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ON THIS PAGE:
> General
> Standard of review. See also Standard of Review,
Article 11 of the DSU (S.7.2-7)
> Article 2.1 — “like or directly competitive products”.
See also Safeguards Agreement,
Article 4.1(c) — Domestic industry (S.1.25)
> Article 2.1 — Domestic decision-making
> Articles 2.1 and 4.1(c) — Territorial application of safeguard measure
> Article 2.1 — Increased imports
> Article 2.1 — Examination of trends
> Article 2.1 — Decrease at the end of an investigation period
> Article 2.1 — Increase relative to domestic production
> Article 2.1 — Serious injury or threat thereof.
See also Safeguards Agreement,
Article 4.1(b) — Threat of serious injury (S.1.24)
> Article 2.1 — Causation. See also Safeguards Agreement,
Article 4.2(b) — Causation (S.1.29-32)
> Article 2.1 — “under such conditions”
> Article 2 — Parallelism
> Article 2 — “factors other than increased imports”
> Article 2 — Separate determinations
> Article 2.1, Footnote 1 — Customs union.
See also Regional Trade Agreements,
Relationship between Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement (R.1.6)
> Article 2.2 — Free trade area. See also Regional Trade Agreements,
Relationship between Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement (R.1.6)
> Article 3.1 — General
> Article 3.1 — Investigation
> Article 3.1 — Multiple findings
> Article 3.1 — Published report
> Article 3.1 — Reasoned conclusions
> Article 4.1(a) — Serious injury
> Article 4.1(b) — Threat of serious injury.
See also Safeguards Agreement,
Article 2.1 — Serious injury or threat thereof (S.1.10)
> Article 4.1(c) — Domestic industry
> Article 4.2(a) — Evaluation of relevant injury factors.
See also Standard of Review, Article 11 of the DSU — Objective assessment of whether the investigating authority’s explanation is reasoned and adequate (S.7.4)
> Article 4.2(a) — Data for the injury evaluation
> Article 4.2(a) — Injury data relating to the most recent past
> Article 4.2(b) — Causation of injury by increased imports
> Article 4.2(b) — Causation of injury by increased imports vs. other factors
> Article 4.2(b) — Non-attribution of injury caused by other factors
> Article 4.2(b) — Causation — assumptions regarding increased imports and injury
> Article 4.2(c) — Publication of a detailed analysis.
See also Safeguards Agreement,
Article 3.1 — General (S.1.18); Safeguards Agreement,
Relationship between Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Article 3.1 of the Safeguards Agreement (S.1.46); Safeguards Agreement,
Relationship between Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2(c) of the Safeguards Agreement (S.1.47)
> Article 5.1 — Application of the safeguard measure to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.
See also
Principles and Concepts of General Public International Law, Proportionality (P.3.6)
> Article 5.1 — Justification of the necessary extent of the application
> Relationship between Articles 5.1 and 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement
> Article 5.2(b) — Quota modulation
> Article 8.1 — Equivalent level of concessions
> Article 9.1 — Exclusion of developing country Members from the application of
safeguards
> Article 12.1 — Immediate notification
> Article 12.2 — Notification of all pertinent
information
> Article 12.3 — “adequate opportunity for prior consultations”
> Relationship between the Safeguards Agreement and the Anti-Dumping Agreement
> Relationship between the Safeguards Agreement and the GATT 1994
> Article XIX of the GATT 1994 — General.
See also Agreement on Agriculture,
Article 5 — Special safeguard (A.1.14);
Safeguards Agreement, General (S.1.1); Textiles and Clothing Agreement,
Article 6 — Transitional safeguard (T.7.1)
> Relationship between Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Article 3.1 of the Safeguards Agreement
> Relationship between Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and Article 4.2(c) of the Safeguards Agreement
> Article XIX of the GATT 1994 — “as a result of”
> Article XIX of the GATT 1994 — “such product”
> Article XIX of the GATT 1994 — “unforeseen developments”
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S.1.1 General back to top
S.1.1.1 US — Line Pipe, paras. 80, 82-84
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
… it is useful to recall that safeguard
measures are extraordinary remedies to be taken only in emergency
situations. Furthermore, they are remedies that are imposed in the form
of import restrictions in the absence of any allegation of an unfair
trade practice. In this, safeguard measures differ from, for example,
anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties to counter subsidies,
which are both measures taken in response to unfair trade practices. …
…
… part of the raison d’être of
Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards is,
unquestionably, that of giving a WTO Member the possibility, as trade is
liberalized, of resorting to an effective remedy in an extraordinary
emergency situation that, in the judgement of that Member, makes it
necessary to protect a domestic industry temporarily.
There is, therefore, a natural tension
between, on the one hand, defining the appropriate and legitimate scope
of the right to apply safeguard measures and, on the other hand,
ensuring that safeguard measures are not applied against “fair trade”
beyond what is necessary to provide extraordinary and temporary relief.
A WTO Member seeking to apply a safeguard measure will argue, correctly,
that the right to apply such measures must be respected in order
to maintain the domestic momentum and motivation for ongoing
trade liberalization. In turn, a WTO Member whose trade is affected by a
safeguard measure will argue, correctly, that the application of
such measures must be limited in order to maintain the multilateral
integrity of ongoing trade concessions. The balance struck by the WTO
Members in reconciling this natural tension relating to safeguard
measures is found in the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards.
