HANDBOOK ON ACCESSION TO THE WTO: CHAPTER 5

Substance of Accession Negotiations

 

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5.2 Rules

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Internal policies

Industrial policy, subsidies

GATT 1994 does not contain obligations on industrial policies as such and while this heading provides an opportunity to discuss industrial policies in general, discussions under it have tended to concentrate on the specific subject of subsidies. Aspects of industrial policies are taken up under a number of other headings, such as TRIMs, trade in civil aircraft and textiles and clothing.

While WTO provisions do not prohibit Members from granting domestic subsidies, they permit countervailing measures to be taken, under defined circumstances, against exports if these benefit from specific subsidies granted to certain enterprises.316 Definitions of subsidies are typically tailored to specific purposes and vary considerably in scope. As defined in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), subsidies exist: if they involve a financial contribution of one sort or another from the government; or if the government forgoes revenue; or if there is any form of income or price support; and a benefit is thereby conferred.317 Article 27 of the SCM Agreement contains a number of paragraphs providing developing countries and LDCs with special and differential treatment.

The Agreement applies to all products but the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture and the negotiation of binding commitments in the areas of domestic support and export subsidies for agricultural products are discussed below.

The way in which Working Parties have approached questions relating to subsidies on non-agricultural products has varied. One or two early Working Parties dealt with domestic subsidies under the heading of export subsidies.318 Others have taken up questions relating to export subsidies for non-agricultural products and subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods under the present heading.319 The points made on these two subjects are discussed above, in the section on export subsidies.

Most Working Party discussions on this subject therefore first concentrate on obtaining full information on any subsidies granted by applicants. This could be done by completing a draft notification pursuant to Article 25 of the SCM Agreement. As domestic subsidies are not prohibited but may have adverse effects on international trade, the multilateral trading system has always stressed the importance of transparency in this area and WTO Members are required to provide notifications on existing subsidy programmes on a regular basis.

The baseline Protocol commitment is well established: “The representative of [X] confirmed that [X] any subsidy programmes would be administered in conformity with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and that all necessary information on programmes would be notified to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in accordance with Article 25 of the Agreement upon entry into force of [X’s] Protocol of Accession.”320

Additional commitments were agreed by two acceding countries. Both agreed to progressively work towards a full notification of subsidies, as contemplated by Article 25 of the SCM Agreement.321 One agreed to a compromise relating to its claim to developing country status in this area.322

Technical Barriers to Trade

While technical regulations making the observation of product specifications mandatory and the procedures used to enforce these are adopted for legitimate purposes, such as the protection of human, animal or plant life or health and protection of the environment, such measures inevitably create barriers to trade since products that do not conform cannot be put on the market. Product standards may also sometimes create obstacles to trade, even though they are not mandatory.

The aim of the WTO in this area is to minimise the obstacles to trade created by technical regulations, standards and procedures for the assessment of conformity with these. The WTO’s main instrument in this area is its Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In order to reduce impediments to trade caused by a multitude of different national measures, this Agreement promotes the use of international standards and the acceptance of the results of other Members’ conformity assessment procedures. It relies on appropriate international standardizing bodies to draw up these standards and encourages Members to participate fully in these bodies. Another considerable innovation was the inclusion in the TBT Agreement of the Code of Good Practice for the preparation, adoption and application of standards, which are not mandatory and are often drawn up by non-governmental bodies.

Acceding governments are asked to supply full information on their TBT measures. They are also asked to complete a Checklist to enable applicants (and Members) to verify that their measures conform to WTO rules.323 The existence of this Checklist is evidence that Members show an interest in ensuring that all the provisions of the TBT Agreement are observed. Particular emphasis has been placed on the implementation of its provisions on the establishment of enquiry points and transparency.

While practice has varied somewhat, Working Parties soon evolved a basic Protocol commitment in this area, providing that: “The representative of [X] confirmed that [X] would apply all obligations under the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade from the date of accession without recourse to any transition period.”324

One Protocol commitment provides that the acceding country concerned will incorporate key provisions of the TBT Agreement in its domestic measures.325 Some Members have been interested in securing Protocol commitments to ensure the modification of particular measures.326 Some Members have also wished to ensure that certain applicants will review their technical regulations, standards and/or conformity assessment procedures in order to bring them into line with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and in securing Protocol commitments designed to ensure this. One acceding country agreed to review all mandatory standards to ensure their replacement by voluntary standards or technical regulations.327

