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WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: MARRAKESH AGREEMENT Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization |
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> Preamble |
Article XIII: Non-Application of Multilateral Trade Agreements between Particular Members 1. This Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2 shall not apply as between any Member and any other Member if either of the Members, at the time either becomes a Member, does not consent to such application.
2. Paragraph 1 may be invoked between original Members of the WTO which were contracting parties to GATT 1947 only where Article XXXV of that Agreement had been invoked earlier and was effective as between those contracting parties at the time of entry into force for them of this Agreement.
3. Paragraph 1 shall apply between a Member and another Member which has acceded under Article XII only if the Member not consenting to the application has so notified the Ministerial Conference before the approval of the agreement on the terms of accession by the Ministerial Conference.
4. The Ministerial Conference may review the operation of this Article in particular cases at the request of any Member and make appropriate recommendations.
5. Non-application of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement between parties to that Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement. (a) Invocation and revocation of non-application 320. The United States invoked Article XIII:1 with respect to Romania(530), Mongolia(531), Kyrgyz Republici(532), Georgia(533), Moldova(534) and Armenia(535). As of 31 December 2002, the United States had revoked its invocation of Article XIII with respect to Romania(536), Mongolia(537), the Kyrgyz Republic(538) and Georgia.(539) El Salvador(540) invoked Article XIII with respect to China on 5 November 2001 and Turkey(541) invoked it with respect to Armenia on 29 November 2001. XV. Article XIV back to top Article XIV (542): Acceptance, Entry into Force and Deposit 1. This Agreement shall be open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, by contracting parties to GATT 1947, and the European Communities, which are eligible to become original Members of the WTO in accordance with Article XI of this Agreement. Such acceptance shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed hereto. This Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed hereto shall enter into force on the date determined by Ministers in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and shall remain open for acceptance for a period of two years following that date unless the Ministers decide otherwise. An acceptance following the entry into force of this Agreement shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of such acceptance.
2. A Member which accepts this Agreement after its entry into force shall implement those concessions and obligations in the Multilateral Trade Agreements that are to be implemented over a period of time starting with the entry into force of this Agreement as if it had accepted this Agreement on the date of its entry into force.
3. Until the entry into force of this Agreement, the text of this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements shall be deposited with the Director-General to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947. The Director-General shall promptly furnish a certified true copy of this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and a notification of each acceptance thereof, to each government and the European Communities having accepted this Agreement. This Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and any amendments thereto, shall, upon the entry into force of this Agreement, be deposited with the Director-General of the WTO.
4. The acceptance and entry into force of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement. Such Agreements shall be deposited with the Director-General to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, such Agreements shall be deposited with the Director-General of the WTO. 1. Transition from GATT 1947 to WTO 321. At its meeting of 8 December 1994, the Preparatory Committee for the World Trade Organization adopted decisions concerning the transitional co-existence of the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement.(543) At its meeting of 31 January 1995, the General Council agreed to adopt a decision to avoid procedural and institutional duplication.(544) 322. Also, at its meeting of 8 December 1994, the Preparatory Committee adopted the decisions to deal with cases of withdrawal or termination of certain agreements associated with GATT 1947.