This natural tension is likewise inherent in
two basic inquiries that are conducted in interpreting the Agreement
on Safeguards. These two basic inquiries are: first, is there
a right to apply a safeguard measure? And, second, if so, has
that right been exercised, through the application of such a measure,
within the limits set out in the treaty? These two inquiries are
separate and distinct. They must not be confused by the treaty
interpreter. One necessarily precedes and leads to the other. …
S.1.1.2 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 264
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… Article XIX and the Agreement on
Safeguards confirm the right of WTO Members to apply safeguard
measures when, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect
of obligations incurred, including tariff concessions, a product is
being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as
to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry
that produces like or directly competitive products. However, as Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards makes clear, the right to
apply such measures arises “only” if these prerequisites are
shown to exist.
S.1.2 Standard of review.
See also
Standard of Review, Article 11 of the DSU (S.7.2-7)
back to top
S.1.2.1 US — Lamb, para. 103
(WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R)
Thus, an “objective assessment” of a claim
under Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards has, in
principle, two elements. First, a panel must review whether competent
authorities have evaluated all relevant factors, and, second, a
panel must review whether the authorities have provided a reasoned
and adequate explanation of how the facts support their
determination. Thus, the panel’s objective assessment involves a formal
aspect and a substantive aspect. The formal aspect is whether the
competent authorities have evaluated “all relevant factors”. The
substantive aspect is whether the competent authorities have given a
reasoned and adequate explanation for their determination.
S.1.2.2 US — Lamb, paras. 106-107
(WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R)
We wish to emphasize that, although panels are
not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute
their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not
mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the
competent authorities. To the contrary, in our view, in examining a
claim under Article 4.2(a), a panel can assess whether the competent
authorities’ explanation for its determination is reasoned and
adequate only if the panel critically examines that explanation,
in depth, and in the light of the facts before the panel. Panels must,
therefore, review whether the competent authorities’ explanation fully
addresses the nature, and, especially, the complexities, of the data,
and responds to other plausible interpretations of that data. A panel
must find, in particular, that an explanation is not reasoned, or is not
adequate, if some alternative explanation of the facts is
plausible, and if the competent authorities’ explanation does not seem
adequate in the light of that alternative explanation. Thus, in making
an “objective assessment” of a claim under Article 4.2(a), panels
must be open to the possibility that the explanation given by the
competent authorities is not reasoned or adequate.
In this respect, the phrase “de novo
review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the
competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a
reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has
not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel
substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities.
Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU,
simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent
authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
S.1.2.3 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 276
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
We explained in US — Lamb, in
the context of a claim under Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on
Safeguards, that the competent authorities must provide a “reasoned
and adequate explanation of how the facts support their
determination”. More recently, in US — Line Pipe, in the
context of a claim under Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on
Safeguards, we said that the competent authorities must, similarly,
provide a “reasoned and adequate explanation, that injury
caused by factors other than increased imports is not attributed to
increased imports”. Our findings in those cases did not purport to
address solely the standard of review that is appropriate for
claims arising under Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
We see no reason not to apply the same standard generally to the
obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards as well as to the
obligations in Article XIX of the GATT 1994.
S.1.3 Article 2.1 — “like or directly
competitive products”.
See also Safeguards Agreement, Article 4.1(c) — Domestic industry (S.1.25) back to top
S.1.3.1 US — Lamb, para. 86
(WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R)
Thus, a safeguard measure is imposed on a
specific “product”, namely, the imported product. The measure
may only be imposed if that specific product (“such product”)
is having the stated effects upon the “domestic industry that
produces like or directly competitive products.” (emphasis added)
The conditions in Article 2.1, therefore, relate in several important
respects to specific products. In particular, according to
Article 2.1, the legal basis for imposing a safeguard measure exists only
when imports of a specific product have prejudicial effects on domestic
producers of products that are “like or directly competitive” with
that imported product. In our view, it would be a clear departure from
the text of Article 2.1 if a safeguard measure could be imposed because
of the prejudicial effects that an imported product has on domestic
producers of products that are not “like or directly
competitive products” in relation to the imported product.
S.1.4 Article 2.1 — Domestic decision-making
back to top
S.1.4.1 US — Line Pipe, para. 158
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
… we are not concerned with how the
competent authorities of WTO Members reach their determinations in
applying safeguard measures. The Agreement on Safeguards does not
prescribe the internal decision-making process for making such a
determination. That is entirely up to WTO Members in the exercise of
their sovereignty. We are concerned only with the determination itself,
which is a singular act for which a WTO Member may be accountable in WTO
dispute settlement. It is of no matter to us whether that singular act
results from a decision by one, one hundred, or — as here — six
individual decision-makers under the municipal law of that WTO Member.
What matters to us is whether the determination, however it is decided
domestically, meets the requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards.
