Let me first say how honoured I am to be your host today, and to open
the academic year of the School of Public Affairs.
It has not been that long since I taught myself in this institution. But
between last academic year and this new one, my personal stage has
undergone some slight changes in scenery. I am therefore especially
grateful to have been given today this opportunity to go back to more
theoretical thoughts. I’m deeply convinced that no sound public action
can be taken without a relevant analysis of its subject matter and of
the global landscape in which it operates.
Regarding today's topic, the WTO, can, in my view play an important role
in global governance. It’s not a sort of inversed Groucho Marx syndrome
that I’m expressing here : it’s not because I’m the new DG of the WTO
that I’m pointing out its very peculiar position in the actual global
governance system! It’s actually a thought that I've been publicly
expressing for years, and that I formed in my former position as the
European Commissioner for trade, negotiating for the EU on the
multilateral trade stage.
Now, turning to our subject of global governance, I’ll try today to
sketch for you the reasons why we need it more than ever, and how we
should think about it if we are really willing to build it.
PART I. DIAGNOSTIC
Globalization – by which I mean the growing interdependence of all the
people on the planet as the distinction between ‘near’ and ‘far’ becomes
blurred — now affects every dimension of our societies, not only the
economic dimension. Globalization has brought several additional
positive aspects: it has enabled individuals, corporations and nation-states
to reach further around the world, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever
before, and the world to reach into them in the same way.
But the global nature of an increasing number of some worrisome
phenomena –the growing shortage of energy resources, the destruction of
the biosphere, the spread of pandemics, the volatility of financial
markets, and the migratory movements provoked by insecurity, poverty or
systemic political instability — is also a product of globalization.
Globalization is already a reality, but it is also an on-going process
that creates a new need for efficiency that cannot be met by nation-states
alone. The new issues raised by global conflicts and crises, by
political developments and by the crises that appear to be affecting the
planet’s governments, make it apparent that we need to contemplate new
forms of governance.
That there is a widening gap between global challenges and the ways of
working out solutions is no longer in dispute today. One of the most
important consequences of this gap is, in my view, the feeling of
dispossession which is spreading among the citizens of this planet.
Dispossession of their own destiny, dispossession of the means to act on
an individual level as well as at a national level – to say nothing of
the global one.
Let's be very clear here: it’s not globalization which creates this
feeling, it’s the absence of the means to tackle it appropriately. It’s
the absence of governance at the required level, the global one. The
feeling that you can’t do anything and that your own government can’t
really do more has two impacts: first, an immediate backlash on the
confidence and trust that you put in your national system of governance.
Second, this feeling of dispossession is a direct threat on the idea
that you can influence your future. What happens next is that feeling
such a dispossession increases the anxieties towards the future. The
future becomes an anxiogenic figure, because citizens are not convinced
that there is a captain to pilot their plane. It represents a direct
blow to the idea of anticipation. And anticipation, which is based on a
comprehensive view of the systemic elements which are at the making of
our societies, is at the very heart of the idea of progress, not to
speak about democracy.
The absence of governance, to put it simply, destroys the very idea of
progress, which has been the basic energy of the transformation of human
societies since the XVIII century and which has been the founding
principle of democracy. Without this idea, it’s back to the rule of the
To address the global questions, problems, threats, fears, at the
appropriate level, we need more governance at the global level. Which is
not at all saying that we need a world government, as I will now explain.
PART II. FACED WITH GLOBALIZATION: WE NEED FURTHER GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
What do I mean by global governance? (1)
For me global governance describes the system we set up to assist human
society to achieve its common purpose in a sustainable manner, that is
with equity and justice. Growing “interdependence requires that our laws,
our social norms and values, our other mechanisms for framing human
behaviour — family, education, culture, religion to name only a few of
them – be examined, understood and operated together as coherently as
possible so as to ensure the basis of our effective sustainable
development”. It involves thus necessarily, the recognition of the role
and responsibilities of new actors, openness of processes, authentic and
effective participation, accountability of those acting, and coherence. (2)
How can the interdependence of our world be better managed? In my
view, three elements must pave the way of this research:
First of all, values. Values allow our feeling of belonging to a world
community, embryonic as it may be, to coexist alongside national
Second, we need actors who have sufficient legitimacy to get public
opinion interested in the debate who are capable of taking
responsibility for its outcome and who are held accountable.