(545) The General Council also adopted a decision on the continued application of invocations of provisions for developing countries for delayed application and reservations under the Customs Valuation Agreement.(546) 323. Pursuant to the decision adopted at its meeting of 8 December 1994 by the Preparatory Committee for the World Trade Organization(547), the General Council, at its meeting of 31 January 1995, adopted a decision concerning the participation in meetings of the WTO bodies by certain signatories of the Final Act eligible to become original Members of the WTO.(548) 324. On this topic, see also GATT Analytical Index, Institutions and Procedure, Section II, pages 1087-1093. (a) Date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement 325. The WTO Agreement entered into force as of 1 January 1995.(549) (a) Notifications of acceptance of the WTO Agreement (i) Acceptance before 1 January 1995 326. Pursuant to Article XIV:3, the Director-General of the WTO issued notifications of acceptance for the following States and separate customs territories: Antigua and Barbuda(550), Argentina(551), Australia(552), Austria(553), Bahrain(554), Bangladesh(555), Barbados(556), Belgium(557), Belize(558), Brazil(559), Brunei Darussalam(560), Canada(561), Chile(562), Costa Rica(563), Côte d'Ivoire(564), Czech Republic(565), Denmark(566), Dominica(567), European Community(568), Finland(569), France(570), Gabon(571), Germany(572), Ghana(573), Greece(574), Guyana(575), Honduras(576), Hong Kong(577), Hungary(578), Iceland(579), India(580), Indonesia(581), Ireland(582), Italy(583), Japan(584), Kenya(585), Korea(586), Kuwait(587), Luxembourg(588), Macau(589), Malaysia(590), Malta(591), Mauritius(592), Mexico(593), Morocco(594), Myanmar(595), Namibia(596), Netherlands(597), New Zealand(598), Nigeria(599), Norway(600), Pakistan(601), Paraguay(602), Peru(603), Philippines(604), Portugal(605), Romania(606), Saint Lucia(607), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines(608), Senegal(609), Singapore(610), Slovak Republic(611), South Africa(612), Spain(613), Sri Lanka(614), Suriname(615), Swaziland(616), Sweden(617), Tanzania(618), Thailand(619), Uganda(620), United Kingdom(621), United States(622), Uruguay(623), Venezuela(624) and Zambia(625). (ii) Acceptance after 1 January 1995 327. The notification requirement is the same for countries accepting before, or after, 1 January 1995. However, pursuant to the requirements of Article XIV:1, all countries accepting after 1 January 1995 must have a delay of 30 days before the Agreement enters into force. Thus, the notifications of acceptance for these countries also indicate the date of entry into force of the Agreement. The following counties accepted after 1 January 1995: Trinidad and Tobago(626), Zimbabwe(627), Dominican Republic(628), Jamaica(629), Turkey(630), Tunisia(631), Cuba(632), Israel(633), Colombia(634), El Salvador(635), Burkina Faso(636), Egypt(637), Botswana(638), Central African Republic(639), Djibouti(640), Guinea Bissau(641), Lesotho(642), Malawi(643), Mali(644), Maldives(645), Mauritania(646), Togo(647), Poland(648), Switzerland(649), Guatemala(650), Burundi(651), Sierra Leone(652), Cyprus(653), Slovenia(654), Mozambique(655), Liechtenstein(656), Nicaragua(657), Bolivia(658), Guinea(659), Madagascar(660), Cameroon(661), Fiji(662), Haiti(663), Benin(664), Rwanda(665), Solomon Islands(666), Chad(667), the Gambia(668), Angola(669), Niger(670), Zaire(671), the Republic of the Congo(672), Panama(673), Latvia(674), Kyrgyz Republic(675), Estonia(676), Jordan(677), Georgia(678), Albania(679), Croatia(680), Oman(681), Lithuania(682) and Moldova(683), China(684) and Chinese Taipei(685). (a) Acceptance of the plurilateral trade agreements 328. Article XIV:4 provides that, "[t]he acceptance and entry into force of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement". Acceptance of the International Dairy Agreement is governed by Article VIII of that Agreement: "This Agreement is open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, by any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in the Agreement Establishing the WTO ..., and by the European Communities".(686) 329. The International Bovine Meat Agreement acceptances are governed by Article VI of that Agreement: "This Agreement is open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, by any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in the Agreement Establishing the WTO, and by the European Communities".(687) 330. Article 9 of the Agreement on Civil Aircraft governs acceptances of that Agreement: "This Agreement shall be open for acceptance by signature or otherwise by governments contracting parties to the GATT and by the European Economic Community".(688) 331. Article XXIV:1 of the Agreement on Government Procurement governs acceptances of that Agreement.(689) On this issue, see also paragraph 317 above.
