those who may
want to join in later, will find the rules of the sector already
pre-determined, in line with certain corporate interests.
The second issue of concern is that of process. As we questioned the process
in the run up to the Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference whereby the Chair of
the General Council drafted the Ministerial Text on his “own responsibility”
without the consensus of the Membership, we again question the similar
process that is occurring today. This process clearly lacks inclusiveness
and transparency. We must ask you, Mr. Lamy, if Ambassador Mateo's approach
represents a new way of defining and practicing consensus in the WTO? Can
the Chair table draft elements that do not represent consensus and then
require consensus for any amendments to the text?
As Chair of the Trade Negotiating Committee you have indicated that you
might be tabling a draft Ministerial Text by mid November based on the draft
texts received from the Chairs of the various negotiating committees. Will
you present a consolidated draft Ministerial Text based on submissions from
negotiating committees that have been questionably crafted, as we have seen,
for example, in the case of the Chair of the Council for Trade in Services?
We look forward to your clarification on this matter and to ensure that — as
in previous years — a draft Ministerial Text will be presented to Ministers
of WTO Members, which includes within brackets the positions of all Members
on matters where consensus does not exist. Civil society organizations in
WTO Member states will hold you accountable on your responsibility to ensure
that the draft Ministerial Text delivered to Ministers before Hong Kong
reflects the consensus interests and positions of WTO Members and, in
particular, in this Doha Development Round, of develop ing countries.
Failure to do so only makes a mockery of the “multilateral”, “rules-based”
trading system.
Signatories back to top
1. 11.11.11 - Coalition of the Flemish North-South
Movement, Belgium
2. ActionAid International
3. Africa Faith and Justice Network, U.S.
4. Alliance for Democracy, U.S.
5. Arab NGO Network for Development (ANND)
6. Asóciacion Nacional de Empresas Comercializadoras, Mexico
7. ATALC-FoE, Latin America & Caribbean
8. ATTAC France
9. ATTAC Japan
10. ATTAC Norway
11. Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network (AFTINET), Australia
12. Bangladesh Krishok Federation, Bangladesh
13. Begegnungszentrum fuer aktive Gewaltlosigkeit (Center for Encounter and
active Non-Violence), Austria
14. Berne Declaration, Switzerland
15. Both ENDS, The Netherlands
16. BUND - Friends of the Earth, Germany
17. California Coalition for Fair Trade and Human Rights, U.S.
18. Campaign for the Welfare State, Norway
19. Center of Concern, U.S.
20. Centre for International Environment Law (CIEL), U.S.
21. Centro de Investigación y Documentación Chile-América Latina (FDCL),
22. Christian Aid, U.K.
23. Citizens Trade Campaign, U.S.
24. Confederacion Campesina Del Peru
25. Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), South Africa
26. Convergencia de los Pueblos de la Amèricas-COMPA, Repùblica Dominicana
27. Ecumenical Coalition on Tourism, Hong Kong
28. Emergence of Projects, Austria
29. Equipo Pueblo, Mexico
30. FAIR, Italy
31. Focus on the Global South (FOCUS)
32. Foodfirst International Action Network (FIAN), Mexico
33. Friends of the Earth, U.S.
34. Fundacion Neno Zanchetta Lucca, Italy
35. Global Exchange, U.S.
36. Haiti Survie, Haiti
37. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), U.S.
38. Instituto de Estudos Sócioeconômicos (INESC), Brazil
39. International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN)
40. International Jesuit Network for Development
41. International Metalworkers Federation (IMF)
42. International Union of Food, Agriculture, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering,
Tobacco and Allied Workers Associations (IUF)
43. LOKOJ Institute, Bangladesh
44. Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns, U.S.
45. NOAH-Friends of the Earth Denmark
46. Oxfam International
47. Polaris Institute, Canada
48. Public Citizen, U.S.
49. Public Services International (PSI)
50. REDES-FoE, Uruguay
51. Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, India
52. ROBA dell'Altro Mondo, Italy
53. Service Centre for Development Cooperation (KEPA), Finland
54. Southern Africa Contact, Denmark
55. Southern and Eastern African Trade and Information Negotiations
Institute (SEATINI)
56. The Asia Project
57. The Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), The
Netherlands
58. The Council of Canadians, Canada
59. The Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (Red Mexicana de Acción frente
al Libre Comercio-RMALC), Mexico
60. The Oakland Institute, Canada
61. Third World Network (TWN)
62. Tierra Vida (Miembro de Accion internacional CONADES), Peru
63. Tradewatch, Italy
64. U.S. Columban Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation Office, U.S.
65. United Church of Christ, Justice and Witness Ministries
66. War on Want, U.K.
67. World Economy, Ecology & Development (WEED), Germany
68. Women in Development Europe (WIDE)
69. World Development Movement (WDM), U.K.
70. World Forun of Fish Harvesters and Fishworkers
71. WTO Watch Group, Pakistan |
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