Third we need mechanisms of governance that are truly effective and
which can, inter alia, arbitrate values and interests in a legitimate
I am not proposing an institutional revolution but, rather, a
combination of global ambition and pragmatic suggestions. Building
global governance is a gradual process, involving changes to long-standing
practices, entrenched interests, cultural habits and social norms and
WE NEED TO ADDRESS “VALUES”
If we wish to construct a collective dimension, we have to want to live
together. Can, in other words, diversity be transcended in such a way as
to allow the ‘community of nations’ to become, thanks to a series of
political measures, a ‘global’ community?
Global collective values, common public goods
Globalization brings into contact peoples, societies and creatures that
have made, through history, choices that are sometimes similar,
sometimes very different from one place to another one. A debate about
collective values, regional or universal, is then a necessity. There are
already steps taken into this direction: for instance, there is a quite
large agreement between the nations on the right to health and education,
or core labour standards. And there is an awareness of the fact that on
questions like environmental goods or international migrations, purely
national responses are no longer adequate.
This debate on shared values may allow us to define the common goods
that we would like to promote and defend collectively at the global
scale. The systemic nature of those goods requires very different
handling than other objects of international cooperation. These
collective world goods provide the basis for world governance. A sort of
As I'll develop later on, to me the multilateral trade system is in
itself an international public good.
Once we have identified and agreed on core values, we need to ensure
that authentic actors are involved in this process.
WE NEED AUTHENTIC ACTORS
To ensure legitimacy, we need a common and representative debating
chamber because there can be no collective appropriation of political
will without it, the basis of democracy. We will not succeed in creating
a real international ‘community’ unless we make a determined effort to
create such an arena for dialogue and politics.
The first, and relatively simple, steps that we have to take towards a
more balanced representation of the world would be to encourage the
establishment of parliamentary structures at the international level in
order to bring together representatives from various national
parliaments, and to admit representatives of civil society to an
economic and social council capable of functioning effectively.
We have also to ensure that authentic interests and the interests of
most people are taken into account in our management of international
relations and the way we operate our regional and global systems of
values, rights and obligations.
The interdependence that unites us can be reflected at several levels of
human activity. The problems and difficulties facing us may be local,
regional, or global, as are the interests to be defended and protected.
Consequently, the representativeness of the interests concerned should
correspond to the human field specifically affected by globalization and
its operational tentacles.
In this context, the various voices and groupings may – depending on the
issues or problems involved – may be horizontal, or sometimes vertical.
For example, while some problems are fundamentally global – certain
environmental phenomena for instance – and require the participation and
representation of horizontal or global actors, other human difficulties
and the negative consequences of globalization are more circumscribed.
These issues call for the participation of actors representing smaller
interests which, although perhaps more specialized, are every bit as
important to maintaining the universal balance if we believe in justice
and human equity. I am thinking here of issues such as violence in the
cities, inland water irrigation problems, etc., which can be better
handled by the local authorities. And though it is they that must act
and be represented, this does not in any way obviate the need felt by
these vertical actors to act jointly and to share, nor does it detract
from the importance that the higher echelons of the international or
global order should accord them.
Once we have made sure that authentic actors will participate in the
debate over which values to protect, we need to ensure that we have an
appropriate mechanism to arbitrate disputes over values.
WE NEED MECHANISMS OF REAL GOVERNANCE
This puts us on the ground of international
institutions – and they all have problems.
Autonomous decisions and the right to take
initiative by international institutions
The further you are, the less legitimate you are: distance reduces
legitimacy. For democracy to be the organisational principle of global
powers, we need to build it and we could begin to do so with our
existing international organisations.