XVI. Article XV back to top Article XV: Withdrawal 1. Any Member may withdraw from this Agreement. Such withdrawal shall apply both to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements and shall take effect upon the expiration of six months from the date on which written notice of withdrawal is received by the Director-General of the WTO.
2. Withdrawal from a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement. 332. As of 31 December 2002, no WTO Member has withdrawn from the WTO Agreement. 333. As of 31 December 2002, no WTO Member has withdrawn from a Plurilateral Agreement.
XVII. Article XVI back to top Article XVI: Miscellaneous Provisions 1. Except as otherwise provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947.
2. To the extent practicable, the Secretariat of GATT 1947 shall become the Secretariat of the WTO, and the Director-General to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947, until such time as the Ministerial Conference has appointed a Director-General in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article VI of this Agreement, shall serve as Director-General of the WTO.
3. In the event of a conflict between a provision of this Agreement and a provision of any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.
4. Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.
5. No reservations may be made in respect of any provision of this Agreement. Reservations in respect of any of the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements may only be made to the extent provided for in those Agreements. Reservations in respect of a provision of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Agreement.
6. This Agreement shall be registered in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. (a) "the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947" 334. In EC - Poultry, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's rejection of Brazil's argument that "the MFN principle under Articles I and XIII of GATT does not necessarily apply to TRQs opened as a result of the compensation negotiations under Article XXVIII of GATT". In so doing, the Appellate Body found that the Oilseeds Agreement, which was a bilateral agreement between the European Communities and Brazil under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1947, does not constitute part of the "decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947" within the meaning of Article XVI:1, and went on to state: "These 'decisions, procedures and customary practices' include only those taken or followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 acting jointly."(690) 335. In Brazil - Desiccated Coconut, the Panel examined the legal relevance under Article XVI:1 of the Tokyo Round SCM Code and the practice of Code signatories to the interpretation of GATT Article VI and the SCM Agreement, stating as follows: "We recognize that the Pork Panel had indicated, in passing, that the Tokyo Round SCM Code represents 'practice' under Article VI of GATT 1947. Article 31.3(b) of the Vienna Convention provides that there may be taken into account, when interpreting a treaty, '[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation'. Article 31.3 clearly distinguishes between the use of subsequent agreements and of subsequent practice as interpretive tools. The Tokyo Round SCM Code is, in our view, in the former category and cannot itself reasonably be deemed to represent 'customary practice' of the GATT 1947 CONTRACTING PARTIES. In any event, while the practice of Code signatories might be of some interpretive value in establishing their agreement regarding the interpretation of the Tokyo Round SCM Code (and arguably through Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement in interpreting provisions of that Code that were carried over into the successor SCM Agreement), it is clearly not relevant to the interpretation of Article VI of GATT 1994 itself; rather, only practice under Article VI of GATT 1947 is legally relevant to the interpretation of Article VI of GATT 1994."(691) 336. In Argentina - Textiles and Apparel, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that past GATT practice has generally required that once a Member has indicated the type(s) of duties in specifying its bound rate, it must apply such type(s) of duties," and explained the status of GATT panel reports: "We are not persuaded that 'the past GATT practice is clear'. The three working party reports cited by the Panel did not arise in the context of dispute settlement cases brought pursuant to Article XXIII of the GATT 1947, unlike some working party reports in GATT history that resulted from complaints made under Article XXIII.(692) We also note that these three working party reports did not result in the CONTRACTING PARTIES giving a ruling or making recommendations, pursuant to Article XXIII:2 of the GATT 1994, on whether a variance in the type of duty applied by a contracting party from the type of duty provided for in its Schedule constituted an infringement of Article II:1 of the GATT 1947.