RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: WORKING PAPERS
Indisputably Essential: The Economics of Dispute Settlement Institutions in Trade Agreements
Economic theory has made considerable progress in explaining why sovereign countries cooperate in trade. Central to most theories of trade cooperation are issues of self-enforcement: The threat of reprisal by an aggrieved party maintains the initial balance of concessions and prevents opportunism.
However, economic scholarship has been less coherent in explaining why
countries choose to settle and enforce their trade disputes with the help of
an impartial third party, a “trade court”. Typically, economists focusing on
the purpose of trade agreements have assumed away the very reasons why
institutions are needed, since under standard assumptions, neither defection
from the rules nor disputes are expected to occur.
This paper is a step towards the formulation of a coherent economic theory of dispute settlement. It challenges traditional models of enforcement (primarily concerned with acts of punishment) for being insufficient in explaining the existence of dispute settlement institutions. We perform a comprehensive analysis of the economics of dispute settlement institutions and demonstrate to what extent the literatures of trade cooperation and dispute institutions are (and should be) interlinked. On the basis of these theories, we show that dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements may assume a variety of roles, including that of an information repository and disseminator, an honest broker, an arbitrator and calculator of damages, an active information gatherer or an adjudicator.
Alexander Keck — WTO
Simon Schropp — University of St. Gallen (HSG), HEI Geneva and NCCR Democracy
Manuscript date: September 2007
Dispute settlement, trade, institutions, enforcement, WTO.
JEL classification numbers:
F02, F13, F51, F53, F55, K33, K41, K42
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This is a working paper, and hence it represents research in progress. This paper represents the opinions of the author, and is the product of professional research. It is not meant to represent the position or opinions of the WTO or its Members, nor the official position of any staff members. Any errors are the fault of the author. Copies of working papers can be requested from the divisional secretariat by writing to: Economic Research and Statistics Division, World Trade Organization, Rue de Lausanne 154, CH 1211 Geneva 21, Switzerland. Please request papers by number and title.
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