International organisations have their own legal personality and
therefore the potential capacity to take decisions to further the
interests of the institution and its membership. But they lack the means,
instruments and political responsibility that would allow them to play a
more decisive role. Elements of collective trust have of course
developed within the international relations system. International law
has, in some cases, been able to police the brutality of state-to-state
relations. Yet we cannot avoid the conclusion that suspicion is still a
structuring factor in international relations. If we want to live
together, we have to reduce the level of suspicion. Setting the system
in motion and reducing the level of suspicion means making it possible
for global institutions to take decisions and initiatives which are
central to the international system.
We have to advance one step at a time and ensure there is a basic level
of trust in every international organisation that can put forward
initiatives, reach compromises and propose solutions. The UN Secretary-General
can play that role, assuming that the permanent members of the Security
Council allow him to do so. Similarly, the Directors of the World Bank
have the power to kick start their institutions. So, to a lesser extent,
do the Directors General of the ILO and the WHO. The Director-General of
the WTO, on the other hand, does not have that power because the
consensus principle – however important in terms of the ethos of the WTO
– makes it formally difficult for him to take real initiatives.
Mechanisms for the arbitration of disputes
Globalization brings into contact peoples who have not always taken the
same social choices. And when States explain what they expect from the
world-governance system, they have different priorities. There are many
reasons for this: their history, their country’s level of development,
the incompatible political and social projects they have drawn up, and
so on. We therefore need mechanisms to arbitrate values or their effect
on trade or other people's rights. We also need to arbitrate conflicts
between values and between fundamental values and other types of
interests. These could also be described as mechanisms that guarantee
that the rules are respected, or as a form of international justice.
These systems, and we have some, do on the other hand raise delicate
questions about legitimacy. What legitimacy does an expert sitting on an
arbitration panel have, when compared for example with an elected
representative of a sovereign state? Why should an International Crimes
Tribunal be in a better position to judge a war criminal than a national
court? How can national authorities be made to accept the decisions of
an International Criminal Court? We need to ensure that the rules
applied by those courts are themselves legitimate and transparent.
I have tried to outline some of the component of such global governance.
But we do not need to start everything again. We do have elements of
global governance in existing regional settings as well as in some
universal systems. Let's look at two examples of those embryos of global
governance: Europe and the WTO.
PART III. EMBRYO OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
I am a pragmatic man and with age growing I am tired of listening to the
same old discussions of Utopia. I don't want to work on yet another
version of the universal polis, a “cosmopolis”, which is a sort of world
democratic chimera. Indeed, we are not starting from scratch. On the
contrary, we have raw materials we can use. We can also capitalise on
the present archipelago of world governance. Today I will refer to two
sets of examples of such embryos of governance: one at the regional
level, the other, at the global level. I will look at what is already in
place and try to sketch how what we have in place can be used to further
REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: EUROPE
To outline the
European paradigm briefly is no easy matter, especially in these
troubled times for the European Union but it is useful to try,
especially since the building of Europe is in fact the most ambitious
experiment in supranational governance ever attempted. It is one of
domestically sovereign nation states and, at the international level,
the mutual agreement of those same nation states entering into, or
abandoning alliances (or obligations) at will. The European construction
has been the one of a desired, defined and organized interdependence
between its member states.
What are the basic tools that have allowed Europe to stand as a
laboratory for a different kind of governance is what I propose we look
at for a moment. To do so we nevertheless have to keep in mind that the
construction of Europe is a work in progress and has not stabilized
neither in its geographical dimension, nor on its political ambition.
And that construction of Europe is a specific process, which is
historically taking place in Europe, but that should not lead us to do
some form of “euromorphism”, i.e. the temptation of ascribing universal
value to what is only a part of the reality of our world.
As I said, the European Union is a desired, defined and organized
interdependence. The key factor, in my view, of this very peculiar
chemistry lies in the intimate mix of three ingredients: first, the
political will to integrate; second, agreement on the goal being sought;
and third, a machinery of procedures and institutions capable of
producing and ensuring the governance of the expected results.