(693) The Panel also referred to the report of the Panel on Newsprint that did not, on its facts, deal with the application by a contracting party of a specific duty rather than an ad valorem duty provided for in its Schedule.(694) Finally, the Panel relied extensively on the unadopted panel report in Bananas II. In our Report in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages(695), we agreed with that panel that 'unadopted panel reports have no legal status in the GATT or WTO system ..., although we believe that a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report that it considered to be relevant'. In the case before us, the Panel's use of the Bananas II panel report appears to have gone beyond deriving 'useful guidance' from the reasoning employed in that unadopted panel report. The Panel, in fact, relies upon the Bananas II panel report."(696) 337. In US - FSC, the Appellate Body examined the legal relevance to the interpretation of the SCM Agreement and GATT Article XVI:4 of the 1981 decision by the GATT 1947 Council to adopt the four panel reports on Belgium - Income Tax, US - DISC, France - Income Tax and Netherlands - Income Tax, subject to certain understandings. The Appellate Body stated: "We recognize that, as 'decisions' within the meaning of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement, the adopted panel reports in the Tax Legislation Cases, together with the 1981 Council action, could provide 'guidance' to the WTO."(697) 338. In this regard, the Panel on US - FSC stated: "Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement on its face is not limited to decisions in the form of 'legal instruments', but rather applies to all decisions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 - including decisions to adopt panel reports- as well as to procedures and customary practices of the CONTRACTING PARTIES."(698) (ii) Status of adopted reports 339. The Appellate Body in Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II noted that the Panel, in the same case, stated that adopted panel reports "are often considered by subsequent panels" and that "they create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute."(699) The Appellate Body went on to state that adopted panel reports are not binding "except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute." For these reasons, the Appellate Body stated: "[W]e do not agree with the Panel's conclusion in paragraph 6.10 of the Panel Report that 'panel reports adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body constitute subsequent practice in a specific case' as the phrase 'subsequent practice' is used in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Further, we do not agree with the Panel's conclusion in the same paragraph of the Panel Report that adopted panel reports in themselves constitute 'other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947' for the purposes of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the language of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement.
However, we agree with the Panel's conclusion in that same paragraph of the Panel Report that unadopted panel reports 'have no legal status in the GATT or WTO system since they have not been endorsed through decisions by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT or WTO Members'. Likewise, we agree that 'a panel could nevertheless find useful guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report that it considered to be relevant'."(700) (iii) Panel findings not appealed 340. In Canada - Periodicals, the Appellate Body stated: "[A] panel finding that has not been specifically appealed in a particular case should not be considered to have been endorsed by the Appellate Body. Such a finding may be examined by the Appellate Body when the issue is raised properly in a subsequent appeal."(701) 341. In Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body referred to Article XVI:1 in examining the legal effect of the panel reports adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 or the Dispute Settlement Body. The Appellate Body stated: "Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement and paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the language of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement bring the legal history and experience under the GATT 1947 into the new realm of the WTO in a way that ensures continuity and consistency in a smooth transition from the GATT 1947 system. This affirms the importance to the Members of the WTO of the experience acquired by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 - and acknowledges the continuing relevance of that experience to the new trading system served by the WTO. Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute.(702) In short, their character and their legal status have not been changed by the coming into force of the WTO Agreement.