S.1.5 Articles 2.1 and 4.1(c) — Territorial
application of safeguard measure back to top
S.1.5.1 Argentina — Footwear (EC), para. 111
(WT/DS121/AB/R)
… Taken together, the provisions of Articles 2.1 and 4.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards demonstrate that a
Member of the WTO may only apply a safeguard measure after that Member
has determined that a product is being imported into its territory
in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten to cause serious injury to its domestic industry within
its territory. According to Articles 2.1 and 4.1(c), therefore, all
of the relevant aspects of a safeguard investigation must be conducted
by the Member that ultimately applies the safeguard measure, on the
basis of increased imports entering its territory and causing or
threatening to cause serious injury to the domestic industry within its
territory.
S.1.6 Article 2.1 — Increased imports
back to top
S.1.6.1 Argentina — Footwear (EC), para. 131
(WT/DS121/AB/R)
We recall here our reasoning and conclusions
above on the meaning of the phrase “as a result of unforeseen
developments” in Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994. We concluded there
that the increased quantities of imports should have been “unforeseen”
or “unexpected”. We also believe that the phrase “in such
increased quantities” in Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards
and Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 is meaningful to this
determination. In our view, the determination of whether the requirement
of imports “in such increased quantities” is met is not a merely
mathematical or technical determination. In other words, it is not
enough for an investigation to show simply that imports of the product
this year were more than last year — or five years ago. Again, and it
bears repeating, not just any increased quantities of imports
will suffice. There must be “such increased quantities” as to
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry in
order to fulfil this requirement for applying a safeguard measure. And
this language in both Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards
and Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994, we believe, requires that the
increase in imports must have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp
enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualitatively,
to cause or threaten to cause “serious injury”.
S.1.6.2 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 346
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… In [Argentina — Footwear (EC)]
we underlined the importance of reading the requirement of “such
increased quantities” in the context in which it appears in both
Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards. That context includes the words “to cause or threaten
to cause serious injury”. Read in context, it is apparent that “there
must be ‘such increased quantities’ as to cause or threaten to cause
serious injury to the domestic industry in order to fulfill this
requirement for applying a safeguard measure.” Indeed, in our view,
the term “such”, which appears in the phrase “such increased
quantities” in Articles XIX:1(a) and 2.1, clearly links the relevant
increased imports to their ability to cause serious injury or the threat
thereof. Accordingly, we agree with the United States that our statement
in Argentina — Footwear (EC) that the “increase in
imports must have been recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough and
significant enough … to cause or threaten to cause serious injury”,
was a statement about “the entire investigative responsibility of the
competent authorities under the Safeguards Agreement”, and that “[w]hether
an increase in imports is recent, sudden, sharp and significant enough
to cause or threaten serious injury are questions that are answered as
the competent authorities proceed with the remainder of their analysis
(i.e., their consideration of serious injury/threat and causation).”
S.1.6.3 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 350
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… we said in Argentina — Footwear
(EC) that “the increased quantities of imports should have been
‘unforeseen’ or ‘unexpected’.” In doing so, we were referring
to the fact that the increased imports must, under Article XIX:1(a),
result from “unforeseen developments” in order to justify the
application of a safeguard measure. Because the “increased imports”
must be “as a result” of an event that was “unforeseen” or “unexpected”,
it follows that the increased imports must also be “unforeseen” or
“unexpected”. Thus, the “extraordinary nature” of the domestic
response to increased imports does not depend on the absolute or
relative quantities of the product being imported. Rather, it depends on
the fact that the increased imports were unforeseen or unexpected.
S.1.7 Article 2.1 — Examination of trends
back to top
S.1.7.1 Argentina — Footwear (EC), para. 129
(WT/DS121/AB/R)
We agree with the Panel that Articles 2.1 and
4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards require a demonstration not
merely of any increase in imports, but, instead, of imports “in
such increased quantities … and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten to cause serious injury.” In addition, we agree with the
Panel that the specific provisions of Article 4.2(a) require that “the
rate and amount of the increase in imports … in absolute
and relative terms” (emphasis added) must be evaluated. Thus, we do
not dispute the Panel’s view and ultimate conclusion that the
competent authorities are required to consider the trends in
imports over the period of investigation (rather than just comparing the
end points) under Article 4.2(a). …
S.1.7.2 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 354
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
We concluded in Argentina — Footwear
(EC) that “the competent authorities are required to
consider the trends in imports over the period of investigation
(rather than just comparing the end points) under Article 4.2(a).” A
determination of whether there is an increase in imports cannot,
therefore, be made merely by comparing the end points of the period of
investigation. Indeed, in cases where an examination does not
demonstrate, for instance, a clear and uninterrupted upward trend in
import volumes, a simple end-point-to-end-point analysis could easily be
manipulated to lead to different results, depending on the choice of end
points. A comparison could support either a finding of an increase or a
decrease in import volumes simply by choosing different starting and
ending points.
S.1.7.3 US — Steel Safeguards, paras. 355-356
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… a demonstration of “any increase” in
imports between any two points in time is not sufficient to demonstrate
“increased imports” for purposes of Articles XIX and 2.1. Rather, as
we have said, competent authorities are required to examine the trends
in imports over the entire period of investigation.