Will, common objectives, institutional and procedural machinery: here is
the European tripod ready to walk. But those three elements, to produce
the chemistry, have to be mixed together. They are so indissociable
indeed that the presence of two of them leads automatically to the
appearance of the third. In the catalysis of those three pillars lies
the political energy that makes it work.
It’s the conjunction of those three elements that made the European Coal
and Steel Community fly, in the 1950’s. There was the political will to
move beyond the destruction of two European wars. To do so, European
founding fathers thought up a concrete project, a concrete and common
objective, that would combine the two essential pillars of the economies
of the time — coal and steel – and create “de facto solidarities”, as
Robert Schumann put it. It was the strength of those first two elements
(the will and the objective) that made possible the boldness of the
third: the creation of a sui generis supranational institution (the High
Authority of the ECSC).
Second example: The same elements crop up again to launch, in 1985, the
campaign for the internal market for 1992. Here, the political will was
gained through the strong support from determined national leaders (François
Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl, Margaret Thatcher, Felipe Gonzalez, Giulio
Andreotti, to name but a few); a precise objective, agreed upon as such
: the disappearance of internal borders for goods, services, capital and
persons ; and, in the name of that will and that agreed objective, once
the objective had been agreed upon, a major institutional reform in that
decisions on the creation of the internal market would change from
requiring unanimity to being adopted by majority vote.
Third and final example, the most recent in the economic field: the
euro. Here again we find signs of political will regarding a monetary
union as early as the 1960s. It grew gradually stronger in response to
the world monetary shocks of the 1970s. It took twenty years for this
political debate – to reach maturity, not earlier as around 1990. It
took this time to recognize the limits of the European monetary “snake”,
the incompatibility of a single market and the free circulation of
capital with independent monetary policies, and the time for all the
participants to adopt monetary stability as the aim of monetary policy.
But as soon as the political will and the political objectives were
agreed and shared, the necessary institutional framework was brought to
life in just a few months.
These three examples are I think clear proof of the existence of the
tripod I referred to a while ago: an interdependence sufficiently
desired and well defined to be organized. When those three elements are
not solid enough – like in macroeconomic governance or defence and
foreign policy for instance – no new political field may emerge, at the
union level. But this leads us astray from the topic of our discussion
I warned at the outset that the construction of Europe can’t be taken as
a blueprint for the construction of global governance. It shows however
that only a democratic debate to share objectives and to build the
political support can give birth to the appropriate global governance,
and that the doses of legitimacy required are higher than what is
necessary at the national level which is, I believe, an important lesson.
Let's look now at an embryo of global governance — the WTO.
MULTILATERAL GOVERNANCE: THE WTO
Although international trade is only one, but the most visible,
dimension of globalization, the WTO system is definitely an active
player in global governance. Today I will discuss first briefly the
governance of international trade which in its sophistication differs
from what is after all the still rather primitive scene formed by the
other sectors of international governance. The WTO contains a set of
values, it involves different types of actors and it provides for
procedure to arbitrate values between States and between values and
trade interest. But the WTO itself is a “universal value” as it
crystallizes the parameters of the multilateral trade system, which I
believe, is an international public good.
The multilateral trading system (and thus the WTO) is an
international public good
Why is the
multilateral trading system an international public good? Non-discriminatory
trade liberalization by WTO Members has the characteristics of a global
public good: everyone benefits in the medium term from the increase in
efficiency that results from the removal of global distortions in prices,
which encourages countries to produce according to their comparative
advantage. According to Ernesto Zedillo the WTO is the only instrument
that can be used to deliver the global public good of non-discriminatory
multilateral trade. As it is essentially public in consumption, its
benefits should accrue to all people.(3)
But we know that rich industrialized countries have drawn more benefits
from the multilateral trade system than developing countries.(4)
This is why I always insist that the opening up of markets must produce
real benefits in the everyday lives of the countries concerned — which
is only possible if we have rules that provide for a level playing field,
that ensure technical capacity building, and that enable Members to
improve their domestic governance so that this opening up of markets can
be truly beneficial to most people. So the opening up of markets
stimulated by the WTO produces benefits to many, but also has its costs,
whose distribution is largely beyond the WTO's control. Hence the need
to cooperate more coherently towards more effective global governance.
