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ON THIS PAGE:
> US — 1916 Act, paras. 60-61
> US — 1916 Act, paras. 62, 68
> US — 1916 Act, para. 75
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 81 and footnote 79
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 82
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 83
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 86
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 87 and footnote 87
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 88
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 89
> US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 168
> US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 172
> US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 173
> US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 186
> US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, para. 187
> Dominican Republic — Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 107
> US — Zeroing (EC), paras. 190-193
> US — Zeroing (EC), paras. 196-198
> US — Zeroing (EC), paras. 200-204 and footnotes 359-360
> US — Zeroing (EC), paras. 231-232
> EC — Selected Customs Matters, para. 165
> US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5 — Argentina), para. 120
> US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), paras. 242-243
> US — Continued Zeroing, paras. 179-180
> US — Continued Zeroing, para. 181
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L.1.1 US — 1916 Act,
paras. 60-61 back to top (WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R)
Prior to the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, it was
firmly established that Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1947 allowed a
Contracting Party to challenge legislation as such, independently from
the application of that legislation in specific instances. While the
text of Article XXIII does not expressly address the matter, panels
consistently considered that, under Article XXIII, they had the jurisdiction
to deal with claims against legislation as such. In examining such
claims, panels developed the concept that mandatory and discretionary
legislation should be distinguished from each other, reasoning that only
legislation that mandates a violation of GATT obligations can be found
as such to be inconsistent with those obligations. We consider the
application of this distinction to the present cases in section IV(B)
below.
Thus, that a Contracting Party could challenge legislation as such
before a panel was well settled under the GATT 1947. We consider that
the case law articulating and applying this practice forms part of the
GATT acquis which, under Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement,
provides guidance to the WTO and, therefore, to panels and the Appellate
Body. Furthermore, in Article 3.1 of the DSU, Members affirm “their
adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore
applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947”. We note that,
since the entry into force of the WTO Agreement, a number of
panels have dealt with dispute settlement claims brought against a
Member on the basis of its legislation as such, independently from the
application of that legislation in specific instances.
L.1.2 US — 1916 Act, paras. 62, 68
back to top (WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R)
Turning to the issue of the legal basis for claims brought under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, we note that Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement addresses
dispute settlement under that Agreement. Just as Articles XXII and XXIII
of the GATT 1994 create a legal basis for claims in disputes relating to
provisions of the GATT 1994, so also Article 17 establishes the basis
for dispute settlement claims relating to provisions of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. In the same way that Article XXIII of the GATT 1994
allows a WTO Member to challenge legislation as such, Article 17
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is properly to be regarded as
allowing a challenge to legislation as such, unless this possibility is
excluded. No such express exclusion is found in Article 17 or
elsewhere in the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
…
Article 17.3 does not explicitly address challenges to legislation as
such. As we have seen above, Articles XXII and XXIII allow challenges to
be brought under the GATT 1994 against legislation as such. Since
Article 17.3 is the “equivalent provision” to Articles XXII and
XXIII of the GATT 1994, Article 17.3 provides further support for our
view that challenges may be brought under the Anti-Dumping Agreement against
legislation as such, unless such challenges are otherwise excluded.
L.1.3 US — 1916 Act, para. 75
back to top (WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R)
Moreover, as we have seen above, the GATT and WTO case law firmly
establishes that dispute settlement proceedings may be brought based on
the alleged inconsistency of a Member’s legislation as such with that
Member’s obligations. We find nothing, and the United States has
identified nothing, inherent in the nature of anti-dumping legislation that would rationally distinguish such
legislation from other types of legislation for purposes of dispute
settlement, or that would remove anti-dumping legislation from the ambit
of the generally accepted practice that a panel may examine legislation
as such.
L.1.4 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 81
and footnote 79 back to top (WT/DS244/AB/R)
… we start with the concept of “measure”. Article 3.3 of the
DSU refers to “situations in which a Member considers that any
benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered
agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member”
(emphasis added). This phrase identifies the relevant nexus, for
purposes of dispute settlement proceedings, between the “measure”
and a “Member”. In principle, any act or omission attributable to a
WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for purposes of dispute
settlement proceedings. The acts or omissions that are so attributable
are, in the usual case, the acts or omissions of the organs of the
state, including those of the executive branch.79
L.1.5 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review,
para. 82 (WT/DS244/AB/R)
back to top
In addition, in GATT and WTO dispute settlement practice, panels have
frequently examined measures consisting not only of particular acts
applied only to a specific situation, but also of acts setting forth
rules or norms that are intended to have general and prospective
application. In other words, instruments of a Member containing rules or
norms could constitute a “measure”, irrespective of how or whether
those rules or norms are applied in a particular instance. This is so
because the disciplines of the GATT and the WTO, as well as the dispute
settlement system, are intended to protect not only existing trade but
also the security and predictability needed to conduct future trade.