For these reasons, we do not agree with the Panel's conclusion in paragraph 6.10 of the Panel Report that 'panel reports adopted by the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES and the WTO Dispute Settlement Body constitute subsequent practice in a specific case' as the phrase 'subsequent practice' is used in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Further, we do not agree with the Panel's conclusion in the same paragraph of the Panel Report that adopted panel reports in themselves constitute 'other decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947' for the purposes of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the language of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement."(703) 342. The issue discussed in the excerpts referenced above is related to the issue of "legitimate expectation"; see Chapter on DSU, paragraphs 68-71. (ii) Relationship with Paragraph 1(b) of GATT 1994 343. In US - FSC, with respect to the difference in scope between Article XVI:1 and Paragraph 1(b) of the GATT 1994, the Panel stated: "In our view, the difference between the more particularly defined range of actions falling within the ambit of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement and the list of 'legal instruments' that are incorporated into GATT 1994 pursuant to the language in Annex 1A incorporating GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement is explained by the different implications of the two provisions. Inclusion of a decision in the language of Annex 1A means that the decision actually becomes part of GATT 1994 and thus of the WTO Agreement. Inclusion of a decision within the scope of Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement, on the other hand, means that the WTO 'shall be guided' by that decision. A decision which is part of GATT 1994 is legally binding on all WTO Members (to the extent it is not in conflict with a provision of another Annex 1A agreement), while a decision which provides 'guidance' in our view is not legally binding but provides direction to the WTO. It is important to note that, as explained by the Appellate Body, adopted panel reports should be taken into account 'where they are relevant to a dispute'. In our view, this consideration applies equally to any other decision, procedure or customary practice of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947."(704) 344. On this topic, see also paragraph 341 above, and Chapter on GATT 1994, paragraphs 1-2. (a) First Director-General of the WTO 345. Pursuant to Article XVI:2, Mr Peter Sutherland, as former Director-General to the GATT 1947, served as the first Director-General to the WTO from 1 January 1995 to 30 April 1995.(705) With respect to the appointment of the Director-General, see paragraph 257 above. No jurisprudence or decision of a competent WTO body. 346. In US - Section 301 Trade Act, the Panel described the role of Article XVI as confirming the following "GATT acquis": "As a general proposition, GATT acquis, confirmed in Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and recent WTO panel reports, make abundantly clear that legislation as such, independently from its application in specific cases, may breach GATT/WTO obligations:
(a) In GATT jurisprudence, to give one example, legislation providing for tax discrimination against imported products was found to be GATT inconsistent even before it had actually been applied to specific products and thus before any given product had actually been discriminated against.
(b) Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement explicitly confirms that legislation as such falls within the scope of possible WTO violations. It provides as follows:
'Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements' (emphasis added).
The three types of measures explicitly made subject to the obligations imposed in the WTO Agreements - 'laws, regulations and administrative procedures' - are measures that are applicable generally; not measures taken necessarily in a specific case or dispute. Article XVI:4, though not expanding the material obligations under WTO Agreements, expands the type of measures made subject to these obligations.
(c) Recent WTO panel reports confirm, too, that legislation as such, independently from its application in a specific case, can be inconsistent with WTO rules.
Legislation may thus breach WTO obligations. This must be true, too, in respect of Article 23 of the DSU. This is so, in our view, not only because of the above-mentioned case law and Article XVI:4, but also because of the very nature of obligations under Article 23."(706) 347. In US - 1916 Act (Japan), the Panel found that a breach of any provision of any annexed agreement gives rise to a violation of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement: "With respect to Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, we note that, if some of the terms of Article XVI:4 differ from those of Article 18.4, they are identical and unqualified as far as the basic obligation of ensuring the conformity of laws, regulations and administrative procedures found in both articles is concerned. The same reasoning as for Article 18.4 applies to Article XVI:4 regarding the terms found in both provisions. In other words, if a provision of an 'annexed Agreement' is breached, a violation of Article XVI:4 immediately occurs. GATT 1994 is one of the 'annexed Agreements' within the meaning of Article XVI:4. Since we found that provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 has been breached, we conclude that, by violating this provision, the United States violates Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement."(707) (b) "laws, regulations and administrative procedures" 348. See Item (b) contained in the excerpt referenced in paragraph 346 above. (a) Reservations to the Multilateral Trade Agreements 349. Exceptions to the principle of non-reservation are provided in the following articles: (a) Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 - Article 21 and paragraph 2 of Annex III;
(b) Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 - Article 18.2;
(c) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade - Article 15.1;
(d) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - Article 32.2; and
(e) TRIPS - Article 72. 350. To date, no reservation has been made under these provisions. (b) Reservations to Plurilateral Agreements 351. The following provisions of the Plurilateral Agreements provide for reservations: (a) Agreement on Civil Aircraft - Article 9.2.1;
(b) Agreement on Government Procurement - Article XXIV:4;
(c) International Dairy Agreement - Article VIII:1(b); and
(d) International Bovine Meat Agreement - Article VI:1(b). 352. To date, no reservation has been made under any of the Plurilateral Agreements. (a) Registration of the Agreement in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter 353. The WTO Agreement was registered as of 1 June 1995(708) in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.(709)
XVIII. Explanatory Notes back to top Explanatory Notes The terms "country" or "countries" as used in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements are to be understood to include any separate customs territory Member of the WTO.