Let's look at how the WTO addresses values, actors and its institutional
mechanisms of real governance.
The benefits of market opening as a basic value
The basic value underpinning the WTO is that market opening is good.
Market opening allows for a division of labour between countries and for
resources to be used more appropriately and more effectively for
production. It has been forged, to start with, as a result of observing
the negative effects of protectionism on our economies at different
times in recent history and in particular between the two World wars of
last century. And then from observing the positive effects of the
opening-up of trade in the last fifty years.
But the WTO’s trading system offers more than that. It helps to increase
efficiency and to cut costs even more because of important principles
enshrined in the system such as non-discrimination (trade from all
Members is treated alike), transparency (clear information about
policies, rules and regulations); increased certainty about trading
relations (commitments to lower trade barriers and to increase other
countries’ access to one’s markets are legally binding). Many other
areas of the WTO’s agreements can also help reduce corruption and bad
Other non-trade values
At the same time
the WTO also recognizes the importance of values other than market
opening and trade efficiency. Since its inception, the GATT has always
recognized that legitimate government policies may justify measures
which are contrary to basic GATT market access
rules. Traditionally in GATT, States have the right to deviate
from market access obligations to favour values of public morals, the
protection of health of people, animals and health or the conservation
of natural resources etc... The WTO includes in its constitution these
fundamental social values.
But there is another principle of the WTO system that assists in the
arbitration of values between Members and between trade values and non-trade
values. Pursuant to the WTO, each Member is free to determine the values
to which it gives priority and the level of protection it deems adequate
for such values. This would include any societal value elected by a WTO
Member. As further discussed below, the only control exercised by the
WTO is whether the Member is in good faith when invoking such non-trade
values or whether it is rather hiding a protectionist device. This
control is exercised by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
The WTO is a classic international
organisation where States are Members. Yet the WTO may be one of the
most avant-guardiste institutions, because it is able to adapt quickly
to reality; I give you two examples. First, the participation of the EC
as an autonomous Member (independent from the EC member states). If de
facto during the 1970's the Commission began to participate in the GATT
meetings etc.. and de facto spoke for all EC states, it is only with the
Uruguay Round that the European Communities became a formal WTO Member,
distinct from the EC states which are also WTO Members. The legal trick
was a simple footnote that stated that in case of votes, the Europeans
would not have more votes that the number of States of the European
Communities – even foreseeing the expansion of the EC. So the WTO has
been able to suggest solutions to deal with problems.
The WTO also has been able to adapt and adjust to the increased demands
from the civil society and NGOs. The development of the WTO – its far
reaching agreements, the linking of these agreements into a “single
undertaking”, and the possibility of economic sanctions – has led many
within civil society to feel more directly impacted by the trading
system. They claim a right to participate in the debate and in the
decision-making process by Members.
Now the WTO has learned to engage civil society in a variety of
different ways. Through the annual Public Symposia that it organizes,
governments, the WTO Secretariat, academia and civil society all have
the opportunity to interact. There are also regular WTO briefings and we
circulate to Members a list of all papers submitted by NGOs to the WTO.
But civil society interacts with the WTO in other ways too. For instance,
members of civil society can send amicus curiae briefs (which are
“friends of the court” briefs) to Panels and the Appellate Body in the
context of WTO dispute settlement. This is in recognition of the
importance of civil society's views.
Last month the WTO witnessed an important evolution in its dispute
settlement process with its first “public” hearing. In a dispute between
the US, Canada and the EC on hormone-treated beef, the parties agreed to
open the doors of the WTO court house for the broader public to see. So
I think that the WTO constitution is flexible and receptive enough to
new realities to adapt to globalization and participate in the
construction of global governance.