Countries in the course of transition to a market economy have also made major changes in this area. Mandatory standards, such as Soviet-era GOST standards, were used in the past to ensure that products conformed to the directives issued by central authorities. Some acceders have therefore had to agree to ensure that the application of these standards would be made voluntary and that they would only be mandatory if they became technical regulations adopted by a public authority in accordance with legitimate objectives such as health and safety.328

In another case an acceding country accepted a range of commitments inter alia, to ensure that: conformity assessment procedures are applied to imported products only to determine compliance with technical regulations and standards that are consistent with the provisions of this Protocol and the WTO Agreement; that technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures applied to imported and domestic products on a national treatment basis and that it will play a full part in the development of relevant international standards and of international guides and recommendations relating to conformity assessment procedures.329

In one unusual case, the acceding country had not adopted any technical regulations, standards or conformity assessment procedures to date, and had no plans to do so. It accepted a detailed commitment, inter alia, to introduce regulations to ensure that its National TBT Notification Authority and Enquiry Point would be operational as from the date of its accession.330

A few acceders have agreed to accept the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards annexed to the TBT Agreement.331

Pursuant to the Guidelines on the Accession of LDCs, both of the LDCs that have acceded were accorded transitional periods allowing them to implement the TBT Agreement progressively, after providing a detailed Action Plan including a specific timetable for attaining full compliance with its provisions.332 Transitional periods have also been accorded to some of the acceding countries that have agreed to review, and where necessary revise, whole categories of their existing measures.333

Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

The aim of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures is to protect human, animal and plant life and health. These measures ensure that food is safe for consumers and prevent pest or diseases from spreading among animals and plants. They apply to both domestically produced and imported products and may require products to come from disease-free areas, the inspection of products, the use of specified treatment or processing of products, maximum levels of pesticide residues or the use of only certain food additives. By their very nature, they restrict trade in products that do not conform to their requirements.

The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures supplements the relevant provisions of GATT 1994, including its basic national treatment provision. It recognizes the right of governments to apply measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and health and to set the level of protection they each consider appropriate but it is designed to ensure that these measures do not create unnecessary barriers to international trade. It does not apply only to agricultural products as it is, for instance, relevant to other products such as fish and forestry products.334 A distinguishing feature of the SPS Agreement is that SPS measures must be based on scientific principles. The SPS Agreement contains specific provisions with respect to the performance of assessments of the risk involved to human, animal or plant life or health. It encourages its Members to participate fully in the relevant international organizations, in particular the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and international and regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention.

Acceding governments are asked to supply full information on the measures maintained in their country, whether by the central government or by any sub-central governments. They are also asked to complete a Questionnaire,335 designed to help applicants to provide the necessary data which emphasizes the need to supply information on steps taken to ensure transparency, and a Checklist,336 to enable applicants (and Members) to verify that their measures conform to WTO rules.

The baseline Protocol commitment for sanitary and phytosanitary measures is similar to that relating to technical barriers: “The representative of [X] confirmed that [X] would apply all obligations under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures from the date of accession without recourse to any transition period.”337

Here again, the two LDCs that have acceded were accorded a transitional period allowing them to implement the SPS Agreement progressively, after providing a detailed plan of action and specific timetable for attaining full compliance with its provisions (see Annex 10).338 One developing country was granted a short transitional period to bring specific measures in line with the Agreement.339

The Protocol commitment of one small developing country contains precise obligations on transparency, opportunity for review of and comment on draft measures, non-discriminatory application of measures and training of relevant government officials.340

One acceding country accepted a commitment to notify all its SPS measures within 30 days of accession.341 In only one case has an acceding government committed itself to reviewing its SPS measures, harmonizing them with international standards and reporting annually on progress until their standards were in conformity with WTO requirements.342

A number of Working Party Reports contain commitments on specific issues discussed in their Working Party. For example, three acceding countries have accepted an additional commitment not to require additional certification or sanitary registration for products which have been certified as safe for human use and consumption by recognized foreign or international bodies.343 The other particular issues addressed in Protocol commitments include: elimination of unnecessary inspections of, and national treatment for imported meat, abolition of a prohibition on the use of powdered milk by industrial users of dairy products344 and removal of a ban on imports of live swine345. Some Members have obtained commitments relating to particular shelf-life measures that they consider to be restrictive, arbitrary, non-transparent and not consistent with relevant international standards.346

Only one Working Party Report contains very detailed Protocol commitments relating to SPS measures. These commitments followed a request of some Members that an Action Plan be provided by the acceding country concerned containing a timetable for bringing the SPS regime into conformity with the provisions of the SPS Agreement. This case also demonstrates, inter alia, that some Members are interested in checking applicant’s legislation to ensure that it reproduces the exact wording of WTO agreements; ensuring transparency (including the establishment of an enquiry point and, in this case, a commitment to disseminate information about its SPS regime and measures through a website); and verifying the observance of the substantive rules of the SPS Agreement.347