This objective would be frustrated if instruments setting out rules or
norms inconsistent with a Member’s obligations could not be brought
before a panel once they have been adopted and irrespective of any
particular instance of application of such rules or norms. It would also
lead to a multiplicity of litigation if instruments embodying rules or
norms could not be challenged as such, but only in the instances of
their application. Thus, allowing claims against measures, as such,
serves the purpose of preventing future disputes by allowing the root of
WTO-inconsistent behaviour to be eliminated.
L.1.6 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review,
para. 83 (WT/DS244/AB/R)
back to top
… we have explained that Article 17.4 precludes a panel from
addressing individual acts (as opposed to measures “as such”)
committed by an investigating authority in the context of the initiation
and conduct of anti-dumping investigations unless one of the
three types of measure listed in Article 17.4 is identified in the
request for establishment of a panel. These measures are a definitive
anti-dumping duty, the acceptance of a price undertaking, and a
provisional measure. We have also found, in US — 1916 Act, that
Article 17.4 does not place such a limit on a panel’s jurisdiction to
entertain claims against legislation as such. Indeed, we stated
in that appeal that no provision of the Anti-Dumping Agreement precludes
a panel from considering claims against legislation as such.
L.1.7 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review,
para. 86 (WT/DS244/AB/R)
back to top
The provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement setting forth a
legal basis for matters to be referred to consultations and thus to
dispute settlement, are also cast broadly. Article 17.3 establishes the
principle that when a complaining Member “considers” that its
benefits are being nullified or impaired “by another Member or Members”,
it may request consultations. This language underlines that a measure
attributable to a Member may be submitted to dispute settlement provided
only that another Member has taken the view, in good faith, that the
measure nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. There is no threshold requirement, in Article 17.3, that
the measure in question be of a certain type.
L.1.8 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 87
and footnote 87 back to top (WT/DS244/AB/R)
We also believe that the provisions of Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement are relevant to the question of the type of measures that
may, as such, be submitted to dispute settlement under that Agreement.
Article 18.4 contains an explicit obligation for Members to “take all
necessary steps, of a general or particular character” to ensure that
their “laws, regulations and administrative procedures” are in
conformity with the obligations set forth in the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Taken as a whole, the phrase “laws, regulations and
administrative procedures” seems to us to encompass the entire body of
generally applicable rules, norms and standards adopted by Members in
connection with the conduct of anti-dumping proceedings.87 If some of
these types of measure could not, as such, be subject to dispute
settlement under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, it would frustrate
the obligation of “conformity” set forth in Article 18.4.
L.1.9 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review,
para. 88 (WT/DS244/AB/R)
back to top
This analysis leads us to conclude that there is no basis, either in
the practice of the GATT and the WTO generally or in the provisions of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, for finding that only certain types of measure can, as such, be
challenged in dispute settlement proceedings under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement. Hence we see no reason for concluding that, in principle,
non-mandatory measures cannot be challenged “as such”. …
L.1.10 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review,
para. 89 (WT/DS244/AB/R)
back to top
We observe, too, that allowing measures to be the subject of dispute
settlement proceedings, whether or not they are of a mandatory
character, is consistent with the comprehensive nature of the right of
Members to resort to dispute settlement to “preserve [their] rights
and obligations … under the covered agreements, and to clarify the
existing provisions of those agreements”. As long as a Member respects
the principles set forth in Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU, namely, to
exercise their “judgement as to whether action under these procedures
would be fruitful” and to engage in dispute settlement in good faith,
then that Member is entitled to request a panel to examine measures that
the Member considers nullify or impair its benefits. We do not think
that panels are obliged, as a preliminary jurisdictional matter, to
examine whether the challenged measure is mandatory. This issue is
relevant, if at all, only as part of the panel’s assessment of whether
the measure is, as such, inconsistent with particular obligations. It is
to this issue that we now turn.