MECHANISM OF REAL GOVERNANCE
Mechanism to arbitrate values and interests
The existence of a dispute settlement mechanism confers on the rules
agreed to in the WTO a particularly binding force for its Members: non-observance
of the rules may give rise to litigation and the litigants are bound to
accept the decision of the eminent persons appointed for that purpose.
Otherwise, sanctions can be imposed, which is a considerable step to
take. That change, which was brought about when GATT became the WTO ten
years ago, has had the effect of raising the profile of the WTO, which
is not without inconvenience.
For many critics, the existence of sanctions allows trade to take
precedence over other sectors of international governance, including
health, the environment or fundamental human and social rights, for
But it has been demonstrated that this WTO dispute settlement system has
not up to now given trade policy rules precedence over other
multilateral rules. Those who denounce what they see as an imbalance in
governance have not been convinced. I think that on the contrary, the
WTO has been quite sensitive to maintaining such a balance between trade
and non-trade values.
Indeed, the WTO provides that in some circumstances non-trade values can
supersede market access and trade values, provided that the governmental
action is necessary to pursue the goal and the value determined by each
Member and provided that the least trade restrictive measure is chosen
to implement the desired value. In the WTO, in cases of disagreement
among two or more Members, it is for the WTO court to adjudicate and to
determine whether the measure was indeed necessary to enforce such value
and whether the least trade restrictive measure to do so was chosen; and
it will do so in using a “balancing test”. The WTO Court has always
insisted on the “importance of the common interests or values” protected
by that law or regulation of that Member. The rule is “The more vital or
important those common interests or values are, the easier it would be
to accept as ‘necessary’ a measure designed as an enforcement instrument”.(5)
Autonomous actions by the WTO, as an international organization
Institutionally the WTO is still weak. Decisions are still taken by
consensus, providing a de facto veto to each Member or at least to the
most powerful ones. Formally there is not yet any secondary treaty law (droit
dérivé) in the WTO. Generally, obligations negotiated in Geneva must be
ratified domestically. Contrary to the EU for instance, there is no WTO
body that is entitled to initiate legislative change. The WTO
Secretariat or the WTO Councils and Committees cannot enact regulations
or other norms that would add to the original treaty or even that would
implement a basic norm included in the WTO treaty. This authority is
left to States alone.
Yet the WTO has put in place a few principles that recognize that the
WTO is an international public good. First, in its Preamble the WTO
states explicitly that while trade expansion should take place, it
should do so while “allowing for the optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development”. By definition
sustainable development calls for the consideration of fundamental
values other than those of market opening to include, for instance, the
protection of the environment, human rights and other social values.
The WTO also prohibits any unilateral action
by any WTO Member. In this sense the WTO goes ahead of traditional
international law that allows individual states to determine whether
another state is in violation of its international obligation and to
react and respond to the violation by another state with countermeasures.
No WTO violation justifies resort to a unilateral retaliatory measure by
a Member. If Members disagree as to whether a WTO violation has occurred,
the only remedy available to them to resolve this question is to
initiate a WTO dispute settlement process and obtain a WTO determination
on the matter. You can see how strong the WTO dispute settlement system
is. But I don't agree with a government of judges so we have to ensure
that the legislative branch of the WTO becomes as efficient and as
powerful as the WTO court.
A third principle was established when the WTO court decided that the
provisions of the WTO could not be read in “clinical isolation” from
public international law. This meant that the WTO
is only part of a more global system that includes several sets
of rights and obligations. There is no priority given to WTO norms over
other norms. Hence a need to ensure global coherence in the
interpretation and application of all values, rights and obligations.
As I mentioned, I am fundamentally convinced that the international
trading system belongs to all of us — it is an international public good.
So the opening up of markets (and globalization) produces benefits, but
also has its costs. And if trade opening results in a different
distribution of benefits between nations, the distribution of the
benefits within nations is largely beyond our control. Hence, the need
to cooperate more coherently with the other international organizations
working in the interests of international governance. Here too we can
detect embryos of international coherence in the actions of the WTO.