Trade-Related Investment Measures

The scope of this subject in this context is defined by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) that reaffirms and clarifies two sets of existing GATT obligations — those relating to domestic purchasing requirements contrary to the national treatment provisions of its Article III:4 and trade balancing requirements contrary to the obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions in Article XI:1.348 Developing country Members may deviate temporarily from these obligations to the extent that balance of payments provisions permit.349

Members have therefore sought to verify that the acceding government applies no requirements that could be construed as a prohibited TRIMs under this Agreement and to ensure that new TRIMs are not introduced.

The usual Protocol commitment in this area is: “The representative of [X] confirmed that [X] would not maintain any measures contrary to the TRIMs Agreement and would apply the TRIMs Agreement from the date of accession without recourse to any transitional period.”350

Few applicants have, in fact, been found to apply TRIMs. One recent acceder undertook an obligation to remove, upon accession, local content and sourcing requirements applied to the production of automobiles and motorcycles and a mixing regulation relating to the use of coal.351 An acceding government eliminated TRIMs during the accession process.352 Another acceding country undertook commitments to remove requirements relating to foreign exchange balancing (as well as trade-balancing), as well as to amend its industrial policy for the automobile sector and relax restrictions affecting motor vehicle producers and restrictions on investments in this sector.353

One LDC that has acceded undertook the usual Protocol commitment. The other had reviewed the relevant legislation but had not found any measures contrary to the Agreement. It agreed to notify any TRIMs subsequently uncovered as part of its initial WTO notification. It also undertook, from the date of accession, not to introduce any TRIMs unless they were in conformity with the Agreement.354

Another acceding country undertook commitments to remove requirements relating to foreign exchange balancing (as well as trade balancing), as well as to amend its industrial policy for the automobile sector and relax restrictions affecting motor vehicle producers and restrictions on investments in this sector.355

State Trading Entities

This section comes under the heading Trade in Goods and was designed to deal with the State trading provisions of GATT 1994, which regulate State-owned enterprises and other enterprises that have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges that enable them to influence imports or exports of goods. The provisions of the GATS on monopolies and exclusive service providers are dealt with in the section on Trade in Services below. See also the related section on State Ownership and Privatization above in which it is noted that a tendency is emerging of negotiating Protocol commitments which borrow language from Article XVII of GATT 1994 and applying it to enterprises that supply goods and/ or services.

WTO provisions do not prevent Members from maintaining State-owned enterprises. However, GATT 1994 rules recognize that the operation of these enterprises may create serious obstacles to trade in goods which may be price-based (e.g. created when State trading enterprises increase the resale prices of products they import more than the resale prices of like domestic products) or quantity-based (e.g. when they restrict the quantity of products imported). The basic principles behind the GATT rules are that such enterprises are to operate solely in accordance with commercial considerations and that notifications are required to ensure that their operations are transparent.356 Applicants are therefore asked to complete the standard notification on State trading enterprises covered by Article XVII. This requests governments to list any State trading enterprises, to state the reason and purpose for introducing and maintaining each of these, to describe their functioning, and to provide relevant statistical information.357

Corresponding obligations in the area of services358 are similar in some respects and the basic principles are the same but the terminology used and the specific obligations differ. For instance, the corresponding services provision is entitled ‘Monopolies and Exclusive Service Providers’ and its provisions on non-discrimination reflect the different approaches to this subject taken in the area of goods on the one hand and the area of services on the other.359 However, Working Parties have often dealt with goods and services under this heading and applied wording drawn from the WTO provisions on goods to both goods and services.

The wording of Protocol obligations varies but the following text is representative of recent common practice: “The representative of [X] confirmed that his government would apply its laws and regulations governing the trading activities of State-owned enterprises and other enterprises with special or exclusive privileges in full conformity with the WTO Agreement, in particular Article XVII of GATT 1994 and the Understanding on that Article and Article VIII of the GATS and would notify any enterprise falling within the scope of Article XVII.”360 A number of Working Party Reports use the term ‘State trading enterprises’ rather than ‘State-owned enterprises’.361

Some Protocol commitments also state that the acceder would ensure conformity with the obligations relating to non-discrimination and the application of commercial considerations in the sale and purchase of State traded commodities.362