In the case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, where an expression in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements is qualified by the term "national", such expression shall be read as pertaining to that customs territory, unless otherwise specified. No jurisprudence or decision of a competent WTO body.
XIX. Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking back to top 1. Ministers recognize that the globalization of the world economy has led to ever-growing interactions between the economic policies pursued by individual countries, including interactions between the structural, macroeconomic, trade, financial and development aspects of economic policymaking. The task of achieving harmony between these policies falls primarily on governments at the national level, but their coherence internationally is an important and valuable element in increasing the effectiveness of these policies at national level. The Agreements reached in the Uruguay Round show that all the participating governments recognize the contribution that liberal trading policies can make to the healthy growth and development of their own economies and of the world economy as a whole.
2. Successful cooperation in each area of economic policy contributes to progress in other areas. Greater exchange rate stability, based on more orderly underlying economic and financial conditions, should contribute towards the expansion of trade, sustainable growth and development, and the correction of external imbalances. There is also a need for an adequate and timely flow of concessional and non-concessional financial and real investment resources to developing countries and for further efforts to address debt problems, to help ensure economic growth and development. Trade liberalization forms an increasingly important component in the success of the adjustment programmes that many countries are undertaking, often involving significant transitional social costs. In this connection, Ministers note the role of the World Bank and the IMF in supporting adjustment to trade liberalization, including support to net food-importing developing countries facing short-term costs arising from agricultural trade reforms.
3. The positive outcome of the Uruguay Round is a major contribution towards more coherent and complementary international economic policies. The results of the Uruguay Round ensure an expansion of market access to the benefit of all countries, as well as a framework of strengthened multilateral disciplines for trade. They also guarantee that trade policy will be conducted in a more transparent manner and with greater awareness of the benefits for domestic competitiveness of an open trading environment. The strengthened multilateral trading system emerging from the Uruguay Round has the capacity to provide an improved forum for liberalization, to contribute to more effective surveillance, and to ensure strict observance of multilaterally agreed rules and disciplines. These improvements mean that trade policy can in the future play a more substantial role in ensuring the coherence of global economic policymaking.
4. Ministers recognize, however, that difficulties the origins of which lie outside the trade field cannot be redressed through measures taken in the trade field alone. This underscores the importance of efforts to improve other elements of global economic policymaking to complement the effective implementation of the results achieved in the Uruguay Round.
5. The interlinkages between the different aspects of economic policy require that the international institutions with responsibilities in each of these areas follow consistent and mutually supportive policies. The World Trade Organization should therefore pursue and develop cooperation with the international organizations responsible for monetary and financial matters, while respecting the mandate, the confidentiality requirements and the necessary autonomy in decision-making procedures of each institution, and avoiding the imposition on governments of cross-conditionality or additional conditions. Ministers further invite the Director-General of the WTO to review with the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the World Bank, the implications of the WTO's responsibilities for its cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as the forms such cooperation might take, with a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policymaking. No jurisprudence or decision of a competent WTO body.
XX. Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organization with the International Monetary Fund back to top Ministers,
Noting the close relationship between the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 and the International Monetary Fund, and the provisions of the GATT 1947 governing that relationship, in particular Article XV of the GATT 1947;
Recognizing the desire of participants to base the relationship of the World Trade Organization with the International Monetary Fund, with regard to the areas covered by the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, on the provisions that have governed the relationship of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 with the International Monetary Fund;
Hereby reaffirm that, unless otherwise provided for in the Final Act, the relationship of the WTO with the International Monetary Fund, with regard to the areas covered by the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, will be based on the provisions that have governed the relationship of the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 with the International Monetary Fund. No jurisprudence or decision of a competent WTO body.