This same coherence must also apply in the relationship between the
opening up of markets and the measures to accompany the effects of such
opening. We cannot ignore the costs of adjustment, particularly for the
developing countries, and the problems that can arise with the opening
of markets. These adjustments must not be relegated to the future: they
must be an integral part of the opening-up agenda. This is why I have
suggested that we must re-orientate the WTO towards what I called the
My suggestion: a new “Geneva consensus”
Market opening and globalization have two types of impacts. On the one
hand, the beneficiaries are many and, more often than not, ignorant,
therefore silent; on the other, those who suffer the effects of the
structural socio-economic changes trade brings are acutely aware of them
and that leads them to rally to preserve the threatened status quo.
Market opening, trade liberalization and the overall globalization are
good and necessary for universal sustainable development and the
eradication of poverty but they are not sufficient. Such trade
liberalization policies must be accompanied with programmes that take
into account the victims of trade opening. If one wants to prioritize
development, relative weight has to be given to economic liberalization,
international official aid, and the finalizing of multilateral rules.
According to the terms of this “Geneva consensus”, trade liberalization
is necessary, but it is not sufficient. It also implies assistance: to
help the least developed countries to build up their supply and
therefore adequate productive and logistical capacity; to increase their
capacity to negotiate and to implement the commitments undertaken in the
international trading system; and to deal with the imbalances created,
as I have just said, between winners and losers from trade opening —
imbalances that are the more dangerous the more fragile the economies,
societies or countries. This is the only way to ensure that the opening
up of markets will produce real benefits in the everyday lives of the
countries concerned. And this is only possible if we have rules that
provide for a level playing field, that ensure technical capacity
building, and that enable Members to improve their domestic governance
so that this opening up of markets can be truly beneficial to most
CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN WE LEARN ?
1. The first lesson: globalization involves
international cooperation. We can only succeed if we want to live
together and if we are prepared to work together. Carve the principle of
cooperation in stone among our international laws and begin with the
economy, that is the first lesson.
2. Second lesson: this cooperation requires political
will and political energy, which implies to accept the debate on the
benefits and costs of cooperation. Multilateral values have to be
defined together. My view then is that we need to monitor and reform
globalization to serve our human, economic and social values, in line
with the UN Millennium Resolution.
3. Third lesson: political will and the negotiation
of those common objectives and values require a complex institutional
apparatus, within the UN system and its constellation of Satellites. We
have some basis already that we need to build on.
The WTO can become a fundamental player in this global governance. But
in light of its impact on individuals, we need to politicize
globalization – in other words, we need, if we want a more harmless
globalization, to supplement the logic of the market capitalism
efficiency of the WTO with a renewed attention to the conditions in
which that logic could favour development. This is why I began my tenure
as WTO DG in suggesting a new “Geneva Consensus”. We have a long way to
go but, as you know, I am used to this marathon rhythm. I've accepted
this challenge because I deeply believe that the best way to establish
further justice and equity – and we need a lot of it — is through more
1. P. Lamy, Towards World Democracy, 2005,
Policy Network; P. Lamy, “Global Governance: Lessons from Europe”,
disertación Gunnar Myrdal, Naciones Unidas, Ginebra, 2005.
volver al texto
2. D. Zaelke, M. Stilwell, O. Young,
“Compliance, Rule of Law & Good Governance”, en: Making Law Work, D.
Zaelke, D. Kaniru y E. Kruzikova (editores), 2005, Cameron May.
volver al texto
3. Véase Ernesto Zedillo, “Strengthening
the Global Trade Architecture for Economic Development: An agenda for
Action”, Reino Unido (2005). volver al texto
4. D. KDas, The Doha Round of Negotiations,
2005, Palgrave; J. Trachtman, “Coherence and Poverty at the WTO”,
Journal of International Economic Law (2005). back to text
5. Informe del Órgano de Apelación, Corea —
Diversas medidas que afectan a la carne vacuna (WT/DS161/AB/R-WT/DS169/AB/R),
párrafo 162. back to text