L.1.11 US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review,
para. 168 (WT/DS244/AB/R)
back to top
When a measure is challenged “as such”, the starting point for an
analysis must be the measure on its face. If the meaning and content of
the measure are clear on its face, then the consistency of the measure
as such can be assessed on that basis alone. If, however, the meaning or
content of the measure is not evident on its face, further examination
is required. …
L.1.12 US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews,
para. 172 (WT/DS268/AB/R)
back to top
… In our view, “as such” challenges against a Member’s
measures in WTO dispute settlement proceedings are serious challenges.
By definition, an “as such” claim challenges laws, regulations, or
other instruments of a Member that have general and prospective
application, asserting that a Member’s conduct — not only in a
particular instance that has occurred, but in future situations as well
— will necessarily be inconsistent with that Member’s WTO
obligations. In essence, complaining parties bringing “as such”
challenges seek to prevent Members ex ante from engaging in
certain conduct. The implications of such challenges are obviously more
far-reaching than “as applied” claims.
L.1.13 US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews,
para. 173 (WT/DS268/AB/R)
back to top
We also expect that measures subject to “as such” challenges
would normally have undergone, under municipal law, thorough scrutiny
through various deliberative processes to ensure consistency with the
Member’s international obligations, including those found in the
covered agreements, and that the enactment of such a measure would
implicitly reflect the conclusion of that Member that the measure is not
inconsistent with those obligations. The presumption that WTO Members
act in good faith in the implementation of their WTO commitments is
particularly apt in the context of measures challenged “as such”. We
would therefore urge complaining parties to be especially diligent in
setting out “as such” claims in their panel requests as clearly as
possible. In particular, we would expect that “as such” claims state
unambiguously the specific measures of municipal law challenged by the
complaining party and the legal basis for the allegation that those
measures are not consistent with particular provisions of the covered
agreements. Through such straightforward presentations of “as such”
claims, panel requests should leave respondent parties in little doubt
that, notwithstanding their own considered views on the WTO-consistency
of their measures, another Member intends to challenge those measures,
as such, in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
L.1.14 US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews,
para. 186 (WT/DS268/AB/R)
back to top
We turn first to the United States’ understanding of the Appellate
Body’s finding in
US — Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review. We disagree with
the United States’ assertion that, in that case, the Appellate Body
left open the question whether the SPB is a measure. It is clear that by
reversing the panel’s finding that “the Sunset Policy Bulletin is
not a measure that is challengeable, as such, under the WTO Agreement”,
the Appellate Body concluded that the SPB is a measure subject to WTO
dispute settlement. …
L.1.15 US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews,
para. 187 (WT/DS268/AB/R)
back to top
… As noted by the United States, in US — Corrosion-Resistant
Steel Sunset Review, the Appellate Body indicated that “acts
setting forth rules or norms that are intended to have general and
prospective application” are measures subject to WTO dispute
settlement. We disagree with the United States’ application of these
criteria to the SPB. In our view, the SPB has normative value, as it
provides administrative guidance and creates expectations among the
public and among private actors. It is intended to have general
application, as it is to apply to all the sunset reviews conducted in
the United States. It is also intended to have prospective application,
as it is intended to apply to sunset reviews taking place after its
issuance. Thus, we confirm — once again — that the SPB, as such, is
subject to WTO dispute settlement.
L.1.16 Dominican Republic — Import and Sale of Cigarettes,
para.
107 back to top (WT/DS302/AB/R)
… we observe that the Appellate Body has consistently affirmed
the right of WTO Members to challenge legislation laying down norms or
rules “as such”, as well as their right to bring claims against the
application of such measures in specific instances. …
L.1.17 US — Zeroing (EC), paras. 190-193
back to top (WT/DS294/AB/R, WT/DS294/AB/R/Corr.1)
… we now turn to examine whether the zeroing methodology, as
framed by the European Communities in this dispute, constitutes such a
measure. In particular, we consider whether the zeroing methodology,
which, as the Panel said, “is not expressed in writing”, can be
subject to dispute settlement under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
In the context of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate
Body has said that Article 17.3 “underlines that a measure
attributable to a Member may be submitted to dispute settlement provided
only that another Member has taken the view, in good faith, that the
measure nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it under the Anti-Dumping
Agreement”. In other words, “[t]here is no threshold
requirement, in Article 17.3, that the measure in question be of a
certain type.”
Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement is
also relevant to the question of the type of measures that can, as such,
be submitted to dispute settlement under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
That provision contains an explicit obligation for Members to ensure
that their “laws, regulations and administrative procedures” are in
conformity with the obligations set forth in that Agreement. The phrase
“laws, regulations and administrative procedures” encompasses, in
our view, “the entire body of generally applicable rules, norms and
standards adopted by Members in connection with the conduct of
anti-dumping proceedings”. As the Appellate Body has previously
explained, the determination of the scope of “laws, regulations and
administrative procedures” must be based on the “content and
substance” of the alleged measure, and “not merely on its form”.
Accordingly, the mere fact that a “rule or norm” is not expressed in
the form of a written instrument, is not, in our view, determinative of
the issue of whether it can be challenged, as such, in dispute
settlement proceedings. Rather, as the Appellate Body has stated, “there
is no basis, either in the practice of the GATT and the WTO generally or
in the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, for finding that
only certain types of measure[s] can, as such, be challenged in dispute
settlement proceedings under the Anti-Dumping Agreement”. This
is, moreover, consistent with the comprehensive nature of the right of
Members to resort to dispute settlement to “preserve [their] rights
and obligations … under the covered agreements, and to clarify the
existing provisions of those agreements” as provided for in Article
3.2 of the DSU.
For all these reasons, and based on our review of the DSU and the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, we see no basis to conclude that “rules or norms” can
be challenged, as such, only if they are expressed in the form of
a written instrument.
L.1.18 US — Zeroing (EC), paras. 196-198
back to top (WT/DS294/AB/R,
WT/DS294/AB/R/Corr.1)
… a panel must not lightly assume the existence of a “rule or
norm” constituting a measure of general and prospective application,
especially when it is not expressed in the form of a written document.
If a panel were to do so, it would act inconsistently with its
obligations under Article 11 of the DSU to “make an objective
assessment of the matter” before it.
When an “as such” challenge is brought against a “rule or norm”
that is expressed in the form of a written document — such as a law or
regulation — there would, in most cases, be no uncertainty as to the
existence or content of the measure that has been challenged. The
situation is different, however, when a challenge is brought against a
“rule or norm” that is not expressed in the form of a written
document. In such cases, the very existence of the challenged “rule or
norm” may be uncertain.
In our view, when bringing a challenge against such a “rule or norm”
that constitutes a measure of general and prospective application, a
complaining party must clearly establish, through arguments and
supporting evidence, at least that the alleged “rule or norm” is
attributable to the responding Member; its precise content; and indeed,
that it does have general and prospective application. It is only if the
complaining party meets this high threshold, and puts forward sufficient
evidence with respect to each of these elements, that a panel would be
in a position to find that the “rule or norm” may be challenged, as
such. This evidence may include proof of the systematic application of
the challenged “rule or norm”. Particular rigour is required on the
part of a panel to support a conclusion as to the existence of a “rule
or norm” that is not expressed in the form of a written
document. A panel must carefully examine the concrete instrumentalities
that evidence the existence of the purported “rule or norm” in order
to conclude that such “rule or norm” can be challenged, as such.
L.1.19 US — Zeroing (EC), paras. 200-204 and footnotes 359-360 (WT/DS294/AB/R,
WT/DS294/AB/R/Corr.1)
back to top
Based on its assessment of this evidence, the Panel concluded that
“the zeroing methodology manifested in the ‘Standard Zeroing
Procedures’ represents a well-established and well-defined norm
followed by [the] USDOC and that it is possible based on this evidence
to identify with precision the specific content of that norm and the
future conduct that it will entail”.
Based on our review, we observe that the evidence before the Panel
consisted of the USDOC determinations in the “as applied” cases
challenged by the European Communities, as well as the standard programs
used by the USDOC to calculate margins of dumping. Furthermore, the
Panel had before it expert opinions regarding the use and the content of
the zeroing methodology. In addition, we note that the Panel had before
it the United States’ recognition that it had been “unable to
identify any instance where [the] USDOC had given a credit for
non-dumped sales”. The Panel noted that the United States “ha[d] not
contested in this proceeding that [the] USDOC’s zeroing methodology
reflects a deliberate policy”. Furthermore, the United States indicated in its opening statement at the oral hearing
that it will soon be publicly announcing that it no longer will engage
in zeroing when using the weighted-average-to-weighted-average
methodology for purposes of calculating margins of dumping in original
investigations.
The Anti-Dumping Manual has also been referred to by the European
Communities as evidence of “the ‘standard’ character of the ‘Standard
Zeroing Procedures’ ”. …
Reviewing the Panel’s reasoning, it is evident that there are
several features of the Panel’s analysis that differ from our own.