One of the LDCs to have acceded accepted a standard Protocol commitment. The other confirmed that the operations of the enterprises to be retained as State-owned were consistent with the provisions of GATT Article XVII, “and that no new privileges in terms of Article XVII would be granted to these or other entities”.363

Most Protocol commitments in this area are phrased in general terms but some others deal with specific issues that have been raised in Working Parties. Two acceders undertook a number of specific obligations in this area. Both agreed to ensure that no price increase by State trading enterprises would result in protection beyond that allowed in their Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods, and not otherwise justified under WTO rules.364

Free Zones, Special Economic Areas

The GATT 1994 does not deal with free zones as a separate topic and so has not adopted a standard terminology. Documentation submitted by applicants refers to free zones and free economic zones but also uses other terms such as special economic areas, free ports, industrial zones, high-tech parks, export zones and export processing zones. Assistance provided to minority autonomous regions and other areas of economic poverty has also been dealt with in one Report under this heading.365

The main point that these entities have in common is that they are “parts of the territory of the country concerned where any goods introduced are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being outside the customs territory”.366 Governments may also provide incentives for producers that locate in these zones.

Acceding governments are expected to provide information on regulations and incentives pertaining to existing zones and/or concrete plans to establish such zones in the future. Members will want to ascertain that goods manufactured and subsequently sold within the ordinary customs territory of the acceding government, will be subject to the duties and taxes normally levied on imported products. They are also concerned that new Members should not use prohibited subsidies as incentives to locate in its export processing zones and about the enforcement of WTO rules on TRIPS.

The main elements of Protocol commitments are as follows: “The representative of [X] stated that [X] would administer free zones or special economic areas established in its territory in compliance with WTO provisions, including those addressing subsidies, TRIMs and TRIPS, and that goods produced within the zones under tax and tariff provisions that exempt imports and imported inputs from tariffs and certain taxes would be subject to normal customs formalities when entering the rest of [X] , including the application of tariffs and any taxes and charges.”367

A few acceders have also agreed to ensure that existing or draft laws and regulations are brought into line with this commitment.368 One accepted commitments relating to the uniform implementation of its policy throughout its customs territory, the provision of detailed notifications and the application of WTO provisions on non-discrimination and national treatment in special economic areas.369

Barter

This is trade by exchange of goods for goods (or goods for services) and is also called counter trade.

Accession Working Parties have not concerned themselves with private-sector barter transactions. WTO Members want to find out if governments of acceding countries have concluded any trade agreements which provide for barter transactions and, if so, whether these contain binding commitments to import or export specified products or merely indicative targets. They may question the consistency of such binding commitments with the most-favoured-nation clause, since it can be argued that these reduce access to the market for other countries.

Only six Working Party Reports have a section dealing with this subject370 and only one contains a Protocol commitment, in which the acceder concerned undertook “upon accession, [to] eliminate or bring into conformity with the WTO Agreement all special trade arrangements, including barter trade arrangements, with third countries and separate customs territories, which are not in conformity with the WTO Agreement”.371

Government Procurement

In the context of trade in goods, GATT 1994 defines government procurement as procurement by government agencies of products purchased for government purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale. The GATS definition substitutes the word ‘goods’ with the word ‘services’.

It is generally agreed that laws, regulations and requirements regulating government procurement are excluded from the rules of the multilateral trading system.372 While the subject of transparency in government procurement was the subject of work in the WTO following the Singapore Ministerial Conference, no consensus was reached at the Doha Ministerial Conference on further action to be taken on the subject and the subject has effectively been dropped from the organization’s agenda.373

A plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement is, however, annexed to the Agreement Establishing the WTO. Parties to the Agreement on Government Procurement agree to grant national treatment to products imported from other members of the Agreement but only if they are purchased by entities on a list that they have negotiated with other members. Acceders must negotiate their own entity list. Accession to plurilateral agreements is governed by the provisions of each of these agreements.374

Government procurement contracts characteristically represent a significant percentage of GNP and applicants are expected to provide information about their government procurement practices, including their general legal regime and procedures for tendering, dealing with tenders and award of contracts. Some Working Party members are interested in access to the market that the procurement contracts open up. Applicants can therefore expect questions about their practices in the Working Party designed to obtain full information on the subject.