We, therefore, reject the United States’
assertion that “the phrase ‘in such increased quantities’ simply
states the requirement that, in general, the level of imports at (or
reasonably near to) the end of a period of investigation be higher than
at some unspecified earlier point in time.” …
S.1.7.4 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 374
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
In our view, what is called for in every case
is an explanation of how the trend in imports supports the
competent authority’s finding that the requirement of “such
increased quantities” within the meaning of Articles XIX:1(a) and 2.1
has been fulfilled. It is this explanation concerning the trend
in imports — over the entire period of investigation — that allows a
competent authority to demonstrate that “a product is being
imported in such increased quantities”.
S.1.8 Article 2.1 — Decrease at the end of an
investigation period back to top
S.1.8.1 Argentina — Footwear (EC), para. 130
(WT/DS121/AB/R)
… In our view, the use of the present tense
of the verb phrase “is being imported” in both Article 2.1 of the Agreement
on Safeguards and Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 indicates that
it is necessary for the competent authorities to examine recent imports,
and not simply trends in imports during the past five years — or, for
that matter, during any other period of several years. In our view, the
phrase “is being imported” implies that the increase in imports must
have been sudden and recent.
S.1.8.2 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 367
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… Article 2.1 does not require that
imports need to be increasing at the time of the determination.
Rather, the plain meaning of the phrase “is being imported in such
increased quantities” suggests merely that imports must have
increased, and that the relevant products continue “being
imported” in (such) increased quantities. We also do not
believe that a decrease in imports at the end of the period of
investigation would necessarily prevent an investigating authority from
finding that, nevertheless, products continue to be imported “in such
increased quantities.”
S.1.8.3 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 388
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… we note here also that, in not explaining
the “most recent decrease” in absolute imports, the USITC did not,
in our view, provide an explanation concerning the overall trend
in imports that occurred during the period of investigation. … In our
view, by failing to address the decrease in imports that occurred
between interim 2000 and interim 2001, the United States did not — and
could not — provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts
supported its finding that imports of hot-rolled bar “increased”, as
required by Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. This
failure to account for the decrease in absolute imports is all the more
serious in the light of the fact that the intervening trend that was not
addressed by the USITC occurred at the very end of the period of
investigation. In US — Lamb, we found that the competent
authority “must assess” the data from the most recent past “in the
context of the data for the entire investigative period”. As the Panel
found, it is, precisely, those most recent data that the USITC failed to
account for with respect to absolute imports.
S.1.9 Article 2.1 — Increase relative to
domestic production back to top
S.1.9.1 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 390
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… Article 2.1 provides that a Member may
apply a safeguard measure after a determination that the relevant
product is “being imported … in such increased quantities, absolute or
relative to domestic production … as to cause or threaten to cause
serious injury” (emphasis added). Therefore, a determination of either
an absolute or relative increase in imports causing serious injury is
sufficient to authorize a Member to apply safeguard measures.
Accordingly, the increased imports requirement can be met not
only if there is an absolute increase in imports, but also if there is
an increase relative to domestic production.
S.1.10 Article 2.1 — Serious injury or threat
thereof.
See also Safeguards Agreement, Article 4.1(b) — Threat
of serious injury (S.1.24) back to top
S.1.10.1 US — Line Pipe, para. 161
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
… precisely what kind of “finding” on
this “pertinent issue of law” must appear in the published report of
the competent authorities? The question is: should the phrase “cause
or threaten to cause” in Article 2.1 be read as “cause or
threaten to cause” in the sense of either one (“cause”) or
the other (“threaten to cause”), but not both? Or should
this phrase be read rather as “cause or threaten to cause” in the
sense of either one or the other, or both in combination (“cause
or threaten to cause”)?
S.1.10.2 US — Line Pipe, paras. 163-164
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
Our view is that the phrase “cause or
threaten to cause” can be read either way. As we read it, the
dictionary definition of “or” supports either conclusion. …
… “or” can be exclusive, and “or”
can also be inclusive. The text of Article 2.1 does not provide decisive
interpretative guidance in this respect. This is not to say that we
believe that “serious injury” and “threat of serious injury” are
the same thing, or that competent authorities may make a finding that
both exist at the same time. Rather, we believe that the text of Article 2.1 lends itself to either interpretation.
S.1.10.3 US — Line Pipe, para. 167
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
… we agree with the Panel that the
respective definitions of “serious injury” and “threat of serious
injury” are two distinct concepts that must be given distinctive
meanings in interpreting the Agreement on Safeguards. Yet,
although we agree with the Panel that the Agreement on Safeguards
establishes a distinction between “serious injury” and “threat of
serious injury”, we do not agree with the Panel that a requirement
follows from such a distinction to make a discrete finding either of “serious
injury” or of “threat of serious injury” when making a
determination relating to the application of a safeguard measure.
S.1.10.4 US — Line Pipe, paras. 170-171
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
… The question at issue is whether the right
[to apply a safeguard measure] exists in this particular case. And, as
the right exists if there is a finding by the competent authorities of a
“threat of serious injury” or — something beyond — “serious
injury”, then it seems to us that it is irrelevant, in determining
whether the right exists, if there is “serious injury” or only
“threat of serious injury” — so long as there is a determination
that there is at least a “threat”. In terms of the rising
continuum of an injurious condition of a domestic industry that ascends
from a “threat of serious injury” up to “serious injury”, we see
“serious injury” — because it is something beyond a “threat”
— as necessarily including the concept of a “threat” and exceeding
the presence of a “threat” for purposes of answering the relevant
inquiry: is there a right to apply a safeguard measure?