First, the Panel did not articulate the criteria for bringing an “as
such” challenge in the same way as we have above. Moreover, the Panel
did not, in its analysis, clearly distinguish between the issue of
ascertaining the existence of the challenged measure, which is
especially important when unwritten measures are at issue, and the
separate examination of its consistency with the relevant provisions of
the covered agreements.359 We are also of the view that the Panel did
not articulate its ultimate conclusion regarding the consistency of the
“zeroing methodology” with Article 2.4.2 with sufficient precision.360
…
Notwithstanding these shortcomings in the Panel’s reasoning, we
believe that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the evidence
before the Panel was sufficient to identify the precise content of the
zeroing methodology; that the zeroing methodology is attributable to the
United States, and that it does have general and prospective
application. This evidence consisted of considerably more than a string
of cases, or repeat action, based on which the Panel would have simply
divined the existence of a measure in the abstract. …
L.1.20 US — Zeroing (EC), paras. 231-232
back to top (WT/DS294/AB/R,
WT/DS294/AB/R/Corr.1)
The Panel found that “to characterize the ‘Standard Zeroing
Procedures’ as an act or instrument that sets forth rules or norms
intended to have general and prospective application is somewhat
difficult to reconcile with the fact that the ‘Standard Zeroing
Procedures’ are only applicable in a particular anti-dumping
proceeding as a result of their inclusion in the computer program …
used in that particular proceeding”. According to the Panel, “the need to incorporate these lines of
computer code into each individual program … indicates that
it is not the ‘Standard Zeroing Procedures’ per se that set
forth rules or norms of general and prospective application”. We agree
with the Panel. Therefore, we find that the Standard Zeroing Procedures
are not a measure that can be challenged, as such, in WTO dispute
settlement.
Because the Standard Zeroing Procedures are not a measure that can be
challenged, as such, it follows that they cannot be found to be either
consistent or inconsistent with a Member’s obligations under the
covered agreements. …
L.1.21 EC — Selected Customs Matters,
para. 165 back to top (WT/DS315/AB/R)
The United States contends that its claim relates to the European
Communities’ system of customs administration “as a whole or overall”.
As a preliminary observation, we do not think that, by challenging the
European Communities’ system of customs administration as a whole, the
United States made an “as such” claim. Indeed, before the Panel, the
United States made it clear that it was “not challenging the
substance of the measures mentioned in its request for establishment
of a panel”. This was confirmed by the United States in response to
questioning at the oral hearing. Also at the oral hearing, the United
States explained that, in this dispute, the claim made by the United
States under Article X:3(a) is not readily classifiable in the
categories of “as such” and “as applied” claims, that it would
be inaccurate to characterize its claim as an “as such” claim, and
that it did not wish to add a further category of claims.
L.1.22 US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5
— Argentina), para. 120 back to top (WT/DS268/AB/RW)
We observe that a respondent’s explanation of the basis on which
its investigating authority will make a determination will have more
weight if it is confirmed by the text of the applicable laws or
regulations. But the United States’ statements that the USDOC must
consider all information and arguments on the record, and that the
relevance of a company-specific finding to the order-wide likelihood
determination would always depend on the facts of each case, cannot be
rejected merely because there is no legal instrument that expressly
requires the USDOC to act in this way. This is insufficient to support
properly a finding of inconsistency as such. Thus, the Panel’s
reasoning seems speculative, and this is reflected in the language used
in the Panel Report.
L.1.23 US — Upland Cotton (Article 21.5 — Brazil), paras. 242-243 (WT/DS267/AB/RW)
back to top
We examine, first, the United States’ argument that Brazil could
have challenged the programmes “as such”. As we indicated above, we
have difficulty accepting the notion that payments under a subsidy
programme can be assessed separately from the programmes or legislation
pursuant to which those payments are made. This is because the terms and conditions, beneficiaries, amounts, and
other aspects of a payment will be set in the programme or authorizing
legislation, especially in the case of annually recurring payments. The
difficulty of divorcing the payments from the programmes, in this case,
is evident in the Panel’s approach to this issue. Despite finding that
only the payments were properly within the scope of the Article 21.5
proceedings, the Panel nevertheless considered that it could not exclude
completely from its assessment the programmes under which the payments
were provided.
Moreover, even if a complainant brings an “as such” challenge to
a subsidy programme, it is difficult to see how a panel would assess
whether the subsidy has resulted in adverse effects without reviewing
the payments actually made under that programme during a past reference
period. The United States acknowledges that “serious prejudice, by its
nature, is fact-specific and depends on the situation in the market, a
situation that may be constantly changing such that the terms and
conditions for a subsidy that causes serious prejudice during one time
period are not causing serious prejudice for another time period”.