XXI. Decision on the Acceptance of and Accession to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization back to top Ministers,
Noting that Articles XI and XIV of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter referred to as "WTO Agreement") provide that only contracting parties to the GATT 1947 as of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement for which schedules of concessions and commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which schedules of specific commitments are annexed to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter referred to as "GATS") may accept the WTO Agreement;
Noting further that paragraph 5 of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (hereinafter referred to as "Final Act" and "Uruguay Round" respectively) provides that the schedules of participants which are not contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of the Final Act are not definitive and shall be subsequently completed for the purpose of their accession to GATT 1947 and their acceptance of the WTO Agreement;
Having regard to paragraph 1 of the Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries which provides that the least-developed countries shall be given an additional time of one year from 15 April 1994 to submit their schedules as required in Article XI of the WTO Agreement;
Recognizing that certain participants in the Uruguay Round which had applied GATT 1947 on a de facto basis and became contracting parties under Article XXVI:5(c) of the GATT 1947 were not in a position to submit schedules to GATT 1994 and the GATS;
Recognizing further that some States or separate customs territories which were not participants in the Uruguay Round may become contracting parties to GATT 1947 before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement and that States or customs territories should be given the opportunity to negotiate schedules to GATT 1994 and the GATS so as to enable them to accept the WTO Agreement;
Taking into account that some States or separate customs territories which cannot complete the process of accession to GATT 1947 before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement or which do not intend to become contracting parties to GATT 1947 may wish to initiate the process of their accession to the WTO before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement;
Recognizing that the WTO Agreement does not distinguish in any way between WTO Members which accepted that Agreement in accordance with its Articles XI and XIV and WTO Members which acceded to it in accordance with its Article XII and wishing to ensure that the procedures for accession of the States and separate customs territories which have not become contracting parties to the GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement are such as to avoid any unnecessary disadvantage or delay for these States and separate customs territories;
Decide that:
1. (a) Any Signatory of the Final Act
any State or separate customs territory
(b) The WTO Agreement shall be open for acceptance in accordance with Article XIV of that Agreement by contracting parties to GATT 1947 the schedules of which have been so submitted and approved before the entry into force of the WTO Agreement.
(c) The provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be without prejudice to the right of the least-developed countries to submit their schedules within one year from 15 April 1994.
2. (a) Any State or separate customs territory may request the Preparatory Committee to propose for approval by the Ministerial Conference of the WTO the terms of its accession to the WTO Agreement in accordance with Article XII of that Agreement. If such a request is made by a State or separate customs territory which is in the process of acceding to GATT 1947, the Preparatory Committee shall, to the extent practicable, examine the request jointly with the Working Party established by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 to examine the accession of that State or separate customs territory. (b) The Preparatory Committee shall submit to the Ministerial Conference a report on its examination of the request. The report may include a protocol of accession, including a schedule of concessions and commitments to GATT 1994 and a schedule of specific commitments for the GATS, for approval by the Ministerial Conference. The report of the Preparatory Committee shall be taken into account by the Ministerial Conference in its consideration of any application by the State or separate customs territory concerned to accede to the WTO Agreement. No jurisprudence or decision of a competent WTO body.
XXII. Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries back to top Ministers,
Recognizing the plight of the least-developed countries and the need to ensure their effective participation in the world trading system, and to take further measures to improve their trading opportunities;
Recognizing the specific needs of the least-developed countries in the area of market access where continued preferential access remains an essential means for improving their trading opportunities;
Reaffirming their commitment to implement fully the provisions concerning the least-developed countries contained in paragraphs 2(d), 6 and 8 of the Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries;
Having regard to the commitment of the participants as set out in Section B (vii) of Part I of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration;
1. Decide that, if not already provided for in the instruments negotiated in the course of the Uruguay Round, notwithstanding their acceptance of these instruments, the least-developed countries, and for so long as they remain in that category, while complying with the general rules set out in the aforesaid instruments, will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, or their administrative and institutional capabilities. The least-developed countries shall be given additional time of one year from 15 April 1994 to submit their schedules as required in Article XI of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
2. Agree that:
(i) Expeditious implementation of all special and differential measures taken in favour of least-developed countries including those taken within the context of the Uruguay Round shall be ensured through, inter alia, regular reviews.