Based on this analysis of the most relevant
context of the phrase “cause or threaten to cause” in Article 2.1,
we do not see that phrase as necessarily meaning one or the other,
but not both. Rather, that clause could also mean either one or
the other, or both in combination. Therefore, for the reasons we
have set out, we do not see that it matters — for the purpose of
determining whether there is a right to apply a safeguard measure under
the Agreement on Safeguards — whether a domestic authority finds
that there is “serious injury”, “threat of serious injury”, or,
as the USITC found here, “serious injury or threat of serious injury”.
In any of those events, the right to apply a safeguard is, in our view,
established.
S.1.11 Article 2.1 — Causation.
See also
Safeguards Agreement, Article 4.2(b) — Causation (S.1.29-32)
back to top
S.1.11.1 US — Wheat Gluten, para. 76
(WT/DS166/AB/R)
… Thus, under Article 2.1, the causation
analysis embraces two elements: the first relating to increased “imports”
specifically and the second to the “conditions” under which imports
are occurring.
S.1.12 Article 2.1 — “under such conditions”
back to top
S.1.12.1 US — Wheat Gluten, para. 78
(WT/DS166/AB/R)
… Thus, the phrase “under such conditions”
refers generally to the prevailing “conditions”, in the marketplace
for the product concerned, when the increase in imports occurs.
Interpreted in this way, the phrase “under such conditions” is a
shorthand reference to the remaining factors listed in Article 4.2(a),
which relate to the overall state of the domestic industry and the
domestic market, as well as to other factors “having a bearing on the
situation of [the] industry”. The phrase “under such conditions”,
therefore, supports the view that, under Articles 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) of
the Agreement on Safeguards, the competent authorities should
determine whether the increase in imports, not alone, but in conjunction
with the other relevant factors, cause serious injury.
S.1.13 Article 2 — Parallelism
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S.1.13.1 GENERAL
S.1.13.1.1 US — Wheat Gluten, para. 96
(WT/DS166/AB/R)
The same phrase — “product … being
imported” — appears in both these paragraphs of Article 2. In
view of the identity of the language in the two provisions, and in the
absence of any contrary indication in the context, we believe that it is
appropriate to ascribe the same meaning to this phrase in both
Articles 2.1 and 2.2. To include imports from all sources in the
determination that increased imports are causing serious injury, and
then to exclude imports from one source from the application of the
measure, would be to give the phrase “product being imported” a different
meaning in Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
In Article 2.1, the phrase would embrace imports from all sources
whereas, in Article 2.2, it would exclude imports from certain sources.
This would be incongruous and unwarranted. In the usual course,
therefore, the imports included in the determinations made under
Articles 2.1 and 4.2 should correspond to the imports included in the
application of the measure, under Article 2.2.
S.1.13.1.2 US — Line Pipe, paras. 179,
181, 194
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
The concept of parallelism is derived from the
parallel language used in the first and second paragraphs of Article 2
of the Agreement on Safeguards. …
…
As we then stated in US — Wheat
Gluten, “the imports included in the determinations made under
Articles 2.1 and 4.2 should correspond to the imports included in the
application of the measure, under Article 2.2.” We added that a gap
between imports covered under the investigation and imports falling
within the scope of the measure can be justified only if the competent
authorities “establish explicitly” that imports from sources covered
by the measure “satisf[y] the conditions for the application of a
safeguard measure, as set out in Article 2.1 and elaborated in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards.” And, as we explained
further in US — Lamb, in the context of a claim under
Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, “establish[ing]
explicitly” implies that the competent authorities must provide a “reasoned
and adequate explanation of how the facts support their
determination”.
…
… To be explicit, a statement must express
distinctly all that is meant; it must leave nothing merely implied or
suggested; it must be clear and unambiguous.
S.1.13.1.3 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 441
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… where, for purposes of applying a
safeguard measure, a Member has conducted an investigation considering
imports from all sources (that is, including any members
of a free-trade area), that Member may not, subsequently, without any
further analysis, exclude imports from free-trade area partners from the
application of the resulting safeguard measure. As we stated in US
— Line Pipe, if a Member were to do so, there would be a “gap”
between, on the one hand, imports covered by the investigation and, on
the other hand, imports falling within the scope of the safeguard
measure. …
S.1.13.2 PRIMA FACIE CASE
S.1.13.2.1 US — Line Pipe, para. 187
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
… Korea has demonstrated that the USITC
considered imports from all sources in its investigation. Korea has also
shown that exports from Canada and Mexico were excluded from the
safeguard measure at issue. And, in our view, this is enough to
have made a prima facie case of the absence of parallelism in the
line pipe measure. …
S.1.14 Article 2 — “factors other than
increased imports” back to top
S.1.14.1 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 450
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… the phrase “increased imports” in
Articles 4.2(a) and 4.2(b) must, in our view, be read as referring to
the same set of imports envisaged in Article 2.1, that is, to imports
included in the safeguard measure. Consequently, imports excluded
from the application of the safeguard measure must be considered a
factor “other than increased imports” within the meaning of Article 4.2(b). The possible injurious effects that these excluded imports may
have on the domestic industry must not be attributed to imports included
in the safeguard measure pursuant to Article 4.2(b). The requirement
articulated by the Panel “to account for the fact that excluded
imports may have some injurious impact on the domestic industry” is,
therefore, not, as the United States argues, an “extra analytical step”
that the Panel added to the analysis of imports from all sources. To the
contrary, this requirement necessarily follows from the obligation in
Article 4.2(b) for the competent authority to ensure that the effects of
factors other than increased imports — a set of factors that subsumes imports
excluded from the safeguard measure — are not attributed to imports
included in the measure, in establishing a causal link between imports
included in the measure and serious injury or threat thereof.