Some Members have also asked applicants to accept commitments regarding accession to the Agreement on Government Procurement. An early acceder undertook a Protocol commitment to “ seek observer status in the Committee for the Agreement on Government Procurement at the time of its accession with a view to initiating negotiations for membership thereafter”375 and a standard Protocol commitment emerged soon thereafter: “The representative of [X] stated that [X] would initiate negotiations for membership in the Government Procurement Agreement upon accession by tabling an entity offer at that time. He also confirmed that, if the results of the negotiations were satisfactory to [X] and the signatories of the Agreement, [X] would complete negotiations for membership in the Agreement by [date]”. Seventeen acceders have accepted such a commitment, or commitments that are variations on the same theme.376 The main variations concern the date by which they expect to complete their negotiations for membership of the GPA. Most of the commitments insert a certain date, which is normally about one year after the date of their accession to the WTO, but which in one case was as little as three months377. Several commitments insert a period of time of one or, in one case, two years rather than a specific date.378 One commitment provides for early accession, the exact timing of which would depend on the date by which the necessary government laws were enacted.379

In only one case does the commitment simply provide that the [acceder] would “initiate negotiations for membership of the GPA by tabling an Appendix 1 offer as soon as possible”. In this case, the [acceder] also entered into a commitment that, until it became a member of the GPA, it would provide transparency and would provide most-favoured-nation treatment, i.e. if a procurement was open to foreign suppliers, all foreign suppliers would be provided with equal opportunity to participate in that procurement.380

As provided in the Guidelines for their accession, the two LDCs that have acceded have opted not to have a Protocol commitment on this subject.381 No commitment was asked of another acceder, whose representative had “noted that this plurilateral agreement had not been drawn up with the situation of very small developing countries, such as [his own], in mind. Few, if any, [of its] government contracts would be covered due to the value thresholds applied under the Government Procurement Agreement. Moreover, large contracts were often implemented in the context of economic aid programmes, which would be covered by the procurement rules of the organizations concerned”.382

Transit

Transit can be of vital importance to some countries, for instance those that are land-locked. The WTO recognizes this: the relevant provision contains a careful definition of traffic in transit and provisions to ensure freedom of transit.383

Information should be provided on procedures and requirements relating to the transit of goods through the customs territory in the light of the provisions of Article V of the GATT 1994 (freedom of transit).

One applicant described in some detail the steps that it had taken to modify its provisions on transit with a view to ensuring freedom of transit as required by GATT 1994.384

The geographical configuration of some countries is such that an extensive discussion of transit rules is unnecessary.

Only nine Working Party Reports contain Protocol commitments on this subject. The baseline wording is: “The representative of [X] confirmed that his government would apply its laws and regulations governing transit operations and would act in full conformity with the provisions of the WTO Agreement, in particular Article V of GATT 1994.”385 One Report adds: “In this regard, he stated that [X] would not deny right of transit to exports from any country.”386

Agricultural policies

In many respects the rules of the multilateral trading system apply equally to agricultural and non-agricultural products. most-favoured-nation treatment and national treatment are to be accorded to agricultural products in the same way as other products. The rules on customs valuation or technical barriers to trade apply to all products. The commitments accepted by acceders analysed above also normally relate to all products, including agricultural products. However, agriculture is special and the Agreement on Agriculture lays down rules that apply only to agricultural products, which it defines (in its Annex 1) as all products in Chapters 1 to 24 of the Harmonized System, less fish and fish products, plus a short list of other products. It should be noted that forestry products are not considered to be agricultural products for the purposes of the Agreement on Agriculture.387 Under the Agreement WTO Members converted their non-tariff measures into tariffs388 and reduced their tariffs, domestic support measures and export subsidies. If there is a conflict between the Multilateral Trade Agreements and the Agreement on Agriculture, the provisions of the latter prevail.389

Applicants are asked to provide information of their policies affecting imports and exports of agricultural products. These are: customs duties; non-tariff measures such as quantitative restrictions; domestic support measures; and export subsidies.390 The agricultural sector is important to many WTO Members and applicants must expect their policies in this sector to be the subject of a thorough verification and review in their Working Parties.

Factual information on agricultural measures will have been obtained under other headings dealt with above, such as: customs duties; tariff-rate quotas; tariff exemptions; prohibitions, quotas, import licensing procedures; technical barriers to trade; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; State trading enterprises, etc. The Protocol commitments on these subjects normally relate to both agricultural and non-agricultural products. The negotiations for tariff bindings, which are conducted bilaterally, also relate to both agricultural and non agricultural products. These are the subject of section 3.1 below. The examination of agricultural support programmes and the elaboration of commitments on domestic support and export subsidies for the most part take place plurilaterally in informal groups of representatives with an interest in the subject, rather than in the Working Parties. They are dealt with in section 3.2 below.

Discussions of agricultural policies in Working Parties therefore address any issues not dealt with under other headings and provide an opportunity for a multilateral review of developments in the negotiations on agriculture. In addition, each Working Party must approve the resulting commitments for inclusion in the Goods Schedule.