(ii) To the extent possible, MFN concessions on tariff and non-tariff measures agreed in the Uruguay Round on products of export interest to the least-developed countries may be implemented autonomously, in advance and without staging. Consideration shall be given to further improve GSP and other schemes for products of particular export interest to least-developed countries.
(iii) The rules set out in the various agreements and instruments and the transitional provisions in the Uruguay Round should be applied in a flexible and supportive manner for the least-developed countries. To this effect, sympathetic consideration shall be given to specific and motivated concerns raised by the least-developed countries in the appropriate Councils and Committees.
(iv) In the application of import relief measures and other measures referred to in paragraph 3(c) of Article XXXVII of GATT 1947 and the corresponding provision of GATT 1994, special consideration shall be given to the export interests of least-developed countries.
(v) Least-developed countries shall be accorded substantially increased technical assistance in the development, strengthening and diversification of their production and export bases including those of services, as well as in trade promotion, to enable them to maximize the benefits from liberalized access to markets.
3. Agree to keep under review the specific needs of the least-developed countries and to continue to seek the adoption of positive measures which facilitate the expansion of trading opportunities in favour of these countries. 1. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the Doha Round 354. The main Ministerial Declaration of the Ministerial Conference held in Doha in 2001, known as the Doha Declaration(710), launched a comprehensive round of negotiations. The Work Programme for the negotiations included provisions for LDCs.(711) 355. The Doha Declaration referred to the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries (IF) as a means to stimulate LDCs' trade development and urged Members and development agencies to contribute to funds related to LDCs: 356. With respect to the mandate of the Doha Declaration and the negotiations on LDCs, see paragraphs 65, and 89-91 above. 357. In regard to the Sub-Committee on Least-Developed Countries see paragraphs V.B.8(b)(iii)191-197 above.(712) 358. Besides the work of the Committee on Trade and Development and the Sub-Committee on Least Developed Countries, the debates over measures in favour of least-developed countries have taken place at various levels of negotiation. See, for instance the Second LDC Trade Ministers' Meeting held in Dhaka, Bangladesh from 31 May to 2 June 2003, in which Ministers undertook a very comprehensive approach to the main issues related to LDCs in: "The Doha Development Agenda and the Participation of Least Developed Countries".(713)
XXIII. Understanding in respect of waivers of obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 back to top Members hereby agree as follows:
1. A request for a waiver or for an extension of an existing waiver shall describe the measures which the Member proposes to take, the specific policy objectives which the Member seeks to pursue and the reasons which prevent the Member from achieving its policy objectives by measures consistent with its obligations under GATT 1994.
2. Any waiver in effect on the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement shall terminate, unless extended in accordance with the procedures above and those of Article IX of the WTO Agreement, on the date of its expiry or two years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, whichever is earlier.
3. Any Member considering that a benefit accruing to it under GATT 1994 is being nullified or impaired as a result of:
(a) the failure of the Member to whom a waiver was granted to observe the terms or conditions of the waiver, or
(b) the application of a measure consistent with the terms and conditions of the waiver
may invoke the provisions of Article XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding." 359. With respect to the WTO practice covering waivers, see paragraphs 282-285 above.
XXIV. Accessions under article XXXIII back to top
XXV. Annex A - WTO Membership back to top
XXVI. Annex B - WTO Observers back to top
Footnotes:
530. WT/L/11. The United States
informed the Director-General on 30 December 1994 and formally
invoked Article XIII:1 27 January 1995. WT/L/11. back to text |