S.1.14.2 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 452
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
In order to provide such a reasoned and
adequate explanation, the competent authority must explain how it
ensured that it did not attribute the injurious effects of factors
other than included imports — which subsume “excluded imports”
— to the imports included in the measure. As we explained in US
— Line
Pipe in the context of Article 3.1 and “unforeseen developments”
in this Report, if the competent authority does not provide such an
explanation, a panel is not in a position to find that the competent
authority ensured compliance with the clear and express requirement of
non-attribution under Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.
S.1.15 Article 2 — Separate determinations
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S.1.15.1 US — Steel Safeguards, paras. 465-466
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… the USITC made two separate
determinations — one determination that the exclusion of imports
from Canada and Mexico would not change the “injury analysis”
of the USITC, and another separate determination that the
exclusion of imports from Israel and Jordan would not change the
conclusions of the USITC.
The requirement of the Agreement on
Safeguards to establish explicitly that imports from sources covered
by a measure, alone, satisfy the conditions for the application
of a safeguard measure cannot be fulfilled by conducting a series of
separate and partial determinations. For example, where a WTO Member
seeks to establish explicitly that imports from sources other than A
and B satisfy the conditions for the application of a safeguard
measure, if that Member conducts a separate investigation, and makes a
separate determination, on whether imports from sources other than A
satisfy the relevant conditions, and then, subsequently, conducts another
separate and distinct investigation, and makes a separate determination,
on whether imports from sources other than B satisfy the relevant
conditions, then these two separate determinations, in our view,
do not demonstrate that imports from sources other than A and B
together satisfy the requirements for the imposition of a safeguard
measure. By making these two separate determinations, that Member will,
logically, for each of them, be basing its determination, in part,
either on imports from A or on imports from B. If this were permitted, a
determination on the application of a safeguard measure could be easily
subjected to mathematical manipulation. This could not have been the
intent of the Members of the WTO in drafting and agreeing on the Agreement
on Safeguards.
S.1.15.2 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 468
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
It may not have made a practical difference in
the application of the safeguard measures at issue in this appeal, in as
much as, on the facts, the quantity of imports from the excluded
countries was negligible or virtually non-existent. However, we are of
the view that, rather than making two separate determinations —
excluding either Canada and Mexico, or, alternatively, Israel and Jordan
— from the underlying data on which it based its overall determination,
the USITC should have, as the Panel found, provided one single joint
determination, supported explicitly by a reasoned and adequate
explanation, on whether imports from sources other than Canada,
Israel, Jordan, and Mexico, by themselves,
satisfied the conditions for the application of a safeguard measure.
S.1.15.3 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 471
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
As for the argument that the USITC’s
findings on imports from sources other than Canada and Mexico should
have been read by the Panel as applying simultaneously to imports from
sources other than Canada, Israel, Jordan, and Mexico by virtue of
the small import volumes at issue, we observe that the Agreement
on Safeguards does not provide for any different application of the
parallelism requirement based on the volume of imports. With this
argument, the United States is asking us to read something into the Agreement
on Safeguards that is not there, and this we cannot do.
S.1.16 Article 2.1, Footnote 1 — Customs
union.
See also Regional Trade Agreements, Relationship between
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement (R.1.6)
back to top
S.1.16.1 Argentina — Footwear (EC), para. 108
(WT/DS121/AB/R)
… at the time the safeguard measures at
issue in this case were imposed by the Government of Argentina, these
measures were not applied by MERCOSUR “on behalf of” Argentina, but
rather, they were applied by Argentina. It is Argentina that is a Member
of the WTO for the purposes of Article 2 of the Agreement on
Safeguards, and it is Argentina that applied the safeguard measures
after conducting an investigation of products being imported into its
territory and the effects of those imports on its domestic
industry. For these reasons, we do not believe that footnote 1 to
Article 2.1 applies to the safeguard measures imposed by Argentina in
this case. …
S.1.16.2 Argentina — Footwear (EC), para. 109
(WT/DS121/AB/R)
… we also are not persuaded that an analysis
of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 was relevant to the specific issue that
was before the Panel. This issue, as the Panel itself observed, is
whether Argentina, after including imports from all sources in its
investigation of “increased imports” of footwear products into its
territory and the consequent effects of such imports on its domestic
footwear industry, was justified in excluding other MERCOSUR member
States from the application of the safeguard measures. In our Report in Turkey
— Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products
[Appellate Body Report, para. 58], we stated that under certain
conditions, “Article XXIV may justify a measure which is inconsistent
with certain other GATT provisions.” We indicated, however, that this
defence is available only when it is demonstrated by the Member imposing
the measure that “the measure at issue is introduced upon the
formation of a customs union that fully meets the requirements of
sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV” and “that the
formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were not
allowed to introduce the measure at issue.”