In one Report, a Protocol commitment records the fact that the acceder will bind all tariffs applied on imports of agricultural products.391 A few Working Party Reports contain Protocol commitments to eliminate all WTO-inconsistent non-tariff measures on agricultural products, to conform to WTO obligations392 or to eliminate specific measures.393 A few Working Party Reports also contain Protocol commitments on agricultural domestic support and export subsidies. Some of these simply note the fact that the acceder has undertaken such obligations in its Goods Schedule.394 One Working Party agreed that the applicant should be treated as a developing country for the purposes of a provision relating to domestic support395 and a compromise commitment on the de minimis level was recorded in the Working Party Report of another country.396 The Protocol commitment of one country accorded a transitional period for the implementation of its domestic support commitments.397

Finally, one country entered into commitments relating to: the linkage of import policies for agriculture with domestic production policy; administrative guidance which could have the effect of influencing the quantity and composition of agricultural imports; export subsidies; and notification of fiscal and other transfers by State-owned enterprises in the agricultural sector (whether national or sub-national).398

Trade in Civil Aircraft

Members of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft bind their customs duties on civil aircraft and parts at zero in their Goods Schedules and accept the Agreement’s provisions limiting trade-distorting subsidies. Its dispute settlement provisions are inoperative as they foresee recourse to the dispute settlement provisions of GATT 1947 which are no longer in force. The Agreement is a plurilateral agreement, accession to which is governed by its own provisions and not by the provisions governing accession to the Agreement Establishing the WTO and its Multilateral Trade Agreements.399

Applicants are asked to provide information on import duties and taxes applicable to the importation of aircraft and parts and major producers of these products are interested in access to markets for their products.

Eight of the acceders accepted a Protocol commitment to join the Agreement on Civil Aircraft upon accession400. The wording in this case is usually very straightforward: “The representative of [X] confirmed that [X] would become a signatory of the Agreement on Civil Aircraft upon accession to the WTO.” Four of these confirmed in addition that they would implement the Agreement without exceptions or transitional period.

Two undertook to “initiate negotiations for membership in the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft immediately after accession to the WTO” without specifying a time-frame and confirmed that its Schedule of Concessions on Goods establishes duty free treatment for products used in civil aircraft.401 One country agreed to “become signatory to the Agreement on terms and conditions acceptable to it and the other parties to that Agreement within a reasonable period of time, but in no case later than the date on which it accords duty-free treatment on the products covered by the Agreement to another country which has become a signatory to the Agreement.”402 Another acceding country said that it “will become an observer to the Agreement upon accession and will join within three years of accession”.403

One acceding country’s Protocol commitment is of a different type, confirming that it “would not impose any provisions of offsets or other forms of industrial compensation when purchasing civil aircraft, including specified types or volumes of business opportunities.”404

In accordance with the Guidelines, the two LDCs that have acceded opted not to join the Agreement.

Textiles and Clothing

For many years, a series of Agreements negotiated within the framework of GATT 1947 permitted importing Members to conclude bilateral agreements with exporting countries imposing discriminatory quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing that were disrupting their markets. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing annexed to the WTO Agreement reintegrated this sector into the multilateral system by providing that all quantitative restrictions maintained under these bilateral agreements would be phased out by 1 January 2005.405 The normal GATT remedies of anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard measures have been available if problems arise in this sector.

Applicants whose exports of textiles and clothing were under restriction had an interest in becoming a Member of WTO during the lifetime of the Agreement so that its provisions could be made applicable to their restricted exports. Six acceders concluded Protocol commitments in their accession Working Party Reports providing that the quantitative restrictions on imports maintained by WTO Members on textiles and clothing originating in their territories will be phased out over a ten-year period from the date of their accession to WTO.406

 

Notes:

316. GATT 1994 Article XVI, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measuresback to text
317. For the complete text of the definition see Agreement on Subsides and Countervailing Measures, Article 1.1back to text
318. Panama, para 63; Bulgaria, para 57. back to text
319. Nepal, para 88; Chinese Taipei, paras 106, 113 and 116; China, para 174; Lithuania, para 104; Croatia, para 111; Jordan, para 131; Mongolia, para 23; Viet Nam, para 276 et seq. back to text
320. Tonga, para 115; Saudi Arabia, para 189; Nepal, para 89; Cambodia, para 122; Armenia, para 119; Moldova, para 109; Lithuania, para 104; Croatia, para 111; Oman, para 88; Albania, para 94; Georgia, para 92; Jordan, para 131; Estonia, para 88; Latvia, para 77. back to text
321. China, para 173, Protocol I.10. For a similar commitment, see Viet Nam, para 288. back to text
322. China, para 171. back to text
323. WTO document WT/ACC/8back to text
324. Viet Nam, para 303; Saudi Arabia, para 205; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 145; Armenia, para 136; Chinese Taipei, para 127; China, para 197; Lithuania, para 113; Croatia, para 122; Oman, para 97; Albania, para 104; Georgia, para 100; Jordan, para 140; Estonia, para 98. back to text
325. Viet Nam, para 303. back to text
326. Shelf-life standards: Saudi Arabia, para 201; Oman, para 103; Jordan, para 145. See also Section on SPS below. Registration and initial imports of chemical products, procedures to obtain and apply safety marks, unified non-discriminatory legislation applied to automobiles and parts, safety and quality licence system for boilers and pressure vessels: China, para 196. Definition of whisky: Chinese Taipei, para 126 bisback to text
327. Jordan, para 137. back to text
328. Moldova, para 124. back to text
329. China, para 187, Protocol I.13. back to text
330. Tonga, paras 117 and 119. back to text
331. Armenia, para 136; China, para 180. back to text
332. Cambodia (two years), para 131; Nepal (two years nine months), para 98. back to text
333. China, paras 180, 184, Protocol I.13.4(b); Moldova, para 124; Georgia, para 99; Jordan, para 137. back to text
334. Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1, para 2back to text
335. WTO document WT/ACC/1, Annex 5. back to text
336. WTO document WT/ACC/8back to text
337. Tonga, para 126; Chinese Taipei, para 137; Lithuania, para 122; Oman, para 105; Albania, para 108; Georgia, para 107; Estonia, para 98; Latvia, para 88; Bulgaria, para 64. Some Working Parties have elaborated on the theme without changing the basic thrust of the commitment: Viet Nam, para 328; Saudi Arabia, para 224; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 153; Armenia, para 143; China, para 200; Moldova, para 125; Croatia, para 135; Jordan, para 151; Kyrgyz Republic, para 103. back to text
338. Cambodia (three years), para 142; Nepal (two years nine months), para 107. back to text
339. Jordan, paras 145, 148 and 149. back to text
340. Tonga, para 126. back to text
341. China, Protocol I.14. back to text
342. Kyrgyz Republic, para 100. back to text
343. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 153; Kyrgyz Republic, para 103; Bulgaria, para 64. back to text
344. Jordan, para 149. back to text
345. Chinese Taipei, para 135. back to text
346. For example, Viet Nam, paras 315 and 316. back to text
347. Saudi Arabia, paras 207, 208, 210, 212, 215, 216, 218, 222, 223 and 224. back to text
348. For details, see the illustrative list of TRIMs which is annexed to the Agreement. back to text
349. Agreement on TRIMs, Article 4back to text
350. Tonga, para 130 (also states tha Tonga’s laws would implement this commitment); Saudi Arabia, para 226; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 155; Armenia, para 144; Croatia, para 137; Oman, para 107; Albania, para 110; Georgia, para109; Jordan, para 98; Latvia, para 90. For a variation, see Viet Nam, para 332; Chinese Taipei, para 141. back to text
351. Chinese Taipei, para 140. back to text
352. Viet Nam. back to text
353. China, paras 203 to 207, Protocol I.7.3. back to text
354. Cambodia, para 144; Nepal, para 109. back to text
355. China, paras 203 to 207, Protocol I.7.3. back to text
356. These may be governmental or non-governmental, including marketing boards. For the full text of these provisions, see GATT 1994 Article XVII and the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of that Articleback to text
357. The questionnaire is reproduced in Annex 6.7back to text
358. The main provision in the General Agreement on Trade in Services is Article VIIIback to text
359. GATT Article III contains a general obligation to grant national treatment while GATS Article XVII makes national treatment the subject of negotiations on specific commitments. back to text
360. See for example, Tonga, para 133; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 160; Armenia, para 148; Lithuania, para 135; Croatia, para 146; Albania, para 115; Georgia, para 111; Latvia, para 93. back to text