Thus, we find it difficult to conceive how an analysis of whether a
programme “as such” resulted in adverse effects would differ from an
analysis of whether payments under a programme have resulted in such
effects.
L.1.24 US — Continued Zeroing, paras. 179-180
back to top (WT/DS350/AB/R)
… the distinction between “as such” and “as applied”
claims does not govern the definition of a measure for purposes of WTO
dispute settlement. This distinction has been developed in the
jurisprudence as an analytical tool to facilitate the understanding of
the nature of a measure at issue. This heuristic device, however useful,
does not define exhaustively the types of measures that may be subject
to challenge in WTO dispute settlement. In order to be susceptible to
challenge, a measure need not fit squarely within one of these two
categories, that is, either as a rule or norm of general and prospective
application, or as an individual instance of the application of a rule
or norm.
In this dispute, the measures at issue consist of the use of the
zeroing methodology in successive proceedings, in each of the 18 cases,
by which the anti-dumping duties are maintained. The European
Communities’ claim regarding these measures is not an “as such”
claim, in that its scope is narrower than a challenge to the zeroing
methodology as a rule or norm of general and prospective application
with regard to all imports into the United States from all countries. At
the same time, the measures at issue are broader than specific instances
in which the zeroing methodology was applied, such as a periodic review
or sunset review determination. In other words, the measures at issue
consist of the use of the zeroing methodology in a string of connected
and sequential determinations, in each of the 18 cases, by which the
duties are maintained.
L.1.25 US — Continued Zeroing, para. 181
back to top (WT/DS350/AB/R)
Thus, the measures at issue consist of neither the zeroing
methodology as a rule or norm of general and prospective application,
nor discrete applications of the zeroing methodology in particular determinations; rather, they are
the use of the zeroing methodology in successive proceedings, in each of
the 18 cases, by which duties are maintained over a period of time. We
see no reason to exclude ongoing conduct that consists of the use of the
zeroing methodology from challenge in WTO dispute settlement. The
successive determinations by which duties are maintained are connected
stages in each of the 18 cases involving imposition, assessment, and
collection of duties under the same anti-dumping duty order. The use of
the zeroing methodology in a string of these stages is the allegedly
unchanged component of each of the 18 measures at issue. It is with
respect to this ongoing conduct that the European Communities brought
its challenge, seeking its cessation. At the oral hearing, the European
Communities confirmed that it is not seeking the revocation of the 18
anti-dumping orders but, rather, the cessation of the use of the zeroing
methodology by which the duties are calculated and maintained in these
18 cases. In our view, the European Communities, in seeking an effective
resolution of its dispute with the United States, is entitled to frame
the subject of its challenge in such a way as to bring the ongoing
conduct, regarding the use of the zeroing methodology in these 18 cases,
under the scrutiny of WTO dispute settlement.
79. Both specific determinations made by a Member’s executive
agencies and regulations issued by its executive branch can constitute
acts attributable to that Member. … back to text
87. We observe that the scope of each element in the phrase “laws,
regulations and administrative procedures” must be determined for
purposes of WTO law and not simply by reference to the label given to
various instruments under the domestic law of each WTO Member. This
determination must be based on the content and substance of the
instrument, and not merely on its form or nomenclature. Otherwise, the
obligations set forth in Article 18.4 would vary from Member to Member
depending on each Member’s domestic law and practice.
back to text
359. We note that the Panel referred to the Report of the Appellate
Body in US — Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews,
expressing the view that if “a non-legally binding policy instrument
such as the SPB is a measure that can be challenged as such, it must
logically also be possible to challenge as a measure a norm that is not
expressed in the particular form of an official written statement but
the existence of which is made manifest on the basis of other evidence”
(Panel Report, para. 7.99). The Appellate Body’s analysis of the SPB
does not, in our view, answer the question whether an unwritten “norm”
can be challenged, as such. back to text
360. In particular, we note that the Panel’s finding, on its face,
is not clearly limited to a finding regarding the consistency of the
zeroing methodology, as it relates to original investigations in which
the weighted-average-to-weighted-average methodology contemplated in the
first sentence of Article 2.4.2 is used to establish margins of dumping.
Nevertheless, this is what we understand the Panel to have meant (see
Panel Report, para. 7.105). back to text
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