S.1.16.3 Argentina — Footwear (EC), para. 114
(WT/DS121/AB/R)
… We conclude that Argentina, on the facts
of this case, cannot justify the imposition of its safeguard measures
only on non-MERCOSUR third country sources of supply on the basis of an
investigation that found serious injury or threat thereof caused by
imports from all sources, including imports from other MERCOSUR member
States. However, as we have stated, we do not agree that the Panel was
dealing, on the facts of this case, with a safeguard measure applied by
a customs union on behalf of a member State. And we wish to
underscore that, as the issue is not raised in this appeal, we make no
ruling on whether, as a general principle, a member of a customs union
can exclude other members of that customs union from the application of
a safeguard measure.
S.1.17 Article 2.2 — Free trade area.
See
also Regional Trade Agreements, Relationship between Article XXIV of
the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement (R.1.6)
back to top
S.1.17.1 US — Line Pipe, para. 198
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
… we do not prejudge whether Article 2.2 of
the Agreement on Safeguards permits a Member to exclude imports
originating in member states of a free-trade area from the scope of a
safeguard measure. We need not, and so do not, rule on the question
whether Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 permits exempting imports
originating in a partner of a free-trade area from a measure in
departure from Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards. The
question of whether Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 serves as an exception
to Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards becomes relevant in
only two possible circumstances. One is when, in the investigation by
the competent authorities of a WTO Member, the imports that are exempted
from the safeguard measure are not considered in the
determination of serious injury. The other is when, in such an
investigation, the imports that are exempted from the safeguard measure are
considered in the determination of serious injury, and the
competent authorities have also established explicitly, through a
reasoned and adequate explanation, that imports from sources outside the
free-trade area, alone, satisfied the conditions for the application of
a safeguard measure, as set out in Article 2.1 and elaborated in Article 4.2. …
S.1.18 Article 3.1 — General
back to top
S.1.18.1 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 304
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… Members may suspend trade concessions
temporarily by applying safeguard measures “only” in
accordance with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and with the Agreement
on Safeguards, including Article 3.1 of that Agreement. The last
sentence of the latter provision, as elaborated by Article 4.2(c) of
that Agreement, requires that:
(a) the “competent authorities … publish a
report”;
(b) the report contain “a detailed analysis
of the case”;
(c) the report “demonstrat[e] … the
relevance of the factors examined”;
(d) the report “set[] forth findings and
reasoned conclusions”; and
(e) the “findings and reasoned conclusions”
cover “all pertinent issues of fact and law” prescribed in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the relevant provisions of the Agreement on
Safeguards.
S.1.18.2 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 331
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… under Article 2.1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards, safeguard measures can be justified “only”
when, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of
obligations incurred, including tariff concessions, a product is being
imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that
produces like or directly competitive products. It is “only”
if these prerequisites set forth in Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994
and the Agreement on Safeguards are shown to exist that the right
to apply a safeguard measure arises. The fulfilment of each of these
prerequisites is a “pertinent issue[] of fact and law” for which “finding[s]
and reasoned conclusion[s]” must be included in the published report
of the competent authorities, as required by Article 3.1 of the Agreement
on Safeguards. …
S.1.19 Article 3.1 — Investigation
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S.1.19.1 US — Wheat Gluten, para. 53
(WT/DS166/AB/R)
… The ordinary meaning of the word “investigation”
suggests that the competent authorities should carry out a “systematic
inquiry” or a “careful study” into the matter before them. The
word, therefore, suggests a proper degree of activity on the part of the
competent authorities because authorities charged with conducting an
inquiry or a study — to use the treaty language, an “investigation”
— must actively seek out pertinent information.
S.1.19.2 US — Wheat Gluten, para. 54
(WT/DS166/AB/R)
… The focus of the investigative steps
mentioned in Article 3.1 is on “interested parties”, who must be
notified of the investigation, and who must be given an opportunity to
submit “evidence”, as well as their “views”, to the competent
authorities. The interested parties are also to be given an opportunity
to “respond to the presentations of other parties”. The Agreement
on Safeguards, therefore, envisages that the interested parties play
a central role in the investigation and that they will be a primary
source of information for the competent authorities.
S.1.19.3 US — Wheat Gluten, para. 55
(WT/DS166/AB/R)
… we note that the competent authorities’
“investigation” under Article 3.1 is not limited to the
investigative steps mentioned in that provision, but must simply “include”
these steps. Therefore, the competent authorities must undertake
additional investigative steps, when the circumstances so require, in
order to fulfill their obligation to evaluate all relevant factors.
S.1.19.4 US — Lamb, para. 113
(WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R)
… In arguing claims in dispute settlement, a
WTO Member is not confined merely to rehearsing arguments
that were made to the competent authorities by the interested parties
during the domestic investigation, even if the WTO Member was itself an
interested party in that investigation. Likewise, panels are not obliged
to determine, and confirm themselves the nature and character of the
arguments made by the interested parties to the competent authorities.
Arguments before national competent authorities may be influenced by,
and focused on, the requirements of the national laws, regulations and
procedures. On the other hand, dispute settlement proceedings brought
under the DSU concerning safeguard measures imposed under the Agreement
on Safeguards may involve arguments that were not submitted to the
competent authorities by the interested parties.