361. Cambodia, para 149; Chinese Taipei, para 152; Moldova, para 141; Oman, para 114; Jordan, para 161; Latvia, para 93. back to text
362. Moldova, para 141; Oman, para 114; Jordan, 161; Estonia, para 103; Kyrgyz Republic, para 113; Panama, para 83; Mongolia, para 29; Bulgaria, para 69. back to text
363. Cambodia, para 149; Nepal, para 111. back to text
364. For details, see: China, paras 210, 212, 213, 215, 217, Protocol I.6; Chinese Taipei, paras 147 to 152. back to text
365. China, para 223. back to text
366. See International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (Revised Kyoto convention), June 1999, World Customs Organization, Specific Annex D, Chapter 2, Free Zonesback to text
367. Tonga, para 135; Saudi Arabia, para 228; Nepal, para 112; Cambodia, para 151; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 165; Armenia, para 150; China, para 222; Moldova, para 145; Lithuania, para 138; Croatia, para 148; Oman, para 116; Albania, para 118; Georgia, para 113; Jordan, para 164; Latvia, para 95; Kyrgyz Republic, para 115; Panama, para 77; Mongolia, para 51; Ecuador, para 61. See Viet Nam, para 339 for similar commitments. back to text
368. Viet Nam, para 339; Cambodia, para 151; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 165; Kyrgyz Republic, para 115. back to text
369. China, paras 222, 223, 225 and 227, Protocol I.2(A). back to text
370. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, paras 166 to 169; Chinese Taipei, para 168 and 169; China, para 323; Moldova, para 151; Croatia; para 149 and 150; Albania, para 120. back to text
371. China, Protocol I.4. back to text
372. See the provisions of GATT Articles III:8(a) and XVIII:2 and GATS Article XIIIback to text
373. WTO document WT/L/579, para 1g, p. 3:“no work towards negotiations on [this issue] will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round”. back to text
374. Agreement Establishing the WTO, Article XII:1 and 3back to text
375. Mongolia, para59. back to text
376. Saudi Arabia, para 231; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 177; Armenia, para 153; Chinese Taipei, para 166; China, para 341; Moldova, para 150; Lithuania, para 140; Croatia, para 156; Oman, para 121; Albania, para 123; Georgia, para 117; Jordan, para 179; Estonia, para 107; Latvia, para 100; Kyrgyz Republic, para 120; Panama, para 68; Bulgaria, para 80. back to text
377. Albania. back to text
378. Saudi Arabia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (two years), Moldova, Jordan. back to text
379. Chinese Taipei. back to text
380. China, paras 339 and 341. back to text
381. See the section on WTO Rules in the Guidelines on the Accession of LDCs in Annex 4back to text
382. Tonga, para 135. back to text
383. GATT 1994 Article V, Freedom of Transit. back to text
384. Viet Nam, paras 351 to 354. back to text
385. Viet Nam, para 355; Saudi Arabia, para 235; Cambodia, para 158; Armenia, para 156; Lithuania, para 143; Croatia, para 160; Georgia, para 119; Estonia, para 109; Latvia, para 102. back to text
386. Croatia, para 160. back to text
387. Work is ongoing to refine the definition of agricultural products in the Doha negotiations. back to text
388. For a list of “measures of the kind which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties”, see Agreement on Agriculture, footnote to Article 4:2back to text
389. Agreement on Agriculture, Article 21:1back to text
390. WTO documents WT/ACC/1 and WT/ACC/4 provide guidance on the information to be provided on these subjects. back to text
391. Chinese Taipei, para 180. back to text
392. Chinese Taipei, para 180; Panama, para 86; Ecuador, para 31. back to text
393. Jordan, para 177; Ecuador, paras 41 and 48. back to text
394. Cambodia, para 164; Chinese Taipei, para 181; China, Protocol I.12.1; Moldova, para 159; Jordan, para 18. Two Reports also contain a commitment not to maintain or apply export subsidies: Viet Nam, para 366 (without prejudice to its rights and obligations arising from existing WTO rules); China, para 234 and Protocol I.12.1. back to text
395. Jordan, para 189. back to text
396. China, para 235. back to text
397. Latvia, para 109. back to text
398. China, paras 231 to 233. See also Protocol I.12. back to text
399. WTO Agreement, Article XII: 1 and 3back to text
400. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 180; Armenia, para 213; Chinese Taipei, para 223, Protocol I.5; Lithuania, para 157; Croatia, para 168; Albania, para 154; Georgia, para 125; Estonia, para 116; Latvia, para 110. back to text
401. Armenia, para 213; Moldova, para 153. back to text
402. Kyrgyz Republic, para 122. back to text
403. Oman, para 128. back to text
404. China, para 240. back to text
405. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Article 9. The Annex to this Agreement sets out its product coverage. back to text
406. Nepal, para 119; Cambodia, para 166; the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, para 192; Chinese Taipei, para 167; China, para 241; Oman, para 130. back to text

  

  

 

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