S.1.19.5 US — Lamb, para. 115
(WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R)
We wish to emphasize that the discretion that
WTO Members enjoy to argue dispute settlement claims in the manner they
deem appropriate does not, of course, detract from their obligation,
under Article 3.10 of the DSU, “to engage in dispute settlement
procedures ‘in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute’.”
It follows that WTO Members cannot improperly withhold arguments from
competent authorities with a view to raising those arguments later
before a panel. …
S.1.20 Article 3.1 — Multiple findings
back to top
S.1.20.1 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 414
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… we note that Article 3.1 of the Agreement
on Safeguards requires the competent authority, inter alia,
to “publish a report setting forth their findings and reasoned
conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law”. We do
not read Article 3.1 as necessarily precluding the possibility of
providing multiple findings instead of a single finding in order to
support a determination under Articles 2.1 and 4 of the Agreement on
Safeguards. Nor does any other provision of the Agreement on
Safeguards expressly preclude such a possibility. The Agreement
on Safeguards, therefore, in our view, does not interfere with the
discretion of a WTO Member to choose whether to support the
determination of its competent authority by a single explanation or,
alternatively, by multiple explanations by members of the competent
authority. This discretion reflects the fact that, as we stated in US
— Line Pipe [Appellate Body Report, para. 158], “the Agreement
on Safeguards does not prescribe the internal decision-making
process for making [] a determination [in a domestic safeguard
investigation]”.
S.1.20.2 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 418
and footnote 388
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… in examining whether one of the multiple
sets of explanations set forth by the competent authority, taken
individually, provides a reasoned and adequate explanation for the
competent authority’s determination, a panel may have to address, inter
alia, the question whether, as a matter of WTO obligations,
findings by individual Commissioners made on the basis of a broad
product grouping can provide a reasoned and adequate explanation for a
“single institutional determination” of the USITC concerning a narrow
product grouping.388
Accordingly, we do not suggest that the
product scope of an affirmative finding by an individual Commissioner is
not relevant for the enquiry whether this finding does or does
not provide a reasoned and adequate explanation for the competent
authority’s determination. Rather, our finding implies that a panel
may not conclude that there is no reasoned and adequate explanation for
a competent authority’s determination by relying merely on the fact
that distinct multiple explanations given by the competent authority are
not based on an identically-defined like product.
S.1.21 Article 3.1 — Published report
back to top
S.1.21.1 US — Lamb, para. 72
(WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R)
… The first clause [of Article XIX:1(a) of
the GATT 1994], as we noted, contains, in part, the “circumstance”
of “unforeseen developments”. The second clause, as we said, relates
to the three “conditions” for the application of safeguard measures,
which are also reiterated in Article 2.1 of the Agreement on
Safeguards. Clearly, the fulfilment of these conditions must be the
central element of the report of the competent authorities, which must
be published under Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
…
S.1.21.2 US — Lamb, para. 76
(WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R)
… we observe that Article 3.1 requires
competent authorities to set forth findings and reasoned conclusions on
“all pertinent issues of fact and law” in their published report. As
Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 requires that “unforeseen
developments” must be demonstrated, as a matter of fact, for a
safeguard measure to be applied, the existence of “unforeseen
developments” is, in our view, a “pertinent issue[] of fact and law”,
under Article 3.1, for the application of a safeguard measure, and it
follows that the published report of the competent authorities, under
that Article , must contain a “finding” or “reasoned conclusion”
on “unforeseen developments”.
S.1.21.3 US — Line Pipe, para. 160
(WT/DS202/AB/R)
We agree with the Panel that the fulfilment of
the basic conditions set out in Article 2.1 is a “pertinent issue[] of
law” for which “finding[s]” or “reasoned conclusion[s]” must
be included in the published report of the competent authorities, as
required by Article 3.1. We agree with the Panel also that among those
“issues” is the condition that the “product” must be “imported
… in such increased quantities, … and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten to cause serious injury”.
S.1.21.4 US — Steel Safeguards, para. 295
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… Although we agree with the United States
that competent authorities “may choose any structure, any order of
analysis, and any format for [the] explanation that they see fit, as
long as the report complies” with Article 3.1, we do not agree that
the Panel was requiring that a report be in a certain form. …
S.1.22 Article 3.1 — Reasoned conclusions
back to top
S.1.22.1 US — Steel Safeguards, paras. 286-288
(WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R,
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R,
WT/DS259/AB/R)
… The requirement of Article 3.1 is that “competent
authorities shall publish a report setting forth their findings and
reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law.”
The meaning of Article 3.1 must be established through an examination of
the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 3.1, read in their context
and in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement on
Safeguards. Thus, instead of basing an interpretation of Article 3.1
— as the United States does — entirely on the meaning of one word
— “reasoned” — in that provision, it is, in our view, appropriate to
interpret Article 3.1 by examining the ordinary meaning of all of
the words that together prescribe the relevant obligation in that
Article .
In doing so, we note that the definition of
“conclusion” is “the result of a discussion or an examination of
an issue” or a “judgement or statement arrived at by reasoning: an
inference; a deduction”. Thus |
